INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE, MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS VOL. 5

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000601280001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 153
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 16, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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Vol. 5
Mire littitgh ftttes Omar
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services
and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences
INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS
(DEFENSE)
Wednesday, March 16, 1960
Washington, D. C.
WARD ?Scz PAUL
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
8-4266
18-4267
NATIONAL8-4268
18-4269
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BD CONTENTS
TESTIMONY OF: PAGE
Hon. Thomas S. Cates, Jr.
Secretary of Defense
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Cantor bdl INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS
- WY
Wednesday, March 160 1960
United States Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services, and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee and Subcommittee met, pursuant to call,
at 9:35 a.m., in Room 235, Old Senate Office Building,
Senator Lyndon Johnson (Chairman) presiding.
Present: Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:
Senators Johnson (Presiding), Symington, Bartlett,
Sa/tonstall and Smith.
Present: Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences:
Senators Johnson (Presiding), Symington, Bartlett,
Magnuson, Anderson, Young, Cannon, Saltonstall, Smith, Wiley,
Martin and Case (N.J.).
Also present: Senators Jackson, Engle, Case (S.D.)
and Bush.
Edwin L. Weisl, Special Counsel; Kenneth E. BeLieu, Staff
Director of Space Committee and Preparedness Subcommittee.
Staff MeMbers, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:
Stuart French, Associate Counsel.
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Staff Members: Committee on Aeronautical and Space
(:) Sciences: Max Lehrer, Assistant Staff Director; Everard R.
Smith, Jr., Counsel; William J. Deachman, Assistant
Counsel; Dr. Glen P. Wilson, Chief Clerk; and Dz. Earl W.
Lindveit, Assistant Chief Clerk.
D. Edward Welsh, Assistant to Senator Symington.
lod
111. oru
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Senator Johnson. The Committee will come to order.
Today in continuation of our review of missiles, space and
other major defense matters, our committees are meeting to
hear from the Secretary of Defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr.
This year, as in the past, we in Congress must make
decisions on the annual defense programs submitted by the
Executive Branch. On these decisions may well rest America's
future.
In order to advise and assist us we have called in the
nation's top military experts.
First, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding
of the threat, we met with Allen Dulles, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. While the testimony, of necessity,
remains classified Mr. Dulles left no doubt about the deadly
seriousness of the threat -- a threat that ever since the
termination of world War II has become increasingly apparent from
the obvious intent of the Kremlin to control the world
through all possible means.
Our particular attention has been directed to the under-
lying principles and facts upon which the decisions governing
America's defense and space programs are based, for these
programs must be designed to actually meet the threat.
To date we have heard from each member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, including the Chairman as well as
other key military witnesses responsible for America's
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bd3 defense programs. These senior military officials have
(:) made it clear that while our defense posture today is
adequate, our programs for the future involve a degree of
(:) risk which could affect the very survival of our nation.
Some of our outstanding military experts warn us that
we must act now to step up such key programs as B-52 continu-
ous airborne alert. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps moderniza-
tion, airlift, Polaris submarines dispersed, hardened and
mobile ICBM's and anti-submarine warfare.
We must take decisive stens to shorten, rather than leng-
then, the lead time for developing an operational aircraft
to replace the 13-52.
We must also accelerate the development of space satel-
lites and the high thrust engines vitally needed for our space
programs.
General Power, Commanding General of America's principal
deterrent force testified he was not satisfied that we were
doing all we should to ensure our future survival.
General Schriever said that the missile gap we now face
results from failure to make the necessary decisions in the
past. He also advised that we could increase our operational
missile strength during the critical year of 1962 if necessary
decisions were made now.
General White testified that there was immediate and
continued need for more manned aircraft. He personally
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bd4 recommended more B-58's to replace our obsolescent B-47's
(:) and the rapid development of the 8-70 hypersonic bomber
as an operational weapons system.
(:) Admiral Rickover testified about the Soviets that:
"Their program is world domination, and no Russian
Communist leader has ever deviated from that principle.
Our main enemy is wishful thinking. Only those who learn
nothing and forget everything, refuse to look at the
record."
Admiral Burke testified that the Navy was approaching
the breaking point with regard to obsolescence, but that
restrictive budgetary guidelines had prevented the Navy
(:) from presenting its military requirements. He urged
immediate expansion of the Polaris program.
General Lemnitzer testified that the Army was not
modernizing as rapidly as it should and that only a small
portion of the funds added by the Congress in 1960 for Army
modernization had been released for this purpose. He voiced
the need for more airlift and warned that the country has as
yet no adequate defense against ICBMs.
General Taylor testified that unless heroic measures
are taken now, this nation faces a threat to its survival.
There has, of course, been a difference of opinion among
individuals both as Committee members and as witnesses.
(:) I cannot help believe, however, that we are all agreed that
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preparedness and security are the necessary watchwords
of this age of advanced and destructive weapons.
America must maintain a position of unquestionedstrength
to assure that world peace will not be broken by any aggressor
tempted to gamble for world domination.
The path to a lasting peace lies through the strength
of free nations, and America is the key strength in the free
world.
As I have said before, there may be some disagreement on
some points discussed before our Committee, but one simple
proposition remains absolutely clear
If we speed up our defenses and they are not needed all
v4e lose is money. If we fail to step up our defenses and they
are needed, we could lose our country.
The very able and distinguished Secretary of Defense,
Mr. Gates is here with us this morning and the committee,
Mr. Gates, wants to thank you for being with us and for
rearranging your very busy schedule on relatively short
notice.
We understand that you need to be back at the Pentagon
this afternoon in order to prepare for your pending NATO
trip. Therefore our session this morning will be limited
to the hours remaining and will be held in open session.
If executive matters are to be discussed, they will probably
have to be taken up at a later date. In accordance with the
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d6 established committee procedures, all witnesses have been
informed that the committee does not desire to have lengthy
prepared statements, especially because of the limited time
available for this hearing.
believe you have been informed by our staff that
we do not care to have any statements read. However, I under-
stand thatyou have a statement available and we will be very
glad to insert it in the record at this point, to distribute
it to the members and to have you if you choose to highlight
it in any manner that you may care.
We will start with questions by the counsel followed by
each committee member in turn in accordance with our practice.
Mr. Secretary, it is also the Committee's procedure to
swear the witness, and if you will please stand I shall adminis-
ter the oath.
Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth in the testimony you are about
to give so help you God?
Secretary Gates. I do, sir.
Senator Johnson. You may be seated and without objection
the statement will be included in the record.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Mrs. Smith?
Senator Smith. I have just received a copy of this
statement. It is a little over 5 pages long double spaced.
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It would seem to me that such an important statement should
be read before the committee asks the questions. Some of the
cvestions could be answered by the statement.
Senator Johnson. I had understood from the ranking
Republican Mr. Saltonstall that he had talked to Secretary
Gates about this and that it would be agreeable to him if
in the interest of time we could include it in the record,
since no members had had a chance to examine it. That while
he was testifying, that they could examine it. The Secretary
agreed that that procedure would be agreeable to him just
before the hearing.
I do not care to make a point of it. I think we
can take more time discussing it than it will take to
read it except we would be making an exception, in view of the
fact we have two committees joining each other in these
hearings, in view of the fact that the tendency in the past
has been for witnesses to come with lengthy prepared state-
ments, that by the time you get down to many members, you
don't hear it.
Senator Smith. But this is a very short statements Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Johnson. And they don't have a chance to ask
their questions if most of the time is taken with prepared
statements. Now if we do this, and I will be glad to do it
if the Committee desires it, we will be making an exception
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for the Secretary of Defense alone, if he wants to make
a point of that or the Committee wants to make a point of
it. I would have no objection.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I agree completely on
2engthy statements. This is a very brief statement and a
very important statement. While I am not a ranking member
of this committee, I do feel that it is important for me at
least to look it over, and I want to listen to the quezticns
I would ask the Chairman and the ranking member of this
committee to reconsider and permit the Secretary to read
it if he can do it quite quickly.
Senator Johnson. If the Secretary desires to have that
done, the Chair will certainly have no objection because we
think we can take more time discussing it than it will take
to read it except it does do this: Next time the statement
may be 20 pages and the principle of having witnesses come
in with statements and permitting them to deliver them at
length will
0.1.???
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman: you will recall I am sure
that Mr. Dulles did not read his statement, but some members
of the committee had read the statement and had prepared
questions from that statement, while some of the rest of us
did not: and I did not appreciate it nor did I get the
information I needed that I would have gotten had I had a
highlight of Mr. Dulles statement and that is why I am taking
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this position at this time.
(:) Senator Johnson. 1 think that's right and I have no
desire to make a point of it except this. The practice has
(07) .vlimn in-the Committee not to have prePared statements. This
is the last witness. No person has been allowed to come in
with a prepared statement whether it is five pages or five
hours. Now if we desire to make an exception and the
Secretary of Defense desires to make an exception, we
can do that and I have no objection to it if the Committee
wishes.
think the better course of wisdom would be for him
to distribute his statement, let the members examine it,
(7.) let him highlight it in his own way and then let each member
C
ask questions after counsel has concluded. But if you care
to have it formally read at this time, and that is your
zequest I will put the question.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, as usual you are very
fair in this and I would leave it to the Secretary. I would
like it read.
Senator Johnson. Without objection then the
Secretary will read his statement.
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bd10 TESTIMONY OF HONORABLE THOMAS S. GATES, JR.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, I have a short statement.
The major threat confronting us today is the persistent
and relentless drive of communism toward an unchanged goal --
a communist controlled world. This threat is real and formid-
able. It encompasses all fields of human endeavor. It is
military, political, economic and psychological.
It is important that we keep this complex threat in per-
spective. To do so we must examine each part in relationship
to the whole.
By the same token we must examine our own capabilities in
the same manner. In the military field we must consider the
entire picture and not an isolated part, regardless of how dra-
matic that part may be.
Our military requirements must be based on our needs and
consistent with national objectives. The communist military
requirements are vastly different. That is one reason we do
not need to match the communists bomber for bomber: missile for
missile, division for division or submarine for submarine.
We need military strength which will convince the commu-
nist leadership that no matter how hard it strikes it will be
hit back so hard that its structure will collapse.
An aggressor's destruction must be so inevitable that
initiating war is tantamount to suicide. That strength I
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believe we have now, and our defense programs are designed
to maintain this strength. This conviction is shared by my
principal military and scientific advisers.
1. Some of the facts which support this judgment are:
a. Our total strength, widely deployed within the
United States and around the periphery. of a single strategic
target area, is so great that any surprise attack upon us vould
result in unacceptable destruction to the attacker.
Contributing to this deterrent are tactical fighter bombers
and light bombers plus tactical missiles and carrier attack
aircraft in addition to the weapons of the Strategic Air
Command.
b. The establishment of early warning systems, the
capability for an airborne alert at the time and on the scale
needed, and the deployment of mobile, hardened, and concealed
missiles are progressing as planned. Our defense programs are
under continuous review to insure that we maintain a long-
range program of military strength. For example, we are acceler-
ating the second MEWS station to bring it into operation
lour months ahead of schedule.
c. Funds are included in the 1960 and 1961 budgets to
provide an airborne alert capability for our heavy bombers.
The extent of this effort is substantial. $142 million will be
obligated this year and $85 million next year.
This entails the procurement of extra engines and spare
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bd12 parts and the training of crews so that an airborne alert can
be mounted if and when the need should arise. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff and I agree that we do not need to fly airborne alert
now but we do need the capability to do so during periods
of tension which may lie ahead.
The Congress has assisted this program by enacting
Section 612(b) in the 1960 Defense Appropriations Act which
authorizes the incurring of deficiencies for this purpose.
We are requesting xe-enacting of this provision in the 1961
Act.
d. The intercontinental missile is a new aid vitally
important weapon that will profoundly affect the character
of our problem. However, the threat it poses is not best coun-
tered by matching missile for missile.
In fact, we must not allow ourselves to over-concentrate
on any instrument of war. Rather the solution to our maintaining
a valid and effective defense posture is by having in being
a variety of types of weapons systems capable of successfully
countering all types of threats facing us and our allies.
2. We have nuclear weapons that exceed thossof the
USSR by several times in total destructive power. We have
long-range means of delivery that exceed theirs by several
times in total carrying capacity. We have, in coMbination,
"enough" to bring destruction to anyone who attacks us.
We are designing our programs to maintain this strength.
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bd1.3 13 Last year we had available to us the National Intelli-
gence Estimate which gave us the numbers of operational
ICBMs which the USSR could achieve or might achieve in
various time periods. These were calculated to cover either
of two possibilities: One, that the Soviets would pursue
and the other, that they
a vigorous but orderly ICBM program,
would pursue a highly accelerated or "crash" program.
A year has now passed. Additional information has been
acquired and further refinement has been accomplished. Consid/
exing all the available evidence, we believe it is now well
established that the USSR is not engaged in a crash program
?-^????""""'"'"."."""""""?5".41.11.11616.41."1.1"111114.4..1
for ICBM development.
Whether we take the estimate of a year ago or the
current estimate, it is my firm judgment and that of my
military and scientific advisers that our deterrent and
retaliatory position remains adequate to meet the threat
today and in the years ahead. We do not foresee a time
whenthe Soviets could launch an attack on us without inviting
unacceptable damage to themselves in return.
I should also like to make it clear that neither
General Twining nor I have been deprived of essential elements
-;
of intelligence, nor do I believe that our testimony indicates
that we have been deprived of such essential elements.
The flow of intelligence information and its assessment
by the Intelligence experts is a continuous process. General
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Twining and I are kept constantly informed on important
developments in this area.
Because they started much earlier and stayed persistently
with the same program, the USSR has booster engines, making
possible exploration in deep space.
Meanwhile, our nation has had to telescope time in
this effort. The lost years cannot be regained overnight,
even though our scientists and engineers have worked wonders.
For the years immediately ahead it is important that we clearly
differentiate space exploration from military weapons systems.
At present the Department of Defense has no specific military
requirements for so-called super-boosters.
We are vitally interested in the development of larger
boosters because the future may well bring specific
military requirements for them.
Our military satellite program is progressing as a matter
of priority and is well supported by the propulsion systems
of our ballistic missiles.
Mr. Chairman, we are continuously reviewing our programs.
We will not hesitate to come back to the Congress for addi-
tional funds at any time we feel such funds are required. We
will not hesitate to take emergency measures.
As of this time, I am'convinced that we are on a sound
basis and have presented a properly balanced concept. We
will continue to plan and to change as necessary. We must
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bd15 always remain superior in total power. Along with the
President, I am convinced that we will.
Senator johnson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We will first ask the counsel to proceed with his question-
ing. Then we will take committee members in order.
I want to ask you one question though, Mr. Secretary,
...?.?????????111191111111.1????.....
in view of your statement that neither you nor General
Twining had been deprived of any intelligence information.
1.111.0101.......1111110011111111.10, ..MPIVAMMITMICIMINNIPOP,
I want to call your attention to page 411 of the hearings
of this committee.
"Senator Saltonstall. General Twining, you are
telling us that until the time you saw this chart, either in
this room or after it had been given to this committee, that
you have never seen these calculations that CIA had made?
"General Twining. I have seen some of them but not all
of them."
How do you reconcile that with the statement that you
made that would imply that all the information had been
seen?
Secretary Gates. That was not an essential element
of intelligence, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. So the description of intelligence
elements would not include these charts in their description.
Secretary Gates. No, sir, it would include those
charts, but it would not include certain figures that did
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bd16 not affect the national intelligence estimates for the
(
(:) two years that were under comparison.
Senator Johnson.
Counsel?
Mr. Weisl. Mr. Secretary, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, namely the Comptroller, has provided a summary
which shows that the Department of Defense has underestimated
the funds required for IRBMs and ICBM programs each and every
year since 1955, and I read:
For Fiscal Year 1955 the budget request for these
weapons was 40 and nine-tenths million. The amount finally
programmed was 158 and nine-tenths million. FY 1956 the
budget request was 159 and three-tenths million. The program
finally approved was 526 and three-tenths million. FY 1957
the budget request was 858 and nine-tenths million. The
amount finally programmed was one billion four hundred million
and nine-tenths. FY 1958 the budget request of the Department
of Defense was one billion nine hundred thirty-seven and
three-tenths million.
The amount finally programmed was two billion one hundred
forty-nine and eight-tenths million. For Fiscal Year 1959 the
budget request was two billion three hundred ninety-one
million. The amount finally programmed was two billion nine
hundred forty-five and six-tenths million. For Fiscal Year
1960 the budget request was two billion five hundred twenty-
two and eight-tenths billion, and the amount finally
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bd17 programmed was three., billion three hundred three million
and three-tenths. Can you explain to this committee why
the Department of Defense has been so consistently wrong
in underestimating the amounts required for ballistic missile
programs?
Secretary Gates. I can only explain it, Mr. Weisl,
to the effect that this is a new program, a new art in terms
of years. It is changing extremely rapidly, and is
under continuous review. It relies on tests, and there are
continuous changes in it. It is not unusual for the
Department of Defense to reprogram in all of its programs,
procurement programs.
But it is true that decision are made throughout the
years and on a month by month basis that change the
figures. This is still going on as of today.
Mr. weld'. why have the budget requests so largely
underestimated the requirements not for one year but for
six years, consistently?
Secretary Gates. I think my answer is just as I gave it.
You must remember that it used to take 10 years to develop
an airplane weapons system. We are dealing with the first
six years of expenditures of substantial amounts for these
missile programs. This is a new business, and subject to
comparative analyses, scientific review and test success or
failures repeatedly, and we do the best we can to estimate
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when ye make up a budget which is in the fall for an 16
month period ahead, and it is not unusual to have this kind
of an overrun in a new program, or an underestimate in a
new program.
Mr. Weisl. My question is why have you always erred
by underestimating and never over-estimating for six straight
years?
Secretary Gates. I think I have answered the question
as best I cane six.
Mr. Weisl. May I ask this question: If we can't
estimate our own requirements on a year by year basis, how can
we estimate the Russians requirements three years ahead?
Secretary Gates. We can only estimate the Russian
requirements on the basis of the best intelligence that
we can acquire in a field that is obviously an inexact
science, so that we do the best we can.
Mr. Weisl, I am sure you do, Mr. Secretary. But my
question is tilt having more intelligence about our own
requirements, and if we underestimate them year by year for
six straight years, how can we estimate the Russian
requirements or intentions, for three years ahead, with an
degree of reliability?
Secretary Gates. Well, this is another thing similar
to the changes in our own programs. We are reviewing the
information we have on their programs on a monthly and
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bd19 regular basis, and our estimates change on their program
as we go down the line.
Mr. Weis/. But we could be just as wrong in underestimat-
ing their intentions or capabilities or programs, certainly
can be just as wrong as we have been underestimating our own,
can't we?
Secretary Gates. I don't know how wrong we have been in
underestimating our missiles in terms of numbers. we may
have been wrong in underestimating our dollars. As fax as /
know, we do-Alt have any estimate of their dollars.
Mr. Weisl. Dont numbers translate themselves into
dollars?
Secretary Gates. No, sir. They translate themselves
into a whole variety of factors, training, construction,
research and operational instruments.
Mr. Weisl. But the more dollars we have, the more train-
ing and research and other elements are available, isn't that
true?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Mr. Weia. And the less dollars we request, the less
training and research and other elements are available.
Secretary Gates. Yes, but these things are very difficult
to estimate, as I said before, in a new field, and I think
we have done remarkably well frankly in a new field to do as
well as we could compared to our historical experience with
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C.)
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other types of weapons systems.
)Mr. Weisl. Since there is about a two year lead time in
missile programs; won't we be in trouble if we change our
estimates a year from now?
Secretary Gates. If we change our estimates on either
side we have to adjust for these changes. We may not be
in trouble but we must be flexible and alert to such
changes as a possibility.
Mr. Weisl. Can we ever make up for lost lead time?
Secretary Gates. Lead time is very difficult, depending
on the type of installation you am talking about. Lead time
of hardened missiles is about 30 months, and you can make up
for lost lead time in other ways of countering the threat,
but in certain specific weapons systems, you cannot make up
for lost lead time.
Mr. Weisl. General Schriever testified that because
we did not make the right decisions two years ago, we have
fewer /CMs today than we could have had, had we made
the right decisions then. Do you agree with that testimony?
Secretary Gates. If we decided to put more effort
several years ago into a particular type of system, we could
have done so and we would have had more of that system, but
we decided it would be wiser from the standpoint of national
defense to diversify our systems and to move into newer
types of missiles that were better, in the fact that they
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bd21 could be more mobile and more widely dispersed and more
invulnerable.
Mr. Weisl. General Schriever further testified that
we could increase the number of operational ICBMs that we
could have by 1962 if we made the necessary decisions now.
Have you reconsidered the current ICBM programs?
Secretary Gates. Yes. I have not completed the recon-
sideration of them, but we have been studying certain factors
that have been introduced, and I hare personally been briefed
on certain possibilities, largely alternate possibilities
that might make it possible for us to, after review particu-
larly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff1 to make recommendations
to change the recommendations that we have heretofore made.
We have these under consideration.
Mr. Weis 1. But no decision has been made.
Secretary Gates. No. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Weis'. Do you have any doubt as to the need for
more ICBMs?
Secretary Gates. I have no doubt that we must
have an invulnerable and a strong deterrent posture based
on a total mix of weapons systems. I cannot look at an
isolated system without looking at the total, and the whole.
So I would balance the need for ICBMs with the other systems
we have under development and the various types of ICBMs we
have under development. I would also take a long look at the
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vs bd22 Polaris system which / have always considered in my own
(:) mind to be an intercontinental ballistic missiles and have
always referred to it as such, perhaps because I was involved
with it from its inception.
Mr. Weisl. Mr. Secretary, may I refer you to an address
that you made when you were retiring as Secretary of the Navy?
This address was made to the Navy League in May of 1959, and
in that address you made the following statement, and I
quote:
"In a limited war situation the Navy must maintain
a capability to use either nuclear or conventional weapons
to the controlled degree necessary to achieve the objective.
More funds are required for this purpose. Mor accent
on its importance is needed. This sort will have to
come from the elimination of certain of the very expensive
mass destruction single purpose weapons systems which
have aIriority of claims against our national resources."
Now first of all you did say that more funds would be
required for that purpose. Have more funds been asked for
for that purpose?
Secretary Gates, Yes. I think we have been putting
(:) more money into our limited war capability each year. This is
the total money that goes toward
4110140?0
(:) Mr. Weisl. You mean more money from year to year,
Mr. Secretary.
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bd23 Secretary Gates._ T think we have been trying to balance
.the three missions that we have in the Deoartment pf Defense,
thigh that speech, refers to, between our strategic general war
weapons systems and our limited war systems. I think that
we are still trying to make this correct balance.
Mr. Weisl. Will you supply for the record the figures
to indicate what you state, that you have put more money into
conventional warfare capabilities from year to year?
Secretary Gates. I will try, Mx. Weisl. This is very
difficult because this involves the effort that practically
mapresents the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps, and their
modernization, which is not all that they would like to have.
But we think we are making progress on. You must remember
there I spoke as a Service Secretary, and I believe at that
time I tried to be non-Parochial. I believed at that time
in proper balance. I believe in it even more today.
Senator Jackson. Will the counsel separate that question
so that you can ask for the amount requested by the Bureau
of Budget and the amount actually out in by Congress, especial-
ly as it relates to modernization of weapons?
Secretary Gates. The amount requested, Senator
Jackson, by the Bureau of the Budget.
Mr. Weisl. The amount requested by the Department of
Defense and cleared by the Bureau of the Budget, and the
amount appropriated for this purpose by Congress.
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bd24 Secretary Gates. Yes. I am not trying to avoid doing
any homework, Mr. Weisi. It is going to be very difficult to
separate out forces as pertaining to limited war. Many people
have tried to put our budget on a functional basis, and we
have found it absolutely impossible to do so.
Senator Saltonstall, Mr. Chairman, would the Senator
yield for a technical question, Mr. Weisi?
Mr. weisl, I wonder if that question can be answered.
For instance, is an aircraft carrier a conventional weapon
or a strategic weapon? Is a tank that will fire a gun,
that will fire a cannon 500 miles a strategic weapon or a
conventional weapon?
I just point out that I think it is a very difficult
question to answer in the form that you have asked it.
I say that most respectfully.
Secretary Gates. If I may say the Senator has outlined
some of the very real reasons that it is almost impossible
to put a functional budget out for the Department of
Defense.
Senator Jackson. I think right at that point the
Secretaries, Mr. Secretary, for the individual services
have been LIP, and made their point that they need additional
funds, for example, for modernization. This is the area that
(:) is indeed limited primarily to limited war.
Secretary Gates. That?s right.
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bd25 Senator Jackson. And certainly you can split it
from that. Otherwise, of course, you could never get an answer.
Secretary Gates. We can give you an answer on such
(7.) things as Army modernization which is the Army Procurement
account and on the Navy shipbuilding account in some
categories. We will try, Mx. Weisl.
Mr. Weisl. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Now last year
General Taylor stated that two of his principal reservations
concerning the 1960 budget were inadequate provision for
Army modernization and for early production of
Nike-Zeus. The Congress was convinced apparently of these
requirements, and appropriated 382 million over the budget
(7.) request for Army procurement. The Army head has testified
that only 43 million of this has been made available for
the Army modernization during 1960. Why has the Congressional
intent been completely disregarded?
Secretary Gates. My recollection, Mr. Weisl, is that
all of that money has been made available to the Army with
the exception of 137 million dollars which was supposed to be
applied to the production of the Nike-Zeus system, and since
we made a decision to have fullscale tests on a research basis
of the Nike-Zeus system and to not put the system in production,
(:)
we have not released that $137 million. But my understanding
(:) is the rest of the money has been released to the Army.
Now thEre maybe a few, a small portion of it that we have not
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bd26 yet gotten together on exactly the type of equipment they
(:) are going to buy.
But in essence it is or will be released.
Mr. Weisl. Have you read the testimony of General
Traub on this subject before the Appropriations Committee
of the House?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Mr. Weisl. Would you be kind enough to read it and
supplement your testimony if you think it is necessary?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I am aware
Mr. Weisl. In that respect.
Secretary Gates. I read the Secretary's testimony. I
did not read General Traub's.
Mr. weisl. In your statement that I just read, you
make this observatio, and I quote: Referring to support of
the Program that you then advocated:
"This support will have to come from the elimination
of certain of the very expensive mass destruction single
purpose systems which have a priority of claims against our
national resources."
Now what did you mean by that? What will have to be
eliminated in the expensive mass destruction single-
purpose weapons systems?
Secretary Gates. I meant by that I am sure that at that
time we had to make choices between the variety of different
4.11, Fla
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d27 ways we had of carrying out our strategic mission, and this
is true.
We have made,choices, such as Navajo and, other weapons
that have been changed. ,I meant that in the long run you ,
should not develop too many competing weapons systems for a
single purpose.
Mr. Weisl. The Navajo, Mr. Secretary, was canceled
many years before you made this talk.
What expensive mass destruction single-purpose weapons
systems did you think ought to be eliminated?
Secretary Gates. I wouldn't have been able at that time
to have had a judgment on it. I just was talking abDut how
much is enough for the strategic purpose.
Mr. Weisl. Has any decision ever been made as to how
much is enough?
Secretary Gates. No. We do the best we can with it.
We make studies and evaluations of it.
Mr. Weisl. But you must have had in mind, Mr. Secretary,
*AI WW1
Secretary Gates. I didn't have in mind -- I had in mind
a broad category of systems. I wasn't competent as Secretary
of the Navy to determine which system versus which other
system.
Mr. Weisl. But you did say that this support will have
to come from the elimination of certain of the very expensive
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bd28 mass destruction single-purpose weapons systems.
Secretary Gates. That's right.
Mr. Weisl. Now, which ones did you have in mind? Did
you have in mind the Atlas?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Mr. Weisl. Is that a single-purpose weapon?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weil. Did you have in mind the Titan?
Secretary Gates. I had in mind the whole category of
systems that were under contemplation or under research or
in development, that when they came into certain stages
they all compete with each other. This is one of the argu-
ments I am having in my present capacity about the 8-70
airplane, for example, which we have talked about in other
committees. I had in mind that you have to make decisions
between these weapons systems: as you see was involved
in them, and you see what dates they are going to come into
operational capacity and take a look at these in regard to
the total balance ofyour military power.
Mr. Weisl. Let us try to be a little more specific.
The single-purpose mass destruction weapons are the Atlas,
the Titan, the Minuteman and the Polaris, is that true?
Secretary Gates. Yes, plus the 8-52.
Mx. Weisle Plus the 8-52, the 8-58, the 8-70. That is
true. Now which one of these did you have in mind eliminating
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bd29 when you made this positive statement?
Secretary Gates. I didn't have anyone in mind. I didn't
have the competence to name one of them. I had in mind
the category had to be reviewed.
Mr. Weisl. You talked about elimination.
Secretary Gates. And some would have to be eliminated.
Mr. Weisl. Now how do you feel about that today? Do
you :feel that some of them have to be eliminated?
Secretary Gates. I feel that we always have to review
these programs and keep a well-balanced defense posture, and
not rely on a single type of systems for our effort, yes,
so in the long run some of them will be eliminated.
Mr. Weisl. Which ones do you have in mind eliminating?
Secretary Gates. None, sir, right now.
Mr. Weisl. In your opinion do Soviet manned bombers
pose a current threat to the United States?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weisl. In view of this threat, will you be kind
enough to explain the abrupt removal of 15 ships from the
seaward extension of the DEW line over the objections of
the Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense
Command?
Was this done for military reasons or budgetary
reasons?
Secretary Gates. While the Soviet manned bomber remains
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bd30 a threat, again it is a matter of balance and degree.
(1,1) When this extension of the DEW line was contemplated, I believe
it was 1955, and I believe it was put into being in 1957.
(:) After a review of the Continental Defense picture again,
and after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it
was considered that we could reduce somewhat the effort in
connection with both Air Force tactical fighter squadrons
and Navy ships in supporting this concept that was, as I say:
devised five years ago. Those ships are not going out
of existence in total.
Some of them are going to still go on part of the same
mission bl being used in what is called the continuous
(:) warning line, and others will replace older Navy ships
that will be put into mothballs.
Mr. Weisl, May I read you from a memorandum submitted
to us by the Department of the Navy on this subject on March
8, /960, and I read from paragraph 3:
"General Nuter notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
he recommended against this action in that removal of the
picket ships would degrade the warning capability of the
seaward extension of the DEW lines, and that the WV-2
(:) aircraft which would remain flying these extension lines
would not have as good detection capability as would the
(:) ships."
Secretary Gates. That is correct. General Kuter
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bd3/ recommended that in a Commanders Conference, unified
Commanders Conference we held, in Norfolk in the first early
days of January. We did not agree with General Kuter.
Mr. Weisl. Who are the "we" that did not agree?
Secretary Gates. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself.
Mr. Weisl. Was that unanimous?
Secretary Gates. As far as I know it was, Mr. Weisl.
Mr. Weis/, General White concurred in that?
Secretary Gates. I would want to check and see whether
we made a record of this, but I never recall any objection
from General White.
Mr. Weisl. Did Admiral Burke concur in it?
Secretary Gates. Yes,
Mr. Weisl, And General Lemnitzer?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Mr. Weis/. And General Shoup of the Marine Corps?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Mr. Weisl. I would like to place in the record if
there is no objection the memorandum, the entire memorandum of
the Department of Defense on this subject.
In January of this year, Mr. Secretary, you submitted
the following unclassified
Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, on the question of
Procedure I assume that that is going in, that memorandum.
Senator Symington. Does anybody object to the memorandum
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bd32 being put in the record? Without objection: the memorandum
will be put in the record.
(The document referred to fo1lows0
0
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bd33 Mr. Weis/. In aanuary of this year Mr. Secretary,
you submitted the following unclassified official statement,
and I quote:
(.1) "It has been stated on previous occasions that the
Soviet superiority in /CBMs could be in the order of 3 to 1
in the period 1960 to 1963. This statement was based upon
estimates of what the USSR could produce in numbers of missiles,
and was not an affirmative statement of fact that the USSR
T:ould produce the number of missiles required to attain this
superiority. On the basis of our current intelligence esti-
mate, which has been presented to the Committee by the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence Agency, we do not now believe '
that the Soviets superiority in ICBMs will be as great as
that previously estimated."
04.
While we do not want to discuss in any sense the
number of missiles in this session, it seems to me that it is
appropriate to discuss the ratios that you raised. On the
basis of the revised national intelligence estimates to which
you referred, and on our currently approved programs, will the
Soviet have a superiority of more or less than 3 to 1 in
mid-1961?
Secretary Gates. This testimony I believe you are refer-
ring to was before the House Appropriations Committee.
Mr. Weisl. Yes, sir.
Secretary Gates. I tried very hard not to discuss the
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bd34 numbers of missiles, the relative number of missiles in
(7) my testimony before that committee. I made it as clear
as I could that these numbers in themselves were misleading,
(7.) that we had to rely upon a variety of factors when we were
C
talking about such numbers, such as accuracy, reliability, the
condition of our own defense posture, relative hardening and
the time that we were discussing. I think these numbers and
ratios pertaining to them are extremely difficult to not have
confusing. We must look at this constantly, and it depends
on the way you start off, how you start to compare what
the so-called ground rules might be, and it depends on the
time that you are discussing. I tried my best in that
testimony to bring out these factors, with the hope that
we would not get into a discussion which has later of course
developed concerning these numbers, because they are misleading
unless you consider the total problem that is involved.
Mr. weisl. I did not bring up the numbers. You are
the one that in your statement stated
WWI.*
Secretary Gates. You are bringing up testimony which
led to this, which is part of the identical page of discus-
sion or the identical two or three pages of the discussion
leading up to the statement you quoted.
Mr. Weisl. But you made that statement to the committee
and in your prepared statement you stated as follows, and I
read:
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bd35 if we compare the estimated Soviet ICBM and the
sea-launched missile programs with plans for deployment of
U. S. ICBMs and Polaris missiles we know that the Soviets
may enjoy at times a moderate numerical superiority during
the next three years.
"This difference in numbers appears to peak during the
1962 period."
That was in your prepared statement. It was not the
result ot any questioning.
Secretary Gates. That is correct/ six.
Mx. Weis!, And the committee tried to find out what you
meant by moderate superiority/ and that is what I am trying
to find out/ and in that regard, since Secretary McElroy/
your predecessor, over television publicly stated that there
will be a 3 to 1 superiority: and you stated that new
intelligence estimates indicate some change in that, I am
siwply asking you whether the change in mid-1961 will be
less than 3 to 1?
Secretary Cates. I can't answer that: Mr. Weisl.
Senator Case of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, may I inject
for just a second, this is a matter on which there has
been I think more discussion than on anything I know of
in this whole area.
I wonder if in order to get the exact facts, without
any reservation as to concern for the country's security we
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bd36 might not have an understanding that thi.2.2L_ilijae_discussed---
ein detail in executive session.
Senator Symington. I don't think there has been any
information that has been given to anybody yet that has not
already been given out by the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Case of New Jersey. That isn't the point, Mx.
Chairman.
senator Symington. I haven't seen any intention or
implication of the counsel to give out any classified infor-
mation.
Senator Case of New Jersey. There is no suggestion of
that.
Senator Symington. The counsel has pointed out that the
subject has been raised voluntarily by the Secretary of
Defense. We have also had testimony that the gap has not
narrowed. It has increased. I think the counsel,
inasmuch as the American people want to know what the facts
are, should be allowed to pursue the matter the way he thinks
best, because he has the interest of classified material at
heart just as much as any member of the committee.
Senator Case of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I haven't
made myself clear.
Senator Symington. / am sorry.
Senator Case of New Jersey. There is no suggestion
that counsel should be deterred from any questioning along
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bd37 this line.
(:) Senator Symington. Would the counsel listen to the com-
ments of the distinguished Senator from New Jersey.
(:) Senator Case of New Jersey. There is no desire on my
part to stop counsel from pursuing this line so far as he
thinks it is desirable of course at this time. / only wanted
to make the point that for my own sake and I think many people
would agree, it is very desirable that we ask the Secretary
to appear before us in executive session on this point so that
-------------
'
we may go into exact detail as to the meaning of his state-
ment, and make it clear to me at least as a member of the
committee -- perhaps I haven't gotten all the
nuancesof the testimony so fax, something that is not yet
clear and I doubt can be made clear without our being in
executive session.
Senator Symington. I must say with great respect I
disagree with the distinguished Senator from New Jersey.
0.11?11.1I
Sena tor Case of New Jersey. This indicates an inadequacy
on my part but I still pursue my suggestion.
Senator Symington. May I continue? Statements have
been made publicly by the Secretary of Defense and by the
Secretary of the Air Force that the gap has either been
reduced or eliminated. That was in public session. Statements
have been made in private session by the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency that the launching capability gap has
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increased. I believe that we have to leave it up to the
counsel of the committee, who is mindful of the importance of
classified material, to question the witness as to who was
right.
Was he right? Was the Secretary of the Air Force right
in a television broadcast, or was the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency right with respect to what has happened
to this gap in the last 12 months?
Senator Case of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to respectfully suggest that what counsel is doing --
Senator Symington. May I continue?
I am sure that the Senator from New Jersey wants to
see the facts given out to the people to the best of the
counsel and the witness'ibility without getting into classi-
fied material.
Senator Case of New Jersey. Of course the Senator from
New Jersey wants this and that has always been his position.
It is his position now. It is his position however further
that we can more quickly come to an understanding of this
either that someone has been wrong or that there has been a
misunderstanding by completely open frank testimony in execu-
tive session and then make the explanation in our reports
and otherwise as the facts may determine.
But I for one do feel that this is a matter we should
go into in detail in executive session where there is no
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bd39 question of our skirting the line of secrecy. It is a
(:) very delicate issue and I believe we ought to have the facts
but we ought to have them first in executive session.
(:) I don't suggest for a second that counsel is not entirely
right in raising the question or pursuing it as fax as he thinks
he can in open session.
I merely want to have an assurance if we may that an
executive session with the Secretary will be available to
us to go into the matter as far as some of us at least think
it should be pursued.
Senator Symington. Senator Jackson?
Senator Jackson. Will the Chair yield? Would it not
be in order in a lawyexlike way for the counsel to have
(:)
the right to cross-examine the Secretary in the area that he
placed in the public domain, that is namely the statement
that counsel read, which has been or was made public in the
Appropriations Committee, and to propound the necessary
questions as to whether or not there has been any change?
Senator Case of New Jersey. May I just make one comment
on this, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jackson. It seems to me how anyone can argue
against that as fax as security, it is beyond my understandi g.
(:) I agree with the Senator from New Jersey that it would be
helpful and it should be in executive session to get back
of all of this, which the Secretary wants to point out, that
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bvd 40 is the matter of other weapons systems. But it would
(:) seem completely in order and entirely in keeping with the
right to cross-examine that area of the statement already
(7) rade public, unless there is some clear-cut reason why security
is involved.
Senator Case,) of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, may I just
comment on that?
think what has happened is this: The Secretary made
a statement. Testimony taken before us in executive session
from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency appears
_
..?????????????????????....1.11.00.????.-a
to some to be in conflict at some point. The questioning
(...........????????????......???????????????????,*.a.
of the witness is now being based upon both his open
statement and the Director of Intelligence Agency's
testimony before us in secret session, and I think we are
not going to get a complete final answer on the basis of
that without going into executive session. i do not in any
way protest counsel's pursuing this as far as he thinks
proper at this time.
I merely want before this matter is closed to have an
assurance if we may that we may pursue this in a way that
/ think is necessary in executive session before the
matter is closed or considered closed by the Committee.
Senator Jackson, isn't it entirely in order to simply
ask whether that statement still stands? The statement has
been made public.
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Aren't the American people entitled to know whether
the statement is still correct?
Senator Case of New Jersey. The American people are
entitled to have every possible bit of information consistent
with security. As a member of this committee, I feel I
would like to have it explained to me in executive session
in which we can pursue it in detail so that my own understand-
ing is as good as I think my duties as a Senator are required
to be.
Senator Jackson. I understand that, but I just for the
life of me dontlt understand why you can't ask whether a
previous public statement still stands.
Senator Case of New Jersey. I am not suggesting
that that question should not be asked as I said I think several
times.
Senator Symington. Senator Case of South Dakota?
Senator Case of south Dakota. Mr. Chairman, it seems
to me that the problem arises from the fact that the Secretary
is being asked to comment upon yardsticks used by other
persons. There is nothing that I have heard this morning
that would indicate that former. Secretary McElroy and
Secretary gates used the same definition of terms in their
comparisons. Further than that, with respect to asking the
Secretary to comment upon a suggested statement or position
indicated by the Director of Intelligence, Mr. Dulles, relating
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to comparative strengths overlooks the fact that Mr.
Dulles in the executive sessioo which I heard at least
talked about an entirely different thing. And further than
that, Mr. Dulles has repeatedly refused to make a comparative
statement.
He has said that he coullgive such intelligence as he
might have in the foreign field, but that it was beyond the
ampetence of the CIA to go into domestic figures, so that
he has refrained from comparative figures. And any attempt
to suggest that Mr. Dulles has made a comparative statement
I think would be unfair to Mr. Dulles, and to ask Mr.
Gates to comment upon an alleged comparative position taken
by Mr. Dulles would bewithout foundation.
Senator Symington. Is the Senator finished?
Senator Case of South Dakota. Yes.
Senator Symington. I would like to make a couple of
observations on my own. First: I do not agree with the
Senator from South Dakota. I believe the information that
was furnished in committee by the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency when compared with the information
that was furnished in committee by the Secretary of Defense
shows that there is a direct disagreement as to what the
strength of the Soviets in this field is
.11,1111=
Senator Case of South Dakota. But that is the
Senator's comparison, not Mr. Dulles.
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bd43 Senator Symington. Let me finish, please.
That, is the first point. The secont point, is that I. think
there is a great deal, more danger of ,insequrity and lack of
security in attempting to have information giveIout in
open bearings whiCh in effect is contradicted in closed
hearings than there would be in releasing this testimony
as to what we think the Soviet is doing. First they know what
they are doing, and secondly based on our system it is a com-
paratively simple matter for them to find out what we are
doing.
Therefore, as 1 understand it, the Senator from New
Jersey, what he is suggesting is that we have a classified
hearing later on. Now 1 have been on this committee for a
(:)
great many years and testified before it for a great many
years in addition.
know of no case where we haven?t had classified hear-
ings either before or after public hearings in order to get
the truth out to the people so long as I have been connected
with this committee either as a witness or as a member, and
would hope at this time that this able counsel who is giving
up his time and effort to do this job is not in any way
hindered by comments as to whether or not he is pursuing a
proper line of questioning of the witness.
yield to the Senator from Washington.
Senator Jackson. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman: the
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d44 Secretary placed the statement, the now public statement,
in the record after the hearing. Is that not correct?
Secretary Gates. Two statements have been read by
counsel. One was my public statement, prepared statement.
Another statement was the one I guess you are referring
to Senator Jackson.
Senator Jackson. Yes. But you had plenty of time to
think through the security angle, right?
Secretary Gates. That was placed at the request of the
committee after the hearing.
Senator Jackson. And is this not the statement, the
one that counsel read to you? Wasn2t that the one that you
placed in tie record alter deliberation?
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Jackson. And did you not state in that statement,
"On the basis of our current intelligence estimate which has
been presented to the committee by the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency we do not now believe the Soviet superiori-
ty in ICBMs will be as great as previously estimated."
I merely make this point to our colleagues who have refer-
red to a reference to the CIA, that the Secretary of Defense,
after thoughtful consideration, based his statement by
referring to estimates supplied by the CIA. So I hardly
(:) understand the relevance, Mr. Chairman, to the exclusion of
counsel from asking questions that refer to information
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bd45 supplied by the CIA, if the Secretary of Defense, after
thoughtful consideration, referred to the CIA as a source
of reference.
Senator Case of New Jersey. , M. Chairman.
Senator Symington. Senator Case.
Senator Case of New Jersey. In the first place I think
I am probably the last person who would be in any way
suggesting that what counsel, particularly this particular
counsel, what he is doing is improper. This is not so.
And any suggestion that that is my purpose ought to be
immediately eliminated. What I am suggesting is that in
order for me, and I am talking about me, I am not talking
about anybody else, to have the kind of understanding that
I think as a member of the Senate of the United States I
ought to have of this matter, it will be necessary for us
to go into executive session for this reason.
The Secretary made a statement. Some people have sugges-
ted that tilt is contradicted by testimony given before us
in secret session. For us to determine this requires us
in my judgment to go into secret session. The quicker we do
it, the better. I think we should have done it before we had
an open session on this point. / hope at least we will have
a secret session hereafter.
Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Symington. Senator Saltonstall?
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bd46 Senator Saltonstall. My remark is this: The Chairman
stated this hearing was going to be over at 12 o'clock.
I have checked and the counsel has about 7 more minutes.
With the number of people here, there is 75 minutes of ques-
tioning. If we are going to give an opportunity to each
one to question, I hope we will let the counsel proceed.
Senator Symington. May I respectfully say to my friend
from Massachusetts that the matter was not raised on this
side of the aisle, that being raised there ought to be
a fair and open discussion of the matter so that the people
understand what we are talking about.
Is there anybody here who objects on the committee to
having a classified session atter this open session? If
there is not, without objection we will have an executive
session, Mr. Secretary, in accordance with the suggestion
of the Senator from New Jersey
------_______
after this open session.
at sometime mutually convenient
Senator Case of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I think you have
been very fair and I thank you.
Senator Symington. I thank the Senator and I have
great respect for his opinion.
Senator Wiley. Peace prevails at least.
Senator Symington. Mr. Counsel: will you pmceed?
Mr. Weisl. Mr. Secretary and Members of the
Committee, in no way directly or indirectly did counsel refer
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bd47 to any testimony given by Mr. Dulles to us in executive -
session.
I was merely referring to the statement made by the
Secretary, that on the basis of our current intelligence
estimates that he had, not that we had, we now believe that th
Soviet superiority in ICBMs will not be as great as that
previously estimated. And since the previously estimated
to which he referred, not I, was 3 to 1, I asked the question
based upon the 3 to 1 that you yourself suggested, if that
superiority has been decreased when you take into account
missiles on launcher for mid-19601 1961 and '62.
Secretary Gates. I have no way of knowing what combina-
tion of circumstances were used in the 3 to 1 that has been
widely quoted.
I jt dont know that. I believe that I stand
on the statement that I submitted. I have no other way of
commenting on it, Mr. Weisi.
Mr. Weisl. But Mr. Secretary, you were the one that
_
referred to the 3 to 1 superiority and you stated that
this was based upon estimates of what the USSR could produce
in numbers of missiles and was not an affirmative statement
of fact that the USSR would produce the number of missiles
required to attain this superiority. I am simply asking
you whether on the basis of the current intelligence estimate
that you referred to, not that I referred to, that 3 to 1
ratio when you take into account missiles on launchers has
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bd48 been changed in '60, '61 and '62.
Secretary Gates. I do not really believe it is possible,
I certainly do not want to add to the confusion, I don't
believe it's possible to talk about ratios. I don't
believe it is possible. I think the difference has narrowed.
The difference this year between last year has narrowed
when you consider the fact, as I said in my statement here
today: that we had an estimate that they might indulge in
a crash program. I believe that the situation has narrowed.
I think it is terribly misleading to get into ratios
and to, into specific numbers, and I wish there was a way
so that none of us would be confused.
I wish we could stay in open session and try and resolve
the confusion. But to me numbers are misleading because
you have to reconcile the other factors that go into numbers,
and we are talking about only one weapons systems not other
weapons systems.
Personally, as I testified earlier here today, I consider
the Polaris an ICBM, the Polaris system, not the missile.
And if you count the Polaris in, you get a different set of
numbers and a different set of ratios. If you take
mid-calendar year versus end calendar year you get another
set of numbers.
To me it is unwise and misleading and difficult for
any of us to understand without confusion if we deal in
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bd50 Mr. Weisl. Military deterrent.
(:) Senator Wiley. Get that in too. There are a lot of
other deterrents.
(:) Senator Symington. Let the counsel proceed because
a question has been raised by the ranking member.
Senator Wiley.
That is all I interrupted. You ought to
give me a little concession once in a while.
Senator Symington. You will be given all concessions.
I am just trying to cooperate with the other side.
Mr. Weisl, General Power testified we have no warning
today against ballistic missiles and will not have a depen-
dable warning system for several years. He therefore recom-
mended that immediate provision be made to place a certain
percentage of the SAC heavy bomber force on continuous
airborne alert.
As a matter of fact, General Power told this committee
that this is number one priority. Do you agree with
General Power?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, this has been extremely
carefully reviewed. It was reviewed last summer. I
personally reviewed it last summer as Deputy Secretary of
Defense. My predecessor reviewed it. We reviewed it again
in this meeting I referred to in Norfolk of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Unified Commanders. We heard directly General
Power's argument.
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bd51 We all agree that we should have a capability to fly
an airborne alert if and when it is needed. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff and myself are agreed that such an airborne alert
in the air as of now is not needed. The only real argument
about this is the degree of the airborne alert capability
that we purchase. This again is an extremely complicated
subject. It depends on how long you fly the airplanes and
so forth.
I think that we are making the right move in buying a
capability to fly an airborne alert if we need it. I do not
believe it should be flown as of now.
Mr. Weisl. How do we know when we will need it?
Secretary Gates. We will need it if international
tensions perhaps get worse. We will know when we will need
it I hope we will know when we will need it.
Mr. Weisl. What assurance hwe you that the Russians won't
make a surprise attack similar to the attack by the Japs
on Pearl Harbor?
Secretary Gates. We do not believe that the Soviet
Union is interested in committing suicide.
Mr. Weisl. You are trying to read his mind.
Secretary Gates. No, sir, I am zit trying to read his
mind. I am saying he is perfectly capable of seeing what
we have in being that will destroy him if he initiates that
surprise attack.
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bd52 Mr. Weisl. You heard the testimony of Genera/ Power,
(:) that if, when and as he had a certain number of ICBMs,
he might be able to destroy completely our retaliatory
striking force.
Secretary Gates. Yes,
Mr. Weisl. If we had no warning system.
Secretary Gates. Thi3was a hypothetical.
Mr. Weisl. And no airborne alert of adequate proportions.
Secretary Gates. A hypothetical mathematical analysis
made with no time table, no estimate of our condition of readi-
ness, and I referred to it I believe as being somewhat unreali-
stic.
(:) M. Weisl. And you disagree with General Power?
Secretary Gates. Yes. sir.
Mr. Weisl. Now may I call your attention to a
statement made by Professor Kissinger, who was the Military
Adviser to the Rockefeller Brothers Committee and is a
Professor / think of Military Science at Harvard University,
and I quote:
He states: "If the proposals of Generals Power and
White are accepted and prove to be wrong, we will have spent
$500 million too much for a number of years. If the program
of the President is adopted and he proves to be mistaken, we
will have forfeited our national existence."
Do you agree with that analysis of the Power Testimony
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on an airborne alert?
That is what Professor Kissinger was discussing.
Secretary Gates. As I understand what you read,
Kissinger recommended we spend $500 more million dollars a
year or our survival was threatened.
Mr. Weisl, No.
Secretary Gates. We were finished.
Mr. Weisl. What he said was if we were wrong in spending
that amount of money we would have lost the money. But if the
Department of Defense was wrong in not spending it we could
lose our country.
Secretary Cates. I donit think there is anyone wise
enough to determine that $500 million of the defense budget
the difference between survival and security.
Mr. Weisl. He was referring to the airborne alert
recommended by General Power.
Secretary Gates. The airborne alert as I said, we
agree we should have the capability to fly it. From a military
point of view we do not believe it need be flown today. Actu-
ally it is again a matter of degree, Mr. Weisl. The airborne
alert is in the air today in a certain sense.
Mr. Weis'. But General Power
Secretary Gates. We have airplanes in the air today
on a fulltime basis.
Mx. weisl. In reply to my question as to whether the
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*/????
657
Secretary Cates. We believe the present program is
correct.
Mr. Weisl. Yes, I understand that but in reply to
my question to General Power as to whetherke believed the
present program was adequate, he answered definitely no. You
are familiar with that testimony I take it.
Secretary Gates. I am sorry1 sir, he answered no? Who?
General Power?
Mr. Weisl. General Power.
Secretary Gates. Yes, tht is correct. I understand
General Power made a recommendation for a larger effort
toward an airborne alert.
Mr. Weisl. Now in connection with warning against ICBMs
General Power and General Schriever testified that it was
urgent to assure the earliest possible development of the
Midas satellite system. General Schriever stated that
he was hopeful a decision would be made very soon to
authorize proceeding with Midas as a weapons system.
Has that decision been made?
Secretary Gates. I agree that it is important to move
ahead as rapidly as we can with the Midas system. I am
advised that we are doing this as of the present time.
Mr. Weisl. Are doing what?
Secretary Gates. Moving ahead as rapidly as we can toward
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bd55 having it in operation.
Mr. Weisl. Has it been approved as a weapons system?
Secretary Gates. It is probably a misnomer to call a
Mr. Weisl. Whatever it is called.
Secretary Gates. A satellite --
Mr. Weisl. It is a warning.
Secretary Gates. Correct.
Mr. Weisl. Has it been approved?
Secretary Cates. Oh, yes. This is one of the lour
space projects of the Department of Defense at high priority.
Mr. Weisl. General Schriever testified too on that
sUbject as follows:
Referring to the Midas, "Well, I mean by that thk you
decide at this point in time the system is technically feasible
within a short period. If you make that decision, then you
also have to plan on the ground bases that will support
this system, the personnel who have to operate it and
maintain it have to be trained, organizations have to be set
up. The lead time involved in doing this is often consider-
ably greater than he production of the hardware itself.
"So it is a matter of doing many things simultaneously
rather than waiting until you have proved out through develop-
ment and tests that it works. If you wait until you have
done that, then you have to take all these steps later."
Do you agree with that statement by General Schriever,
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bd56 referring to the Midas?
Secretary Gates. I agree that we should move at highest
priority on it and have so approved. I don't want to be
nisleading. We are not going into the production on all these
aspects of the Midas pmgram as of this time because our
research and scientific people tell us we should not. / believe
that within these next 6 months we will make such a decision.
But it has highest priority and I agree with its importance.
Mr. Weisl. At the request of this committee the Navy
has prepared a summary of budgetary action on the Polaris
system since FY 1958. Are you familiar with this summary
which was cleared by your office for release to this commit-
tee?
Secretary Gates. I read it last night, Mr. Weisl, but
it is in such detailed Navy language / can probably not answer.
I am familiar with it from my own experience in general
terms.
Mr. weisl. Yes. So that we can be fair, I would like,
Mr. Chairman, to place this summary inthe record.
Secretary Gates. This is the summary that starts in
57 and goes through to the presents is that correct?
Mr. Weis/. That is correct.
Senator Symington. Is there objection? Without
Objection that will be included as part of the record.
(The document referred to follows:)
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bd57 Mr. Weisl. This summary states, and I quote:
"The program recommended by the Navy to the Department
of Defense included 9 Polaris submarines in 1961 and provision
for 12 in 1962 at an estimated cost of $1,654,000 in this
amount would be made available. Yet latex it is stated that
under the budget guidelines prescribed for FY 1961 the
Navy could ask for only $1,089,000 covering four Polaris
submarines in 1961 plus long lead time components for
four more in 1962. The budget reduced this to $952,000,000
covering only three Polaris submarines in 1961 plus advance pro-
curement for only 3 in 1962."
Could you kindly explain exactly what happened to the
Navyes original Polaris recommendations and why they could
not be included in the official budget submissions?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. Over the past years we have
made a great many recommendations from the Navy to the
Department of Defense, all kinds of coMbinations of
ships, missiles, tenders, supporting facilities and
research money. We have gone on the principle that about
three nuclear submarine systems per year was right, and
vie have gone to the extent of 3.7 billion dollars so far
through the 1961 period, until we had more confirmation and
increasing confidence in this system and its being as
good as we all hope it will be, I have testified this year
that if we receive more confidence on this system, and it was
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possible to reappraise it, which we are doing right now
again as a matter of fact -- I have another letter from the
Navy as of this week or last week on some recommendations.
We are going to watch this very closely, and with more
confidence we will not hesitate to give it further support.
Mr. Weisl. My question is viny wasn't the recommendation
included in the official budget submission ?
Secretary Gates. Because we just felt that up until
the time we had further tests and verifications, that we
should not go any faster than 3 per year.
Mr. weisl. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Gates. Thank you, sir.
Senator Symington. Senator SaLtonstall?
Senator Saltonstall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, just a few questions in the time allowed
me. You state upon page 4 of your prepared statement:
"Rather than the solution to our maintaining a valid
and effective defense posture by having in being a
variety of weapons systems capable of countering all types
and threats faced by us and our allies", and on page 5,
the second sentence you stated, "We do not foresee a time
when the Soviets could launch an attack on us without inviting
unacceptable damage to themselves in return."
We hear a lot about gaps of one kind and another.
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bd59 You are relying on your judgment that our overall deter-
rent strength is sufficient today and on the plans that you
are making in the Defense Department approved by the President
are sufficient for the future years as far as you can see
ahead, 1961, 2 and 30 we will say.
Secretary Gates. That is correct, Senator Saltonstall,
uLth the continuous proviso that this is a fast-moving business,
and we must look at that at all times.
Senator Saltonstall. And that you are looking at it
at all times from all different types of weapons that compose
the overall deterrent strength.
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
senator Saltonstal/. Now we hear a lot about intelligenc?
estimates, estimates based on hard evidence, estimates based
on soft evidence, estimates based we will say on inferences
and information picked up that can't be too relied on.
Those we learn are put together and recommended or given
to the various officers of the government including yourself
by Mr. Dulles. Now who makes the decisions to carry out
that overall deterrent based on the intelligence estimates
that are given you?
Secretary Gates. The decisions are made ultimately by
the President. The decisions are made by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and by myself and recommended to the President.
Senator Sa/tonstall. So that the decisions that you
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bd60 make on this overall deterrent strength are based on the
best intelligence or the best decisions that you can make
on the intelligence that is given to you at the present
(:) time.
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Saltonstall. And that applies today and it
apPlies to the future.
Secretary Gates. As of this time, yes, sir.
Senator Saltonstall. Wow we hear a lot about research
and development of weapons. Dr. York stated in a conversa-
tion or in a hearing that there were several hundreds of
research efforts going along from time to time at all times.
(:) And the great responsibility was to select from those research
efforts and cut them down and when you got them cut down,
then to cut down some more so that the final development
went into just 2 or 3 weapons.
MayI ask you if your decisions to go forward we will
say with certain efforts like this line, this Midas enter-
prise, the Polaris, the Minuteman and weapons of that charac-
ter, those are the results cut down from a great number of
research efforts, am I not correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes. Dr. York often says it is a
cpestion of choosing between good ideas, and one of the
best things that has happened in recent years has been the
authority that came with his office under the reorganization
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C)
C)
C)
C)
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plan of 1958. We have now transferred to this office
authority for research test and evaluation, a great portion
of which funds used to be carried in our procurement
accounts.
So a great bulk of our effort is in the research cate-
gories which he is responsible for. And the Midas program
thich you mentioned is one of those.
Senator Saltonstall. In other words, this overall
deterrent effort for the future is based on the judgments
that comes from the various research and development efforts.
Secretary Gates. That's right, sir, and also not only
our in-house research capabilities, but advisory
committees of great competence formed from national sources,
both to advise us and the President has in addition his
own scientific adviser and a scientific advisory committee,
and these are all consulted in connection with these research
systems.
Senator Saltons tall. So that even if several millions
or hundreds of millions of dollars havebeen spent, the slowing
down for or the stopping of any single research effort is
based on the decision that another research effort is
valuable at the present time?
Secretary Gates. Yes, in which we al/ play a role
in the decision process, the scientist, the aoint Chiefs
of Staff and the civilian management.
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bd62 Senator Saltonstall. And that also is a concern as to
(:) whether that weapon will be an offensive weapon or a defensive
weapon.
(:) Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Saltonstall. And you are leaning more towards
the offensive rather than a defensive weapon, is that
correct, or both, or would you express an opinion on that?
Secretary Gates. This is difficult to answer. I would
say that we were leaning more toward the offensive weapon.
This is a matter of opinion.
Senator Saltonstall. Now I was very much encouraged,
Mr. Secretary, by your decision that you made several months
(:) ago to get right in with the Joint Chiefs of Staff whenever
there was a difference of opinion expressed by them. How
has that worked out?
Secretary Gates. Pram my point of view it has worked
out even better than I dreamed. We have been meeting on
a weekly basis tryingto meet every Monday afternoon. We
have met four or five times. We have made decisions which
have treed up a back log of papers. It has been accepted
with remarkable goodwill by the Chiefs and I think if
you ask them they would testify it has been a very successful
way of doing business.
Senator Saltonstall. And that in your opinion makes
the Joint Chiefs of Staff more effective and keeps the
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bd63 civilian authority over them in closer touch.
(:) Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I think it is a very fine
way of working. I think they agree.
Senator Saltonstall. You testified I think that
section 612(b) in the budget: that is in the present
budget and inthe budget that you have submitted to the Congress,
gives you all the authority that you need to Put an airborne
alert into the air at any one time, that you believe it is
wise to do.
Secretary Gates. That allows us to spend funds for that
purpose in an unlimited manner.
Senator Saltonstall. I think you have testified to
this. I would just like to emphasize it. You are going for-
ward with the research and development of conventional weapons
so-called as well as these so-called nuclear weapons?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Saltonstall. So that you are improving the
conventional weapon with the development of nuclear power:
with the development of science such as the M-14 rifle and
the cannons and that sort of thing.
Secretary Gates. That is right, Senator.
Senator Saltonstall. And those are overall weapons
that you are building up as your deterrent effort for
1961, 2 and 3.
Secretary Gates. That is right.
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Senator Saltonstall. Now we have not heard any discus-
sion of mutual security and the NATO. You are going over to
NATO very shortly.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Saltonstall. Nhat in your opinion as Secretary
of Defense is the value of NATO in the Mutual Security
Program in our overall deterrent effort?
Secretary Gates. Our whole security arrangements are
based on collective security of the free world. We have
treaties as the Senator well knows with some 40 nations.
The most successful perhaps of all of our collective security
relationships has been NATO, which has, Which can, I believe,
claim considerable credit for not having a war in Europe
in the years it has been in existence.
The mutual security, the Mutual Military Assistance
Program we consider absolutely vital to the preservation of
these collective security arrangements, both from the point of
view of building allied forces that supplement our own forces
at a far less expensive and more effective way than if we
tried to do this ourselves.
Also for building the Internal Security and responsi-
(:) bility of these countries themselves. And we are saying
with confidence and with support of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that we would not want to see any funds subtracted
from military security programs to add to the defense budget.
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We think it is so important.
Senator Saltonstall. I have time for just one more brief
question. You have spoken about your decisions in the offing
or in the making on more Polaris submarines as you watch them
develop an3successfully. What about the Atlas? Is there
any decision in the making or being made to speed up the Atlas
program?
Secretary Gates. In all of these things they axe
under continuous review and there are under considerations
possibilities of a variety of different combinations concerning
the Atlas which in one case, for example, would add mare Atlas
missiles to already authorized sites. This is under consider-
ation.
Senator Saltonstall. Mr. chaizman I have the breakdown
given by General Traub on that 382 million about whidh there
has been so much discussion. 1 will be glad to show it
to the counsel and if he approves he can put it in because the
Secretary stated that it was not fresh in his memory.
Senator Symington. Yes I think there has been a mistake
there.
I have the testimony on page 451 of the House Appropria-
tions Committee. We can clear that up.
believe my turn comes next. Mr. Secretary, first /
don't think we will have a chance to ask a lot of
questions we would like to ask, but / want to get into the
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d66 details of this Polaris situation and the 3-70 with you later
411) on as soon as it is mutually convenient.
/ supportedevery Polaris program that has come before
the Congress. I am worried about the fact that in effect we
are stopping the development of airplanes, in my opinion,
in research on manned aircraft in the United States.
have been a believer in air power and I have never made
a secret about it, Army Air Force, Air Force, Naval airpower,
the power and prestige of commercial air power. This is
becoming an increasing mystery to me why we are going to put
billions and billions of dollars into something tilt moves
a good deal slower than 50 miles an hour and yet we are
111 cancelling out entirely something that moves at many thousands
of miles an hour.
So I just wanted to tell you that my questioning,
would like to get into that and find out why that decision
was made, the way the world is today.
Secretary Gates. Is this a comparison, Senator, of the
3-70 and the Polaris?
Senator Symington. That is correct, isn2t that sort
?
of apples and oranges?
Senator
You can call it anything you want.
say that we are putting billions and billions of dollars
into something that goes less than 50 miles an hour and that
we are cancelling out future development of all military and
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therefore commercial aircraft that could go many thousands
of miles an hour. And in the doing of that incidentally we
are cancelling it out despite the fact it would cost less
than one-third of one day's annual income of the United
States.
I thought inasmuch as we won't have time to pursue that
in detail, that I would like to tell you that it is something
that I think we ought to discuss at your convenience, and
the convenience of the Chairman and the counsel of the
Committee.
Secretary Cates. I will be glad to.
Senator symington. Now we have had considerable
discussion this morning about this question of the gap.
It is my understanding based on what I have heard this
morning and before that you said the new intelligence analysis
had narrowed the gap.
It ts also my impression in listening to Director Dulles
that the reverse was true. The testimony of Secretary
Sharp on a national telecast implied that the gap had either
been narrowed or eliminated. It is my impression from the
testimony of Director Dulles that the reverse is true.
At this point, Mr. Counsel, and members of the committee,
I would ask unanimous consent that testimony from a
telecast of Secretary Sharp be included at this point in
the record, as long as I have referred to it. If there is
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13468 no objection it will be done.
Senator Saltonstall. I have no objection, Mr. Chairman.
When was that telecast held, please?
(2) Senator Symington. I will read it. May I ask that it
not be taken out of my time?
Senator Saltonstall. If you identity it, it isn't
necessary to read it.
Senator Symington, January 24, 1960, 8:30 to 9000 p.m.
Face the Nation CBS Television Network, guest Dudley C.
Sharp, Secretary of the Air Force, questions from Mr. Von
Fremd.
(The document referred to follows:)
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bd669 Senator Symington. Is there any reason why this
(:) year in order to clarify this matter you don't announce
publicly the ratios based on our best estimates of the number
of ready to launch ICBMs the Soviets have as compared with
the number we plan to have?
Secretary Gates. I think that the ratios are misleading,
Senator, and I don't know how to announce them in a way that
wouldn't cause more confusion.
Senator Symington. Secretary McElroy announced them last
year. Are you implying that he misled the American people
when he did so?
Secretary Gates. No, sir. I am not familiar with where
Mx. McElroy made this statemento nor am I familiar with
how he arrived at the ratios.
Senator Symington. But you referred to it in your
statement that Senator Jackson put it?
Secretary Gates. I didn't refer to it in this statement
/ don't think. I referred to it as it had been stated.
Senator Symington. Who stated it if he didn't?
Secretary Gates. I don't know, sir, / just know that I
read it repeatedly over a period of time.
Senator Symington. To whom were you referring when
you referred to the 3 to 1?
Secretary Gates. I was referring to the common newspaper
ama other publicity that has been given over quite a long period
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bd70 of time of the 3 to 1 ratio attributed to a variety of people
I think.
Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that
Secretary McElroy did not say that?
Secretary Gates. I dont know, Senator.
Senator Symington. You don't know whether he did
or not.
Secretary Gates. No, I really do not.
Senator Symington. Irgu have never taken the trouble to
find out?
Secretary Gates. To be completely frank with you,
Senator, we have had a research group on this and we have not
found out where he said it.
Senator Symington. Have you ever asked him whether he
said it or not?
Secretary Gates. No, I have not.
Senator Symington. Has anybody else in your office ever
asked him whether he said it or not?
Secretary Gates. I don?t know, sir.
Senator Symington. Is it your impression that he did
not say it?
Secretary Gates. No. It is my personal impression
that he must have said it.
Senator Symington. Then if that is true and it was said
last year, inasmuch as we are in the same confusion this
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bd71 year that we were in last year, which he clarified by his
statement, wouldn't it be logical fox yo p to attempt to clarify
this confusion by PiMPW issuing those ratios which he
automatically declassified when he made hs statement?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, I don't think it would.
C
??????????????.???????.??=....
Senator Symington. ?.k., Mr. Secretary.
What is the overall expenditure ceiling in dollars for
the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year 1960 and for the
Fiscal Year 1961?
Secretary Gates. I can supply that accurately for
the record. My impression is that the target for expenditures
is $41,025,000,000 for 1960.
Senator Symington. How much is that?
Secretary Gates. This must be supplied accurately for
the record, but my memory tells me that it is $41,025,000,000.
Senator Symington. Thank you. Going back, you are not
sure whether Secretary McElroy made that statement, is that
correct, about the 3 to 1 ratio?
Secretary Gates. I am not sure, no, sir. I told you it
was my impression he had.
Senator Symington. Let me read to you your testimony
before the House Appropriations Committee, the subcommittee.
Secretary Gates. I told you, Senator.
Senator Symington. The subcommittee on Appropriations.
Secretary Gates. I told you, Senator, it was my
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bd72 impression he had made it.
(:) Senator Symington. Here is what you said:
"Mr. McElroy made such a statement in his testimony
(:) last year. He also made that testimony on a television
program in December, but he was always very careful to say
that this would be true only if they do what it is estimated
they are capable of doing, and that 'is the very point
that I was talking about earlier. Secretary McElroy
was operating on the basis of capability figures that produced
only theoretical capability basis something that was like 3 to
1. This new intelligence estimate has narrowed the differ-
ences."
Do you want to change that testimony?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, because that was my impression
and still is. I tried to find out a little more about it
to verify it so I would be better informed on how it
was arrived at, but I haven't been able to do this.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
You also have an expenditure ceiling for each service?
And if so, what is it?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, we do.
Senator Symington. How much is it?
Secretary Gates. We have expenditure targets would be
a better word. For 1960 Senator, the Department of the
Army, our estimate at this time, and these have to be inexact
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because you are never sure until later in the year,
$9,349,000,000, for the Department of the Navy $11,571,000,000,
for the Department of the Air Force $18,823,000,0000 and for the
Office of the Secretary of Defense $1,202,000,000.
Senator Symington. That is enough. That gives us what
we are after.
Secretary Gates. I guess without military system which
plays quite an important part of this, because it reflects
one way or the other, this totals 49.45 for military func-
tions excluding military assistance.
Senator Symington. If the Congress appropriates more
money than is requested in the budget for specific purposes in
which we are particularly deficient, will expenditure ceilings
or other policies prevent the Department of Defense from
spending that additional money?
Secretary Gates. We always take very seriously the money
that is appropriated by Congress.
Senator Symington. I understand that. That is not my
question.
Secretary Gates. If the expenditure -- is your question
related to 1960?
Senator Symington. In 1955 the plan was to eliminate
20,000 Marines who were volunteers at the same time we
were drafting 10,000 men a month off the forms and out
of the cities to go into uniform in peacetime who did not
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bd74 want to go. The Congress put up about 48 million dollars
as I remember it to prevent those volunteers from being
relieved of duty and discharged, because they wanted to stay
in.
They were trained men. Nevertheless the money was
not used and they were discharged. Now I am asking if we
put up more money this time, to the best of your knowledge
as Secretary of Defense before this committee, do these
expenditure ceilings prevent you from using that
money?
Secretary Gates. No, the expenditure ceilings would
not prevent us from using it. we would have a decision of the
President on things like force levels, which is the illustra-
tion you just gave.
Senator Symington. Is there a particular number of dol-
lars over and above present expenditure plans which you
would be able to spend if the Congress made the money avail-
able?
secretary Gates. I am sure that either the Congress
or ourselves would not hesitate to spend more money if
national security required it over and above any plans.
Senator Symington. My time is coming to a close.
I will skip a lot of questions that I wanted to ask you
which / will when you have another chance.
I will ask one more. In your press conference of March 10,
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bd75 you said that decisions were pending on the Polaris,
the Atlas, the Bomarc B, the long-range cargo aircraft
where there has been some most interesting testimony recently,
and the Midas.
You also said "The program is all right the way it is".
Does that mean the decisions have already been made on
these 5 items?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Senator Symington. Senator Smith?
Senator Smith, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you have stressed that numbers are mis-
leading. I like what you have said in your statement and
wish it could be repeated over and over again, especially
the first page of your statement.
On page 40 however, you say "We have in combination
enough to bring destruction to any one who attacks us."
First, what do you mean "we"?
Secretary Gates. We, the United States.
Senator Smith. By whose interpretation?
Secretary Gates. By the interpretation of those
responsible for the defense program.
Senator Smith. And would that be the Defense Department
or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council
and the President?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
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Senator Smith. And would that be by unanimous
agreement.
Secretary Gates. There might be differences. Yes, that
would be by unanimous agreement.
Senator Johnson. Will the Senator yield? Does that
include General Tower, General Lemnitzer?
Secretary Gates, General Lemnitzer I will qualify
my answer, Senator Smith.
There would be varying differences of opinion within
the framework of how we do any given -- how we could pose any
given budget. / would like to look at the statement.
I think you are talking about a statement of policy decision
here which is agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Security Council and the President.
Senator Smith. Would that be by unanimous agreement
or would there be dissension in that group?
Secretary Gates. Could / see the statement you are
referring to?
Senator Smith. Your statement on page 4, point 2:
"We have in combination enough to bring destruction
to anyone who attacks us."
My question is this: I don't like the word "enough".
I would like it better if you said "More than enough" and
/ would like to ask you if you would not agree with me on
that?
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bd77 Secretary Gates. Yess,I would.
Senator Smith. Then I asked about the "we". I wanted
to be sure that that was the administration of the President.
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Smith. And next I was asking, and I think that
was the question you had in mind* is it by unanimous
agreement of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the
other services, or is there dissension in that group and
what percentage would that be?
Secretary Gates. I don't think the question as phrased
here has probably ever been posed for a vote. But I believe,
I mean I am satisfied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the President would agree with the statement that we have
in combination enough to bring destruction to any one who
attacks us, and would agree to this unanimously.
Senator Smith. Mx. Secretary, I would like to read para-
graph 2 on page 17 of the March 14, 1960 issue of Newsweek,
and ask you to comment on the statement or what you would
have to say about it. If you prefer to delay to executive
session, I would leave that to you. It is under the heading,
"Taipai. In one recent dogfight against the Chinese Nationalist
group which included members of the elite Air Force acrobatic
team the red fliers eluded heat seeking U. S. made sidewinder
rockets. Some military sources here believe that the Communists
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vd78 have now found a way to jam the infrared guidance system
C.) of the side winder, a weapon which in one 1958 air battle
knocked down 4 MIGs."
(:) Secretary Gates;, Iihave not had,any inbrmation given
to me that has indicated that they have this capability.
Senator Smith. Would you want to check?
Secretary Gates. So far as I understand it, the side
winder is a most effective weapon for its purpose and is still
being purchased and installed.
Senator Smith. You would not be in a position to state
whether that is an accurate statement or inaccurate or whether
our military sources were making such statements.
(:) Secretary Gates. We can check it, Senator Smith. /
find it difficult to believe that it is an accurate statement
if we are still procuring side winder missiles, and I am
sure we are. Therefore, I wiRcheck and let you know.
Senator Smith. You will check on the jamming.
Secretary Gates. That is what you are asking.
Senator Smith. That is what I am ading, yes, sir.
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Senator Bartlett.
Senator Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in response to a question put to you by
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Senator Saltonstall, I believe you said that advisory groups
contributed in some measure or other to decisions reached in
the Department. It is my recollection that a man quite well
informed as to the operations of the.Department told a
Committee of the Congress not long ago that there were too many
committees in the Pentagon and that the operations were bogged
down as a consequence.
Would you care to comment on that?
Secretary Gates. Yes e sir. The response I made to Senator
Saltonstal/ dealt with scientific advisory committees in
connection with research where we have one top flight committee.
We do have panels of committees perhaps on separate research
problems.
/ believe that Mx. Lovott was referring to a time
probably prior to this where we have done a great deal in the
last 2 years to eliminate committees in the Department of
Defense.
I am sure that there are probably still too many commit-
tees. But we have made progress. We have reviewed these
committees and particularly the committees in the decision-
making process. And we have eliminated a considerable number
of them. This was the result of the Hoover Commission and
other types of studies that were made on the Department of
Defense.
Senator Bartlett. How many committees do you have now?
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bd80 Secretary Gates. 1 could not answer that question.
Senator Bartlett. Do youknow how many have been eliminated?
Secretary Gates. There were some 200 I think eliminated
under the clean-up committee program that was instigated
about 2 years ago.
Senator Bartlett Roughly what percentage of the total
has been eliminated?
Secretary Gates. I would say a very high percentage of
official committees. How many ad hoc and other kinds of
committees there are I really could not say. But I would say
that the percentage of the official committees has been greatly
reduced.
Senator Bartlett. Do you know of any new committees that
have been organized during this period?
Secretary Gates. Yes, but only the ones that / have
any association with have been on an ad hoc basis for a special
study of some character or other.
Senator Bartlett. I couple this with your response to
Senator Symington,
Secretary Gates. This was pertaining to research,
Senator Symington's question.
Senator Bartlett. I believe you told Senator Symington
ilat a research group had been set to work if Mr. McElroy
had actually said what Mr. McElroy had been said to have said.
What I can't understand is why someone did not pick up the
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bd81 phone and ask Mr. McElroy instead of putting a research
group to work on this.
Secretary Gates. I tried to find a little more information
on this subject, than we had. We tried to examine in our office
the statements Mr. McElroy made. That is all.
Senator Bartlett. I still believe that Mr. McElroy
might have been the best witness on that.
You said as / recall, Mr. Secretary, in reference to
missiles, that we have done very well in comparison with our
historical experience with other types of weapons, and I
dont quite understand exactly what you meant here. I wonder
if you would explain.
Secretary Gates. What I meant, Senator, was that it
was not uncommon to spend as long as 10 years for the develop-
ment of a fighter aircraft system. In fact approximately
10 years was more or less normal in the production of air-
craft I believe, although we have done better at times and
longer at other times, from its inception until the time
it joined thecombat forces as an operating system. / think
we should take great pride incur scientific, industrial and
technical capabilities that have brought these missiles
systems along to the extent that they have been brought along
during a short period, a relatively short period.
Senator Bartlett. You would say then in general that
we are doing better than we were, but would you say that we
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bd82 are doing well enough?
Secretary Gates. We never do well enough. We do the
best we can to expedite all of these things.
(2) Senator Bartlett. Why then, Mr. Secretary, in connec-
tion with what you have just said, is it, the 8-70 program is
being stretched out?
Secretary Gates. The 8-70 program, as Senatpr
Symington already referred to, it is a very difficult decision.
The 8-70 was envisioned to be a very expensive weapons system
that would come into being some time in 1965 as an operational
system.
There were a good many people that reviewed it that felt
it might come in at a later period in 1965, maybe as late as
67 or something of that nature. At this time we will have
In being, if we stay on schedule, the 4 missile systems,
the Titan, Atlas, Minuteman and Polaris in being, in operation-
al quantities on station in considerable numbers. The 8-70
therefore is a competing system to these missile systems in
that sense, although it is wise always to have variety in
your attack. / agree with this as a military
principle.
We felt we ought to take a year's look at the 2-70, build
two prototype aircraft, and a year's look at the development
of our missile programs, and see where we would be at the end
of that time.
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bd83 This is a compromise decision.
Senator Bartlett. Isn't it the case, Mr. Secretary,
that when this prototype is completed, you will have the bones
(:) with no flesh on it?
Secretary Gates. That's right. This is not the develop-
ment of a prototype weapons system.
Senator Bartlett. And that will of course occasion further
delay.
Secretary Gates. It will delay the 12 months we have
delayed. Yes, it will.
Senator Bartlett. Now, Mr. Secretary, on page 2 of your
opening statement you said this:
(2) ?For example, we are accelerating the second BMEWS
station to bring it into operation four months ahead of schedule".
Can you tell us where that station is located?
Secretary Gates. It is in Alaska, Senator.
Senator Case of South Dakota. That is the right answer.
Senator Bartlett. I honestly did not know that.
Secretary Gates. I was delaying to see whether this
as classified information or not.
Senator Bartlett. Yes. I thought it might be. But your
answer astounds me a little bit because my information about
that station, and it is not classified in Alaska, is that
it is months behind schedule: that the entire winter was
lost, that the principal buildings were to be under cover last
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fall and that this was not accomplished and the whole winter
virtually was lost.
Secretary Gates. I have no personal knowledge of that,
Senator/ I have seen a schedule from the time I have looked
at the program of a certain date for this installation, and
we have now found from experience with the first one that we
can accelerate that date by some period of time, and this
is what we are doing.
Senator Bartlett, I was a little astounded, and I would
be very grateful if you would inquire into this further and
inform the committee.
Now you regard these BMWS stations as being quite
essential, I infer.
Secretary Gates. They are a very important part of
warning.
Senator Bartlett. Why then, if you know, did it require
two years or thereabouts, Mx. Secretary, to reach a decision
on the site of the third BMWS station?
Secretary Gates. I didn't know how long, I do not know
how long it took. I was not in my present position, and
have not looked at it. / didn't know it took that long.
Senator Bartlett. You do know, however, that it took
a long time to reach a decision as to where
Secretary Gates. I know tilt this station is involved
in arrangements with another country, which takes negotiations
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and discussions with that country.
? Senator Bartlett. Do you know whether those arrangements
have now been completed?
Secretary Gates. Yes, it is my understanding that they
have been.
Senator Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Secretary, I as Chairman have
not asked any questions or made any statements, and I need
to open the Senate at a quarter of 12:00. There have been
two Democrats and two Republicans have asked questions.
If it is agreeable with the Committee and Senator Wiley has
no objection, I would like to take a very brief time now to
make a statement and ask a few questions and then to be
followed by Senator Wiley, because you will be here until
noon at least.
Is that agreeable with you, Senator Wiley?
Senator Wiley. I am always agreeable with you, six,
but I have got people waiting for me.
Senator Johnson. Then I will yield to the Senator.
Go ahead.
Senator Wiley. No, you have got to go to the Senate,
go ahead.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Gates, I am going to leave very
shortly, and before doing so I want to again thank you
for being with us this morning and I want to take this
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bd86 opportunity of emphasizing what / believe you already know,
and that is that these committees before whom you are appearing
today recognize you as a very sincere, dedicated, devoted,
patriotic public servant.
We know your responsibilities are heavy and farflung,
and so are ours in the Congress. Because of the unquestion-
ability of our nation's ability to defend itself against
threat rests on not only our American heritage but the peace
of the world is dependent upon it.
It is in that spirit that I have tried to conduct these
hearings. You are one of the conluding witnesses and /
have a few questions that I want to submit that I think you
can answer brief/ye and I would like to have them in the
record.
Firste are you contemplating adding hardware and opera-
tional facilities to the Polaris and ICBM programs over that
osntained in the originally submitted fiscal year 61 budget?
Secretary Gates. I am using the word "contemplating",
Mr. Chairman. I am. we are reviewing other possibilities,
and will continue to review them in the case of Polaris
contingent on some further , tests.
Senator Johnson. Then you do propose an increase in
the Polaris strilecapability.
Secretary Gates. I am not in a position to propose it.
I have it under study and have it referred to the Joint Chiefs
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bd87 of Staff and the technical people involved.
(:) Senator Johnson. Was this under consideration when
the FY 61 budget was submitted?
(:) Secretary Gates. It would be incorrect to say that more
Polarises were not under consideration.
Senator Johnson. The answer is yes, then?
Secretary Gates. I think, yes.
Senator Johnson. Didn't you say at that time that the
budget was adequate?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnson. And you did have some question out it
then?
Secretary Gates. No, sir. I felt that if we could proper-
ly gain more confidence in the systems that we would not
hesitate to augment them.
Senator Johnson. Then what you meant is adequate exclud-
ing increases to be decided on later?
Secretary Gates. I meant that it was a properly balanced
defense program, and I still believe it is, Senator Johnson.
I believe, however, that when le gain more confidence in a
system that is as good as the Polaris system appears to be,
that we should not hesitate to augment it.
Senator Johnson. And you do not think we will hesitate
to augment it?
Secretary Gates. I will not hesitate to recommend it.
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Senator Johnson. Do you concur with Mr. Allen Dulles
that the Communist threat is most serious?
Secretary Gates. I most certainly do.
Senator Johnson. Do you agree with me that America
must maintain a position of unquestioned strength in order
to meet that threat?
Secretary Gates, Absolutely.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Secretary, if Congress after detailed
hearings and after expressing all points of view and after
hearing witnesses that cover the entire lot express individual
opinions, if we after careful and prudent consideration,
fully aware of our constitutional responsibilities as a separate
branch of the government: if we conclude that we should raise
ad support the Armed Services: and in order to do that we
must increase the appropriations made by the House or the
request made by the Budget Director, if we should do that, would
you use the funds?
Secretary Gates. This is always a question for the
President to decide, Mr. Chairman. I believe that we would
certainly be in agreement in what programs should be increased.
Senator Johnson. You think it is a most serious thing
though if Congress, acting under its constitutional
responsibilities and after hearing all the witnesses over
numerous committees for many weeks finally concludes that in
exercising its constitutional responsibMity and protecting the
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security of this nation we should do something, do you think
it is a pretty serious responsibility to have one man veto
that?
Don't you?
Secretary Gates. I am not competent to testify on
the legal relationships between the executive and the Congress,
but I think it is a very serious business and I certainly
recognize your responsibilities in this connection.
Senator Johnson. Now if we come along and grant some
departments request for we will say the Air Force asking
for 17 Atlas squadrons rather than the 14 approved, and after
we have heard the Central Intelligence and we have heard the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force and all the experts we
can get and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the ex-Joint
Chiefs and so on and so forth, we conclude that it is
necessary in exercising our responsibility to appropriate
funds for X squadrons, you are called upon to make a
recommendation to impound those funds, you realize that
that is a nretty serious responsibility you are taking when
you veto the action of both branches of the Congress.
Secretary Gates. I certainly do, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Have you ever made such a recommenda-
tion?
Secretary Gates. NO, / never have.
Senator Johnson. You would stop, look and listen before
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bd90 you did, wouldn't you?
(:) Secretary Gates. Yes: sir.
Senator Johnson. Thank you. I am very grateful to
(:) you, Senator Wiley, for permitting me to go ahead.
Senator Wiley is recognized.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, before the Senator
starts could I ask do we automatically stop at 12 o'clock?
Senator Johnson. I think that depends on the committee.
We are not going to cite anyone. We are not goirg to issue
any contempt citations and we are not going to report any
bills.
We are just meeting here for informational purposes.
(:) I will be glad to ask the Senate to permit us if you want
to, to continue during part of the afternoon that the Secre-
tary can be here.
What time do you need to leave: Mx. Secretary, to keep
your other engagements? I understood you had afternoon
engagements.
Secretary Gates. I would prefer to leave not later
than 1:00 o'clock.
Senator Johnson. I think you could go ahead and run
(:) until 1:00 o'clock if the committee is disposed to do SID. If
not/ I will ask permission and if that is granted, I will
notify you. What is the pleasure of the committee?
Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, I might just say this:
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I understood that Mr. Gates had some very important
engagements this afternoon in connection with Paris, and
his original statement was half past 12:00. I am afraid he
will lose all his lunch and everything else and perhaps
not get the full benefit of Paris if we sit until 1:00.
Secretary Gates. I was trying to be as helpful as X
cane Senator Johnson. I would prefer to leave earlier. From
my personal point of view I would prefer to leave any time after
12:00 o'clock but I would want to be as cooperative as I can
and I appreciate it.
Senator Johnson. I don't want anyone to lose any lunch
he hasn't had. I think then if there is no objection that
we will attempt to find an area of agreement here between the
two parties and say if the Secretary says he can stay until
1:001 the Senator from Massachusetts thinks 12:30 is a
proper time, I would suggest 12:45. Now is that?
Secretary Gates. That is all right, Senator.
Senator Johnson. Senator Symington, will you preside
and we will run until 12:45.
Senator Symington. Senator Wiley?
Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, I first want to agree with
the very fine words that were just extended to the Secretary
by the Senator from Texas in relation to you, Mr. Secretary.
I want to compliment you also on this statement which in my
opinion if the public can get ahold of will calm a lot of fears
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that have been engendered fT this talk of gaps.
When you talk about a gap, as I understand it, if I have
one pistol and you have 3: that is a gap of 2, isn't it? Is
that what you mean by a gap?
Secretary Gates. That is the way it is generally refer-
red to: yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. But if I happen to also have a gun and
awe other weapon, then the gap isn't as big as it was before,
is that right?
Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.
Senator Wiley. Now tht is what you mean when you say
that there is no reason why we need match the Communist bomber
for bomber, missile for missile, division for division, or
submarine for submarine, is tht right?
Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.
Senator Wiley. Now you mentioned in your statement
the Communist military requirements are vastly different
from ours. What are those requirements? Set them out briefly
so we will understand.
Secretary Gates. I would say that the requirement would
be based I believe on the sincere conviction that they would
know that we would not strike them first. I believe it would
also be set up on the basis of their geography, which is quite
different from ours, they being a large land mass. And I
believe that their total military posture is greatly
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different .from ours with our collective security Arrangements
and our deployed forces worldwide. Therefore, their require-
ments are different from the standpoint of geography and differ-
ent from the stamdpoint of the fact that they are still en-
gated in an objective of world domination.
Senator Wiley. Now among other things you have
said: and I want to hurry through this SD that we can get it
synchronized, the strength, speaking about our strength:
"The strength I believe we have now and our defense programs
are designed to maintain the strength".
By that you mean the adequate strength to meet the
challenge if it comes.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. Now you say: "Our total strength widely
deployed within the United States and around the periphery
of a single strategic target area is so great that any surprise
attack upon us would result in unacceptable destruction
to the attacker."
Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.
Senator Wiley. The thing particularly that I am
interested in is that we have been talking about the gap in
ICBMs. But you also say, which I think is very, very
significant, and Senator Smith quoted part of the sentence:
"We have nuclear weapons that exceed those of the USSR by
several times in their total destructive power."
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Secretary Gates. That's right, sir.
Senator Wiley. That is correct: isn't it?
Secretary Gates. That is the basis of our estimates,
that is correct.
Senator Wiley. And we have long range means of delivery
that exceed theirs by several times in the total carrying
capacity.
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Wiley. Now we have been talking about deterrence.
The terrible destructiveness that would follow from a war under
conditions as they are now: do you think that is a deterrent?
Secretary Gates. Yes, six.
Senator Wiley. In other words, there are 200 million
Russian people that don't want war and there is 175 million
of us that don't want war, is that right?
Secretary Gates. I would hope the Russian people did
not want war any more than the American people.
Senator Wiley. I am talking about now some of these
deterrents: because I think it is very important that we
understand what we mean. You already mentioned the fact of
NATO. That is a military deterrents and it is agreed
now according to the General in charge that they are going
to create a unified missile defense of some kind. Do youknow
something about that?
Secretary Gates. I have not seen the proposal that has been
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1bd95 referred to, but we have a unified defense in a sense in
(:) the whole NATO alliance.
Senator Wiley. Now there are a lot of captive nations
right around Russia. Take for instance Poland. Do you think
that if Khrushchev should think about letting the balloon
go up he would probably have to give consideration to the
Baltic nations, to Poland, to East Germany, Czechoslovakia:
Bulgaria and Roumania?
Do you think those captive nations -- do they create
a deterrent in your mind?
Secretary Gates. On the same general analysis that
people do not want to be destroyed and their will and
determination to prevent war and to be strong and in our case
our will and determination to remain stmng is a deterrent.
Senator Wiley. If you were sitting in Khrushchev's shoes,
and he is a practical fellow, he would have to count the
costs, and that is part of the cost, what the slave nations
wuuld be doing in case he let the balloon go up, is that
right?
Secretary Gates. He would certainly evaluate it.
Senator Wiley. Recently we have been hearing a lot about
the attitude of Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese. Khrushchev
went down and visited in India, and we understand that condi-
tions are doing so well between the Chinese and Khrushchev.
But be that as it may, there are 650 million Chinese and there
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bd96 will soon be a billion. Is there any place they have got
(:) to go except North?
Secretary Gates. No, sir. I think that that would be
(:) the logical direction that they mould move.
Senator Wiley. That is the logical direction: yes.
In other words, with the increased population pressure:
the pressure would be such --I am talking about deterrence
now. That is the thing I am getting at, because in my humble
opinion it is a very important matter when we consider this
question of how much we are going overboard with probably
the result of carrying out the very thing that Lenin said,
that he would cause us to bust our own economy.
(:) We have got to give consideration to that.
Senator Jackson. Would the Senator yield at that
point?
Senator Wiley. Just a minute. I have got a meeting.
Senator Jackson. Would you supply for the record the
statement by Lenin? That came up in our hearing when Mx.
Lovett was present and you will find that the Library of
Congress will tell you that he never made that staterent.
Senator Martin. Does the gentlemen know what he said?
Keynes reported that he: Stalin, said the surest way to do
away with free nations is to debaucher their currency.
Senator Jackson. You are quoting Stalin.
Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, you might protect me a
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bd97 little bit now. I like that gentleman from Washington.
Senator Symington. Senator Wiley, will you proceed.
Senator Wiley. He is so taken up with his concept
in this matter and I am trying to be judicious. I am not an
Army man, a Navy man or a flyer. I am still thinking in terms
of the United States of America.
Senator Symington. You are a very fine man, Senator.
Will you proceed?
Senator Wiley. What is that?
Senator Symington. Will you proceed, sir?
Senator Wiley. Are you butting in now too?
What I am getting at, sir, can you think of any other
deterrence?
Secretary Gates. I think we must have a strong military
deterrent to prevent the outbreak of war. I think we must
have the will and determination to maintain this deterrent,
sad the will to use it if necessary in terms of interferences
of small nations, of probingins of our will ad determination
worldwide, in terms of things other than military as well as
things that are military. I feel that if you want to talk
in the broad sense, I believe Senator, you are talking our
spirit and our general intellectual and spiritual approach
to life is involved in a deterrent.
Senator Tilley. I read from the conclusion of your
statement: We will not hesitate to take emergency measures.
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bd98 "As of this time I amconvinced we are on a sound basis
4:) and have presented apicoperly balanced concept. We will con-
tinue to plan and to change as necessary.
401) We are living in a changing world, aren't we?
Secretary Gates. We certainly are, sir.
Senator Wiley. We don't know what is going to happen
tomorrow in any field of human endeavor, isn't that correct?
Secretary Gates. Well, we have some very fast-moving and
tremendous progress that has been made in a period of
time that is almost unprecedented in history.
Senator Wiley. Your concluding statement We must always
remain superior in total power".
Secretary Gates. That is my absolute conviction.
Senator Wiley. When you talk total power, you talk not
only the military power, the power that results from our
allies combination, the power that results from this new
world condition, and so forth.
Secretary Gates. That2s right, sir.
Senator Wiley. All right. Well under those circumstan-
ces the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the President
are giving it their attention. That is their job, is it not,
o sir?
Secretary Gates. Certainly, sir.
Senator Wiley. And men may differ as to what is a gap?
Secretary Gates. That's right.
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bd99 Senator Wiley. And men may differ as to what is neces-
C) sary. But if you have the discretion to use this money as
it comes in, for one thing, and we think it should be used
4:) for something else, you will not give up your discretion, will
you?
Secretary Gates. We will try and consider the respon-
sibilities of the Congress in good judgment.
Senator Wiley. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Symington. Senator Magnuson?
Senator Magnuson. Mr. Secretary, I donvt want to resolve
some of these controversies here regarding gaps, what we
should do or what we are not doing and what we are doing
at present, but I think that when the American people look
at this thing, they will want to look for some place of
responsibility as to what decisions are made. ?Let me ask
you this question. There are 2 or 3 members of us here on the
Appropriations Committee, because this gets down to money
when you break it all down. Has Congress ever denied the
Defense Department in appropriations any major program that they
have come to Congress and suggested that we do in the security
of our country?
Secretary Gates. / think in the context of your question,
Senator, my answer would be as far as I know they have not.
/ know of times when they have not granted all the money that
has been requested, but you used the words "major program".
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(:)
703
Senator Magnuson. Well, there have been some slight
disagreements: but what I am saying is
.0.1.1?1?11
Secretary Gates. So far as I know the Congress
has always been mindful of
Senator Magnuson Would you agree with me that the Ameri-
can people should know?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
Senator Magnuson. That the Defense Department and
those that are responsible when they made up their minds and
come to Congress, eongress has always given them the money.
Is that a correct statement?
Secretary Gates. I want to be as truthful as I absolutely
can.
Yes: I think it is a correct statement. I think that
there have been occasions where there have been differences of
opinion and Congress has not always given all the money for
a specific program, but in terms of total defense I don't
know any occasion myself where Congress has not granted
the money.
Senator Magnuson . Do you know of any occasion when the
total amount asked by the Administration for the security of
this country, the overall total, leaving out maybe some
differences of opinion about certain phases of the program,
has ever been deniedthe Administratioh?
Secretary Gates. I am not sure that I can answer that.
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/ believe that the Congress has on occasions cut the
defense budget, yes.
Senator Magnuson. Would you say that the cut in any
way affected the major security, effort?
Secretary Gates. It was not done during my time, sir.
Senator Magnuson. If I showed you the figures that
Congress has never varied in granting the request of the
Defense Department in any case within 2% one way or another,
would you agree with me on that?
Secretary Gates. I would assume, Senator, that you
had studied the figured and would give me the right answer.
Senator Case of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, may I
interrupt for clarification?
Senator Magnuson. Let me finish and then I will yield
to the Senator.
Senator case of New Jersey. I just wanted to clarify
what you meant by a question you asked, Senator. I assume
you are excluding USIA from the Defense Department.
Senator Magnuson. I am talking about the Department of
Defense.
Senator Case of New Jersey. I just wanted that clarified.
Senator Magnuson. YSIA and parts of Mutual Selurity
and even there.
Now let me ask another question. That being the case,
and It is the case, there has beensome discussion here as
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to making choices between relative programs.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Magnuson. Senator Symington suggested that
there should te more on the air and not less on the Polaris but
he suggested that one should not be neglected for the other,
isn't that correct?
Senator Symington. That is correct.
Senator Magnuson. Now if that is the case and Congress
has had that attitude toward the Defense Department at all
times, why can't you have both instead of all this discus-
sion whether se whould do this or do that when you make a
decision that they are important.
Why can't you have both? Why can't you come to Congress
and say We need the Polaris and we need the air thing too"?
Secretary Gates. We have to review. We have to stop
smnewhere. I mean we review total programs and we review
total balance, total balance that we have for specific
purposes and we come up with as good priorities as we know
how to do and as good judgments as we know how to do and present
it.
Senator Magnuson. I understand that, but my next
question then is, isn't a great deal of the meat of the
problem we are discussing here a problem of budget
ceilings on this whole situation?
Secretary Gates. Senator, money affects everything that we
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do.
Senator Magnuson. I asked you isn't that the real problem,
budget ceilings?
Secretary Gates. It is not the real problem in connection
with the 18-70.
Senator Magnuson. The budget gives you a ceiling do they
not, befure you start out?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Senator Magnuson. They don't?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Senator Magnuson. You make your decision. Then the
budget gives you a ceiling?
Secretary Gates. No, sir. The Secretary of Defense
gives guidelines to the services and they come up with their
programs to him.
Senator Magnuson. Would you say that there has not been
circulated in the Defense Department on many occasions to the
various departments that you can spend so much and no more?
Secretary Gates. I would say that once we establish
a financial plan within the Department of Defense, we circu-
late to the Services where they stand in relation to that
plan, yes.
Senator Magnuson. The point I am making here isthat a
lot of this gets down to that sole question, why we should not
have, if Polaris is good and SAC is good and the things
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bd4 Senator Symington talked about is good, which / believe they
(:) are, Senator Jackson talks about Polaris for the security
of the country: we ate sitting here arguing about whether
(2) we are going to downgrade one or upgrade the other.
Why don't we have both?
Secretary Gates. If we took, Senator, all of everybody's
good ideas and tried to finance them, we would mare than
double the defense budget.
Senator Magnuson. Maybe the situation might call
for that.
Secretary Gates. This is a question of choosing
between good ideas.
(2) Senator Magnuson. I don't think you wanted the statement
to stand when you said we never make well enough.
Secretary Gates. I have no objection to saying we are never
perfect.
Senator Magnuson. Well enough is not perfect.
Secretary Gates. We always can improve.
Senator Magnuson. It is a little bit beyond having
enough. Donut you think that is a desirable philosophy?
Secretary Gates. Senator smith is the one that raised
this question and I agreed with her.
Senator Magnuson. Now I just have one more question.
I think the American public should know this because it is
important and it surely would not be classified.
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bd5 Axe yOu going to the,, Summit conference as an adviser?
4:) Secretarates, I have, not -- do not KnoWl, Senator.
Senator Magnuson. You do, not )now. Disarmament will be
of course A major part of the agenda there, will it not?
Is that not correct?
Secretary Gates. X would assume so. The disarmament
meetings have already, commenced in Geneva.
Senator. Magnuson. Now if we are negotiating or discussing
the question of disarmament, what Wealpone system would you
suggest would have priority in disarmament? You are going
to be called upon for that advice like we call upon you?
Secretary Gates. No, six. The disarmament conversations
will all be conducted on the basis of certain agreed on phased
proposals that have been presented by our negotiator, Mr.
Eton, at Geneva, and they will all be based on the hypothesis
that there is agreed upon and valid control systems that will
monitor the results.
Senator Magnuson. I understand that.
Secretary Gates. / am not going to be asked about any
weapons system in connection with disarmament.
Senator Magnuson. If you are going to disarm you are
going to have to cut out something, isn't that correct?
Secretary Gates. Conversations hopeful in the world
that will develop will come to the Senate in terms of a
treaty.
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dd6 Senator Magnuson. I understand that but if you are going
to disarm You have got to throw down certain weapons and
(2) would wonder what priority of weapons or of our defense
you would suggest would come within the negotiations or
the phasing of disarmament?
Secretary Gates. I would not know until the time for
the disarmament.
Senator Magnuson. You would not know.
Secretary Gates. I would not have any idea until
I knew what we were talking about.
Senator Magnuson. Supposing I should ask you right now
which one would you give priority to?
(2) Secretary Gates. I wouldrOt know, sirs because I wouldn2t
know what the terms were.
Senator Magnuson. Supposing the terms were predicated
upon inspection, full inspection as I understand it the West
is going to propose. Supposing that was agreed to? What broad
section or segment of our defense would be the disarmament
part of it?
I think the American maple want to know what we are going
to disarm.
Secretary Gates. We are not going to disarm anything
until we have an approved treaty.
Senator Magnuson. I understand that.
Secretary Gates, I think it would be terribly misleading
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to prejudge this, and I would not know how to answer your ques-
tion.
Senator Magnuson. You wouldn't know. That is an answer
to the question.
Now / want to ask You just one question that is somewhat
unrelated, but because the Secretary. is.here and he is going
to urope, a very important meeting as you know in the Defense
Department is taking place now in Geneva.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Magnuson. Has the Defense Department taken any
official stand on the territorial limits on the law of the sea
that you know of?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Magnuson. What is that stand?
Secretary Gates. I am only hesitating to know whether
this is part of negotiating procedures that / might not be
permitted to disclose, Senator. I believe it is and I believe
I would like to tell you in private what that stand is if
that is satisfactory.
Senator Magnuson. All right. I would like the Secretary
when he has time on another matter that might seem unrelated
here but it won't be unrelated if something happens. The
Defense Department has said many, many times that they consider
the Merchant Marine literally the fourth arm of our defense,
our security, is that correct?
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Secretary Gates. / have heard a lot of things suggested
as fourth arms, Senator. I never heard that expression to
tell you the truth.
But / don't dispute it.
Senator Magnuson. Would the Defense Department, the
head of logistics having said so, send to the Committee,
because I think when we discuss security this is just as
important if something happens with missiles, airplanes or what-
ever we may have, hardware or anything else, a simple answer as
to whether or not you think the American Merchant Marine is
adequate enough to fit into this broad concept of defense
that you say is adequate in your statement. Could you do that
at a later time?
Secretary Gates. I would like to take a look at it, be-
cause I really don't feel that we have taken a recent enough
look for me to practically answer the question.
Senator Magnuson. I would appreciate that, and several
Senators would.
Senator Saltonstall. Would the Senator yield?
Senator Magnuson. Yes,
Senator Saltonstall. I think it might be helpful to
the Secretary if you referred him to the speech President
Eisenhower made in Los Angeles in 1952 on that subject.
I think the Senator correctly quoted him.
Senator Magnuson. I donat want to talk about '52 because
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we have gone way down the hill.
Senator Symington. We Wm been cut a little by the other
side on this time angle. Senator. Martin.,
Senator Martin. ,Mr. Secretary, we have had consl.derable
discussion in these hearings about the views of several
Generals regarding the amount of funds needed for certain
equipment and weapons.
I want them to come and tell us what they think they need.
But is it not expected that a Chief of Staff of any service
or the Chief of any special branch of the service will portray
the indispensability of that branch and argue for its
expansion?
Secretary Gates. It has been historically true that the
requirements of the services as they see them have been greater
than have been finally approved.
Senator Martin. That is their job to bring us the picture
as they see it in their special branch of the service.
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Martin. That does not mean that they are at
loggerheads with you on your overall judgment. They are argu-
ing for their particular branch of the service. I think they
would be a very odd Chief of Staff or Chief of Branch if
they ceased to portray the best qualities and best needs of
their particular branch.
Secretary Gates. They are all highly responsible, reliable
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bd10 and greatly respected peoples and I would hope they would
4:)
always tell the Congress precisely what they believe.
Senator Martin. I went through this very realistically
401)
in 1941 to 045 with the substitution of the armored force
for the horse cavalry. We had an awfully hard time getting
horse cavalry men out of the picture. They even wore their
spurs quite a while after their horses went off the playgrounds.
Secretary Gates. I was in the Horse Cavalry for
nine years myself once.
Senator Martin. And I admired them for their spunk
but I don0 t want to take their judgment as final for
what I should do in surrendering in their particular arm
400 of the service. That is the position I see you are in.
You have to pass on overall judgment. Is not the present
organization of the Department of Defense functioning satis-
factorily notwithstanding divergent views of responsible
leaders within the department?
Secretary Gates. Yes. I think that over the months ahead
we can probably improve administratively some of the proced-
ures within the organization. But I think my personal opinion
is the organization which has been changed twice in recent
years should 1x left to shake downs and / believe its frame-
work is corrects and I believe it will shake down and operate
effectively.
Senator Martin. It strikes me that there is no particular
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bdll difficulty in the Armed. Services .with the recognition of
the President as, Commander in Chia f pf the Armed Services
in the administration of the total matter of our Armed
Services.
They must recognize him as the Commander in Chief.
Secretary. Gates. Certainly.
Senator Martin. And we do not tolerate the crossing over
into other branches of the service or government to supplant
the President in that role. I remember the struggle we
had in creating the Court of Military Appeals. Some people
wanted to put that under the Supreme Court. But that would
cut into the functioning of the President as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces. We had to bear that in mind in our
committee back there in 1964. Yes, I think we need here in
Congress to play the role of Congress in doing all we can to
create and maintain Armed Forces, but not to supplant our
opinion for the opinion of those responsible for carrying
out the Armed Forces program in the field.
Notwithstanding that, is it not true that even
though the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces has the power to impound funds appropriated by
Congress, President Eisenhower will not exercise that power
arbitrarily?
Secretary Gates. I am sure of that.
Senator Martin. I am as certain of it as I can be, and
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bd12 I wouldn't stand aghast if he should overrule my decision
as a member of the Senate in what we should spend if he wants
to impound those funds.
400 I know they have been impounded in the past. I went
through very much the reorganization of the Air Force in
1946. I know we had 90 air groups then and the Defense
Department came over and asked for authorization of 70 air
groups and we gave it to them because they asked for it, and
that was actually built up to 48 air groups by following that
action by Congress.
That has been an experience we have had many times.
I never thought at that time we should overrule them. We
should air it out, now, knowing we have different opinions.
That is a part of the function of Congress. But I still hope
that no one in this Congress will attempt to take over the
power of overruling the President in his function as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
Now getting back to this quote that I jumped in with a
moment ago, I happen to be a student of Russia over the past
40 years or so, and I have looked far and long for the quote
of Stalin.
Senator Jackson. No, no,Lenin.
Senator Martin. Lenin, I should say, and I had to look
4:) up Staling but Lenin was the one that you had reference to?
Senator Jackson. I didn't raise the question.
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Senator Martin. / thought you made some reference to
the Library of, Congress.
Senator Jackson. Let me just state it very simply.
Senator Wiley referred to Lenin having said in substance
that their objective would be to bankrupt us. This question
again popped up in our heaxings I believe when Ms. Lovett
or Mr. Sprague or maybe it was Mr. Watson was present.
Senator Robertson pointed out then at the time of the hearings
that he had had that question researched by the Library
and the answer was that he had not said it. We again had the
statement brought up to date as of 2 or 3 weeks ago, and the
statement by the Library and by Soviet and Russian scholars
is to the effect that they have not been able to find where
Lenin ever made such a statement or a comparable one.
Senator Martin. Yes. The Library also wrote me on
the subject several years ago, and at that time they made
the statement that the nearest approach to it they could get
was from a statement made by Lord Keynes of Britain
who is reported to have said that Lenin said the surest
way to wreck free nations was through debaucher of their
currency, and I agree with you that he never said anything
stronger than that so far as I can find out.
Senator Jackson. You are quoting Keynes now, the
great monetary expert, which is more than hearsay.
Senator Martin. He is the author of the Canadian theory
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bd14 and he is the, one who made the statement.,
I just wanted to agree with you, senator.
Senator Jackson. All I know is what we were advised
on that.
Senator Martin. Of course debaucher of the currency,
if he said that is one way, of destruction and we are trying
to hold this budget within workable bounds.
Senator Jackson. Would you yield at this point?
Senator Martin. That is on my time.
Senator Symington. Senator Martin, this comes out of your
time.
Senator Martin. I am all through.
(:) Senator Symington. Senator Anderson?
Senator Anderson. I hope, Mr Secretary, you dont
mind my staying in a field that I spend more time on than any
other.
Therefore page 40 item 2, "We have nuclear weapons that
exceed the USSR by several times in total destructive power".
Do you refer to the individual bank of the individual weapon,
or do you refer to the total stockpile?
Secretary Gates. Total.
(:) Senator Anderson. Did you have a chance to examine Russian
stockpile figures to satisfy yourself on that point?
Secretary Gates. NO/ sir.
Senator Anderson. How do you make it then?
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SeCr:etAXY.Gatezi Only make it fromlfte estimates that
?
(:) we have on the subject.
Senator Anderson. Then in the third line you say "We have
in combination enough to bring destruction to any one who
attacks us."
If you rely on those estimates in the first statement
would you then say the Russians have enough to do the same
thing?
Is their stockpile sufficient?
Secretary Gates. I am going on the principle in my
second statement that we are attacked first and we have enough
to destroy him after this attack, which is the validity of
our deterrent posture.
Senator Anderson. I am only trying to find out if you
think they have a substantial stockpile also.
Secretary Gates. I think they have, yes, I think they
have.
Senator Anderson. You say near the bottom of that page
that "The USSR is not engaged in .a crash program for ICBM
development."
,------
Does that come from the national estimates of some kind?
-
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Anderson. That is interesting because if you saw
scientists who showed up at Geneva in 1955 at the conference
who were at that time experts in thermonuclear power and
biology and medicine and all of them have been quoted in the
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missile field, that might indicate to you that Russia
does have some interest in missiles.
Did the Russians recently test out a missile that went
some 7760 miles plus with a CEP of less than 2 miles?
Secretary Gates. I only know there what they said
about this CEP, but they went the distance.
Senator Anderson. When they put their -- just what is
classified and what isn't -- when they put their devices for
measuring how accurately it fell it fell right where they
thought it was going to fall, didn't it?
Secretary Gates. I can't testify to that personally,
Senator Anderson, but it was a good shot. / don't mean to
minimize it.
Senator Anderson. That is all I wanted you to say,
that it was a good shot and I think it was a very good shot.
Now if it was a very good shot, would that indicate that they
night have improved something on their old missiles that
traveled less than 62000 miles?
Secretary Gates. It would mean that they carried a
different weight warhead re they made some changes in the
missile. Yes, it would mean it was an extended range missile
compared to the others I presume, although they
might have fired the others at closer range before they tried
the longer range. I don't know.
Senator Anderson. Do you think we will be able to get an
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8,000 mile Missile without nuclear propulsion?
Secretary Gates. Yes, Ikelieve we can do this as of
the present time.
Senator Anderson. And having relidble,guidance in it.
Secretary Gates. , I believe so, .,and .Z also believe and think
lh should be said in that connection that this is longer
than it need fly for the mission that it is assigned.
Senator Anderson. They did not think so. / dont say
that they were wrong but they thought it was worthwhile
to goa long distance and so forth. You say also on page
5, and I hope not to take too much time, that At the
present the Department of Defense has no specific military
requirements for so-called super-boosters."
Secretary Gates. That is correct, six.
Senator Anderson. Do you feel it would be an advantage
in the Department taking a more aggressive position on the
development of nuclear propulsion or various types of missiles.
Secretary Gates. Senator, I have participated with
you and your committee on that subject as of about a year
ago, and I have not looked at it since. The status of the
program to whidh you refer I guess is the nuclear powered
aircraft, is that correct?
Senator Anderson. No, flat nearly as much as project
Rover.
Secretary Gates. Oh, yes.
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Senator Anderson. I have greater.. hope with Project
Rover and we have had. a little bit of a, delay, I don't
say too deliberate a delay,, and some budget troubles that
stem not pnly, from the Space Agency but from the Air Force
on the. delay part of it.
There are many people who believe that if we hope
to attain ability to put large objects in space we have to
search for it in the specific impulse that we can get from
nculear fuels instead of the specific impulse from
even the most exotic chemical fuel that has not yet been
developed.
Therefore, I hope that when you say you have no program
fox supetboosters, that youmight think at /east of the
nuclear propulsion devices as superboosters that are possible
to use.
Secretary Cates. I know the Senator is a great student
and expert on this subject. What meant when I made my state-
ment was that our present military satellite requirements can
be met. by the propulsion systems that we have or will have rela-
ted to our intercontinental ballistic missile program.
And at the moment there is no specific military vehicle or
satellite that is a. requirement of the Department of Defense
that would require a large booster of the supetbooster type.
However, this does not mean that the Department of
Defense should not maintain a very serious interest in the
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bd19 development of these boosters, because it is highly likely
4:1)
that a military requirement of the future will develop
in space.
411,
Senator Anderson. Project Orion has been mentioned.
I don't know whether the nature of it is classified. We
dbn't need to get into that, but the project Orion is of
some interest in this field because at one of the laboratories,
one of the men whose name is on the patent for the hydrogen
bomb had an idea, and he tried to get some money
through the Atomic Energy Commission to develop it. They
did a little miscellaneous work but could not get the money.
Yet the man who was his assistant was picked up by one of the
4:, companies, came in and sold the Defense Department a
$40 million contract without any trouble. We wish that we
could get the Department of Defense, I do at least somewhat
more interested in some of these very promising things where
their costs would be extremely low. The Rover budget was
cut only a very few millions of dollars while Orion I read
a news item in I think Nucleonics-recently which
said it now had no fixed place of abode. The Space Agency
had dropped it. Somebody else had dropped it. It was now
CI) back on the doorstep of the Air Force. Isn't it back there
now?
Secretary Gates. I believe it is assigned to the Air
Forces Senator.
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bd20 Senater Anderson. Yesa but it has had a little route here,
there and back and forth. Nebody seems to want to work on it
ad yet you have got a very large budget for it and yet the
budget to the Atomic Energy Commission was completely denied.
That is not your responsibility I recognize.
Secretary Gates. It may have been. I am not certain of
this, but it may have been one of these projects that was with
the Advanced Research Projects Agency that we have been
transferring out with the changed organization.ofthat agency,
and assigning to the services as it seemed appropriate to do so.
If that is so, why then the assignment of the Air Force
will make good sense.
Senator Anderson. Now just to come back to that first
sentence again "We have nuclear weapons that exceed those of
the USSR by several times in total destructive power",
isn't this one. of the things that gets us into these rows
again, because we can't go back and use classified information
to discuss your statement?
Secretary Gates. I would certainly not want to get into
a row and I certainly donut want to be confusing. I believe
that this is a correct statement that between us we would
agree to.
Senator Anderson. I believe we would but if we had the
full figures it might show rather surprising Russian
strength. General Walsh was asked some question about the
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bd21 ability to build up their missile production, and the language
CI)
is all full of the word "delete, deletes delete", and
"deleted".
4:1) The question was "In other words, they could even
Ideleted' your estimates if they went to full capability is
that right?"
General Walsh says "Without question."
I understand from the previous questioning that it
must mean that they could produce more missiles than ihey are
now doing if they wanted to. And yet the statement is left
that the USSR is not engaged in any crash program_for ICBM
development.
I only hope the fact that they have pulled top scientists
away from their pet projects and put them or missiles
that they have started developing a very long range missile
might be persuading that they are doing some work in that
field.
Secretary Gates. The crash program refers of course
to production, and there might be people working on research
in missiles.
Senator Anderson. That is all.
Senator Symington. Senator Case?
Senator Case of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Reserving for the executive session which the Acting Chairman
and the Members of the Committee were gracious enough to
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accede to at my request, the matter of testimony, the
statement of the Secretary and the figures in the intelligence
estimates, I would like to ask just a couple of clarifying
questions on other matters.
Counsel early in his questioning referred to a statement
by General Schriever that if we had made different decisions
two years ago, we could have more ICBMs now. You stated in that
connection that you were reviewing the program on ICBMs at the
present time.
Does this review or consideration involve the possibility
of doing now what General Schriever said we could have done
then, or are your considerations dealing with different
systems than those as to which different decisions two years
ago could not have been acclerated?
Secretary Cates. Senator, if I understand what you mean,
and I am trying to understand what General Schriever meant,
you mean that General Schriever said that if we had started
two years ago, we would have had the lead time behind us
and we would have had in construction, lead time1 being quite
long in case of hardened missile sites, we would have had
opportunity to put into being additional intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
This is true, but we made a decision to go more
rapidly toward the second generation missiles which we
believed were better, namely the Minuteman and Polaris
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b423 as opposed to going completely in the others.
Now the variety of alternatives that I now have under
review, which is part of the normal process of review,
400 deals with putting in additional missiles and reviewing
the times and costs pertaining to what these missiles
would do, at what time period and for how much and how effec-
tive they would be in relation to all of the other programs.
So they deal with the same missiles. They deal in some cases
with an augmentation of those missiles that General
Schriever was referring to.
Senator Case of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The other question that I thought might be clarified I think
has at least in part been clarified by subsequent questions.
Senator Symington made a statement in which I understood him to
say in effect that we now had decided to cancel out all
development of the B-70.
This is not my understanding as to the present decision.
Secretary Gates. No.
Senator Case of New Jersey. Or the present activity, and
I wonder to the extent you think it is desirable if you might
just review what we are doing about the B-70 program very
0 briefly in your own way?
Secretary Gates. I think Senator Symington said that we
0 were not going to develop a weapons system in the prototypes
that we were producing, and he is correct. What we are
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727
going to do is.develop R pretotype aircraft that will be
flyable hopefully at the speed of 3 times the speed of
sound, and we will learn more about the program. We have
is it 75 million dollars I believe in the budget for
this year for this purpose toward the initial cost of these
two prototypes?
The Senator is correct. Senator Symington is correct in
saying that this is not a development of weapons system com-
ponents.
Senator Symington. W11. the Senator yield?
Senator Case of New Jersey. That is exactly my under-
standing. Yes.
Senator Symington. Just so long as my name has come
into it: what I say is the reason you are postponing the delay
of the 3-70 is a fiscal reason, and that the reason is,
the mason it is a fiscal reason is because, it can be proved
to my satisfaction that you are building it and you are saying
the mason that you are building only half of that is because
you are not sure of it.
If you were sure of it, you would go ahead and build it,
if you did not think it was necessary, you would not build it.
What you will have may go a great deal faster according to
the testimony of General White than the MACH 3 that you talk
about. All I say is again we are in effect abandoning the
research and development of any true supersonic aircraft for
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the future in the Air Force: in the Navy and commercially.
I thank the Senator.
Senator Case of New Jersey. I am very happy to yield to
the Acting Chairman. I am still a little bit concerned
that his very last statement is not quite an accurate summary
of what is going on. / don't think we are dbandoning this
development as I understand it, but rather we are taking it at
a somewhat slower pace pending a decision which is under review
now as to whether it should te gone on in fullscale as a weapons
system.
Secretary Gates. That is right. I would like to say that
it is not a fiscal reason, the B-70. Everything of course
has money assigned to it, but the decision on the 8-70 was
pot a fiscal decision. It was made because we are taking a
whole new step in the state of the art involving certain com-
ponents and metals I believe that are non-existent that have to
be developed. We are also running, as I previously testified:
into competitipn with other systems for the mission, and
there are other doubts on paper pertaining to this system
that have to be thought through.
These were the doubts that really led to this decision
which was terribly carefully reviewed by the President and
by the Advisory people of the Government throughout all fields
of responsibility, military: scientific and judgment person
who could contribute to this decision. Now any compromise is
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bd26 not a good decision. It would be better to cut it off, clean
(:) or to proceed with it..put,we thought we would learn. .from these
two prototypes. We would also have more time to review our
(.1) other programs in relation to the system.
Senator Case of New Jersey. I thank the Secretary and
I reserve for the executive hearing the matter discussed
earlier.
Senator Symington. Senainr Jackson?
Senator Jackson. Mr. Secretary, just a couple of
questions.
I think you made a fine statement and I agree with a lot
of the statements. For instance you said on page 1 "The
Communist military requirements are vastly different".
You also stated on page 4 "We have nuclear weapons that exceed
those of the USSR by several times in total destructive
II
power.
Now is&t it a fact that inasmuch as we are dealing with
am enemy that will have the advantage of the first strike
capability: that this places a greater burden on us to have
a survivable retaliatory systems or as you have used it and
I have used it for several years, the invulnerable deterrent
(in capability.
Secretary Gates. Yes, this is true.
(:) Senator Jackson. So that I mean the statement
Secretary Gates. Does put a serious responsibility.
111111.1.
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Senator Jackson. When you say we don't want to match just
missile for missile, it is a matter of having a missile that is
survivable.
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Jackson. When you talk about SAC's striking
power being awesome, I agree, standing by itself, but it is
less awesome if you give the enemy the capability that
we must in our planning, the fact that they will strike first.
Is this not true?
Secretary Gates. Yes. We have to appraise the effect of
permitting him the first strike against the United States.
Senator Jackson. And I agree with you as I said a moment
ago that we have more weapons, nuclear and thermonuclear, than
the Soviets in total destructive power and in numbers. But
thermonuclear capability and nuclear capability are insepara-
ble from deliverability, are they not?
Secretary Gates. As a deterrent, certainly.
Senator Jackson. I mean to draw
Secretary Gates. You must have a system.
Senator Jackson. To draw on Senator Wiley's analogy,
which involves with the next question sort of a fallacy, that
is if you have 3 pistols and I have one, but if I fire first,
why those extra two don't do much good, or any of the three,
do they?
Secretary Gates. Oh, yes, they do good depending on the
41.011rWiet
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bd28 circumstances, depending on the time of warning, depending
(:) on the reliabilitY of the attack against you and so forth. All
these factors come into play.
Senator Jackson. I was just taking his analogy.
If you are sitting there with 3 pistols and I fire first,
you don't have time t) get your first one, do you?
Secretary Gates. On that hypothesis / assume that you
would outdraw me, Senator.
Senator Jackson. The real problem, and 2: think you
tried to make this statement, just missiles, just putting
in more missiles in itself, if they can be destroyed before
you can use them don't add to this invulnerable deterrent
(2) that you referred to, is that not correct?
Secretary Gates. that is correct. More missiles add to
his problem of more missiles to take them out. They add to his
requirements. But more missiles per se are not the total
answer.
Senator Jackson. Of course, then in that connection
me are placing, it is a mutter of public record, Mr. Chairman,
that our ICBMs are being placed for reasons of economy
adjacent to our SAC bases, are they not?
Secretary Gates. I don't know that the reasons were
economy. I believe it was a sensible way to cooperate. /
believe the Air Force determined that was the right way to
do the business.
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d29 Senator Jackson. You are using the housekeeping facili-
ties, and for reasons of economy we were so told in the
Armed Services.
Secretary Gates. Let's say economy of effiCilincY.
Senator Jackson. I thought though in developing a deter-
rant capability you want to make sure that it is survivable.
Is it always wise to, (a) place them in an area where
you already have manned bombers, where you are adjacent to
cities e and to make them completely fixed?
Secretary Gates. They have been very carefully evaluated
in connection with bomb damage assessment and analyses, and I
believe that the distance between them is related to their
survivability in a way that is just as effective as if
they were widely separated from the home base.
Senator Jackson. What do you have in mind for this
to provide more survivable retaliatory deterrence? I am
referring of course to completely hardened facilities which
would be fixed.
I'm referring to mobility onland which involves I presume
ahead the Minuteman, and mobility on and under the sea.
I just wonder what your thinking is on this. It seems
to me that just talking about more missiles that are on
fixed locations that can be destroyed in a surprise attack
does not really add to the enemy's problem in the way it
should.
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bd30 Secretary Gates. It adds in an extraordinary way on
putting a requirement on his production demands. However/
I agree with you; Senator, that the more mobile missiles,
the more concealed missiles, the more invulnerable our
deterrent, the more effectife that it is. And we are constantly
working on the programs we have in being and thinking up other
ideas which I am sure will develop. Just recently, for example,
we are talking again, although we rejected it last year, again
about looking at Polaris on surface ships.
Senator Jackson. I completely agree with you. That was
turned down. 02 course, Admiral Burke's request for 6 addi-
tional Polaris subs was turned down. What about the use of
Polaris overseas in connection with the program, with
our bilateral and NATO agreements with our allies?
There you have a mobile system of shorter range it is
true than Minuteman.
Secretary Gates. This is also under review.
Senator Jackson. I am pleased to hear that. Now what
about the Minuteman program? Doyou feel that additional
funds would speed the time when we would achieve what I think
is one of the finest deterrent systems that has a survivable
capability?
Secretary Gates. up until now, with constant urging
too, I have been advised that there is no way we can usefully
spent any additional money on the Minuteman to accelerate its
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bd31 procurement in operational status. I have asked this question
and I received that answer repeatedly.
We have as you know established or agreed to go ahead
and build a production facility for the Minuteman.
Senator Jackson. I would hope that the supporting launch-
ing systems would move as rapidly on a concurrent basis as
the production system.
This is one of the real problems is it not?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Jackson. In connection with a fully operational
or an on-launcher capability when you talk about ballistic
missiles.
C.) Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Jackson. I hope you will recheck that just to
make sure that we are leaving no stones unturned for reasons of
finance.
Secretary Gates. The whole thing could change you
know at any time. But this is presently correct testimony.
Senator Jackson. In connection with the B-70 I think
here again is a classic example where budgets cause a lot of
difficulty, Mr. Secretary. / have the feeling that the B-70
is more than just another manned bomber. If I recall my
history correctly, that we have had to rely on manned bombers
to put us ahead in commercialariation. It does seem to me
that we are going to find ourselves in a situation -where once
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bd32 again the Russians may well come out with a commercial
a irc raft of supersonic speed and we will be behind.
I would hope that within the Administration some
consideration would be given to this weapons system on the basis
of it meeting more than just a manned bomber requirement.
/ do feel that it has animpact on our prestige in connection
with commercial aviation.
I think that there are certain additional military uses
that are applicable, and certainly it has a great ability
to provide rapid support in case of limited war, airlift.
Secretary Gates. I can only repeat that I can personally
assure you that it was not a fiscal decision. I can
personally assure you in this case that it was not, because
I personally participated in the conversations at all levels
on this program. But I agree with you that
1111?101.
Senator Jackson. May I ask this question though, I had
the impression that each of thp services were given guidelines
which gives them a ceiling.
Secretary Gates. No, but the B-70 and other programs
were separated out and reviewed as programs and we never
got to the service budgets untilve were through with the
programs.
Frankly outside of the fact you would obviously know
the B-70 was an Air Force program we didn't know the
Air Force total was when we were reviewing the budget. We
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bd33 reviewed the entire budget this year by programs.
Senator Jackson. All I can say is t1 we must be
a little more daring: Mr. Secretary, in some of these things.
40110 There are times when we do have to move concurrently knowing
that there are hazards that may not prove out.
I felt that from the beginning on Polaris. / was
recommending Polaris when no one was much interested in
it.
Secretary Gates. You were very helpful to me at that
time.
Senator Jackson. Thank you very much, but I was just
hopeful, and I have so much faith in this:in our engineers,
cur designers and the talent that we have, as I am sure you
have, that we should be willing once in a while to take a
chance on these things.
If we don't, we are going to come out second, coming out
second is not coming out when you are dealing with / think
some crucial systems. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Symington. Senator Case of South Dakota?
Senator Case of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I too was attracted by your testimony
with respect to the 3-70. I hope the Senator from Washington
can wait just a minute because I want to follow up on the
questions he was asking.
I was struck by your reference to the 3-70 as a competing
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bd34 system with Atlas, Titan and Minuteman and Polaris as a
missile system.
I had been under the impression that the B-70 had poten-
tials both in the commercial or civilian field and the
military field. For example, I thought that the B-70 if develop-
ed satisfactorily offered abilities in conventional war as
well as in a nuclear war. And Atlas, Titan, Minuteman and
Polaris are primarily nuclear war weapons are they not?
Secretary Gates, Yes, Senator. This might be debatable
opinion, and I am not the expert othexpeople are in this. I
would rather hear expert testimony on it. My judgment is
the B-70 is a strategic bomber for a strategic bombing
mission, and that it would be of very little or no use in
limited war, however, I would not argue at all with
Senator Jackson that it had implications for the future of
commercial aviation, if someone wants a commercial airplane
for some reason that goes over MACH 3. But it has the impli-
cations in the advancement of the state of art of manned
aircraft.
There is no question about that.
Senator Jackson. Will the Senator yield at that point
for clarification?
What concerned me bmdgetwise Mx. Secretary, is that
sme other branch, the CAB, will want money for assisting
in our commercial aviation industry to provide this kind of
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738
commercial carrier, so that sooner or later we are going
to be paying for it maybe out of a different pocket.
Senator Case of South Dakota. Mr. Secretary, would
you say that the 8-70 program has been abandoned or merely
that you are continuing the research and development
before you commit yourself to a volumemoduction program.
Secretary Gates. I would say the latter.
Senator Case of South Dakota. Now there was another
area of testimony earlier, I thought one of the most signi-
ficant points coming up in the hearing was the presentation of
counsel concerning the budget estimates for ballistic
missiles from '55 through '60 as compared with the program.
Did you note the figures?
Do you substantially agree that there was a substantial
difference between what was actually spent in the program
execution?
Secretary Gates. / have the money that was
spent, and as / look at the last three or four, this was
correct. But yOu must recall until 1956 or '55 there was very
little money spent.
Senator Case of South Dakota. Yes, I recognize that.
Secretary Gates. We are now up to 3 and a half. I have
the money. I don't have the initial request that counsel
was referring to.
Senator Case of South Dakota. I would like to ask, Mr.
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bd36 Chairman, that the table that Mr. Gates has may be inserted
in the record.
Senator Symington. Objections? Without objection.
(The table referred to follows:)
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bd37 Senator Case of.- South Dakota. The point I want to make
4:1)
about this is what lapse of time or what lead time is there
between the time that you finalized the budget figures to present
4:)
to Congress and the time of program execution.
Secretary Gates. Well, Senator, it would depend on
the program. We start working on the budget about this time
of year, the fiscal 1962 budget in the services, and a great
many people devote a lot of time to it from now until
it is finalized. It gets into serious discussions in the fall,
usually depending uponother pressing problems, but normally
it would got into serious discussions around October
and November it would be very serious discussions, and the
budget is usually furnished for printing if my memory is
right before t1 15th of December.
So it is around the first week in December it is pretty
Tall established.
Senator Case of South Dakota. Finalized in December.
Your program of execution mould be roughly perhaps 18 months
later
Secretary Gates. Yes, I think that would be a fair
statement.
Senator Case of South Dakota. Do you stand still during
those 18 months?
Secretary Gates. No, we don't. And of course we have
been given and congress has recognized this, no year funds
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bd38 for procurement and this is often sufficient or is
normally sufficient to carry over during the period of the
smnmertime between sessions og Congress.
Senate Case of South Dakota. mr. Chairman, I think
that the time limitation will prevent me from pursuing the
question, but I wanted to make this observation. The
Secretary and others testifyingfor the Defense Department
used the phrase repeatedly that their program is under
continuous review, which is as it should be in my judgment.
I would hate to think that if they finalized their budget
picture in DeceMber, that between that and a year from the
following June they did not change their program if during
that 18 month period they found that there were some things
that ought to be dropped and some things that ought to be aug-
mented.
So that I am glad there is some difference between the
kmdget figures and the program figures. It seems to me that
without that we would be chained to estimates and pictures
that were anywhere from 6 months to a year and a half old.
That there ought to be changes. There ought to be
augmentations of some programs, and probably decreases
in other programs. Some programs ought to be dropped
depending upon What you learn during this interim between
the time you have submitted your budget and the time you
spend your last dollar in a given fiscal year.
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bd39 Thank you.
4:)
Secretary Gates. The authorizing committees and the
Appropriations Committees of Congress have been very aware
of what is called reprogramming, and this has been very
helpful because of this time period, and there always has been
this kind of reprogramming in the process.
However: it is all the more urgent in these days of
fast moving technical advances to have decisions, not just pro-
grams continuously reviewed.
Senator Symington. I would like to ask the Committee
for unanimous agreement, having seen this statement that
Secretary Oates had, that the Committee be allowed to put a
commentcn this at the place it is put in the record.
Senator Case of South Dakota. I have no objection.
I thought it ought to be in along with the figures on the
Senator Symington. / thank the Senator.
Senator Cannon?
Senator Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mx. Secretary,
on page 1 of your statement you say:
"Our military requirements must be based on our needs
and consistent with national objectives."
Mat are our national objectives to which you refer
there?
Secretary Oates. First the unquestioned responsibility to
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bd40 deter and retaliate in connection with general war. Secondly,
to maintain a posture that will permit deployed n)rces to
handle limited wars of all sizes and character.
Third, to make .a contribution to whatever cold war
posture would be helpful to our foreign policy.
Senator Cannon. Have those been our national objectives
in that respect for some period of time?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Cannon. And would that apply as to long range
objectives as well as to immediate objectives?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Cannon. The reason I ask those questions is
because in a speech you made on May 8, 1959 you say:
"We should ask scientists and industry to help us
with fresh thinking on our long-range objectives and on our
weapons systems".
Secretary Gates. Maybe I ought to clarify. I thought
we were talking about military objectives. Of course, there
am other national objectives.
Senator Cannon. In other words, in your speech you were
not relating there specifically to long-range objectives
of the military type?
Secretary Gates. Total U. S. objectives.
Senator Cannon. I see. I thought there was some conflict
and I just simply wanted to resolve it in my own mind.
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bd41 Now, since you appeared before this committee last,
have you revised any of the specific programs in the
Department? For example, I am referring naw, to the Atlas,
the Polaris, the Air Alert, Bomarc, Midas and so on?
Have any of those programs been revised since you appear-
ed before the Committee here this year?
Secretary Gates. I haven't appeared before the committee
before this year, Senator. I appeared before the Armed
Services Committee. I have not appeared before this committee.
Senator Cannon. I am sorry, I was attending that one
also as a member of the Armed Services Committee. I will say
since the time you had appeared before the Armed Services
Committee?
Secretary Gates. Yes, the decision to augment, I mean
accelerate the BMEWS system has been made since I appeared
before the Armed Services Committee.
Senator Cannon. And that is to give us an earlier
warning capability?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Cannon. Now with reference to the BMEWS system
you indicate that agreement has been reached on the third
location. I don't suppose any construction has started there?
Secretary Gates. I believe it is just about to start
and we now have under study the same thing that we did in
connection with the second one, to see whether this can be
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bd42 accelerated.
Senator Cannon. And if it isn't classified, would you
ate when the MEWS system would be completely operational
(:) for the purpose for which it was intended.
Secretary Gates. It is classified: Senator. It will be
completely operational is difficult also. It will be in very
good shape as we go along with the increments.
Senator Cannon. If this is not classified, I wonder if
you would state whether or not the MEWS system is designed
to protect only in a certain direction, and that the additional
range indicated by the firing of the ICBM into the Pacific
would indicate that the Russians have a capability of firing
from an entirely different direction for which our MEWS
would not give us any warning? I don't want to get into that
if that is classified information.
Secretary Gates. No, I understand, Senator. My under-
standing is, and I think it is right technically, that the
BMEWS system when installed will be completely effective.
Senator Cannon. Will give us complete coverage?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Cannon. You made the statement that our defense,
our present plans are adequate for deterrent in the years
ahead, and again you said our defense programs are designed
to maintain this deterrent strength.
How far ahead in your opinion is our deterrent posture
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bd43 adequately protected now under present plans?
Secretary Gates. As far ahead as the present estimates
and understanding of our relative positions are valid, and sub-
ject to changes in actions on the part of the Soviet Union.
So fax as we can See ahead with present information, as I
say, this information sometimes changes very quickly.
But our planning is based on the plans as we see them
ahead. You certainly have to plan ahead a couple of years
because this is the lead time on some of the things we are
doing.
Senator Cannon. Then in your opinion the things that
we are doing now axe adequate to give us a deterrent posture in
the foreseeable future?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Cannon. And that includes the present plans
that we have insofar as the ICBMs are concerned, the Atlas?
Secretary Gates. Total mix of missiles, yes.
Senator Cannon. Total mix of missiles.
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Cannon. Including ICBMs and Polaris which you
say you refer to as an ICBM.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Cannon. Now if that is your position, then
why do you state that you are now reconsidering whether
you would change the ICBM program, that is to bring more
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bd44 of them in and put them in hardened sites sooner, and why
are you reconsidering the plans to speed up the Polaris
program if we already now bare what you say is an adequate deter-
rent plan?
Secretary Gates. If we can be more effective, we want
to be so, and in the case of Polaris, as I have testified
earlier, before other committees, we have held it back to a
two or three year possibility even though the investment
ald the effort has been very, very large. We have held
it back on the basis that we wanted more technical informa-
tion.
Now we have 2 very significant tests pertaining to Polaris
this month, if they are on schedule, we believe that when
this is evaluated, we may have additional confidence to do
samething different. We have just got that under review.
In the case of the Atlas which we have under review,
it looks like a more efficient way of doing the business. I am
not sure it will turn out to be but it looks so. This I have
asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review. I think we
should continue to improve, and particularly improve in the
more advanced things every time we get an opportunity to
do so.
Senator Cannon. And then would you say that if you do
augment both of these programs, that we would have a stronger
deterrent in the future than we have under plans right at the
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bd45 moment.
(:) Secretary Gates. Naturally if we can include more missiles
at sea in submarines, we are going to have a bigger deterrence.
(:) Senator Cannon. Then you do feel --
Secretary Gates. It doesn't mean the present one is inade-
quate. It means the seaand one will be better.
Senator Cannon. And that it would be a wise idea to have
more.
Secretary Gates. More particularly of the advanced sys-
tems that we are so terribly interested in yes.
SenatorCannon. In other words: you are saying in your
opinion now we are planning for an adequate deterrent, but
you would like to have a better than adequate deterrent
if these plans work out?
Secretary Gates. I would like to move as rapidly as
us can on the improved second generation items that we have
in research.
Senator Cannon. You made the statement in the questioning
a little earlier that we have an air alert now of
sorts.
Do you actually mean that we have an air alert with
airplanes flying with nuclear weapons on board now, flying
in an alert status or wouldwu have the public believe that,
or are you just referring to the fact that we have some of
SAC in the air on a training status all of the time?
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Secretary Gates. It is a training program, and I would
not want to infer that it was a sizeable program, but they
are on alert status all of the time the same as an air-
borne alert would be.
Senator Cannon. I am not talking about the
ground alert, the 15 minute alert.
Secretary Gates. I understand. I am answering the
question as I understand it, in the air.
Senator Cannon. In other words, we have a limited air
alert in the air at the moment now with weapons.
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Cannon. And the 'weapon is armed so that it could
be dropped in anger if need be.
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Cannon. I asked that information because that
is not the information that has been given me and I believe that
has been given meMbers of this committee on other occasions
by other people in a position to know.
Secretary Gates. I will certainly correct the record, Mr.
Chairman, if this is wrong, but this is completely my under-
standing and the order of magnitude of this is nothing like
the order of magnitude that General Power has recommended.
/ want to be clear on that.
Senator Cannon. Yes, I understand that.
Secretary Gates. But we have strategic bombers in the
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air on a ready status at the present time.
Senator Cannon. And those bombers have assigned targets.
Secretary Gates. That is correct. ?
Senator Cannon. You, referred to the present plans for
the on the shelf airborne alert. Let me ask you if thetresent
planning for this so-called on the shelf alert would permit
Genral Power to fly at any time in the future an airborne
alert to the extent he says is necessary to 'Insure the surviva-
bility of SAC in the event of a surprise attack.
Secretary Gates. I donut want to get complicated, but
it is a complicated sUbject. First / will answer specifically.
It is not what General Power requested. It is less, less of a
capability than General Power requested.
However, you have to deal in terms of an airborne
alert with the length of time the planes fly. Obviously a
great many aircraft in SAC could be put on an airborne alert
for a few days and there would be no problem at all of degrading
the force.
If you keep them longer than a certain number of times
you certainly downgrade the force. What we are doing is
buying a capability for a continuous 365 days a year 24
hours a day airborne alert as an insurance policy you might
say.
This capability is not as large as General Power
requested or testified to. However, it gets again into the
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bd48 question of time of aircraft in the air, and so forth and
it is a, complicated subject,,
. , Frankly I think it is largely a matter of degree of
capability that the argument is abcmtx and we are satisfied
that this degree of capability that we are providing at the
present time is a pretty healthy. one.
Senator Cannon. Is it the degree of capability or
it because of the difference of opinion as to what you would
have to have airborne to avoid destruction of our SAC
forces in the event of a surprise attack?
Secretary Gates. It all gets into all the other coMbina-
tions of whether a salvo attack is possible. How much warning
time you have and how much reliability they have and how hard
you are, how dispersed you are and so forth. So that it is
a difficult thing to analyze.
believe that we have a capability to fly a certain
very substantial airlift for a short period of time any time
we want to, and I believe we are building in a capability
to fly a very substantial number for a longer period of
time any time we want to, and it is a matter of degree of how
much reserve, spare engines and spare parts and how much
additional training is required to do this.
The Joint Chiefs have reviewed this, and I believe they
are agreed that we are doing the thing about correctly.
Senator Cannon. And it it based in part on your analysis
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that the Russians would not be in a position to launch an
all out surprise attack in the foreseeable future.
Secretary Gates. It is based on an analysis of various
types of attack over various periods of time.
Senator Cannon. Mr. Secretary: in answer to a question
from Senator Martin
*Mahe
Senator Symington. I think the Senator
NEE OW,
Senator Cannon. I have only one more question if I may,
Mr. Chairman.
In answer to a question from Senator Martin you said the
Department of Defense is now functioning satisfactorily.
Does that hold true as to the Joint Chiefs of Staff also?
Secretary Gates. I believe so, Senator Cannon.
I am very pleased with the arrangements.
senat,r Cannon. I raise that question because on May
8, 1959 you said "The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to strug-
gle with divided opinions as to the emphasis to be placed
on various systems: and the Secretary of Defense continues
to struggle handicapped by traditionally divided service
opinions."
Secretary Gates. That is right.
Senator Cannon. Is that true today?
Secretary Gates. I think we have made a big step.
/ don't want to be boastful about what we have put into being
and I don't want to be premature in judging its results. But
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bd50 I think we have made a goodEtep and I think it will work.
(.7.) Senator Cannon. I thank the Chairmen.
0
753
Senator Symington. The committee will now unfortunately
because of the time, Senator Johnson just said we could go
to 1 o'clock, and not beyond.
I want to say, Mx. Secretary, may I thank you for your
invariably considerate and kind effort before the committee.
I am not at all satisfied yet as to where we stand in
this matter. I think there are many more questions that I
would like to ask and I hope that you can adjust your time
and the committee can adjust its time and we can proceed in
an effort to clarify this situation so that we understand
where we are.
I would hope that you would consider, in order to eliminate
much if not most of this confusion, doing this year
what Secretary McElroy did last year and release these
ratios as given to us by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Senator Saltonstal/. Would the Senator yield?
Senator Symington. I would be glad to.
Senator Saltonstal/. Mr. Chairman, may I express for this
side of the table our appreciation of your frank clear
testimony this morning, Mr. Secretary, and we wish you well
onpur very difficult mission to Paris next week.
Senator Symington. I would like to join in that too if I
May.
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bd51 Secretary Gates. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Symington. The Committee recesses subject to
the call of the chair.
(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m. the hearing was adjourned?
subject to the call of the chair.)
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