HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF MAY, 1960 AND INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO VOL. 1

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000601290003-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 139
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 27, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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Vol#41
Obr littitrh fttr.,0 rt-tatr.
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Committee on Foreign Relations
HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE
OF MAY, 1960
and Incidents Relating Thereto
Afternoon Session
MAY 2 /1960
Washington, D. C.
WARD & PAUL, INC.
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
8-4266
NATIONAL 8-4267
8-4268
8-4269
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115.
AFTERNOON SESSION 2:30 p.m.
(Present: Senators Fuibrighto Carlson and Lausche)
The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
Mr. Secretary e there are one or two statements in
your own statement I would like to have developed a bitp
for clarification.
On page I2e at the bottom of the page of the mimeographed
statement you say as follows:
"Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course
must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part.
Proponents of a Peaceful course should be encouraged by
our readiness to get on with outstanding international
business in a sober and rational manner."
Into which of these groups do you include Mr.
Khrushchev?
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
SECRETARY OF STATE (RESUMED)
Secretary Herter, That I think would be very difficult
to answer categorically.
(At this points Senators Gore and Hickenlooper
entered the hearing room.)
There have been a good many estimates made as to whether
or not he really means some of the things that he has
said with regard to peaceful coexistence? with regard
to disarmament and other matters. There is another group
that feels that this is a front for the same power line
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that Stalin used to take.
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s-take 13-2
mtadk I dont think it is possible yet to answer that
categorically.
I think that events are likely to show which of those
groups he belongs to.
The Chairman. Who did you have in mind when you wrote
that? Maybe you cant cagegorically for all time designate
him, but what has been your view and the view of the Department
as to which group he belongs in. I think that is rather
important as to how we treat him. Is it in our interest
to discourage him? If he was a member of the aggressive
course, I suppose it would be. If he is a member of those
who are proponents of the peaceful course, then it would be
(:) to our advantage to encourage or be cooperative within
limits. I wondered why you put that in there if you didn?t
have some idea of who does belong to these groups or how
It is constituted.
(At this point, Senator Mansfield entered the hearing
room.)
Secretary Herter, What I was trying to describe here
was in effect a middle course. Insofar as Mr. Khrulhehev
Is concerned, I think those who have dealt with him directly
are convinced that he is ganulnely in favor of a disarmament
program, that he genuinely wants, for the sake of developing
the economy of Russia, a reduction both in expense from a
monetary point of view and from a human point of view, of
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the great burden of armaments.
(At this points Senator Lausbhe entered the hearing
POO .)
Secretary Herter. Certainly there I would put him In
the second category. His more recent behaviors however, has
shaken my belief that this Is entirely genuine, and, as I say,
I think that only the events of the next few months and
possibly even of the next few years can give a final answer
to what you lhave asked.
The Chairman. Can you identify any other members
or any people you had in mind in these groups?
Secretary Herter. No. I would rather have those who are
real Russian experts do that Wind of identification, those
who are familiar with the individuals, more familiar than
I am.
There is no question but what there are still
The Chairman. Would you care to have Mr. Bohlen
comment on this question?
Secretary Herter. I would be very glad to have himsif
you wish to.
The Chairman. It would be very good to have him comment.
11.
(:) He is recognized, is he not, as one of our best Russian
nd unstad experts?
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Would you care to comment on this; Mr. Bohlen?
.Mx. Bohlen. Mr. Chairman my ,experience has been it is
not always possible to identify trend in the Soviet Union
with individuals. As the Secretary said earlier we
literally know nothing of what goes on in the
hierarchy. My impression of the statement the Secretary
made is that it is possible to detect trends. You cannot
identify people with them. my experience with the Soviet
officials is that they follow whatever the agreed line isa
whether it is hard or whether it is softa with great
consistency? and they just do not reveal sufficiently to
any foreigner what their inner thoughts are to identify one
individual with one trend or another. But I think the indi-
cations are that both trends exist.
The Chairman. Well? don't you think we know more
about Mr. Khrushchev than any other one. More of us have
seen him. He has been about more than any other. Don't
you have any view as to which of these groups Mr. Khrushchev
would be identified with?
Mr. Bohlen. Well? my acquaintanceship with Mr.
Khrushchev was when I was in there as Ambassador when he
was not quite as prominent as he is now. I would merely
say that he, along with them are excellent actors?
and are able to maintain whatever the
common line is in their dealings with foreigners. I think
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also there, is a quePtiOn pg time. .. 0140, as. .i7,11P events. of
Paris showed :4W14t there have 7bPPP qPX:4P Vlig0 p. emphasis
inside the Soviet Unison which were manifested in part by
what they .did in Paris,
_(4t this pointe Senators Williams and Wiley entered
the hearing room.
Therefore: it is conceivable that Mrathrushchev would
have been entirely serious in the line he was pursuing prior
to Pariss and be equally serious in pursuing one diametrically
opposite to it.
The Chairman. If I may interpolate: do you mean that
prior to the U-2 incident that Mr. Khrushehev may have been
identified with the second group, that is proponents of a
peaceful course.
Mr. Bohlen. I would not segregate out the U-2 incident
alone: Mr. Chairman. I think as put in the Secretary?s
statement there seemed to us to be three elements involved
in this matter and I think it is difficult to assess the value
of each. But certainly I would say his doubt as to the
success from his point of view of the summit conference, the
fact that I feel a logical deduction that some of the views
voiced by the Chinese Communists had supporters within the
Soviet hierarchy and the U-2 incident brought about this
change.
/ have no difficulty --
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The Chairman. _I didn.?t. wish to make. you review all that
was .said was merely trying to find the inner meaning
of this particular statement. I thought that I could elicit
some clarification since many of us don't know about these
proponents of these courses or any groups of people.
Mr.' Bohlen. The answers Mr. Chairman, is that I think
we don?t know. That you cannot tell whether X0 V.? or Z in
the Soviet hierarchy, what particular line he advocates
because he never takes any differences even a shade of
difference publicly, with what is the agreed line. It is
quite impossible. I believe for anybody to tell who, within
the leading group stands for one trend or the other. YOU
can only detect from external evidence that there appear
to be certain divergent trends and the individuals may not
remain the same.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. One other statemente
MI. Secretary, on page 50 point 2: The decision not to
suspend this program of flightse as the summit meeting
approached? was a sound decision."
Can you tell us who made that decision and when and
of the circumstances?
Secretary Herter. That is a decision that I think has been
a decision that has carried over the whole four year period.
Here, sir0 we get into certain technical aspects of
when these flights would properly be conducted and could
not be conducted? but I think for technical reasons
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had better be kept in executive session.
The finding of a good time of a flight of this kind in
relation to current events is almost impossible if you
(:) know in advance that it is going to fail.
The real issue was how urgent was the information
and is there any one time that is more favorable than another?
From a technical point of view it was our time was more
favorable at that time than another. From a diplomatic
point of view, it seemed to me that with the President
scheduled to go to Russia later, with the fact he had the same
difficulty e when you had Khrushchev here you had the same
difficulties, in effect you would run into one time after
(:) another where diplomatically it would have been a bad
time.
The Chairman. I donut think I make myself clear0
understood from your previous statement and others that the
program was agreed upon, and it was running along without
being suspended. But this statement seems to leave the impli-
cation that a specific decision was taken not to suspend
them in view of the conference approaching.
Was such a decision taken?
Secretary Herter. That I caret tell you0 I was not
a party to that.
The Chairman? Well, this says "The decision not to
suspend this program of flights, as the Summit meeting
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approached:, wasa sound decision."
Was there any decision taken"not tg susPend it?
Secretary Herten. I know that when the matter came
before mer which was some time previous from the point of
view of the continuation of the program? when conditions
were appropriate: I did not interpose any objection
to it because of any diplomatic event that was coming
up.
The Chairman. Is it fair to say then no specific
decision not to suspend them was taken? It was allowed
to go? along without any decision being taken to suspend them.
Secretary Herter. I think that is correct.
The Chairman. Therefore? the other way around is
that no positive decision was taken not to suspend theme
is that correct?
Secretary Herter. That is right.
The Chairman.: : That statement: I think, needs
clarification. I think to mee it means that at some point
prior to May 1.4 a specific decision was taken not to
suspend them in view of the summit. Isn't that a legitimate
interpretation of that sentence?
Secretary Herter. I think that is correct. May I read
what the President said on that subject: He said As to
the timing4 the question was really whether to halt the program
and thus forego the gathering of Important
information that was essential and that was likely to be
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unavailable at a later date. The program went forward."
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14 The Chairman, Then that decision was made by the
;or
President,
Secretary Herter. Oh, he was certainly consulted with
(:) regard to the continuation of the program.
The Chairman. Do you know when that was made?
Secretary Herter. No.
The Chairman. Was it prior to May let?
Secretary Herter. I couldngt tell you.
The Chairman, Mr. Secretary, do you know whether there
was a moritorium on these flights during the meeting at Camp
David?
Secretary Herter. No. As far as I know, that question
never arose.
The Chairman. So that there was not, as far as you
know?
Secretary Herter. As far as I know, there was not.
The Chairman. I believe that with regard to this
matter about Mr. Lincoln White did not know that Powers might
be alive, that would be with regard to the last question
before we recessed. Did Mr. Hagerty know whether or not he
was at that point?
Secretary Herter. That I will have to ask Mr. Dillon to
answer. I have no direct information.
Mr. Dillon. I have no way of knowing whether Mr. Hagerty
knew or not. In the ordinary course of business, a telegram
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such as the one which informed us of this rumor its only
AOC.
a rumor that we had received through other diplomats in
Moscow -- such a telegram would have been transmitted for
information to the White House staff.
Whether Mr. Hagerty knew about it or not, I donft
know.
The Chairman, Mr. Secretary, was any effort made on
the part of our Ambassadors or anyone from the Department
after the incident, to pursue Mr. Khrushchev's feelings?
Was anyone instructed to approach him and express any
regret or in any way to reconcile him, to forgive or overlook
this incident?
(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Morse enters
the hearing room.)
Secretary Herter. No, I don't know of any such thing.
The Chairman. No approach was made?
Secretary Herter. No.
The Chairman, Mr. Secretary: what were the considerations
which led to the decision: not only to assume responsibility
for the flight, but to imply that the flights would continue
in the future?
Secretary Herter. I have to take responsibility for the
statement that was interpreted and If I may, I would like to
read you exactly what was said on that score.
This is a statement that was interpreted that we were
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p.
going to continue the flights:
"The Government of the United States would be derelict
ri to its responsibilities, not only to the American people, but
wit
to free people everywhere if it did not, in the absence of
Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible uni-
laterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise
attack.
"In fact, the United States has not and does not shirk
this responsibility."
That is the statement that was interpreted that we were
going to continue the flights, and it seems to me it was a
pretty far-fetched interpretation.
The Chairman. Then do you mean that that statement, that
you did not intend to convey the view or the possibility that
the flights would be continued, is that correct?
Secretary Herter. No, what I was saying there was just
what I have testified to today; that from the point of view of
our own interests and that of the whole free world, it is
essential for us to do whatever we properly can in order to
acquire information to avoid surprise attack or to be prepared
for it.
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tor- The Chairman. But in view of that statement, do you think
e I4-A
that Mr. Khrushchev could accept it and continue the
conference?
Secretary Herter. Yes, I certainly do if he had
wanted to.
The Chairman. Do you think our President would accept
such a statement from any other power?
Secretary Herter. If he wanted to go to a conference?
Certainly.
The Chairman. My time is up.
Senakw Wiley?
Senator Wiley. Now in relation to that last question,
the President suggested time and time again open skies
arrangements hasntt he?
Secretary Herter. Yes,
Senator Wiley. That means that planes would be flying
over our country and over every other country where it is
necessary. Again, I go to the subject that I think Is most
Important, because some quoted and I quoted on the floor of
the Senate the other day the biblical verse that a little
child shall lead them. I had a group of children from Oshkosh,
Wisconsin, that I was talking to. After I talked to them,
I opened myself to questions. One of these girls said,
"Senators if we stop taking these flights, how are we going
to get the information that is going on back of the Iron
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Curtain?"
Well, I think all America is asking that question,
and I am satisfied that if we realists, as I think we are
becoming more and more, that we are not soing to go up
lot of blind alleys about this and that , and about lea- was
or what wasnIt said/ we are going to face the situatiun head
on and simply say we want to be adequate and alert and we
want the Kremlin to know the facts as they have now for,
I think about, three and a-half years as I think the facts
are that we have been putting these planes over. Khrushchev
knew it at the time that he was up at Camp David, and certainly
knowing could have interferred with him holding the meeting
if he wanted to, having the knowledge then. Do you think my
conclusions are correct in that respect?
Secretary Herter. I do.
Senator Wiley. I didn7t get the import of the questions
when I came in that apparently referred to some different
groups. What is the name of the young man that defected the
other day? I guess that is what you call it. He testified
on one of the --
Senator Lausche. Meet the Press.
Senator Wiley. Meet the Press. It Is a long Russian
name. I put what he said into the record today. But one
of the important things he brought out, and. I would like
to get the former Ambassadors attention on this, as that
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there is a group of young people growing up in Russia
that have different Ideas, and he was about to go into detail
on it when time ran out. But among other things, he Is the
one that said, and this Is important, he said some two years
ago that he didntt think -- well, the time I haventt gots
but some months ago he said that Khrushchev and the powers
in being would not permit the President to come to Russia.
They would find some excuse.
Now, that is all in what he said over the wire here
a couple of weeks ago. That confirms, I presumesyour own
idea that when Khrushchev came to Paris, it was already
decided that he was going to throw the bombshell, and he
would refuse the invitation and so forth, is that right?
Secretary Herter. That is right.
Senator Wiley. So this is something that didnrt result
from the shooting down or the downing of the plane.
I want to ask you a question. Have you any definite
information as to whether or not this young Powers is alive?
Secretary Herter. No, sir. We have no Information other
than that which the Russians have furnished to us.
Senator Wiley. If that plane had been shot down, do you
think the instruments that he had with him would have remained
intact?
Secretary Herter. There, sir, I am not skilled enough
In the technique of shotting down planes. But I should think
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it is very doubtful if he was hit by a rocket whether either
he or the plane would have come down intact.
Senator Wiley. Is there any thought that perhaps they
have the plane? They claim they have the Instruments
ard they have shown something which wasnit the plane. Do you
think they havethat intact?
Secretary Herter.. They have shown a laterphotograph
of a .plane which those who built the plane feel is the
Plane itself. They have also shown pieces of the plane
in. Gorky Park in oscow when they invited all the d5p7,:cmats
to come and look at i, and I think our people ,7ee1 that that
is a geniune part of theytane.
Senator Wiley. I want to ask the ;:e-vmer Ambassador --
es it true that the youth in Russ1A, the new class of youth
is gv.ewing-ep like this fellow eaid, that someone said if
he were privileged to carry on that answer he would have
said they are not satisfied with their standard of living
they are not satisfied with the little opportunity they have
to express themselves in the political life of Russia? Do
you know whethe2 Oat would be true or not?
My. Bohlen, I Odnk it is a fair assumption, Senator.
3f courtier as you know, the possibilities for contacts in
there dung the period I was there were considerably less than
they are now. The country is still totally controlled by
the mechanism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
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They control all modes of expression by press, meetings, or
anything else, so it is very difficult to get any overt
signs of the feelings of the youth or any other section of
the population.
But there are certain indications that the youth are
looking forward at some time in the future to considerably
different circumstances. They hope for better material conditions
and also undoubtedly hope for a period when they will have
more freedom of expression and more ability to participate
in the political life of their country.
But this is very hard to document because people .do
not talk openly and freely_ in the Soviet Union.
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,.$enator Wiley. _Well, you know that .the ferment generally
is all ever this world. You know that the, President of
Turkey has been kicked put. You saw that today0. and you
know what is happening elsewhere. Is there any reason why
that yeast or ferment should not be operating in Russia
among the youngsters?'
Mr. Bohlen. There is no reason why it should not be
and it is a logical assumption it is. But I should also say
that the controls in a society like the Soviet Union are
very tight indeed and I have seen no sign that those
controls axe breaking down or weakening to the point
where the party is not in complete control of the situation.
They are able to stifle? if you will, or hold in check
this ferment due to the nature of their system.
Senator Wiley. Out of the two hundred million Russians
how many of them do you think belong to the Communist
Party?
Mr. Bohlen. I think the latest figure is somewhere
in the neighborhood of 8 million.
Senator Wiley. Thank you. That is all.
The Chairman, The Senator from Montana?
Senator Mansfielo Mr. Secretaryo it has been reported
that at the House hearingso you said there were indications
that even before May 6 the Russians planned to scuttle
the conference.
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Nowe it seems to me if we are going to estimate the
importance of the incident in the conaPse of the summit:
we need to fix the date when these indications in any
(:) significant fashion began to appear. I would appreciate
then in the interest of saving time, yes or no answers
to certain questions which I am about to ask unless
there is a need of an elaboration.
The first question: .Are you aware whether any member
of the Cabinet or the President had any reason to believe
on May 15 when Ithrushchev made his demands for an apology
and so forthe that he would come to Paris and leave as he
did.
Secretary Herter. No,
Senator Mansfield. Were there any indications that
Khrushchev planned to scuttle the conference before the U-2
plane was shot down on May 1?
Secretary Herter. No.
Senator Mansfield. Did Khrushchevas Baku speech
precede or follow Mr. Dillon's speech to the AFL-CIO
Convention?
Secretary Herter. It followed it.
Senator Mansfield. Would you classify Mr. Dillon's
speech as very much in the spirit of Camp David or would
you say it was an excellent0 forthright and anti-Communist
statement somewhat Oblivious to the spirit of Camp
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David: the kind of speech which any official of the State
Department might have made before that historic meeting?
Secretary Herter. That I can"c qualify with a yes or no
answer, Senator.
Senator Mansfield. You can to into detail there.
Secretary Herter. I would say this/ that Mr. Dillon's
speech was almost a requirement as an answer to the
allegations that had been made by Mr. Khrushchev against
Adenauer and the Germans and his continued repetition
which I have given the chronology of: of the fact that they
were going to take this unilateral position sooner or later with-
out its being an absolute ultimatumon the subject of Berlin,
Germany.
Senat)r Mansfield. In other words/ Mr. Secretary/
speeches which you and Mr Dillon made were a counteraction
to the gradual hardening of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches
in the period preceding that?
Secretary Herter. Entirely.
Senator Mansfield. Did Secretary Dillon propose that
a U-2 flight be undertaken prior to the summit conference?
Mr. Dillon. No.
Semtox Mansfield. . Mr. Dillon/ as acting Under Secretary/
were you aware beforehand of the scheduling of the U-2
flight over the Soviet Union on May 1?
Mr. Dillon. No0 I was not aware of it.
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I waP aware that ,:her was a PrPgram
of flights that might? take Place at scMe time when the weather was
right hut / think I was informed,Cf that malrhe a Month or,twe
before this actual timet and I had nothing to dt? With it after-
wards because I didn't in the ordinary course of my duties.
Senator nansfield. .our knowledge was, in effects general
knowledge?
Mr. Aillon. Yes.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Herter happening to be out of
the country at the tine was, I assume- unaware of any specific
flight but perhaps had general knowledge that these flights
were being undertaken and had been over a period of years.
Secretary Herter. The first knowledge I received was
when I was in Ankara I didn't know there was a flight
under way. All I heard was this same report that a plane
was down.
Senator Mansfield. Now both of you have had general
knowledge of this: Would it be a fair assumption to
?
says despite the fact that the President undertook: in a
certain sense: personal responsibility for this particular
flights that he: too: likewise, had only general knowledge
but that because of his position as the Chief of State:
he would be held responsible under any circumstances
because of his position of responsibility?
Secretary Herter. That is correct.
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mot I. juat qualify pne thing? ?When you say ,he was
familiar with this.partipplar flight and his timing, so
far as I know all of us were familiar with alternate possi-
bilities of flights but not this particular flight as such.
Senator Mansfield. That would apply to the Department
of State and the President.
Secretary Herter. That is correct.
Senator Mansfield. From what legislation or executive
orders or both, was the authority for these flights of
deep penetration derived?
Secretary Herter. Well, presumably from the act that I
have here before me I am told that this applied to two
specific acts. The one that I am particularly familiar
with, that I had a moment ago is the one creating the
Central Intelligence Agency. The other is the National
Security Act.
Senator Mansfield. Would it be possible to have
copies for the record at this point?
Secretary Herter. Yes.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, I ask that they be
included in the record at this point.
The Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, by what authority
have these flights now been suspended?
Secretary Herter. Senator, I have now got before me the
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National SeouritY'Aot Of. X947: and if ,you wish me to
read thepextinent paragraph I glad to do sp.
Senator Mansfie10. Nos would just like_te have the per-
tinent parts incorporated in the executive record.
Secretary. Herter. Right.
Senator Mansfield. Now the question to rePeats by what
authority have these flights now been suspended?
Secretary Herter. By direction of the President.
Senator Mansfield. By a presidential directive.
Could we have a copy of that for the record?
Secretary Herter. Yes I assume so, I don't know
whether it was given in writing or whether it was done by
word of mouth.
Senator Mansfield. Well will you look into it
and see what you can do to comply with the request?
Secretary Herter. Yes,
Senator Mansfield. Will this order suspending the
flights automatically remain in force after President
Eisenhower leaves office and until it is superseded by
another order of some future President?
Secretary Herter. It could be. The Presidents
responsibility as Commander in Chief which gives him
the right to give an order of this kind would, of course
expire with him. It would only be through some treaty
obligation that there would be a binding commitment on the
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part of the United States to carry beyond his term.
Senator Mansfield, Do I understand you correctly then,
to state e that this order would automatically die ulth the
leaving of office by President Eisenhower s and become
effective again would have to be once again initiated by
the next President?
Secretary Herter. I think so. I believe another
President would be free to do as he sees fit.
(At this point: Senator Humphrey entered the
hearing room.)
Senator Mansfield. Have Russian experts in the executive
branch suggested the possibility that Khrushchev's position
at home may have become seriously undermined?
Secretary Herter. Yes.
Senator Mansfield. Do you believe that the U-2 may have
been a contributing factor to this undermining?
Secretary Herter. It may have been. May I elaborate
on that?
It may have been in the sense that it must have been
a great shock to both the military and to the civilian leaders
in Russia to find that they had been as open as they were
for such a long period of time.
Senator Mansfield. And to him as well.
Secretary Herter. To him as well.
Senator Mansfield. If Khrushchev should be forced out of
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power.0 is it their thinking that his successor, the Russian
expert P 1.14 the, DePartrflent: that hLs,,ucesoro i4 liKelY
to be a man more amenable to friendly and peaceful dealings
with the Wept?
Secretary Herter. That si y cannot answer categorically.
I think that thatis a pure mattes of guesswork.
Senator Mansfield. All right.,
Whate in the view of our Russian experts is the most
probable coalition of influential forces in the Soviet union
andjh world Communism that could bring about Khrushchev's
downfall?
Secretary Herter. There? sire I am afraid of my own know-
ledge I could not answer that. If you would like for
Mr. Bohlen to answer that, he is as good an authority as we
have on the subject.
Senator Mansfield. If you wille Mr. Bohlen, but before
you doe I would like to throw out indications that perhaps
the militarye the Chinese Communists and forces of that
kind might be considered.
Mr. Bohlen. Senator, / honestly in all sincerity
it is not possible to answer that question. I think in
(:) events dealing with the Soviet Union in view of the secrecy
and general secrecy prevailing in the Communist Bloc it is
only after the events that you can hope to trace them
beck and see what particular influences have seemed to
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have brought about given decisions., There is literally no
way in which kfcreilner. can ascertain what.the varying
degrees of, influence 0 all factoXs whliqh go Ant!) the,
making of any particular event. If I, might I will give.
you one illustration of secrecy. I was not there but in
June 1957 for ten days the Presidium of the Central Committee
and the Central Commitee itself met in a violent inner
row which resulted in the expulsion from both of those bodies
of Molotov e Kaganovicho Malenkov and several others.
This went on for ten days in Moscow and no foreigner
in the Capital and mighty few Russians knew anything about
IL.
We had trained observers there. There was an extremely
alert U.S. press corps and not one of them got any inkling
of this major development. This / merely cite to show the
degree of secrecy and if you are trying to get these
things you are in truth looking into a crystal ball and
a very cloudy one at that.
Senator Mansfield. What you have said Mr. Bohlene
is a reinforcement of thoughts you have previously
stated in response to questions propounded to you by the
Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. Bohlen.
- That's right, sir.
Senator Mansfield. And once again that secrecy is so great
there that it is impossible for a Westerner to find out
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what goes on in many instances until after the fact is
accomplished.
Senator Mansfield. Ip it the view of the experts in
the Department) the Russian experts that Khrushchev, even if
he remain P in power will now take a bardex line a reversion
to cold war type tactics in dealing with the Western
nations.
mr. Bohlen. The indications at present are, and
am speaking at present, that this not necessarily will be
SO.
I think we can expect a propaganda campaign. The
indication frcm his own statements and from such information as
we have received from Moscow is that there seems to be
no determined policy to return to the
depths of the cold war at this time.
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Senator Mansfield. Would you say that if that reversion
does take place, taking the opposite tack from what you have
just said, and is pushed by the Kremlin or Khrushchev or his
successor, that it will make more difficult the maintenance of
peace?
Mr. Bohlen. It would if it returns to a line that we
would call the lowest phase of the cold war, it most certainly
would, Senator. However, there are degrees in this thing of
return to the cold war situation which are impossible to assess
and which might not materially increase the danger of war. But
if it went all out, sealed off the Soviet Union and the
Communist bloc from contact with the outside world, attempted
to exert pressures wherever they thought they could do so, I
think undouratedly a much more dangerous world situation would
be created.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions
but I donut want to take too much time.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?
Senator Hickenlooper. I donut have any questions at
this time.
The Chairman. Senator Humphrey, did I overlook you?
Senator Humphrey. I came in late, Senator. If any other
Senator wants to go, it is all right.
The Chairman. Senator Morse, are you ready?
Senator Morse. I will yield to Senator Humphrey.
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T-16 Senator Humphrey. If the question I ask, Mr. Secretary,
s-2
has already been asked, just brush it aside. I dont want to
take any of your time on that.
Did anyone ask as to whether or not you had any personal
knowledge of the U-2 flight?
Secretary Herter. Of the program?
Senator Humphrey. No, of the particular flight.
Secretary Herter. It was included, I said it was included
I am sure it was included in a group of flights that I had been
asked whether I had any obje ctions to them.
Senator Humphrey. If you wanted to, could you have
effectively vetoed such a policy?
Secretary Herter, No, I could only have given my advice
to the President.
Senator Humphrey. Would the Vice President be aware of
these decisions?
Secretary Herter. I think that in the matter of the
National Security Council, he was aware of the program in the
larger sense. I doubt if he was familiar with any of the
individual flights as such, but he may have been.
Senator Humphrey. The reason I asked that question was
.chat the Vice President intimated on a television program, I
believe the day before the President announced in Paris) that
the flights should continue, and the next day the President
announced that he had already cancelled them.
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The Vice President said they would continue, and the next
day the President announced that they had been suspended.
What I am asking is, would the Vice President, as a member
of the Security Council, have any opportunity of knowing the
decision that had been made by the President?
Secretary Herter. There, the days followed so quickly
one on another that I just couldn2t answer that, whether that
opportunity would have been offered or not.
Senator Humphrey. Let me see if I can -- what I am trying
to get at is the policy making machinery.
We have a Subcommittee, as you know, that is studying the
policy making machinery of the government, the Jackson Sub-
committee..
am a member of that Subcommittee.- We had, recently
before the Subcommittee, Mr. Kendall. We have had many of the
prominent officials of government and former officials of
government.
The program of the flights, the reconnaisance flights,
was an established program, apparently was agreed upon by the
Security Council, is that correct?
Secretary Herter. The Security Council was aware of it,
yes.
Senator Humphrey. The Vice President is a member of the
Security Council?
Secretary Herter. Yes.
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146
T-18 Senator Humphrey. If the Vice President states on a
s-4
television program that he understood that the.. flights would
continue, yet the President announced the next day in Paris,
that as of the previous Thursday they had already been suspended,
do you think there was any lack of communication between the
responsibile officials of this government?
Secretary Herter. There, sir, I am trying to think of the
dates.
The Thursday on which the President gave that order was
the day that I went to Paris. I went to Paris that night.
The President followed two nights later and whether or
not in that two day interval anything had been distributed with
(:) regard to that order, I just donut know.
Senator Humphrey. Do you have any changed views, Mr.
Secretary, as to the value of the so-called Summitry diplomacy as
a result of this recent meeting?
Secretary Herter. I think as a method of carrying out
negotiations it has taken a hard knock.
Senator Humphrey. Have you any idea as to how we are
going to proceed in the months ahead? I heard the Presidents
address. It was a good address. He gave a good accounting.
He talked about the necessity of maintaining our -- I believe
the word was business like relationships, or at least normal
relationships insofar as we can -- with the Soviet Union.
Is there any projected plan as to how we will proceed with
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s-5
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our contacts with the Soviet Union?
For example, we have the Cbneva Conference still in
session on the nuclear testing. I suppose the Disarmament
Conference is still a reality.
Is there to be any adjustment in these conferences, any
changes? Are they to proceed according to the past?
Secretary Herter. Yes, the President, I think made that
very clear in his statement.
Senator Humphrey. Are there any plans for any type of
a high level Foreign Ministers9 Conference of Sub-Cabinet
officers?
Secretary Herter. As of now, there is not. I may add
this with regard to the Summit; that the four nations that were
involved in the Summit were the four nations who, as a result
of the decisions and agreements reached after the war, were the
four nations that have the responsibility for Berlin and for
the final settlement of the whole German question and that is
the reason for those four, essentially getting together.
It is possible that again they will have to get together.
Wbether normal diplomatic changes would make progress or Foreign
Ministers meetings in advance would make program so that it
would be worthwhile for them to come together, I just cant
tell you. That is always a possibility. But almost any other
subject, there are many other nations that are involved beside
those four, and it is a great question in my mind whether or not
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that method of coming together for the resolution of problems
would be fruitful in the future.
Senator Humphrey. In other words, what you are indicating
is that a Summit Conference ought to merely be the ratification,
essentially the ratification of decisions that have been
tentatively arrived at at the normal diplomatic levels.
Secretary Herter. In my opinion, that is the most
desirable thing.
Senator Humphrey. I agree. How do you explain, or is
there any explanation for what appears to be a contradictory
bit of evidence ofGromyko7s blustering up at the United Nations
on the Soviet Resolution and yet, the Soviets apparently
conciliatory behavior in recent days with respect to the quick
release of our plane and flyers who strayed into East Germany
and the recent broadening of Soviet-American exchange projects?
Secretary Herter. There again, you have got one of those
contradictions. As I was saying earlier, the fact that the
attitude of the people in Moscow and even the officials with
whom our Embassy officials have to deal, have been entirely
normal since this incident.
It is very hard to reconcile with the very harsh words
that both Khrushchev and Gromyko have uttered.
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3antor-take Senator Humphrey. Do you lay any credence to the doctrine,
I6-A
or at least an observation that has been made, that while
the Soviet tactics may change for awhile, that insofar
as their general over-all strategy is concerned, that It will
remain pretty much the same as it has?
Secretary Herter. Certainly as far as their objectives
are concerned. I think It was quite clear from some of this
documentation that will be put into the record, that is
the speeches that were made by Mr. Rhrushchev, that he had
laid greater and greater emphasis on the eventual trimph
of Communism over the world, and that he put particular
emphasis on that in recent months before the Summit.
(:) (At this point, Senator Case, of New Jersey, entered
the hearing room.)
Senator Humphrey. I have a letter from a tentleman
who is a professor emeritus of a university up at Bennington
College, who has had an uncanny record in my' years of
acquaintanceship with him in understanding what goes on In
the Soviet Union. His name is Dr. Bernard Tauev. He is a
former social Democrat of some 35 years ago from Austria,
a professor of politcal economy, now retired, He mi5nitors
(:) Soviet broadcasts, studies Soviet literature, particularly
photographs and what-have-you. Just to Give you a little
background, he predicted to me some three weeks, I guess it
was before it happened/ the removal of Beria. I have a letter
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2 here from him right before me, and it is a letter telling
how Mr. Khrushchev was going to scuttle the Summit Conference,
written on April 25th, this letter is. And I also have a
letter from him here which indicates that this -- he says,
"The Soviet leader will now do everything possible to prove
that Eisenhower is a war-mongerer and an imperalist aggressor
and not a man of peace, in action not merely in words. We
must, therefore, prepare ourselves for all kinds of provocations
all around the world."
His thesis is that Khrushchev had been selling the Soviet
people upon the idea that President Eisenhower was a man of
peace and man with whom he could deal. I dontt mean deal
in the sense of the crudeness of that word, but one with
whom he could conduct reasonably good negotiations, and that
when the President accepted the responsibility for the flights
and didntt accept the opportunity, at least what some people
say was an opportunity of removing himself fromthat responsibility
that Mr. Khrushchev took this as a very personal matter,
since he had staked his reputation in the Kremlin and in
the consuls of the Communist Party upon the fact that he
could work with Eisenhower, and that Eisenhower had in a sense
not merely upset the diplomatic applecart by referring to
this is Mr. Khrushchev, the explanation that is given to me
here that Mr. Khrushchev felt that Eisenhower had not only
upset the diplomatic applecart. But, more importantly, from a
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subjective point of view of Khrushchev put Khrushchev
in a very difficult position with Communist Chinese,
with the Right Wing Stalinists in the Soviet Union, so. that
Khrushchev is now making a personal crusade out of attacking
the President.
What is your view of this? I am going to give you this
letter. I have a thole series of these, and this Is a very
remarkable man, may I say.
At this point, Senator Aiken entered the hearing
room.)
Senator Humphrey. For example, I have a letter from him
two weeks bePore the recent shake-up in the Soviet Union
which was not too fundamental, but indicating some of the
changes that were going to be made, by a very careful analyst
of broadcasts and meetings and literature. I had this man
down to see the late Senator Walter George some of you may
recall, and he was very helpful at one time. What is your
view of Mr. Khrushchevts reactions lately to the Presidents
the personal venom that he seems to exhibit?
Secretary Herter. I am particularly interested in two
things, Senator, in the letter that you have just read; one,
the fact that it was written before the U-2 incident.
Senator Humphrey. Yes.
Secretary Herter. In which this authority cites the
fact that Mr. Khrushchev was going to scuttle the conference.
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end unstad
firs-take
17 fls
152
Senator Humphrey. I think that substantiates essentially
what you were sayinis this morning, your own observations
on this.
Secretary Herter. Yes. The second has to do with the fact
thc't the President dldnit accept the way out which Mr. Khrushchev
appeared to offer him. My own feeling with regard to that
second matter is that it was very much of a trgp. That what
Mr. Khrushchev thought might happen is that the President
would disclaim personal responsibility and that then
Mr. Khrushchev would say. "The situation is even more dangerous
tun I thought, because this means that that same little frantic
group in the Pentagon" -- and that is the phrase that he used
in his press conference-"is running the government of the
United States without the President knowing about it, and
that makes our situation even worse" and he would have
inveighed in exactly the same terms and asked the President
for exactly the same apologies and punishments which he
asked for later.
I think that the element of personal pique certainly
played a part in the whole show.
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xs-take 17-1
The Chairman. The Senators time is up.
The Senator from Kansas.
Senator Carlson. Senator Aiken
The Chairman. I am sorry, the Senator from Vermont.
Senator Aiken. I won!t take long.
Speaking of the reaction of the rest Urthe world, have
you made any analysis of the reaction of the other countries
of the world relative to the collapse of the Summit meeting?
Secretary Herter. Yes, I think we have. It isntt, of
course: complete. This will mean a study from a great many
nations and bring this altogether in one place.
I think that: perhaps, the best indication has been
the attitude among the representative?s at the United Nations
where you have got a cross-section from the rest of the world.
From the very outset of the Russian complaint there it was
very obvious they weren$t going to be able to get any votes
from their calling this an aggression, except Soviet bloc
votes.
Some of the smaller countries, two of them, abstained
in the final vote for reasons that were of a rather different
nature.
But,by and large, we have heard no sympathy from the
point of view of what you might call the uncommitted nations
or the free nations of the world for the attitude that
Mr. Khrushchev took.
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2 Senator Aiken. Are you satisfied we have not lost
the prestige throughout the world, as a result of or lost
more than Russia has.
Secretary Herter. May I say, sir, that in my opinion
our alliances are firmer than they have ever been.
Senaor Aiken. What was the significance of the shake-up
in the Russian government prior to the U-2 incident, I believe,
last April, was it not, when Mr. Kozlov was promoted, and
coupled with that question, why don't we hear anything
about Mr. Mikoyan any more? Has -he been isolated or jut
got out of thenews, or what has happened with him?
Secretary Herter. Mr. Bohlen, who is our expert,
is also the tenstrof the document,; 80 I am afra.1.d he has
gone out of the room at the moment.
With regard to the disappearance of Mr. Mikoyan,
we have been told this is just a normal vacation he has
taken down to the Black Sea. It is true in years gone by
he had taken rather extended vacations there, and whether
this is true or not we cantt say.
With respect to the shake-up, I think the only significance
that it had were that two of the strengest members of
the Central Committee were sent to other responsibilities
and this may haVecbeen a personal strengthening of
Mr. Khrushchevts power within the Committee itself. But
154
it was not considered very highly significant.
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Senator Aiken. That is Mr. Kozlovfs promOtion, is
not significant?
Secretary Herter9 I donft thSnk so. I didnft know that
he as such had been promoted.
Secretary Herter. Well, a long time ago, I think vhen
Mr. Averill Harriman was visiting in Russia.
Senator Aiken. Yes
Secretary Herter. He reported that Mr. Kozlov
had been pointed out to him by Mr. Khrushchev as his
successor, saying that he and Mikoyan were too old to carry
on and that Kozlov was the number two man. But there w.a.s no
telling whether he was saying ,;'hat seriously or whether he
was being flattering about it because Mr. Kozlov was
thre at the time.
Senator Aiken. I thought he made the best impression
of any of our Russian visitors last summer. At least when
he came before this Committee/ I thought he did.
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I have no further questions.
The Chairman. The Senator from Oregon.
Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I think it would be hlepful
for this record If you made a statement in regard to the
functions of NASA, and the part that NASA played in connection
with the U-2 flight.
I,dopt. think the record is very clear what the
functions of NASA, and what juriSdiction, if any, the State
Department has over NASA and what the relationship between
NASA and the Security Council is, and the State Department,
Secretary Herter. NASA, as you know, is an agency devoted
entirely to the peaceful development of satellites and outer
space vehicles of one kind or another.
Its operations have now been separate out from what
were called purely military operations, althoughlt is
always inevitable in the development of boosters that there
should be an Interrelationship between the two, because
the military vehicle and the peaceful vehicle have tot
the same problems of propulsion to get up into the air.
The witnesses of NASA, of course, will be before the
Committee.
most of the U-Vs
are used by NASA In connection with pure4 scientific work,
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meteorological work. Actually, the Japanese Government
found them tremendously valuable in tracing the course of
tornadoes last year, and I think that NASA put out at least
three publications on their findings from the U-2 weather
observations.
With respect to the actual development of events
in relation to NASA s I am sorry to say that I can,t give you
arst-hand information.
Perhaps Mr. Dillon can supplement that as it occurred
while I was overseas and when Mr. Dillon was in charge.
Mr. Dillon. All I can say is as far as I know the
State Department didn,t have any direct relationships with
NASA on this matter, and the relationships that there were,
were handled by the Central Intelligence Agency
so either Mr. Dulles or the NASA witnesses
themselves will be able to inform you on that.
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Senatr Morse. Why would NASA make a statement in regard
to this plane if it was under the jurisdiction of CIA.
,Mr. Dillon. On the cover story it was ip the,open,
it was .under the jurisdiction of, NASAJ the plane Was. ,
Actually, or this oPera'cion it ,was under the jurisdiction of
CIA
Senator More. Thereforeo NSA a in your opinion?
was acting within the proprieties when it issued the statement
that it issued.
Mr. Dillon, r think so, yes.
Senator Morse. You think it had cleared that statement
with CIA or had authority from CIA to issue it.
Secretary Herter. I think so.
Mr. Dillon. They should have, as I understood the
matter, these guidelines to answer questions were prepared by
CIA. They were gone over with State Department people a day
or two before. We had thought that NASA was going to
handle this in the way of answering questions, which we knew
they would get, because this was a NASA plane, and
they apparently chose instead to forestall the questions
just by putting it all out in the formof a statement.
Senator Morse. I raise the question because I want to
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do what I.could in order to clarify, the record in regard
to the allegation made that there is not the best of
coordination between the State Departments CIA: Pentagon
Builiang and now NASA, and that there may be a need for a
centralization in the State Department of the authority
to authorize any statement by any of these agencies in regard
to a situation such as this, because of some possible
reason to believe that if this had been centzalizedmore
we would not have been having different statements coming
from different agencies.
Mr. Dillon. We were not aware, actually of the
fact that NASA was going to mlke as formal a statement as
this, and it was somewhat of a surprise.
The Chairman. I could not hear that answer.
VW. Dillon. I say we were not aware of the fact that
NASA was going to make such a formal statement as this,
and I am not sure that the Central Intelligence Agency
was either.
Al/ the relationships -- as I said in my original
statement, there was coordinations there was a decision that
the statements were going to be made by the State
Department.
That decision was taken and made known to the other
agencies concerned, which were the Department of Defenses
and the Central Intelligence Agency then on the morning
of May 5th.
The Central Intelligence Agency had the relationships
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with NASA and undertook to pass that on which we had no
relationships so far as NASA. was concerned. They didn't
know we were in this things and somehow, this statement
was put out by NASA somewhat more complete than we expected
but it was along the lines of the material that they had
been furnished.
Senator Morse. Turning to a question that Senator
Humphrey asked and may I assure you that I am quite non-
political in raising thate I am only seeking to find cut
who had knowledge of what in regard to the mattero I refer
to the May 27 issue of the WashingtonPosto in this article
by Mr. Roberts in the course of which he said "Nowhere
in the three and a half hour television program did
Nixon refer to any presidential direction inthe U-2
crisis other than his approval ofthe flights some years
earlier. Nor was there any reference to his own part in
the affair. Nixono of course? sits in the National
Security Council. Nixon did say that he was privy to
the U-2 reconnaissance policy, and I do endorse ite and
he also said el knew about this flight.'"
Nowe my interpretation, Mr. Secretarye of your testimony
is that neither you nor the President knew of this specific
flight going to be taken at the time that it was takene but
that you did know that there was a general program for such
flights and that this flight could be considered as a part
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of that program.
Now I ask you do you have any reason to believe that
Nixon knew anything that you and the President did not
know and that maybe just an unfortunate use of language when
he says nI knew about this flight", and that he probably
means that he knew about the general program of reconnais-
sance.
Secretary Herter. I would assume it was about the general
program rather than tout the particular flight.
Senator Morse. But as :Ear as you know the National
Security Council did not brief its mnbers in regard to
any particular flights without also notifying the President
in regard to specific flights.
Secretary Herter, No I think the National Security
Council was only aware of the general program.
Senator Morse. Are you a member of the National
Security Council?
Secretary Herter. Yes, I am.
Senator Morse. One final question at this round, Mr.
Secretary: As you know 10 along with everyone else, I
think, who has the interest of peace at heart, am very much
concerned about long continuation of this nuclear armament
race.
Do you think that the United States and the Western
Powers on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, can
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continue this nuclear armament race with its constant
increase and Acceleration for another ten years, and not create
the great probability of war.
Secretary aerter. I don't know about the great
prambility of ware Senator but I would say certainly
increase the chances of war.
Senator Morse. I know we are of one mind but I want the
record to show it, this particular one mind: Do you agree
with me that our generation simply has the responsibility
in history to find some honorable way to end this nuclear
armament race?
secretary Herter. I agree with you completely on that.
Senator Morse. Do you think that we ought to do every-
thing that we can to try to get the United Na ions to
exercise greater jurisdictional authority in connection
with this whole matter of armament race than We have
been able to get it to do so far?
Secretary Herter, Senator? some time ago, I made a
speech in connection with disarmament in which I stated my
views as to the great necessity in the following years to find-
ing some answer to thise and at the same time finding an answer
within the framework of the United Nations of an authority
which could maintain the peace with law and I still feel that
just as strongly as I did at the time / made that speech.
Senator Morse. Mx. Chairman? my time is up and I want
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to make a request for data if I may.
The.,, Chairman Certainly.
Senator Morse,. This morning we talked about the cases
that we bed offered to take to the World Court.
Senator Wiley. A little louder: Senator.
Senator Morse. This morning you talked about the cases
that we were willing to take to the World Court. I wonder
if the State Department can compile for the committee the
record in regard to the World Courts operation: both
on the cases it has handled and the cases that we have
offered to have it handle that have been rejected by Russia
or any other power.
(.) Secretary Herter. Yes, we will be very glad to do that.
The Chairman. The Senator from Kansas.
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Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, recently one of our
Nations financial writers, writing on the conditions of Russia,
wrote that Mr. Khrushchev was proposing a devaluation of the
currency as of January 1st, and he stated that no nation tampers
with its currency unless they are in financial difficulty.
What do we know about. the financial and economic condition
of Russia that would lead us to believe or do we know that he
is planning on devaluating the currency?
Secretary Herter. This, I hadnyt heard at all. I hadn3t
seen that particular statement and I hale seen no where in
any report any indications that they were planning to devalue
their currency.
There is no question but what their foreign exchange rate,
their official rate, dont correspond with reality. They have
got two rates: one an official rate and one a tourist rate. They
are very far apart. One is four rubles to the dollar and one
is ten rubles to the dollar. But from the point of view of their
internal financial situation, I have heard no reports they were
planning to devalue the ruble.
Senator Carlson. We have had evidence that there is social
unrest among the people, thinking that they are entitled to better
living conditions, better homes and housing.
Do we have any evidence of that?
Secretary Herter, Yes, I think there is. But this is
a matter that Mr. Bohlen testified to a few moments ago.
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Senator Carlson. That there is?
Secretary Herter. There is evidence of that. As Mr.
Bohler said, it is impossible to get documentary evidence as
such, because of the secrecy and the discipline in their
society, but I think that every visitor to Russia who has
had a chance to talk with the workmen or the students at the
university and so on, have come back with that feeling.
After all, Mr. Khrushchev has made a good many statements
about the necessity of increasing the standard of living of
their people.
In their incentives that they offer from the point of
view of their workers, better living conditions in these
housing projects is one of the principal incentives that they
have been offering in the past, giving people priority if their
particular sections of a plant do particularly well from the
point of view of production, they will be advanced to better
living quarters.
think that the urge for better living quarters and a
better standard of living, more consumer goods, is a very real
one.
Senator Carlson. Does the State Department have any evi-
dence of a labor shortage in Russia based on a statement that
was recently made that Mr. Khrushchev reduced his military
strength because it was necessary to get some of the people
back into the labor market?
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Secretary Herter, Yes. Very recently there has been
a study that I think will be made available to you, made on
the whole question of the labor problem in Russia.
It is an extremely interesting one from the point of view
of the present situation and the relationship of women at work
compared with men and the very large excess number of women
over men that exists in Russia today.
There is certainly every reason to believe that Mr.
Khrushchev9s announced reduction of the Armed Forces was an
effort to increase the male labor force by taking the extra
men out of the Armed Services when he said he was planning to
reduce from some three million, six hundred thousand down to
two million, four hundred thousand; that the principal purpose
of that was to get a larger working force.
Senator Carlson. Is it not reasonable to assume then:
that Mr. Khrushchev does have some problems, internal problems,
and that that may have some effect on his actions and his
decision at Paris?
Secretary Herter. That undoubtedly is true. He has had
some other internal difficulty that you undoubtedly know about,
Senator, in connection with the new land that was planted: an
area that has not been too successful and this was something on
which he had backed very heavily to increase the food supply of
Russia and I think he had been rather heavily criticized
because it hadn9t worked out as planned.
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T-18 Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman,
3-4
The Chairman, Senator Gore?
Senator Gore. Returning, Mr. Secretary, to the examina-
tion of whether there was a breakdown in coordination and
administrative procedure, I would like to inquire when you
personally first learned of the President os order that the U-2
flights would be discontinued?
Secretary Herter. At the time that he gave it.
Senator Gore. When did he give it?
Secretary Herter. My recollection is that it was
immediately after a meeting at the White House on Thursday
morning at about noon.
(:) Senator Gore. Did he give the order to you?
Secretary Herter. No, he did not give the order to me,
think it was through General Goodpaster, but I am not quite
certain.
Senator Gore. How did you know that it was given?
Secretary Herter. I heard him.
Senator Gore. You heard him give the order?
Secretary Herter. Yes,
Senator Gore. And this was on Thursday?
Secretary Herter. This was on 'Thursday.
Senator bre. Then you do not know whether this in-
formation was communicated to the Vice President?
Secretary Herter, I have no idea.
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Senator Gore. He was not present?
Secretary Herter. He was not present.
Senator Gore. Was this at a meeting of the Security
Council?
Secretary Herter. No, I don9t think it was the Security
Council. I think it was at the meeting immediately after the
Security Council at which there were three of us present.
Allen Dulles was not present and I have forgotten -- I think
Gates was present after a Cabinet meeting it was.
Senator Gore. I didnit understand.
Secretary Herter. After the Cabinet meetin
Senator Gore. After the Cabinet meeting?
Secretary Herter. Right,
Senator Gore. That settles that. You heard the order
issued, and I will have no further question as to where it was
issued and to whom. If you heard it issued to Secretary
Gates, that settles one question specifically.
But you do not know whether the Vice President was in-
formed about ii%?
Secretary Herter. Excuse me
Senator Gore. Did you wish to add something?
Secretary Herter. No, no.
Senator Gore. You do not know then whether the Vice
President was informed about it?
Secretary Herter. No, I do not.
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Senator Gore. On this question of coordination or lack
thereof, in addition to NASA and the State Department, to
which Senator Morse referred, there is the State Department,
NASA/ Mr. Hagerty and officials within the Department and
perhaps others.
Did Mr. Hagerty operate in this field strictly as Press
Secretary or did he undertake some Executive function?
Secretary Herter, I know of no Executive function that
he assumed.
Senator Gore. I would like to ask Mr. Dillon when -- well,
will ask you.
Was Mr. Hagerty present when the President issued the
(:) order that the flights would stop?
Secretary Herter, No.
Senator Gore. Do you know if he knew about it?
Secretary Herter I cant tell you.
Senator Gore. Are you aware of the fact that the New;
York Times carried a story the next day that such an order
had been issued?
Secretary Herter. No, Ididnit even know that, I left
town that night, I went to Paris that night.
Senator Gore. Do you know, Mr. Dillon, if Mr. Hagerty
knew about the order?
Mr. Dillon, I am not aware whether he knew about it or
not, no, sir.
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Senator Gore. Are you aware of the fact that he, in
press parlance, Knocked down the New York Times g news story
that such an order had been issued?
Mr. Dillon. I was not aware of that, no.
Senator Gore. You were not aware of that?
Mr. Dillon. I assume it is correct since you say so, but
I w as not aware of it.
Senator Gore. And neither of you know whether or not
Mr. Hagery, like Mr. White; was speaking without knowledge?
Secretary Herter. Senator, may I ask you is the New York
Times story a quotation from Hagerty?
Senator Gore. I dont have the exact quotation. Does the
staff have it?
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that the staff
may find the reference to Mr. Hagerty and Mr. Restongs story
and insert it at this point in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The quotation from the New York Times is as follows:)
COMMITTEE INSERT
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T-18 6,-Alator Gore. Mr. Dillon, on May 5th Mr. Hagerty told a
s8
press conference that the State Department and NASA would issue
statements. Were you aware of this?
(:) Mr. Dillon. I have very recently learned that he indicated
that NASA would issue a statement as such.
It was decided that the State Department would issue a
statement. I hadnIt been aware that he had said we were.
But it had been decided and he knew it had been decided that we
were going to do it.
Senator Gore. You say you very recently learned this.
How recently?
Mr. Dillon. I think a day ago or i;oo days ago that
someone from the press said that he had told the press when
they were there that NASA would issuP a statement, so that
they could get their information from NASA.
Senator Gore, Did Mr. Hagert suggest to you that the
State Department issue a statement?
Mr. Dillon. No, it was decided when we first heard of
this, this news, as I said earlier ni.11 morning, at this
National Security Council meeting or right after it that was
held outside of Washington, that the State Department would
handle the publicity on this, and that we would make any
statement that would be made, and it was known at that time that
we would make a statement.
Now, Mr. Hagerty was not at the Security Council meeting,
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but he was at that area out there where this exercise was
taking place and so he was aware of the fact that the State
Department would be making a statement at noon that day at our
regular press conference time.
Actually, the statement was delayed forty-five minutes.
It was made at 12:45 when our regular daily press conference
took place.
Senator Gore. Was it decided there that NASA would make
a statement also?
Mr. Dillon. It was not to my knowledge, .no. It was not
decided there that NASA would make a ,Statement.
Senator Gore. Who made that decision?
Mr. Dillon.. I think that you have to ask NASA. I donut
know, who made any such decision.
The fact is, as I have said earlier, I thought that NASA
would answer questions.
I didnIt know they were going to make a statement until
I saw it.
Senator Gore. You donut know whether NASA or whether
Mr. Hagerty made that decision?
Mr. Dillon. I have no idea, no. I would assume NASA
made it because we did know that NASA would have to answer
questions because this was a NASA plane that was lost and the
reporters were going to find out how high the plane flew, what
kind of a plane it was, anything they knew about it and we had
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given them -- the Intelligence Agency had given them good
answers on how to answer such questions.
Senator Gore. You say you assume this. You did not
know it?
Mr. Dillon. I knew they had given them that material.
I knew that as a fact: but we did not know that they were
going to use that and put it into the form of a statement as
it actually came out.
Senator Gore, But Mr. Hagerty did know that a statement
by NASA would be made?
Mr. Dillon, I dongt know that what he said meant that
he knew they were going to make a formal statement or whether
he was just tains that as a phrase, indicating that they would
answer questions.
He may have thought they were going to make a statement.
I just dont know that. He may have called them up and asked
them, I dont know,
Senator Gore. Did: in fact: both the State Eepartment and
NASA make statements subject to Mr. Hagertygs notice to the
press that they would do so?
Mr. Dillon, The State Department made its statement and
NASA made one about three quarters of an hour later: yes.
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EXPUNGED
CP TO. 4/16 M. IUD
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?Fetatcr =Leo. Ny Lime io up, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senaber Wi1liams7
Senator Williams. No questions.
Th Chairman. The Senator from Ohio.
Senator Lausche. When did the Camp David meeting take place
with Khrushchev?
Secretary Hertor. am terribly sorry --
Senator Lausche. When did the Camp David meeting take
place with Khrushchee
Secretary Herter. That was in September as I recall
it.
Senator Lausche. Did Khrushchev since May lst, make
any statements indicating that the Soviet had knowledge
of American reconnaissance planes over their territory?
Secretary Herter. None.
Senator Lausche. Based upon his statements and upon
the knowledge which he claims the Soviet possess at day
was it that he understood the first American plane flew over
theSoviet?
Secretary Herter. I can't identify that. My recollection
is that when he was in Paris he made the statement tha: he
knew about these overflights at the time thathe was at Camp
David and that he thought there was something fishy about
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President Eisenhower at that time.
Senator Lausche. Well,, then at Camp David he did state
that at that time he knew that our planes were flying over
the Soviet.
Secretary Herter. That is at he said later when he
got to Paris.
Senator Lausche. When he, got to Paris?
SeoretarY Herter. When hP gPt to PeriP. He never
mentioned it at Camp David or at any time between Camp
David and Paris.
Senator Lausche. Well, if he knew at Camp David
that our reconnaissance planes were flying over the
Soviets and he said nothing about its can you give
any reason for him remaining silent on the subject?
Secretary Herter. He was asked that question in a press
conference in Paris?
(At this point? Senator Hickenlooper left the
hearing room.)
I haven't got here the exact words of response but I
think we could dig them out for yous and tell you just what he
said in answer to that himselfs but as I recollects he said
he felt that this was an inappnpriate moment to bring
it up but that he did think there was something fishy
about the President at that time.
Senator Lausche. Then at Camp Davide when he knew that
our planes were flying over his land e he was discussing what
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was to be the summit conference/ is that correct?
Secretary Herter. What he hoped would be the summit
conference.
Senator Lausche. And if we take him at his word at
that time he hoped to have a summit conference although he knew
then that we were supposedly committing a flagrant transgression
against his rights.
Secretary Herter. That is correct, from his own later
testimony.
Senator Lausche. Can you reconcile those two positions
as both being trues one that he honestly intended
to attend a summit conference and, twos that he knew our planes
were flying over his land.
Secretary Herter. HO, it would be very difficult
to reconcile the two. It ia very difficult particularly
to reconcile the tremendous issue that he made of
it later when he knew about it all the time/ ,according
to his own statement.
Senator Aiken. Will the Senator yield? You will find
it on page 16 of Khrushchev's statement that Twinings then
Chief of Staff sent a plane over Russia the day after he
left/ went into Kiev or whatever it is0 it is the third
paragraph on page 18.
Senator Lausche. Yes.
Your recollection is that the meeting took place last
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SepteMber. ?
Sec4etaxY.Hexter. Yes, sir.
?Senator 1,ausche. pow then, from September to May 14,
was that thP day he came to --
Secretary Herter. May 15 he came to Paris.
Senator Lausche. He came to Parise he said nothing about
this knowledge that he had supposed to have had while he
was at Camp David.
Secretary Herter. That is my recollection. I would
want to check on that. It is possible that he may have
said something at the Presidium meeting before he left
Moscow. My expert here tells me he did note and
that wasmy recollection that he had never mentioned it
until he got to Paris.
Senator Lausche. Can one rationalize the furor of
his resentment in May of 1960 compared to his admitted silence at
Camp David about simi/ar flights?
Secretary Herter No one cannot.
Senator Lausche. Mow then r last January 18, Dulles
appeared, Allen Dulles appeared before our committee, and
at that time he merely on the surface scratched what I
thought was a very vital question: The comparative ease
with which the Soviet gets information in the United States
and the impregnable wall that bars us from getting us in
the Soviet.
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ask you the question Mr. Herter, to give your
understanding of the facilitY with wh1Ch we get the, infor-
mation out of the Soviet, and that whidhthey get out of the
United States.
Secretary Herter. Senator, as you know, we have what
we call an open society. We are very proud of it in which
we have complete freedom of the pree's0 in which except for
matters of highest security, very freely talked dbout, and
a great deal is published.
Our technical magazines publish a great deal from the
point of view of vital military information. Our
installations in this country, while no direct overflights
are permitted, can be photographed with comparative ease from an
angle of one side.
Generally speaking we have had no restrictions at
all on travel in the United States except for a few
very small circumscribed areas, like the Atomic Energy
Agency plants, and we have had restrictions on Soviet
citizens traveling in this country which have been taken
entirely as a retaliatory measure because of the
limitations put on the travel of Americans in Russia.
Senator Lausche. Right.
Secretary Herter. The Soviet Society, as you know,
is a closed society, where one moves and goes only where they
tell you you can go or when they tell you you can go.
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Senator Lausche. TAis morning in answer to a question
assuming that a Soviet plane as over. gthe United Statesa
what We would do about it, You ee44 tbat there is no need
of them sending planes for reconnaissance PurPoses because
they can get that information without going through
that effort.
(Senator Williams left the hearing room.)
Secretary Herter. That is quite so.
Senator Lausche. That is they can go to Cape Canaveral
and pretty simply see what is going on there.
Secretary H rter. Well, sire there are newspaper
men down at Cape Canaveral all the time and a good
many visitors,
Senator Lausche. Now the fact is that The Soviets
still consider that secrecy and the security of:"
everything relating to their military operations is one
of their great assets a and they have no intention whatever
of changing that Those are the words of Dulles'.
"Moreover they have no intention of letting us into areas
of military importance."
That is there is a difference between the Soviet getting
information here and our getting it in the Soviet.
Secretary Herter. Oh a a very great difference. It is
the whole difference between an open and a closed society.
Senator Lausche. You had been asking for this Congress
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to pas a a bill that would give the State Department some
limited control over Communists going to the Soviet Govern-
ntent Is, that corre !t?
Secretary Herter. That is correct.,
Senator Lausche. And why have you asked that2
Secretary Herter. Because we felt that we ought to
have some control -- these are American citizens traveling
abroad -- that we ought to have SOMG contral over those
who may be going to various parts of the world
in interest inimical to those of the United States.
Senator Lausche. And you asked that because you have
in mind the grave dangers that lie in the ability of a
Communist to distribute information in the Soviet when
he makes the visit, if he so desires.
Secretary Herter. Yes s sir.
Senator Lausche. That bill has not been acted upon,
is that correct?
Secretary Herter. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. Is there any Wpe of legislation
that you feel that we ought to pass with respect to the
curtailment of theduties of the powers of the Central
Intelligence Agency or the expansion of them. If you have
given that subject no thought you can state it.
(At this point, Senator Aiken left the heatng
room.)
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Secretary Herter. have given it no thought. I hope
there wouldlis no change so far as the activities are concerned.
Senator Lausche. That is all I have.
The chairman. Mr. Secretary. there was One Statement
that 1 was told whenI was in Paris that anaccount of over-
flights of the Russian territory had been carried in the
French newspaper some 30 to GO days prior to that.
Have you ever heard of such account?
Secretary Herter. I think I heard the same reports in Paris
but I never saw any documentary proof of it.
The Chairman. Have any of your people tried to confirm
it?
Secretary Herter. Yes, but I have not heard it
mentioned by anyone exccpt when I was over in Paris too0
had not heard a word before that.
The Chairman.
In his speech of May 50 Mr. Khrushchev referred to the
U.S. overflight of July 2, 19560 April 90 19G00 and May 10
1960. He said that the April 9 flight caused concern
within the Soviet Government and resulted in admonishments
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to the Soviet military not to let it happen mgain.
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cant or-take
20
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3 The Chairman. This, again, raises this point that
puzzles me very much. The evidence is quite clear that
Mr. Khrushchev, if he didntt know positively, he certainly
(:) suspected that it was our planes that were going across his
territory, didntt he?
Secretary Hertez!. That is what I assume.
The Chairman. And it comes back to this point that
he hadntt raised such a terrible fuss about it until this one,
that is the May 1st flight which he shot down. .And, pin, it
occurs to me that you said you couldWt-reconcile his
difference in his attitude toward the prior flights to
the attitude toward the May 1st flight. But isntt the
reconcIliation, if it is explainable at all --E:am just asking
you if there Is one -- doesfit not lie in the fact that our
Government did take the position regarding the May 1st flight
and this program, that this is a deliberate program which we,
the President, takes responsibility for, and which we
intend to continue?
Secretary Herter. Not which we intend to continue. That
has never been said.
The Chairman. He interpreted it as such. Mr. Khrushchev
C.) in his statement, which I have a copy of here -- this is his
language. He says -- this is a quote from part of our documents
arich says: "At his press conference, Herter made an
outrageous statement. Far from feel guilty and ashamed of
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4 aggressive actions, he justfies them and says that he will
continue in the future. Only countries which are in a state
of war can act in this way. Herterts statement has made us
doubt the correctness of our earlier conclusions that the
President and the American Government did not know about the
flights. Herterts statement says that this intelligence plan
was encored by the Government."
At least that is the way he Interpreted it, and, as we
said bre --
Senator Lausche. Who is he? Who interpreted it?
The Chairman. This is a quote from Mr. KhrushchevTs
statement. He is interpreting what Mr. Herter said as
speaking for the Government. But is this not at /east a
possible reconciliation of the difference in attitude between
the prior flights and the May let flight?
Secretary Herter. It might be if one wanted to interpret
the words that I spoke that way. There was no need of his
interpreting those words that way. Certainly from what I said,
that is a very far-fetched interpretation. I think he was
interpreting it for his own purpose that way. I think that
the one reconcilable feature between those two things is
that in one case he had specific evidence and in the other
case he did not.
The Chairman. Then it is your position that neither
your statement or the Presidents press conference can
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5 legitimately be interpreted as an endorsement and justification
of the flights and a policy of pursuing them In the future?
Secretary Herter. Certainly not the policies of pursuing/
them in the future. The Presidentis statement that was made
in Paris said it was perfectly clear from what I had said
and from what he had said that there was nothing that allowed
that inference.
The Chairman. Did you in your background nem conference
in Paris on Sunday; May the 15th -- I repeat the same statement
that you had made prior thereto In Washington.
Secretary Herter. I was asked at that background press
conference whether or not I had made a statement that we
would continue doing this. I repeated the very words that I had
teed In my statement. I said I stood on those. That did not
Imply that we would continue.
The Chairman. Prior to that second statement; Mr. Khrushchev
had so interpreted it. Were you aware that he had so
Interpreted it in his statement to the Presidium?
Secretary Herter. I think I may have been; but if one
took cognizance of every interpretation of his of everything
that happens in this country one would be spending all ?nets
time trying to correct his statements.
The Chairman. You believe that it is an unreasonable
and far-fetched interpretation of your statement or the
Pres1dent9s in his press conference that these would be
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continued, is that correct?
Secretary Herter. Yes, I do.
The Chairman. Is it or is it not a fact that the press
in this country interpvted it in that same fashion?
Secretary HerteroI am told that some did and some did
not.
The Chairman. It might have been wise for us to clarify
at that time so that we both interpreted it properly, dontt
you think?
Secretary Herter, That, as I think I have indicated
earlier, referred to the cessation of the flights and not
resuming the flights. The President had reserved to state in
Paris in conjunction with the fact that he was going to offer
at the United nations his plan for aerial supervision of all
nations that would be willing to submit to it.
The Chairman. Do you believe that any head of State
of any important nation at least could proceed with
negotiations at a conference under the situation at least as
he interpreted it, that is that we intended to continue
such flights?
Secretary Herter. After all, Mr. Ithrushchev arrived
in Paris and made an arrival statement there the Saturday
before the conference saying that he expected to proceed and
have fruitful results.
The Chairman. For the record, In order that It is clear
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7 what is involved here, I would like to read one sentences
the one which I think you clarified that is referred to
by Mr. KhruShchev, and I quote from the statement that was
maie by the Department of State on. May the 7th.
"The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate
national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecies
practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world."
I think that is the statement that led to the interpre-
tation, do you not?
Secretary. Herter. I am sorry, sir, I have got before me
now the stement of May 7. Which were those words?
The Chairman. It occurs on page 12 of the background
documents prepared by the staff, the first paragraph at
the top of page 12.
Secretary Herter. .That does not in any way intimate
that they would go on.
The Chairman. You do not believe that that could
reasonably be interpreted as meaning that they will continue?
Sec:Jetary Herter. No,
The Chairman. My time is up.
Senator Wiley?
(At this point, Senator Gore withdrew from the hearing
room.)
Senator Wiley. Mr, Secretary,. I have listened to
this examination, and as you brought outs Mr. Chairman, I think
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8 that what we had better do 2. get down to what I think is
the basic issues not what was said or particularly done,
but let ts see what Khrushchev did.
On April 28th, al what has been called the speech
at Baku, an examination of that speech shows clearly that
the Soviet Government had come to the conclusion that It would
get nowhere at the Summit Conference. Now, listen to this:
"Overnight all the government-controlled radio stations"
and get the date, May 25th -- "all the controlled radio
stations and newspapers in the Soviet Union began to prepare
the people for a summit failure, and flatly blamed the west.
The same bitter tones which Khruahchev used in Paris is
to be noted in what he said at Baku."
And Baku was days before.
"In a violent attack in Baku on Secretary Herter
and under Secretary Dillon, on that same day, the Soviet
Premier intimated that he planned to use military power to
enforce the pronpactive seizure In the West."
I am quoting him.
"If the Western Powers refuse to sign a peace treaty
with the German Democratic Republics they will not retain
the rights and preservation on which they are insisting.
They naturally will forfeit the right of access to West
Berlin by land, water aid air."
In another portion of his speech, theSoviet Premi:e
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practically admitted that he had no hope of reaching any
agreemnt at the Summit Conference.
He said:
"The nearer the day, May 16th, the heads
of Government are to meet, the more one-sided is the approach
of certain statesmen of the Western powers of problems before
the conference."
Then he goes ahead and gives examples attacking
Herter and Dillon.
(At this point, Senator Carlson withdrew from the
hearing room.)
Senator Wiley, Now, I want to quote this. This
morning I called your attention to this young Russian that
stepped out from the inelligence department of the Russian
Government, that was heard .He said, and I quote, "The Soviet
Communist regime is In no way interested In allowing
so popular a man as the American President to come to the
Soviet Union. They are definitely afraid of the impact such
a visit can make on the people."
Now, If the issue is what caused Khrushchev to shoot
his wad, so to speak, I think it is very clear that when
he found out, one, that he couldntt make and impress upon
his associates that were to be at the conference, two, that
Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese were ready and Mao Tse-tung
laced him up and down before this conference, as the record
shows, when he found out that they adnIt want it; and, three,
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10 that he was having trouble with his own gang in Russia; and,
four: that the youth of Russia were simply getting all fed
up: he decided before he went to Paris that he was going
to let the balloon go up.
(At this point, Senator Gore entered the hearing room.)
Senator Wiley. It wasntt the question of U-2. That may
have given them the ostensible opportunity to blow his top,
but, as a matter of fact, he was already to go days
before. Now, if that is the fact, and I think it is sustIned
by the people who weigh the evidence, then there is no need
of our inquiring into what some folks feel. They may be a
little remiss hither and yon in our own public service. They
were laboring under deep pressure. When you put yourself
In the Presidents boots and go over there and see what he
took you have got to say, HGod bless him. He held his temper
and he handled himself so that he made all America and all
the world proud,' arid the result was as suggested, that the
record now shows. Look at the UN, look at Britain, what they
say about it. And the answer is that I think we should just
out stop our investigation and not try to ball up further
the issue.
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The p44i4man. For the record I will pay that the President
on yesterday morning, hp heartily endorsed this inquiry.
Senator Wiley. That what?
The Chairman. ,The President himself said in my
presence that he heartily endorsed this inquiry, and if the
Senator wishes to take issue with the Presidents why I suggest
he talk to him about it.
Senator Wiley. Oh,no. I heard him say that. I am
not disputing his saying it. I am just simply saying that
where do we go from here now?
Are we going further, are we going to try to ball
up themency that gets the information, that has
done such a tremendous job that three and a half years
has given us the information.
The Chairman. I think the Senator misunderstands the
purpose of this meeting. It is not to. ballup anything.
It is to try. to clarify a situation fox the benefit of
the committee and the Senate and the country. And I
know of no one who has the slightest purpose:In balling
up anything.-
Has the Senator completed his questions?
Senator Wiley. Yes, but I am sorry that I probably used
that expression. What I meant was confuse, and if there
is going to be further evidence would you mind telling
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me who the next witness is?
The Chairman. There will be no other witnesses this
afternoon.
Senator Wiley. Well do you expect to call some later
on?
The Chairman. Yes Mr. Dulles is coming on Tuesday.
Senator Mansfield -- is the Senator through?
Senator Wiley. Noe that is the point I am making0
want to state in all sincerity ? gentlemen? it is your respon-
sibility if you want to call this man who has created this
agency under the mandate of the Congress ? that we have
appropriated money fox, and have not tied his hands
and he is the one who brought about this. let us be frank.
(Discussion off the record.)
The Chairman. The Senator is misinformed if he thinks
that is going to go in the public record. There was no inten-
tion at any time of putting this in the public record.
Senator Wiley. Did you hear yesterday when the
distinguished Senator from Ohio very plainly and bluntly
said that the leaks? and I belong to a committee where
have seen them go right from the committee room right out in
front of the fellows who have got the mechanisms for retaining
the -- fox giving the news now to me this is the first
time I have blown my top but I am simply telling you in
the interests of my country? I think you should not call in this
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other agency. I think that these gentlemen have told what
the public know now, it is all public c but to bring
in this other agency, I think would ba a mistake.
The Chairman. Does the Senator saya that he knows Senators
who have gone out of executive sessions before the microphone
and repeated what has been said here?
Senator Wiley. I am not putting my finger on any
Senators0 If you want to know what is going on what have they
got the television out there for and you are quoted every day
as appearing before it.
LWE, be frank and this is not the only committee
where they spill over the beans. But / am talking about
the Central Intelligence Agency, gentlemen, I happen
to know something about it, and I know what it means,
ane people over in the House know what it means, and
sincerely hope that you will not bring Dulles before youa
that is all I have to say.
The Chairman. Senator Mansfield.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, in an attempt to
clarify 30Me of the confusion which exists in some of
our minds I would like to ask some questions:
What is your present official interpretation of interna-
tional law as regards the extension of national sovereignty
skyward.
Secretary Herter. What?
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Senator Mansfield. What is our present official
interpretation of international law as regards the extension
of national sovereignty skyward?
(:) Secretary Herter. I donut think we have any.
C
Senator Mansfield. We have no international law in
that field as yet
Secretary Herter. That I know of. There is no definition
as to what is considered the atmosphere above the air.
There is no accepted interpretation or verbiage when
they are talking about the atmosphere.
Senator Mansfield. Would you think it advisable to
have an international conference or conferences to decide
the question of Sovereignty in the air over a country
and also the possibility of regulating the seas in
a more orderly fashion.
Secretary Herter. Wella as you knowa we have tried
for over a year to get the United Mations to get
the outer space committee organized and under way.
Senatr Mansfield. At our suggestion.
Secretary Herter. At our urging. We have been urging
that this be done. We have been pressing it. We have not
been able to make any headway because it was refused
continually by the Russians who refused to go alonga
first of all on the principles of the thing. There have
been further discussions of the thing but we have been unable
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to agree on who should carry it out. I think we are making
progress but it is still one,, of. those things, where
there is a constant dispute as to what shguld be. done.
(:) VQt only that IPA we.hoPe to ge.t it adjuated :n time
so that this. year. there can be, a great international scientific
Congress because youtedealing with now matters
that the scientists are expert in that the layman is
not, and they were unable to even allow the calling of
that Congress.
Senator Mansfield. Noe in other wordse as yet there
is no clarification of this particular matter.
Getting back to my statement concerning regulation of the
seas, we, of course, operate under the doctrine of
freedom of the seas. But what I have in mind is the
fact that it is my understanding that the Soviet Union
can launch missiles anywhere it wants to up within,
say2 three miles of our coastline if it is in our vicinity,
and we have the same right under international law to
fire missiles up to three miles, say, of Valdivostoke is
that correct?
Secretary Herter. Yes, and it deperds again on what
one takes as the territorial waters. Three miles have been
the generally accepted territorial limit. The Soviet
Government has claimed 12 miles and, as you know, the recent
Geneva Conference failed in reaching agreement among the
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nations as to what should constitute the territorial water
of different nations.
Some nations have gone much garthe4 than that&
particularly with regard tckfishing rights. .
Senator Mansgield. That's ght: Wt_whak= / TWF0
mind is_that times have changed considerablya even in our
generation.
Mr. Chairman maY we have order in the committee?
The Chairman. It is difficult to have order.
Senator Mansfield. In view of the fact we have these
satellites going skyward hundreds of miles and we
have these missiles going thousands of miles into the ocean,
9a000 miles wasthe limita it was because of these new factors
that I offered the suggestion that it might be well to have
international conferences to take heed of changed
conditions in this modern day.
We have also advocated as you are aware of peaceful
uses of outer space and we have made no headway.
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The,Chairman. Senator Gore?
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, the first question I wish to
pursue leads to a question of Mr. Bohlen, since others have
asked him questions and I wonder if I might ask if he return.
Mr. Secretary, Secretary Dillon testified this morning
that he did not know of this particular flight, and to the best
of my memory you said you were away at a time and did not
know of this particular flight.
Secretary Herter. I knew of theprogram, I made that
clear in which the flight was included but not that
particular flight.
Senator Gore. I was specifying this particular
flight. Did I correctly understand both of you?
Mr. Dillon. Yes, Senator. I had heard that there
was a series of flights about that would be undertaken about
six weeks earlier is when / heard of it, and I had not
heard anythingsince that time but it wasnot in my regular
order of business.
Senator Gore. Would you repeat what you said, I didn't
quite catch it.
Mr. Dillon. I said I was informed about six weeks
before the date of this flight, I say, that there was a program
of particular flights of which this one could have been a
parte and I did
GYM.
Senator Gore. It could have been but you did not know of
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this particular one.
Mx, Dillon. Ho:I did not know any more than that of this
particular.flight.
Senator. GOre The.TTesidons in.. is. statement to the :
American people) the other night) said this:
"As to tie timing: the question was really whether to
halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important
information that was essential and that was likely to
be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the
program should not be halted."
Now) as I understood your reply to the Chairman
of the Committee, you did not participate in the making of
a decision to halt or not to halt this particular
flight.
Secretary Herter, I had approved of it.
Senator Gore. On this particular program.
Secretary Herter. And approved of it as part of the
program. The question of the halting of it was rot in
issue at that time although know that the Summit
Conference was coming.
Senator Gore. Well my specific question is this:
Did you participate in a conference or were you aware of
a decision) did you make a decisive What is the full
extent of your knowledge of a decision that the flight would
not be discontinued.
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Socletary Herter. I. know of no conference at which
that mettGr was discussed.
Senator Core. Then would it Wm Pzoiler/Y,heen.--
,Secreteyy Herter. The only patter that came before
me was the approval of thit program.
Senator Gore. How long ago did you approve the program?
Secretary Herter I can't tell you exactly but it
was some tine prior to the time I went abroad.
Senator. Gore. Is it a matter of weeks?
Secretary Herter. A matter of weeks.
Senator Gore.
Would such a decision have beenProperly within the
province of the State Department?
Secretary Herter. No. The State Department would not
have a final decision in the matter. The State Department
wotld have an advisory position in the matter, and the CTA eq4A
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that have been made here today either.before noon or since
imply the opinion oS any of our colleagues that we are doing
other than performinq our duty as vie sep,i
I understood the purpose 9f :is hear ng Was to develop
the facts insofar as we were capable of.doingso and to the
extent that security would permit: to make available the facts
:o the American people.
Do I correctly understand the purpose of the hearing
The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee understands it
as I understand it in spite of the opinion E the Senator
fron Wisconsin.
Senator Lausche. Hay / aske is it --
Senator Wiley,
You night as well ju3t now.
3enator Lausche. is it confined to what our government
has done or are we concerned about what the Soviet has
done?
Tho Chairman. I certainly am concerned about WIfet the
Soviet has done.
Senattir Lausche. It hasn"a beenr-vanifested-hare,todayz
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The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee has the
floor.
Senator Wiley. May I just say one thing?
The Chairman. Does the Senator yield to the Senator
from Wisconsin?
Senator Wiley. As long now the storm is over, I
realize when I hit the ceiling before, that I was probably
not as coherent as I should be. I want to say to you with the
conviction of a man who has lived long, that the business of
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a committee .1ike ours is to develop facts for
Develop facts. 'Oat 4X.P.4eCeSsarY te.b.xing_qq4.CPXative
9X iZ you pleasel, if you mant to,investigate an
(in individualo that is anothzt thing. we had he,,
C
hearings. We know what that didy, but_here is another angle.
It is not the business of this CoMMittee_to exPose
to the People of this countrYs a mechanism that iso
important, toIreserve the life and ;integrity pf?this
countrY and I mean the CIAD I know whati means,
X happen to know somothing out what it has donee
and to mee at
leaste and az I saye as a young man of past 70 summers, please
remember that when you go into this thinge as you axe
going into it you are going to expose a mechanism that is
as vital to the life of this country as anything you can think
02.
It is that mechanism that made possible this series
of three and a half years of exploratory missions over the
Soviet Unione
If that is uhat you aze going into, just count your
words.
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Cantor.
s-1
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Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman?
The ala.irman. The Senator from Tennessee.
Senator Gore. Dealing with the CIA is not a new experience
for me. I happen to have handled in the House of Representatives
the appropriation Bill for the Atomic Energy Commission, for
five years before I was elected to the United States Senate.
I was party to the appropriation for the Atomic Energy
Program when the Atomic Energy bomb was being built in my State.
No one ever heard those secrets from my lips and every year for
the past fourteen, every year I have listened to the testimony
of the CIA from one to two or three or more times. I dont
think that it is necessary that we violate the security of
this country in order to hear Mr. Allen Dulles testimony.
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield? Mr. Dulles said
to this Committee when he was asked if he would appear, that
he would be very pleased to appear. He thought it would serve
a useful purpose. He had no objection.
Senator Gore. I will not continue this diaglog. I didn?t
want any implication to rest that because I was pursuing some
of the very important questions that reflect upon the effect-
iveness of our country and the prestige of our country, that
there was something unpatriotic or partisan in the purpose.
I thought this was the purpose of the hearing, to develop
the facts, and so far as they could be revealed to the public,
to do so.
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t22 The Chairman. The Senator is quite right.
s2
Senator Gore,
To return to the question, insofar as either of you know
or any official of the Department, no actual decision to proceed
with the flight or not to proceed with the flight was made.
If such a decision was made, it was beyond your knowledge.
Is that a correct statement?
Secretary Herter. Yes, I think that I ought to say this.
When the matter came before me, I had an opportunity of dis-
approving it and did not do so. Not it, but the program.
Senator Gore. But this particular flight did not come
before you?
Secretary Herter. As one of a group.
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Senator Gore. When did you first learn of its misfortune?
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s4 Secretary Herter. I received word in Ankara, Turkey that
a plane was down. That is all.
Senator Gore. From whom did you receive it?
Secretary Herter. It was handed to me from a slip of
paper that Mr. Livingston Merchant had. He was sitting behind
me at a NATO meeting and he handed me a slip of paper, "word
has come that
a plane is missing.
I donut think he said in Russia. I didrilt know which one
of the flights it was.
Senator Gore. Is it your presumption that this was
communication within the Department?
Secretary Herter. Oh, yes. I assume it was either in the
Department or from CIA sources with whom we are constantly in
touch overseas.
Senator Gore. I believe my time is up. I will return to
this.
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t-22
s6
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t22
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The Chairman, You had one question of Mr. Bohlen. He
was called back at your request.
Senator Gore. Yes. If I may digress a moment, I have
been told several times, Mr. Bohlen, that in your press
briefing at Paris, I believe on this 16th? that you expressed
the view that except for the U-2 plane, there would have been
a Summit Conference.
Will you relate to us what you said at this briefing in
this regard?
Mr. Bohlen. I dont recall, Senator, honestly that I
(:) made that statement --
/
- Senator W.:Ley. A little louder, please.
Mr. Bohlen, I donut recall that I made that statement.
The press briefing that I held on the 16th was an open press
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conference on the record, and I d o not recall any statement
of that kind because my view then as now is that the U-2 was
one of the factors that may have led to the particular Soviet
behavior at Paris.
I really do not recall any such statement of that kind.
Its all on the record. This was an open press conference.
Senator Gore. You did not hold an off the record back-
ground briefing?
Mr. Bohlen, I held a background later in which I outlined
at that conference the three factors that I believed and still
do entered into the formulation of the Sbviet position.
Senator Gore. Was a transcript made of that background
briefing?
Mr. Bohlen, I would have to check on that, sir. I think
there probably was.
Senator Gore. Would you supply it to the Committee if
there was?
Mr. Bohlen. If there is one, I would have no views on it.
Secretary Herter. I would have no objection.
Mr. Bohlen. If there is a transcript of it, but I recall
the circumstances very well in this, in that three factors that
I mentioned earlier, the Soviet pessimism as regards the outcome
of the Summit from their point of view; the possible opposition
or questioning of its conduct and the U-2 matters were the
three factors that appeared to me to have entered into Soviet
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t-22 decision to torpedo the conference.
s9
I might add: Senator, for clarification on this, we have
used the words "scuttle the conference" quite often
There are various ways of scuttling a conference. You
can scuttle a conference before it begins or you can sabotage
it from within,
Senator Gore. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
The Chairman. Does the Senator from Ohio have any
further questions?
Senator Lausche. Mr. Herter, I have in my hand the
National Security Act of 1947, ,and I have read from page 5 that
part of the material which deals with the duties of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Are the duties enumerated in this section complete?
Secretary Herter, Yes, I think those are enumerated
in that section.
Senator Lausche. This section did-it place any directions
on how intelligence is to be obtained.
Secretary Herter. No.
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t22
310
end
t -22
4:5
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firs-take 23 Senator Lausche. Based upon the questions that have
been asked here today, one set Implied that the President
should not have told the truth. The next set implied that
one of the men lied. And the third set Implied that there
was an inability to coordinate the views.
Now, my vestion is -- off the record.
The Chairman. Take it off the record.
We make a special dispensation. Whatever the
Senator wishes: does he wish it on or off?
Senator Lausche. Let it on. Has anyone given any
thought about the peculiar position that the Preident
of the United States is placed in in connection with the
paradoxical situation that he is supposed to be a man of truth,
and moral charactersand yet requested to Ile about these
matters, if they are within his knowledge?
Secretary Herter. I am not sure whether that is a
rhetorical question or whether you are asking me that question.
Senator Lausche. Well, take it both ways.
(Laughter.)
Senator Gore. Rhetorical or oratorical.
(Laughter.)
Senator Lausche. Well, letts assume that you were the
President, Mr. Herter, and you were faced with the dilemma
of telling a lie about what happened or telling the truth,
In either event you are hooked. What course would you follow?
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Secretary Herter. I can answer that one so far as
myelf am concerned.
The Chairman. He followed both.
Senator Lausche. I dont know. I am beginning to wonder
what the Central Intelligence Agency is doing ought
not to be a matter left with them and without the knowledge
of the President.
hamano other questions.
The Chairman, Mr. Secretary, I just want to make a
comment. The Senator from Ohio has put his finger on the very
po.tnt that galhaps I didntt make clear to him earlier in
my Inquiry. This is in my opinion a central important
(:) question about this whole matter. Is the wisdom of the policy
of Involving the President in this kind of business, that
is espionage, which traditionally involve lying and cheating
and murdering and violating the sovereignty of countries
wi.411 which you are not at war and all of this, and what
the SenatiJr has said -- is perhaps, I didntt make it
clear, but this is exactly the point that I was seeking to
raise and to elucidate in the first line of questions that
I asked. And I agree with him this presents a very difficult
dilemma, and the question is the wisdom of departing from the
traditional historical practice of not involving the head
of the state in any espionage responsibilities, that he is
above and apart from. We follow that in the Congress, as
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you have just stated.
We treat it differently, and I was
suwesting and raising the question of whether it is wise
to depart from the traditional practice that all important
states throughout history, without exception in accordance
with the Secretary's testimony have followed, and this Is the
very point. I dontt think the Senator understood what my
point was.
Senator Lausche. I knew if I were President
Senator Wiley. You would tell the truth.
Senator Lausche. I would tell the truth.
Senator Wiley. So did he.
The Chairman. He did and this is the answer.
Senator Lausche. And could you not expect him to do
anything else?
Senator Wiley. That is right.
Senator Lausche. An the only way you could enable
him to perform his duty to his country was not by having
him know what was done and if he didn't know the questions
would be pursued why didntt he know.
Senator Wiley. He taught the world a lesson in 1960,
new diplomacy, by telling the truth, pad I think that it will
echo down through the years.
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y'? ?
Simator Lausche. So I den know which group to
follow.
The Chairman. It is echoing down the years already.
This i the principal echo that has arisen from this whole
matter.
Senator Lausche. The tragedy Is that this is made the
principal echo but all of the misdeeds of the Soviet
are looked upon as inconsequential.
The Chairman. Well, the Senator Is entirely incorrect
In that statement. He draws conclusions that are not justified
by the record or any statement that I have heard before the
Committee.
Senator Lausche. Well, I can
Senator Mansfield, Can I ask a question?
220
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The Chairman. Do I inderstand Mr. Allenvsstatement
on the television program was not approved by you or by
the Acting Seretary?
-Secretary Herter. No, As I undertitand its this was in
answer to a quoction on a TV program.
. Senator Mansfield. Yes. I think we have the program
here. But could somebody on the staff find it right away
so that I could read It just as it is?
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, while they Ere looking
for its is it or Is it not the policy of the Department of
State that its employees clear public statements with regard
to delicate international relations before they make them?
Secretary .Herter. Yeas sir,
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The Chairman. It Is the policy?
Secretary Herter. It is. Any statement dealing with
fbreign affairs should be cleared with the State Department.
The Chairman. Then when they are made in this fashion
without clearance, it is not in accord with your policy, is
that correct?
Secrobary Herter, Well. as I say, this had not been
cleared with us.
The Chairman. He is an employee --
Secretary Herter. I think it is very possible that
a prepared statement had been cleared, but not an answer to
a question. There is no warofelaaring that, until one knows
what question is asked.
The Chairman. What I asked this for is because later
on it seems to me one of the important things that might
come out of this Committee hearing is a tightening of the policy
which gives the Department of State and the Secretary of
State a much closer control over public statements by other
agencies, and it strikes me that we would get in much less
trouble if all these people would clear with you or with
whoever is secretary of state or the department, we will
say. Dont you think that would minimize the chances of
inconsistent statements being made by members of the Government?
Secretary Herter. Yes, that is so. But I think that
anything that he may have said in a prepared statement on that
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7 TV program at that time had been cleared. Insofar as
answers to questions are concerned, there Isno way of clearing
them without knowing the answer and in that way he was on his
own.
The Chairman. It Is his responsibility, then, when he
goes beyond anything that had been cleared?
Secretary Herter. Yes.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, on page 35 of the back-
ground document on the Summit Conferences about 7 or 8
lines up from the bottom of the page/ Mr. Allen, in response
to a question from Miss Dodd states the following: "There
are a lot of different definitions of tspying t and I dont
want to ilry to quibble, but I do think I ought to point
this out and that more people ought to recall it: When he went
down he told exactly what his mission was and exactly what
he was expected to do, and he was under instruction to do
that."
Now, the Secretaryfs anowel, to the question, I just
thought it ought to be in the record, beause there was some
Jonfusion about this statement in view of information 'which
had been given to a group previously in the Capitol. Again,
I want to says Mr. Chairman, that I am through with my
questions of Mr. Herter, but I want to express my thanks
to Secretary Herter, to Secretary Dillon and to Ambassador
Bohlen for their candor and frankness today and to assure them
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8 that I, for one, appreciate what they had to say, and I think
they have made a real contribution to clearing up a
confused situation which confronted the Committee as a whole.
Secretary Herter. We are very grateful for that,
Senator.
Senator Wiley, Of course, on this side of the aisle,
I have vaisedyour statement in the beginning and I will
praise your conduct in the conclusion. You all did very
well.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman, Senator Gore.
Senator Gore. I do not wish to unduly tire the Secretary,
but I am perfectly willing to come back after dinner or
to come back tomorrow. I do have many more questions.
The Chairman. Well, it is my understanding the Secretary,
he looks very well to me, if he prefers to go on tonight
He does not wish to run over to next week.
Secretary Herter. I prefer to go on, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore, I dont think it will take very long
tonight.
The Chairman, The Senator may proceed.
Senator Gore. Fine.
(At this point Senator Lausche withdrew from the
hearing room.)
Senator Gore. twish to resume my inquiry with respect
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to this particular flight I am perturbed that you say
it would not be 'within the province of the Department of
State to make the decision to discontinue these flights;
that this would be the decision, a decision for Mr. Dulles
to make.
Secretary Herter. No:, I nevercaid that at all.
Senator Gore. I beg ywr pardon?
Secretary Herter, I never said that at alL I said he
was the operational man who had to plan things, and then submit
them for approval.
Senator Gore. Well, who would make who would be the
proper agency to consider whether these flights should or
should not be discontinued?
Secretary Herter, If the questron of discontinuance had
come up, if that was a decision to be made, we would have
been asked advice on it. We were not asked for advice on
it. We gave approval to carry on with the routine planning
that had been done from the point of view of flight.
Senator Gore. Some weeks plor?
Secretary Herter. Yes, and had given that approval,
Senator Gore. Did that approval --
Secretary Herter. That approval, as I say, is advice.
Senator Gore, Was advice?
Secretary Herter. Is advice. The President himself took
the responsibility for any final decision.
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10 Senator Gore. Was your approval -- did your approval
Involve continuation of the flight through and during
the period of the Summit Conference?
(:) Secretary Herter. Not specifically as such. The approval
constituted going ahead when conditions were appropriate
for carrying ';hem out.
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Senator Gore. Did you give no consideration to dis-
continuance at a time prior to the Summit meeting or during
the Summit conference?
Secretary Herter. Senator: I answered that question
before when I said that there is no good time for a failure,
that if the Summit conference had debarred carrying out these
flights the Presidents visit to Russia may have been the
next thing that might have debarred them.
It may have been debarred when Khrushchev was at Camp
David; it may have been debarred when Mr. Khrushchev was
visiting in France.
There may have been any number of diplomatic reasons_ why
they shouldn7t be conducted at a given period of time.
In my opinion: the value of the information and the
necessity of carrying out these flights under given conditions
warranted their going ahead.
Senator Gore. I am trying to be specific in my questions,
and I am trying to elicit from you whether at the time you gave
your approval for the general program some weeks prior to this
particular flight, you gave specific consideration to the
question of continuance or discontinuance during or near the
time of the Summit conference.
Secretary Herter, Certainly. The Summit conference was
very much on my mind as it was on everybodys mind, at that time.
Senator Gore. And you gave your approval then?
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s?
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Secretary Herter. I did.
Senator Gore. To their continuation throughout the Summit
,
conference?
Secretary Herter. That was never specified as such.
Senator Gore. In other words, you are saying then that
there was no decision to discontinue?
Secretary Herter. That is right.
Senator Gore. Then if any decision to discontinue or if
any decision was made not to continue, to use the words, you
are not aware of it?
Secretary Herter. No. The only decision that I kmow of
at any stage of the game was to go ahead.
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t24
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Senator Gore. That is fine. Another statement which
the President made, I would like to read;
"Of course, we had no indication or thought that basic
Soviet policy had turned about. But when there is even the
slightest chance of strengthening peace, there could be no
higher obligation than to pursue it."
Now, on page 4 of your statement here today, I would like
to read. This is on page 4 beginning "On the Summit Prospects."
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the second,
third, fourth and fifth paragraphs on page 4 be printed, re-
printed at this point in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered.
(The paragraphs referred to are as follows:)
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s In the first weeks after the Kn'rushohev American visit e
there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began
talking, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about
"detente". Thee were eomparatively conciliatory speeches on
each pidej therd was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva; a
new Soviet-DS cultural agreeMent was signed November 21$ and on
December I the U$, the USSR and other powers signed the Antaretic
treaty.
pu.t cIeuda'began,to gather even then, One of the earliest
e signs iiis the-dtiong'SoViet prOtest on November 11 against West
? German plans to.'but34 a,broadcaiting etation'in West Berlin.
Another was, the KhrUShehtv speech. on November 14 Which was harder
in tonel,boisted again:er Soviet miseile prowess, and began a .
concentrated attack onAdenaUer:and the Garman Federal Republic
; which later increased and seemed to be A central feature of
Soviet pre-Summit tactics. The reason for :this attack is still
4D a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would under-
. mine the Western position on ?Berlip_by helping to divide the
-:
Western Allies._ It hademejuch effeet?of 'course, but naturally
rallied,us to steeak,outin defense of our German ally, '
, ? ..?
e
f,?
A
Khrushchev.as earl$?:aii teeember 1 also began repeating his
threat a to sima-separata peaoe treaty with East Germany. He
repeated theee threats in his speeeh'to the SupreMe Soviet on
januar his.remka duiing his visit to Indoneeia and
other countries.in Januarys On FebrUary 4, the Warsaw Fact .
powers issued the first formal bloc-wide commitment to sign a
separate GDR peace treaty. Thus .Kbrushchev's threating Bairu
speech of April 25, though it was the most sweeping since F0114,
ar7 1959, was only,a harsher versigh of what he had been saying
for mopthsbeforee" I shill make: full documentation on his -
speeches availablo to theCommittee.
Not until Apreldid we re01 at length to this mounting
crescendo'ofeoviat,statellients. .We.did so in order to keep the
recOrd'atraeght -ereotably n the speeches of April 4.and 20$:
*whichKlleleshehey 4tteeked fOr stArting arguments that he in fact
emed ,
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s6 Senator Gore. You will see from this statement, Mr.
Secretary, that you contradict the Presidents statement,
you not?
The President says:
"We had no occasion or thought that basic Soviet policy
had turned about."
You say from what I have just read, you list one, two,
three, four occasions that the Soviet policy had, in fact,
changed.
Do you wish to comment?
Secretary Herter. Yes, I would be very glad to comment.
1 dont think that there is any essential disagreement
(:) in the two points of view.
am talking primarily in my statement in regard to
Berlin and Germany.
The President was talking about a series of things in
which he spoke of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic
control: and then he added Germany and Berlin.
As I testified earlier in the day, I think we all had
hopes that there might be a possibility of making some progress,
even though not in the German-Berlin situation, but in the
disarmament field, and as a correlary possibly in the nuclear
testing field where it was not a Summit problem, but it would
have been a three power problem that could have been discussed
in Paris.
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s7 For instance, so long as there was any hope of making
any progress, the President was willing to go.
Senator Gore. I didn7t question the President being
willing to go so long as there was any hope of progress.
What I was asking you to comment on was what appears to
me to be a contrast between the Presidents statement that there
is no indication that basic Soviet policy had turned about,
and you give almost a full page, indicating that they had
turned about. But you have finished your comment on that.
Secretary Herter. Yes, there was some talk here about
basic policy and tactics in connection with the Summit. I
dont think the President felt it necessarily that basic policy
had changed.
I think as he said after Camp David, he hoped that there was
a mutuality of interest, particularly in the disarmament field,
which would allow the great powers getting together in order
to make progress in disarmament.
That had always been the area in which he hoped, because
of the mutuality of interest, that we might make progress.
I dont think that there is anything fundamentally opposed
in these two statements.
Senator Gore. Now, I want to ask a few questions which
relate.,;() the first of the three questions which I wish to
examine you opinion; that is whether the diplomatic failure
in Paris represented a failure in policy.
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You recall that I submitted certain questions to you here
on March 22nd. At that time I asked you:
"Do you think it would have been more prudent to have
had an understanding about the subjects to be considered at
a Summit conference before agreeing to have one, or do you
think this is the proper way to keep the store?
"Secretary Herter. It is a gamble. I dongt know.
"Senator Gore. You are gambling with high stakes, and
it seems to me in a wreckless manner. I am disturbed to have
the Secretary of State make the statements that you have made
today about the Summit conference; that there is no plan, no
purpose, no understanding as to what will be discussed and
what we hope to attain there.
"Secretary Herter. Mr. Senator, I v iew this as essentially
a matter of exploration. We have the situation where an
individual, Mr. Khrushchev? is the man who makes the decisions
so far as we know, for the Russians."
Later on, I asked you:
"Is there any reason why the Russian dictator could not
delegate the same power to his Foreign Minister as President
Eisenhower should or does delegate to you?
"Secretary Herter. None.
"Senator Gore. Then isngt that a fallacious argument?
"Secretary Herter. Not necessarily, because you are
dealing with an individual personality who many believe wants
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to be the negotiator."
Now, I read those things because one of the principal,
if not the principal justification for going to the Summit and for
tie exchange of visits was that Mr. Khrushchev and he alone
spoke for the Russian people, but today you tell us on page 7:
"1 might digress here to observe that it had been our
experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least
since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no
matter how highly placed he may be, was bound by the collective
decisions and basic policiy Inatters made prior to his departure
from Mowcow.
"Any substantive changes in those positions apparently
required reference back to Moscow before they could be under-
taken," and then on page 80 you say:
"This meeting completely confirm:4 our conclusion of the
flight before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the
fixed limits of a policy set before his departure from Mowcow."
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Secretary Herter. There appears ts be an inconsistency in
those two statements.
When I was testifying here before, the visits of Mx.
Khrushchev in which sometimes he had an important person
with him and sometimes hedid not --
Senator Gore. In which, what: sir?
Secretary Herter. Sometimes in which he had an important
personwith him and sometimes he did not: indicated that
his situation at home was such that he had a great deal more lee-
way than had previously been the case.
Wher he went to Pan is and I think this has been
brought out he had with him Gromyko and Malinovsky,
General Malinovsky: Marshal Malinovsky: who never left
him for one moment at any time. This was a departure from
previous occasions? This is why we said they had gone back
to their stahdard policy of taking directions from
home?
Prior to that time I had be/ieved he had greater
leeway than was clearly indicated here in Paris.
Senator Gore? So the assumption proved to be erroneous.
Secretary Herter. It is?
Senator Gore. I believe you testified before the House:
according to press reports yesterday that summitry as a
diplomatic method had had some hard knocks.
Secretary Herter. Yes: I did.
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In answer, to a question from Senator Humphrey, I
repeated the same thing today.
Senator Gore. And in recommending, which I
certainly endorse, continuing businesslike negotiation with
the Soviets, you have in mind the more usual processes
and procedures of diplomacy.
Secretary Herter. That is correct.
Senator Gore, Negotiations.
Secretary Herter. The one thing that / did point out,
however, is that with regard to the Berlin situation
there that is Great Britain, France, the United States
and Russia. This is the carry-over from the war.
Senator Gore. Yes,
Secretary Herter. And that there, there must be
agreement. This is a thing we have been fighting all the
time, that unilateral action by the Russians cannot take
away those rights and obligations which they as well as our-
selves had acquired as a result of the war.
That it must be done by the consent of the four.
So that whether or not in thefuture the discussions to
bring the four together should take place through diplomatic
channels, through Ambassadorial level, through foreign minis-
ter or not, I would not say which would be the level, but
I think that it is much better to see if we can not, as we did
in the foreign ministers' conference: and failed, try to
come together prior to the meeting of a summit
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conference so that there might be one, or two_small unresolved
issues that could be resolved there rather, than trying to
negotiate when you know that you are very far apart at a summit
conference.
Senator Cora. Well: I hope thatyou will persist: and
that the President will persist in the businesslike under-
takings. / will not ask you to say that summitry apart
from diplomacy failed. I am content with your statement in
that regard. I am sorry that I think it did fail.
Secretary Herter. I would differ with you, sir, on the
question of personal diplomacy as against summitry. I
think that visits: are, on the whole useful things.
I wouldn't say that that was something that should be
discarded completely. I think it is particularly true
that visits of ministers of foreign affairs, and
visits of heads of state fromtime to time can accomplish a great
deal of good,, But I believe very strongly that insofar as
heads of state are concerned that is not the place to
begin negotiations. It is the place perhaps where there
should be the culmination of negotiations.
Senator Core. I will agree with you in that statement.
The exchange of visits offers opportunities. But for the
fbrmalization of-a head of state conference, where severe
international tensions are involved, without precise planning,
without assurance that at least limited agreements can
be reached, is: in my view, a dangerous process, and a
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policy upon which we should never have embarked.
Of aurse/ it is easier t say that now than it was
before.
Hindsight of coursee we learned a longtime ago o is
better than foresight.
The Chairman. Would the Senator yield for a moment?
I have one or two questions and then he may come back to
it.
Senator Gore, Good,
The Chairman. These I think have been covered but for
clarificationo I might ask them again. Was there ever a
time when the President authorized each flight in this
program e that3s never been the practice.
Eecretary Herter It has never come up to the President.
The Chairman. Nor of the National Security Council.
Secretary Vertex, No.
The Chairman. It has always been under a blanket
authority understood?
Secretary Herter. That is my impression.
The Chairman. Ir this blanket authorization under
review; either -onstant review or periodic review?
becretary Herter. In my experience the CIA has planned
a number of alternate flights at a time.
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The CLairman. When the Department brought
Mr. Bohlen back from Manila, and he was well known as an
expert on Soviet behaviors and this mass I thought s in
anticipation of these summit meetings which had been dis-
cussed a long times did he or any other of our Russian
experts advise you or the President to wait and see what
Mr. Khrushehey knew about the n-2 flight before making the
NASA statement
Mr. Dillon. The people in the Departmet:who were
familiar with Soviet policy took part in discussions with
the CIA which led to the coordination and the agreement
on the guide lines which mere given to rAsk and those
included the people who were familiar with all aspects
of our policy.
However, as we said before; we did not know that there
was going to be a full statement by NASA.
The Chairman. Mx. Bohlen was not consulted about
the MASA statement.
Mx. Dillon. Nobody in the State Department was consulted
about the statement as a statement.
The Chairman. Nobody.
What puzzles me about this is why.was there such
compulsion, if there was, to make such an immediate reaction?
I have wondered why there was any necessity for immediately
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reacting to the first Khrushchev statempnt.
It would seem to me much more normal to wait a while and
see what developed.
Was there anything that was compelling you to answer
almost immediately?
Mr. Dillon. Yes: I would say so. /t was such an unusual
andremarkable statement when Mr. Khrushchev
said that American plane had been shot down over the Soviet
Union, that we were not in the position to not make any
comment whatsoever.
As a result we had to make some comment, and we
made the very bland statement which was put out onthe
5th.
The Chairman. I didn't mean that. You misunderstood
me. I accept the necessity for the cover story, the
statement.
M. Dillon. Yes.
The Chairman. It is the second one that went into
such detail. It would seem to me that order, it would be
common sense not to follow up too quickly in the
matter of typing. What was the reason for that?
Mr. Dillon. The State Department's second statement was
innocuous too. It didn't go into any detail, any more
detail than the original cover story did. There was great
-- if any detail, that was the statement that was put out
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by NASA.
The chairman. Is it not true that the NASA statement
itself is what put you in a position of having to make a
further statement?
Is that true?
N. Dillon. The further stateMentz I think ,was the
next statement in this Series, was the one that was Put out
on, Saturday which was made only at the time when we knew
that the Soviets probably had he pilots which was new
information: and then the Soviet o had already said they had
him, and had said where he was shot down; and we knew they
had certain the probability was that they had certain
parts of the airplane because the picture which they had
first put out turned vat to be a fraudulent picture.
The Chairman.' porhaps donut understand the timing
of it.
It seems to me: if I do understand it that
you could have stood upon the cover story for some time
before the necessity of any further statement? await
developments.
Mr. Dillon. You mean, your question is why we made
the statement on Saturday May 70 which was the first time
we departed from the cover story.
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Secretary Herter. That: as I think I have testified
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before c was a decision that was made in the light of
the very full revelation of Mr., Khrushchev in giving out,
both as to the pilots testimony as to the parts
and equipment that had been recovered,. That was when
we had to make the decision were we going to
.1=t,
keep on lying about this or were we going to tell the truth?
The Chairman. Why wasrOt there a third alternative is
Oat I am trying to get at?
Why didn?t you just be quiet and say nothing? You
don't have just the alternatives of either continuing to
lie or tell the truth?
You could have said nothing. I was just curious, was
this ever considered that you didn?t have to react?
Secretary Herter. A good many statements were already
being made in Congress, a good many statements were already
being made or required of us almost.
The press was hounding everubody, "What do you say
now after what Mx. Khrushchev had said" c it was a very diffi-
cult time in our society, our form of society to have said
nothing.
The Chairman. I believe that was the statement in which
you said "It has been established that insofar as the
authorities were concerned in Washington there was no
authorization for such flights", is that correct?
Secretary Herter. That is right.
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The Chairman. Which was not a truthful statement at
that point; was there?
Secretary Herter Jo, this was still partly cover.
The Chairman. Still partly cover?
Secretary Herter. Still partly cover. It was not
until Monday, after the briefing had taken place before
the Congressional leadership here on the hill that the full
statement was made.
The Chairman. It was after that statement that the full
statement was made.
Secretary Herter. That is correct.
The Chairman. Was that full statement if I understood
it, I think you have testified, was only after complete
and thorough consultation with everyone concerned,
and had the unanimous support of state and the President,
is that correct?
Secretary Herter. It is, yes.
The Chairman. Senator Gore, go ahead.
Senator Gore. Well, when you made the final statement
that the President did approve, he was responsible, I am
not undertaking to quote you exactly, you also made it
plain that he did not approve specific flights?
Secretary Herter. Yes.
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cantor Senator Gore. I will wait until his testimony.
Ake 26
Now, I wish to make my own feelings explicit. I have
not intended to suggest, nor do I believe the Chairman or
anyone else has intended to suggest, that the President or
any other official of the United States Government tell a
falsehood. I dont know of any requirement in Anglosaxon
Jurisprudence or any other jurisprudence stemming from Roman
law that a citizen is required to incriminate himself. I know
of no requirement that a. nation is required to incriminate
or denigrate or defame Itself. I do not claim any sense
of morals or sensitivity to moral standards greater than
the average Americaa,but I want the record to show that
I was humiliated with official falsification, and I think
millions of Americans were humiliated. I can agree with you
that our alli4nce stood firm. I am happy that it did, but
I think we would be deluding ourselves if we did notrealize
that this unfortunx4e incident has dealt a severe blow to
the moral position of the United States. I think we should
begin to mend it. The way to mend it is to ferret out our
errors and our mistakes, correct them, and thereby demonstrate
to the world our w113. and our capacity to survive this kind
of blow, and I hope be stronger thereafter.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, there was one point
that I overlooked. I had heard that Chairman Khrushchev
had directly or indirectly made some inquiry about the
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2 possibility of meeting Mr. Eisenhower before the Summit
meeting. Do you know whether or not that is so? ?
Secretary Herter. No. I know of no such effort.
The Chairman. No,effort?
Secretary Herter. Actually Mr. Khrushchev, when he came
to Paris, or just before. he came to Paris, sent a note
to the British and to the French, I think, largely on
a procedural matter, no such note to us. When the President
arrived in Paris, there was just as much opportunity for
Mr. Khrushchev to seek a meeting with him as with Macmillan
or de Gaulle, and no such effort was made from any Russian
source.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, have you drawn any
Inferences from tille9 whole event relative to the Military
preparedness of the Soviet Union?
.Secretary Herter. Of course my jul,lment would not be
as good as that of experts. And here, again/ I wouldn't want
to give my judgment as a considered judgment from the point
of view of the recoA. There Is no question but what the
Russians are V.ery active in certain directions, and that
the intelligence that has been gained with regard to that
activity has been of very great value to us. And I think
that is as far as I should go.
The Chairman. Any further questions?
Senator Wiley. Is the cold war still on or is it over?
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3 Secretary Herter. It remains to be seen.
Senator Wiley. Then we had better give primary attention
to the main issue, instead of qUarreling about who is who
and what Is what in relation tihandling situations. It was
your judgment, It isn't my judgment. It int the business
of every little one in the Senate to tell you what you should
do. It is your business, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Mansfield, do you have any
questions?
Senator Mansfield. No.
Senator Gore. Off the record, Mr. Chairman.
(Discussion off the record.)
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The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, one last things, Do you think
we have learned, not justm but all of us including you and
the Administration, anything' from the U-2 Incident?
Secretary Herter. Not to have accidents?
The Chairman. Is that all we have learned?
Senator Gore: Not what?
Mr. Macomber. Not to have accidents.
The Chairman. Do you thank that Is the only lesson
we can draw from thesements?
Secretary Herter. Mr. Chairman0I think that anyone
would be foolish to say that with hindsight one couldnIt have
done better than when one is faced with certain events at a given
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time. I think obviously we should be giving serious
consideration to the very best method of the handling of
anything of this kind that might happen in the future, and
I think from that point of view, as the President said, we
welcome this inquiry. We welcome a full disclosure as far
as we could, from the point of view of responsIbilities
and coordination. I thank you for your patience here
today.
The Chairman. I want to thank you for your patience
and your frankness and candor. I think you and your associates,
Secretary Dillon and Mr. BohlenOlave been most cooperative
In this whole hearing. I like to think that out of this
one, as you know, rather pet project of mine is that the
State Department itself be given greater prestige and
authority in controlling and coordinating all matters relating
to our foreign relations.
As I have tried in the case, for example, one recent
example was the control of the black market in Turkey. I think
your Department, the Department of State, ought to have more
authority than we have in the past accorded it. I am sure
that some of our troubles do not relate to any fault on dour
part, but to the sort of Institutional practices that have
grown up and people assuming authority to make statements
without you or without consulting you and the Department.
I feel at this stage of the proceedings that this may be one
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of the good things that will come out of these hearings,
that the prestige and authority of the State Department
will be ,enhanced.
Secretary Herter. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Gore. Could I join you in commending the
Secretary and his assistants for their candor and their
patience and their diligence here today.
Secretary Herter. Thank you.
Senator Wiley. May I also join you the third time
by saying 41 my humble opinion the evidence and the statement
yulariade and the statement that Dillon made and the Presidents
wech shows conclusively that the break-up of the Summit
Conference was due to Khrushchev and no other cause.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
The Committee is adjourned until next Tuesday.
(Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m the Committee recessed, to
reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Tuesday, May 31, 1960.)
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