INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE, MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS VOL. 4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000601190001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 102
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 9, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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Vol. 4
OIR 3JIuifriiftttrs *nide
Report of Proceedings
14 OF 15
Hearing held before
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services
and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences
INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS
(JOINT CHIEFS)
February 9, 196C
Washington, D. C.
WARD & PAUL
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
8-4266
/8-4267
NATIONAL
)8-4268
84269
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bd CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF; PAGE
General Nathan F. Twining
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 509
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Cantor bdl INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER'DEFENSE PRCGRAMS
Tuesday, February 9, 1960
United States Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services: and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee and Subcommittee met, pursuant to recess,
at 10:10 a.m., in Room 235, Old Senate Office Building,
Senator John C. Stennis presiding.
Present: Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:
Senators Stennis (Presiding) Symington and
Saltonstall.
Present: Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences:
Senators Stennis (Presiding), Symington, Bartlett,
Young, Cannon: Saltonstall, Smith, Wiley, Martin and Case (N.J.).
Also present: Captain L. P. Gray, Military Assistant to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Senator Bush.
Edwin L. Weisl, Special Counsel; Cyrus R. Vance, Associate
Counsel; Kenneth E. BeLieu, Staff Director of Space Committee
and Preparedness Subcommittee.
Staff Members, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:
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bd2 Stuart French, Associate Counsel and Robert M. Neale
(:) httorney.
Staff Members, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
(:) Sciences: Max Lehrer, Assistant Staff Director; Everard H.
Smith, Jr., Counsel; William J. Deachmane Assfstant Counsel;
Dr. Glen P. Wilson, Chief Clerk; and Dr. Earl W. Lindveit,
Assistant Chief Clerk.
ay. lag aaa
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Senator Stennis. The committee will come to order,
please. Let's see if we can't have a working arrangement
here with our photographers this morning. You know that is
one of the things that I have changed my mind on considerably
since coming to the Senate.
I realize that the photographers really serve a major
part in transmitting the news and operations of our govern-
ment to the American people. It is a part of the free press,
without which I am sure that our form of government could not
last very long without a free press and all of its elements.
So I am willing to swap time with the photographers but don't
want to have it where you are really interfering with the
committee, and I am sure you don't want to. But in the enthu-
siasm sometimes you detract from the witness or from the man
who is trying to question the witness.
So after out 5 minutes, if you can settle down below the
witness and the Senators, I hope you can do that without being
reminded again, and also after the Senate is in session, why
these chairs up here are reserved for the Senators.
By working together / believe we can better serve the
cause, and that will be the purpose of the chair and / am sure it
is yours.
I have a short statement, Members of the Committee and
General Twining. Today the Preparedness Investigating Subcommit-
tee and the Space Committee will hear General athan F. Twining,
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bmd 4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following General
Twining, we expect to hear from Secretary of Defense Thomas
Gates. Because it is the responsibility of Congress to
provide the essential enabling legislation for America's
security, we have asked the nation's senior military officials
to advise us.
The head of each military service and each member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already appeared. Today
General Twining, we are asking your advice in your capacity as
the country's military official, as former chief of staff
of the Air Force and as a distinguished citizen.
History proves that nations who do not look to their
common defense do not remain long as principal actors on the
stage of world affairs.
America today is strong. We must continue to be strong.
We must be certain that our defenses are based on sound mili-
tary requirements, and I think that that is the major question
before the world, as General Eisenhower goes to the summit
conference. Are we really in actuality strong enough for him
to be in a position of strength rather than having a major
part of the thoughts of the world thinking, whether we are or
not, thinking that we might be secondary.
I believe that that is what the question comes down to.
General Twining, it is the custom of swearing all
witnesses. Will you please stand and be sworn?
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Do you solemnly swear that your testimony at this
hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
General Twining I do.
Senator Stennis. Have a seat. Ig the members
of the comaittee are ready, we will proceed. Perhaps it will
be better if we can to let the General make his statement,
which I understand is brief, make it without interruption.
General, proceed.
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bd6 TESTIMONY OF GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Twining. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Commit-
() tee, I would like to have permission to make a few opening
remarks.
I believe I can be of service to the committee in setting
forth as clearly as I can my personal views on some of the vital
iesues that are involved in the current hearing. I realize
that there are some honest and sincere nen who will not hold
the same views that I do. I respect their views, even though I
my not agree with them. I have the responsibility as chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Secretary of
(:) Defense, the National Security Council and the President of my
own view.
These are views formed after careful consideration of
all the facts involved in the complex matters which led to the
design of our defense posture. In analyzing our posture versus
that of an enemy, we utilize the national intelligence of
the highest degree of sensitivity. Moreover, to conduct the
analysis we undertake war games.
Senator Stennis. Pardon me just a minute. Do you have
copies of your statement so we may follow you more closely?
General Twining. No, I'm sorry I dont, This is very
short.
In these efforts we established assumptions, crank in
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bd7 national intelligence and then engage in the most complex
(:) calculations known to professional analysts and strategists.
Some of these efforts require months of work on the part of
(:) the best brains that this country can muster. I believe in our
national intelligence estimates. I am briefed nearly every
day of the year regarding the developing intelligence picture
worldwide. This daily briefing is standard practice for
key officials and officers of the department. We do not wait
until the end of the year for one final intelligence briefing
and then relate al/ of our plans and programs to it.
Our planning porcess is continuous as is our intelligence
process. I believe that I know that the military professional
(:) is never satisfied with the forces at his command.
Each of us all over the world in all nations would like
to have just a little bit more regardless of how much is at
hand. I believe that we have enough military strength today
to carry out our assigned missions, and I believe that our
combined American leadership will see to it that we continue
to have enough.
On the basis of all the information available to me, and
In view of the mission and locations of our retaliatory weapons
(:) systems: I just do not believe that any nation possesses the
ability today or in the foreseeable future to attack us or
(:) destroy us without receiving unacceptable damage in return.
So long as our armed forces are maintained strong and ready
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bd8 and so long as the national will and courage remains vigorous
(:) and hardy, we have no reason to fear any human system or
threat.
(:) I am not complacent. Yet I am not fearful of the Soviet
capability. Thank you.
Senator Stennis. All right, Members of the Committee,
we will follow the usual pattern today of calling on counsel
and then each Senator for 10 minutes so as to give everyone
a chance to ask any questions. On the second time around we
will extend the time on the request of any Senator I think.
Mr. Weisl, you may proceed.
Mr. Weisl. General Twining, General Power stated to this
(:) committee last week that in March 1959 he sent a request to
the joint Chiefs of Staff stating his urgent requirements
for airborne alert, and I quote his answers to my question
hciefly:
"Were the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked to approve and fund
an airborne alert for SAC?
"General Power. They were.
"Mr. Weisl. When was the request submitted to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?
"It was submitted in March of 1959, I believe around the
(:) 6th of March.
"Mr. Weisl. That was almost 10 months no.
(:) "General Power. Yes, sir.
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"Mr. Weisl. Did you receive any reply?
"General Power I have not received a reply from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff."
How is it possible, General Twining, in these critical
times that a request of such urgency has not been replied to
for 10 months by the Joint Chiefs who are in command of General
Power?
General Twining. His request would naturally go into the
normal budget cycle because it requires a considerable amount
of money, so it was held until we went through the normal budget
cycle and had the discussion with the Chiefs.
That is why the delay. A decision on this whole matter
was not made until late this fall.
Mr. Weisl. Wasn't the major --
General Twining. I might say though that of course
General Power though he did not get a direct communication
from the Joint Chiefs: he knew exactly the status of what was
going on all this time through his own Chief of Staff.
Mr. Weisl. Did he learn that through the grapevine
or directly from the people who command him ?
General Twining. He probably got it through the Chief
of Staff of the Aix Force, but he was not informed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. You are right.
Mr. Weisl. Don't the Joint Chiefs have the responsibility
of telling the Commander of SAC who serves under the Joint
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bd10 Chiefs?
General Twining. They had not made the decision.
Mr. Weisl. Wasn't the major change in the National
Security Act amendment of 1959 removing the secretaries
in the Department from the chain of command so there would be
Oirect chain of command between the unified and specified
commander and the Joint Chiefs.
General Twining. That is correct, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff would be the proper people to inform him.
Mr. Wei 1. Since this was supposed to streamline the
operations, why does it take more than /0 months to answer a
letter of such urgency to a Commander of 90%; of the free world's
retaliatory power.
General Twining. / would like to check the record on it
and see what he was told and was not told.
I do not kn)w.
Mr. Weisl. Very well. Will you supply it for the record?
General Twining. I will.
Mr. Weisl. Genera/ Taylor says there's no machinery avail?
able for the Joint Chiefs to make hard decision, and I quote
him briefly: "Nowhere in the machinery of the Government
is there a procedure for checking military capability against
political commitments or our forces in being against the
requirements growing out of the basic national security policy."
Do you agree with that?
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General Twining. No, I do not agree with that entirely,
no. That has been taken up before with the Chiefs when
General Taylor was have, and there was no real merit to his
proposal.
Mr. Weisl. / quote him further: The aoint Chiefs of
Staff have failed to agree on the forces needed to support
the agreed strategic concept, and hence have not produced the
military guidance needed by the military services. The
Secretary of Defense has interjected fiscal considerations
into midrange strategic planning, and has thus deprived it
of much of its potential value."
Do you agree with that?
General Twining. He is right on the forces,
and the JSOP, and there has also been a difference of opinion.
Otherwise we know what we call the *MOP has always been
agreed by the Chief with the exception of the
41111.040
Mr. Weisl. Has there ever been a decision made on that
subject?
General Twining. No, not on the aSOP. We now have the
'MOP fox this next go-around in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.
Mr. Weisl. General Twining, could you tell us, do you
feel there is a future need for manned bombers?
General Twining. Ilm sorry, sir, I missed that.
Mr. Weisl. Do you feel there is a future need for manned
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bd12 boMbers?
General Twining. Yes, I do.
Mr. Weisl. On the 3-70 General White testified that
he felt there was an urgent requirement for the development
of the 3-70 as a weapons system. Can you tell us whether
the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body made any decision or
recommendations on this?
General Twining. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have discussed
this at great length, and the Secretary of Defense knows
the opinions the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold in this matter.
Mx. Weisl. Can you tell what those opinions axe?
General Twining. No, I donet think I should tell what
they are.
Mr. Weisl. Have they made any decision or recommendations?
General Twining. The recommendations were made and they have
gone all the way up to the President himself, also through the
Defense Department on the way.
Mr. Weisl. Were those decisions unanimous or split?
General Twining. Those decisions were not unanimous.
Mr. Weisl. There has been considerable open testimony,
General Twining, about the fact that the development of the
B-70 has been downgraded. Do you care to comment on that?
General Twining. Well, yes. I believe that is probably
true. It was originally designed as a complete bomber weapons
system, and now in this budget, as you know, the B-70 will
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coatinue as more or less a development project for the air-
plane and the engines and not as a bomber system.
Mr. Weis'. Perhaps I might quote some of the testimony
taken on the B-70, if you haven't already read it.
General Twining. I have read quite a bit of it, sir, but
I will be glad to hear it.
Mr. Weisl. Senator Cannon asked this question: "Tow
in connection with the 3-70 program, was the B-70 scheduled
to come into the inventory at the time the B-52 became
Obsolescent?
"General Power. Yes, it was timed. Whether this was
by design or accident, but it was timed to come in just about
the time of the first B-52 becoming obsolescent.
"Senator Cannon. And if the B-70 program is delayed as
it is now proposed, will the 2-52 in the inventory be comparably
as obsolescent as the B-47s are today?
"General Power. Yes, to the same extent. There is a rule
of thumb in bombardment, and I think it still holds, that
7 years you approach Obsolescence, 10 years Obsolete."
Do you agree with that?
General Twining. I think that is correct, yes. I agree
with that.
Mr. Weisl. Then under the present plan will the B-70
possibly be in operation when the 13-52 becomes obsolescent?
General Twining. Well, if we proceeded on the 3-70
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program full speed ahead we wouldn'tget it I would say until
about '67.
Mr. Weisl. Then by that time the B-52 will be obsolete.
General Twining. It will be on the way out2 that is
right, six.
Mx. Weisl. What are your personal views as the principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the B-70?
General Twining. Well, I think if you go back a little
bit on the whole bomber, I think that we areriPt quite sure how
much the ICBMs will take over the role from the bomber. We
certainly know that the bombers will go down in nuMbers as
the ICBMs become perfected. But how much and to what
numerical numbers the ICBM will replace the bombers we don't
knew for sure.
But I am convinced that we will have bombers all the
way through this period we are talking, '67, '68 and maybe beyond,
and the bomber will still be a useful weapons system in the inven-
tory, regardless of how good the ICBMs may get.
Mr. Weisl. Doesn't that depend on how quickly or at
what time a potential enemy will decide to make war on us?
General Twining. That would have some bearing on it,
and I certainly believe that at that period, '67 and ?68
if the bomber is still a useful weapons system, we would be
much better off with a more advanced bomber like the B-70.
Mr. Weisl. What bombers will we have?
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General Twining. None.
Mr. Weisl. If we don't have the B-70.
General Twining. The B-70 is the only one.
Mr Weisl. What are your personal views on airborne
ale:ct, General Twining?
General Twining. My personal views are that the airborne
alert capability is what we must go for.
I think that what is in the budget this year will take
care of it. I do not advocate an allout airborne alert but
I do think we should have this capability and use it when we
wan:.: it and when we think we need it, and Change it from
day to day and time to time so the enemy knows we have this
capability.
He doesn't know when we are using it, and I think it is
just about as much of a threat to him then in his planning,
it makes it difficult for him as if we used it 100% in
every 24 hours a day: which I do not believe in.
Mr. Weisl. But General Twining, in order to have it when
we teed it, we have to do certain things now, don't we?
General Twining. Yes: sir.
Mr. Weisl. And are we doing those things now in order
to have it in the force that General Power and General White
recommend?
(:) General Twining. I think we are doing, pushing for
what we need to get the airborne capability, not the airborne
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Mx. Weisl. Or that General White wants.
General Twining. That is correct.
Mr. Weisl. Did you make your views known to the General,
to General White?
General Twining. Yes, on many occasions.
Mr. Weisl. Did you advise General White that you agreed
with his views but that the budget didn't provide for the money
that he wanted and if he wanted to put his views on airborne
alert into effect, he would have to take it out of his Air
Force budget?
General Twining. I don't recall that. That might be
the way that it would happen though.
Mr. Weisl. May we ask What did you advise General White?
General Twining. I advised General White that I thought
that the airborne alert capability was essential and
was sufficient s not the whole airborne alert operation as
General Power wanted it.
Mx. Weis].. Or that General White wanted.
General Twining. Thaes right. I am not just sure what
General White does want. / didn't see his testimony.
Mr. Weis'. His testimony was that be supported General
519
Power in the
General Twining. Permanent airborne alert?
Mr. Weisl. In the airborne alert that General Power
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bd17 recommended. I don't want to state the percentages, because
that was in closed session.
General Twining0 I certainly never recommended that to
Mr. Weisl. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate
body make any decisions or recommendations on General Power's
urgent request for airborne alert?
General Twining. Yes.
Mr. Weisl. What was their decision?
General Twining. There was a difference of view there
again r but none of them I can say went along wholeheartedly
with General Power's recommendation.
Mr. Weisl. What were the differences? I mean you under-
stand General Twining, anything you feel you shouldn't answer--
General Twining. 1 feel that those Generals
testifying should say how they feel. I can tell you what
recommendPd and I have told you, and they didn't agree with
General Power, but I don't think I want to say any more on that
because they smight have said something up here since I have
seen them that I don't know about. I don't know, but I think
you ought to get it from them, sit.
Mr. Weisl. Then really there was no decision made.
General Twining. There was certainly a recommendation
to the Secretary of Defense. He knew exactly how the Chiefs
felt about it.
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Mr. Weisl. And what were those recommendations?
General Twining. I think you ought to get those from
the Chiefs. I gave them mine. I gave you mine, I mean.
Mr. Weisl. Does the budget incorporate your recommenda-
tions?
General Twining. Yes.
Mr. Weisl. Does the budget incorporate -- that
incorporates your recommendation.
General Twining. I think the budget does. If the
figures are correct there they have got enough money for what
I feel they should do, the on the shelf capability is what
they call it: / think that is a very good plan and very
essential and badly needed.
Mr. Weisl. General Twining, if you are concerned that
we will need the Th-70s to replace the 13-52 when it becomes
obsolete, why did you advocate delay in the development of the
3-70 as a weapons system?
General Twining. I made the recommendations on the 3-70
and General White made them and our recommendations were con-
sidered at the proper sourced and the decision was made to do
otherwise as was specified in the budget.
I certainly go along with that. I would like to see
possibly a little bit more: but I do go along with this.
The project is still alive and we can look at it this year.
It is a very d very expensive project as you know. There are
521
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many unknowns in the project, and maybe as we go down the
road this year we can find out more about it and make a more
careful analysis and judgment later.
Mr. Weis'. Were your recommendations overruled?
General Twining. They were not al/ considered, no.
Mr. Weisl. Your recommendations were not all considered?
General Twining. No.
Mr. Weisl. What do you mean by that?
General Twining. They were listened to. / had the
chance to make my speech and I made it and the result was
what you see in the budget today.
Mr. Weisl. To whom did you make your speech?
(:) General Twining. How is that?
Mr. Weisl. To whom did you make your speech?
General Twining. I made it several places.
Mr. Weisl. Sir?
General Twining, The Secretary of Defense basically
and the Chiefs.
Mr. Weisl. And yoursoeech or your requirement--
General Twining. My recommendation.
Mr. Weisl. Your recommendation was not granted?
General Twining. Not 100%, no.
Mr. Weisl. Can you tell this committee what your recommen-
dations were?
General Twining. I don't think I had better do that, no,
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bd20 six, Mr. Weisl.
I would rather not do that.
Mr. Weisl. You would rather do that in closed session?
General Twining. That is right.
Mx. Weisl. May I call your attention to General White's
testimony on that question, and X quote:
"At some point in the proceedings as Chief of Staff
of the Air Force I entered a paper into the Joint Chiefs
of Staff requesting that an airborne alert of the magnitude
requested by General Power be implemented."
Do you recall that?
General Twining. He never told me he was going to do
that but that is fine. That is his recommendation.
Mr. Weisl. He said he entered a paper into the Joint
Chiefs of Staff requesting that an airborne alert of the
magnitude requested by General Power be implemented.
Genera/ Twining. I would like to see which one that is
six, which airborne alert he is talking about. We have had
quite a lot of discussion.
Mr. Weisl. He said of the magnitude requested by
General Power.
General Twining. I am reminded that was General Power's
full &borne alert, one-quarter of the force on 24 hour alerty
and General White did back that.
Mr. Weisl. What was the action taken on that paper
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sVomitted to the Joint Chiefs by General White backing up
General Power?
General Twining. It was considered by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. There was quite a little discussion about it, and
as I said, the Secretary of Defense was informed of the Chief's
views on airborne alert. He knew how they all stood on it.
Mr. Weisl. And you don't care to tell us how they stood on
any one?
General Twining. No, sir. And this was studied a great
deal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was a pretty serious
study.
Mr. Weisl. Now may I ask you, General Twining, did the
Joint Chiefs as a corporate body make any decisions or recommenda-
tions of what should be done about the Nike-Zeus program in the
1981 budget?
General Twining. Yes. We did make a recommendation on Nike-
Mr. Weisl. What was that recommendation?
General Twining. The overall recommendation, and there
was a difference of opinion again.
Mr. Weisl. What?
Genera/ Twining. A difference of opinion, one dissenter,
was not to go Into production this year with the Nike-Zeus,
to carry it on as a high priority, top priority research
program, and do as much as they could on it, but not to go into
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bd22 productions not to authorize any pre-production of it.
think there was one dissenter of the Chiefs in this
vote.
525
Mr. Weisl. There was one dissenter.
General Twining. Yes.
Mr. Weisl. And that was the dissent I tak it of
those who had the responsibility of using the Nike-Zeus.
General Twining. ThaWs right.
Mr. Weisl. There was appropriated by the Congress
137 million for the development of pre-production parts for
the Nike-Zeus system in the event there was a breakthrough.
That appropriation was never used and has not been used
to this day. Has that issue come up before the Joint Chiefs?
General Twining. No, sir. We have not gone into that
issue at all. That would be a matter for the
Secretary of Defenses and I think for Secretary Brucker to
work out how to handle it. I think the Secretary of Defense
is prepared to talk about that.
Mr. Weisl. Wasn't that an important matter for the Joint
Chiefs to consider?
General Twining. Not necessarily.
Mr. Weisl. Why not?
General Twining. Because they did not go into the produc-
tion fund and it is up to the Army then to handle that
themselves with the Secretary of Defense.
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Mr. Weisl. Where does the Secretary get his military
advice as to whether a certain fund appropriated by the
Congress should or should not be used to make a military
weapons system?
General Twining. We recommended no preproduction from the
Chiefs as the majority view, no preproduction, and the money
that Congress voted, and that is up to the Secretary of
Defense I guess in the bid get what to do with that money.
We have nothing to do with holding up the money or spending
it. It is up to the Secretary of Defense, because he gives
it to the services, not to the Chiefs.
Mx. Weisl. In other words, then the majority view
was that it should be released if it referred to preproduction
use.
General Twining. No. Referring to preproduction funds
the majority view was not to go into the preproduction.
Mr. Weisl. What was the majority view? I thought the
majority view was to go into research and development.
General Twining. Research and development, that is
correct.
Mr. Veisl. Which involves preproduction, doesn't it?
General Twining. No, no, no, sir.
Mr. Wtia. Don't you develop a program before you go
into production?
General Twining. Well, the way we looked at it, and it was
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a z I
thoroughly understood that we would not set up advance
procurement items to prepare for production, but to go ahead
purely on an R&D program, sir.
Mr. Weisl. Suppose that a breakthrough took place
where the Hike-Zeus team was ready for production, and the
$137 million that the Congress appropriated for components to
be ready in the event production was ready, what would happen
then?
General Twining. Well, I think they ought to go ahead
and use it right away. That is what the Secretary has said.
I would like to bring that up right now. I have been here with
him for two straight years now before the committees, and he
has said that all these programs like Hike-Zeus, Polaris,
Minuteman, that the minute that we make any breakthroughs
and see a chance to spend more money intelligently we are
going to come right over to the Congress regardless of what
time of the year it is and ask you for the money, and he has
said that repeatedly, and that would apply to this money you are
talking about.
Mx. Weisl. But in this respect you did not have to go
to Congress to ask for the money. The Congress already
appropriated the money, and the purpose of it was to be
ready in case there was a breakthrough not to have any year
or more delay in the production of the weapon system, and that
money was not used.
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bd25 General Twining. That's right, because it had not
(:) gone far enough to use. They had nt made the proper advance
to warrant spending the money.
(:) Mr. Weisl. Why do you suppose Congress was requested to
appropriate that money if they didn't need it? Didn't the De-
partment of Defense urge Congress to make the $137 million
available last year?
General Twining. I don't think the Department of Defense
did. I am not sure about that, sir.
The Army probably asked for it, 1 don't know.
Mr. Weis'. The Secretary of Defense sent a letter to the
Senate requesting that this $/37 million be appropriated, that
there was a need for it, and the Congress appropriated it, and
the question I am asking you, why that money wasn't used,
in view of the recommendation of the Secretary that it was
needed, and that was the reason it was appropriated.
General Twining. Sir, I am not prepared to answer that.
You will have to ask Secretary Gates about that.
?
Mr. Weisl. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate
body make any decision or recommendation on accelerating the
Polaris program in the fiscal year 1961?
General Twining. The Chiefs of Staff did not make that
recommendation. 1 think that came from the Secretary of
Defense.
Mr. Weisl In your statements you and Secretary Gates laid
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bd26 great stress on the importance of the Polaris program as
(:) a retaliatory force. Don't you think that a matter of
529
that kind should have some use from the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
General Twining. Well, here again, sir, the Joint
(:)
Chiefs of Staff have gone into the Polaris on many occasions,
but this particular recommendation, they agreed with the size
of this program, the Chiefs did. But it didn't instigate in
the Chiefs of Staff as I recall. That is a program that came
from the Navy through the Secretary of Defense. The Chiefs
were asked about it and they went along with this program
that was given by the Secretary.
Mr. Weisl. What I am asking you is whether the Joint
(:) Chiefs made any decision on the acceleration of the Polaris
program as recommended and appropriated for by the Congress?
General Twining. Those are Secretary of Defense matters.
Mr. Weisl. Who advises the Secretary since he is a civilian?
General Twining. We advise him.
Mx. Weisl. What did you advise him on the accelera-
tin of the Polaris program?
General Twining. On what is in the budget now?
Mr. Weisl. No, the acceleration provided for by the
Congress. The Congress appropriated more money for the acceler-
ation and for the production of more nuclear submarines than
the program provides for.
General Twining. We were not consulted on that.
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bd27 Mr. Weis/. That was in the 1959 budget?
General Twining. We were not, the Chiefs as a grpup were
not con sulated on that. Up there again that is up to the
Secretary of Defense what they do with those funds.
Mr. Weisl. Did you make any recommendation on that sub-
ject?
General Twining. No.
Mr. Weis/. Isn't that one of our at least it was
testified to as being one of our chief retaliatory forces,
and yet you say the Joint Chiefs of Staff; who are the only
military advisers that the Secretary of Defense has, made
no recommendation on that.
General Twining. The Chiefs of Staff were satisfied with
the program as submitted, and wsnt along with it, not the
accelerated program that you are talking about.
Mr. Weisl. Then the Joint Chiefs opposed the acceleration
ol the program; is that correct?
General Twining. Well; they certainly did not recommend
to go ahead with it.
Mr. Weisl. Did you make any recommendation?
General Twining. We went along with the program as put
in the budget, as presented by the budget.
Mr. Meisl. Did you go along with the program as
put in the budget after the budget was made or before the
budget was made?
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bd28 General Twining. Before the budget was made.
Mr. Weisl. What was your recommendation?
General Twining. I forget now what the recommendation was.
It was a 3 submarine increase / believe.
Mr. Weisl. Did you have any personal view that you gave?
General Twining. Yes, I did. I thought it was about the
right program, 3 submarines a year as / recall.
Mr. Weisl. In other words, you disagreed with the recommen-
dation of the Congress and the appropriation of the money for an
accelerated Polaris program?
General Twining. I was never asked that question.
Mr. Weisl. Wells what are your personal views on that?
General Twining. My personal views axe we should go
along just about like we are, until we find out more about
Polaris. I think it is a good program?
Mr. Weisl. Wont it be too late when you find out -About
Polaris? Isn't there a lead time involved? Doesn't it
take a year or two years of pre-planning in order to get a
submarine?
General Twining. What do you mean? I don't understand
what you mean by being too late.
Mr. Weisl. I mean you can't make up the time that you lost
by not making preparations for the production of more
Polaris submarines by making up your mind tomorrow or
the next day.
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bd29 General Twining. Certainly the sooner you make up your
(:) mind to buy something the sooner you are going to get it.
Mr. Weisl. Then I take it as your opinion that you
(:) did not agree with the recommendation of the Chief in charge
of Naval Operations you did not agree with the appropriation
for the acceleration of the Polaris program by the Congress.
You did not agree with that.
Genera/ Twining. I wasn't asked that question, but I still
wouldn't agree with it if I was. That is what I mean.
Mr. Weis/. Who was asked that question? How does the
Secretary
General Twining. I guess the Secretary of Defense decided.
Mr. Weisl. I know, but how does the Secretary of Defense
a civilian: make a military decision without military advice?
General Twining. Well: I think you had better ask him about
that.
Mr. Weisl. Well, we will: but you didn't give him that
advice.
General Twining. I was not asked about that particular
problem.
Mr. Weisl. Neither as far as you know were the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body.
General Twining. No: sir.
Mr. Weisl. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff make any
decision on incorporating the Polaris on surface ships?
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General Twining. Not yet.
Mx. Weisl. Have they been asked about that?
General Twining. I don2t recall it was Polaris, but we
had one project some time ago of putting other weapons
systems on surface ships, and I think the Chiefs did not go along
with that project at the time.
Mr. Weis/. Then the joint Chiefs were opposed to the
project of incorporating the Polaris on surface ships.
General Twining. Yes, I recall that is correct.
Mx. Weis/. That is the decision?
General Twining. That is right.
Mr. Weisl. Do you agree with that decision?
General Twining. I still do, right as of the moment, very
vulnerable.
Mr. Weisl. And Admiral Burke testified that unless that
decision is made now, that there will be a considerable delay
in bringing that decision into fruition if at a later time
the Joint Chiefs change their mind. Do you agree with that?
General Twining. I do, I agree with it, yes, sir.
Mr. Weis. Admiral Burke testified yesterday that the
Navy never had an opportunity to present its military
requirements to the Secretary of Defense because the Navy
had to stay within the established budget guidelines. What
function do the Joint Chiefs perform if military requirements
are not considered when the budget is determined?
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bd31 General Twining. Well, I dont see why if Admiral Burke
(:) had a set of requirements he could not present them to the
Secretary of Defense. He certainly presents them to his own
Secretary.
Mr. Weisl. He testified that because the guidelines
limited him as to the amount that he could ask for, and since
his minimum requirements were more than the guidelines provided,
he was in no position to ask for those military requirements.
General Twining. The Secretary of Defense had what he
called reclama meetings with the service secretaries and
the service chiefs of staff and they could present any problem
to him they wanted to present at that time, requirements or
anything else, and / think Mr. Weisl there is another thing
that you should ask the Secretary.
Mr. Weisl. May I ask this question, General Twining.
What good is it to present requirements when the guidelines
prevent those requirements from being acted upon?
General Twining. You can still present the requirements.
If you have got a strong enough case I think the guidelines
would have to give.
Mr. Weisl. May I read to you the testimony given by
Admiral Burke briefly:
Weisle, You have given us several examples in which
the Navy did not ask for the funds it required because of budgetary
guidelines. Did you ever submit to the Secretary of Defense
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bd32 your military requirements for 1961?
(:)"Admiral Burke. As I explained before, .a had a direc-
tive to submit our budgetary request for '61 in two amounts.
(:) One was the basic budget and one was the basic and
add-on, and we followed our directive.
"Mr. Weisl. Then you did not submit your requirements?
"Admiral Burke. Not as it had been conceived heretofore:
no sir."
General Twining. Well: I think what Admiral Burke
said was correct, but still that doesn't mean to say that he
was not listened to or his Secretary was not listened to: if
they had requirements other than were listed in that program.
Mx. Weisl. I understand that the Secretary and al/ of
(:)
you have freedom of speech in this country, but since the
guideline or the budget says you cannot ask for more than
this amount, it doesn't do any good to present a requirement
exceeding that amount no matter how urgently the man in charge
of that responsibility needs it is that correct?
General Twining. That is right. Of course, / do want
to make clear that the Secretary of Defense is fully aware
of the requirements of all the services, that he is not in
ignorance on this. He knows. Re is the one that has to
judge, and he knows what the service requirements are. There
O is no mystery about that.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman?
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? Senator Stennis. All right, Senator Case.
Senator Case. If Mr. Weisl might not get from the Chief
of Staff the definition of add-on.
Mr. Weisl. Will you give us the definition of add-on?
General Twining. I think this is purely a matter of
the Secretary of Defense, and I wouldiet mind defining it,
but if I define it, I am getting into his sphere, the way
this budget was handled, and I personally was absent du?ing
this period when this was going on, and I understand just how it
was done and all that, but it was a way of managing this
budget.
They were given objectives, and I think it would be
much better, Mr. Weisi, if you would let Mr. Gates explain
that to you.
It is really in his ballpark.
Mr. Weisl. Were you represented at that time?
General Twining. Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. Weld. By whom?
General Twining. Probably Admiral Burke. He was the
senior.
Mx. Weld. You were represented by Admiral Burke?
General Twining. Admiral Radford came in. I was absent
for several months.
Weisl. In connection with the formulation -- may I
say, Senator Case, we will try to get you that information,
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bd34 what add on means in connection with the formulation of the
?1961 budget: did the joint Chiefs make any determination of
e:zactly how much and what types of strategic deterrent and
...retaliatory forces we need now and for the next several
years?
General Twining. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not get
down to snecifics on that. This is a matter that is discussed
all the time with the Chiefs, all, these force levels ,
intermittently through the year are discussed. It isnct just
budget time, like carrier programs, 3-52 programa, they
come out all the time for discussion. They see the programs,
they know exactly what each service has in the way of programs.
They know exactly what SAC consists of, which is the
basic retaliatory organization, and they don't want to change,
? they might think it is a little big but they have not recommen-
? ded we cut it down.
Mr. Weisl, General Taylor testified and I think you are
familiar with his views, that no one determines what the over-
al/ need is.
He says that a certain budget is fixed, and then the Army
gets a certain part, the Navy gets a certain part, the Air
Force gets a certain part, the Marines get a certain part,
Vat there is no determination of how much is enough for the
overall defense of the United States.
General Twining. That is one of the very difficult
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bd35 problems. People have very strong opinions about forces,
(:) hew big they should be and what should comprise them, what type
they should be.
(:) That is one of the most difficult things we have to contend
with in the military.
Mr. Weisl. I know it is.
General Twining. Very difficult.
Mr. Weisl. Don't you believe that someone should make a
decision of what overall forces we need before we decide how
much the Navy should get, how much the Army should get and
how much the Air Force?
Dont weapons systems, in other words, today in modern
(:) warfare cross service lines?
General Twining. That is right.
Mr. Weisi. So that someone ought to make a decision
what overall requirements there are before deciding?
General Twining. I think the Secretary of Defense will
explain to you when he comes up here, and I don't want to be
taking words out of his mouth on this, but this year I think
really for the first time we concentrated in this budget
more on programs without worrying about the ultimate end cost
C.) of the budget or the service budget, but worked =programs,
what programs were necessary, weapons systems were necessary
C.) for the defense of this country, and we stayed with this
weapons system discussion for days over there, regardless of
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bd36 costs ox anything else, to find out which ones we must
(:) have: which ones should go on to research and so forth.
Mr. Weisl. But the Joint Chiefs were decided on all
(:) of those subjects.
Genera/ Twining. No, they aren't divided on all, but
they have their strong opinions. They naturally want their
own weapons systems in: and that is the thing, that is the great
debate of course.
Mr. Weisl. There was no firm recommendation: no unanimity
on the Polaris, on the 3-70, on airborne alert.
General Twining. Well, when the final thing was decided
on what amount of money would be spent on Polaris in this
(:) year, how big the program would be, everybody went along with
it.
There is no objection by the Chiefs on it. I think
Admire/ Burke would like to have had a few more but he went
along with the three submarines plus the lead time for more out
in the distance.
Mr. Weisl. He had to go along, didn't he? Be had no
choice.
General Twining. He presented his case and / think it
Was a pretty good decision myself.
Mr. Weisl. Well, now, if he presents his case, and the Joint
Chiefs don't make a decision, what good is the presentation of
the case?
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bd37 General Twining. He presented his case but the Joint
Chiefs didn't agree with him. Another one of those split
decisions. The Secretary gets this for advice. Sometimes
it isn't too formalized,but he calls us in and says "What do
you think about this", we are al/ there and we state our views
and he has got them. That is the kind of advice we give the
Secretary of Defense. We do that quite frequently and we don't
make a formal paper lots of times on these things.
Mr. Weisl. You agree that up to this year there has been
no overall planning.
General Twining. X wouldn't say there hasn't been overall
planning but I say it can be improved and it is the toughest
problem we have, Mx. Weisl.
It can be improved.
Mr. Wets 1, Thank you. Did you want to say anything
further?
General Twining. He brought up a point about the Chiefs
and our split decision. I will explain now what it means. /
can tell you that since I have been Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, we have passed on over 2300 papers, and of
those 2300, over 2300 papers we passed on, 34 were split
decisions, that that is about a 1.5% roughly and I think
that is pretty good business.
Mx. Weis'. Well, yes.
General Twining. Of course those were major decisions, I
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b438 must say.
(:) Mr. Weis/. Yes, but the 2300 things that you passed on
didn't concern the vital questions like the B-70, the airborne
(:) alert, the Polaris program: the acceleration of the Atlas
program and so forth. Thosewere the important things, weren't
they?
General Twining. They were quite basic.
Mr. Weisl. And that is where the splits were.
General Twining. Some of them were basic, that is right.
Those are the ones.
Mr. Weisl. The modernization of the Army, the moderniza-
tion of the Navy. That is Where the splits occurred.
General Twining. I don't think it is a split on moderni-
zation of the Army. It is just a question of priority of funds,
getting the money for it. I think we all realize that the
Army should be modernized.
Mr. Weisl. The recommendation as to the speed of the
modernization was denied to the Army, the recommendation of
the Chief of Staff of both General Taylor and General Lemnitzer
as to the requirements for speed of modernization was denied.
General Twining. Well, the speed: the rate may be.
Mr. Weisl. The rate?
General Twining. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weisl. Now may we go to another subject, General
Twining?
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bd39 Secretary Gates testified before the Subcommittee of
(:) the committee
Senator Stennis. Pardon me just a minute, Mr. Counsel,
yo l are running overtime but I think this has been very, very
illuminating testimony.
I will yield to you five minutes of my time if you will
proceed now and you can round off your questioning in five
minutes, please.
Mr. Weisl. Secretary Gates testified, and I quote:
"There was a significant matter brought up by Mx. Dulles,
and it was brought out by General Twining. Heretofore we have
been giving you intelligence figures that dealt with the
theoretical Soviet capability. This is the first time that we
have had an intelligence estimate that says This is what the
Soviet Union probably will dou.
Therefore the great divergence based on figures that have
ben testified to in years past narrows because we talked before
about a different set of comparisons, ones that were based
on Soviet capabilities. The present one is an intelligence
estimate on what we believe he probably will do, not what he is
capable of doing.
3Mr. Mahon. That is what you are doing this year?
"Secretary Gates, Yes, it is a very significant
charge.
Now then, on the same subject within a few days you stated
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bd40 as follows:
On the basis of my own personal knowledge of the
national intelligence estimate for this yeax I can inform
this committee that there was nothing new introduced in
the principles followed."
How do you reconcile these two statements?
Secretary Gates saying there was a significant
change and you are saying that on your personal knowledge of
the national intelligence estimate, "1 can inform this
committee there was nothing new introduced in the principles
followed"?
General Twining. I don't want to confuse these problems
any more than they, but what I would like to say is that he
was re:cox:ring to a specific item, and what I was saying was
intelligence has not been changed, the way we put out
intelligence, make it up and distribute it has not been
changed.
How what happened? Every single good intelligence man
wants to give the military planner the most accurate information
he can About the enemy: so he gives him the best he can, and
that degree of help is how much input he has into his intelli-
gence.
Now we had very little information on the ICEMprogram
of the Russians, for example.
I dont want to get into security, but I want to say this:
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bd41 The intelligence thing has not been changed at al/.
(:) This year we had more evidence, more specific evidence in which
C
we can refine our judgment on what the Russians have.
Last year we didn't have that much information, that is
all. We have more specific evidence this year. We formed
a deduction on how many missiles he is going to have or express
a judgment, a course of action he might take, that is the
point.
Mr. Weisl. -,Cf that statement is correct, has the
kett,uwA,4
intelligence-sto,Qmaimpt narrowed the difference without going
into numbers?
Let us be specific; what did you say? I didn't hear
your answer.
General Twining. I think that is a question we ought to
thrash it out and I don't want to start it here if we can't
finish it.
Mr. Weisl. The statement was made in public by the
Secretary.
Genera/ Twining. I agree with his statement. That is
as much as I will say here. I will agree with his statement.
Mr. Weisl. That the number was narrowed.
General Twining. I agree with his statement.
Mr. Weis'. And I quote the statement made by the Secretary:
This new intelligence estimate has narrowed the
differences." Do you agree with that?
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bd42 General Twining. Yes, in a particular field.
Mr.Weisl. Let us be specific without going into nuMbers.
Let us compare the current estimates without going into nuMbers
of Soviet ICBMs on launchers with those of last year in
mid-60?
General Twining. We had no estimates on launcher last
year.
Mr. Weisl. What about mid-60 of this year?
General Twining. / have got to get them.
Mr. Weisl. Would you say under oath that it is narrowed?
General Twining. Yes.
Mx. Weisl. You say that under oath?
General Twining. From the intelligence we have. Now you
may have some special intelligence that I don?t know about.
/ am stating this compared to the intelligence we had last
year and that I personally gave these committees and the
intelligence we have this year that I personally gave the
committees, it has been narrowed.
Mr. Weisl. For missiles on launchers.
General Twining. For ICBMs.
Mr. Weisl. ICBMs for missiles on launchers.
General Twining. As I said before, last year we did not
list missiles on launchers in my intelligence.
Mr. Weisl. IsrOt that the significant thing?
General Twining. It is, but we didn't know it. We didn?t
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bd43 have it.
(:) Mr. Weisl. We did have them last year and we had them
this year, unless you get different briefings from the CIA
(:) than this committee got.
General Twining. I have my charts of last year. I have
then all, and I gave no figures on launchers last year, and
I had one set of figures, and this year we have the same.
Mr. Weisl. You say the save thing about '61, that it
is narrowed?
General Twining. As I said, I am getting in a bad spot
hero because you can't air this out without putting charts
out and the whole business.
(2) Mr. Weis/. Yes, I know.
General Twining. And I don't like to discuss it.
Mr. Weisl. The Secretary has testified publicly that it
C
has narrowed. We have heard evidence also from the CIA.
General Twining. Al/ right, and he meant that, and he
will show you when he comes up here in executive session,
he will have to show it in executive session, what these charts
are.
You can show what you have got and let's straighten this
thing out. I am very anxious to get it straightened out,
I don't think we can do it here.
Mr. Weisl. How are we to learn about it? The public haste
been told that its narrowed. We have received evidence from the
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C/A in closed session. I am not asking you to give numbers:
but I an asking you whether there has been any intelligence
estimate that indicates that the relative position of missiles
on launchers by the Soviet Union and ourselves has narrowed
from last year.
General Twining. We didn't have an estimate on launchers
/ast year, and it is just very difficult to explain it without
getting into security problem. I would like to straighten it
out I assure you.
Mr. Weisl. You would like to straighten it out?
General Twining. Yes, but not here. The Secretaty is also
prepared to do this.
Mr. Weisl. I can tell you that we did get those figures
last year and this year.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, will counsel yield
for a question?
Mr. Weisl. Certainly.
Senator Symington. Did you see before you came before
this committee on the 19th of January that you know of the new
Central Intelligence Agency estimates of what the soviets
had on launchers?
General Twining. I think we have the list.
Senator Symington. On the 19th of January. Are you
saying that on the 29th of January that the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency did not estimate that they had
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more of these missiles on launchers this year than last year
for mid-1960, mid-1961 and mid-1962? This could be answered
by your assistant because he sat here When Mr. Dulles gave
us the testimony.
General Twining. Last year there was no CIA estimate
of on-launcher.
Senator Symington. I didn't say that. I said when you
came before the Committee on January 19, 1960, did you know
the Central Intelligence estimates of what was on launchers
last year and now what was on launchers this year?
General Twining. I didn't know what was on launcher last
year, no.
Senator Symington. That was the evidence that was
presented to us by the Director of Central Intelligence this
year, on January 29.
General Twining. We have never had that in the Defense
Del?artment,
Senator Symington. You mean the information that the
Director of the CIA gave this committee has never been in
the Defense Department?
General Twining. I know the chart you refer to, Senator,
but we didn t have it until this thing broke. We didn't know
about it.
Senator Symington. I just want to be sure in your interest
that what you are stating is then that the information that was
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given us on the 29th of January as to what were on launchers
estimated for last year that you did not know about in the
Department of Defense; is that correct?
General Twining. As to on launcher last year, the answer
is nos I did not know.
Senator Symington. Do you have a representative on the
national intelligence agency board?
General Twining. Yes,
Senator Symington. Thank, you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stennis. Ail right, this is a special situation.
You have used up the chair's time too: which is all right.
There is one more question.
General Twining. I think it is very important that this be
straightened out and we can't straighten it out here. That
is my point. That is all I have got to say.
Mr. Weisl. I don't want to ask a question. I just want
Captain Gray to look at his own handwriting showing hie
attendance at the session when Mr. Dulles briefed this Com-
mittee and then advise General Twining.
Captain Gray. With the Chair's permission I will do this.
Senator Stennis. All righto we will proceed in the regular
order, gentlemen. We will come back to that, gentlemen; as I
say, counsel was permitted to go over considerably in his
time but it was an important matter.
Senator Saltonstall?
Senator Saltonstall, Mr. Chairman, I have just come in
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and I prefer to hold my questions until latex. I simply want
to make this observation, that I think that some of this secret
information that was given to us in the most secret sections has
been leaked to the newspapers and questions have been asked,
I have just heard questions asked of General Twining, who
said that he did not want to answer them in open session, and
then there was persistence. I think that is very wrong. I
hope that General Twining in open session will stand on his
rights and not give away any military secrets or make any state-
ment that he thinks is derogatory to the security of the
United States.
I will support him and I am confident every member of
this committee will support him, and in executive session he
can make what statements he believes.
But I resent tremendously the security that has been
leaked to the newspapers in recent weeks, and which I think is
dangerous to our country, and is derogatory to our military
officials.
Senator Stennis. The Chair was following those questions
very closely indeed, and it is very clear to the Chair that
Counsel was not trying to require the witness to disclose
(:) figures. In fact, counsel insisted that he was not calling
for figures all the time. I think General Twining -- may I
have your attention, gentlemen?
I don't know how far this is going. I think the General
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had a good point too, being careful that he not disclose
these figures, and he handled himself very well indeed.
At the same time it is of concern to the committee about whether
or not the Chiefs of Staff have the! full figures before them and
Whether or not the correct figures have been given here. The
acting chairman has no sympathy whatsoever with disclosing figures
anywhere near the borderline of security and he thinks we overdo
it.
I don't know where those figures come from. I used to
think that maybe some members of the committee or the staff might
gve them out, but I have changed my mind. I don't believe
they come from those sources. I mean I never did accuse any
individual, but we come in here and have these briefings, and
then a few days later what purports to be the figures show up
in the paper and I can't understand it. I don't know where it
comes from but I think the General has made his points well, and
at the same time it is my impression that counsel was certainly
w;:thin the limits of the examination.
If the committee wants to go into executive session, why
I will be certainly glad to.
Senator Saltonstall. I appreciate that.
Senator Stennis. The Chair will not rule that he has
to disclose anything that he doesn't want to in open session.
Senator Symington.
Senator Symington. Mx. Chairman, I too regret very much
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bvd 49 as the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts does
that figures have been given to the newspaper, and I would
hope -- I am sure that everybody else. regrets that very
much.
I have seen four lists of figures by four different
people. All those Uses were wrong, as against what is given
this committee. In general they underrate the Soviet capacity,
those lists and they overrate our own. I too am very sorry
that they have been given.
General Twining I have here a statement. General well
D. Taylor, retired Chief of Staff of the Army: told the Senate
hearing this week that the Chiefs of Staff instead of being
able to consider free world needs, have been frozen in their
thinking by fixed budget percentages of the defense dollar
made avaiLeble to each of the Services.
Do you agree to that?
General Twining. Hot entirely. The budgets have been,
as we all know, they have been fairly rigid percentagewise
to the various services because of the missions the services
had, the expense of equipment andell that. But I don't think
it is complete/v stereotyped. He may have a point, sure, yes.
Senator Symington. Another statement has been made.
In the past two or three years the Service Chiefs have
been authorized to include a list of what they consider most
essential for their weapons, at a cost not to exceed half a
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bd50 billion dollars as a possible addition. This has given them
(:) a chance to list projects they consider essential that cannot
be undertaken within the present budgetary limitations.
(:) Is that correct?
General Twining. We had one exercise where something
like that was done, yes.
Senator Symington. These presentations have been ineffec-
tive in the main, is that correct?
General Twining. I wouldn't say that, no, six.
Senator Symington. Then the statement continues:
"The speed up of the Atlas Intercontinental program during
the past two years was denied, although production could have
been doubled."
(:)
Is that correct?
General Twining. Production could have been greater than
it was, there is no question about that, yes.
Senator Symington. This would have lessened the Soviet
advantage in the missile gap during the critical next few
years."
General Twining. We could have had more missiles.
Senator Symington. Thank you, General. The statement
then is made: "The reasons were budgetary, a desire to wait
(:) fox the as yet undeveloped and much cheaper solid propellant
Minuteman Intercontinental Missile.
(2) "Today it is claimed that since the lead time on the Atlas
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bd51 not for missiles but for preparation of sites and training
of crews is 2 years and the Minuteman should be available
by mid-1963 there is no need now to increase Atlas production.
This evades the fact that the Minuteman is yet to be per-
fected and that the expected date of readiness is only a hope."
Is that correct?
General Twining. I think that is true. T think Genera/
Schriever testified to that.
Senator Symington. Now last May 20th, "Asked about his
recommendations on the 3-70 bomber it was stated We
questioned the use of a new bomber when we and presumably our en-
emy would have converted to principally a missile capability.
We questioned whether by the time the B-70 could be developed,
we would be preparing for the kind of warfare that it would be
capable of carrying on.'"
Inasmuch as that statement was made by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget last May 20, doesn't that imply that
the decision was a budgetary decision on the 3-70?
General Twining. No, sir, I don't think so because we
were discussin te 3-70 right up to the close of budget time.
Senator Symington. Then the statement is made: "From
the Air Force point of view, the United States may never know
where all the targets for strategic attack axe, and missiles
(:) cannot be shot at those targets that are not known. But
a bomber capable of evading hostile defenses can find hidden
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targets such as missile launching sites and destroy them.
The Air Force is convinced of the continued need therefore
/br a small number of bombers, but for bombers of much greater
performance than the present subsonic craft that can penetrate
the formidable modern air defenses."
Would you agree with that?
General Twining. I think that statement has a lot of
merit.
Senator Symington. Then it is stated: The Air Force
tried to keep the B-70 program alive first by reducing the
amount spent on the B-58 program and then by eliminating entire-
ly the F-1081 the new supersonic long-range fighter, but these
savings failed to save the B-70."
Would you agree with that?
General Twining. Well, I agree with the first part, and
still dont think the 2-70 is lost.
Senator Symington. You said that it took until 1967
to get it if we went full speed ahead?
General Twining, I think that is pretty close.
Senator Symington. And previous testimony is 1965.
Which do you think is the right one?
General Twining. I hope 1965, but my experience has been
it generally takes a little longer than you think.
Senator Symington. That is pretty much true for all these
weapons, isn't it?
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bd53 General Twining. That is right.
Senator Symington. And if we delay now further, why then
it will be just that much farther probably based on the cycle
just that much more obsolete, will it not?
General Twining. That is correct.
Senator Symington . Or Obsolescent.
General Twining. I do want you to understand that all these
points were presented strongly by the Aix Force, and they had
a good hearing1 and the people had a lot of problems besides
purely defense, and the Air Force business felt maybe we should
go a little slower, I just want you to understand that.
senator Symington. Was that the reason that you opposed
General White's position?
General Twining. On the 13-70?
Senator Symington. Yes, sir.
General Twining. I never opposed his position on the
0-70.
Senator Symington. Captain, will you come here please,
Captain Gray?
Senator Jackson asked a question.
General Twining. Well, it depends at what stage of the
(:) proceedings you anatalking here now. Initially of course, I
would be for it 100%, but when all things came out --
Senator Symington. Were you for it for military reasons?
General Twining. Yes.
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d54 Senator Symington. Then you supported it? It is not
going ahead. You couldn't have had any other reason but budget-
ary reasons, could you?
General Twining. It is a very expensive weapons system.
There are a lot of unknowns in it. I hate to see the delay in
it certainly, but I think it is probably pretty good to take a
look at it this year.
Senator Symington. Can we say then that you did feel
because of its cost after it was turned down that you had to
differ with General White, and therefore oppose it as Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs? Isn t that a fair statement?
Genera/ Twining. I think that is a fair statement.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I want to put out that
on high authority, I am going to present a statement to the
committee on very high authority: the statement has been made
that the B-70, the cancellation of the B-70 was not on the
basis of budgetary considerations. My time is up. I have
some more questions. I will wait my turn. I would like to ask
just one more.
Senator Stennis. All right, proceed.
Senator Symington. It is true, is it not, that as of today
in the United States Air Force there is not a single plane:
fighter or bomber, under research and development?
General Twining. I think that is right, sir:
except the B-70, this airplane is still going ahead on a
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bd55 high-powered research problem.
Senator Symington. My final question adding to it --
Genera: Twining. Not a weapons system.
0
0
Senator Symington. That any advantages in breaking the heat
barrier on the 8-70 could be immediately interpreted into all
other airplanes for the Air Force, for the Naval Air, for commer-
cial air, could they not?
General Twining. That is correct.
Senator Symington. Thank you, General.
Senator Stennis. Senator Wiley, you have 10 minutes.
Senator Wiley. General Twining, I am not a military man.
/ am not a man versed in aircraft or in ships, but I was
interested in a statement that you made, and I think we Should
spend a little time, because you intimated that the military
p,:ofessional, and that means one in each of these classes, is
never satisfied with the forces at his command. You repeat
that, do you?
General Twining. Yes. I think that is around the world.
Senator Wiley. You also made the statement that you
believe that we have enough military strength today, and /
stress today, to carry out our assigned missions, and I believe
that our combined American leadership will see to it that we
continue to have enough. You have faith in that state?
General Twining. Very much faith.
Senator Wiley. Now then, when we talk about a threat of war,
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bd56 we axe all thinking in terms of the Kremlin, are we not?
(:) We are not talking so much about limited war.
General Twining. That is correct.
Senator Wiley. As wa axe about the overall war?
(:)
General Twining. That's right, general war.
Senator Wiley. I think Admiral Burke made a very profound
statement. He said that we had in his judgment at present
adequate military deterrence, but he said the other deterrents
are more significant than the military. Do you agree with
that?
General Twining. 1 do.
Senator Wiley. Can you enumerate these other deterrents,
why the Kremlin would not let the balloon go up? gust why
wouldnit it and what are the deterrents outside of the so-
called military deterrents?
General Twining. Well, I think the Kremlin feels that
they are doing a pretty good job without the military operations.
They are moving around the world pretty freely doing about
What they want in accomplishing programs.
think that is one area that Admiral Burke was talking
about.
Senator Wiley. would a world war Mean the destruc-
tion of both the contending forces or nations?
General Twining. I certainly think that Russia, the people
of Russia have been through wars. They have had their country
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bd57 completely ruined, like just recently in the last war.
(:) think the last thing they want, even less than we do,
is to have their beautiful country hit again with bombs and
(:) terrible weapons of destruction.
Senator Wiley. You are talking about the 200 million
Russian people, aren't you?
General Twining. That is right.
Senator Wiley. The common people of Russia?
General Twining. That is right. They are very proud of
their country and they are building it up at a great rate as
me all know. I was there in 1956 and / was greatly impressed
with what they showed us, and they axe so eager to show us
(:) what they were building, what they were doing.
For instance, Stalingrad, we thought when we went down
there we were going to hear about the battle of Stalingrad:
all about what went on there. We heard practically nothing
about that, but we certainly heard plenty about the master
plan for the rebuilding of the city and they took us all over
and showed it to us.
They dont act like they are ready to jump on the United
States.
(:) Senator Wiley. Well, what do you say about the captive
nations? Do you think that that is a deterrent force? In
(:) other words, that the Kremlin or the men in the Kremlin
IVO 1NIII
General Twining. We are getting into politics, Senator
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bd58 Wiley: and that is a little over my head: but I certainly think
their captive nations would be a questiondble thing in the
case of a showdown. Their loyalty might be quite questionable.
Senator Wiley. In other words, we are talking about Poland:
Czechoslovakia: Bulgaria, the Baltic States and so forth,
is that right?
General Twining. That's correct.
Senator Wiley. Well, do you suppose that our allies
crnstitute a deterrent?
General Twining. Our allies constitute a great deterrent.
This collective security-is what-we base our military posture
on, and that is part of the deterrent definitely.
Senator Wiley. Have you been reading lately about the
difference between Mao Tse-Tung and Khrushchev over Khrushchev's
visit to Inida?
General Twining. I have been reading some of it, yes,
sir.
Senator Wiley. Well, do you think that 650 million, it
will soon be a billion Chinese on the south of Siberia is also
a matter that Khrushchev would have to consider?
General Twining. He might some day, yes.
Senator Wiley. What is that?
General Twining. He might, yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. Now would you mind briefly in the few
minutes that I have left telling us what our military deterrent
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d59 consists of, because we had yesterday an enumeration of a
great nuMber of airplanes and also our Navy and so forth.
would like to get that briefed so that today at least we
can have a little answer to what we have had so far, because
heretofore we have had evidence in cross-examination to the
efect that there has been a lack in the men who are supposed
to handle the job.
Let's put it this way. What is the percentage that the
Navy gets, the Army gets and the Air Force gets of the budget?
Have you got that?
General Twining. The Air Force is now getting the highest
percentage. I haven't got the exact figures with me, but
(:) it is about 18 billion roughly to about 11 to out nine, Air
Force, Navy, Army. That Is roughly the percentage, the $41
bfalion budget.
Senator Wiley. When the general military group like
yourself get together, and you take, for instance, the billions
that each one of these forces get, then it is up to that
particular force to determine how they are going to use those
bills1 or is it up to the Secretary or what?
General Twining. The money is created during the budget
cycle according to the needs of the services, the weapons
systems they have to buy and the people they have to provide
for and all of that, and the money comes out at the end to
provide for, for instance -- for instance the Army's carrying
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bd60 out their mission. Then within that once the budget is set
O: course the Army bas to live within that budget for that
yaar.
If it has some new requirements they have to come back
in the way of supplemental as you know to get more money.
Senator Wiley. You said "I have the responsibility as
Caairman of the Chief of Staff to advise the Secretary of
Defense, the National Security Council and the President of my
oan views."
General Twining. That is correct, sir, and I do.
Senator Wiley. So it isn't just a Chief of Staff. It is
the Secretary of Defense, the President and the National
Security Council, all of which consider the disposition of the
funds that Congress votes.
General Twining. That is correct, and I attend the Security
Council as advisor to the Secretary of Defense when the Security
Council meets, and I am free there to voice an opinion.
Senator Wiley. I think that Is all.
Senator Stennis. The Acting Chairman read in the morning
papers that the Senator from Massachusetts was going to have
to be in conference at the White House advising the President, and
the Chair therefore knows for that sole reason the Senator was
a little late.
Senator Saltonstall. That is correct.
Senator Stennis. So the Chair takes the liberty with the
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bd61 permission of the committee to recognize the Senator from
(:) Massachusetts out of order.
Senator Saltonstall. I thank the Acting Chairman. He is
(:) as courteous and always polite and always thoughtful.
General Twining, while 1 missed much of your preliminary
stiinents I have a general knowledge of your position from
other hearings. I would like to ask just one question, and
/ appreciate the courtesy of the Chair. You stated that the
B-70 research was going forward but not as fast as recommended
by the Air Force or that the Aix Force would like?
General Twining. That is right, sir.
Senator Saltonstall. That is a fair statement, is it not?
General Twining. The Air Force would like to have a whole
weapons system developed with all the components, which is
quite different from what it has.
Senator Saltonstall. Isn?t it true there is research going
forward on a number of projects of intense value to our
security if they are perfected, and the problem is in the over-
all Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the Defense Department, is to
decide whether to make a selection, and then proceed with that
more fully as in the weapons system of the B-70, and if that
was done, it would mean the elimination of some of the other
research projects, or to decide to go forward with more of the
research projects in their preliminary stages, and then make
a decision to drop some and concentrate on the ones that they
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bd62 may decide on?
Genera/ Twining. That is right.
Senator Saltonstall. Like the B-70.
General Twining. That is right, to keep taking a new look
at these things as you go along.
Senator Saltonstall. Isn't that the problem and isn't
that the fundamental reason why the decision was made to keep
the B-70 going forward with these other projects, with the
money available, and with the men available and the space and
the research facilities: rather than to make a selection at this
time of the B-70, and drop some of the other projects, and
concentrate on them?
General Twining. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Saltons tall. And that was one of the fundamental
bases of the decision, was it not?
General Twining. That is correct.
Senator Stennis. I thank the Senator. Without going back
into the subject unless someone wishes to / think the following
quotation from the public record will clear up the situation.
A few minutes ago when Mr. Weisl was questioning General
Twining, the Chair thought the counsel's questions were proper
even in open session, as long as the General did not go into
figures based upon the following consideration.
In open hearings or at least in testimony that has been
cleared and has been printed in the public record, the
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bd63 Subcommittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives,
Secretary Gates testifying in this year at page 24: referring
to these intelligence estimates makes this statement:
(:) "This new intelligence estimate has narrowed the differ-
ences."
Then later Secretary Gates sent in the following state-
ment:
"It has been stated on previous occasions that the Soviet
superiority in ICBMs could be in the order of 3 to 1 in the
period of 1960 to '63. This statement was based upon the
estimate of what the USSR could produce in numbers of missiles
and was not an affirmative statement of the fact that the USSR
would produce the number of missiles required to attain this
superiority."
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, what is this?
Senator Stennis. This is from Secretary Gates testimony
before the House Committee on Appropriations of the approximate
date of aanuary 1960. The rest of that sentence quoting from
the Secretary:
"On the basis of our current intelligence estimate, which
has been presented to the committee by the Director of Central
(:) Intelligence Agency, we do not now believe that the Soviet
superiority in ICBMs will be as great as that previously
estimated."
Now that being a pUblic statement was why the Chair thought
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bd64 that the Counsel was within his rights in examining the
General as long as this committee did not require the General
to give any figures, and that was the matter we had up a while
ago and I thought that had a place in the record at this
time:
May we proceed now in regular order? Senator Cannon?
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I am interested in this
subject. May I make one observation?
Senator Stennis. Certainly.
Senator Symington. I am very glad the Chair read that
statement because based on the testimony given us by Mr. Dulles,
the Soviet launching capability willbe greater than what he
said he estimated it was last year.
That is why this situation has got into the condition
that it is in now.
Senator Stennis. Unless there is further comment from
the members we will return to the regular order. Senator
Cannon, you have 10 minutes.
Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Generals yesterday Admiral Burke stated that in his
opinion the greatest threat in the next 4 or 5 years was the
prospect of limited wars. Do you share that view?
General Twining. I think it is pretty hard to say that;
limited wars are certainly a real threat like the thing we
are talking dbout. I think it is hard to say which is more
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b465 likely to happen but in general I think he is right, yes.
(:) Senator Cannon. In general you think the greatest threat
would come from limited wars. Now are we making as adequate
(:) preparations for limited type wars as we are for a general
all out war?
General Twining. I think our preparations fox limited
war are adequate, yes.
Senator Cannon. You say you think they axe adequate?
General Twining. Yes.
Senator Cannon. I wonder then if you would take
issue with this statement from General Lemnitser: "The
Defense Department is woefully andhopelessly unprepared for
(:) the type of emergency airlift it might require."
General Twining. I think he has exaggerated that a little
bit. Certainly we donut have all the airlift that the Army
would like to have and all the airlift we would like to
have.
We would like to have the airlift more modern too. We
do have lots of airlift and I think we can handle the situa-
tion.
Senator Cannon. Is it your view that we have adequate
airlift for the type of emergency situations in limited wars
that we might conceivably foresee within the next 3 or 4
years?
General Twining. We have, as our studies show, we have
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adequate airlift for the general war situation.
In the limited wax situation we do have some problem
areas, and I recall one not long ago of a limited war in
Korea while we were mobilizing at the same time at home. There
was an indication that the first 20 days we were going to
be short in some of our lift. We can take some administrative
action, getting the craft in sooner and relieve it somewhat,
but of course it all depends on what the requirement is.
Now we couldn't move all the Army divisions at one time
of course. We couldn't move 3 Army divisions at one time but
we could move some of the advanced echelons.
Senator Cannon. You did show you would be short in the
first 20 days, is that right?
General Twining. That is right.
Senator Cannon. And the first 20 days of course would
very likely be the critical period?
General Twining. That is correct.
Senator Cannon. I am wondering then if you agree with
Mr. Mahon who made the statement that lack of an adequate
airlift is one of the weakest links in our defense chain?
General Twining. NO, I don't go that far.
Senator Cannon. You don't believe that that is our weakest
link. What do you believe is our weakest link then?
Genera/ Twining. I don't think we have a real weak link.
We have a lot of things we would like to have certainly, and
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bd67 this airlift has been one of the problems that has vexed us
for years and I think and / hope that we will get some improved
airlift, modernize the fleet more than we have done, and we
should do it.
Senator Cannon. Do you think that more should be done in
that direction than is being done at the present moment?
General Twining. I do c yes.
Senator Cannon. You do agree that more should be done
toward modernizing the fleet?
General Twining. That?s right.
Senator Cannon. And providing additional airlift.
General Twining. The fleet is getting kind of old now as
you know.
Senator Cannon. Now getting back to this all out war
proposition and this so-called air alert, General, does the
money in the budget for the on the shelf air alert capability
provide for a 24 hour continuous air alert capability at
some future time?
General Twining. I cangt give the number but not for a
fourth but for a limited number of aircraft, yes.
Senator Cannon. Be sure you understand my question
there. Does it provide for a continuous 24 hour alert capabil-
ity at some future time for a portion of the SAC forces?
General Twining. For one year, yes, for a very limited
portion though, not anything like General Power wants.
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bd68 Senator Cannon. I think that General Power stated if
I remember correctly in open session, he testified to about
one-eighth, but this is simply to get it in a position to go
on an air alert and not to actually carry out that capability
for any continuous period of time. Do you agree with that?
General Twining. That's right, an air alert I feel should
be something that you have a capability of doing and you use
it when you want to do it.
Senator Cannon. I think that Genera/ Power stated in open
session that he estimated it would take about 600 million to
get SAC in a condition to carry out a continuous air alert
with the requirements that he foresaw.
Now as I understand the budget, there is 20 million
this year and 90 million next year for this so-called on the
shelf capability, is that correct?
General Twining. I think it is a little bit more than
that. I think this year the '61 budget is some 91 million and
I believe in '60 they have about the equivalent of pretty close
to 100 million. We can get those figures, but it is more
than you have stated.
The whole bill is about $200 million.
Senator Cannon. Over a 2 year period.
General Twining. That is right, '60-61.
Senator Cannon. / see, and that would provide for the on
the shelf capability?
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bd69 General Twining. The on the shelf capability, yes,
sir.
572
Senator Cannon. General Power also stated that he believed
this danger would be the greatest within the next few years.
That is the necessity for the air alert while our additional
missile capability was coming into being. Do you share that
view?
General Twining. That looks Like you could take that
point, but I still think with our forces and the way they are
deployed and set up, that we are not going to have that
deterrent gap in there.
There is a time of relative difference in numbers of
ICBMs between the two countries I would say, yes.
Senator Cannon. Would you say it is the time of the lowest
position insofar as our deterrent capability is concerned,
the next 3 or 4 years?
General Twining. Well, it might be.
Senator Cannon. Do you think it would be?
General Twining. It could be, yes.
Senator Cannon. I think that was the testimony of a
number of people.
General Twining. Yes.
Senator Cannon. Who have appeared before us. As a
matter of facto General Power said that he foresaw the
maximum period of need for an air alert to extend perhaps fox
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bd70 five years. As I recall, General Taylor said -- General
(:) White rather said he thought the maximum need would go through
possibly 1963. Now do you agree that General Power's theory
(:) of an air alert would cost approximately 600 million this
year, and one billion a year thereafter for such time as we
needed to keep it in effect?
General Twining. I think that is pretty close.
Senator Cannon. Now if General White was correct in his
analysis that we would need it in his opinion through 1963:
then we would be talking here about figures of 600 million for
the '61 budget and a billion for the '62 and a billion for
the '63, is that correct, a total of a little less than $3
billion?
General, donut you believe that that is a pretty good
life insurance policy for this country for that amount of
money?
General Twining. Sure it is a good life insurance policy,
but I think the other, the on the shelf capability is just about
as effective, and if I was in need of the cash I would put
that money in some other programs than a full airborne alert, I
think something else of high priority.
Senator Cannon. What programs would you put it in?
General Twining. I would put it in an offensive weapons
system of some kind.
Senator Cannon. Well, what kind?
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bd71 General Twining. More missiles.
Senator Cannon. You would put it in more missiles?
General Twining. Yes. As I say: you don't need it but if
/ had to spend it that would not be my first priority.
Senator Cannon. You said you would put it in more
missiles. I think General Schriever testified if we started
doing something now we couldnt bring any more missiles into
the inventory until the end of 062 or early '63.
General Twining. That is correct, but my point is if I had
to spend the money / think that would be a better investment
than going to a full airborne alert, that is all.
I wouldn't advise the missile business.
Senator Cannon. When you say the full airborne alert.
General Twining. That General Power wants.
Senator Cannon. That is General Power's recommendation.
General Twining. Yes: sir.
Senator Cannon. What other areas would you put that
little less than $3 billion in?
General Twining. I would like to have it go into Polaris
or the Minuteman? speed them up. As I say again I don't
advise it but if I had to spend the money -- in other words,
we end up with this, we have nothing for this $3 billion
you are talking about. By my system I don't think we are
going to get like a lot of people do so I say put this in
an offensive weapons system so When you end up the period you
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bd72 have something for your 3 or 4 or 5 billion dollars. When you
end up with the air alert you have nothing but some wornout
airplanes.
Senator Cannon. But you have some trained crews and
air alert in the meantime?
General Twining. That is correct.
Senator Cannon. Prepared to make a strike if a surprise
attack is made against us and if a surprise attack is made
against us and those airplanes are on the ground, they are
no good to us axe they, General?
General Twining. That's right. We don't want to get
caught on the ground.
Senator Cannon. Now General Taylor made this statement
before the committee, and I would like to get your views on it:
General. He said: "Meanwhile the trend of relative military
strength is against us. Our manned bomber force is a dwindling
military asset."
With the present program of the manned bomber force do you
consider that to be a dwindling military asset?
General Twining. / certainly don't. It has, it is going
up through 1963 in numbers. I disagree heartily on that.
Senator Cannon. General Taylor said "Our long-range
missile force is limited in size/ uncertain in reliability
and immobile upon exposed bases." Do you agree with that?
General Twining. I think part of it is right. We don't
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bd73 have the hardening completed, but our plan is to harden these
miesiles and they will be well protected and as far as reliability
goes, I think they are proving out very well, much better than
we hoped for.
Senator Cannon. There is no question but what it is limited
in size and immobile upon exposed bases at the present timee
isn't that true, General?
General Twining. At this moment, yes.
Senator Cannon. General Taylor also stated "We have no
antimissile defense in being or in sight. There is no effec-
tive fall out protection for our civil population."
Do you agree with that statement?
General Twining. I do at the moment.
Senator Cannon. General Taylor also made some recommenda-
tions for immediate measures that we might take, and I will
read them to you.
He stated: "We can improve our readiness for limited
war by better use of our existing resources. We can at least
partially offset the missile gap by using Jupiter as a mobile
field weapon as it was intended, by an airborne alert for
part of SAC, and by the initiation of a simple fall out
protection program for our civil population."
Do you agree with those views, General?
General Twining. No, I don't agree with all of them.
/ don't think Jupiter by any stretch of the imagination can be
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bd74 called a mobile weapon. That is Number one. Ifyou have
seen them you can see that they are pretty big. In this day
and age we have to have a weapon of less weight, the Pershing
is very good. The Army is building Pershing. The other one
on shelters, I don't think that is really a military problem.
That is something that we have an organization in the
Administration to look after that, and they are studying
that now and there is a lot of thought being put on the
shelter program, but it is just not that simple to say let's
build a shelter program and build one. It is going to take a
lot of thinking.
Senator Cannon. And you have already answered the one on air-
borne alert so I tak it you don't agree with any part of his
views then as to What we might do at present.
Thank you very much, General.
Genera/ Twining. I don't want to give the opinion that /
don't think highly of General Taylor.
I think he is a wonderful officer. I served with him for
four years on the Joint Staff and he is a most outstanding
individual.
But he is very dedicated on these things. He has written
his book. He thinks highly of them and he had his chance
in the JCS to expound on them, also the Secretary of Defense
and the President of the United States he went to with his
problems and some of the committees of Congress, and they
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bd75 weren't bought and / think that he is entitled to his ideas,
but I just don't buy them and I don 7t think the others
do either.
Senator Stennis. All right, Senator Martin, you have 10
minutes.
Senator Martin, General Taylor, in your prepared state-
ment you made the statement:
81n analyzing our posture versus that of an enemy,
we utilized national intelligence of the highest degree of
sensitivity."
And again later on down in the statement you made
this statement:
"Our planning process is continuous as is our intelligence
process."
Now from those statements I gather that you have access
to al/ intelligence reports that are available to other
members of the Armed Services?
General Twining. Yes, sir.
Senator Martin. Doyou have access to all intelligence
reports that are available to Mr Dulles and his organization?
General Twining. I think that we have access to every
single thing that is being done in an intelligence way for
the security of this country.
1 am sure of it.
Qict fls
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fls bd75 Senator Martin. And following those two statements you
C
make this statement, which I think is very important:
"1 believe that we have enough military strength today
to carry out our assigned missions."
General Twining, Yes, sir.
Senator Martin. I have considerable confidence in your
judgment in the matter without trying to pick to pieces the
various fragments of your thinking and approach to that
conclusion.
I also agree very strongly with this statement, and it
has been my own Observation through my lifetime that the
military professional is never satisfied with the forces at
his command. I have tried to bear that in mind during the
entire hearings we have had here.
Now these intelligence reports that you rely upon do
change frequently and quite extensively, do they not?
General Twining. Yes.
Senator Martin. And a person can be well primed on
intelligence reports one month and may be out of date one
month or six months later, ish2t that true?
General Twining. It could be, and they do change quite
frequently, some of them.
Senator Martin. I hope out of these hearings we do not
create the impression that Congress is getting away from its
role for creating and maintaining our forces.
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I hope that we do not undertake to Interfere with
strategic planning and the making of taotica/ decisions.
That is my own positionc.
I just want that in the Record at this point. I have
tremendous confidence in your ability as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff m and I want to get that on the record right
now, and I commend you very highly for your statement.
General Twining. I just want to state I think that is
the greatest thing we have, and I think it is fine that the
Congress does take the interest to investigate and find out
what is going on. It is very Important to the security of
the country.
Senator Martin. It is absolutely a good program of
planning and congressional action, and as long as we do not
allow it to disturb us too much in strategic planning and
tactical decisions, it Is all to the good.
General Twining. That is right.
Senator Martin, I believe that is the spirit in which
you are taking this inquiry here today.
Senator Stennis. Thank you Senator.
Senator Bartlett, the Chair requests that because you
are not in your customary place that the Chair did not nee
you sitting here at that moment, You are recognized for
ten minutes, Senator.
Senator Bartlett. It is far from too late, Mr. Chairman.
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General Twining, with the recent publication of hearings
on the military budget before the House Appropriations
Committee, it was revealed that there is a vide, even complete
divergence of opinion between the Air Force and the Army on
the advisability or even the necessity of placing missiles
in Alaska.
Are you familiar, General, with the testimony given on
the subject before the House committee?
General Twining, I am sorry I am not, but I am quite
surprised at that, because we have just recently, as you
know, gone into this problem, and the chiefs, the Army did
not present that problem you just brought up at that time.
Senator Bartlett. In the testimony published that came
to my attention only yesterday: maybe it was published only
yesterday, the Army, through Secretary Brucker, urged that
I1B141s be placed in Alaska, and the Air Force dissented from
this conclusion, and suggested that Alaska was defensible
by the use of ICBM,s placed in the interior of the United
States.
Now General Twining, has this been a subject for
discussion and decision by the Joint Chiefs?
General Twining. Yes, it has.
Senator Bartlett, And by the Secretary of Defense?
General Twining, Yes.
Senator Bartlett, And you say the Army has not raised
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this issue within the Joint Chiefs?
General Twining. No,
Senator Bartlett, General, I believe that man is or
could be more familiar with Alaska than you are, because you
served there as Commander In Chief of the Alaskan Command
through some critical and constructive years so far as Alaska
is concerned.
I should like to ask you if it is not true, General
Twining, that the present Commander In Chief of the Alaskan
Command is an Air Force officer?
General Twining. That is correct,
Senator Bartlett. And a very distinguished, able out-
standing officer?
General Twining. Yes, sir.
Senator Bartlett. Lt. Gen, Frank A. Armstrong.
General Twining. That is correct.
Senator Bartlett, Is it not true, General Twining, that
with General Armstrong, it was General Armstrong himself
who urged in a very dramatic, unexpected public speech, that
it is Imperative not so much for the security of Alaska but
for the security of the whole United States that IBMs be
placed in the 49th state without delay?
General Twining, That Is correct, and he made that
recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Senator Bartlett. And he made it publicly: did he not?
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General Twining. Yes.
(:) Senator Bartlett. Now I am not going to say here the
number of bases in Siberia at which the Russians are said
(:) to have missile sites, although I take it that this no
special secret. It has been published even if not widely.
General, in a, statement published by the Air Force in
the House Appropriations Committee, it was said that the
Siberian situation should be taken care of by the ICBMs in
the interior of the United States. I am wondering, and I
put this to you as a question, if the United States, within
the foreseeable future, would have a sufficient number of
ICBMs to take out the Siberian bases much less accomplish
(:) other military missions, granted the number of bases there?
General Twining. Yes, sir. We will have to take out
those bases. Those bases are the closest to the United
States, and they would be very high on our target priority
system with ICBMs, or it might be with bombers when the
time came.
Senator Bartlett. Are there going to be enough ICBM1s
to do that?
General Twining. Yes, there will have to be, because
that is a very, very high priority target up there.
Senator Bartlett. I was somewhat interested, very
interested in fact by the statement presented to the House
Appropriations Committee by the Air Force on this subject,
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because it did say this is a mission for ICBMs, Only a
few months ago the Air Force said, as I recall, this Is a
mission for SAC bombers, is that correct?
General Twining, Well, it might be. They will change
as these missiles come in, the targets will be changed.
Of course up to now it has been all bombers because we
haventt had the long-range missiles, But as the missiles
come in, some of these targets will be shifted over from
the bombers to the missiles as the micsiles are ready to take
0
0
over,
Senator Bartlett. And is it not true, General Twining,
that in a public declaration General Armstrong said it will
be too late if we have to rely upon bombers coming from
Omaha or elsewhere in the interior of the United States,
because it is a matter of minutes until these missiles can
hit here, and he said this is a subject of concern not so
much for Alaska but because if war came, the enemy could then
come to Alaska and, using those fields, bomb West Coast
cities and, as I recall, he said Chicago, and then went on
to declare that at that time the President would have to make
the hard decision of whether to bomb our former bases in
Alaska then held by the Russians, or subject all the cities
in the United States to bomber attack, if the Russians chose
to unleash a fleet of bombers against us from these great
bases of ours in Alaska.
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Now General Twining, it was stated in the testimony
(:) before the House Appropriations Committee that General
Armstrong was at the recent conference at Norfolk, and the
Oimplication was that he made no complaint against the decision
reached by the Department of Defense on this matter.
Is it not true that a military judgment had been imposed
upon him, and he could go no further with this? '
General Twining. I think that is right, and I just want
to tell you that this question of placing weapons in Alaska,
intermediate range missiles or something else, is not a
closed book. I mean this is something we keep looking at
all the time,
Senator Bartlett, It is being actively considered?
(2)
General Twining. Yes, oh, yes.
Senator Bartlett, Is it true, General I have read
this, I do not know whether it is or not --
General Twining. But at the moment the decision was
made not to, and General Armstrong was notified, that. is
correct, and he could do nothing more about it.
Senator Bartlett. Is it true, do you know if you can
tell us -- I have read this -- that we have sought to station
some IFIBMIs on the land of some of our allies, and some of
(2) then are a bit reluctant to accept them?
General Twining. That is correct.
(2) Senator Bartlett, And yet here where the Commanding
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General a distinguished officers seeks them imperatively,
the decision is not to place them for the immediate protection
of the whole United States, is that right?
General Twining. That is correct.
Senator Bartlett, General Twining, one final question.
It is often said in situations like this that the Ideal
Commander always wants more, he always asks for more.
Do you think this is comparable to that? Isn't it true
that if missiles were placed there, the Commander in Chief
of the Alaskan Command* who would not be General Armstrong
his time there is coming to an end -- would have not more
and more to boss but less and less?
You have no doubt, have you, General Twining, that this
recommendation on General Armstrongs part was that of a
dedicated officer gravely concerned with the situation he
confronts across from Siberia. Will you agree with that,
General?
General Twining. Yes.
Senator Bartlett. General, we are aware of the fact,
are we not, and this has been published, that the Russians
have made tremendous developments in Siberia In military
bases, construction of airfields and surrounding sites?
General Twining. Yes, they have done a great deal of
work in Siberia.
Senator Bartlett. And is it not true that in Alaska
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during the last several years our military strength has
Obeen steadily reduced?
General Twining. It has been reduced some, yes, not too
O much though.
Senator Bartlett. And this tremendous Russian build-up
has taken place with an accelerated pace right across the
Bering Straits from Alaska. That is a matter of common
knowledge and not intelligence, is it not, General Twining?
General Twining. That is correct.
Senator Bartlett, Thank you, Mr, Chairman.
Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator.
Gentlemen, I feel sure there will be time for everyone,
Obut the Senate has gone into session, and after we have
concluded the open hearing, we will have an executive session.
We have the choice here that Mr, Allen Dulles presented
earlier, and General Twining indicated his testimony should
not be in open hearing, I think that is correct, and we will
go into that in a short session.
Senator Case, you are recognized next.
Senator Case, Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman,
I wonder if you, counsel and my colleagues and the general
will stop me from asking any questions that involve security.
I am just anxious to get as much information and opinion from
the general based upon the facts.
Senator Stennis. The Chair leaves that largely to the
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general himself. He is a better judge than the Chair is I
think on those matters.
Senator Case. This relates to the question largely
of matters whether they have or have not been discussed
previously in open or closed sessions, and my memory may
not be completely accurate about it.
It is my recollection, just in preparation for the
question, General, that General Power in open session did
state the percentage of his force that he wanted on airborne
alert, I think that is correct.
Senator Stennis. No, not in open session.
Senator Case. Not the percentage?
Senator Stennis. That is what I understand. The Chair
thought to the contrary. I am advised the only thing he
said in open session was that he desired twice as much as
he was given.
Senator Case, Yes, that was the very question that I
wanted to ask. Then I think I an right that you did give a
figure today as to what percentage General Power wanted,
General Twining.
General Twining, I don,t recall that. I shouldn,t
0 have,
Senator Case. I think you did, but I dont want in
any way to press you to answer that, because I dont want to
get into anything,
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General Twining. I don't think that ought to be
discussed in open session.
Senator Stennis. That is a closed session matter. /
Othink the Senator tram New Jersey is correct.
Senator Case. Is it accurate, can we go this far, and
I dont want to press you to say yes if you think not. Is
General Power's statement that he got about half what he was
after a correct statement?
General Twining. I didn,t get that.
Senator Case, Is General Power's statement, which the
Chairman just repeated, that he got about half the air alert
that he was after a correct statement?
O General Twining. I think that is about right.
Senator Case. About right. And it is subject to this
qualification, isn't it?
General Twining. Yes, about ha/f.
Senator Case. Then there is a difference, besides the
difference in size, there is a difference that what has been
authorized would provide an on-the-shelf capability both as
to mechanical parts and men, I take it, to be available as
I recall it approximately -- was the date given in open
session?
Then I won't pursue that. You did maks this statement:
that your judgment was that the amount of capacity provided
for under present funding, that is in the two budgets, I6o and
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161, was equivalent used on an intermittent basis to as much
or more than the amount General Power requested, if used only
on a full 24-hour alert basis. That was in general the
subject of your testimony.
General Twining, No, it is less. I said somewhere
around two hundred million total program in the budget.
Senator Case. No, this is the question of the value
of what was provided for in the budget. Used on an intermit-
tent basis, you thought it was almost as great.
General Twining. Yes, I think so.
Senator Case. As the 24-hour alert of the amount
General Power wanted or perhaps even a larger one.
General Twining. I dont think if General Power had
the authority and money and equipment to run it 24 hours a
day around the clock all the time, that he would do it. He
just wouldnit choose to do it I an sure.
But I donit think so as a commander. He would kind of
play it by ear too. He is a pretty smart fellow, and I think
that is what he would do. He wouldn!t put it up there and
grind it 24 hours a day all year long.
Senator Case. You made quite a point of this, General,
and the fact that it would be used on this intermittent basis
would make it additionally valuable and useful as a deterrent.
General Twining. That is right.
(2) Senator Case, But isnit this true, and perhapsyou have
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already taken this into account.
(7) Assuming you have a period of tension, of strategic war,
and you decide to put everything you can in the air for an
airborne alert, that your capacity to keep this there for
any length of time is
General Twining. Yes, sir, that is the idea of this.
Senator Case. Unless you are able to do this for an
extended period, maybe for months, the situation might go
against you rather badly. I take it you are taking that
into account also?
General Twining. And I think on this on-the-shelf
capability you have got enough for those periods when
tension exists, and you want to keep the force up for a
while. I think we can do that on this concept the budget
provides for.
Senator Case. The rest of my questions I think have
to wait until executive session.
Senator Stennis,. Very well, Senator Case. Thank you.
Senator Bush?
Senator Bush, General Twining, I want to speak of the
matter of disclosing so much information that we do in these
hearings and otherwise,
Yesterday I raised a point with Admiral Burke, and I
am going to read in a moment from the record, But it seems
to me that inasmuch as we have been warned by the highest
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military officers that we have that we are in a very grave
and dangerous situation today, and likely to remain in one
for the next two or three years at least, that a great deal
of the information that is given to this committee should
come to it in closed session, and the same way over at the
House.
In saying this, I do not single out any Senator or
Member of the House in a critical way, but I do express very
grave concern for our country, because I believe we are
disclosing much too much information to potential enemies of
this country.
Not only are we disclosing to them what our own plans
for the future are respecting development of weapons and so
forth year by year, and the course thereof, but we are
disclosing to them our own estimate of their own plans day
after day. I think this is very dangerous.
Now I believe that the Congress should be fully advised
as to what the situation is, but this is a representative
form of government, and one of the advantages of it is that
the representatives of the people can. act as representatives
of the people, and they should, in matters where the national
security Is involved.
I recall in World War II we spent enormous sums of money
on a thing called the Manhattan Project, which later resulted
in the atomic weapon that brought the war to a sudden end in
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the summer of 1945, and that project was going on in various
parts of this country, but nobody knew what it was.
The people of this country didn't know what it was.
I don't believe the enemy knew much about it. At any rate,
it was a very well kept secret for a period of two or three
years, and a tremendous project into which hundreds of millions
of dollars went. And the Members of the Congress no doubt
must have known something about it because they appropriated
the money, but it wasnit given out in these open sessions.
So I raised this question yesterday with Admiral Burke,
and I am just going to read a part of what I said to him, and
because he mentioned your name, I am going to ask you to
respond to this question. I said, in view of the statements
of General Power and General Taylor and others:
"I just wonder whether it is wise for us to disclose
so mush information, practically everything about our military
posture and our intentions and our plans."
And I might add here our estimates of the Soviet
capabilities and intentions and plans.
"Is this something that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
ever considered or not?
"Admiral Burke, Yes, sir. This is one of the most
serious problems confronting us in this country, and there is
apparently no way we can keep the information from going out.
"We have to put out contraots for things, They are all
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published. We can?t keep anything, any of our own equipment
secret for very long. Everyone knows the location of what
we plan on doing, let alone what we have done. It is a very
serious problem, sir, And I do agree with General Twining
in his very strong feelings on this, sir."
Would you tell the committee what your feelings. are
about this matter?
General Twining. This is a very difficult problem:
because I know full well that the Members of the Congress are
trying to get the facts up here and do a job: and they feel
much of this information the public should have and are
entitled to, and I certainly go along with that. The public
should have some of this information. But where do you draw
the line? There is the difficult thing,
Senator Bush. We have got to rely on you to draw the
line; General,
General Twining. We mark these things top secret. We
mark them secret and all that, and we have executive sessions.
But things just seem to get out that shouldn,t get out,
and I don,t know how you are going to control it in a
democracy like ours.
Senator Bush, Do you think it is a hopeless proposition?
General Twining, It is not hopeless because we do have
some secrets that havenft leaked out yet, but they are
getting fewer every day I would say.
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Senator Bush. I would suggest that if it is as serious
a problem as it is apparently thought to be in the Joint
(2)
Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Burke certainly didn,t hesitate
to say that he thought it was a very serious problem --
General Twining. I do too.
Senator Bush. -- that the representatives of the
Defense Department from the Secretary on down would demand
that their testimony on these very sensitive points be held
in executive session, and I am sure that the Congress would
be glad to cooperate.
General Twining. I think you are exactly right, and I
would like to see it done that way, because I think this can
(:) be very dangerous to our security.
It is the little things, not that anyone person does
anything bad, but when these people add it all up, the
people on the receiving end add these things all up, they
really get the whole business. These newspaper people are
pretty smart. I hope that something can be done about this,
I really do.
Senator Bush. Donit blame the newspaper people.
General Twining. No.
Senator Bush. For trying to get the information. They
(2) are all here as our guests.
General Twining. Not at all.
Senator Bush. My point is that what you have said here
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today will probably be in the papers in Moscow in the morning:
and all over the world, in Japan, China and every place else,
General Twining. And this isn,t limited to the Congress
either. It happens in practically everything we do, every
group we have, wherever it is around the world, Things just
seem to get out, and they shouldnIt get out.
Senator Bush. My suggestion is, General, that you as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs -- and I am going to make the
same suggestion to the Secretary when he comes should not
hesitate to refuse to, answer questions on the basis of
security, arid 'offerat the same time to: answer them in
executive session.
I think we should have a lot more executive sessions
and a lot less public discussion of these very, very
sensitive matters.
General Twining, I certainly go along with,you on that.
Senator Bush, Thank you very much,
Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Are there other
matters now in open session? Mr. Weisel, do, you have some-
thing?
Mr. Weisel, I just want to make this observation,
General Twining,
General, Secretary Gates testified in open session that
Secretary McElroy over television discussed these figures
by saying that in his opinion, based on these figures, there
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would be in the future a three to one superiority. It was
not the committee. It was Secretary McElroy who, over
television, made that statement.
General Twining, Well, I didn't infer that any of the
committee had leaked anything.
Mr. Weisel. Here is the testimony of Secretary Gates:
"Last week he stated: 'Mr. McElroy made such a state-
ment in his testimony last year. He also made that state-
ment on a television program in December,'"
Senator Bush. What is the purpose of counsel's reading
this? I don't quite understand it.
Mr. Weisel, To show that these things aren't originated
by the committee. They are originated by the officials of
the Defense Department,
Senator Bush. I didn't say they were originated by the
committee. I didn't point the finger at anybody, but I do
say that I would regret that Mr. McElroy did exactly what
he did then, if it involved sensitive information.
Mr, Weisel. That is right.
Senator Bush. Counsel seems to be a little sensitive
on this, but I can assure him, as I did yesterday, that I
know he is only carrying out the wishes of this committee,
for which I commend him, because I think he has done it very
well for several years.
But that isn't the point that I am talking about at all.
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I am talking about the general policy not only of
this committee but over in the House and in the Defense
Department too. I think there should be a lot more security
observed.
Mr. Weisel. Thank you, Senator. I think also, General
Twining, you made the public statement as follows, if I
quote you correctly:
"I can also inform this committee that the over-all
military capability of the Soviet Union has not been down-
graded."
General Twining. That is the over-all military
capability, yes.
Mr. Weisel. Thank you..
Senator Stennis. All right, gentlemen of the committee.
.Senator Symington. I have a question I would like to
ask.
Senator Stennis. It appears here now that we will have
an executive session, as the Chair has already indicated.
It is now 12:15, and there is no way to accurately
determine how long that session will be. It seems in view
of all these conditions, that we can hardly get to the
Secretary this afternoon.
So suppose, when we complete with the general in
executive session, that we recess subject to the call of the
Chair, and we will have the Secretary at some convenient
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599
(:) Now we will have the further questions in open session,
and then go into executive session. Senator Symington?
(:) Senator Symington. Genera/ Twining, yesterday the
Secretary of State, and I think this is important, because
I saw it several times on a telecast, was asked this question:
"Mr. Secretary, last November at a news conference you
told us that you had thought the Russians had come a very
long way on Berlin since November of 1958 when they were
threatening to throw us out. Now in the past two or three
months Mr. Khrushchev seems to have became a little tougher
on it I am thinking particularly of his statement that if
we dont make a peace treaty on his terms, he will sign a
treaty with East Germany with all the consequences that
entails.
"Do you feel that since you talked to us in November
on that, he has became tougher in his position?"
The answer given by Secretary Herter was:
"Yes, I think that is the only way we can interpret the
statement if it had been made since that time."
Now later on in the same press conference, and I think
this is very important from the standpoint of the American
people, I am not one who has been giving out this information,
but I think if any information is given out, it should be the
correct information, and I know you agree with me on that:
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"Queation. Mr, Secretary, the Soviet Union apparently
is leading the United States, according to some critics, in
a military posture vis-a-vis the United States, First of all,
sir, do you think this is so? Are the Soviets ahead of us
in military strength through missiles, and, secondly, if this
is so, does this account for the stiffening Soviet attitude
on such questions as Berlin?"
I want to read this all because I want to be sure not
to get anything out of context. ,The answer was:
"Well, in the first place you are asking me to get into
the current estimate of relative strength, on which I think
a great deal has been said by much better experts than I am
in this field. Whoever has done the estimating I think has
agreed that the Soviets are gaining in strength in the missile
field."
May I point out to you that is the statement of the
Secretary of State yesterday, one of the finest public
officials, public servants it has ever been, my privilege to
know. He goes on:
"It is possible that the Soviets feel that their
increased strength from a military point of view, not
necessarily from the point of view of being able to take on
the offensive, without an unacceptalbe retaliatory strike,
but from the point of view of their defensive capacity, has
made them, has given them great assurance in what they are
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saying in the international field.. But there again that is
only speculation, and I think that sometimes it is unfruitful
to get into speculation of that sortO .
"Question. Mr. Secretary, in that same vein, sir, do
you think that the United States ought to make a greater
effort to close the gap then if this is creating a sense of
increased strength on the part of the Soviets in their dealings
with us and the rest of the free world?
"Answer" -- and this is what I was getting at -- "Now
you are getting into a very technical field, the question of
the closing of the gap. This is a matter that has, of course,
been given a great deal of very serious consideration by
people in the administration, by people up on the Hill: and
(:) there are some conflicting views in our military on the
subject.
"In so far as I aa concerned, I have heard a number
of discussions on this matter, and have faith in the
Presidents and the Joint Chiefs and Mr. Gates, evaluation
that we are taking steps to close that gap as effectively
and as soon as we can, and that there will not be a disparity
In strength in the coming years which would, in itself
tempt the Russians to make a sudden attack upon us."
Now I have here the figures that were given us. If we
are talking about the missile gap: letls not get into the
question of what we all know, that their ICBMs are estimated
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to be far more powerful than ours, because of the amount
of payload in the third stage of the lunar thrust, and so
forth. I am not interested in this bottom part.
But with the premise that a missile in a cave that
can't be launched doesnit mean anything, that what is able
to be launched against this country is what counts, show
me any evidences if you will, on what was given us by the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Captain Gray,
will you take this piece of paper please?
Captain Gray. Do you want M2 to show it to the
general, Senator?
Senator Symington. Yes, I would like to see if there
is anything there that justifies the American people in
believing that any missile gap is being closed -- you have a
representative of the Joint Chiefs on the National Intelligence
Board, each service has, There are the figures.
General Twining. There is no way to answer this in
open session, Senator.
Senator Symington. All right, General. Thank you very
much.
General Twining. I have, Senator, this chart, but I
dida,t have it last year.
Senator Symington. Thank you, General. I have no
further questions.
Senator Stennis. All right. It is the pleasure of
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the committee now that we finish the open hearing. All
right: gentlemen: we will go into executive session at
2p. m.
(ghereupon: at 12:25 p. m.0 the canaittee took a recess
to resume in executive session at 2:00 p. m.: the same day.)
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