LATIN AMERICA - WARNING MEETING - FEBRUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: March 8, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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J L~L 1
National Intelligence Council
NIC 1688-83
8 March 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Constantine C. Menges
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America - Warning Meeting - February 1983
1410111
El Salvador
1. The political infighting in the military has continued to have a
deleterious effect on the conduct of the guerrilla war, but the bottom line
judgment remains that the Salvadoran military will be able to maintain the
stalemate. Most analysts expect that General Garcia will resign and doubt
that current pressures from conservative politicians and military officers
will lead to a coup attempt. If Garcia refuses to step down, this would
sharpen conflicts within the military and lower its combat effectiveness.
2. The momentum could swing dramatically to the guerrilla side, however,
if US military aid to El Salvador is cut off or the US is perceived as
supporting guerrilla power-sharing. Most analysts assume that the military is
hoarding ammunition in expectation of such a cutoff, and it would be able to
maintain current levels of activity for only a few months if not resupplied.
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Suriname
3. Bouterse remains in control with a small coterie of loyalists on whom
he can rely. A new revolutionary government has been announced, drawing most
of its support and members from the radical PALU and the pro-Cuban RVP.
Analysts expect a slow "acretion" in the Cuban presence as small numbers of
security, financial, and agricultural advisers move into the country.
Bouterse apparently feels sufficiently confident in his position to travel to
New Delhi for the NAM with a possible side trip to the USSR.
4. One analyst noted that "everyone is afraid to talk to Americans"
because of the repression by the "people's militia." Concerning the
democratic opposition, there is virtually no information about its activities
in Suriname and internationally, the analysts expect mainly political
gestures. France is perceived as anxious to assure that no exile paramilitary
force crosses into Suriname from French Guiana.
5. Concerning future relations with Cuba, the State Department/INR
country analyst said, "If he (Bouterse) perceives himself internationally
isolated, then he will move more toward Cuba." CIA and DoD analysts agreed
witn that. The NIO/LA views this as an inaccurate formulation of the
situation and instead would note that once Bouterse made the decision to crush
the democratic opposition groups in December 1982 in order to retain power, he
saw the Cuban link as the best way to assure this. While Bouterse would also
like to have western economic aid, even if it were provided, he would use it
while retaining and increasing his Cuban/Soviet bloc political/security
relationships in order to keep power (following the successful example of the
Sandinista Directorate in Nicaragua).
Bolivia
6. Analysts indicated that the level of coup plotting is relatively low
by Bolivian standards, although one analyst noted little usually is known
about most successful coups before they are launched. The general assumption
is that the military is not pleased with President Siles, but is prepared to
wait until he has sufficiently discredited himself and his regime before
moving against him. And so far Siles has had difficulty managing Bolivia's
serious financial problems and controlling disparate elements within the
government coalition. On balance, analysts are more positive than last month
and expect that Siles has a good chance of remaining on top.
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7. Analysts have yet to see any large increase in the number of Soviets,
Cubans, Nicaraguans, or any radical Arab presence in the country and do not
believe they pose a serious, subversive threat to the government. DoD/ISA
noted that the military has the capability to pull off a coup, but now lacks
the will and the unity to do so. If and when the military moves against
Siles, however, Siles' non-aligned impulses and especially the decision to
reestablish relations with Cuba will be the major issue.
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Pope's Visit
He e ieves a vise wi ocus attention an some
opprobrium on the "popular Church," but doubts that much will be changed in
the long run. Several threats have been made against the Pope (Haiti and
Guatemala), but apparently nothing credible yet.
11. The views of most analysts can be summarized as follows: They see
no reason for increased concern re Duvalier's position and the stability of
the regime in general. The Hector Riobe Brigade warrants closer attention in
that it has pulled off some operations within the country (bombings) which is
much more than any other exile group has managed to date. The Brigade,
however, is small (perhaps less than a score), Miami-based, and with no known
ties to the Cubans. There have been no signs of increased Cuban support for
anti-regime activists, increased rhetoric, or any infiltration attempts.
12. However, the NI0/LA is concerned that there is some real potential
for Cuban-supported destabilization in the next 12-18 months which warrants
more attention. Drawing on the information presented in two DDI papers on
Haiti (31 January 1983 and 3 February 1983), the following items summarize
reasons for concern:
--Among 19 organized anti-Duvalier groups listed by the CIA, 8 are
Marxist-Leninist, 1 is Maoist, 3 others are also supportive of
violent action and only 2 are connected to genuinely democratic
political parties abroad (Social Democrats).
--The communist party of Haiti is funded by the Soviet Union, closely
linked to the Dominican communist party; it has leaders in France,
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic along with four-,identified front
and, auxiliary organizations.
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--The total estimated membership of three Marxist-Leninist
paramilitary groups is 550 to which could be added as a
destabilizing factor the estimated 250 members of the Maoist group.
and unknown numbers of the five communist party organizations and
three other violent anti-Duvalier groups.
--The estimated 40,000 Haitians living in Cuba (some of whom have
served in the Cuban armed forces) and the estimated 35,000 to
300,000 Haitians living in the Dominican Republic offer the far
left accessible persons for recruitment.
Briefs (NIO/LA items -- not discussed at the meeting)
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Styf TJ
Constantine C. Menges
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?
SUBJECT: MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA
DATE: 4 March 1983
1 - DC I
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - DD I
1 - DDO/EPDS
1 - DDO/PCS
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - DDI Registry
5 - NIO/W
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/EA
1 - NIO/GPF
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/AL
1 - NIO/AL (AG)
1 - NIU/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/WE
1 - NIO/SP
1 - NIU/Econ
1 - SRP
1 - SA/NPI
1 - IPC/DDI
1 - D/CPAS
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/ SO VA
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/NESA
1 - D/OCA
1 - D/OSWR
1
1 - IC
1
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