WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010039-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: February 28, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8 25X1
?
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC #1376-83/1
28 February 1983
THROUGH . National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT . Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa F-1
Community representatives and specialists met on 22 February 1983 with
the Acting NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated
with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel
their views have been misinterpreted, they have significant additional
concerns, I'll report further to you.
Attachment
NIC #1376-83
225X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02 : CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8
0
?
NIC #1376-83
28 February 1983
WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SUDAN-LIBYA
Community analysts do not expect Qadhafi to be deterred by his recent
setback from his longstanding goal of toppling Sudanese President Nimeiri, and
they will be watching for future sins of renewed operations
Khartoum
CHAD
provoke Qadhafi into stepping up anti-Habre operations.
The Intelligence Community is fully aware that Qadhafi's frustration over
his failure in Sudan could lead him into further adventures in Chad. The
anti-Libyan Habre government's control over the country, particularly in the
north, remains tenuous and Habre's military operations against Libyan-backed
dissidents in the north and his efforts to reclaim the Aouzou Strip could
Analysts also are concerned over Libyan contacts with Chadian dissidents
in the Central African Republic
oil prices.
NIGERIA
The impact of Nigeria's sharply declining oil revenues on the growing
economic crisis is of major concern to the Community and to policymakers.
Attached is a brief memorandum prepared for the ANIO/AF by analysts in CIA's
Office of African and Latin American Analysis discussing one aspect of
Nigeria's oil problem that is often overlooked in the continuous discussion of
ZIMBABWE
The recent detention of ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo and the government's
increasingly harsh response to dissidence in Matabeleland have ushered in what
is likely to be a prolonged period of rising tension in Zimbabwe. Analysts
are watching closely for signs that the dissidence could be moving toward
full-scale, organized insurgency, particularly if the dissidence becomes
organized around ex-ZAPU deserters from the army. The Mugabe government is
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8
?
involved as many fear.
?
divided between hardliners who advocate ruthless suppression of ZAPU and
moderates who favor reconciliation with a view toward eventual absorption of
ZAPU, into a single-party system. The potential for regional instability in
the Matabeleland crisis becomes greater if the South Africans choose to become
ANGOLA-SOUTH AFRICA
25X1
25X1
front is likely to increase in the coming weeks rather than diminish. 25X1
have hit a new high and that overall military activity on the Angola-Namibia
Regarding the military situation, there was a consensus that the recent
upsurge in SWAPO-South African military operations increases the odds against
Pretoria and Luanda agreeing on a limited disengagement in the northern
Namibia-southern Angola area. Some analysts suggested that recent SWAPO
activity may be deliberately designed to scuttle disengagement talks since
SWAPO would be the loser if any such agreement were reached. South African
casualties appear to be increasing but are still well within the "acceptable"
range. Analysts also noted that UNITA operations in central Angola appear to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02 : CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8 25X1
0
?
NIGERIA'S OIL POLICY
An important element, in addition to price, behind Nigeria's inability to
sell oil is its current marketing policy. In 1979, when the world oil market
was feeling the impact of the Iranian revolution, Lagos decided to push ahead
with a program to reduce the dominance of both the United States and Western
Europe as producers and consumers of Nigerian oil. Each purchaser of Nigerian
government oil (at that time equal to 55 percent of total production and
subsequently increased to the current level of 78 percent) was limited to
50,000 barrels per day. Preference was given to black African and other Third
World governments, such as Ghana, India, and Yugoslavia. This policy worked
initially because it was a sellers market. Most of these consumers, however,
now have serious financial problems and buy Nigerian oil only as long as its
price is competitive. In recent months, customers have been buying oil on the
spot market where prices were as much as $6 per ower than what Lagos
was charging prior to last week's price cut.
There are a number of factors that influenced the marketing strategy that
was designed in 1979. They were:
-- The government's determination to increase control over
Nigeria's oil industry by limiting the role of major
international oil companies as marketing agents. Lagos has
believed for some time that the current group of foreign
producers operating in Nigeria is determined to present a
united front against government efforts to eventually take
over all aspects of oil operations.
-- Oil was to be an instrument of Lagos' foreign policy to show
the West that Nigeria was capable of denying some oil to
countries not in agreement with Nigeria's foreign policies.
At the time the new policy was implemented, Lagos was
increasingly frustrated with what it believed to be
footdragging by the United States and other Western
governments on reaching a political settlement in Rhodesia.
The Nigerians also on occasion have suspended temporarily oil
shipments to Chad and Ghana as a sign of displeasure with
those government's policies.
-- Lagos hoped to gradually reduce the volume of Nigerian oil
going to the United States. Lagos was concerned that because
it is a leading foreign supplier of crude, it will be hit
hard by various oil conservation measures imposed by
Washington; including possible quotas on future US oil
imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8
Leonardo Neher/State
0
DISTRIBUTION:
NIC #1376-83
C/D
?
SUBJECT: WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
NSA
Maj. Harry Colestock/Air Force
Kenedon Steins/Treasury
National Warning Staff
JCS/J-5
Maj. Peter Kosmo/HQUSMC/INTP
LTC Wes Groesbeck/JTF (WLO)
Robert White/Navy
Nancy McCabe/Army
William D. Eckert/Off Vice President
C/DDO/AF
D/ALA
ALA/WED
ALA/SCD
ALA/MCD/CC
D/NPIC
NPIC/IEG
D/NESA
D/OIA
D/OCPAS
OCPAS/FLS
OCPAS/CIG
ICS/OHC
D/OCR
OCR/NEA
D/OSWR
D/OEA
D/EURA
D/ SOVA
SOVA/PA/F
SOVA/CS/C
OGI/ISID
OGI/GD/AF/LA
D/OGI
uuv
DDO
DDO
DDO~
OGI/IIC
NIO/EA
NIO/GPF
NIO/LA
NIO/NESA
NIO/SP
NIO/USSR-EE
NIO/WE
NIO/Econ
NIC/AL
NIO/AG F_
SRP
C/CA/IAD
DDI/CRES
DDI/IPC
DCI
DDC I
EXDIR
SA/DCI/IA
DDI
C/NIC
VC/NIC
NIO/W
SA/DDI/CS
DDI REG
ER
NIO/AF
-4-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
(w/att NIC #1376-83
25X1
25X1
5cys
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010039-8