WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100020043-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 7, 2010
Sequence Number:
43
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 21, 1983
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100020043-2.pdf | 121.58 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2
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National Intelligence Council
NIC #5283-83/1
21 July 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
Community representatives and specialists met on 19 July 1983 with the
Acting NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with
the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their
views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional
concerns, I'll report further to you.
Attachment
NIC #,5283-83
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2
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NIC #5283-83
21 July 1983
WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
CIA analysts began the discussion by observing that Habre apparently was
taking time to consolidate his control in eastern Chad after recently
capturing Biltine and Arada. Once having done so he probably will move
against Faya L argeau on two fronts, from the south and the east. The NSC
representative expressed the hope that Habre would not move prematurely and
risk suffering a major defeat against the fixed and better armed
the Libyan-backed Gouk ouni forces at Fava.
CIA also noted that the outcome of the situation in Chad now hin es on
the external support that is bein ~rovi r-, 1- L 11~ si riec
~iH analysts were encouraged that, despite earlier fears, southern
an cen ra Chad are quiet and thus not distracting Habre from his northern
and eastern campaigns.
WARNING NOTE
The fighting in Chad is likely to drag on with the chances increasing of
more Libyan involvement as Habre moves north. To a large extent, the outcome
of the fighting will depend on the relative staying power of Habre's and
Goukouni's external suppliers.
ETHIOPIA-USSR
Discussion focused on indications of what may be a new phase in
Ethiopian-Soviet relations, with Mengistu moving closer to the Soviet model in
his efforts to restructure Ethiopian society and the Soviets, for their part,
probing Mengistu to see how much they can Qain from him in the wav of arracc
and facilities.
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ore an more
vie exper s are eing a ace to the Ethiopian administrative structure.
The NSC representative speculated that Soviet actions toward Ethiopia may
be part of a larger Soviet counteroffensive to head off the weakening
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2
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positions of its major African client states -- Ethiopia, Angola and
Mozambique.
Turning to recent Somali claims of a major Ethiopian invasion, analysts
agreed that the Somali government has ,exaggerated what may have been little
more than low-level insurgent forays. These forays can be expected to occur
at any time but do not presage, in the view of the intelligence community
representatives, an upsurge in Ethiopian-Somali hostilities.
ANGOLA
Community analysts agree that UNITA activity in Angola is increasing but
the situation is obscured by conflicting claims and counterclaims. Cuban
forces do not appear to be meeting UNITA head-on but they do seem to be taking
a somewhat more active role in supporting Angolan operations against the
insurgents. Cuban casualties appear to have increased somewhat in recent
months but may reflect increased UNITA targeting of Cubans rather than a
new-found Cuban aggressiveness. Although UNITA is expanding its operations
out of its traditional tribal areas, analysts do not believe that UNITA is
prepared to hit fortified Angolan military positions in areas where it does
not have local support.
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SNIPPETS
NIGERIA: The community agrees that the level of pre-election violence in
Nigeria is less than might have been expected in view of the violence that
preceded and accompanied the elections four years ago. Nevertheless, during
the 5-week election period beginning on 6 August, the danger of escalating
violence will be strong although the process itself probably will not be
derailed.
GHANA: The DIO for Africa noted that Ghana will be facing a crisis by
mil-August when it will run out of diesel fuel unless it finds new supplies.
ETHIOPIA: The DIO for Africa felt that the intelligence community needs
better information on the Ethiopian military campaign against insurgents in
Eritrea Province.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2