SENATOR HUDDLESTON'S AMENDMENT TO SENATE RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE SOVIET SHOOTDOWN OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00135R000200320009-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 11, 2008
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 14, 1983
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 473.02 KB |
Body:
t
Approved For Release 2008/01/11
I HiTT4[lT'EZTOI 2 adam'Preai-,
dent, I have an -amendment. at the
The i RESIDING- OFFICEB..The
clerk will report. i
The assistant legislatitie'mlerk-read
'
asfoUows: ilrnr.'-" ?': r~s
The -SenatcTJrom Boon-
.z roN). for thmseif and other proposes iii
amendment numbered 21St::?:?:';-^e? :;?,r.
At the end taf the resolution, 'add the fol-
lowing: ;-:'.."_:=:--?;--?:.-~,.;:,,.
"(9) declares -in Intent So redare tUbstan--:.
tinily the Soviet official presmee within the:
-lialted States Jn' carder to :.establish-. real
equivalence with The.offidaIVnlted.Staies":
,presenoe-In theSoviettn)oa:Zi;%,' z,-.
Mt ,'HUDDLESTON: Madam' Presi-
rlent,:desptte-heiact there has been i; -,
trend. developing 33ereIn -the. Senate
s?elative;'to - possible& arnendments=X.e
this'esolution. think-tt-ts-important^.
that: we. Consider. at leash one _morgt_
amendment=' ztic'a- ';ti ~ac,5'.17aiy=s
:.I.know:the.?mmt e-body-herE'ncog~:
rues it is appropriate'that-the-Senate",
of the United Sfates'.and-the Congress:.
express. their position. relating Ito-'the
horrendous act of the Soviet Union In
shooting:down an'unarmed--commies-
ciel Air liner and destroying 269 innoa
cent people who were.atioard that air- -
plane- : - -
:: The President has iroposedy-cettain :
actions that will -betaken that win ex; -
press She revulsion of the American
.people forthis kind ofaet -. '_' :,: -cE;Tr
I I. believe, - however,: we::should -.do
more than: the President has suggest.:
ed, :as :did the' Senator from .North -
Carolina,-and the amendment that I
offer Is one that -was,originally includ-
ed in some similarity in the amend-
ment by the Senatorfrom2orthiCaro
line, but which he altered and struck.-
tram -Ads amendment ,due do the fact
that we vmre offering-one.-very cimila.' . '
This amendment is cosponsored ;hy
Senator ?Got.ownri, the :ehalrman-of.
the- - Intelligence -Committee:- of the
Senate, -Senator, -Lrwrrta,.Senator
INoUra, Senator ExoN, '_Senator
Csrrrs, Senator Haats,:Senator
Pavoa, Senator Wnsox, and zayself
and, perhaps, others of whom I have
not been advised, requesting that their
-='
names be included. -
This amendment would declare the
intent of the United States to reduce
substantially the official Soviet pres-
ence in the United States in order to
establish a level of equivalence with
the U.S. presence-in the Soviet Union.
Madam President, this amendment
really ought to be passed irrespective
of what has happened with the Soviet
action against the Korean air liner.
But that gives an.added impetus for
taking this particular action.. -. :
In simpler terms, Mr. President this
amendment would reduce the total
number of positions available to -the
Soviet Government for placement of-
trained intelligence officerg in' the
United States. In other : words, ' we
would make their: jobs more dilfi~~lt,-
and we would dolt in such a way as to
preserve a general balance between
our Nation's representation In Russia
and their representation here. .
Approved For Release 2008/01/11
nova 1 o erp
CIA-RDP91 B00135R000200320009-7
Today, the total number of Soviet
Government employees in the United
States is about 1,000, while the
number of U.S. Government employ-
ees in the Soviet Union Is about 300. .
Mr. SYMMS. Madam President, will
the Senator yield for a unanimous-
consent request?
Mr. HUDDLESTON. I yield: `-'
Mr. SYMMS. I ask unanimous'coh-
sent to be added as a cosponsor. .
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, It isso ordered- :.:-
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Madam Presl-
dent, to continue, more than, hail of
the Soviet numbers in this country are
attached to the U.N. Secretariat-and
the Soviet U.N. mission. and these we
cannot -change= under -U:N- policies.
However, the official presence, which
includes Soviet employees of Aeroflot,
Amtorg, the. Soviet trade corporation,
and other Soviet operations, as well as
the diplomatic corps, leaves a disparity
of more than ?100. between our num-
bers and theirs. ......
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
estimates that some 40 percent of the
Soviet Government employees here
are trained professional Intelligence
officers of the Soviet KGB and Soviet
military intelligence-the GRU. Many
other Soviet officials are used by the
KGB and GRU to perform intelli-
gence assignments. ' - _ :: .`.
The time has come to draw the line
so that the Soviets can no longer take
advantage of the imbalance that has
existed for so long in this area. . -
This amendment gives us this oppor-
tunity, and I can think of no better ve-
hicle than this resolution of condem-
nation of the Soviet Union for the
Senate to express its will in this
matter. . . -?
I would also like to address questions
that might - be raised . about this
amendment
chat, what Ts the Intended meaning
of the terms "official, presence" and
The amendment has been written in
order to Include . employees of the
Soviet Government, who are assigned
Jo the United States-.-:It is not-limited
to accredited diplomats. However, it is
not intended to include Soviet Govern-
ment employees ' assigned to the
United Nations, such as Soviet Gov-
ernment employees working at the
U.N. Secretariat and. the Soviet-U.N.'
missions. .:
There Is no question that some Sovi-
ets-assigned to the United Nation are
used by Soviet intelligence and include
Soviet intelligence officers. In 1979
two Soviet employees at the United
Nations without diplomatic immunity
were caught redhanded in espionage
-and were tried, convicted, and sent to.
jail. 'They were later exchanged'as
part of an international arrangement
Despite the fact that Soviet intelli-
gence uses the United Nation for espi-
onage and other Intelligence purposes,
the diplomatic and political costs to
the United States of attempting to
reduce the Soviet official presence at,
the United Nations are probably not
worth the gains. Thismeans that'the
CIA-RDP91 B00135R000200320009-7
amendment ~Wa not affect the 518
Soviet officials currently assigned' to
the United Nation. - : .- =
The term "official presence" does in-
clude' more than just Soviet diplomats,
For example, in New York City alone
there are 41 Soviet Government em-
ployees assigned to *the Amtorg Trad
Ing Corporation. 'Other Soviet com-
mercial establishments in the United
. States employ. about 24 Soviet nation-
als. Beyond that,.here in Washington
the Soviets have not only the Embassy
Itself and its. compound on Chesapeake
Bay, but also the Office of Trade Rep-
resentative, Information :Department,
Military Office; Maritime Office, Agri-
culture Office; Office of Fisheries Af-
fairs, and the Consular Office. There -
-is also a separate Construction Office.
Many of .the Soviet Government em-
ployees in these offices are not accred-
ited diplomats, but they deserve to be
counted in determining the size.of the
Soviet official presence.
According to statistics as of August
1, 1983, there were'461 Soviet Govern-
ment employees assigned to the
United States, not counting those at
- the United Nations. This includes 16
Tess News Agency. employees and. 18
other correspondents. .I:believer It
would not be necessary to'count these
Soviet Government employem in de-
termining "equivalence":with the offi-
cial.U-S. presence In the Soviet Union.
No doubt some of Ahem-are intelli-
gence officers or'agents;l. and I can
assure you that no U.S. journalist in
the Soviet Union Is'working for the
CIA. Nevertheless, there are enough
other positions to reduce elsewhere,
without having to deal with the Soviet
news media
The terms "official' presence" and
"equivalence" give the United States
the flexibility to address the most seri-
ous aspects of the imbalance. This re-. --
quires including: more than just
accredited diplomats. However, it does
not-necessarily mean including every-
one employed by, the Soviet Govern-
.ment when there might be a risk of
action, for example. against American _--
journalists in the Soviet Union:... ,.-. r -- --
Based on the figures as of August 1,
the action required by the amendment
-would reduce the number of Soviet
-Government employees permitted in
the United States by about 100 in
.-order to match the official U.S. pres-
ence in the Soviet Union-.,.:::
-" 'The second question is-what are the
risks to the United States.in terms of
possible Soviet retaliation against US.
- officials in the Soviet Union?
There Is no doubt that the action re=,
quired . by this amendment- might-
result in some kind of response by the
Soviet Union- However, the likelihood
of that risk has been taken into ac-
count in drafting the language of the
amendment- The amendment does not
expell diplomats or require,any other
action. directed at specific individuals.
-Instead, it reduces the permissible ceil-
ing to a level equivalent to the official
U.S. presence In the Soviet Union.
He Approved For Release 2008/01/11: CIA-RDP91 B00135R000200320009-7
that the Senator from Kentucky yield me a.
accepted principle of reciprocity? couple of minutes?
What grounds would they have to re- ::Mr- HUDDLESTON. I yield the Sen-
taliate against a rule of equivalence?
Of course, we know that the Soviets
do not need reasonable grounds to jus-
tify their conduct, but ths- amend-,
ment does-not give them an excuse to
"Equally important. by including
more than Just accredited diplomats in
the meaning of the term-'official pres-
ence;' the amendment makes It possi-
ble to lower-the ceiling for Sovietposi-
tions by focusing on the Soviet com-
mercial ' establishments. The -United
States has no office in the Soviet
Union comparable to' Amtorg,- the
Soviet' commercial establishment In
New York City. Therefore, the Soviets
would not have a convenient target to
go after if'we insisted in reducing' or
eliminating the-Amtorgofflce__tt*r!.~
Overall, In the final analysis it Is
necessary to weigh the totality of the
benefits and possible. risks to the
United States. Reducing the Soviet of-
'flcial presence In the United States is
not a symbolic gesture, because the
size of that presence creates direct and
immediate dangers to the national se-
curity. of the United States. Cutting
back on the numbers will clearly in-
hibit the ability of Soviet intelligence.
to operate in this country. -In my judg-
ment, that benefit itself outweighs
the risks _.:. . .
Madam President, I reserve the re-
mainder of our time. %
? Mr. PRYOR. Madam President, I
would like to say a few words in sup-
port of the amendment by the Senator
from Kentucky.
A recent series of articles by the
New York Times described the nature
and extent of present KGB activities
in the Western democracies.
_ The Times referred to a U.S. Gov-
.ernment report which concluded that
the last. 10 years of. Western technol-
ogy collection by the Soviet intelli-
gence agencies have saved the Warsaw
Pact countries "hundreds of millions
of dollars" and "years in development
time." The stolen: Western technology
aided the modernization of-the pact's
weapons Industry, weapons perform-
ance, and the development of counter-
measures to western military capabili-
ty.
The U.S. Government report went
on to say that the manpower levels
which Soviet intelligence agencies
have allocated to this effort "have in-
creased significantly since the 1970's
to the point where there are now sev-
eral thousand technology Collection
officers at work. These personnel.
under various covers ranging from dip.
lomats to Jour insts to trade officials,
are assigned throughout the world,"?
Evidence Indicates that among legal
Soviet residents of Western nations, 30
td'40 percent are officers in the KGB
or the GRU. the Soviet military Intel-
ligence organization. '
For -these reasons, I believe that the
Senate has a duty to adopt the Hudd-
-leston amendment today.*
ator from Vermont 2 minutes ''
Mr. LEARY. Madam President, "I
Join my distinguished colleague from
Kentucky, Senator HwDLESTON, inof-
fering. an amendment to declare the
Intent of the United States to reduce
the . official Soviet presence in this
country to the. approximate level of
American Government employees in
the Soviet Union. In calculating the
number of Soviet. officials in the
United States, we would naturally ex-
elude Soviet . representation to the
United Nations in New York.
Madam 'President, I . support this
measure as an'effective; responsible
protest against the - brutal'- Soviet
downing%ofKorean Air- Lines flight-
007. killing 269 innocent civilians.
Equalizing the Soviet officiai'presence
_ In the United States with that of our
country .over there will not -damage
the ability :ofthe two nuclear:super-
powers . to maintain diplomatic con-
tacts. In-the nuclear age, we and the
Soviets must continue to' talk and to
negotiate, above all In the area of
arms control I commend again Presi-
dent-Reagan's refusal to' delay the
Geneva negotiations or strategic and
intermediate range weapons. Neverthe-
less, let us show S our revulsion and
- anger in deeds= well as word- ? ? ? as
this amendment s do,
. .
Let me review the statistic provided
by the FBI-on the Soviet presence in
. the. United States Setting aside the
518 Soviet officials - accredited to the
United Nations, there are some 454
other Soviet Government representa.
tives loving and working in the United
States. Thatlater figure includes TASS
correspondents, who are -employees -of
the Soviet Government. The FBI in-
forms me that around 40 percent of all
Soviet -employees work for various in-
telligence arms of their government.
Madam President, I recently visited
the Soviet Union in a 'delegation
beaded by the distinguished ranking
minority member of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Senator P?r,. A cen-
tral yurpose of our trip was to do what
we could to help the arms control situ-
ation"Hardly had we landed in the
United States after this mission of
good will than we learned of the-terri-
ble Korean Air Lines tragedy.
While in Moscow. I viewed firsthand
the abysmal conditions under which
our people must live and work. I wit-
nessed the tight controls over the lives
of American officials. We have only
some'300 U.S.-Government employees
in the Soviet Union. There is, as I un-
derstand, no official numerical ceiling
on our representatives. but there may,
as well be. Our people are jammed into
overcrowded, dilapidated, appallingly
inadequate quarters.
I :visited -with many of them last
month in Moscow- We seem to make tt
very easy forthe Soviet Union to have.
accommodations far more luxurious
than their people would have in their
own country, when they come here,
. but we do not see any kind of recipro-
cation_'The United States does not get
anywhere. near as nice accommoda-
tions for its people. Even if we wanted
to send more people, we could not
until new facilities are available'As
far as I could see, it will be years yet
before our. new chancery and living
quarters will .be. completed. Mean-
while, the Soviets are quite comfort-
able In.their new Embassy compound.
There is a disparity of some 150 be-
tween Soviet and American Govern-
ment employees in each other's coun-
tries-again, excluding the enormous
Soviet U.N. Mission in New Yark.-A
phased reduction of the Soviet official
presenoe.in the United States to.ap-
proximately the number of American
employees in the Soviet Union would
not only be a strong signal of our out-
rage over the KM. incident, it would
contribute to balance and equity, be-
tween .the two countries in the treat-
ment of each other's representatives;
Madam President, there has been a
good deal of criticism here today
about our continued pursuit of arms
control with the Soviet Union. Some
have alluded to alleged Soviet viola-
tions of arms agreements and treaties
I regret': this exploitation of the
Korean Air Lines tragedy to attack
the arms control process. Outrage over
this callous act should not be used for
such ,purposes. It sullies our expres-
sions of grief and loss over the victims.
. Frankly,:!, too, am concerned about
unbiguous and unexplained Soviet be-
vavior regarding the unratified SALT
II treaty and the ABM treaty. But, .l
refuse to allow the Korean airliner
episode to deflect me from my deter-
mination to support mutual, verifiable
arms agreements that strengthen
American security and reduce the risk
of war. When in the Soviet Union, I
presented Chairman Yuri Andropov
with a statement outlining my con-
cerns about arms control compliance. I
ask unanimous consent that a copy of
my statement to Chairman Andropov
appear at the end of my remarks.
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. -
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. LEAHY. Even though it should
have no bearing; the Korean-Air Lines.:
incident does underline a fundamental
reality I attempted to convey to Soviet
leaders: Their lack of restraint can and
will erode the political base of support
for the' arms control process In the
United States unless they show a
greater .sensitivity to genuine Ameri-
can concerns, about their behavior.
Unless the Soviet Union can be made
to understand how -its actions affect
American attitudes, I fear for the
future of arms control What a monu.
mental tragedy -it-would be it, by ig-.
poring basic norms of international be-
havior and by refusing to respond ap-
propriately to legitimate American
questions about compliance with arms
control agreements, the Soviet Union
were to destroy the broad support for
arms control which now exists in this
country.
Madam President I urge my Col
lt:a? Approved For Release 2008/01/11
inessage to the Soviet union. we can
do this by adopting this amendment to.
equalize official representation.
Enuan' i
STATEMENT TO CHAIRNAH YURI AsDROPOV
(By Senator Patrick Leahy)
Mr. Chairman, I have come to Moscow for
one overriding purpose: to underline my
deep and growing concern that the anus
control process is in jeopardy. -
Perhaps you know that my colleagues and
I are strong advocates of ve.-ifiabie arms
control between the United States and the
Soviet Union. I,- supported the SALT II
Treaty, and I earnestly hope the Geneva ne-
gotiations will soon lead to equitable agree-
menu.
- However, in all -frankness. I most tell you
that questionable Soviet activity regarding
existing formal and informal arms agree-
ments is causing me increasing concern. Al-
though there are important issues relating
to the possible use of chemical weapons In
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, my main
concerns at this meeting are about the unn-
tifled SALT U Treaty which both sides say
.they will observe. and the Anu Ballistic Mis-
sile Treaty. -
I am worried by reports that the Soviet
Union is testing two new intercontinental
ballistic missiles when the SALT II Treaty
permits only one. Perhaps even more worri-
some for the future of verifiable ar:m con-
the
frosovietlstrategic mcmissile tests. Access tto
telemetry is necessary to verify compliance
with Important provisions of s-kLT IL as
well as any future treaty with qualitative
limitations. Recently, there have also been
press reports of the construction in the
Soviet Union of a large phased array radar
in a location which could be Inconsistent
with the ABM Treaty.
Mr. Chairman. I do not wish to debate
these matters. My intention is to explain to
you the widening distress among all mem-
bers of the United States Senate. Republi-
can and Democrat, regarding your country's
activities Arms control supporters like
myself can't defend the arms control proc-
ess when Soviet behavior raises legitimate
questions which remain unanswered- - -
Not only may the political basis for
American observance of SALT U thus be
weakened, a climate is being Created which
will make senate approval of any future
arms agreement much more difficult. For
the United States to ratify any treaty, two-
thirds of the -100 senators must agree.
Whether they do or not will depend mainly
on the-past Soviet arms control record. - -
There may be valid explanations for all
-these activities As one who firmly believes
mutual, verifiable arms reductions and liml-.
tations are good for both our countries, I
urge you to resolve our concerns. This
would immeasurably strengthen those in
the United States who are convinced that
arms control can reduce the terrible threat
to our peoples of a nuclear catastrophe. , .
Mr. GOLDWATER. Madam Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield me a
couple of minutes? -
Mr. HUDDLESTON. I yield 2 min-
utes to the Senator from Arizona. -
Mr.?GOLDWATER. I became a co-
- sponsor of this amendment -because-
either last year or the year before we
held hearings before the Intelligence
Committee on this very subject, and
what the amendment states is already
the law.
CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000200320009-7 The second point I would make,
,- ' -u nun ne nan trrls weapon he Madam President, is that the senator
can use with any country, the equiva. from Arizona, the distinguished chair-
lency of diplomatic representation, man of the Intelligence Committee, is
and I d
o not think anybody can give us
an accurate figure of how many Sovi-
ets are working in this country against
our country.-But we do.have slightly
in.excess of 200 In the whole of Russia,
and eyeball-to-eyeball intelligence Just'
exists over there....
So this is already the law, and -I
would just like to impress once again -
on the President that he' has this
power if he wants to use It, if he can
get the timid State Department to do
something about it.-
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCLURE. Madam President,
will the Senator from Kentucky yield
for a unanimous-consent request?
. Mr. HUDDLESTON...Yes, I will
yield. . .. .
Madam President, how much time
remains? .- ......-..:.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has 3 minutes. ' ..
Mr. McCLUR& Madam President, I
ask unanimous. consent that I be
added as a cosponsor. to the amend-
ment. .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Madam Presi-
dent, I make the same unanimous-con-
sent request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With.
out objection, it is so ordered.-
Mr. NICKLES. Madam President,'I
make the same request:
The PRESIDING OFFICER:- With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I
ask unanimous consent that 11' be
added as a cosponsor.'
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.-
Who yields time?..
Mr. FORD. Madam President, I- ask
unanimous consent that I be added as
a cosponsor:..
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With.
out objection, it is so ordered.-.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, the Senator from Kentucky is as frus-
if the Senator from Kentucky, for the trated, as all of us have been after our
moment will reserve the remainder of hearings on the Intelligence Commit-
his time-1 -make three points: The tee, that the State-Department has
overriding one is that the administra- not done what It can do and which the
tion has asked us to send the Presi- law directs them: to do-I would, even
dent this measure declaring the action so, suggest that this'is an inappropri
of the Soviet Union to be a crime so
that he may sign it today; that in 2
days there will be a unanimous action
by the House, the Senate,. and the
President in conformity.
Forthe first time in the.history of
-the Senate, we will have declared the
behavior of another government to be
.a crime. No' stronger action could be
contemplated. To dilate It with mat-
ters extraneous to.that central asser-
tion seems to those of. as who have
been voting to keep the House resolu-
tion intact 'and not to go to confer-
ence, to be the wise move. -
sions Act of 1982 gives the President
.not just the power that he has to
demand-parity, but Irpstructs him*.to
demand parity and require-it and
obtain It. if necessary by refusing the
admission of foreign,diplomats_where
there is not parity..-- " ..:
What we need is more American dip-
lomatsIn.the Soviet Union. And this
would work directly contrary to that
objective and polic,y,-or should be
policy.; - .. -::.:.
Third, Madanr-Pre_sident;.I hope we
would not get to use this occasion for
minimal concerns. We are talking
about a crime. We are not -talking
-about the accreditation of vice coun-
sels. ' - - .
There are crimes going on right now.
Six years ago in this body I introduced
legislation, and have done so in every
Congress, that asks the Government
of the -United States to force ' the
Soviet Embassy, soon to be on Mount
Alto, the highest site in the District,
to stop intercepting phone calls of
American citizens, including Members
of this body-a crime if an American
does It. It issomething the Soviets do
here, in New York, in San Francisco'
and in Chicago, about which we do
nothing. - And this body, filled with
brave souls in these matters, has not
chosen to do a thing about that., It
seems to me rather more relevant
than the number of press attaches and
KGB agents.-. .. .. .. ...
The distinguished ' chairman says
there Is not much eyeballing In the
U.S.S.R. He does indeed know that the
principal source of Intelligence in the
Soviet - Union is the- budget of the.
United States of America and the CoN-
CRESSIONAL RECORD. They can have
that mailed to Toronto if they really
-got down to it.' :.: ,'".`..-.....'- . :._
But. -without -In* anyway wishing to
ate vehicle, given the urgency of get-
tint this matter- to the President's-
'desk tonight. Therefore, reluctantly,
because the Senator from Kentucky
knows the regard with which I -hold
him and the Senator from Arizona
knows the fear in which-I hold him,
when the Senator from Kentucky has
completed his time, I shall move to'
table the resolution
:-'(r Approved For Release 2008/01/11 : CIA-RDP91BO0135R000_200_320009-7
' Mr. MATSUNAGA. Will the Senator _ _ -
ice-if we do not very strongly express
'
from New York yield? ,
Mr. MOYNIHAN. May I ask Mr.
President. how much time I have re-
to the Russians the commitment of
our feelings and how deep those feel-
ings are, on the subject We.have
malning? . . talked in many ways about the need to
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The' try to get our allies to go along with
Senator has 5 minutes remaining. `. I us. And I think that is true; I think we
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy : to need to do that ,
yield to the Senator from Hawaii. - ' '- " I -think, again, we want to keep our
Mr. MATSUNAGA. For the reasons hands off of the arms talks and try to
so eloquently stated by. the Senator allow those to progress. I - think we
from New York. I would urge the Sen- want to be careful that we do not take
ator from Kentucky to seriously con- some steps that are irresponsible.
sider withdrawing his- amendment -go -:It seems to the what the Senator
that we can promptly act upon the from Kentucky is reaching in his
resolution and send it to. the. President. amendment is a very responsible way.
for his signature, as he had hoped, to, 'Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator from
night. And I willmake this' assurance New York yield me 30 seconds? :.
.*Mr. MOYNTHAN, I am happy to do
Senator from Kentucky: that
th
t
.
o
e .
the next time he bffers his proposal:
will be a cosponsor of It
.. Mr. HUDDLESTON. If. the Senator
will yield to the for a minute, I-will tell
him that I will give him that opportu-
nity.. Because if the fate - of ,this
amendment is what has been the fate
of the others, I do intend to offer it as
a subsequent resolution.
However, in view of the arguments
made by the Senator from New York,
which..support this- amendment so
strongly, that it is necessary, I must
say that I agree with-him. I think-we
ought to do something about the
Soviet intelligence presence in this
country. I would like to close the.San
Francisco Consulate; and I originally
had it in this amendment, but. I
thought we ought to try-to be a little
more moderate at this time. .
There is tremendous Imbalance here.
And our poor old FBI that has to look
out for all these folks would like very
much to see a reduction in their pres-
ence here. The CIA is another matter.
They look at it from a different stand-
But. at any rate, I think it is well to
go"ahead and consider this 'and give
the Senate an opportunity to vote.
This would add I think some more
substance to the resolution. The Presi-
dent would have no reason to really
oppose this. As the Senator from New
York says, it is what should be _done
anyhow. . " '
Before the Senator makes the
motion. I wanted to make sure, for
those who indicated they wanted to be
cosponsos, that their names were re-
ceived at the desk. Let me remind you,
Mr. President that Senators ARM-
'sTRONG.:McCLVIIE, HAWKLVS. BOREN,
JOHNSTON, Coan and FORD, in addi-
tion to those already listed, have indl--
cated their desire to be cosponsors.
As far as I know, no one else is seek-
ing time on this.
Mr. CHILES. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. HUJDDLESTON. I yield the time
I have remaining to the Senator from
Florida
Mr. CHILES. .Mr. President, I just
wanted to complement the Senator on
offering of this amendment It seems
to me this is a very legitimate way in
which we can respond. I think it is re-
snonsible. .
majority. leader and the managei,of
sorrily absent. ':: ::[: -:.a?^:-. .:~
the bill on the 'minority side what
`? The. PRESIDINGOFFICEr'Aie
their forecast is for final passage: The there any other Senators In the Cham.
reason I ask is' that Senator- MAT- ber wishing to vote?
TrxciY and bare on the horns a -'.'The result was announced= yeas'49,
vpr'v'nnnh Atlnmrne ~'honn s we
.both would. like to vote for 'final pas-
sage and vote for this very severe con=
demnation of : the Soviet's behavior
but, on the other hand, there is a me-
morial service. for Congressman -Mc-
Donald, who, of course, was one of the
victimsof this tragedy: The memorial
service Is In our home State of* Georgia
and we must depart on an airplane in
order to make.that. -'.
I'would just like to get some feel so
we can make a judgment about how
we handle this impossible choice.
Mr. BAKER. Mr.7President, if the
Senator will permit.me to:reply; I am
sympathetic in the extreme. The
Junior Senator from Georgia also men-
tioned this to me. I cannot think of a
more difficult conflict; that is to say, a'
memorial service for Congressman Mc-
Donald, on the one hand, and final
passage of this resolution of condem-
nation, on the other.
I wish I could offer some advice on
how to proceed. I cannot.
All I can say is that I hope that we
will get to final passage on this meas-
ure within the next 45 minutes There
are several other amendments, but I
begin to get,the feeling that there may
not be other rollcalls. except final pas-
sage. with the exception of the Hudd-
leston amendment.
Mr. NUNN. If there is going to be
any kind of delay for any reason to ac-
commodate -other Senators on -final
passage; I hope both sides of the aisle.
would consider starting the vote at the
earliest possible time on final passage
so that Senator MATTINGLY and I could
record our strong feelings on this sub-
ject. - .
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I assure
the Senator I will make every effort to
do that :. ? - 7' -.
Mr. MOYNIHAM Mr. President, I
yield back the remainder of my time. ,
- Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
I yield back the remainder of my time.
'Mr. BAKER: Mr. President, I move
to table the amendment and I ask for_
the yeas and nays. - - , .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered-
The PRESIDING -OFFICER, The
'question is on agreeing to the motion
to lay on the table the amendment of
the Senator from Kentucky. The yeas
and nays have been ordered and the
clerk will call the roll. -
i The legislative clerk called the roll:
Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the
Senator from Nevada (Mr.' LAxALT)
and the Senator from South Dakota
(Mr. PRessL>at).are necessarily absent.
-Mr. BYRD..I announce that the
Senator from -California (Mr.. CRAM-
sroN), the Senator from Ohio ,(Mr.
GLENN), the Senator from South Caro-
line (Mr. HoLLrNas), and the Senator
nays 45;as follows: ' ' ? -~
LRollcall Vote No. 252 Leg.l
Abdnor . Goldwater Percy ::-
Andreas : Gorton ' .Proxmire;'
Baker Grassley" Quayle
Elden Hart ' -Rudnun
Boschwitz Batch - Sarbaned
Burdick . Hatfield " - Simpson
Byrd ' - Becht" Stafford
Chafee Heinz Stennis
Danforth . Jensen. .!Stevens
Denton - Kassebaum ~ Thurmond
Dixon " - , Lugar ...'rower
Dole Mathias Trible
Domenici Matunaga Tsongas
Durenberger Moynihan ? Warner
Eagleton. Murkowaki. , Weicker
Armstrong
Baucus
Bentsen Bingaman
Boren
Bradley
Bumper,.
Chiles,
Cochran '.
Cohen
D'Amato
DeConcini
Dodd
Fast.
Exon
NAYS-45
Ford Melcher .
Hawkins Metzenbaum
Hein ' ... . Mitchell
Heins . Nickles
Huddleston . Pa
Humphrey Pr
Inouye . Ra
Johnston
Kasten
Kennedy
Lau ten berg
Leahy
'sin.
Mattingly
McClure
ndolph
Rlegle
Roth
Sasser
Specter
Symms
Wallop
Wilson
Zorinsky
NOT VOTING-5 - -
Hollings Long.
Laxalt _ Pressler
So the motion to lay on the table
amendment No. 2134 was agreed to.
Approved For Release 2008/01/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000200320009-7
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 12363
September 15, 1988
SENATE RESOLUTION 222-
CALL-ING FOR A REDUCED SOVIET
PRESENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES AS A RESULT OF THE
DESTRUCTION OF KOREAN
-AIR LINES FLIGHT 007 _
Mr. HUDDLESTON submitted the
following resolution; which was re-
ferred to the Committee. on. Foreign
Whereas, the United States is shocked and
outraged over the actions of the Soviet Gov-
ernment on-August 31. 1983. which led to
- the destruction of Korean Air Lines flight
007. with the lose of 269 lives; . .
. Whereas, Korean Air Lines flight 007 was,
an unarmed, clearly-marked civilian airliner
with innocent men, women, and children of
13 nationalities aboard;
_Whereas, the Congress believes appropri-
ate. sanctions must be imposed upon' the
Soviet Government hi order to demonstrate
that the actions of August 31. 1983, repro
' . sent unacceptable behavior, - - : '
.:Whereas, the official Soviet presence In
the. United-States is substantially greater.
than the Official United States presence in
the Soviet Union: Now, therefore, be-it
Resolved, That It is the sense of the Senate
that the United States should reduce the
Soviet official presence within the United
'_- States in- order - to -'establish substantial
equivalence with the official United States
presence in the Soviet Union . ?'.. :~~:
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr-- President;
earlier today my amendment to House
- Joint Resolution 353, regarding the de-7
struction of Korean Air; Lines flight
007 on-August- 31, was tabled. I am,
consequently, introducing my amend-
ment as a separate sense.of the Senate
resolution and will seek ;to find - an-
other vehicle to which to attach IL: