SCENARIO FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00966R000400220018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975
• Content Type: PAPER

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Scenario for Discussion With
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The mandates of the Select Committees are all encompassing
in their charge to review U.S. intelligence activities. It is our
intent to be forthcoming and helpful in getting at all the pertinent
facts necessary to Hermit thorough and complete review of U.S.
intelligence legal authorities, ove:rsight,organizations, and
activities. ,Arrangements are being made to facilitate the work of
the.Crnrmittees and develop at the outset an atmosphere of cmperaticm.
SE:CURZTY
At~my first meeting with Senator Church and Congressman .
Nedzi, I ;plan on making the fallowing points with them:
(1) Departr~ents and agencies may on occasion find
it necessary to request that testimony be given only in
executive session, that in some instances testimony be
"off-the-record" and that certain testimony be heard on~.y
by ;n-embers and ire some cases only by the Chairmean and
Vice Chairmen.
(2) When c~;.astioned about intelligence matters thr:t
ccsme under the pL-trview of another organization, witnesses
should be perznitt:ed to state that a response to -the
question is not properly within their authority and to
respectfully suggest that the appropriate party be callelx
to testify on such matters.
(3) In some cases, those agencies furnishing dcrtm~ents
to the Committees; should be authorized to excise frcxzt those
documents, prior to presentation, the mamas of their
personnel under rover or whose personal. safety might be
?jeopardized as well as those of other individuals whose
? safety or individual-privacy may be jeopardized by dis-
closure. Also excised should be names of sources, operations,
.specific details of technical devices and systems maintained
in compartmented channels and names of organizations coop-
era~ting on a higYLty confidential basis.
(4) What iri view of th;~ir susceptibility to foreign
countermeasures, details of the technology of the technical
ool.lection programs which have been placed under strict
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access rules should not be required. If the details are
requested, the Chairap..n should adopt the use of the
strict security groundrules and comp~tatiun to protect
information about these programs and provide access only
to those staff personnel with an absolute "neeld.-toPkrbaw: "
Z'he departments and agencies responsible for -these programs
will be glad to advise and assist in any arraaagements
the Chairman would desire.
(5) I will also att~npt to secure an agreement
with ?the Chairmen of the Select Committees that they will
entertain and consider a list of security pr~ciples and
guidelines, a.s well as a Secrecy Agre~exzt four staff members,
copies of which are attached and will be provided 'them.
(fogies of these have already been furnished -to Mr. W.lliam
Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Ct~iittee and
Bill Hogan of the House Select Cca~miittee. } Such agreements
have been reached with the President's Omission and the
Department of Justice.
(6) I will strive for an agreement that the comRUUii.ty
par:acipate in an advisory roles. in the saniti.zation of the
final Committee reports in both the classified and unclassi-
fied versions.
DF,'(~RF'.F'G QF DISCLOSURE .
In provision of documents and testimony to the Congressional
Select Comni.ttees there will be many sensitive areas where careful
consideration must be given to 'the degree of disclosure to meet the
Committees requirements. In general, arrange.nts will permit a
fairly w2de access to the staff investigators, particularly if the
CliairmP.n agree on the foregoing security prnvi~sions_ However., in
sane instances, disclosure should be made only to the ConBnittee and
Staff Directors, in others ,only to Committee members, and in still
others only to Chairmen and Vice Chairmen. Since ]both Cam?nittees
have subpoena authority and a variety of witnesses rmay be called
who have knowledge of sensitive matters; the likelihood is expanded
that highly sensitive details will surface_
In illustrating, options along these I.ir~es ar+e:
Covext Action
1. General statements admitting the f~ of covert action,
including manner of oversight and nature of approval gmcedures could
be given in open session.
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2. Where questions are raised about specific covert actions,
these should be discussed only in closed, classified sessions. Answers
should deal_ generally in the nature of the covert actogn without revealing
the specifics of the operation such zs names of assets used and specific
operational details. Th~_s would be available to members and staff,
3. Where details of operations, funding, etc., are requested,
these should be limited to responses to staff investigators' specific
questions. Where elaboration or access to raw files for either covert
ac~i-inn nr ml l Pr_t-i nn mai-t-~r~ i S ~c^_i fi c-ai ly r~rnle~t-c~3
s w prov~_ e s s.
4. Hopefully, no comprehensive discussion or doc~nnentation of
all covert actions or 4QCbmmittee matters will be necessary. Where
specific details of cove~:t actions, including names, etc., covered
above, are insisted. upon, each case will be the subject of consultation
between the Chairman and Vice Chairm=uz and tfie DCI. When appropriate,
the President's National Security .Adviser s?riZl also be ccns~lted.
Collection of Intelligence
1. 1'he Committees will probably address the matter of haw
intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual
rights. Responses should be forthcx~ming under proper security condi-
tions so as to help Selec;t Committee staff investi ators asc e
facts in a particular ca.~e, 5X1
on a case-by-case basis :;hould be made available under the same general
access provided for the President's Commission.
2. General information on the value of products, the contribu-
tions of various sources to intelligence estimates, organi?motional
details, methods of analysis and substantive review can be provided
to Committee members and staff.
3. If regt,ired, information with respect to technic. intelligence
systems including crypto7'_ogic and communications activities and recon-
naissance capabilities will be provided on a selective basis under
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appropriate security grouted rules. This information will be kept
as generalised as possiblE.. General coimieritary on contractual
arrangements, funding anc:. the like can be provide if regdiested. If
the investigation of thes~~ systems goes to very specific c1uestions
where a general answer is not appropr:late, each request will Piave to
be considered on a case-by-case basis so as to protect the collecti?n
capability. Where the Prcxtram Manager concerned believes he is over
or at the limits of specificity, he should consu:Lt with the Director
of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the
coanrn~nity's answers.
4. Attached is a l:i.sting of Intelligence Comzrnznity activities
of particular sensitivity. Each item therein has been graded.. Those
with a D designator should not be provided to the Committees as a
general rule without consultation between the DCI and the C:onmittee
Chairmen and Vice Chairmen. Category C will be provided to the Chair-
men, Vice Chairmen, and Staff Directors only. Category B will be
provided to the Committee Members and Staff Directors only. Category A
will bs provided to Members and Conanittee Staff .in executive session only.
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Intelligence Estimates and Processing Plethodologies
In general and under appropriate security provisions,
the processing of rats data, their analysis, and the pre-
paration and the reporting of finished intelligence will
be discussed. Finished intelligence reports and estimates
will be made available to the Committees and Staffs.
Administrative
1. Information concerning the internal administrative
ar~`angeme:nts of intelligence agencies should be made avail-
able.
2. In consideration of the private rights of individuals,
specific files such as security, personnel, and medical, will
be provided to the Committees only in accordance with the
standards followed throughout the Executive Branch.
3. Intelligence Budgets
A general budget presentation o~ funds employed
for intelligence, their location in the appropriations,
the size and scope of their distribution to specific
programs and tasks, and the audit procedures and
documentation employed should be available to staff
investigators under appropriate security arrangements
and not in open session. However, where specificity
of detail will lead investigators into particularly
sensitive areas contained in categories on the
attached list, thesE matters will have to he treated
on a case-by-case basis.
With respect to the general overview of U. S.
intelligence programs, it would be expected that the
DCI be called upon in his community role to provide
these details.
With respect to specific programs within the
community, the DCI and/or other Program Managers
shou:Ld be directly responsive.
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The Committees may be particularly concerned
-with Executive and Congressional oversight of budget
authority. Response to ?these mattex:s should be
forthcoming under the general proviso that Congress
must set its own ground ru:Les for handling intelli-
gencE~ budgets in a secure and responsible manner.
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4. Internal inspection reports, etc. will be available
on a selective case basis and when edited to protect security
and privacy .
5. Central records of all material and testimony will
be carefully kept by each intelligence a~~ency in a farm
accessiblE~ to recall if needed.
PROCEDURAL SGEN~IRIO
In addition to the foregoing Security and Disclosure
issues, there are a number of other considerations on which
consistency across th.e Intelligence Community should be
maintained.
1. I would propose to ask Senator Church and Congress-
man Nedzi to have their Staff Directors or Counsel meet with
DCI Staff and Counsel. to develop a clear outline of Committee
procedures. Such outline would help the community to
organize itself to be responsive to the Committee require-
ments and where those requirements are unacceptably or
insufficient, provide the DCI and the community opportunity
to negotiate a common understanding, e.g., on handling of
specific subject matter; procedures for witnesses and their
legal involvement; access ground rules f'or investigating staff
to the files, physic~cl facilities and overseas field installa-
tions; and understandings about the availability of informa-
tion provided the Select Committees to other Congressional
.Staff, Justice Department, state or local officials.
2. Determination of the physical location of files in
the thought that some common ground can be reached between
the House and Senate to minimize adrnini~>trative duplication
and to focus staff investigators in a coordinated fashion.
In this context, a central entry Foint into each intelligence
organization should be identified and coordination of these
entry points with thy: DCI's ?task force where appropriate.
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This arrangement is not designed to restrict access but
rather to channel it for constructive response and unless
negotiated carefully and at the outset could be misunder-
stood. Consideration may be given to offering a common
building at 2430 E Street, N.W., where Intelligence
Community files, etc,., needed by the community can be
centrally located for use by House and Senate Committee
staffs.
3. Guidance to employees needs to be addressed i:~
terms of their relationship to the Select Committees and
their respective agencies and .in the light of their
individual rights. There is a responsibility to inform
employees of their Constitutional rights. It is important
that agencies do so and that the Chairmen of the Select
Committees or the public fully understand that such advisories
are in no way intendE,d to impede the investigation. Where
employeesc wish to proceed directly to the Committees without
reference: to their s-~apervisors, this action. is open to them,
and they will be so advised. G+Te need to assure that the
Committees' procedures are understood by employees, and that
they understand their right to counsel. We want to seek
agreement: on the manner and procedures by E~hich Committee -
Staffs will advise witnesses and in~ervie~~ees o.f their
rights. Also we need understandings that employees will be
allowed access to fi:Les in preparation for appearances
before the Committee: and especially those already provided
the Committees. The matter of ex-emplayees must also be
addressed.
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