SENATOR MOYNIHAN'S MEETING WITH TOMAS BORGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00135R000701210001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1983
• Content Type: CABLE

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SUBJ : SENATOR-MOYNIHAN'S MEETING WITH TOMAS GORGE
2. SUMMARY: INTERIOR MINISTER GORGE TOLD SENATOR
MOYNIHAN THAT THE GRN DESIRED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. AND
HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. HE ADDED
THAT THE GRN'S RECENT CONCILIATORY MEASURES WERE NOT A SIGN
OF WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF U.S. PRESSURE BUT DEMONSTRATIONS
OF SANDINISTA STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE WITH
THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM. MOYNIHAN STRESSED THE U.S.
STRATEGIC CONCERNS ABOUT AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR AND STATED THAT
THE U.S. COULD NEVER ALLOW A RECURRANCE OF THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS. GORGE ASSURED MOYNIHAN THAT THE GRN WOULD NOT PERMIT
A SOVIET OR ANY OTHER MILITARY BASE ON ITS TERRITORY. RESPOND-
ING TO MOYNIHAN'S CALL FOR A HALT TO THE MILITARIZATION OF
THE REGION, BORGE STATED THAT THE GRN WAS READY TO ENTER INTO
AGREEMENTS DEALING WITH THE SIZE OF ARMIES AND THE SUPPLY
OF ARMS TO INSURGENTS. BORGE ALSO ESCORTED THE SEN-
ATOR TO'A LOCAL MARKET PLACE FOR A TYPICAL LUNCH. END SUMMARY.
3.'ON DECEMBER 9, SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN AND SENATE
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBER DR. GARY SCHMITT, ACCOMPANIED
BY AMBASSADOR QUAINTON, CALLED ON INTERIOR MINISTER TOMAS GORGE.
ALSO PRESENT ON THE NICARAGUAN SIDE WAS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.
ANTONIO JAROUIN, MINISTRY OF"THE EXTERIOR DIRECTOR OF NORTH
AMERICAN AFFAIRS SAUL ARANA AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FSLN'S
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT JOSE PASOS.
4. GORGE WELCOMED THE SENATOR AND SAID THAT HE HOPED THEIR
CONVERSATION WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO PROTOCOLARY NICETIES
BUT WOULD DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HE INSISTED THAT THERE
WAS A GREAT NEED FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE GRN AND
THE USG. BORGE NOTED THAT NICARAGUANS APPRECIATED THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE, IN SPITE OF THE INJURIES WHICH THE USG HAD INFLICTED
ON NICARAGUA OVER THE YEARS. MOYNIHAN RESPONDED THAT HE
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SHARED BORGE'S INTEREST IN HAVING A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION.
5. FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE PRESS CORPS, WHO HAD FILMED
THESE PRELIMINARY SESSIONS, MOYNIHAN COMMENTED ON HIS EARLIER
MEETING WITH JUNTA MEMBER SERGIO RAMIREZ, IN WHICH RAMIREZ HAD
EXPLAINED THE BASIC GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE GRN'S
DESIRE FOR DETENTE (SEPTEL). GORGE PICKED UP ON THE SECOND
POINT AND ASSERTED THAT THE GRN HAD PUT ALL THE ELEMENTS IN
PLACE FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE US: HE URGED MOYNIHAN
TO TAKE THAT MESSAGE BACK TO THE CONGRESS. GORGE EXPLAINED
THAT SOME PEOPLE WANTED PROOF THAT THE GRN WAS SERIOUS ABOUT
AN UNDERSTANDING AND HAD CHARGED THAT THE FSLN HAD FAILED
TO FULFILLL ITS PROMISES. GORGE ARGUED THAT THE FSLN HAD
NEVER GONE BACK ON ITS WORD (SIC). HE REFERRED TO THE PUNTA
ARENAS MEETING IN 1979, WHEN THE ALLEGED PROMISES WERE MADE,
AND ASSURED MOYNIHAN THAT THE NATURE OF THE REVOLUTION WAS
DISCUSSED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. THUS. THE FSLN COULD NOT
HAVE RENEGED ON PROMISES WHICH HAD NEVER BEEN MADE.
6. GORGE INSISTED THAT THE REVOLUTION HAD FULFILLED ITS
PROMISES AND WAS CONTINUING TO DO SO DESPITE AGGRESSION COM-
MITTED BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. HE STRESSED THAT THE
GRN'S RECENT CONCILIATORY GESTURES WERE NOT THE RESULT OF
U.S. PRESSURE OR U.S. TROOPS IN HONDURAS. THEY WERE MERELY
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FSLN'S LONG STANDING REVOLUTIONARY
PROGRAM. HE CITED AS EXAMPLES THE MOVEMENT TOWARD ELECTIONS
IN 1985 AND THE AMNESTY FOR MISKITO INDIANS. GORGE EXPLAINED
THAT IN 1980, THE GRN HAD ANNOUNCED ELECTIONS FOR 1985. THE
DELAY IN HOLDING ELECTIONS WAS MANDATED BY THE DESIRE TO CREATE
THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR ELECTIONS. THE RECENT ANNOUNCE-
MENTS WERE A NATURAL PART OF THIS PROCESS. SIMILARLY, THE
AMNESTY WAS,SIMPLY ANOTHER IN THE REVOLUTION'S LONG RECORD
OF ACTS OF GENEROSITY. AFTER THE REVOLUTION, THE GRN HAD
RELEASED HUNDREDS OF FORMER NATIONAL GUARDSMEN, ONLY TO HAVE
MANY OF THEM JOIN THE COUNTERREVOLUTION. AS A RESULT,
THERE HAD BEEN A PUBLIC OUTCRY TO SUSPEND RELEASES. NEVER-
THELESS, THE GRN HAD DECIDED TO GRANT AMNESTY TO THE
MISKITOS. GORGE EXPLAINED THAT THE GRN COULD AFFORD TO BE
SO GENEROUS BECAUSE IT WAS STRONG. IT HAD NEUTRALIZED THE
CONTRA THREAT, AND IT REALIZED THAT THE CIA DID NOT CON-
STITUTE A REAL DANGER TO ITS POWER.
7. GORGE MOVED ON TO THE AREA OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
ASSERTED THAT, HERE TOO, THE GRN HAD KEPT ITS WORD. THE
SANDINISTAS HAD PLEDGED TO BE NON-ALIGNED, AND GORGE
RHETORICALLY ASKED WHO SERIOUSLY COULD SAY THAT NICARAGUA WAS
A SATELLITE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
3. MOYNIHAN ADVISED GORGE THAT HE RELARDED THE AMNESTY AND
ELECTORAL PROCESS AS INTERNAL NICARAGUAN MATTERS. HE NOTE,
HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. WAS A COUNTRY GIVEN TO ELECTIONS, HAVING
HAD THEM REGULARLY FOR OVER TWO CENTRIES. GORGE INTERJECTED
THAT IN THE U.S., THE ELECTORAL PROCESS DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL
15 YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION. MOYNIHAN CORRECTED THE
COMANDANTE BY POINTING OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
WAS NOT INITIATED IMMEDIATELY, EACH STATE HAD AN ELECTED
LEGISLATURE. HE THEN STATED THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA
HAD LONG HISTORIES ABOUT WHICH THE OTHER WAS UNAWARE. THE
HISTORY OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA STUCK IN THE MINDS
OF NICARAGUANS, BUT FEW AMERICANS EVEN KNEW OF IT. THE U.S.
WAS AWARE THAT IT HAD ERRED IN ITS PAST RELATIONS WITH LATIN
AMERICA AND HAD TRIED TO MAKE CORRECTION. FOR EXAMPLE,
SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS FROM EISENHOWER TO CARTER HAD
RECOGNIZED THAT THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY VIOLATED PANAMA'S
SOVEREIGNTY AND LABORED TO HAVE IT REVISED. NOW, EVEN
THOSE WHO HAD OPPOSED THE NEW ACCORD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY
HAD BEEN WRONG.
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ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE U.S. WAS A WORLD POWER. SINCE
WORLD WAR II, IT HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDING WESTERN
EUROPE AND JAPAN. ALSO, SINCE THE ONSET OF THE NUCLEAR AGE,
THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THE U.S. HAS BEEN TO AVERT A NUCLEAR
WAR. SUCH A DISASTER ALMOST HAD OCCURRED WHEN THE SOVIETS
PUT MISSILES INTO CUBA. THE CRISIS WAS RESOLVED WHEN THE
SOVIETS WITHDREW THE MISSILES, WITH THE UNWRITTEN UNDERSTANDING
THAT CASTRO COULD REMAIN IN POWER. MOYNIHAN DROVE HOME THE
POINT THAT THE USG COULD NOT ALLOW ANOTHER SUCH CRISIS TO
ARISE, AND HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S.'S ALLIES COMPRE-
HENDED THIS.
10. BORGE ASSURED THE SENATOR THAT THE GRN HAD NEVER CON-
TEMPLATED ALLOWING SOVIET BASES IN NICARAGUA. THE SOVIETS
HAD NOT REQUESTED ANY, AND THE GRN CERTAINLY HAD NEVER PRO-
POSED IT. BORGE STATED THAT THIS IDEA HAD ORIGINATED IN THE
U.S. AND THE WAY IT KEPT REAPPEARING DESPITE NICARAGUAN
DENIALS LED HIM TO BELIEVE IT WAS A DELIBERATE ACT OF DIS-
INFORMATION BEING SPREAD TO ALARM THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.
THE GRN, AS A SIGNATORY TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, WAS
PROHIBITED FROM ALLOWING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE BASED ON ITS
TERRITORY. IT COULD ALLOW A NON-NUCLEAR SOVIET BASE, BUT
WOULD NOT DO SO SINCE IT HAD UNILATERALLY RENOUNCED ANY
FOREIGN MILITARY BASES ON ITS TERRITORY. MOYNIHAN POINTED
OUT THAT ANY SOVIET BASE, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR NOT, WOULD
BE OF GRAVE CONCERN TO THE U.S.
11. MOYNIHAN, ADDRESSING THE REGIONAL SITUATION, STATED THAT
EACH NATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA SHOULD LEAVE ITS NEIGHBORS
ALONE. HE PERCEIVED A TROUBLING PROCESS OF MILITARIZATION
THROUGHOUT THE AREA. U.S. TROOPS IN HONDURAS WOULD BE
WITHDRAWN, BUT THEY COULD EASILY RETURN AND EVENTUALLY
BECOME A PERMANENT.FIXTURE. THEREFORE, AN AGREEMENT WAS SORELY
NEEDED TO ARREST THIS DANGEROUS TREND. NICARAGUA HAD HAD ITS
REVOLUTION, AND IT WAS PREPARED TO DEFEND IT, MONNIHAN SAID,
BUT IT NEEDED TO DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY, AND COULD NOT DO SO
BY SENDING ARMS TO EL SALVADOR OR BY BUILDING A HUGE ARMY.
BORGE ASSURED THE SENATOR THAT THE GRN WOULD ACT RESPONSIBLY.
THE GRM HAD EXPRESSED ITS CONCERNS ABOUT FOREIGN MILITARY
BASES IN THE REGIONAND HAD PROPOSED THAT THEY BE BANNED.
BORGE CHALLENGED THE U.S. TO RESPOND.
12. MOYNIHAN AGREED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD RESPOND TO THE GRN'S
PROPOSALS. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY BORGE-HAD NOT BEEN
GRANTED A VISA TO VISIT THE U.S. THE SENATOR THEN MENTIONED
TWO AREAS WHICH HE FELT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN NICARAGUA AND THE
SIZE OF THE GRN'S ARMY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CUBANS
WERE NOT ORGANIZED INTO COMBAT UNITS, BUT HE AVERRED THAT
THERE WERE FAR MORE OF THEM THAN NICARAGUA NEEDED. HE
ADDED THAT THE SANDINISTAS' RAPIDLY GROWING ARMY GREATLY
DISTURBED NICARAGUA'S NEIGHBORS WHO HAD TURNED TO THE U.S.
FOR ASSISTANCE. MOYNIHAN STRESSED THAT THE GRN SHOULD
DEVELOP NICARAGUA, NOT MILITARIZE IT. HE ADDED THAT THE
U.S. FOR ITS PART SHOULD NOT THREATEN THE GRN'S SECURITY
AND COMPEL IT TO DIVERT RESOURCES FROM DEVELOPMENT TO
DEFENSE.
13. BORGE RESPONDED THAT SOME THINGS WERE DIFFICULT TO
UNDERSTAND. NICARAGUA'S REGULAR ARMY WAS NO LARGER THAN ITS
COUNTERPARTS IN THE REGION. MOST OF ITS SOLDIERS WERE IN THE
MILITIAS, WHICH HAD GROWN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF EXTERNAL AGGRES-
SION. BORGE CLAIMED THERE HAD BEEN PLANS TO FOMENT A COUNTER-
REVOLUTION USING THE EX-NATIONAL GUARDSMEN IN HONDURAS EVER
SINCE THE GRN SEIZED POWER IN 1979. BORGE STATED THAT IF THE
GRN HAD NOT PREPARED TO DEFEND ITSELF, WE WOULD NOT BE HERE
TODAY!" HE SAID THAT BY ARMING THE PEOPLE, THE GRN
WAS STRENGTHENING ITSELF AND ASSERTED THAT THIS DEMONSTRATED
THE TYPE OF DEMOCRACY THAT EXISTED IN NICARAGUA. HE
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CONTRASTED THIS SITUATION WITH THAT IN HONDURAS, WHERE IF
THE GOH ARMED 200,000 PEOPLE, ITS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN
DANGER. MOYNIHAN POINTEDLY REMINDED GORGE THAT HONDURAS HAD
AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT. THE SENATOR ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED
THE HONDURAN ARMY WAS LARGE ENOUGH AS IT WAS.
14. GORGE REMARKED THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS NEEDED WHICH WOULD
LIMITE THE. SIZE OF ARMIES. HE STATED THAT HONDURAN FEARS OF
AN INVASION BY NICARAGUA WERE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. IF GRN
FORCES CROSSED INTO HONDURAS, THE U.S. WOULD INTERVENE;
THE GRN WOULD NOT DO SOMETHING SO STUPID AS TO PROVOKE AN
INTERVENTION. MOYNIHAN RESPONDED THAT IN THIS AGE, ARMIES
SELDOM CROSS BORDERS, BUT ARMS OFTEN DO. HE REFERRED TO
THE RECENT CASE IN WHICH HONDURANS WERE RECRUITED FOR TWO
YEARS TRAINING IN CUBA AND THEN INFILTRATED BACK INTO
HONDURAS VIA NICARAGUA. GORGE ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING HEARD OF
THE OLANCHO AFFAIR AND HE SAID THE SENATOR HAD TOUCHED ON
THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM. THE ISSUE WAS NOT TANKS BECAUSE
EVEN IF NICARAGUA HAD 100 TANKS, IT COULD NEVER USE THEM
AGAINST HONDURAS. THE PROBLEM WAS SHIPPING ARMS TO INSURGENT
GROUPS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. HE STATED THA THAT THE CONTRAS WERE
ARMED AND TRAINED IN HONDURAS AND THEN SENT. INTO NICARAGUA.
NICARAGUA WAS READY TO HAVE A TREATY TO END THIS TYPE OF
ACTIVITY, AND HAD EVEN TAKEN UNILATERAL STEPS TO END ARMS
SHIPMENTS TO EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH
A BASIS FOR THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. MOYNIHAN RESPONDED
THAT IN THAT CASE, NEGOTIATIONS SHOJLD TAKE PLACE. GORGE
REITERATED THAT THE GRN WANTED A DIALOGUE AND WAS PREPARED
TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF ARMS TRAFFICKING.
15. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, GORGE ESCORTED MOYNIHAN TO THE
MARKETPLACE IN CUIDAO SANDINO, A WORKING CLASS SUBURB SOME
10 MILES FROM MANAGUA. GORGE, FLANKED BY HIS ENTOURAGE OF
BODYGUARDS AND PRESS AGENTS, STROLLED THROUGH THE MARKET AND
DREW.A SMALL CROWD OF CURIOUS SHOPPERS AND VENDORS. GORGE
TREATED MOYNIHAN TO A "TYPICAL" LUNCH AT THE LOCAL DINER,
WHICH, TRUE TO HIS DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND, THE SENATOR
ACCEPTED WITH OUTWARD GRACE. A SMALL FSLN CLAQUE ATTEMPTED
TO PROMPT THE CROWD INTO RECITING SANDINISTA CHANTS, BUT ONLY
A HANDFUL RESPONDED. A FEW MARKET WOMEN APPROACHED THE
COMANDANTE AND PROTESTED THE SCARCITIES OF STAPLES AND THE
INADEQUACIES OF THE WHOLESALE SUPPLY SYSTME. GORGE LATER
COMMENTED THAT THIS TYPE OF CRITICISM DEMONSTRATED THAT
NICARAGUA WAS INDEED A DEMOCRACY.
16. COMMENT: THE CONVERSATION WAS FRANK AND CORDIAL
WITH GORGE EXHIBITING HIS IMPRESSIVE CHARM. HE REPEATEDLY
STRESSED THAT THE GRN WANTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S., BUT
NOT BECAUSE OF U.S. PRESSURE. HE OBVIOUSLY WISHED TO CONVINCE
THE SENATOR THAT THE GRN WAS DEALING FROM STRENGTH, NOT
WEAKNESS. GORGE FULLY GRASPED THE SENATOR'S STATEMENTS ABOUT
OUR SECURITY CONCERNS AND DID NOT HESITATE TO RULE OUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET BASES IN NICARAGUA. SCHMITT LATER
COMMENTED TO POLOFF THAT HE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT SURPRISED BY
THE LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR GORGE AMONG THE PEOPLE AT THE
MARKETPLACE.
QUAINTON
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