SOVIET INTENTIONS AFTER INF DEPLOYMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100050019-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 10, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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S E C R E T
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NIC #8152-83
10 November'1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Harry C. Cochran
Special Assistant for. Warning
SUBJECT Soviet Intentions-After INF Deployment
1. The Soviets have set the stage for their withdrawal from
the Geneva INF talks, perhaps in late November, for
implementation of the countermeasures they announced last May,
and for a "revision" of their position in the START
negotiations. This "revision,". which may be preceded by a
temporary recall of their START'-delegation, apparently will
demand the inclusion of British and French missiles as well as
the Pershing II's and GLCM's in a new definition of strategic
weapons., Moscow's scenario for responding to the initial INF
deployments probably rests on a calculation that serious efforts
to explore prospects for mutually acceptable arms control
agreements will be shelved by both superpowers at least until
after the U.S. elections in November 1984.
2. The Soviets have virtually written off chances that
Bonn, Rome, and London will be obliged by public pressures to
press for a postponement of initial deployments. Soviet
political strategy in the next three to six months, therefore,
will concentrate on creating conditions that will confront West
European governments with a choice between yielding to negative
public reactions and curtailing further deployments, or facing
potentially dangerous political polarization that will, at the
very least, undermine their-domestic authority. In the few weeks
that remain before INF deployments begin, Moscow can be expected
to advance new bargaining initiatives calculated to increase the
political risks and costs to NATO governments of proceeding on
schedule. Soviet objectives in manipulating the INF issue
throughout the coming year will be to alienate West European
public opinion from the U.S., deepen transatlantic divergences,
erode the political base of incumbent NATO governments, and where
possible work for their replacement by accommodationist cabinets,
and discredit the Reagan Administration's arms control, defense,
and foreign policies in a manner aimed at impairing the
President s prospects for re-election.
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3. Despite the election victory of Chancellor Kohl's
coalition last March and the subsequent failure of West European
anti-nuclear and peace movements to force their governments to
retreat from NATO's December 1979 "two-track decision" on INF,
the Soviets have tenaciously held to their assumption that West
European fears of nuclear war and concerns about U.S. intentions
in arms control negotiations would eventually result either in
policy changes or the weakening and replacement of governments
committed to INF deployment. Andropov in his 28 September
statement on Soviet-U.S. relations contrasted the "will of the
majority of the population in West European countries" with the
nefarious intentions of the U.S. and those European leaders who
are "helping the implementation of the U.S. Administration's
militarist plans." In his Pravda interview on 27 October,
Andropov claimed that Washington's responsibility for the
deadlock in the Geneva talks "is now clear...even to the most
faithful U.S. allies, and only Bloc loyalty prevents them from
acknowledging this openly." Georgiy Arbatov pontificated to Der
Spiegel in late October that, "It is risky for politicians to
ignore what is happening at the grass roots level." Old "German
hand" N. Portugalov warned in Izvestia on 26 October that by
proceeding with INF deployments, "West German leaders could
undermine and indeed totally forfeit the national consensus,"
including the "fundamental consent of the majority of the
country's population to the authorities' foreign policy,
particularly on a vital issue like safeguarding security."
Soviet media frequently call attention to West German opinion
polls that-show that over 70 percent oppose INF. Soviet
initiatives such as Andropov's offer to reduce SS-20's to about
140 launchers in the western USSR, to freeze the number of SS-
20's in eastern USSR, his pledge not to transfer these to the
west, and his hint of concessions on NATO Forward Based Systems
(FBS) were aimed primarily at influencing the outcome of the
Social Democrats' party conference on INF in mid-November. The
Soviets-seem to believe that a clear SPD repudiation of INF will
have a far-reaching impact on West European sentiment and
encourage other socialist and labor parties to follow suit.
Soviet Pre-Deployment Initiatives
4. Soviet moves before mid-December will be tailored
primarily to saddle the U.S. with sole responsibility for the
deadlock at Geneva and to undercut the political base of West
European governments committed to INF deployment.
--Andropov may sweeten his 27 October offer by
revising the level of 140 SS-20 launchers downward
to between 54 and 120 to bring the total number of
SS-20 warheads closer to the combined British-
French total of about 162;
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--Display "additional flexibility" on the FBS
issue by making specific proposals regarding the
number and types of nuclear-capable aircraft NATO
and the USSR could maintain--a number Andropov
said "could be substantially different from the
range proposed by us previously;"
--Offer to begin immediate reductions of SS-4
missiles and move forward to mid-1984 Andropov's
date for their complete elimination provided the
U.S. agrees to a moratorium on INF deployments as
long as the Geneva talks continue;
--Andropov letters to President Reagan and
other heads of NATO governments detailing
ostensible concessions, proposing a reciprocal
moratorium on SS-20 and INF deployments and urging
that NATO's "artificial deadline" be removed;
--Reiteration of Andropov's warning that "the
appearance of new American missiles in Western
Europe will make it impossible to continue the
talks now being held in Geneva," coupled with
ambiguous threats to extend the walkout to START
and MBFR negotiations;
--Sharp reminders of the three Soviet
countermeasures detailed in the Soviet
government's statement last May: termination of
the unilateral moratorium on deployment of SS-20's
in the western USSR, deployment of "additional
means" in Eastern Europe to counterbalance INF,
and measures to enhance Soviet strike capabilities
against U.S. territory;
--More explicit warnings about the
consequences for Bonn's Ostpolitik and relations
with East Germany, the USSR, and Eastern Europe,
including renewed claims that INF will violate
Bonn's treaties with Moscow and East Berlin in
1970-1971 and possibly damage West Berlin's
welfare and security. Honecker warned Kohl in
mid-October of a "new ice age" in relations
between the two Germanies;
--Threats to increase Soviet and Warsaw Pact
defense budgets and to deploy what the May
statement described as "corresponding new
strategic systems."
S E C R E T
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Post-Deployment Initiatives
5. The Soviet walkout from the INF talks may occur before
initial, deployments begin. The Soviets might dramatize West
Germany's crucial role by breaking off the talks immediately
following the Bundestag debate on INF on 21 November. On the
other hand, the Soviets may prefer to withhold their walkout
until the first missiles are actually emplaced in West Germany.
Moscow's timing probably wil be strongly influenced by the
outcome of the Social Democrats' conference on INF. The Soviet
scenario will be orchestrated to magnify the expected negative
public reactions in Western Europe to initial deployments, with
the immediate aim of maximizing pressure on these governments to
halt or curtail further deployments.
6. Moscow will move promptly-to execute the three
countermeasures announced last May:
--It probably will convey the impression that
termination of the unilateral moratorium on SS-20
deployments in the western USSR will be followed
by an open-ended expansion of the SS-20 force
targeted on Western Europe. It seems possible
that Moscow's priority interest in promoting a
political rapprochement with China will lead the
Soviets to declare that present SS-20 strength in
eastern USSR will not be increased as long as
"there are no substantial changes in the strategic
situation in the Asian region," as Andropov put it
on 27 October. He added that, "This means
primarily that the U.S. does not deploy new
medium-range nuclear means in regions from which
they could reach the eastern part of the USSR's
territory."
--SS-21, SS-22, and/or SS-23 missiles will be
deployed promptly in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. The Ministry of Defense announced
on 24 October that preparations were under way to
deploy "operational-tactical" missiles in the two
countries as part of "planned countermeasures."
--The Soviets have practiced calculated
ambiguity in discussing the third category of
countermeasures--those affecting U.S. territory.
This evasiveness may reflect uncertainty or even
disagreement within the leadership in assessing
probable U.S. reactions to a spectrum of
options. This circumspection, however, may simply
be a product of prudent concern to avoid
telegraphing specific moves so far in advance. In
dealing with what they perceive to be an
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unpredictable U.S. Administration, the Soviets
obviously have strong incentives to preserve the
advantage of surprise and to deny Washington the
time and opportunity to take preemptive action.
On the cautious, non-provocative end of the
spectrum, the Soviets may confine their
countermeasures against U.S. territory to moving
SSBM patrol zones closer to the Atlantic and
Pacific coasts. Higher-risk, potentially
provocative options include the deployment off
U.S. coasts of depressed trajectory submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on
submarines and/or surface ships. Whatever
measures the Soviets select, they probably will
characterize them as "new systems" with the
capability to place the U.S. under what General
Nikolai Chervov has described as the "ten-minute
threat" which he states the Pershing II's will
pose to Moscow.
7. These three military countermeasures will be accompanied
by a variety of political and economic initiatives designed to
dramatize Moscow's repeated warnings that INF deployment will
plunge the world into a dangerous arms race that, in Arbatov's
words, "can be even worse than the Cold War." Andropov charged
on 28 September that the Reagan Administration's plans to deploy
"more and more new weapons systems" may "altogether fundamentally
overturn notions of strategic stability and of the very
possibility of effectively limiting and reducing nuclear arms."
8. Soviet measures to heighten fears in the West of a new
Cold War are likely to include:
--Recall of Soviet delegations to START and
MBFR to Moscow for indefinite "consultations;"
--Cosmetic increases in Soviet and Warsaw Pact
defense budgets and ostentatious measures to
strengthen the readiness postures of their armed
forces;
--Initiatives aimed at deepening political
polarization in West Germany, including at least
token curtailment of contacts and trade between
the two Germanies;
--Token or symbolic restrictions on East
European political and economic contacts with the
West;
--Ambiguous and noncommittal warnings that the
new situation in Central Europe created by INF
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deployments cannot fail to affect West Berlin's
security and welfare. It seems unlikely, however,
that the Soviets and East Germans will actually
take concrete steps that would jeopardize the 1971
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.
9. In the Soviet scenario, military and political-economic
countermeasures will provide the backdrop for a major initiative
demanding a redefinition of the weapons systems covered by the
START negotiations. The Soviets will not propose that the INF
issue, be combined with START and they will reject any Western
initiative to integrate the two sets of negotiations. Andropov's
blunt statement that INF deployment "will make it impossible to
continue" the INF talks-reflects Moscow's fundamental position
that it will refuse to acknowledge that deployment of any
Pershing II's and GLCM's is justified as a means of redressing an
imbalance in intermediate range systems in Europe. Arbatov has
dismissed the idea of combining INF and START as nothing more
than a "variant attempt to compel us to accept American missiles
and...to give them our blessing in one way or another."
10. The new Soviet proposal, which may be surfaced within a
few weeks after the Soviets withdraw from the.INF talks and apply
their countermeasures, will redefine START in a way calculated to
turn the tables on NATO by tacitly accepting British and French
claims that their missiles constitute national strategic
deterrents and, as such, are not covered by the INF negotiating
framework. Using this same logic, the Soviets also will insist
on defining Pershing II's and GLCM's as strategic weapons because
of their capability to strike targets in the USSR. Under this
definition, Moscow may claim that its intermediate range missiles
deployed within the Soviet Union fall into the category of
regional systems because they cannot reach U.S. territory.
11. The Soviet leaders, of course, would anticipate an
immediate rejection of this proposal by the U.S. and its NATO
allies. They would then counter by playing the "card" created by
their countermeasures against U.S. territory. This "fallback"
position would offer to include ballistic missile submarines and
cruise missile ships and/or submarines stationed off U.S. coasts
in a comprehensive package deal that would require major
reductions or elimination of all INF weapons, British and French
missiles, and FBS systems in exchange for reciprocal reductions
or removal of the Soviet submarine/surface force off U.S.
coasts. To "sweeten" this package, the Soviets at some point
probably would magnanimously renew their offer to reduce the SS-
20's targeted on Western Europe to a level equal to that of the
combined British and French missile force and to eliminate
completely their SS-4 missiles in 1984-85, as Andropov proposed
on 27 October in exchange for a renunciation of INF deployment.
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Conclusions
12. This Soviet scenario combining military and political-
economic countermeasures with new strategic arms control
proposals will represent Moscow's most ambitious political
warfare offensive against the West since the attempt to block
West German rearmament and entry into NATO in the mid-1950's.
The Soviets are confident that it will generate debilitating
disarray and divisiveness in West European politics, widen
transatlantic divergencies, and confront the U.S. with an
unprecedented challenge to its leadership of the Western
alliance.
13. The coming Soviet offensive also represents the
culmination of strenuous efforts over the past three years to
achieve two fundamental objectives:- First, the Soviets are
determined to nullify the threat INF deployments pose to their
nuclear and conventional superiority in Europe and, as a
consequence, to their capability to intervene militarily in
Eastern Europe if necesary, and to deny.NATO the capacity to
capitalize on internal crises in the Bloc and to deter Soviet
intervention to protect its strategic glacis. The Soviets have
long viewed unchallenged hegemony in Eastern and Central Europe
as the keystone of their internal security as well as their
global status as a superpower. The campaign against INF
therefore involves the highest geopolitical and strategic stakes
in the entire Soviet global outlook and makes imperative the
commitment of all the resources at their command to protect these
vital interests.
14. Secondly, the Soviets have interpreted the Reagan
Administration's foreign and defense policies as a serious
challenge to their interests and pretensions as.a superpower, and
one that requires a decisive rebuff. In particular, the Soviets
have been determined to defeat what they perceive to be the
Administration's crucial challenge, namely, confronting them with
an inescapable choice between agreeing to major reductions in
Soviet strategic weapons or coping with a major American military
buildup. The significance of the President's statements during
the 1980 election campaign were not lost on the Soviet leaders.
Given this definition by President Reagan of the key issue in
Soviet-U.S. relations, the Soviets have seen INF both as a
dangerous challenge to their global geopolitical position and as
an opportunity to inflict a decisive rebuff on U.S. influence,
prestige, and credibility.
15. The final countdown to INF deployment against the
backdrop of Soviet-American recriminations over the shootdown of
Flight 007 has brought Soviet policy to a crucial turning
point. If the drive to block full INF deployment in the next few
years fails, the Soviets genuinely fear that this defeat will
result in an irreversible shift in the global balance of forces
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against them. If, on the other hand, the campaign succeeds in
frustrating full deployment and in alienating Western Europe from
the U.S., the Soviets believe this outcome will produce an
unprecedented crisis in the Atlantic Alliance that will lead over
the next decade to a decisive geopolitical realignment, drawing
Western Europe gradually into greater political, economic, and
security dependence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
16. The outlook for the coming year therefore is for
relentless Soviet political and military pressures on the
Atlantic Alliance dominated by a protracted test of wills between
the Soviet Union and the U.S. In this trial of strength and
political stamina, the Reagan Administration has been assigned
the role of the "heavy." Andropov's political strategy and
stage-managing were clearly exposed in his ostentatious statement
on 28 September assessing "the course pursued in international
affairs by the current U.S. Administration." "If anyone," said
Andropov, "has any illusions about the possibility of an
evolution for the better in the present American Administration's
policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all. The
Administration is going so far for the sake of achieving its
imperial objectives that one cannot help doubting whether any
restraints at all exist for Washington to prevent it from
crossing a line before which any thinking nuaht to
stop." Soviet officials solemnly informed in
early October that this judgment was final y precipi ate by the
U.S. Administration's political exploitation of the Korean
airliner tragedy, but was also the consequence of what the Soviet
leaders see as a long history of American unwillingness to accept
the changing "correlation of forces" in the world.
Harry C. Cochran
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NIC #8152-83
10 November 1983
SUBJECT: Soviet Intentions After INF Deployment
Distribution:
Orig
DCI
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DDCI
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Executive
Director
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SA/DCI
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Executive
C/NIC
Registry
1
VC/NIC (Mr. Meyer)
1
VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman)
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NIO/W
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A/NI0/W
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NIO/W Chron
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NIO/W Subject File
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