WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010010-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 14, 2008
Sequence Number: 
10
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 20, 1983
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010010-9.pdf168.53 KB
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Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9 ? ? The Director of Central Intelligence National Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence NIC #3692-83/1 20 May 1983 THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning SUBJECT Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa Community representatives and specialists met on 17 May 1983 with the Acting NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if the_v__ave significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. ---Attachment NIC #3692-83 Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9 Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9 ? ? NIC #3692-83 20 May 1983 WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SOUTHERN AFRICA Discussion on southern Africa focused primarily on collection concerns. INR opened the discussion by referring to reports that had just been received from Luanda that an additional - Cuban troops had arrived in Angola in early April without the authorization" of the Angolan government. South African press reports in March state that 7,000 Cuban reinforcements had arrived in Angola in February. The varied and often contradictory nature of the reporting on Cubans in Angola once again highlights the difficulties in obtaining reliable intellignce on this subject. Angola/USSR: Analysts took note of the warm reception accorded Angolan President dos Santos in Moscow, including a one-on-one meeting with Andropov. No details were yet available on the discussions dos Santos had with Soviet officials. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS The discussion led off with a presentation on conditions in Chad by the INR Chad analyst who-had just returned from a one-month TDY. This was followed by comments on Habre's recent unsuccessful military operations against the dissidents. The defeat of President Habre's forces in their attempt to retake Ounianga Kebir in northern Chad was regarded by Community analysts as a major setback but one that would not necessarily lead to the collapse of the Habre government over the short term. Nevertheless, prospects for Habre's government over the longer term are problematical. CIA analysts warned that Habre must make gains in the north if he is to consolidate his power, yet the northern Libyan-backed dissidents could remain in defensive 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9 Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9 0 positions there and draw down Habre's meager military resources as he attempted to defeat the dissidents. Even if the dissidents did not move south and a military stalemate resulted, Habre's position could erode. Continued uncertainty about the situation in the north could well result 1n slippage in much needed private investment and development funding, thereby threatening even further a government that already is barely functioning. Prospects for a reconciliation between northern and southern Chad are also problematical. Habre himself is highly regarded in the south but his military forces, which the government cannot afford to pay or supply regularly, prey on the local population and thus encourge local opposition. The Habre government is suspicious of French motives in Chad and believe that Paris is holding back on military and economic aid. The Nigerians also are resented for having opened hostilities on the Lake Chad border at a time when Chad is facing other challenges. -Tensions in Ghana are on the upswing. Food shortages continue to worsen and have now even begun to reach the military. Opposition to the recently announced budget is strong and has been greeted by student demonstrations and threats of strikes by Ghana's various professional groups. Upper Volta Prospects for instability in Upper Volta appear to have diminished considerably as a result of the arrest on 17 May of pro-Libyan Prime Minister Sankara and most of his leftist supporters. Kenya Analysts throughout the Community are concerned that President Moi's recent strident accusations of a Western-backed Kikuyu plot against him could further inflame the Kikuyu and prod them to take action against him. Some analysts feel tht Moi has underestimated the degree of hatred toward the Kikuyu, Kenya's dominant tribe, by the other tribal groups that Moi has been courting and that Moi's accusations could lead to serious tribal frictions that threaten internal stability. Somalia The National Security Council representative noted that construction to upgrade the military facilities at Berbera that will be used by the US is about to begin .__He feared that US personnel involved in the construction program-could be an attractive target for Libyan or Ethiopian attacks. He --expressed skepticism over the Somali government's ability to provide adequate security for US personnel. US/Africa The DI0 for Africa and the NSC representative also expressed concern over the safety of US personnel in a number of African countries. They noted disinformation campaigns in Nigeria and Ghana alleging CIA campaigns to destabilize those governments. They also cited the possibility of growing -2- SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9 Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9 0 ? problems in US-Kenyan relations stemming from Moi's accusations -- which are primarily targetted against the British but also have a slight anti-US undercurrent -- that could increase if US assistance to Kenya does not measure up to Moi's expectations. SNIPPETS Organization of Africa Unity The OAU is schedu_1_ed to hold its long-postponed summit in Addis Ababa on June 6-10 and the prospects are not good for a harmonious meeting. The controversy over the seating of-the-P` isario delegation has not been settled "out of court" and could prove as disruptive at the upcoming meeting as it was at the aborted summit meeting in Tripoli last August. Moreover, should former president Goukouni, leader of the Libyan-backed anti-Habre dissidents, appear in Addis, the session could well lapse into total disarray. Libyan leader Qadhafi's hopes to revive his claim to chair the summit may have been a motivating factor in his recent swing through Benin, Nigeria, and'Upper Volta and his renewed interest in West Africa in general. -3- SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9 Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9 Approved For Release 2008/11/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010010-9