PROPOSED BOOK REVIEW FOR PUBLICATION IN STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100050010-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
January 4, 2017
Document Release Date:
April 21, 2008
Sequence Number:
10
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 17, 1983
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
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Body:
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17 November 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Editor, Studies in Intelligence
David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT Proposed Book Review for Publication in
Studies in Intelligence
1. The attached review of Robert Jervis' 1976 book,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics has become
particularly timely again as world events such as the Korean Air
Lines Flight 7 shootdown demonstrate a vastly different view of
the world among nations. It should be highlighted to
intelligence analysts.
2. Recommend this review be published in an early issue of
Studies in Intelligence.
Attachment:
As stated (h/w)
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A REVIEW OF PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ROBERT JERVIS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
1976, 445pp.
THERE ARE FEW EVENTS IN RECENT HISTORY THAT HAVE
CRYSTALLIZED PUBLIC OPINION AS THE SHOOTDOWN OF KOREAN AIR LINES
FLIGHT 007. THE UNFOLDING OF THOSE EVENTS TOOK A CIRCUITUOUS
PATH OF UNDERSTANDING FOR MANY PEOPLE WHO HAVE SINCE REALIZED,
PERHAPS SOME FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE THE
WORLD MUCH DIFFERENTLY THAN THE U.S. PERCEIVES THE WORLD.
WHATEVER THE SPECIFIC REASON FOR SHOOTING DOWN A DEFENSELESS
CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT, THE GENERALIZED REASON LIES IN A DIFFERENCE OF
SOCIETIES AND A ZENOPHOBIC PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD EMBEDDED IN A
BUREAUCRACY LADEN WITH RULES TO MEET MOST SITUATIONS. THE
CIRCUMSTANCE POINTS OUT WITH GREAT DEFINITION THAT PERCEPTION IS
AS MUCH A FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS IT IS IN PERSONAL
RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH NOT NEW, THIS VOLUME BY ROBERT JERVIS FILLS
THE BILL AS A WAY TO BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND PERCEPTIONS OF PEOPLE AS
DECISION MAKERS IN AN INTERNATIONAL SENSE.
THIS EXCELLENT BOOK SHOULD BE REQUIRED READING FOR EVERY
INTELLIGENCE ANALYST. IT COMBINES A SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, HISTORY, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN A
WAY THAT MAKES IT CLEARLY UNDERSTANDABLE WITH SUBJECTS THAT
RELATE DIRECTLY TO INTELLIGENCE INTERESTS.
ROBERT JERVIS USES TOPIC SENTENCES, SUMMARIES, AND LISTED
CONCLUSIONS TO MAKE HIS POINTS EASY TO UNDERSTAND. EXAMPLES
ABOUND THAT ILLUSTRATE IN A STARK WAY THE PROCESS OF HUMAN
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PERCEPTION AND HOW THAT HUMANITY IS TRANSFERRED TO RELATIONS
BETWEEN NATIONS.
THIS VOLUME HAS DIRECT IMPACT ON WARNING. IT EXPLAINS FROM
MANY PERSPECTIVES WHY INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE CAN PROVIDE A CORRECT
ASSESSMENT THAT IS NOT CORRECTLY PERCEIVED BY THE DECISION
MAKER. THE PITFALLS OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS INFLUENCED BY
PERCEPTIONS ARE ITEMIZED. EVEN THE VISUAL CUES RECEIVED FROM THE
MOST GENERALLY ACCEPTED "FACTUAL" SOURCE OF INFORMATION-IMAGERY-
TAKE ON A NEW DIMENSION.
THE DISCUSSION PROVIDES FOOD FOR THOUGHT AS ONE ATTEMPTS TO
UNDERSTAND PEOPLE OF OTHER NATIONS. PROFESSOR JERVIS MAKES A
STRONG CASE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE DURING
THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF EARLY ADULTHOOD TO ANALYZE THE IMPACT ON
FUTURE DECISIONS. THIS ARGUES FOR THE SOMEWHAT FORGOTTEN
PRACTICE OF THOROUGHLY STUDYING THE BACKGROUND OF LEADERS OF
POTENTIAL ADVERSARY NATIONS. INTELLIGENCE BIOGRAPHERS--TAKE
HEART.
THE READER IS CONSTANTLY CHALLENGED BY THE LOGIC OF HIS
EXAMPLES TO ASK WHETHER A DECISION OR AN ANALYSIS HAS USED ALL
THE INFORMATION THAT IS AVAILABLE OR WHETHER ONE SUBCONSCIOUSLY
LEFT OUT FACTORS WHICH ARE IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY ARE PART OF A
CENTRAL BODY OF EVIDENCE THAT OPENS NEW THEORIES OR ANALYSES.
FOR EXAMPLE, EUROPEAN MILITARY PEOPLE DID THAT WHEN ASSESSING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CAVALRY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.
"...MANY EUROPEAN OBSERVERS ATTRIBUTED THE
INEFFECTIVENESS OF CAVALRY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL
WAR TO THE UNUSUAL TERRAIN AND THE SOLDIERS' LACK
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OF TRAINING, NUMBERS, AND LEADERSHIP. IN THIS WAY
THE EUROPEANS WERE ABLE TO AVOID RECOGNIZING THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW FACTOR THAT WOULD APPEAR IN
THEIR OWN FUTURE WARS--THE GROWTH OF FIREPOWER."
(p.302)
JERVIS HAS IMPORTANT THINGS TO SAY ABOUT ANALYZING EVIDENCE
THAT ARRIVES BIT-BY-BIT AND THE TENDENCY TO FAIL TO LOOK BACK AT
TRENDS OR TO PROJECT TO THE FUTURE. ANALYSIS IS IMPACTED MOST BY
SUDDEN EVENTS; THEREFORE, THE GRADUALLY DEVELOPING SITUATION
LOOMS MORE DANGEROUS BECAUSE WE MAY FAIL TO COMPREHEND ITS
SIGNIFICANCE.
STARK, LOGICAL, HISTORICAL EXAMPLES FILL THIS VOLUME. IT IS
A PRIMER IN PERCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND SHOULD BE REQUIRED
READING FOR ALL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS.
Assistant National Intelli nce
Officer for Warning
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