MONTHLY WARNING AND FORECAST MEETINGS FOR NOVEMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100060042-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: December 2, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
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2 December 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings
for November
1. The reports on the NIO Warning and Forecast meetings are
attached.
2. Warning highlights follow:
(1) Soviets appear resigned to at least initial
U.S. deployments, but they will increase pressure to
postpone or cause slippage in the 1984 schedule for
Western deployments. Soviet officials continue to
threaten military countermeasures against Europe and the
U.S. without clearly defining what the entire set of
measures might be. In Europe they will initiate or
continue ongoing programs that they will try to portray
as countermeasures. Soviet references to
counterdeployments affecting U.S. territory remain
undefined, yet most analysts see the most probable
response will be to deploy SLCM-equipped submarines off
the U.S. coast.
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b. USSR
Andropov's illness is not seen as life-
threatening. Nonetheless, his absence has raised
questions about his longevity and many Soviet officials
may now see him as a transitional figure. Barring
death, he will probably remain in power into 1984. Any
change in the leadership in the near future, however,
would result in a weaker General Secretary, increased
factional struggles among the Politburo leaders, and
greater immobilism in Soviet foreign policy.
c. Latin American Debts
During 1983 international cooperation avoided any
major default on debts owed by Latin American
countries. Next year, however, will see growing
political tension due to declining domestic tolerance
for the kinds of austerity imposed by. IMF and U.S.
banks. In any case, several major debtor nations will
need additional new money in 1984 to service their
obligations. There is a danger that U.S. banks, which
may either prefer more profitable investments elsewhere
or be hampered from making further loans because of
regulations governing the banking system, could provoke
a financial crisis in one or several Latin American
countries. Several Latin American countries may declare
a unilateral moratorium on interest and principal
payments due to either domestic political considerations
or the unacceptability of the terms on further loans.
d: Lebanon
Unless major progress is made in the reconciliation
talks in Geneva, the overall security situation will
probably deteriorate. Gemayel has made few compromises
on internal politics and will seek U.S. support for his
government against the Syrians. Radical pressure on__
moderate Shia leaders is increasing. The Shia are
rearming and may seek to stake their claim to a share of
power in Lebanon through increased violence and attacks
on the MNF. Additional terrorist attacks seem certain.
e. Iran-Iraq
The Iranian. war of attrition'strategy appears to be
succeeding Although Iraq has suffered no major
battlefield setbacks, the cumulative effect of the
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campaign may force Saddam to take action to expand the
scope of the war with Iran. Shifts among the Iraqi
leadership may presage an effort by Saddam.to relieve
the pressure within his government by changing the shape
of the conflict.
f. Ethiopia-Angola-Cuba
The drawdown of Cuban troops in Ethiopia is
apparently aimed at reinforcing the Cuban presence in
Angola. If this occurs, a higher-than-usual level of
fighting in Angola is likely with the possibility of a
confrontation with South Africa.
g. Guyana
A worsening economic situation seems to have set the
stage for a coup against the Burnham government.
Although Guyana has muddled through in the past, various
analytical groups insist there is less support for the
government than ever before. Only a weak and
disorganized state of the Guyanese opposition seems to
favor Burnham's survival. The army remains the key to
the future course of Guyana's politics.
h. Argentina's Nuclear Program
The announcement by the outgoing military government
of the successful development of a gaseous diffusion
process for the production of enriched uranium may be a
ploy to secure support for the fledgling nuclear program
during the transition to civilian rule. The new
Minister of Energy has called for cutting the nuclear
program. In any case, the successful production of
large quantities of nuclear fuel cannot take place
before 1985 and then only if the program proceeds
without problems. Argentina may be seeking to establish
itself as a supplier of fuel to other Latin countries.
Attachments:
As stated (h/w)
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