HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF MAY, 1960 AND INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO VOL. 4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000601290002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 2, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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Vol. it
011.r. littitrh ftttrg rt-tatr.
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Committee on Foreign Relations
HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE
OF MAY, 1960
and Incidents Relating Thereto
June 2, 1960
Washington, D. C.
WARD & PAUL INC.
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
8-4266
)8-4267
NATIONAL ) 8-4268
8-4269
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HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF MAY; 1960
AND INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO
Thursday, June 2, 1960
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met at 10:10 a.m.,, pursuant to recess,
Senator F. William Fulbright (Chairman of the full Committee)
presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Gore, Wiley,
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.
Also present: Brig. Gen. G. S. Brown, USAF, Capt. Means
Johnston, Jr., USN, Military Assistants to the Secretary of
Defense; Capt. L. P. Gray, III, USN, Military Assistant
to the Chairman, JCS; William B. Macomber, Department of
State; Richard Helms, CIA; Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant
? ,
to the Secretary of State.
Staff members. present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt; Mr. Denney,
Mr. Henderson and Mr. St. Claire.
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The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
We have this morning the honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr.,
the acretary of Eefense.
Mr., Secretary, I think you know about the regulations.
Your testimony will be taken down but nothing will be released
except that which has been passed by the censors representing
the State rbpartment and the CIA, and I assume perhaps you
may want to advise with them.
I think you understand that.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I understand you have a statement.
Secretary Gates. A very brief statement.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.
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STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. GATES,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you.
I have a short statement, if I may read it. It relates
to two subjects. First, I am certain that you wish me to
cover the role played by the Department of Defense in the U-2
overflight program.
Elements of the Department of Defense gave technical ad-
vice to the U-2 project. No military aircraft were used for
these flights nor were the pilots military personnel..
From time to time, the Director of the CIA, after obtain-
ing the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State, recommended a series of programs to the
President.
More specifically, I reviewed program proposals embracing
several priority missions, one or more of which it was proposed
to execute in the near future. Responsibility for the operational
conduct of the program rested with the CIA.
We obviously were interested in the results of these
flights as we are in all of our nations intelligence
collection results.
For example, from these flights we got information on
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airfields, aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training,
special weapons storage, submarine production, atomic pro-
duction and aircraft deployments and things like these.
These were all types of vital information. These results
were considered in formulating our military programs. We
obviously were the prime customer and ours is the major interest.
Secondly, on a separate subject --
One incident, and one over which I assume full respon-
sibility, is the calling of a test of the readiness of our
military communications from Paris. In view of the fact that
my action in this matter has been subject to some speculation,
I would like to give you the facts.
First of all, our military forces are always on some
degree of alert. So it is merely a matter of moving this
degree or condition of alert up or down the scale. On Sunday
night (May 15) we were already aware of the sense of the
statement which Mr. Khrushchev was going to make the following
morning. The conditions which he had set for his participation
in the Conference made it apparent even at the time that he
deliberately intended to wreck the Conference.
This communications alert was not an act that was either
offensive or defensive in character. It was a sound pre-
cautionary measure. It did not recall Army, Navy, Air Force
and Marine personnel from leave. There was no movement of
forces involved. However, I want to emphasize that it did
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make certain that if subsequent developments made necessary
a higher state of readiness, such action could be taken
promptly and convincingly.
Under the circumstances it seemed most prudent to me to
Increase the awareness of our unified commanders. Moreover,
since the command and individuals concerned in the decision
process, including the President, the Secretary of State,
and myself, were overseas it was important to check out our
military communications. At about midnight, Paris time, Sunday
night, I requested that a quiet increase in command readiness,
particularly with respect to communications, be instituted
without public notice, if possible.
One phase of our testing is to call no-notice exercises
of our command communications. While some commands went further
in executing the instructions issued by the JCS as a result of
my message than I had anticipated, I consider the order proper
and absolutely essential. In similar circumstances I would
take exactly the same action.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, did you or any of your aides participate
in any conference prior to May the 1st regarding the U-2
flights?
(At this point, Senator Young, of Ohio, entered the
hearing room.)
Secretary Gates. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I was, some
weeks before May 1st briefed on the preliminary results
of the April 9th flight. At that time, I was Informed
a program of
of possible flights/ one of which would be selected to
be flown: and I gave my approvdlon that program.
The Chairman. Was anything said at that time about a
moratorium in view of the Summit Conference?
Secretary Gates. No: sir.
The Chairman. Who participated in that conference?
Secretary Gates That conference was in my office
in the pentagon, and was between myself and a man
from CIA.
The Chairman, Was anyone in the State Department present?
Secretary Gates, No: sir.
The Chairman. Do you know whether the State Department
was advised specifically of the plans for the May 1st flight?
Secretary Gates. I donft know from my own knowledge, but
I am perfectly certain that the Secretary of State was advised
of the program as I was.
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2 The Chairman. You didnDt advise him nor was he represented
at that meeting?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
The Chairman. And no one raised the question of whether
or not there should be a suspension?
Secretary Gates. No, sir. In this conversations
CIA representative
it was a private conversation between the
and myself, and I was asked for my advice on approval
of the program and I gave it.
The Chairman. I understand that, but I merely meant
that the question of whether or not there should be a suspension
In view of the upcoming Summit was not raised, is that
correct?
Secretary Gates. Not raised between the two of us,
no, sir.
The Chairman. Was it raised at any time?
Secretary Gates. I didnPt have any other discussions
about the flight with anyone,. Senator Fulbright.
The Chairman. Then so far as you know, it was not
raised?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
The Chairman.
To your knowledge, were any flights
prior thereto ever suspended because of political meetings,
that is other than weather or military considerations?
Secretary Gates. I have no knowledge of any suspension
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of any flights for those purposes.
The Chairman. There was no suspension to your knowledge
when the Camp David meeting took place?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
The Chairman. No was there any suspension, so far
as you know, during the period in which Khrushchev visited
the United States?
Secretary Gates. I dont know of any suspension, I dont
know precisely whether during that period we flew any
flights, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. No, but I mean you didntt discuss the
question?
Secretary Gates. I didntt discuss the question of
suspension of flights, no, sir.
The Chairman. Since you never considered it, then you
had no position relative to the continuation, did you?
Secretary Gates. I approved this program, so I took
a position affirmatively.
The Chairman. Were the results as I take it from your
Initial statement, the results of these flights were important
to the Defense Department?
Secretary Gates. The results were very important to
the Defense Department.
The Chairman. Very useful to you?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
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The Chairman. Do you regard it as an important loss
that the flights have now been suspended?
Secretary Gates.I think that it has by becoming
compromised, has removed an Important source of intelligence
that has been a very successful program over the past.
(At this point, Senator Mansfield entered the hearing
room.)
The Chairman. Then it is a great loss from your point
of view not to haveavailable any further flights, is that
correct?
Secretary Gates0 I think if we had been able to continue
them without having been caught and therefore compromised
the source, it would have been most useful.
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The Chairman. Well, Mr. Gates, did Khrushchev, the
Russians, know of overflights prior to May 1?
Secretary Gates. He says he did.
The Chairman. Well, what do you think?
Secretary Gates. I believe that he did, Mr. Chairman,
but I don't believe anyone could specifically prove it. But
I believe that he did. I believe he told the truth.
The Chairman. If he knew about it, why did the incidents
of May I compromise the flights, why should they be discon-
tinued?
Secretary Gates. Well, I don't believe he knew the
exact type and character of the flights. He probably -- all
he knew was that they were aircraft high above his
sky.
The Chairman. On your order on May /5, your alert,
did you consult the Department of State before ordering it?
Secretary Gates. No. I advised the Secretary of
State, who was with the President at the same place that
I was when it was issued.
The Chairman. Did you advise him before you issued
it?
Secretary Gates. He was advised before it was released
yes, sir.
The Chairman. Was his opinion asked or was he merely
advised of it?
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Secretary Gates. Well, I told him that I was about to
issue a communications alert, and the communication readiness
exercise.
The Chairman. He approved of it.
Secretary Gates. He did not register any disapproval.
The Chairman. Well then he approved it.
Secretary Gates. I think so e yes, sir.
The Chairman. Was that Mr. Herter?
Secretary Cates, Yos,sir.
The Chairman. In Paris.
Secretary Gates. Yes, six.
The Chairman. Did you advise the President?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Before it was made?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Was the NSC consulted about the alert?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Gates, did you participate in any
meeting on May 7 to consider the statement which was later
issued by the Secretary of State?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
The Chairman. Or on May 9?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
On May 9th0 that is Monday, I believe, I participated
in a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State.
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On the morning of the 9th.
The Chairman. Did you approve of the statement made
in which the full revelation was made
Secretary Gates. I approved of the statement that was
made on May 9, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Who waspresent at that meeting?
Secretary Gates, Well, I know that Mr. Douglas and
myself were present fromthe Department of Defense. Mr.
Herter and Mr. Douglas Dillon, and Mr. Kohler were present,
I think Mr. Bohlen were present from the State Department,
there may have been one or two others.
The Chairman. Did that meeting go on for some time?
Secretary Gates. I would say about an hour.
The Chairman. About an hour.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Was the question of whether or not
it was wise for the President to take responsibility
discussed at that meeting?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What was your position?
Secretary Gates. My position was that he should take
responsibility.
The Chairman. Was the meeting unanimous?
Secretary Gates. I believe it was.
The Chairman. They all agreed?
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Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It went on about ap hour.
Secretary Gates. Well, I would say at least an hour,
Senator.
The Chairman. Well, did it go, on more than an hour?
Secretary Gates. Well, I am talking about my recollec-
tion. I would think it was at least one hour. Perhaps
it was longer.
The Chairman. Was the statement issued by the NASA
organization on May 5, was that cleared with your office?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
The Chairman. You didn't know anything about it.
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you had any relations with NASA?
Secretary Gates. No, six, not in this connection.
The Chairman. I mean in connection with the U-2 flight.
Secretary Gates. Noo sir.
The Chairman, These U-2 flights, were they under your
direct control in the field) that is under the Air Force
direct control in the field?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, they were under the control
of the
The Chairman. How did it happen the Air Force made
the initial statement of the missing plane?
Secretary Gates. That was a part of the cover story
that was decided upon and they issued this statement from
the base in Turkey about a plane being missing.
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The Chairman. Well, does that indicate that you had
arrived ahead of time in concert with the CIA upon proper
procedure to be followed in case of a mishap?
,Secretary Gates. I was not familiar with the details of
how a cover story would be executed. I was aware of the
fact that a cover story existed, and I imagine that when
the detaEs of it were put into operation, the Central
Intelligence Agency went to work,
The Chairman. It wasn't your responsibility, it was
not your responsibility to supervise the cover story.
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
The Chairman. My time is up. Senator Gore
Senator Gore, Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the
National Security Council.
Secretary Gates. That is right, Senator.
Senator Gore. Did you attend the meeting of the council
held on May 5?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Did the President participate in that
conference?
Secretary Gates. At the meeting of the NSC?
Senator Gore. Yes,
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Was the cover story discussed there?
Secretary Gates. Nt,
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Senator.
There was a meeting of the small group after the NSC
meeting.
Senator Gore. Did you participate?
Secretary Gates. With the President, where we discussed
the Khrushchev statement and I participated in that, with
the President. It was not at the NSC meeting.
Senator Gore. At this conference in which Mr. Khrushcheves
speech was discussed, was the cover story discussed?
Secretary Gatos. Well, I think it was discussed in a
general mannertut not in detail. It was decided at that
meeting that the responsibility for all releases pertaining
to this matter would be handled by: the Department of
State.
Senator Gore. Was there any discussion at this meeting
of the advisability of telling the truth?
Secretary Gates. I think I made a statement in that
meeting, something to the effect that the prestige of the
Presidency should not be involved in an international lie
particularly when it would not stand up with respect to the
facts.
But that was the extent of the discussion. There was
no decision.
Senator Gore. After this observation on your part,
the State Department did issue a statement that was not true,
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is that the case
Secretary Gates.. I think --
Senator Gore. Well, the record shows
Secretary Gates I think they issued a statement, that
is right. I think they issued a part of the cover story
statement after that meeting, yes, sir.
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Senator Gore. So no decision -" although the question
of the involvement of the Presidency in what you call an
international lie, was discussed, and you expreseed your view
that it would be an unwise thing to involve the President
in the cover story or in an internatinal -- an official
falsehood?
Secretary Gates, If It turned out that Mr. Khrushchev
had all the facts, which we subsequently found out that he
had, yes.
Senator Gore. How did you think his involvement or his
association with this incident in its ramifications could
be avoided by an assumption of responsibility by the President
for the program.
Secretary Gates. I believe the President did assume
responsibility, and I believe he should have assumed
responsibility.
Senator Gore. Well, lets see let me see if I understand
you correctly. I certainly do not wish to make any implication
at all. I do not wish to impute to you any meaning which you
did not intend. Did I correctly understand you to say that this
question was discussed at a small meeting following the NSC
meeting on the 5th at which you particIpaed as did the
President?
Secretary Gates. That is correct, sir.
Senator Gore. Who else participated?
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2 Secretary Gates. Mr. Douglas Dillon, Mr. Allen Dulles,
Mr. Gordon Gray and General Goodpaster.
Senator Gore. At this meeting, you expressed the view
that it wculd be unwise for the President to be involved
in an international lie, I believe you described it.
Secretary uates. That is right. This depended on
what Mr. Khrushchev knew and when he knew it and if he knew
everything that he claimed to know, and it turned out later
he did, I believe that the President should take the respon-
sibility for the truth, for telling the truth. That is my
opinion. I did not know specifically at that time the extent
of Mr. Khrushchevvs knowledge.
Senator Gore. You have amended your --
Secretary Gates. I didntt mean to be evasive, Senator.
Senator Gore. I understand, but you have nowapended,
and I would like to clarify, if I may.
Secretary Gates. I was talking
Senator Gore. I know you are not trying to be evasive
and I assure you that I am only seeking to develop the
facts.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. As they existed, and the Government has
ful leeway, so far as I am concerned, to exercise censorship
for security.
Now, when you expressed the view that the Presidency should
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3 not be involved in an International lie, did you at that
time, on the 5th, suggest the President should assume
responsibility or was this on the 7th or the 9th that you
(7) expressed that additional view?
Secretary Gates. It was on the -- I had no more meetings
an the subject until the 9th, Senator. That meeting was
tike 3 fl s with the Secretary of State.
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Senator Gore. Did you express the view on the 5th that
the President should assume responsibility or did you express
that view on the 9th?
Secretary Gates. I expressed the view on the 5th that
if Mr. Khrushchev had the complete information and the pilot,
that the President should assert the true story.
expressed it again on the 9th when we knew that he had
the plane and the pilot.
Senator Gore. You were informed that Mr. Khrushchev had
made the public speech with respect to the plane that it was
shot down or that it came down in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk?
Secretary Gates. Yes. I am not sure of my timing, Senator.
We knew some information on the 5th, but we knew a great deal
more a day later. He didnQt report the full story until the
7th.
Senator Gore. I understand. I am only trying to develop
the background of information.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
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Senator Gore. And then the decision that was made.
Although you express these views, and although this information
was in the hands or was discussed in the conference --
Secretary Gates. Some information was in our hands.
Senator Gore. The information which you have described?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Gore. I am perfectly willing for you to describe
it.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. I have no description of it except as you
give it to me. The decision was not reached at this meeting?
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Gore. A decision to tell the truth was not
reached at this meeting on the 5th?
Secretary Gates. That is right, Senator. The only
decision that was reached at that meeting was that all the
statements pertaining to the incident would be handled by the
Department of State.
Senator Gore. What information was the State Department
to give? Was it specifically understood at the meeting that
the cover story would be continued?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I think it was assumed that the
cover story would be continued.
Senator Gore. And the --
Secretary Gates. At that time.
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s3 Senator Gore. And the cover story was untrue?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. It turned out to be untrue.
I mean, yes, because it was untrue. We didnit have the full
facts that we later had two days later.
The Chairman. The Senators time has expired.
The Stnator from Wisconsin.
Senator Wiley. Mr. Secretary: I have listened to this
interrogation. Now see if you cant tell us the story without
questioning, starting in when you first became acquainted with
the facts, who was there: what was said, and then go on.
For instance, we have heard so many statements about some-
thing not being true. Now this release on May 5th, it was
the cover story, wasnqt it?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. When did you first get acquainted with
the situation? Start in the beginning and give it consecutively
so that it will be clear.
(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Carlson leaves
the hearing room.)
Secretary Gates. I first got involved in the situation
when the airplane did not return to base and I knew an airplane
was down, presumably because it hadn@t come back and it had
taken off and that was on May 1st.
I had no other relationship with it until the morning of
Thursday, which was May 5th when we had an ? meeting of
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the NSC at a remote location under a Civil Defense Exercise.
On that morning, there was the preliminary statements
of Mr. Khrushchev that we had been flying over his territory,
and so forth.
After the NSC meeting, there was a small meeting at
which I have listed the members present, in which we discussed
this matter.
Senator Wiley. Who was there?
Secretary Gates, Mr. Dillon of the State Department,
Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster and
myself and the President and we discussed this whole matter
and we made the decision there that the matter would be handled
by the Department of State, and we adjourned.
I had no further participation or discussion concerning
the incident until the following Monday morning.
Senator Wiley, What date?
Secretary Gates. Which was the 9th.
Senator Wiley. The 9th?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. It was then that the Secretary of the
State Department issued the
Secretary Gates. I at that time participated in a meeting
in the office of the Secretary of State, and he issued his
complete statement.
Senator Wiley. Have you got one of these pamphlets in
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front of you?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. Turn to page 4 and see if we cant get
into the record -- that which is on page 4, is that the cover
story, up at the top: for the press?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. And that is the one that had been said
was a lie?
Secretary Gates. This was a covery story, yes, sir.
Senator Wiley, What I am getting at is that that is
when you had only part of the facts, isngt that it?
Secretary Gates. That is right.
(11.) Senator Wiley. On May 9th, if you will turn to page 5,
you have got the Department of Stategs release.
The Chairman. Page 6.
Senator Wiley. 5 and 6.
Secretary Gates. Press release of May 6th, on page 5.
Senator Wiley. The Department of States press release.
No, that is May 6th. Where is the May 9th? Was there one
issued on May 9th?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir,
Senator Wiley. At any of these meetings was the Presidert
there?
Secretary Gates. The only meeting the President attended
was the meeting of May 5th, after the NSC meeting.
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Senator Wiley. I didngt understand. Was he there on the
5th?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, after the NSC meeting. That
is the only meeting at which he was present.
Senator Wiley. When it was decided to have the alert,
was that the judgment of all that it was in the interest of the
national defense?
Secretary Gates. It was my judgment and I was responsible.
Senator Wiley. You had in mind, did you, what the
condition of this country was at the time of Pearl Harbor,
how we were asleep?
Secretary Gates. I certainly did.
Senator Wiley. During negotiations.
Secretary Gates. I did, indeed.
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Senator Wiley. Is it your judgment from the facts
that when Khrushchev went to Paris that he had already
made up his mind to call off the summit meeting?
Secretary Gates. Yes, it is my judgment, Senator.
Senator Wiley. Something was said by yourself in the
cross-examination to the effect that you claimed they should
tell the truth. Where was that, was that on the 5th?
Secretary Gates. I said on the 5th, if it proved that Mr.
Khrushchev had the pilot, had the equipment, had the
full and complete story that then it later turned out that
he had, that I believed we should tell the truth at that
time.
(At this point, Senator Gore left the hearing room.)
Senator Wiley. That is all0 Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman, Senator Mansfield?
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, since you have become
Secretary of Defensec you have made it a point to sit in on the
meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and if an agreement
could not be reached you make the final decision.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Mansfield. In that period you have also brought
about reforms and increased the efficiency of the centralized
purchasing system.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Mansfield. In that period you have also brought
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about a centralisation of the communications system.
Secretary. Gates. Yes,sir.
Senator Mansfield. Fox all those you are to be most
highly commended because I think they were reforms long
overdue and it was about time they WOrp put into effect.
Now, at the time you issued your, alert of the communi-
cations system in Paris did you have any information that
Soviet forces were massing or mobilizing?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Senator Mansfield. Did anyone person or any group
ask you to order the alert?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Senator Mansfield. You did that entirely on your
own responsibility?
Secretary Gates. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Mansfie/d. Did the alert order which you issued
put the forces of this country at a war readiness level?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
(Pit this point, Senator Long entered the hearing
room.)
Senator Mansfield. There was no call back of
reserves or cancellation of leaves to any extent.
Secretary Gates. No, sir. There was in one or two
instances worldwide some people who interpreted the JCS order
as meaning that they would have a couple of more aircraft on
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alert, and in that case, they, on their own, recalled,
I believe some pilots who were home or off duty to have
approximately twomore airplanes on an alert status. But this
was done on their owns testing their own alert procedures
under the broad order that was issued by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
It was not the intention of this order to move forces
in any way.
Senator Mansfield. Now that JCS order was in response
to your order?
Secretary Gates. That is right, Senator.
Senator Mansfield. Is there any connection between this
communications alert and therecent centralization of the
communications system?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, because that will not be in
effect in its entirety for approximately nine months.
Senator Mansfield. Now, during the course of your
responses to Senator Gore, you mentioned the following
WOrdsa "The prestige of the Presidency should not be involved.?
isnat it true that in almost any undertaking in a general
way the prestige of the Presidency is always involved under
our constitutional system of government?
Secretary Gates. Certainly.
Senator Mansfield, What I am getting at there is this:
That whether or not he had any specific knowledge of this
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particular flight or, of this. particular order, which you
issued, that nevertheless. under our system be is generally
raspopsible for. actions undertaken. by the head. of the, CIA and
for actions and orders issued by the Secretary of Defense,
is that correct?
Secretary Gates. He is the head of the Executive Branch
and he is Commander in Chief, Senator, so of course he
is responsible in that sense.
Senator Mansfield. Yes, he is generally responsible.
Secretary Gates. Certainly.
Senator Mansfield. He is Commander in Chief and Chief
of State.
Secretary Gates. That is right.
Senator Mansfield. There has been something said out
a.cover story and the fact that it is not truthful. Well,
isn't a cover story by its very nature almost always a lie?
Secretary Gates. Yes, Senator.
Senator Mansfield. That is the purpose, to seek protection
in some kind of a story under a ?given circumstance so that
for the time being at least the situation could be taken care
of.
Secretary Gates. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Mansfield. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, I believe that
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we have had repeated statements from the Kremlin in the
last months, weeks or even years that contained threats of
what the Kremlin is ready to do to the West generally or
to the United States under a variety of conditions, isrOt
that correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes, it i
Senator Hickenlooper. I believe Mr. Khrushchev has been
quoted as saying that he would bury use whether he meant
economically or militarily might be argued, and I believe
he stated that they have missiles on the launching pads
directed at various countries of Europe as well as the
United States?
Secretary Gates. That is right.
Senator Hickenlooper. These statements have been
reported, have they not?
Secretary Gates. That is right.
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take 4-a Senator Hickenlooper. Are the Russians still engaging
in scramble operations and massive airflight operations over
East Germany, do you know?
Secretary Gates. I dont know of any flights over East
Germany recently, but, of course, they have some 20 divisions
in East Germany.
Senator Hickenlooper. I don rt know whether this comes
within your time or not, but I have heard in one way or another
in times past that they have repeatedly had large air
forces in the air over East Germany, large military
41,.? ?11:*
Secretary Gates. They have large air forces stationed
in East Germany.
Senator Hickenlooper. I mean in the air.
Secretary Gates. They have had maneuvers, yes, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. They have had maneuvers toward
the West German border which come very close to the West
German border on occasion?
Secretary Gates. They have had them regularly, yes, sir
Senator Hickenlooper. That sometimes these are rather
mosive maneuvers in the air?
Secretary Gates. I believe that is correct, yes, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, now, recently we have heard
a great deal of discussion and argument about keeping all
of our strategic Air Force planes or a great many of them
in the air all the time, there have been some that have advocated
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2 that and criticized us for not keeping our .4irp1anes in
the air more than we have.
Secretary Gates. I am very familiar with this argument,
with the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations
Committee.
SenaPor Hickenlooper. I presume you do not see anything
unwarranted about this air alert which you ordered, but I will
ask you the question anyway, do you see any reason for
criticism bea-Ause of a demonstration by your Department of
a world-wide air alert of our forces?
Secretary Gates. I stated when I got off the airplane
and was asked the question by the press on my return, I said
I believe it was Incredible to me that anybody would question
it.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I agree with that statement,
but there seems to be some criticism nevertheless.
Now, on the question of whether or not, that is from
your viewpoint, in your Department, the particular U-2 flight
should have been cancelled on the 30th of April or the 1st
ar May or whenever it coccurred, isntt that a political
question and not a military question?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is in view of the se-called
Summit Conference?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
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3 Senator Hickenlooper. That becomes exclusively a
political question as to whether or not it was advisable
at that time from the standpoint of the Summit Conference?
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Hickenlooper. And I take it that from the
standpoint of primary responsibility you have nothing to say
about Wether it would be cancelled or not as a political
gesture in view of a political conference?
Secretary Gates. Well, 1, of course, knew of the date
of the summit meeting, and if I had had a strong conviction
about it I would have said it even though I didntt have the
responsibility for the decision. I was in an advisory
capacity, but I believed that there was really no good txme
to stop the collection of important information. There is
always some international conference or something.
Senator Hickenlooper. What I am trying to get at
is do you have any primary responsibility for making political
atcisions or is yours military decisions?
Secretary Gates. No, my responsibility is with the Department
of Defense.
Senator Hickenlooper. Now, these U-2 flights have been
extremely valuable in the securing of intelligence, have
they not?
Secretary Gates. They have indeed, Senator.
Senator Hickenlooper. They have also been very valuable
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4 in securing weather inforxationl have they not?
Secretary Gates. Yes 5 $ir.
Senator Hickenlooper. Do you believe that in view of
the general tensions that exist and the rather jingoist
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eke 5 fls
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statements, lets say, that have been emanating from the
Kremlin from time to time, that it was a beneficial thing
to do to have this air alert as not only a show of strength
but as an assurance to our friends and allies over the world
that we had a readiness capability?
Secretary Gates. I do. It was not an air alert,
Senator.
Senator Hickenlooper. Sir?
Secretary Gates. It was not an air alert. I think you
miss -- technically, you said air alert. It was a command
readiness and communications alert. I agree, however, with
what you said that it was a good thing to do.
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Cantor Senator Hickenlooper. I shall adopt your description
T-5
Swetland 1 for my question then, on that point.
But anyway, it was a show of ability on our part in
connection with our alertness, general alertness and our
ability to put a defensive force into the air in a short time?
Secretary Gates. Yes, and we could go from there to
further measures if we needed to, but this was primarily a
measure of checking command and checking communications,
particularly as I said in my statement, in view of the fact
that the persons involved in important policy decisions were
out of the country.
Senator Hickenlooper. Would you agree that it either does
have or should have a certain degree of comforting effect upon
not only our own country but upon our Allies that we do have
these capabilities?
Secretary Gates. I would hope it would, Senator. It seems
to me this is our responsibility, to be ready and alert under
these circumstances at all times, and we always are.
This was merely a matter of degree. It was a little increase
in the degree of alertness. We are in an alert condition at all
times.
As of midnight last night we are having another communica-
tions exercise, starting at 11 o?clock last night, and it is
going for several days.
Senator Hickenlooper. This fact that we may be always
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alert sometimes is not fully appreciated except occasional
demonstrations of that.
Secretary Gates. This is right, and the Joint Chiefs, as
a result of this experience and critique of it have recommended
to me that we have these alerts on a no-notice basis more
frequently.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you. My time is up.
The Chairman. The Senators time is up.
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Senator Long. Did you advise or consult as to whether
we were to admit that we authorized these flights if and when
the Soviets did succeed in bringing one of our planes down?
Secretary Gates. If we should continue them or not?
Senator Long. No, no. What I meant is this: As a matter
of forehandedness -- I see a Naval officer sitting behind you --
they taught me the definition of that word as a Midshipman. I
am sure that you anticipated that sooner or later, they were
going to bring one of our planes down.
Secretary Gates. We knew it was a dangerous occupation,
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yes, Senator.
Senator Long. You c,ould anticipate that sooner or later
one of these planes was going to fall into enemy hands?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Long. There was a distinct possibility at any
moment, and had you advised and consulted as to how this matter
should be handled if and when such an event materialized?
Secretary Gates. No, I had not, Senator0 I was only
aware of the fact that a cover story existed, but I had no part
in it.
Senator Long. And you had not been advised as to what the
position of this country was going to be in the event that that
happened?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, this was not my responsibility.
Senator Long, Senator Young passed up two questions he
would like for me to ask. I will just ask them on my time
since I have no further questions.
He says if it were essential
The Chairman, I think the Senator ought to ask in his
own name.
Senator Long. May I yield the remainder of my time to
Senator Young then?
The Chairman. No, you may not. You may ask any question
you, yourself, but on your own responsibility.
Senatar Long. If it were essential or important that the
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U-2 flights be made for years, right up to and including May
1, is the defense of the United States adversely effected by an
absolute discontinuance on May 13?
Secretary Gates. We have lost, through compromise, an
important source of information.
Senator Long. In other words, we do badly need the same
information that we were gathering with the U-2 flights?
Secretary Gates. We need a continuity of this information
I think, Senator.
(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Morse enters
the hearing room.)
Senator Long. Then if that be the case, in your judgment
was it essential or advisable that the flight of May I should
not have been cancelled?
Secretary Gates. In my judgments it was proper to fly
the flight of May 1.
Senator Long. Thank you. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Is that all?
The Senator from Vermont.
Senator Aiken. Mr. Secretary, at the time you ordered the
communications alert on May 15th, did you have any apprehension
at that time that the Communists might be considering or planning
surprise action in any part of the world?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, I felt that the situation was
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one that was at best, not very constructive. We knew the
.sense of Mr. Khrushchevgs remarks, but I did not anticipate
a surprise attack.
I didngt order that kind of an alert.
(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Long leaves
the hearing room.)
Senator Aiken. In other words, it seemed like a good
thing to do at the time?
Secretary Gates. I think it was, yes, sir.
Senator Aiken. Was the response to the order fully
satisfactory?
Secretary Gates. Yes,
Senator Aiken. Have you had any similar alerts since?
Secretary Gates. I testified a minute ago I believe, that
we started one at 11 ogclock last night which will run for
several days.
(Pages 583-584-585 & 586 deleted)
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The Chairman. Senator Norse
siLc:cta:4zv ;.-17 evered
please tell me.
Secretary Gates. Yes, Senator.
Senator Morse I am somewhat concerned about the implica-
tionso propagandawise and otherwise, of the alleged threat
of the marshal of the Air Forces of the Soviet Union that
if they know that another spy plane is leaving a foreign base
the instructions are to shoot a missile to that base What is
your judgment as to the seriousness of that threat?
Do you think it is a bluff or do you think that he means
it?
Secretary Gates. Well Senator, this is awfully hard to
know. He must know that if he did such a thing that we
Allied Allied
have commitments. If it was a country, for example,
he would be starting a very major problem for himself.
Senator Morse. That is the point I want to raise.
Secretary Gates. And this would only be done with
the assumption that he would take the consequences of
an act that would probably start ?a general war
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Senator Morce. I don't pee how, we can either. Doesn't
it seem to imply, Mr, Secretary, that if he is not bluffing,
that they thereby mean to start a general war over espionage
activity on the part of the United States or any other
foreign power that sends a spy plane over their territory?
Doesn't that seem to be
MINI OM
Secretary Gates. /f I understand your question, Senator,
/ think he must take the responsibility of starting a general
war or very likely starting a general war if he hits one of
cur allied bases for any reason.
Senator Morse. Could it possibly imply that the
Russians are of the opinion that our power of both defense
and aggression is such that they are willing to take it on?
To put my question a different way --
Secretary Gates. I doubt very much that they are willing
to take it now. I think they absolutely know they will
commit suicide the moment they try it because I think
they are fully informed in every way possible about the
practical exact defense posture of the United States.
Senator Morse. If that is true, and / think it is true,
that they ought to know that if they get involved in
a nuclear war there can't be any victory for them, and I
doubt if there could for us, but apparently this type of
military mind in Russia possessed by their Air Marshal,
is ready to start a nuclear ware, Wouldn't that be a fair
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deduction from this threat unless it is a bluff.
Secretary Gates., think it is part, myself Senator
Norse, I think it, is a part of A ptepped up cold war
aggressive propaganda, that is what I think, it really.
is, because I don't believe that Mr. Khrushchev wants to
start a war which he knows will be the end of his country.
Senator Morse. I am inclined to.think that is probably
true of Khrushchev. But the reason I am asking, this line
of questions is to find out from you if the leaders in our
country have reason to believe that Khrushchev is being
pushed in Russia by a preventive war group that entertain
the point of view that sooner or later they are going to
have to fight the United Staten, and that they think probably
now is a better time to do it than later.
Do we have any intelligence information that would
Justify our believing that a military group in Russia
are now taking over and pushing Khrushchev to the side?
Secretary Gates. We do not have. We have only the ability
at this time to speculate, and there is a strong indication
that this is one of the -- this might be possible, that the
military group have come into more power in Russia or that
Mr. Khrushchev may have had some of his power diluted.
This is however & just speculation, and it is? I suppose,
rather dangerous to speculate, but we do not have any hard
facts on the subject.
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Senator Morse. I understand they have some 200 and
50 thousand military Officers Army and Naval and Air. Could
it be possible that within the military in Russia they
see the possibility of reaching an agreement on total
disarmament which means that they would be moved out
of the very favored position in Russian society they
now occupy, and that we need to he on the alert to the possi-
bility that a great military change is taking place in Russia
by, in the form of a military hierarchy taking over
control from the Communist leadership.
Secretary Gates. Well, I couldn't agree with you more,
sir, that we should certainly be on the alert to this
possibility and antinuously so. I agree ent we must
consider this as one of the possibilities.
Senator Morse. What concerns me is that as far as their
leadership is concerned and as far as I have any reason to
believe, based upon the briefings we have had from our own
American leaders, we are dealina with a group of very
amoral leaders in Russia and when you get amoral leaders
among the military establishments, such as they have,
I think we have cause to concern as to whether or not
even in desperation they might not be willing to start a
war, and if this is more than propaganda, if this is
more then bluff, if this is more than what you suggest
might be the case of a new step up in the cold war to try
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to frighten our allies, then we have to take a long look, it
seems to me, as to our responsibility to history in respect
to following an espionage course that might cause these
amoral men in desperation to start a war because there is
always the hope on our part that we may be able to contain
them until we can negotiate through the United Nations
a workable and enforceable total disarmament program.
I have raised this question because I don't think
that in terms of history we can completely ignore our
responsibility in dealing with a group of desperadoes
such as I think the Russian military people are, and so it
raises the question how far can we justify going morally,
in connection with an espionage system such as the U-2 system,
when we know we are dealing with a group of amoral military
leaders in Russia who might start a nuclear war because
of their complete lack of appreciation for the value of human
life.
It puts us in a difficult position, it seems to me. We
have our own security to protect, we have our duty to gather
information, but the nature of the "beast" with whom we
are dealing, in quotation marks, I put the word, of course,
nevertheless puts upon us some responsibility, it seems to
me, to not go too far in our own espionage program if by
going a certain distance might indirectly put us in a
position where history might record that we knew we were
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dealing with that kind o2 a gang., and knowing it we nevertheless
followed an espionage couese of action that, they considered
so violated their severe:Den rights that, they. were willing
then to take that last step into a nuclear_ war.
:Secretary Gates. Well the Senator care speculate more
intelligently, I am sure, than I can on military people.
Senator Morse. Not all.
Secretary Gates. But basically military people are
conservative, worldwide, and basically they are well informed
on military matters, and therefore, the military in the Soviet
Union should know better than the political leaders
that they will be lost, and slaughtered and devastated in a
nuclear war.
On the other question, it seems to me again as a lay
person that our survival is at stake. If he threatens us,
I have repeatedly testified in Congress that I didn't
think he intended to make any significant concessions at
any meeting that we have not prepared our defense
program on that basis, that we had to keep it under
continuous review, at all times, and with a completely
closed country, and our survival threatened, if he builds
up a capability for a surprise attack, it seems to me
absolutely vital that we obtain all the information we
can from every source.
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Swetland 1
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Senator Morse. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. The Senator from Indiana.
Senator Capehart. I have no questions except I think
you did the right thing by ordering the laert.
I hope that you will continue to be on alert. I hope you
will continue to get intelligence on Russia in every conceivable
way we can
The Chairman. Is that all?
The Senator from Ohio.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Gates, how long have you been the
Secretary of Defense?
Secretary Gates. Only since last December, sir.
Senator Lausche. Were you in the Department prior to
that time?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I have been there since 1953
in the Department.
Senator Lausche. In what capacity?
Secretary Gates. I was Undersecretary of the Navy, then
Secretary of the Navy, then Deputy Secretary of the Navy.
Senator Lausche. Based upon your knowledge, when did the
Soviet hierachy first know of the fact that there were foreign
planes flying over the Soviet?
Secretary Gates. I dont think we can confirm, Senator.
We just have to take Mr. Khrushchevs statements at face value.
I think that it is debatable how much he knew. I assume
he knew that there were planes flying. He said he knew. He says
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t7 s2
he Oack known since he was here in the United States. But
donut think we can definitely confirm this.
(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Cooper enters
the hearing room.)
Senator Lausche. Testimony has been given by some witness
that I think on July 2nd, 1956, he made a protest that there was
a plane overhead in the Soviet.
Secretary Gates. Yes, I have the record of this.
believe this was the time General Twining visited the Soviet
Union. They made a public protest of overflights in July of
1956.
Senator Lausche. And since that time, U.2?s have been
making missions over the Soviet?
Secretary Gates. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Lausche. And Khrushchev, after May 1st, made
a statement that he knew at the time that he was at Camp
David that planes were flying overhead?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, he did.
Senator Lausche. Then the proof indicates that at the
time he was invited to the United States, at the time he went
to Camp David, and at the time that he arranged for the Summit
Conference, he knew of these planes being overhead?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Lausche. And he did nothing about it.
Can a staff member tell?
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Secretary Gates I cangt say that we can confirm this,
Senator.
Senator Lausche. I understand.
Secretary Gates. This is his statement.
Senator Lausche. That is correct. When was Khrushchev
in the United States?
Mr, Marcy. September, 1959.
Secretary Gates. September 15 through the 27th.
Senator Lausche. He made no statement to the President
at that time about planes being overhead?
Secretary Gates. He did not.
Senator Lausche. And he agreed to meet at the Summit?
Secretary Gates. That is right.
Senator Lausche. Then on May 1st, this U-2 was brought
down in the Soviet and he then made these declarations that
had been reported. That is correct, isngt it?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. Now then, what, in your opinion, motivated
him in agreeing to have a Summit Conference, excepting our
invitation to come to the United States, meeting with the
President, while he knew that this supposed grave transgression
of his rights was taking place?
Secretary Gates, I can only hazard again a personal
opinion, Senator.
My opinion is that he believed that he could not make any
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progress at the Summit meeting, and he made a pre-positioned,
he took a pre-position -- made a brief on it and came to Paris
to wreck the Summit quite apart from the U-2 incident.
Senator Lausche, Based upon your opinion or active
knowledge, during this period, was there espionage practiced
by the Soviets in our country?
Secretary Gates. Yes, there was.
Senator Lausche. Is that answer based upon your knowledge?
Secretary Gates. Based upon reports that I have read.
Senator Lausche. From the Central Intelligence Agency?
Secretary Gates, Or from the FBI.
Senator Lausche. In the Soviet all things are hemmed
in against an-individual getting into proximity of their
bases. Am I correct in that?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. Does that situation prevail in our
country?
Secretary Gates. It certainly does not, Senator.
Senator Lausche. Then there is a tremendous difficulty
in the ability of obtaining intelligence by our agents in the
Soviet as compared to their ability, through their agents in
our country?
Secretary Gates. That is correct, and there is obviously
no reason for him to overfly the United States.
Senator Lausche. Based upon the knowledge that you
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,cquired through the 1J-29s, what would be your opinion about
our intellectual ability to properly pursue the development
of our national defense?
Secretary Gates. I think we had a responsibility to take
every means we could.
Senator Lausche. That is not my question. My question
is if you did not have the knowledge acquired through the U-2,
could you have intelligently developed your national defense
to cope with the actual, potential military power of the Soviet?
Secretary Gates. By no means as well, Senator, by no
means.
Senator Lausche. By no means whatsoever?
Secretary Gates0 We have other means.
Senator Lausche. Yes?
Secretary Gates. That gives us other information, but
this was a very important piece of information.
Senator Lausche. If you didngt have that information, do
you:feel that the security of our country in all probability
would have been effected because of our inability to properly
develop our military strength?
Secretary Gates. I think this was -- I want to be careful
in my answer because this is one source of several sources of
intelligence. It 13 a very important one. I think it would have
been effecting our ability to properly defend the United States
if we didnvt have this information.
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Senator Lausche. Now, getting down to the matter of
the May 16th meeting, have you formulated any opinion as
to whether Khrushchev, when he left Moscow, already had
prepared these four unacceptable demands that he made upon
the President with respect to the U-2 Incident?
Secretary Gates. ,Everyone is entitled to a personal
opinion, Senator, and I have an opinion, yes, sir, that he
had very definitely, because the moment he arrived in Paris
he presented those conditions to Mr, de Gaulle along with
a copy already in French.
Senator Lausche. That is the fact is that he was supposed
to go to Paris on Maj 15th, the Sunday?
Secretary Gates. Yes. He came on Saturday night,
believe.
Senator Lausche. And for some reason that has not been
explaincd he decided to come there In advance?
Secretary Gat611. That is right.
Senator Lausche. OnEaturday?
Secretary Gates. That is right.
Senator Lausche. Andearly in the morning at 11 otclock
on Sunday, he oked for a conference?
Secretary Gates. Attended by de Gaulle.
Senator Lausche. Attended by Malinovsky, himself, and
de Gualle?
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
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2 Senator Lausche. At that meeting, he set forth these
unacceptable demands?
Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.
Senator Lausche. Then in the afternoon at 4:30 he
asked for a conference with Macmillan?
Secretary Gates. That Is correct.
Senator Lausche. And he again set forth those four
demands?
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. This is merely asking for your opinion.
Do you believe that in self-respect and maintenance
of the Presidents position he could conform to the demands
made in that ultimatum?
Secretary Gates. I certainly do not. I certainly believe
he could not, I guess, would be a betVer answer.
Senator Lausche. I am of the opinion that when he left
Moscow he knew there VMS not to be a summit conference. He
prepared his paper. He had his mode of operation completely
outlined.
Secretary Gates, I share that point of view, Senator.
Senator Lausche. Now, you have stated that you did
not feel that he could, in the face of these di3cussions
about a summit conference, suspend our activities with respect
to the security of the country, is that right?
Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.
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Senator Lausche. If there was to be a temporary
600
arspension of these U-2 flights, when should they have
begun? This is speculation. I am just trying to search
It out. The discussions for a summit conference preceded by
far the September visit in the United States, and then from
September to May 16th you have September, October, November,
December, four months, practically nine months. Should we last
September have discontinued our U-2 flights?
Secretary Gates. Not in my judgment, Senator. I think
it would have been most incorrect to have suspended them.
Senator Lausche. Do you believe the Soviet, because
of the arranged Summit Conference, discontinuted its activities?
0,7,) Secretary Gates. I am sure they didnft, although I
don ,t know, but I am perfectly sure they didn,t.
Senator Lausche. That is all.
The Chairman. Mr. Reporter, your staff overlooked a document
which should have been included in the background informat/n.
It is the Soviet :iote of May 10th, which was sent to cur
Government together with the reply, as reprinted in the New York
Times of May the 11th, and I ask that it be inserted in
the record so that this step in the development from a
(:) documentary point of view may be complete.
(The document referred to is as follows:)
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1/43.11-' 1
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, referring just a moment
to a previous question, on the May the 9th meeting in
which the issuance of the statement by the Department was
considered, were there any alternative statements proposed
and considered to the one which was issued?
Secretary Gates. Not in principle, Senator Fulbright.
The Chairman. Not inL:rinciple?
Secretary Gates. But thee were, of course, various
language versions considered.
take 8 fls
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602
The Chairman. Did anyone at that meeting raise. the
point that for the President, the Chief of State to assume pers-
onal responsibility would be a departure from the historical
practice of this country?
Secretary Gates. I think this was understood, Senator
and Ibelieve that we felt the circumstances were different
from anything that had prevailed heretofore.
The Chairman. But the point was raised and discussed?
Secretary Gates. I can't accurately say that it was
raised and discussed but it was certainly in my mind
and I believe it was obviously -- it was obvious to
all of us that it was a departure from precedent.
The Chairman. It was a departure from precedent in
this country. Do you know of any other country that has
followed this policy?
Secretary Gates. No, I do not.
The Chairman. Did any one -- was any one concerned
that this might have far-reaching implications for the future
of our intelligence openitions.
Secretary Gates. Well, we knew that it had -- it marked --
it already had marked the end of this particular method of
collection of intelligence because of its being compromised,
The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that to your
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knowledge there was no time in the last few years in vhich
you are familiar with our activity that U-2 flights were
suspended for political reasons.
Secretary Gates. Not to my knowledge, Senators that is
correct.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, wereyou ever consulted with
regard to the wisdom of holding a summit conference?
Secretary Gates. No, I was not, Senator.
The Chairman. Do you personally believe there is any
reasonable hope for any agreement with the Russians with
regard to disarmament?
Secretary Gates. I think it is extremely donbtfuls
Mr. Chairman. / think that the Soviets are playing off and
on again tactics, sometimes cool, sometimes cold, sometimes
hot.
/ believe that their proposal for disarmament or total
disarmament is completely unrealistic and I find it rather
difficult to believe they will ever agree to the controls and
inspections that we will of necessity insiRt upon to make
progress on disArmament.
The Chairman. Do you believe the same with regard
to nuclear test bans?
Secretary Gates. I am not so definite on that, Mx.
Chairman, fn)m a personal point of view. We seem to have made
more progress in the negotiations on tests than we have in the
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other field. But I again worry about the. possibility of having
valid control and inspection systems for either of these
efforts,
(At this point, Senator Gore entered thehearing room.)
The Chairman. I understood you to say, I believe,
in answer to a question by Senator Morse that you did not
believe any significant concessions could be expected
gram the Soviets at the summit meeting.
Secretary Gates. That is right. This has been consis-
tent with my testimony before the ommi_ttees of fon4xess all of
this Year.
? The Chairman. Is it now probable that as a
result re; .2,11 re.mms1.-11-, or the efficiency of the U-2
photography, that the Russians will now change the location
of many of their strategic bases?
Secretary Gates. This is quite an undertaking. You don't
build the construction that is involved in strategic bases
easily or quickly, and they don't know precisely how much
information we have about them, and I would think that they
would perhaps take different means of building new bases
ox of dispersing bases or something of that character,
but I don't believe that it is very practical to
assume that they would shift major installations because
of the character required to handle the strategic weapons.
The Chairman, What I meant is do you feel that the
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informatLon you now have may become rapidly ob plate because
of their knowing you know about it they will change them,
that you will have a great deal of difficulty in keeping
up with their location.
Secxetary Gates. We will have to augment other
methods toward obtaining this information.
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607
Mr. Secretary s was. your prepared statement released
to the press?
Secretary Gates. Was what e sir?
The Chairman. The statement which you read Initially,
was that released to the press?
Secretary Gates. I didnvt release it, unless the
Committee did.
-
The Chairman. No, the Committee didnvt, as far as
I know.
Captain Johnston. It has been released by Mr. St. Claire;
I believe that he had released it. We didnvt release it.
The Chairman. Was it your purpose to release it?
Secretary Gates. It was up to you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, normally, the initial statement
made by witnesses is the same as their own testimony, they
either censor it or release it. I was just inquiring.
Secretary Gates. It is all right with me if it is all
right with you that it be released, Mr. Chairman. I
understand it has been released.
The Chairman. It has been released?
Secretary Gates. That is what I understand.
Captain Johnston. Yes, sir,I was informed by someone
from the committee, I believe Mr. St. Claire, that it had been
released.
The Chairman. By whom?
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2 Captain Johnston. By the committee, Senator.
The Chairman. May I ask the staff, did you release
it?
Mr. Marcy. No, Mr. Chairman, this will just be released
in the normal way. It isrut on the tape here. It went
through the censors and unless they took any portion of it
out it went to the public.
The Chairman. I just was wondering.
Secretary Gates. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I eonaidered
It your prerogative. I have no objection one way or the
other.
The Chairaan. It usually follows the same procedure,
you make the statement and then it goes through the record
an if the censors wish it, was this statement cleared with
the State Department before you made it?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we
find out whether a copy was -- got In the hands of the
newspapermen other than through our normal sources here.
Mr. Marcy. No, sir, that did not happen, not through
the committee. Everything goes through the regular process,
through the censors, and so on.
The Chairman, Well, I asked the clerk a moment ago
if you had released it. He understood you had, I mean that
you had givenit to the press before.
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Secretary Gates. I didntt give it to the press,
Mr. Chairman,
The Chairman. You or one of your aides, I dont know.
Secretary Gates. No, we did not release it.
The Chairman, You stated very positively that you
believed the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 141, Khruahchev,
before he came to Paris, had already made up his mind to
wreck the summit. Can you tell us how and why you arrived
at that opinion?
Secretary Gates. Well, I felt, again, art' again speaking
personally, I felt that the fact that he arrived on Saturday
night and asked for these appointments with President de Gaulle
and Prime Minister Macmillan and he arrived with a position
paper translated in French In the case of de Gaulle and given
orally by translation in English to Macmillan, a position
paper that he used almost verbatim as the first part of his
text the following morning, was pretty good indication that
he had a preconceived plan at the summit meeting and
was planning to, in my judgment again, and used the fact
that there were 3,000 newspapermen in Paris and he had a
platform to issue all of theme statements from. Then I believe
there were indications in other geeches that he made prior
to the Summit that he was going to adopt later on.
The Chairman. What in your opinion caused him to arrive
at this conclusion to wreck the conference?
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Secretary Gates. Why, I believe that he found that he had
been unsuccessful in creating any disunity among the allies,
and that he was not going to get any substantive concessions
himself, according to his terms, on Berlin and other critical
issues that he might consider important, and that he wasnrt
going to get a blanket disarmament check without controls
and so forth, and I believe he felt that he was not going to
make any progress at the Summit.
The Chairman. Do you believe the U-2 incident contributed
to that belief?
Secretary Gates0 I, frankly in my judgment it did not,
Senator Fulbright. I believe it gave him, it contributed
to his public case, but I donit think it contributed to his
position.
The Chairman. You dont think that was a significant
element in causing him to arrive at this conclusion?
Secretary Gates. 'really do not, no, sir. I believe it
was a factor in his, an important factor ii helping him
make his cases but I dont think It had anything to do
with his policy decision.
The Chairman. Why do you think he would be better off
and what reasoning leads you to this conclusion, why is
he better off having followed the course he did, than having gone
to the conference and having it ,esult in no concessions?
Secretary Gates. Only he can answer that, Senator.
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The Chairman. Why do you think he left in his initial
statement what is called an "out" for the President, by
saying he thought the President didntt know about this?
Secretary Gates. I dont know what his intentions were
about that, whether that was an out or whether that was just
a statement that he believed. I really don't know.
The Chairman. If it was an out, it would be inconsistent
with his determination to wreck the conference, would it
not?
Secretary Gates. Sir?
The Chairman. If it was an out an it has been alleged, it
would be inconsistent with his determination to wreck the
conference. He wouldn't want to give the President an out,
would he, if he
Secretary Gates. I never personally considered it was
an out. I just thought he was using this as part of his
speech -- I don't consider it was an out.
The Chairman. Well, he did say that he thought the
President didn't know about it, didn't he, in his initial
statement?
Secretary Gates. Yes, he did.
The Chairman. My time is up.
Senator Morse, do you havesny further questions?
Senator Morse. Senator Wiley is next.
The Chairman. Senator Wiley?
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Senator Morse. I have some more questions.
Senator Wiley. Mr. Secretary, we know very well that
he had canvassed the situation with Macmillan, de Gaulle,
with Adenaue4 and with our President, and they were all
agreed and firm on thelvoposition that Khrushchev wanted, to
wit, he wanted to divide Germany, and so forth and so on. Now,
he was acquainted with that fact from his conversation, was
he not?
Secretary Gates. I believe he was, Or.
Senator Wiley. And, in other words, he knew that if he
went to the conference and couldntt get his way, which would
be very apparent, that wouldntt sit so well with the people
of Russia?
Secretary Gates. I think that is a good speculation.
Senator Wiley. So, it seems to be the consensus of those
people who claim to know, including yourself, that the U-2
incident would give him something to hang on his previous
determination and that he utilized. Do you agree to that?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I think he used the U-2 as a tool
rather than as a matter of principle. I think he decided
that there was no progress for him at the Summit.
Senator Wiley. Well, there is just this one other
usation. I think you have answered it, but see if I cant
get it out into the open and get it so there wonvt be any
question: Is it your opinion that he had known of the U-2
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7 incidents for a long time, I mean the U-2 flights.
Secretary Gates. I think he -- I think I believed him when
he said that he knew we were overflying the Soviet Union. I
donut believeiBknew their capabilities. But I think he knew
that unidentified aircraft were over his territory.
Senator Wiley. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
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Cantor T9
Swetland 1
The hairman. Senator Morse?
Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I want to pursue a bit
further the line of questioning that I was conducting when my
time was up because I think you have got to deal also with the
problem of where do we go from here, in view of Russian attitudes
at the present time.
We have the 'Air Marshal s statement now which has not
been countermanded as far as we know by Khrushchev, that if
an American U-2 plane flies from any base, goes over Russia,
they will fire a missile against that base.
Your testimony I think justifies my concluding that if
they fire at that base, that our commitments under NATO? our
obligations to defend our Allies, we will meet that force,
and that that may very well start general war.
As I understand also your testimony, you share my doubt
as to whether or not the Air Marshal is bluffing, whether or
not this is propaganda in the cold war or whether or not this
is an announcement of a definite decision as to what they are
going to do.
So we have to discuss this hypothetically from this point
on. Let's assume that he means exactly what he said, and because
of my fear of the type of military mind they have in Russia as
contrasted with our own, namely, the different between amoral
military leaders and moral military leaders, I am very fearful
that the group in control of the Russian military at the present
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time mean exactly what he says.
They will fire a missile at any base from which an
American U-2 plane flies. Doesnut that put squarely up to
us then the question as to whether or not we can justify being
a party indirectly to the starting of general war by flying
any U-2 planes from any foreign base, in view of that announce-
ment by the Russian Air Marshal?
Secretary Gates. We have announced that the U-2 flights
will not be resumed. The President has announced this. This
is, of course, known to them and that was announced prior to
this Defense Ministers statement that you refer to.
Senator Morse. That is what I want to clarify for this
record because most respectfully, I donut think it is clear in
the record that this Committee has made to date.
The President has announced at Paris that they were
suspending them.
Secretary Gates. He made the statement, Senator, that
he couldnut commit the next President, but as far as he was
concerned, during his Administration, the flights were stopped.
(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Cooper leaves
the hearing room.)
Senator Morse. Then do you with to express the viewpoint
that at the present time the United States does not intend to
continue any U-2 flights over Russia?
Secretary Gates. I think we made a commitment not to.
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Senator Morse. There nas been a considerable amount of
discussion in these hearings and outside of these hearings
that in view of that situation that confronts us, lt is
intended to continue 13-2 flights; that the President9s statement
was a statement made in connection with the Summit Conference
situation.
The Summit Conference situation having blown up, it does
not follow that that statement of the President now continues
in effect.
It is your testimony that it is your understanding it
does continue in effect?
Secretary Gates0 I am not a lawyer, Senator, but I think
you could take the legal point of view that the President
had no commitment because of the blow up of the Summit
Conference, but from a national point of view, prestige and the
standpoint of the honorable point of view, I think the United
States has made a commitment regardless of the technicality
of the timing of the decision, so that in my judgment we have
made a commitment not to fly 13-2 during the Administration of
this President.
Senator Morse, I dont care to get into any argument
over semantics, but only judging from what I read about the
interpretation of the Presidentls speech to the nation.
There are many news comments interpreting the Presidents
speech to the nation as a speech that does not commit this
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617
nation to a discontinuance of U-2 flights, now that the Summit
Conference has blown up.
I think it is very important that we make clear our
position. I am not passing judgment now on what our position
should be.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Morse. But we have problems, may I say most
respectfully with people in other parts of the world, even
including the segments of the population of our Allies, raising
the question as to whether or not the Presidents speech to
the nation the other night means that we may continue U-2
flights.
In view of the statement of the Air Marshal of Russia as
to what they are going to do if they do continues my question
is this: Should not our government restate its position in
regard to the continuation of U-2 flights and give the world
assurance at the present time that we do not intend to continue
U-2 flights, and thus risk the possibility that the Russians
may send a missile to the air base from which any U-2 flight
might leave?
Secretary Gates. Senator, I have in my hand the
President9s statement in Paris in which he said:
"In point of fact, these flights were suspended after
the recent incident, and are not to be resumed. Accordingly,
this cannot be the issue."
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That is a categorical statement that they are not to
be resumed. This is what I understand our position is.
Senator Morse. The President didnut say that_inhis
speech to the nation the other night. There isnut anything
in the Presidents speech to the nation the other night that
categorically and unequivocally assures to the world that we
are discontinuing as a matter of espionage policy, the flying
of any U-2 planes over any foreign territory.
All I seek to do at this point in the record, and please
let me assure you of this, all I see to do is to raise this
point so that our government can remove any suspicion or fear
In other parts of the world, in view of the Russian Air Marshals
statement, that the world doesnut have to be concerned about
a nuclear war being started by us, by sending a U-2 plane from
any foreign base over Russia.
I think the world is entitled to that assurance at this
moment in order to produce the relaxation that I think is
necessary for the continuation, through the United Nations I
hope, of a good faith, this attempt to reach some understanding
with Russia.
Secretary Gates. It may well need clarification, Senator.
I didnut think it did. I thought it was perfectly clear to me
that We had made a commitment so long as the President is in
office, not to fly the U-2 airplane, and everyone understood
it. If they donut, perhaps it should be reexamined. However,
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t9 you are nooi faced with making another statement in face of
s6
a threats and I dont know whether this is a wise move or not.
Senator Morse. I think it is a wise move if we honestly
believe that this is more than a threat, that this is an
announcement of military policy that they intend deliver on.
I donut intend to argue the point. I think the judgment
of the world will be against us if, in view of what you call
this threat, we should continue U-2 flights, because I think
we have to share joint responsibility with Russia then for
starting a nuclear war, because I seriously question whether
world opinion will ever be with us on this kind of espionage
conduct.
I think that world opinion is against our sending a U-2
flight over any foreign territory, because I think most people
in other parts of the world consider it a form of constructive
aggression.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman, Senator Hickenloopers do you have any
further questions? I think you are next.
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, with reference to
the discussion which you have just had with Senator Morse,
I think perhaps I only have a comment because my comment will
go to a matter of personal opinion, but as I understand the
line of questioning that has been going on here, end as I think
it probably will be interpreted, the United States is required
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t9 to take the burden for all the ills of the world and take the
s7
responsibilities for all the mistakes in the world, and we
must do everything, including complete submission to the demands
and the threats of the Kremlin and that the opinion of the
world is apt to be slanted against us unless we do this at this
time.
I have heard this from so many sources over the country,
that we have got to do this or that or the other thing as a
gesture that we are not war minded or that we are not war
mongers, or that we really have some interest in our fellow
man.
Now, if the record of the United States over the last good
many years of humanitarian activities, of fantastic expenditures
of billions of dollars for peace, of fostering all kinds of
conferences: of making all kinds of offers to meet all kinds of
reasonable propositions for peaces based only upon reasonable
agreements for their assurance of being carried out -- if that
isn9t an assurance to the world, I personally think that to
further humble ourselves by yielding to this threat of this
military man in Russia would certainly not add to our prestige
in the last, and it probably would be little use in the eyes
of the worlds at least those that we would expect to stand by
us in an emergency.
I cant follow that line of reasoning, especially in view
of the past record of the United States.
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We started out at the end of World War II with the sole
and exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, the ability to blow
any nation off the map and anybody else if we wanted to if
we were war-minded. Nobody else had it. We offered to give
it up to an international agency to get out of the atomic
business, to turn over all fissionable materials to an
international agency, all we asked was that reasonable
inspection, reasonable assurance would be given that the
international agency would have control and that no nation
would cheat on this obligation.
Never in the history of the world as far as I know,
has a nation, possessing the exclusive ability and the
exclusive power to destroy any other nation in the world,
have they ever given that up or offered to give it up
voluntarily.
We go fm that step by step with vast amounts of
money, with all kinds of humanitarian offers, with all
kinds of peaceful offers, with all kinds of peaceful
efforts in the world and I just want to make my position
clear, that we have stated we are not going to overfly
Russia, at least so far as President Eisenhower's
Administration is concerned, with U-2s, that that has
been stopped, and I -- if we did continue it sometime
in the future in the interestsof the security of this
country, I think the security of this country comes first
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n.our responsihi litya. and we .must take whatever reasonable
means we have. and whatever, calcule.ted risks. .that Tnpty, be
involved in order to ,secure p.spential inormatjon..and
in order to secure and maintain oureproper.defensiVe Posture. .
it.
feel that very deeply and I am not questioning you about
You don't have to agree cr disagree. I merely wanted
to make that statement in view of the fact that I don't
agree that we have got to continually humble ourselves
in the eyes of the world, because I think it can do nothing
but destroy the confidence in many cases that other nations
have in us if we continue to bow to the threats that
emanate periodically from the Kremlin, and we have had
just as bad threats in the past as this one, as I
pointed out in my previous questions, where they said they
have got rockets pointed at our basest they have got rockets
on the pads pointed at other countries in Europe, they know
how many rockets they are going to put on Paris and that
they are going to bury us one way or another, and so one and
I think there comes a time when even the world has to turn
and stand fast. That is all I have to say.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Senator Hickenloopex. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Gore?
Senator Core.
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cantor take li
The Chairman. The Senators time is up.
The Senator from Ohio, any questions?
Senator Lausche. No further questions.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I dont want to labor this
too long, but I am interested in your reasoning. I di6nit get
to finish that question. What, in your opinion -- let me go
back. Do you think when Chairman Khrushchev was in the United
States last September that at that time he had an intention
to have a summit conference?
Secretary Gates. I would only be speculating,
Mr. Chairman. I think he did.
The Chairman. I want to know what happened between then
and May the 15th, in your opinion, that caused him to take
the firm decision which you stated a moment ago you believe he
had.
Secretary Gates. I really dontt know the value of my
opinion, Mr. Chairman, hut my opinion is that he has tried
for many years to divide our allies from us. He has tried
to divide the NATO membership in particular. He has resented
the bases that surnmnd his country, and he has had, I think,
as a number one objective the division of our security
and collective alliances. I think he found during this
intervening period that he couldnve make a dent in the
solidarity and unity of there relationships, that he couldntt
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2 get anybody to change their position on Berlin. He found
the British and the French and the United States stalwartly
together on that subject, and that he found the NATO alliance
in good shape and strong, and that he was going to run into
a positicn where he would make no progress, and as someone else
has remarked, I believe, during this testimony, he would
probably lose some face at home if he couldnft make any
progress.
The Chairman. Do you think he would have refused to
participate If there had been no U-2 incident?
Secretary Gates I think he would have again, we must
only speculate, Senator --I think he would have probably
employed tactics that would have ruined the Summit from
within.
The Chairman. But you think he would have participated?
Secretary Gates0 I think he would have participated
and found some other mechanism of destroying it.
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630
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The Chairman. Mr. Dulles testified that the Air Force.
gave CIA weather forecasts that were helpful to the U-2
operation, is that correct?
Secrtavy Gatos. That is correct.
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The Chairman. What inference from Soviet military pre-
paredness can properly be drawn from the U-2 incident?
Secretary Gates. This, pieced together and repeated and
associated with other sources of intelligence builds up, un-
folds a story that definitely disclosed a military posture.
It builds up a story that gives you a judgment on a
capability for a surprise attack. It gives you a judgment
on important installations. It gives you some judgment on
production. It gives you some judgment on logistic back up
and actual military sites, so that I would say it gave you a
very definite looksee at their military posture.
The Chairman. Is it possible for you to give us a
judgment? Was this preparation and strength very impressive?
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Was it greater than you had expected?
Secretary Gates. Coming into two recent Jobs, I have had,
which is the first time I was ever involved in this, I would
say that it impressed me, Senator.
The Chairman. In other words, the result of your over-
flights and the information you got has given you an apprecia-
tion of their military strength better and that appreciation
is that they are very well armed, is that correct, better than
you expected?
Secretary Gates. In some case, yes. In some case, perhaps
less well than they advertised.
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? The Chairman. Does this failure of the summit and all
that has resulted from it, has it given you any new ideas
as to the level of expenditures of programs relating to
defense?
, Secretary Gates. Vet immediately, no, sir. But believe
havesaid when I started to testify in JanuarY, I rePeatedly
stated we didnit expect to have. any significant 051 substantive
=cessions. We believed there was a tactic on the .pat of
the Soviet Union. We didn't know how long it woulllast
and were not basing our military programs on this premise
and I also said that we should keep than under continuous
review and as late as April we went back with a major
revision in our military programs to the Appropriations
Committees.
believe now we should continue this careful and
mntinuous process, and I have no desire right now to
make any further recommendations to
Senate Appropriations Committee are
defense bill I believe next week or
the Congress. The
about to mark up the
this week.
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The Chairman. One inference / wish you would comment
on that might have been drawn from the ordering of"the
test on May 15, I believes Would it be fair, to draw the
inference that you had any doubt about the readiness of our
Armed Forces.
Secretary Gates. No, sir, but it is a very good move
and we should do it more frequently, to have a no notice
alert communications and command readiness test, and we
hope to do this, I say we started one again last night
iihich has been long planned, it is going to be about a 7 or
8 day exercise.
The Chairman. It has been long planned.
Was the one on the 15th'long planned? ?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
The Chairman. Whpr cid yifirqt. think oc doing that?
Secretary Gates. There was another one planned for about
that period of time, as a matter of fact, I made the decision
to do this myself.
The Chairman. After you arrived in Paris?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you think that that might have been
construed as a provacative act under the circumstances
that then existed in Paris?
Secretary Gates, No, sir, it was made after midnight
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on Sunday night. It was not intended nor was it worded
ps a provacative message. The fir t word in it was "Quiet",
and the last wordsin it were "minimum need to kn0w.'!
It was not meant as provacative. It was not meant as
either an offensive or defensive alert.
In fact it was not issued as such. If we were going
to go on that kind of an alert we would hue had a higher
degree of readiness than the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
The Chairman. I didn't mean you intended it as such.
Don't you think reasonable people might have regarded it as
a provacative act?
Secretary Gates. I think reasonable people would have
regarded it as a prudent act.
The Chairman. But not as a provocative act?
Secretary Cates. That is right.
The Chairman. My time is up. We have a new member here
who has just comeo would you care to ask any questions?
Senator Humphrey. Can I follow up on two or three of
yours?
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The Chairman. You have ten minutes to do as you please.
Senator Humphrey.
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Senator Humphrey. Do you think it was essential to have
overflights in order to gain the kind of information that is
supposed to have been gained in recent months?
Secretary Gates. Yes: this was by all means our best
information.
Secretary Humphrey. Well: it might be your best
information.
Secretary Gates. Yes: I think it was essential: yes: I do.
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Senator Humphrey. Have we ever shot down any Soviet
?craft that have been over American territory?
Secretary OttlBis. No sir.
Senator Humphrey. Have we shot down any Soviet aircraft
that have been over areas where we have some military re-
sponsibility?
Secretary Gates. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Humphrey. Not over Korea, Japan?
Secretary Gates. You mean in peacetime?
Senator Humphrey. Well, in the Armistice period.
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Secretary Gates. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
Senator Humphrey. We have not?
Secretary Gates. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator Humphrey0 I had been informed once that we had,
and that is why I had asked the question.
Secretary Gates. Maybe we ought to qualify this. There
has been speculation that "volunteers" have flown aircraft that
have been shot down. These volunteers may have been Soviet,
but as far as I know any identified as a Soviet aircraft has
not been shot down.
Senator Humphrey. Has the Soviet Union protested to the
United States because of an attack on our part on Soviet air-
craft?
Secretary Gates. I cant answer that question, Senator,
because my knowledge is that they have not. I donut think
they have. No, I dont think so, sir.
Senator Humphrey. Do you have reason to believe that the
so-called volunteers might very well have been a little less
than voluneers, possibly engaged actively in Soviet espionage?
Secretary Gates. Well, there has been sort of a technique
envolving over a period of time in various places of the world
where volunteers have appeared and we have always been a little
apprehensive about them.
Senator Humphrey. Just a little?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
(Laughter)
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19A Senator Humphrey . That is all.
(:) ns6
The Chairman. Senator Wiley?
Senator Wiley, None,
The Chairman, Senator Morse?
Senator Morse, I have a few more, Mr. Secretary, pursuing
the same line of questioning I was pursuing before.
The President the other night in his speech to the
nation indicated very clearly that; a nuclear war would
produce devistation upon al/ partLcipants.
Going back to my hypothetical, assuming that we should
4:) fly a spy plane out of some foreign base and assuming that
the Russian Air Marshal makes good on his threat and strikes
that air base with Russian missiles and starts a general war,
do you think we could win it?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Morse. You think we could destroy Russia and
have enough of the United States left so that we could remain
a power?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, because in this case he would,
by initiating this attack, give considerable warning to our
retaliatory forces and with that warning, we would move in.
Senator Morse. Your view then is that the United States
could win a nuclear war?
Secretary Gates. If it is started under those circumstances
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Senator Morse. Do you think that the Russian military
are aware of the fact that we could win a nuclear war if they
started that war by simply sending a missile to one air base
from which a spy plane might fly?
Secretary Gates. I think they are well aware of it.
Senator Morse. Do you think then that if he kept his
threat of sending a missile to a foreign air base from which
a spy plane might be flown, he probably would go much further
than that and send missiles elsewhere and if he knows it is
going to lead to a general war, start a complete general war?
Secretary Gates. I think he would have to.
Senator Morse. In your opinion, could we win that war?
Secretary Gates. Well, we could do what we call in the
military, prevail in general war, but there would be great
damage to the United States.
Senator Morse. There would be terrific mutual destruction
in a general war?
Secretary Gates. Yes, terrific damage.
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antor take 13 Senator Morse. Therefore,
Secretary Gates. But everything depends, Senator, on
a lot of factors. If you vary any part of the equation you
vary the answer. In other words, time of warning,
reliability of missiles, ability to fire a salvo of missiles
worldwide against deployed and U. S. forces at home and
abroad. These factors and the accuracies of these weapons --
any one piece of this equation varies the answer.
Senator Morse. Therefore, referring most respectfully
to Senator Hickenlooperts observation, do you think that we
would be showing a sign of weakness, that we would be guilty
of appeasement:that we would be surrendering to threats
if we removed any doubt in the world at the present moment by
notifying the world that we have no intention of using military
aircraft esplonage tactics henceforth either by CIA, by
NASA, by the Defense establishment or by any other agency of
the American Government?
Secretary Gates. Well, I wouldntt know quite hcw to
answer your question, Senator, because maybe some of us
that live so close to these things have a different under-
standing than thepublic has. It is so clear in my mind that
the President has made a commitment not to fly these airplanes
during his administration that I believe that the question
becomes hypothetical, and I believe If it is clear to other
people as it is to me that this is so, then it would be,
I believe, stepping up to a threat. But if it is not clear,
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and I am inco-reot In this, then I think we might to take
a look at it.
Senator Norse, I am so anxious to see to it that we make
it crystal clear because I am very much concerned about
world reaction to our present position. I think we are living
in the moment now where we can stop an adverse world reaction,
and I think we are living in a moment where there is great
danger that a substantial segment of world opinion is going
to go against us, unless we are willing to make crystal
clear that we are not going to, through any agency of our
Government, resort to aircraft espionage, because we are
dealing here when we are dealing with espionage as you so
very well, I thinks described it yourself as being a form
of activity that is a pretty ugly business.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Morse.. And we all know that it int based
on princirieR cl*P trul-Y1. In f-'r?,"r\_ Ar% nt is nocpssar7
to protect your country, in espIonage work, including
deception and engaging in immoral acts,
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Nov, I donvt think we humble ourselvee. To the contrary,
I think we put them on the defensive in world opinion if
we uay to the world: "Listens we want the Russians to
understand that theywe going to have to assume full
responsibility for any starting of a war. We have said and
we repeat to the world that we have no intention oftsing
aircraft in espionage work over foreign territory."
You think it is perfectly clear. I have just come
from across the country and I can give you assurance that
It isnvt clear in my judgment in American public opinion
todays and you have really got a segment of public opinion
in this country that wants that assurance from the Presidents
because they take note T the fact that in his speech the
other night he wasn!t even as definite as he was at Paris
in regard tothie matter.
Secretary Gates. Senator, under the American tradition,
I would say that the President says he isntt going to overfly
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Russia during his administration, any circumvention of
that steement would not be in character with either the
President or our country. To me/ it is completely clear,
but I respect your judgment.
Senator Morse. I may be .completely wrong. My only point
is that we can afford, it seems to me, as a nation that
does seek peace, we can afford to reassure the world as
many times as that when assunance might help the cause of
peace, and in doing so I dontt think we hamble ourselves.
To the contrary, I think we put Russia on the defensive. It
will help us In my Judgment to win the so-called battle of
propaganda for peace and strengthen us in getting these issues
4:) into the United Nations. Of course I would say this. I think
the President is to be commended for making clear in Paris
that he is svspending U-2 flights -- that io leihat he said.
U-2 flights,
I think he is to be commended for that, and I hope that those
who seek to replace him will give the world assurance immediately
that when any one of them is elected President that will be
their policy, too, because if all this is Is a moratorium
for a few months, it is not going to strengthen Americas
position in world opinion. They want to know whether or not
this is going to be the policy of the United States, because,
in my Judgment, if you continue espionage work by way of
aircraft, you are going to lose the world opinion in southeast
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5 Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the opinion of which
America has got to win in the decades ahead to survive, because
if that part of the world goes against us, it is only a matter
of a few decades before we will cease, in my judgment, being
a nation.
You have got to yin to the cause of freedom those
hundreds of millions of peoples and you are not going to do
it in my judgment if you let Khrushchev get by with a propaganda
drive now that we are the ones that are committing a form of
aggression by carrying out an espionage program. We dontt like
to face up to it but in my judgment that is going to be
the verdict of those people.
The Chairman. The Senators time is up.
Senator Gore?
Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say
that the decision on the 9th that the President should
assume full responsibility was a unanimous decision. Did
I correctly understand you?
(At this pont, Senator Morse withdrew from the hearing
room.)
Secretary Gates. The statement that was issued was a
unanim.zus paper. I think I am answering you yes.
Senator Gore. I wanted to give you an opportunity to
affirm that, and you so do now.
You did not participate, I believe you told me, or you
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told the Committee in any conference between the 5th
and the 9th.
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Gore. So you did not participate in a conference
or in a communication between the Department of State, the
President at Gettysburg, or otherwise, with anyone regarding
the issuance of the statement which was issued on the 7th
by Mr. Herter?
Secretary Gates. No, I did not.
Senator Gore. Which partially acknowledged the mission
of the plane.
Secretary Gates. That is correct0 I had no participation
in that in any way.
Senator Gore0 I believe that concludes my questions,
Mr, Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche?
Senator Lausche. I want to explweebit the course of
conduct taken by Khrushchev after his visit to the United
States, concerning his attitude especially on West Berlin
and West Germany. Isn't it a fact that following his visit
to the United States 2 there was shown by him a conciliatory
attitude for a period of about a month or owo? Are youeble
to answer that?
(At this point, Senator Humphrey withdrew from the hearing
room.)
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Secretary Gates. My Impression is about the same as
yours, Senator, that there was sort of a tone of conciliation
in the air.
Senator Lausche. We have had before this Committee
the Antarctic Treaty that has been recommended.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. That was signed by the Soviet and
by the United States.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. And that, I think; was last December
lst. And there was progress made for a period on thematter
of banning nuclear tests.
Secretary Gates. Yes, there was progress made.
Senator Lausche. In fact, there was more progress made
during that period than there had been at any other time
on that subject.
Secretary Gates. I think that would be fair to say,
that It looked more hopeful.
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Senator Lausche. Now then, with respect to the impression
on the world, we have advocated the banning of nuclear
tests, the initiation of disarmament be achieved through
agreements that would make possible the honest discussion
of those agreements, is that correct?
Secretary Gates. That is right.
Senator Lausche, May I have your view on what the position
of the Soviet has been with respect to the consistency
of its deeds with its talk on nuclear tests, and disarmament?
Secretary Gates. Wol1 I have not been as intimately
involved as perhaps I should have been.
Senator Lauscha. Well, the fact is that it spoke of banning
nuclear tests and initiating disarmament but it wanted no
supervision, control or circumstances that would ensure the
discussion of the agreement.
Secretary Gates. That is right. We made very little
progress on getting anywheres on all kinds of different propo
sals for any kind of valid inspection system.
Senator Lausche. All right.
Now, getting back to Khrushchev's treatment, isnat it
a fact that on November 11 he issued a vigorous and
acrimonious tirade about the purpose of the West Berliners
to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Are you
or are you not familiar with that?
Secretary Gates. I am not familiar with that, Senator?
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Senator Lausche. On November 14 in a speech he brutally
attacked Adenauer and the. German Republic.
Secretary. Gates. I remember, the speech.?
Senator Lausche. You remember that speech?
Secretary. Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. And there was some ,spe.culation in the.
minds of, the people, in, our government as to what is purpose
was in making that attack, when .ostensibly there was, ,p b.e. a
conference to reach some, agreement on West Germany and Berlin.
(At this point, Senator Humphrey left the hearing
room.)
Now then, on December 1 he began repeating his threats
that he would sign a separate Peace treaty with East Germany.
Is it not a fact that his attack upon Adenauer and upon
the German Republic and his purpose to sign a separate
peace treaty was confirmation of the unmoveable position
he took before he met at Camp David about West Berlin and
East Germany.
Secretary Cates. Yes, I think it was. I think his
position was well advertised, and we felt in the Department
of Defense that we were 'living under a threat of a separate
peace treaty at that time.
411 Senator Lausche. Then he Ilas the Baku speech of
April 25 in which he gave a harsher version of what he
had been saying for months about East Berlin, West Berlin, and
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the German Republic. That is in April, pretty close to
May 16 and then we have those circumstances in which you
point out that he had a translated paper originally written in
Russian into French translation so that he gave it to
Secretary Gates. DeGaulle.
Senator Lausche. DeGaulle. How did he present his
paper to Macmillan?
Secretary Gates. My understanding e Senator, was that
he didn't leave a paper with Macmillan. He talked from the
amte paper and it was translated through an interpreter
to Macmillan verbally. This is my understanding.
Senator Lausche. Isn't it also a fact that during all
of this time and especially in the several months preceding
the olonference, the supposed conference, the four
powers stated that there would be no yielding on West
Berlin, and our rights in West Berlin?
Secretary Gates. That is right.
Senator Lausche. In your opinion what was the primary
thing that he was aiming for in the conference. I am speaking
of Khrushchev.
Secretary Gates. You mean when he agreed to go to
a summit conference?
Senator Lauschee And down to the end.
Secretary Gates. I testified that I think he thought he
would have his way and make some peace treaty in Berlin with
401116 Ova
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some kind of give on the part of our allies and our allies
refused to give.
Senator Lausche. All right. Now then, have you given
any thought to why he revoked the invitation to the President
to come to the Soviet land?
Secretary Gates. Well, again we speculate but in my
opinion the last thing he wanted was, for. the President
to travel around his country and be acclaimed and received by
the population of Russia.
Senator Lausche. Do you think that he had flashes in
his mind about the acclaim that Nixon got in Poland, and in
other places?
Secretary Gates. He probably did.
Senator Lausche. And do you think that he kind of thought
that there would be demonstrations for the President of the
United States by the Russian people unparalleled anywhere?
Secretary Gates I believe there would have been
Senator Lausche. That is my honest conviction that he did
not dare have the President meat the Ukranian people and the
normal Russian people: excuding the Communists in at trip
to the Soviet and that is why the invitation was revoked.
Senator Wiley. Will the Senator yield?
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Senator Lausche. I yield.
656
Senator Wiley. I think there are some other facts there
that fit into the picture that you have very dramatically
given us.
Do you remember after he came to American he went back
and he canvassed individually the various heads of the various
states, and then he made a trip out East and he met Mao Tze-Tong?
It was after Mao Tze-Tong that he made that Baku speech.
He made several other speeches, and if you remember the
papers were pretty well-filled with the thought that the
Chinese Communists were telling him and that at the time that
he did go to Paris, that conditions were such that the evidence
indicated the CHinese were in Russia and now all this bolsters
up the conclusion that the Secretary has made, that it wasngt
the U-2 incident. That was just something that he got ahold
of as an ostensible reason.
The other was that he couldngt get his way and that, I
understand, is your position.
Senator Lausche. I have nothing more to ask you. Thank
you very much, Mr. Gates.
Senator Gore. If the Senator would yield, I would like
to observe that I was in the Far East at the time President
Eisenhower made his visit to India and other countries, and
there was a tremendous favorable reception. It served the
cause of our country magnificently well.
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I think it is a great loss to us that the President has
been denied the opportunity to visit in the Soviet Union.
It would have, in my view, been a great contribution. He is
unquestionably a great exemplary influence for America, and
I agree with you, Senator Lausche and Ebnator Wiley, that
the denial of the opportunity of this visit is a great loss
to us.
I do not know whether Mr. Khrushchev wanted it or did
not want it. Everyone can draw his own conclusions there.
I wish now that the exchange visit had been arranged
'before the Summit Conference. Perhaps we would have had a
different result.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get a
question
The Chairman. The witness would like to make a comment.
Secretary Gates. I want to make a comment I sort of
feel like making, Mr. Chairman. I think you know about this
because you were there. I think everyone should be terribly
proud of the dignity and character of the President in this
Paris meeting.
I happened to be sitting next to him and it was a most
remarkable performance of strength of character and dignity
of any man I have ever seen.
Senator Gore. You might be interested to know that I
immediately took the Floor and expressed such views, and I
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do not believe you will find any member of this Committee
Secretary Gates I am sure of that.
Senator Gore. Has criticized the Presidents conduct
while in Paris.
Secretary Gates. The purpose of my remarks were not
intended to do anything but just make a statement I know he
has had remarkable support of not only the Congress and this
country, but of all of our Allies too, the NATO meeting that
followed the Paris meeting was a remarkable meeting.
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14c Fir
bd
The Chairman. Is that all, gentlemen?
Senator Wiley. I want to express what you usually do,
the appreciation of the committee for the fine work of the
Secretary here this morning.
Senator Lausche. I did want to go into this speech of
Senator Dodd where he points out how Communists took charge
in the organizing of the meeting in Hew York of the
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. But I am not going to
go into
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The Chairman. I want to thank you for your very frank
and candid responses and fox the patience that you have
shown in bearing with the committee in asking these questions.
I think you have made a very useful record for the benefit
of the committee, and I think we understand what has
gone on much better than we did before you came up here,
and I hope that the record, as censored by the proper
authorities, will not in any way embarrass you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Gates. I hope not, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Core. Mr. Chairman, before concluding the hearing
would wish to express to you my personal appreciation
for the dignity, intelligence and discretion and the courage
you have displayed and statesmanship during the course of
this hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Gore, Now I ask your unanimous consent
to have printed in the record a chronology of events which I
found exceedingly well done by Mr. Chalmers Roberts.
The Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered.
(The document referred to follows)
COMMITTEE INSERT
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Senator Lausche. I would like to put into the record
a copy of Senator Dodd 's speech describing how this meeting
in New York o on the phase sponsored by the Committee
for a Sane Miaow: Policy but organized by Communists,
was conducted._
The Chairman.
, Without objection so ordered.
(The document referred to fo1lows0
COMMITTEE IUSERT
(Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the Committee adjourned.)
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