PROPOSE PUBLIC REPORT ON SALT II SOVIET COMPLIANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00135R000701310134-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 134
• Publication Date: April 14, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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15 April 1983
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Director, Office of External Affairs
For your information, here are positive public statements by
Goldwaterflioynihan and Huddleston re the Chairman and Vice
Chairman's offer of the SSCI to review and report on Soviet
compliance with SALT II.
cc: DDCI
EXDIR
STAT
STAT
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es release
Senate Select Corgi
a Intelligence
Release Date:
April 14, 1983
PROPOSE PUBLIC REPORT ON
SALT II SOVIET COMPLIANCE
In aletter to the President today, Chairman Barry Goldwater and
Vice Chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan, of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence offered the services of the Intelligence Committee to work
with the White House in reviewing the relevant data and preparing a
bipartisan public report on Soviet compliance with'the unratified SALT II
Treaty.
In their letter to the President, the Senators expressed their
concern about the implications of recent Soviet.test activity with regard
to Soviet observance of the SALT II accord. Senators Goldwater and
Moynihan wrote that a "firm" approach with the Soviets on compliance
issues was essential to "preserve U.S. national security and to preserve
the viability of the arms control process."
Noting.that some of the media were reporting that the President
might make a highly public charge of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT II
_--Treaty, the Senators told the President, "We are confident that you
recognize the pitfalls in such a course." Senators Goldwater and Moynihan
observed that such charges would have to be supported by detailed intelli-
gence information whose release might trigger further disclosures of
information that could compromise sensitive sources and methods.
Senators Goldwater and Moynihan wrote the President:.
"We would like.to offer our services to help you keep
the United States on.the path of firm, but effective
diplomacy. The Senate-Select--.Committee-could work with
you to review available intelligence data and the results
of confidential discussions with the Soviets to determine
the facts of this test activity.- Having made this deter-
mination, we could then prepare-a public report in. such
a manner 'that sensitive sources and methods are protected,
and the bipartisan nature of this important issue would
be preserved.''
In its 1979 report to the Senate on The Capabilities
of
the United
States to Monitor the SALT II Treat , the Select Committee
on
Intelligence
.conducted a comprehensive review of Soviet compliance with
the
SALT I
accords. In accordance with the law, the Select Committee
on
Intelligence
has been kept "fully and currently informed" of all intelligence concern-
ing Soviet compliance with the existing arms control agreements. The
Committee has also kept the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and
Armed Services apprised of any significant information in this regard
which affects their mandated duties.
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SALT II Soviet Compliance
Senator Walter (Dee) Huddleston (D-KY) has issued the
following statement regarding the letter from Senators Goldwater
and Moynihan to President Reagan offering the services of the
Intelligence Committee to review relevant data and prepare a
bipartisan public report on Soviet compliance with the unratified
SALT II Treaty. Huddleston, a member of the committee, endorses
the effort by the chairman and the vice chairman.
The offer today by the chairman and vice chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee to work with the President to
review intelligence on recent Soviet ICBM activity is an
important bipartisan step towards getting to the bottom of
allegations that the Soviets have violated the unratified
SALT II Treaty. I wholeheartedly support this effort to avoid
politicizing the Intelligence Community on the vital issue of
arms control verification.
Control of strategic weapons is the greatest challenge
we face as a nation in this generation. Any agreements
reached by the United States and the Soviet Union must,
however, be verifiable. Therefore, as a member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, I have worked for many years to
ensure that our intelligence capabilities will continue to be
able to monitor Soviet behavior effectively.
I agree-completely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman,
Senators Goldwater and Moynihan, that we must be firm with
the Soviets on compliance with arms control agreements and
that these questions must be pursued vigorously in
confidential channels. I share the concern that selective
release of intelligence to promote a partisan viewpoint on
this issue could compromise highly sensitive intelligence
sources and methods.
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 1 _7_
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In 1979 the Senate Intelligence Committee issued a
unanimous report on "Capabilities of the United States to
Monitor the SALT II Treaty." That report stated that "the
Soviet Union will push to the greatest extent possible any
advantages which the provisions or ambiguities of the SALT II
Treaty might permit." Indeed, that is why we maintain a
sophisticated verification system.
The report concluded that "the United States must
expect that unanticipated Soviet activities may occur during
the course of the SALT II Treaty and be willing to raise and
aggressively pursue questions of Soviet compliance with the
Treaty in the Standing Consultative Commission." The report
noted that "the Standing Consultative Commission is a
valuable forum for resolving compliance issues, and possible
ambiguities in intelligence information and Treaty
interpretation, when the United States aggressively pursues
them."
Recent experience demonstrates that we were correct in
1979 and that it is necessary-for the-United States both to
monitor vigorously and extensively and to aggressively pursue
questions of Soviet compl-iiance. The-latest events indicate
that- the U.S. -Intelligence--Community has the- capabil-ityto
monitor Soviet- conduct in order -to -provide -the -intel-ligence
needed to challenge Soviet behavior. Now we must make the
judgment on how best to deal with the information our
capability has provided. The letter lays out the proper
course of action.
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