STATEMENT BY MR. ALLEN W. DULLES AT THE BRIEFING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS MONDAY, MAY 9, 1960 2:00 PM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000701420003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2014
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 9, 1960
• Content Type: MISC

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I �4 UNCLASSIFIED I I CONFIDENTIAL
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i CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
1
LEGISLATIVE COtTNSEL
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
For your files.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
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0/DCI, 221 Admin, Ext.
5,110/60
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STATEMENT
BY
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE
BRIEFINQ OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
MONDAY,/ MAY 9, 1960
2:00 PM
Under anthority of the National Security Act of 1947 which
set up the Central Intelligence Agency, that Agency was then entrusted
by the National Security Council with the duty of collecting Intelligence
essential to our national security.
Under other directives of the Council, the Central Intelligence
Agency was also entrusted with certain tasks relating to meeting the
menace of international communism and in particular the aggressive
activities of the Soviet Union.
Since that time, and growingly in recent years, the Soviet
Union behind the shield of tight security, has been arming in secret
with the objective and expectation that its military power would be
largely invulnerable to counterattack U they initiated an aggression.
At the Summit Conference 1955 in order to relax the
growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack. the
President advanced the !Open Skies proposal.
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That proposal was Summarily rejected by Moacow and Soviet
security measures were relnforced.
Thus the Soviet has been armingin secret while our counter-
defensive measures in the field of armaments were largely matters
of open knowledge.
The ordinary means of intelligence were largely ineffective
to gain the information about Soviet armaments which were ease tial
to our survival and to the survival of the Free World.
As early as December 1 1954, a project to construct a
high-performance reconnaissance plane was initiated. The first U-2
flew in August 1955.
By this time the results of the Summit Conference were
known and the likelihood of r�alizirg anything from the "Open Skies"
project became negligible.
We were then faced with a situation where the Soviet were
continuing to develop their missiles and missile bases, and their
bombe bases without any adequate knowledge on our part.
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This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable
both from the point of view of adequate military preparatiot on our
par,t,tO meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being
� able effectively to take counte action in the event of attack.
Any state 17,316 the duty to take the measures necessary for
survival, and we received a high directive to gain vitally required
� intelligence by every feasible mean
Meanwhile by espionage the Soviet had been endeavoring to
penetrate our nuclear and certain other secrets and observing the
details of our own military establishment.
A policy decision was then reached that the U-2, should be
used to obtain information with respect to vital targets within the
Soviet Union as conditions permitted. As Mr. Herter has indicated,
this project had competent policy approval. The details and timing
of missions were left for determination by those most competent to
judge the highest priority targets and the right weather, rarely
available in many parts of the Soviet Union.
"
-2
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Since that time there have been a cortsderabe number a
successful flights over the Soviet Union. over Communist Ch,ina.
and over the Satellite areas. Many square miles of strategic
territory in the Soviet Union and Comtramist China have been
photographed.
Essential information has been obtained with respect to
the development a the Soviet mLsUe threat; its bomber bases; its
nuclear establishments and other highly strategic targets.
Mr. Bissell under my direction and that of Genera Cs.bell,
has been in charge a this project, He will describe the flights in
more detail, and selective photographs a the results of these
znissions will be shown out of a total of thousands available to us.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/24:
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