CNO COMMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100050026-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: October 31, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/04/21: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100050026-8
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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council 31 October 1983
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM David Y. McManis
NIO for Warning
SUBJECT : CNO Comments
As I noted some time ago, I had sent
a paper on warning and mobilization, which
was prepared for the 0 exercise, to
several individuals including the CNO.
We had discussed the relationship during
my visit with him, and he preached much of
our sermon to me. The attached response
affirms his concern about warning and is
very reassuring, insofar as it confirms
once again our direction. He is also
extremely interested in perception
management. Both subjects would be worth
discussing during your Wednesday lunch with
Admiral Watkins.
Attachment:
As stated (h/w)
cc: C/NIC
VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman)
Approved For Release 2008/04/21: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100050026-8
 Approved For Release 2008/04/21: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100050026-8
31 October 1983
SUBJECT: CNO Comments
Distribution:
Orig - DCI (w/att)
1 - SA/DCI (w/att)
1 - Executive Registry (w/att)
1 -
C/NIC
(w/att)
1 -
VC/NIC
(Mr. Waterman) (w/att)
1 -
NIO/W
(w/att)
1 - A/NIO/W (w/att)
1 - NIO/W Chron (w/o att)
Approved For Release 2008/04/21: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100050026-8
 Approved For Release 2008/04/21: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100050026-8
qP
Ser 00/30300396
14 October 1983
(C) Thank you for the recent letter that enclosed
a most interesting draft paper on National Indications
and Warning and its relationship to military
readiness. You are right in the points you make,
particularly with regard to the problem of ambiguity
and warning. Our recent war games illustrate how
critical ample warning and fast reaction are to the
successful accomplishment of maritime objectives.
(C) Clearly, force readiness alterations and
early intelligence estimates that Soviet forces have
been placed in an increased readiness posture are
essential. Information on readiness is not only
critical in national policy formulation, but also thee:.
first element in support to our forces--warning is a
force multiplier.
(C) I also agree that the warning, decision, and
action cycle needs to be stimulated and exercised. We
must, in measured steps, condition our adversaries by
routinely exercising our force readiness system. As we-
discussed, Soviet perceptions are the crucial factor;'
and I-believe -it would be an excellent topic for.
discussion between the DCI-and the-:Joint Chiefs.
Sincerely,
41)L4
AMES D. WATKINS
Mr. David Y. McManis
Admiral, U.S. Navy
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National Intelligence officer for warning (NIO/W)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
CLASSIFIED BY OPNAVINST S5512.4-58
DECLAS: OADR
Approved For Release 2008/04/21: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100050026-8