HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000601140001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 195
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1961
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman
HARRY R. SHEPPARD, California GERALD R. FORD, JR., Michigan
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida HAROLD C. OSTERTAG, New York
W. F. NORRELL, Arkansas ? MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin
JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi ? GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska
JOHN J. RILEY, South Carolina WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania KEITH THOMSON, Wyoming
ALBERT THOMAS, Texas
SAMUEL W. CRosim, Staff Assistant to the Suboommittee
PART 1
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1961
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman
HARRY R. SHEPPARD, California
ROBERT L. F. SIKES; Florida
W. F. NORRELL, Arkansas
JAMIE L. WRITTEN, Mississippi
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama
JOHN J. RILEY, South Carolina
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
ALBERT THOMAS, Texas
sAmunt. W. CROSBY, Staff Assi8tant to the Subcommittee
GERALD R. FORD, JR., Michigan
HAROLD C. OSTERTAG, New York
MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin. ,
GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska
WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio
KEITH THOMSON, Wyoming
PART 1
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
50026 WASHINGTON : 1960
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
CLARENCE CANNON, Missouri, Chairman
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas
HARRY It. SHEPPARD, California
ALBERT THOMAS, Texas
MICHAEL J. KIRWAN, Ohio
W. F. NORRELL, Arkansas
JAMIE L. WRITTEN, Mississippi
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama
JOHN J. ROONEY, New York
J. VAUGHAN GARY, Virginia
JOHN E. FOGARTY, Rhode Island
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
PRINCE H. PRESTON, Georgia
OTTO E. PASSMAN, Louisiana
LOUIS C. RABAUT, Michigan
SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
FRED MARSHALL, Minnesota
JOHN J. RILEY, South Carolina
JOE L. EVINS, Tennessee
JOHN F. SHELLEY, California
EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts
DON MAGNUSON, Washington
WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
WINFIELD K. DENTON, Indiana
TOM STEED, Oklahoma
HUGH Q. ALEXANDER, North Carolina
ALFRED E. SANTANGELO, New York
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico
GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois
KENNETH SPRANELE, Clerk and Staff Director
JOHN TABER, New York
BEN F. JENSEN, Iowa
H. CARL ANDERSEN, Minnesota
WALT HORAN, Washington
GORDON CANFIELD, New Jersey
IVOR D. FENTON, Pennsylvania
GERALD R. FORD, JR., Michigan
HAROLD C. OSTERTAG, New York
FRANK T. BOW, Ohio
CHARLES RAPER JONAS, North Carolina
MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin
ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan
GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
JOHN J. RHODES, Arizona
JOHN R. PILLION, New York
PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska
WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio
KEITH THOMSON, Wyoming
ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois
SILVIO 0. CONTE, Massachusetts
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1961
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1960.
WITNESSES
HON. THOMAS S. GATES, JR., SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
GEN. NATHAN F. TWINING, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
HERBERT F. YORK, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGI-
NEERING
FRANKLIN B. LINCOLN, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER)
JOHN M. SPRAGUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(C OMPTROLLER)
/VIAJ. GEN. R. S. MOORE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE COMPTROL-
LER
CAPT. L. P. GRAY, USN, MILITARY ASSISTANT TO CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
H. R. LOGAN, DEPUTY COMPTROLLER FOR BUDGET, OFFICE OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
HENRY GLASS, DIRECTOR OF ECONOMICS, OFFICE OF THE ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
M. H. LAN1V/AN, ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL (FISCAL MATTERS),
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
Mr. MAHON. Gentlemen, we began our hearings on Monday,
January 11, 2 days ago, with the appearance before the committee of
Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Robert W. On22.E4s.tnd other representatives of
the Central Intelligerice?Akency, who gave the committee an intelli-
gence briefing of 2 days duration. Of necessity that testimony was
highly classified and will not be included in the printed record of the
hearings. Therefore, to all intents and purposes, this is the beginning
of the hearings on the 1961 defense budget.
I think it fitting to pause a moment to pay tribute to the memory
of our departed colleague who served so loyally and faithfully on this
committee, the gentleman from Illinois, Charlie Boyle. He was
able, efficient, alert, constantly in attendance, and he did a good job.
The full Committee on Appropriations has adopted appropriate
resolutions, but I think it proper to make some reference here to our
able and good friend who has so recently passed away.
Mr. Secretary, this is your first appearance before the committee
as Secretary of Defense. This is the first time we have had Mr.
Lincoln, who succeeds Mr. McNeil as Comptroller, here. Is this not
a first for you, Mr. Sprague?
MT. SPRAGUE. It is.
Mr. MAHON. Of course, this is not the first appearance of Secretary
Gates before the committee. He has been before us many, many
times over the past 5 or 6 years, but it is his first time to appear as
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Secretary, we are well aware of your serious and dedicated ap-
proach to the problems of national defense. You are a demonstrated
(1)
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friend of the cause of adequate national defense of the country. You
have a hard job. We all have hard jobs. Reviewing the budget pro-
grams totaling $39.3 billion; which this committee ,will consider, will
require -many weeks of effort. We will work with you to the best 'of
our ability and in the best interests of the United States regardless of
political considerations, or any other considerations.
This is serious business in which We are engaged. I know you weigh
your words carefully in your statement, and you will do so in your
testimony in answer to questions.
Now, General Twining, we, of course, are going to rely very heavily
upon you, as in previous years, to give us advice and counsel and in-
-formation that might be helpful to us in our work.
I suggest now that we proceed with the presentation of the Secre-
tary. Ar d you ready to proceed, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary GATES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
? Mr. MAHON. You may proceed and take whatever time you may
need to present your views to the committee.
GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary GATES. I would like to thank you for your remarks, and
I hope I continue to justify your confidence. -
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this opportunity to
present and discuss the. defense program and budget proposed for
fiscal year 1961 is greatly appreciated. Although I have appeared
.before this committee on many occasions, this is my first appearance
as Secretary of Defense. I never fully appreciated the burdens of the
Secretary's Office until I assumed the post of Deputy Secretary last
----- June, After almost 7 years in the Pentagon I find there is still a great
deal to learn. Every new responsibility is different and poses new
problems.
count myself fortunate to have had the opportunity to serve Under
Secretary Neil McElroy. Fully mindful of all the problems confront-
ing any man taking over these duties, he made every effort to, effect
the transitiOn smoothly. He gave unstintingly of .his counsel, and
experience. He also arranged our joint participation in the revieiv'of
this 'budget.
The defense program and budget cannot be formulated in isolation.
'It must be dealt with in the context of the entire national policy!! It
? May be uSeful, therefore, to review some of the major factors which
were considered in developing this budget. ??
First, the threat to our national security, and indeed the security
of the entire free world, is not only military., It .is also political,
economic, and psychological. To cope successfully with this 'total
threat the United States must have a total strategy within which all
elements?the military, the political, the- economic, and the lisycho-
logical?are closely coordinated and, most important, are in proper
balance. , Thus, the military program is and must be consciously
? ,integrated with all elements' of national policy.
Second, we cannot assume at this time that negotiations with the
Soviets will result in agreements that will ease our defense problems.
There is nothing to justify a belief that the Soviets will make substan-
tive concessions which will reduce our security requirements. In
fact, the Soviet Union is increasing its military capabilities, especially
its missile delivery systems.
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Third, we have adopted the principle of collective security as a
basic tenet of our foreign policy. We no longer -think in terms of our
national defense alone but rather in terms of the total defense capa-
bilities of the free world. Our strategy, therefore, requires that we,
sustain and strengthen the integrity of our alliances and contribute
our fair share of forces to these alliances. Our overseas deployments,
though costly, are critical in maintaining, in conjunction with our
allies, the many outposts of freedom around the world.
Admittedly, there are problems in an alliance of free sovereign
nations held together by ties of mutual interests rather than by bonds
of fear. We have strong partners. We do not seek subservience or
dependency on the part of our allies, but rather equal partnership in
the struggle toward common goals. We want partners who share with
us the same objectives and who work toward them not simply because
the United States favors these objectives but because they themselves
believe in them and want them.
Looking back over the past decade, I believe it can be fairly said
that the United States and the cause of freedom have made distinct
progress in the struggle with communism for the hearts and minds of
men. One has only to consider the warm response to President
Eisenhower's recent journey abroad to realize that a great reservoir of
friendship for the American people exists in the Free World today.
There is no question that the Soviet Union is a formidable power.
It has made tremendous progress since the end of World War II in
developing not only its military but also its economic strength, and
will make continued progress in the future. But the impression in
some quarters that the Soviet Union has overtaken or even out-
distanced the United States in military power is simply not supported
by the facts. General Twining will present to this committee a
highly classified and detailed analysis of comparative military,
strengths. Some conclusions, however, should be placed in the
public record.
Our retaliatory forces are capable of carrying out their assigned
missions. Manned bombers are still, for both ourselves and the
U.S.S.R., the primary means of delivering heavy nuclear weapons in
the volume and with the accuracy needed to strike a decisive blow.
In this category the United States far excels the U.S.S.R. We have
several times more intercontinental jet bombers and more medium .
jet bombers. We enjoy a marked qualitative advantage and can
claim credit for the most experienced bomber crews in the world.
We are well ahead of the U.S.S.R. in air-to-air refueling, capabilities,
air-to-surface missile development, and other important air warfare
techniques.
I understand you have already received a report from Mr. Dulles
which, among other matters, covered the Soviet ICBM test program,
their production capability, and the estimated pace of their. deploy-
ment preparations.
During the past year we have continued to acquire information
which has enabled U.S. intelligence, for the first time, to estimate
the probable Soviet ICBM inventory and its expected buildup with
time. We also have?an informed estimate of the performance of the
Soviet ICBM. .
We have gained in experience with our own missile programs. We
have been able to measure the accuracy of ATLAS missiles with
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greater precision than heretofore and have conducted many full-scale
guided flight tests. The accuracy attained by this missile has sur-
passed our highest expectations.
If we comrare the estimated Soviet ICBM and sea-launched missile
programs with plans for deployment of U.S. ICBM's and POLARIS
missiles, we note that the Soviets may enjoy at times a moderate
numerical superiority during the next 3 years. This difference in
numbers appears to peak during the 1962 period. Our estimates
indicate that both before and after mid-1962 the numbers are closer
together.
Whether or not this numerical calculation, which deals exclusively
with the long-range missile aspect of the defense problem, comprises
a "deterrent gap" which is the real threat to national security is a
question which has been studied in considerable detail. It is the
conclusion of those who have analyzed this matter that even a sur-
prise attack by all the missiles the Soviets could muster would not
suffice to destroy enough of our retaliatory strike forces to enable
him to make a rational decision to attack.
We have estimated the performance characteristics?such as
accuracy, reliability, warhead size, etc.?which Soviet missiles may
be expected to exhibit during the period. While in many respects
Soviet missiles have characteristics similar to our own, the analyses
indicate that their accuracy will be inferior to ours. The significance
of this simple numerical comparison to our deterrent posture depends
greatly upon the accuracy which the Soviets may attain with their
missiles. This is so because the number of relatively inaccurate
missiles required to destroy a hardened military target, such as an
ICBM emplaced in a concrete silo buried in the ground, is considerably
greater than the number of highly accurate missiles required to do
the same job.
We have examined the relative positions that would exist if the
Soviets were to develop missiles which would exceed the performance
we expect them to have. It is also possible that the Soviets might
elect to produce and deploy missiles in larger quantities than is
presently estimated. Our analyses show that even under such
circumstances the resulting difference in numbers, in itself, would not
enable the Soviets to gain a strategic posture which might tempt them
to initiate a surprise attack.
This conclusion is based on the knowledge that our overall deterrent
posture depends not only on our long-range missile capability but also
upon the continued success of other strategic weapons development
programs, including those for mobile systems; upon the continued
evolution and refinement of our capability to mount a sustained air
alert on short notice; upon our ability to bring advanced early warning
systems into operation; and upon our continued vigilance in detecting
and reacting to improvements or changes in the Soviet posture,
intentions, and weapon developments.
The present Soviet lead in very large rocket engines does not alter
this appraisal. As President Eisenhower pointed out in his State of
the Union message, our military missile program does not suffer from
our present lack of such engines. The thrust of our present missiles
is fully adequate for our defense requirements today.
lk Our air defense system against manned bombers, partly due to
geography, is more comprehensive and concentrated than that of the
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U.S.S.R. We have more high performance, true all-weather inter-
ceptors armed with air-to-air missiles in operational units today than
the U.S.S.R. We also have first rate ground-to-air missiles in the
NIKE-HERCULES, operational in large numbers in our defense
system today, and BOMARC, soon to be operational in quantity.
Our seapower, as a whole, is clearly superior to that of the U.S.S.R.
The fact that the U.S.S.R. has more submarines in operation than the
United States is in large part a matter of differing requirements, but
it does pose a threat of significance. We have no need for large num-
bers of antishipping submarines inasmuch as the seaborne commerce
of the U.S.S.R. is limited. The U.S. Navy is clearly ahead techno-
logically. We have 9 nuclear-powered submarines already in com-
mission and 23 under construction or conversion. The Soviets are
estimated to be in the process of achieving their first operational
capability with nuclear-powered submarines.
The United States is also more advanced in nuclear-powered
surface ships. We have under construction a nuclear-powered carrier,
a nuclear-powered cruiser which will join the fleet next year, and a
nuclear-powered frigate. Our first nuclear-powered merchant ship was
launched last summer. The only known Soviet surface ship with
nuclear power is an icebreaker now in shakedown status.
You are, of course, aware that the Soviet Union has no aircraft
carriers, while the United Srates is in a position to deploy several
powerful task forces built around aircraft carriers. These carrier task
forces are equipped to participate in situations of limited conflict by
applying the appropriate degree of air power and, if necessary, furnish-
ing close air support to landing operations. In addition, they constitute
a sea-launched nuclear retailatory contribution unique to the United
States, and one which is in the process of being augmented by
POLARIS submarines. The tactical air forces of the United States
and its allies, deployed throughout a wide area around the Soviet
periphery, contribute importantly to our overall retaliatory power
and deterrent posture and also provide a strong limited war capability.
With respect to ground forces, the Soviet Union clearly outnumbers
the United States, but a comparison of the ground forces of the Sino-
Soviet bloc with those of the free world allies, including the United
States, is more favorable.
It is not necessary to match the ground forces of the opponent on
a unit-for-unit basis. Our Army and Marine Corps make substantial
contributions to our deterrent strength. The Army furnishes an
important part of the shield forces in Europe and Korea which, with
U.S. air and naval units in such oversea areas, provide ready evidence
of our willingness to contribute our fair share of forces to the common
defense and our continued faith in the policy of collective security.
We must be ever cautious not to underestimate the military
strength of possible opponents, but it does not contribute to our
national security to overestimate their military strength. It can be
dangerous to our national security and our position in the world to
allow a false impression to gain ground that the United States is second
to the Soviet Union.
The same holds true with respect to our relative economic strengths.
While the Soviet Union since the end of World War II has made great
progress in developing its economy, the United States is still far
ahead by virtually any measure of economic strength. The gross
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national product of the United States is more than double that of the
U.S.S.R. We have more than double their steel capacity, three times
their oil and electric power production, and many times their produc-
tion of motor vehicles and consumer durable goods. In the production
of chemicals, especially petro-chemicals, the Soviets are, by their own
admission, far behind the United States. .
Also, the economic strength of many of our major allies has grown
at a rapid rate. Thanks to our system of voluntary alliances, this
free world strength is a major asset to our Security?an asset which
has been built up to a considerable extent by our wise investments in
military and economic assistance to these countries.
Even if the Soviet Union successfully completes its new 7-year
plan, which would represent a great step forward, in many important
areas Soviet economic capacity in 1965 will still be significantly below
that of the United States in 1959. Of course, our economy by 1965
will also be much larger.
? The continued expansion of Soviet economic strength would not, in
itself, be a threat to the United States or to the free world if it were
used to enhance the welfare of the Soviet people. Unfortunately,
Soviet economic progress is exploited for propaganda purposes. The
7-year plan is being presented to the world as proof positive of the
superiority of the Communist system over a free enterprise system.
There should be no question that a free enterprise system is inherently
more productive and more efficient than a government planned and
controlled economic system.
The strength of our economy is important to our military strength.
It is imperative that the United States continue to maintain a sound
economy. We must show the world what a free people can accom-
plish when the proper economic environment is provided and, at the
same time, make certain we are prepared to mea the economic and
military challenge which faces us, perhaps for many years to come.
We have been aware in framing our defense proposals for 1961 that
our country has dedicated itself, m conjunction with its allies, to con-
tinue its unremitting search for lasting, sincere disarmament and for
a lessening of international tensions. But as President Eisenhower
pointed out in his state of the Union message:
No matter how earnest is our quest for guaranteed peace, we must maintain a
high degree of military effectiveness at the same time we are engaged in negotiating
the issue of arms reduction. Until tangible and mutually enforceable arms reduc-
tion measures are worked out, we will not weaken the 'means of defending our
institutions.
The two principal objectives of our defense program continue to be:
first, to deter the outbreak of general war by maintaining and im-
proving our present capability to retaliate with devastating effec-
tiveness in case of a major attack upon us or our allies; and second, to
maintain, together with our allies, a capability to apply to local situa-
tions the degree of force necessary to deter local wars, or to win or
contain them promptly if they do break out.
I have no doubt that today our defense forces can accomplish these
major purposes. However, the problem of maintaining our capability
to deter general war has become complicated and costly because of the
rapid progress in military technology. These phanges are coming
fast and are drastic. The defense program must be kept under con-
tinuous review. Programs which looked promising only a short
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while ago have become marginal in importance in the light of technical
advances. This compels a continued shift in emphasis and resources
from older to newer programs, and the outright termination of some -.
programs.
In an organization as complex as the Defense Establishment, it is
not always easy to make the necessary shifts as quickly as desirable.
we must avoid being carried away by the glittering promise of the
future at the expense of present military strength?hastily discarding
proved and effective weapons we actually have now for developments
which may become reliable weapons in the future. Undoubtedly, we
have overstayed our time on some projects, 'but considering the
program as a whole, the rate of adjustment to technological progress
has been rapid and remarkable.
The most important military-development in recent years has been
the nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile. It has produced a
weapon of tremendous speed and destructiveness against which no
sure method, of defense has yet been devised. This d.evelopment is
profoundly altering the nature of the military problem confronting
the Nation.
A great deal of-thought and study. has been: given to these changing
circumstances in the formulation of the .1961 defense program and
budget. Plainly stated, our first concern is how best to assure our
continued capability to retaliate effectively to surprise attack, at a
time when the U.S.S.R. could have in its possession a large number
of intercontinental ballistic missiles in addition to a significant number
of manned bombers. ' . ? ,
. Just matching our competitor, missile for missile, is not the answer.
The simple piling up of ever larger numbers of a single weapon, without
regard to their ability to survive a surprise attack or to perform
effectively under a wide range of conditions, would not only be
enormously costly but would not assure our security.
The solution lies in a whole complex of related measures each of
which in various degrees contributes to the establishment and main-
tenance of an assured retaliatory capability. These are improved
warning against both missile and aircraft attack reduction of reaction
time, dispersal, protective hardening, concealment, and mobility for
our weapon systems; and, as soon as practicable, an effective active
defense against ballistic missiles as well as aircraft.
Our deterrent posture is strengthened by a variety of types of
weapon systems. Each weapon system has its own particular char-
acteristics, its own strengths and weaknesses both with respect to its
vulnerability and effectiveness. For example, one B-52 on target
could deliver the destructive potential of several ICBM's, and with
greater accuracy. It is, of course, more susceptible to enemy inter-
ception than an ICBM.
Again, the manned bomber is a much more flexible weapon system
than the ICBM. For obvious reasons, missiles should not be launched
unless the warning of attack is unmistakable. In contrast, the manned
bomber forces on ground alert can be airborne within 15 minutes of any
kind of warning, can proceed to their targets under positive control,
and can be recalled if necessary.
On the other hand, the ICBM lends itself much better to protective
construction or `base hardening." But again the vulnerability of the
?
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manned bomber can also be greatly reduced by keeping it in the air on
a continuous airborne alert status during periods of international ten-
sion.
I have not mentioned carrier-based attack aircraft, submarine
launched POLARIS missiles, deployed tactical aircraft and missiles, or
other weapons. The point is variety in weapons systems, in itself,
reduces the vulnerability of our retaliatory forces and adds to their
offensive potential by vastly complicating the enemy problem?both
in attacking our forces on their bases and in defending against our
retaliatory forces as they launch their counterattack.
We must be certain that an attacker cannot knock out at one blow
the major part of our retaliatory forces. This is the surest deterrent,
since an attacker can hope to win only if he can be almost certain of
destroying virtually all of our retaliatory power before it can be applied.
We believe the program proposed for the coming fiscal year supports
that objective.
'While we are steadily shifting the emphasis in the program to the
more advanced weapons?the strategic missiles?we are continuing
to improve the tried and proved weapons;?the manned bombers.
Included in this budget are additional B-58 supersonic medium
bombers and B-52H heavy bombers with the new turbofan engine,
together with the associated RC-135 jet tankers. HOUND DOG
air-to-ground missiles and QUAIL decoy missiles, both to be carried
by the B-52's, are also provided in this budget to improve the pene-
tration capabilities of the manned bomber 'force.
The large ballistic missiles will in 1961 take an increased proportion
of the funds devoted to strategic weapon systems. Funds are pro-
vided for additional ATLAS and TITAN ICBM's, and to prepare
for production of the MINUTEMAN solid-fuel ICBM. We are
continuing both ATLAS and TITAN because the ATLAS program
provides the means of achieving an earlier operational capability,
while the TITAN offers certain operational advantages and greater
growth potential. The planned programs for both of these missiles
have been substantially increased over those presented to the Congress
last year.
The presently planned THOR-JUPITER program has already been
fully funded. Four THOR squadrons and three JUPITER squadrons
are being provided through the military assistance program to
England, Italy, and Turkey.
As you know, the ATLAS is now operational at Vandenberg Air
Force Base. Additional ATLAS missiles will become operational
within the next several months. Notwithstanding some present dif-
ficulties of the type usually experienced in the development of new
missiles, we expect the TITAN to become operational in the summer
of 1961. The MINUTEMAN is scheduled to be operational by the
middle of 1963. The THOR in England is now operational. The
JUPITER squadrons in Italy and Turkey will become operational
over the next year or two.
In addition to these land-based missiles, the Congress has authorized
the construction of nine POLARIS submarines and associated missiles
and provided funds for the long leadtime components for three more.
We are requesting funds to complete the construction of the 10th
through the 12th submarines and for the advance procurement of long
leadtime components for 3 more, making a total of 15.
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The POLARIS system promises to have vital advantages. We plan
to continue a "three-a-year" rate until this weapon system has been
better tested. Progress has been satisfactory, and, if the POLARIS
proves out sooner than expected, a reconsideration of the program
would be undertaken. Four submarines have been launched and
testing of the missile is progressing on schedule. By December 1960,
the first submarines should be operationally deployed and on station
with missiles aboard. Additional submarines should be at sea by the
end of fiscal year 1961.
General Twining will discuss in considerable detail the operational
status of all these missile programs.
Thus, we now have four strategic ballistic missile systems in various
stages of production or development. Before 1965, these systems
will have been tested and their reliability established. The expected
availability of these weapons raised a serious question as to the wisdom
of continuing the development of the costly B-70 long-range supersonic
bomber. This aircraft was programed to become available in opera-
tional quantities in 1965 when it is expected that all four strategic
missile systems will have been in operation for some time.
Even though the B-70, designed to fly at Mach 3, is not as sure of
penetrating enemy defenses as a ballistic missile, it does offer some
unique operational characteristics. Therefore, we are requesting
funds to continue development work on the B-70 airframe, engines,
and certain critical subsystems so that two prototypes of this advanced
bomber can be made available for flight testing. By next year we
should be in a much better position to determine theluture course of
its development.
We have given great attention to improving the safety and readiness
of all our retaliatory forces. The original program for the dispersal
of Strategic Air Command aircraft and the construction of alert
facilities has been substantially completed, and the necessary facilities
for the additional heavy bomber wings, bringing the total up to 14,
will be virtually complete by the end of fiscal year 1961. These
measures will permit a large portion of our manned bombers and
supporting tankers to be airborne within 15 minutes after receiving
warning of an attack.
To further insure the safety of this force we are developing an
airborne alert capability as recommended by this committee last year.
We are not now operating an airborne alert of any significance because
we do not believe it necessary. However, SAC does have a present
capability to place a sizable portion of the B-52 force continuously in
the air for brief periods during times of tension.
By reprograming available funds the Air Force has begun the
acquisition of a more extensive "on the shelf" alert capability for the
heavy bombers. Funds are included in the 1961 budget to expand this
program?to purchase extra engines and spare parts, and to train
heavy bomber wings in the conduct of an airborne alert. This
capability would be exercised if, when, and as needed.
We are also pursuing a number of different techniques to protect
the land-based strategic ballistic missiles against surprise attack.
Except for the first several squadrons, all ATLAS and TITAN
missiles will be dispersed in hardened underground sites. We cannot
have all our strategic ballistic missiles fully dispersed and in maximum
hardened sites without delaying the operational dates of the first
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ICBM squadrons. The MINUTEMAN squadrons coming later are
planned to be dispersed and hardened, or else deployed in a mobile
configuration. The POLARIS, because it will be carried in sub-
marines at sea and because it is designed to be launched while the
submarine is submerged, inherently possesses the advantages of
concealment and mobility, and will have a very high degree of
survivability.
Measures are being taken to shorten the reaction time of liquid
fuel missiles. These involve the development of storable fuels, and
facilities for in-silo launch. Both MINUTEMAN and POLARIS,
because they are solid fuel missiles, can be more easily maintained at
:a high level of readiness.
The safety of our retaliatory forces is heavily dependent on the
efficiency of our warning systems. Our warning network for the
detection of manned bomber attack is already well developed. It now
extends from Midway Island in the Pacific, around the northern
perimeter of the North American Continent, and across the Atlantic
approaches. The ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS),
designed to detect ballistic missile attack by means of long-range
radars, is under construction. The first station is expected to become
operational this year and two other stations will follow. We recognize
that for a period of time there may be uncertainty as to the adequacy of
warning against a surprise ballistic missile attack, and this is a signifi-
cant reason to develop an "on the shelf" airborne alert capability.
We are also pursuing, through research and development, additional
means of detecting ballistic missile attack. One such system, which
would augment BMEWS, is MIDAS, a warning satellite which would
give us a complementary and earlier warning. Other means of de-
tecting ballistic missile launchings are also under intensive study.
We are most conscious of the great need to develop an active defense
-against ballistic missile attack. During the last 2 years we have
.greatly accelerated the research and development effort on the
NIKE?ZEUS antimissile missile. The work is proceeding in a satis-
factory manner, but the technical problems involved in detecting,
tracking, and computing the course of an incoming ballistic missile
4and guiding the intercepting ZEUS missile to its target?all within a
-period of minutes?are staggering. Our knowledge of ballistic missile
,defense is still limited and we are not sure that we have identified all
of the problems which such a system would have to solve.
No single project in the defense program has been and is being given
more study by as many highly competent minds than the NIKE-
ZEUS. After the most painstaking review, it was decided to press
forward rapidly with the research, development, test, and evaluation
of this system, but not to place it into production. Accordingly, funds
are requested to provide the necessary radars, computers, target mis-
siles, defense missiles, test-range facilities, and other equipment re-
quired to carry out a full-scale test program. Pending the completion
of the necessary tests, the $137 million authorized last year for the
design and manufacture of special production equipment and for
other preproduction steps will be carried over into fiscal year 1961
and held in reserve.
During the past year we have stepped up our basic research and
development effort in this field through a project named "Defender."
The purposes of this project are (a) to explore all of the phenomena
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associated with missile flight which might be useful in:solving the
defense problem, and (b) to examine the possibilities for applying
other techniques to the problems of detection, discrimination, mter-
ception, and kill of enemy ballistic missiles. In Defender we seek to
find means for making an interception of an ICBM during any phase.
of its flight. .
The emphasis is shifting to ballistic missiles and defense against
them, but the manned bomber remains an important threat to our
security. As long as the Soviets maintain a significant manned bomber
force, this Nation must provide a defense against it.
Last year the Department of Defense presented to this committee
an integrated plan for continental air defense. The funds requested
in this budget for air defense reflect, with some modifications, the
programs outlined in that plan. The 1961 budget will complete the
last major elements of the NIKE-HERCULES program for conti-
nental defense. For BOMARC the funds requested will provide the
initial complement of missiles for the planned number of squadrons,
and maintain the production leadtime into fiscal year 1962 in the.
event it should be decided next year to increase the number of BO-
MARC missiles per squadron. This budget will also permit us to con-
tinue the equipping and modernization of the related radar warning,
electronic control, and communications systems.
As you know, the F-108 long-range supersonic interceptor was
canceled last summer. This aircraft would have become available in
operational quantities by the mid-1960's. Since the substantial
progress being made in ballistic misSile technology is shifting the main
weight of the threat from manned bombers to missiles, the need for
the F-7108 in that time period became questionable. Considering,
also, its high cost, estimated at over $4 billion for the relatively small.
force that had been planned, the continued development of the 1?108
was not considered justifiable in relation to the needs of higher
priority projects.
In these ways we have sought to strike a balance among all the
various factors bearing on this ever-changing, problem of air defense.
In addition to the specialized strategic and air defense forces; we
are continuing to provide modern naval forces, and mobile ground and
tactical air forces, suitably deployed for immediate action, particularly
in limited war situations.
Pwould like to take a few moments at this point to ? discuss -the
question of "general war" versus "limited war" forces. Actually
there is no clear line of demarcation between those two types of force..
All forces are a deterrent to and would be employed in a general war.
Most of our forces could be employed in a limited war, if required.
For example, air defense aircraft and antiaircraft missiles can be,
and in fact are, deployed overseas. The aircraft of the Strategic Air
Command could also be used if needed.
The effort to categorize our forces becomes particularly arbitrary?
in the case of the Navy and the tactical air forces. Certainly, the
carriers with their embarked attack aircraft and the Air Forces
tactical aircraft have a significant general war capability. But they
also have an important limited war capability.
So, as a practical matter, there is no simple way to divide our
forces or our budget into general war and limited war categories.
Simply for discussion purposes, we can consider all forces except the
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Strategic Air Command of the Air Force, the POLARIS submarines
and the forces specifically assigned to the continental air defense
mission, as particularly suitable for limited war use.
The so-called limited war forces of the United States, together with
the forces of our allies, properly trained and equipped, provide the
means of deterring or rapidly defeating or containing local aggressions.
As an essential element of our collective security system, and in our
own interests as well as those of the entire free world, it is necessary
that the United States maintain certain forces deployed in critical
areas of the world, together with a capability to reinforce these deploy-
ments. It is equally important that we help our allies to develop
their own forces to maintain internal security and to withstand the
threat of aggression against their territories. Few uses of the defense
dollar provide a greater return than those spent for this purpose.
That is why we feel so strongly that the military assistance program
should receive the continued support of the Congress and the Nation.
To emphasize the interrelationship of our own military programs
and those of our allies, funds for the military assistance program in
fiscal year 1961 are also included in the defense chapter of the budget.
We will be prepared to discuss the latter program at the appropriate
time.
NAVAL FORCES
Our naval forces during the coming fiscal year will be considerably
strengthened even though the number of active ships will be reduced
below the present level. An unusually large number of ships, financed
in prior years, will be delivered to the fleet during fiscal year 1961.
Included are the fifth and sixth Forrestal-class attack carriers, the
first nuclear-powered cruiser, 16 guided missile destroyers and frigates,
3 POLARIS fleet ballistic missile submarines, and 6 other nuclear-
powered submarines.
For the coming fiscal year we are recommending 20 new ship starts
and 15 conversions or modernizations.
The budget request for the 1961 shipbuilding program reflect s a
change in the method of pricing ships. Because of a number of fac-
tors, among which design changes are probably the most important,
there has been a tendency in recent years to underestimate the ulti-
mate cost of ships. This has necessitated going back to the Congress
each year for additional funds to complete programs already started.
As a matter of policy we have decided to reprice all ship programs
to completion. Part of the additional money required to fully fund
the shipbuilding program to completion will be made available by
dropping four new ships and one conversion from the 1960 program.
The balance is included in the 1961 request.
Included among the new ships is a conventionally powered attack
carrier. Last year the Congress appropriated advance procurement
funds for a nuclear-powered carrier. These funds, with the approval
of the Congress, will be applied to the new carrier.
It is generally agreed that a nuclear-powered attack carrier has
certain definite military advantages, such as extended range and en-
durance at high sustained speeds. But these advantages are not
overriding as in the case of a submarine. In a submarine, nuclear
power provides the critical advantage of almost unlimited operation,
submerged, at high speeds. This enables nuclear-powered submarines
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to carry out missions which no conventionally powered submarine,
no matter how modern, could accomplish.
Such is not the case with respect to the carrier. The advantages
of nuclear power, here, are not critical. The primary requirement in
a carrier, today, is up-to-date facilities to operate, safely and effect-
tively, the most modern naval aircraft. Use of a conventional power-
plant of the most modern design will in no way compromise the ability
of a carrier to function as a completly modern and mobile base for
fleet aircraft for its foreseeable life. The additional $130 million
which a nuclear-powered carrier would cost can be used to much
greater advantage for other currently pressing purposes such as anti-
submarine warfare, in which this committee has expressed a great
and helpful interest.
The need for this carrier is urgent. If we are to maintain strong
carrier task forces, capable of meeting high performance enemy air-
craft on equal terms, they must possess the most modern equipment.
The Essex-class carriers, one of which this new carrier would replace,
cannot be further adapted to the operation of such fast, heavy aircraft
and should be assigned to other missions as soon as possible. I
strongly urge this committee and the Congress to support our request
for another conventionally powered attack carrier.
Funds are also included for a second increment of the fleet rehabili-
tation and modernization program. An additional 14 World War II
destroyers will undergo major modernization in 1961 to improve their
antisubmarine-warfare capabilities and to extend their useful life.
Short of additional new construction, this is one of the most promising
methods ydt devised to offset the block obsolescence of the fleet and
improve its antisubmarine-warfare capabilities.
The antisubmarine-warfare forces of the Navy will be significantly
improved in fiscal year 1961 in many other ways. Included in the
new ships I mentioned earlier are 22 with antisubmarine warfare as a
primary mission. These will be equipped with our latest antisub-
marine-warfare systems. Several new items of antisubmarine-warfare
equipment will be introduced in the coming fiscal year. ASROC, a
rocket-assisted torpedo and depth bomb; several new types of sonar
equipment; and DASH, a drone antisubmarine-warfare helicopter, are
scheduled to become operational for the first time. In addition, a
new all-weather search helicopter, the HSS-2, and a new improved
carrier-based antisubmarine-warfare aircraft, the S2F-3, will be intro-
duced into the fleet during 1961. Funds are provided in this budget
for the procurement of additional quantities of these aircraft, missiles
and equipment.
The overall ASW capabilities of the Navy are still far from satisfac-
tory in view of the magnitude of the threat. As a result of this com-
mittee's concern about the submarine threat, the Congress
appropriated an additional $137,300,000 last year for augmentation
of the antisubmarine warfare program. This amount, including $45
million for research and development and $92.3 million for procure-
ment, has been made available for use by the Navy. If any break-
throughs are achieved, additional resources can be made available from
the emergency fund as was done in 1959. The 1961 program will
include the development of improved tracking equipment, depth
charges, and new antisubmarine missiles, as well as sharply increased
research in the vital field of oceanography.
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?7?111Additional aircraft'and missiles for other Navy missions will also be
procured in 1961, including the supersonic A3J attack aircraft, the
all-weather 'F8U-2N and Ir4H interceptors, and the. GV-1 tanker-
!assault trahaport 'aircraft (adapted froin the 0-130): In the missile
-Category; additional TALOS TERRIER, and TARTAR fleet air de;-
,
-fense"Missiles' will be'procuredi as well as? additional quantities of the
*air-to-air missiles, SPARROW and SIDEWINDER.'
' . GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES
? r
. .
?
The major elements of the ground and tactical air forces will be
continued through fiscal year 1961 at about their present levels?the
Army with 14 divisions and numerous other major.combat units; the
Marine ,Coriis, 3 combat divisions .and 3 aircraft ivings; and the Air
Force with 33 tactical wings (including 11 troop carrier wings): The
overalljeombat capability of these forces will be significantly enhanced
during .1961 through the introduction of substantial,quantities of new
weapons and equipritent. In: the case of the Army, for example, the
M40 tank; the 7.62-millimeter family of RI-jail arnis, the new jeep, and
the new armored personnel carrier will ,all begin to enter the inventory
in quantity for the first time.] The Army also receive the first
iiioduction quantities of the LITTLE JOHN and SERGEANT ,sur-
face-to-surface tactical missiles, and the man-carried nuclear-capable
recket, DAVY CROCKETT: ", The Marine Corps, toe, will receive
its'first increthent of the 7.62-millimeterdifie and machinegun,, as well
as DAVY CROCKETT, and t additional quantities.: of BULLPUP
air-to-surface tactical. missiles.. 0 t ; . ; , ? ?
$200 million of the $375 niillion.addechby the Congresslast year for
NIKE-ZEUS ,preproduction and/or :Army modernization are planned
fcir obligation in 1960 for modernization. I .Thebalance of $175 million;
including $137.infflien for NIKE-ZEUS, Will be carried into 1961.
The 1961...budget will provide, funds to ,continiie the Modernization
of our. ground forces. Well oVer 20,000.combat and tactical -v eh' cies
of.allikinds are planned for procurement in 1961 including.additibnal
quantities of Jthe M-60. tank, 'tank recovery vehicles, air :droppable
personnel Carriers, trucks, jeeps, etc. In additien; the Army will begin
the procurement of a new famiy. of 'self-propelled artillery which will
be/lighter, more mobile, and will have greater range, than. the types
currently available.-
. Both the Army and ,Marine CorpsMill ibuy additional quantities Of
amide :variety 'ot?guided,miSsiles and ,rocketa including, in addition to
those already mentioned, HONEST JOHN, LACROSSE[JIAWK;
REDEYE, and a new,wire-guided 1antit? missile. ,The?,REDEYE
is anew, man-carried; bazooka-type weapon designed' for defense.of
forward combat forces against low level air attack. .?
Army aviation will be further modernized through the procurement
of additional quantities of Mohawk turboprop observation aircraft,
Caribou transports, and Iroquois utility helicopters. The first pro-
duction quantities of the Chinook helicopter will also be bought in
1961. ?
While the Marine Corps provides much of its own air support, the
Army relies on the Air Force for such support. After considerable
study we are convinced that this is still the most effective arrangement.
We have given special attention in the 1961 budget to the needs of the
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Army in this area? and have provided for a sUbstantially increased
procurement of 'the F-105 tactical fighter tO increase the direct. air
support available to the-Army.' The F-40,5 is a modern, high' per-
formance, All weather aircraft With special low altitude handling
characteristics and a large carrying capacity ? for both nuclear and
nonnuclear weapons. The F-105 is now entering the inventory in
sizable numbers and -should centribute sigificantly to the close air
support of Army ground operations.
There is a pressing requirement tb initiateithe modernization of the
MATS fleet. Although ,no'w quantitatively' adequate, much of the
present MATS fleet is obsolescent. Failure to initiate a moderniza-
tion program will adversely affect the ability of the fleet to meet future
Military requirement? for airlift.. Accordingly, this budget provides
$50Million to take the first steps on such a program.
?
RESERVE FORCES
With, respect to the Reserve Forces, we are .again recommending a
i0. percent reduction in the Army National 'Guard and the Army
Reserve?from 400,000. and 300;000 respectively to 360,000 and
270,000, 'by the end of fiscal year 1961. However,. during 1960, they
will be maintained at the 'levels desired by the Congress. The other
Reserve conii;onents?the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserve
and the Air Force National Guard?will reinain .at about their present
levels.
The Army :National Guard. and the Army Reserve together con-
stitute 70 percent of the number of reservists on drill pay status. The
average cost per man 'on drill pay status for all Reserve components
has increased. steadily Over -the years and is. noNtr 'estimated .at about
$1,200 per year. One. of the most important factors in this .increasing
bostlias"beon the 6-month active duty training program for reservists.
HoweVer, 'all. the Reserve coinponents, and particularly the ArinY
National. Guard andi ReserVe; ? have 'benefited,' considerably from this
program.,;' By providing basically trained' pers'onnel; it has permitted
these Reserve,components to,concentrate on unit training and mobili-
zationreadiness: The Army National. Guard and 'Reserve are how
better trained and equipped. and are' at &higher state of readiness than
they have ever been. before 'in our peacetime'. history. We feel that,
parallel With the 'reduction S in the size of the Active 'Forces as new
and more powerful weapons- have been introduced, a similar .shift in
emphasis away from mere numbers in 'the Reserve Forces can be
ma,de.without affecting their overall combat capability.
? 'It' has been some time now since we 'have had a comprehensive
review Of the role's and missions of the Reserve Forces. I think we all
recognize that if the Reserve components are to serve effectively in
time of war, their .basic organization and objectives must be kept
compatible with the organization and Objectives of the Active Forces:
During the next, :several months the Defense Department will
reexamine the roles and missions of the Reserve components in relation
to those of .the Active Forces and in the light of the changing character
of warfare: ?
? Mr. Chairman, the rapid pace of science and technology has greatly
complicated the task of planning and formulating the annual defense
program and budget. The costs of developing new weapons systems
50026-60-2
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are now so large and the risk of obsolescence so great that sound
experienced technical judgment has assumed a place of key importance
in the entire military planning, programing, and budgeting process.
This fact has been recognized by both the military and civilian officials
of the Defense Department.
STRENGTHENING OF TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS
During the last year we have sought to find new ways to strengthen
our technical organizations. Within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, technical and scientific responsibilities have been brought
together under the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
Our latest action was to place the Advance Research Projects Agency
directly under his supervision. This completes the program started
in 1958, with the aid of this committee, when ARPA was first estab-
lished to handle those research projects which had not yet developed
to a point where they could be assigned, logically, to any one of the
services. Now that civilian space projects are being concentrated in
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the develop-
ment of military space projects has progressed to a point where they
can be assigned to the military services, ARPA will be able to turn
its full attention to truly advanced research.
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. York, has
strengthened his staff in the last year and will continue to improve
his organization. Our goal is an organization which can bring to bear
experienced and sound technical judgment at each stage of the devel-
opment of a new weapon system?starting at the beginning with a
technical evaluation of the military requirement. In this way we
hope to improve and expedite our decision making processes on the
choice of new projects and the continuation of old ones.
The proposed transfer of the SATURN project to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration does not mean that the Depart-
ment of Defense has no further interest in large boosters or the national
space program generally. We intend to continue our close relations
with NASA in matters of common interest. We shall follow their
work very closely so that any new military applications which may
flow therefrom can be promptly exploited.
The Department of Defense, however, is not interested in space
flight and exploration as ends in themselves. Our space efforts are
an integral part of our overall military program and will complement
other military capabilities. As space technology expands, new military
requirements are very likely to materialize. Our objectives, therefore,
are (1) the development, production and operation of space systems
which will enhance the overall defense program; and (2) the develop-
ment of components for systems the need for which cannot be clearly
demonstrated at this time, but which probably will become necessary
in the future. Thus, considering the nature of our space objectives
it is not logical to formulate a long range military space program which
is separate and distinct from the overall defense program.
While we are admittedly behind the Russians in the development
of very large thrust boosters, the use of IRBM's and ICBM's as first
stage boosters for our near-earth satellites provides us with a payload
capability adequate for our immediate military needs. Within a year
or two we will have considerably more weight-carrying ability with
our improved upper stage space vehicles.
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DEVELOPMENT OF 1961 BUDGET
Before presenting the usual brief fiscal summary, I would like to
outline our general approach to the preparation of the 1961 budget.
It was considered, in the light of the international situation, the
state of military technology, and the general economic and fiscal
situation, that the 1960 level of expenditures?about $41 billion?
would be a reasonable point of departure for the preparation of the
1961 Defense budget. This was to serve as a general guide and not
as a final determination of the 1961 budget?either in total or for the
individual services.
In order to assist in bringing the major issues into focus, it was
agreed that each of the military departments would use planning
objectives aggregating somewhat less than the 1960 level for the
development of what we call their basic budgets. It was contemplated
that these basic budgets would include the hard core of top priority
requirements for combat-ready forces; military hardware; and new
weapon systems development; together with the related construction.
In addition, each service was requested to submit up to $500 Inillion
in new obligational authority above the 1960 level for any other de-
sirable programs, bringing the total new obligational authority to
about $43.7 billion and net expenditures to about $41.8 billion. Fur-
thermore, the services were not precluded from submitting items over
and above these limits, and in fact the Army, Air Force, and ARPA
did just that.
All the budget requests, totaling $43.9 billion in new obligational
authority and $42.6 billion in net expenditures, were then reviewed by
the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense by program?on a
defensewide, across-the-board basis.
This year a particular effort was made to assure that all the prin-
cipal officials of the Department of Defense?the Service Secretaries,
the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and the Chiefs of Staff, both in
their individual capacities and in their corporate capacity as the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?participated in the review of the annual program and
budget. The staff of the JCS was furnished various evaluations,
analyses, and data by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to facili-
tate the examination of the budget by the JCS from a military point
of view.
We also had the benefit this year of the active participation of the
new Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
established by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.
The Defense budget developed in this manner was then presented
to the President. The major issues relating to the composition and
size of our military forces, to the choice of weapons systems, to the
timing of procurement, and to the nature of the Defense research]. and
development effort were thoroughly reviewed. The Service Secre-
taries and the Chiefs of Staff then presented their individual views
and comments on the defense program and budget proposed for
fiscal year 1961. As a final step in the process, the Defense budget
was again discussed with the President in the National Security
Council.
In summary, the fiscal year 1961 Department of Defense budget,
as approved by the President, provides: (a) For military functions, a
total of $40,577 million in new obligational authority and $350 million
to be derived by transfer from the revolving funds of the Department
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of Defense in lieu of new appropriations; (b) for military assistance,
a total of $2 billion in new obligational authority.
Net expenditures are estimated at $40,995 million for military func-
tions and. $1,750 million for military assistance.
The 1961 budget request includes $150 million in new obligational
authority and $150 million in transfer authority for the Department of
Defense emergency fund, the same amounts provided by the Congress
last year. We are also requesting the reenactment of section 633 of
the 1960 act, which would provide us with $150 million in transfer
authority for strategic and tactical missiles.
Of the total amount recommended for 1961, $39,335 million in new
obligational authority and the amounts to be derived by transfer are
contained M the bill now before you. The $1,188 million for military
construction, the $24 million for later transmittal (retired pay) and
the $2 billion for military assistance will be presented separately. $30
million (Wherry Act housing) is for reappropriation.
This budget will provide for a military force structure of about the
same size and composition as planned for the end of the current fiscal
year. The Army with 870,000 men will ,support 14 divisions and
numerous other major combat units; the Navy with a strength of
619,000 will man 817 ships; and the Marine Corps with 175,000 men
will continue to support 3 combat divisions and 3 aircraft wings. The
Air Force with a strength of 825,000 will man 91 combat wings at the
end of 1961.
Active duty military manpower levels will remain constant during
fiscal year 1961 although the planned beginning strengths will be
somewhat lower in the case of the Navy and the Air Force than the
actual levels on June 30, 1959.
In maintaining a balance in and ainong all of the forces and pro-
grams of the Defense Department, it was felt that a 175,000-man
Marine Corps was adequate. Furthermore, during 1961, with im-
proved personnel management and a lower-than-normal loss of
personnel, the Marine Corps will be able to allocate a larger percent-
age of its strength to the combat forces. This will permit the reactiva-
tion by the end of 1961 of a number of battalion landing teams without
any increase in overall strength. The additional funds provided by
the Congress last year to maintain the Marine Corps at 200,000 will,
therefore, not be used.
This budget does not provide everything that everyone would like
to have, but in my judgment it does provide for those programs which
are essential to our national security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
assured me that they will support this budget.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate your
patience and courtesy in listening to this rather lengthy statement.
I felt that it was important to describe the 1961 Defense budget in
some detail and to show how our policies and programs related to our
total national strategy.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF SECRETARY GATES
Thomas Sovereign Gates, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa., was born in Germantown,
Pa., on April 10, 1006, He has been a lifelong resident of the Philadelphia area.
He is the son of the late Thomas S. Gates, former president of the University of
Pennsylvania.
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He attended ?Chestnut Hill Academy and the University of Pennsylvania, from
which he graduated in 1928.
After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania in 1928, Mr. Gates
joined the firm of Drexel & Co., investment bankers. In 1940, Mr. Gates was
made a partner in this firm. In addition, he has been a director of the Beaver
Coal Corp. the Scott Paper and the International Basic Economy Corp.
During World War II, Mr. Co.,tes was commissioned in the Naval Reserve and
served on active duty from April 1, 1942, until his release to inactive duty in
October 1945. He graduated from the Quonset Point Air Intelligence School,
and was then assigned to Commander in Chief, Atlantic, to help in the organiza-
tion and development of the Naval Air Intelligence Center under that command.
In the spring of 1943, he was assigned to the U.S.S. Monterey and served in the
Pacific for approximately 1 year. In the summer of 1944, he was assigned to
the staff of Rear Adm. Calvin T. Durgin (now vice admiral, retired), and served
on that staff during the invasion of southern France. Immediately following
this, he was sent back to the Pacific where he remained until the end of the war,
taking part in the?Philippine liberation and the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns.
For his war service, Mr. Gates was awarded the Bronze Star and a Gold Star in
lieu of a second Bronze Star. In December 1953 he was promoted to captain,
USNR, and placed on the retired list.
Since the war, Mr. Gates has kept up.his interest in the Navy by being active
in the organization of Reserve Officers of the Naval Service; serving as a director
and national vice president of the Navy League of the United States and serving
as 'a member of the Naval Advisory Council of the Bureau of Aeronautics. In
addition, he is a member of the Pennsylvania Commandery of the Military Order
of Foreign Wars of the United States. ?
Mr. Gates has also been actiQ?In civic affairs in the.Philadelphia area, having
been president of the Associated Hospital Services of Philadelphia; director of
the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic; director of the Community Chest of
Philadelphia and vicinity; director of Health Services, Inc.; a member of the
Finance Development Committee of the United Services Organization, and on
the Philadelphia Council of the Boy Scouts of America. He is a trustee and
member of the executive board of the University of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Gates was appointed Under Secretary of the Navy by President Eisenhower
and assunied that office in October 1953. One of the first assignments was as
Chairman of the Navy Reorganization Committee. On April 1, 1957, he suc-
ceeded the Honorable Charles S. Thomas as Secretary of the Navy. On Feb-
ruary 10, 1959, President Eisenhower accepted Mr. Gates' resignation as Secre-
tary of the Navy: Subsequently, on the, death of the then Deputy Secretary of
Defense Donald A. Quarles, Mr. Gates was nominated to the position and was
sworn into that office on June 8, 1959. He became Secretary of Defense on
December 2, 1959.
Mr. Gates is married to the former Millicent Anne Brengle. Their children
are Millicent Anne (Mrs. Joseph Ponce), Patricia S. (Mrs. William K. Norris),
and Katherine.
(Note: See p. 132.)
Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for this very
helpful statement. We will now proceed with the statement of
General Twining.
General Twining, during what period were you Chief of Staff of the
Air Force?
General TWINING: 1953 to 1957.
Mr. MAHON. When did you become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?
General TWINING. August 1957.
Mr. MAHON. When does your present term expire?
General TWINING. August 1961.
MT. MAHON. Proceed.
General TWINING. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
I would like to proceed with this presentation as I did last year and
have the 'bulk of it off the record because it is very highly classified.
Then we could go as we did last year with questions and' answers and
prepare those for what kind of release we want.
Mr. MAHON. Will you submit a sanitized statement for the record?
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General TWINING. I do not believe it would work, sir, because it
would not be very helpful since it is pretty condensed and very highly
classified.
STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, it is
my privilege to appear before you today to present our best estimate
of the Communist military threat to our country, together with a
review of our capabilities to counter this threat.
Today we hear and read a tremendous volume of material compar-
ing the strength of the United States and the free world with that of
the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc.
All too often the writers and commentators are inclined to degrade
the capabilities of the American people and the peoples of the free
world. At the same time, the efforts of the Soviet Union and the
Communist bloc are reported in glowing terms.
The plain and unadultered truth of the matter is that the moral,
military, physical, and economic strengths of our people and of our
allies have been adequate to resist and deter Communist aggression. I
am confident that this will continue to be the case.
We cannot, however, in this day of exploding worldwide competition
on all fronts, be content to maintain the status quo. We must also
realize that the preservation of our freedom in the years ahead may
require greater sacrifices from us than those made by Americans who
have walked before us.
Our Nation is not defenseless. Our Nation is not populated by a
people who are ready to knuckle under to a rocket-rattling dictator-
ship. I am quite certain that the American people will fight with all
weapons available in the national arsenal should such a fight be
required to preserve our freedom and that of our allies.
(The remainder of General Twining's statement was made off the
record.)
Mr. MAHON. We will resume at 2 o'clock.
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. MAHON. The committee will come to order. You may proceed.
General TWINING. Very well.
(General Twining continued his classified presentation.)
PRESENT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
Mr. MAHON. I sympathize with the military in making presenta-
tions to Congress. If you seem too satisfied and happy with the
situation and seem to think you are absolutely invincible, you are
confronted with a problem. If you take a position of timidity and
come up here with long faces and say, "Gentlemen, we are in trouble,
we want more and more defense dollars," you are confronted with
another problem.
In my long period of service on the committee this is the most
enthusiastic and rosy and reassuring presentation that we have ever
had. I think we will not want to overlook what I assume to be the
fact that in the event of an all-out war between the Soviet Union
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and the United States today, the destruction which the Soviet Union
could deliver upon us and the destruction which we could deliver
upon the Soviet Union would be greater than ever before in our history.
I think that it would be greater now than it was last year and the
year before, and I think when the next year rolls around the capability
for mutual destruction will have further increased.
I would like to have you gentlemen comment with respect to this
statement I have made
Secretary GATES. I would agree with you.
General TWINING. Yes, that is right.
Mr. MAHON. In other words, we live, as the President said, in an
age of peril, and the possibility of destruction?not necessarily the
probability?is, it seems to me, increasing with the passing of the
years.
? Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. MAHON. I think it is that fact which causes the President to
want to do everything in his power to bring about an atmosphere of
peace and good will because this age of peril is quite intolerable from
several standpoints.
? Now it is obvious to me that in this presentation you have had in
in mind some of the critical things which have been said with respect
to the capability of the United States and the Department of Defense.
You have had in mind, I think, various columns in the press and
statements made by various political and nonpolitical figures. I think
we are all interested in one thing, and that is facing up to the truth
and to the facts of life from the standpoint of national defense.
CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES
Now is there any likelihood, Mr. Secretary, that in your very well
prepared statements you have overly reassured us as to our capa-
bilities?
Secretary GATES. I would not have that intention, Mr. Mahon.
The intent was to be as factual and as accurate as we knew how to
be, and certainly not to be complacent. The efforts we are making
are to build as invulnerable a deterrent as possible and as quickly
as we can, taking into account our present power vis-a-vis the Rus-
sians. If this deterrent ever goes into operation after we are attacked,
as you say, worldwide destruction will be enormous and will be in-
creasing. We have not intended to present a rosy picture. We have
intended to state the facts as we see them.
Mr. MAHON. General Twining, you spoke very feelingly about our
defense capabilities. While you have not said so, I had the feeling
as you spoke?and most of your discussion was off the record?that
probably you feared that the United States was being sold short in
the eyes of the American people and in the eyes of the world with
respect to our military prowess.
What is your feeling about that matter?
General TWINING. We are in a position now, as you say, where we
can annihilate each other. We must not let that ever happen. That
is why we are having all of this business going on?disarmament and
all that. The only way we can deal with this fellow is not to tell
him how deficient we are today; we are prone to do this at times,
because it gets us more money. it is the democratic system and I am
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not bucking it, but I think it is very dangerous. We have great
strength, we are a powerful country, and I do not think we should
downgrade our capabilities as a nation to the Russians. That is
what gives me great cause for concern?this downgrading of our
capability. It looks like we are going to get licked every day. I am
afraid that the public will become frightened some day. It sometimes
appears to me that there is an element in the country that thinks,
"gentlemen, we better be Red than be dead." It is a serious thing.
My point is, let us not downgrade our capability at a time when
we are entering upon negotiations which may lead to peace and dis-
armament. We want to deal from strength. We have terrific strength
in the military and in our country. We know what we have. We
do not know what he has, although I believe that our intelligence
system is improving all the time.
I did not mean to be complacent at all. I am still concerned by
the same possibilities that you are, that an enemy might some day
launch an attack and that would be awful. We would take a lot of
losses in our population and we would have to strike back and do the
sam.e thing to him. I do not think it is going to happen.
Mr. MAHON. You have confirmed to me your feeling that you are
deeply disturbed by the possibility that we Might convince the oppo-
nent that we do not have the fighting strength which you feel we have.
General TWINING. That is right. If he thinks we are not confident
of our national capability h.e may assume that there is an open gate
for him., Similarly, we should not build up in oiir own people this lack
of confidence in our national capability.
Mr. MAHON. You do not feel, I assume, that the American people
would be in any way disposed to knuckle under to the rattling of
missiles as a result of this controversy over the relative strength of the
people of the two countries?
General TWINING. Not at the moment, but I am afraid that such
an attitude could be generated or could be building up if our Nation
is portrayed continually as second best.
Mr. MAHON. Do you have any comment on that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary GATES. No. I can verify the fact that when we discuss
at the summit meeting disarmament questions, NATO problems,
security problems generally, we have to deal from a hand of strength.
We have to have great military strength to carry out our foreign policy.
I subscribe to that statement of General Twining's. I think it is im-
portant that the American people realize the fact of what our capabil-
ities are.
There has been some concern, I think, about the propaganda slogan
of "The spirit of Camp David," that may tend to make us loosen our
guard a bit. I trust we will never be so foolish as to do that.
ADEQUACY OF ICBM PROGRAM
Mr. MAHON. There are those who will say with respect to this
budget that we are moving toward dropping our guard because we are
not doing more. What is your thought there?
Secretary GATES. We do not share that opinion, Mr. Chairman.
We feel we have a good rounded program and a diversified and strong
mixture of weapon systems to protect our strength and deterrent
capability.
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Mr. MAHON: I am not disposed to blarne anyone?I suspect there
is enough praise and blame for everybody in the picture?but I think
we have to agree we have lost d, propaganda battle with respect to the
conquest of space, and with respect to the ICBM. I do not think
that there is any doubt about that.
Secretary GATES. If I may comment, I do not think they ought to
be directly related. We are temporarily behind in the space busi-
ness?for whatever propaganda advantage that may have. That is
because they have a larger booster capability than we have.
Mr. MAHON. Yes.
Secretary GATES. Shooting the moon has very little relationship to
effective weapon systems as of this generation, or. these years that we
are discussing. I think that they should be separated. A military
weapon system should be separated from a space propaganda question
and clearly explained.
Mr. MAHON. When we admit that we are behind in the inter-
continental ballistic missile area, of course that has military signifi-
cance. We have admitted that; is that not true? .
Dr. YORK. In terms of numbers of missiles only; not in terms of the
status of development.
-Mr. MAnoisr. Notin terms of the Status of the deVelopment, or the
quality of the missile? ?
Secretary GATES. There was a very significant matter brought out
by Mr. Dulles, and it was brought out by General Twining. Hereto-
fore, we have been giving you intelligence figures that dealt with the
theoretical Soviet capability. This is the first time that we have had
an intelligence estimate that says, "This is what the Soviet Union
probably will do." Therefore, the great divergence, based on figures
that have been testified to in years past, narrows because we talked
before about a different set of comparisons?ones that were based
on Soviet capabilities. This present one is an intelligence estimate
on what we, believe he probably will do, not what he is capable of
doing.
Mr. MAHON. That is what you are doing this year?.
Secretary GATES. Yes. It is a very significant change.
Mr. MAHON. It is much More helpful.
I will now read from a Washington Post story by John Norris,
who is a reputable and able reporter, under date of January
Last winter Neil H. McElroy, then the Secretary of Defense, admitted publicly
that if the Russians build all the ICBM's they can and if the United States
produces the number it now plans, the U.S.S.R. will maintain a 3 to 1 lead through
the early sixties.
I assume he means, though he does not say,' 1960, 1961, 1962, and
1963?during that period.
?
In explaining this unhappy ratio, he said it stemmed from an Administration
decision not to try to."match Russia, missile for misSile," but to rely On American
superiority in Air Force and carried-based bombers, plus available ICBM's,
IRBM's, and POLARIS submarines. '
Those who argued at that time and since that such a policy was too risky won
support from an unexpected quarter, yesterday. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA,
retired, who, while Army Chief of Staff, contended that the United States had
too much "massive deterrent" and too little conventional war strength, confessed
that he has "reluctantly" come to accept the "reality and significance of the so-
called missile &p." " ?
','Somehow 'it-must be made clear to ,our citizens that 'the Nation will face, a
serious crisis beginning about 1961," he said in a just published book. "For a
period of years thereafter the balance of military strength will tip dangerously
in favor of the Communist bloc unless we take drastic action now."
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I read these statements in order to be provocative, frankly, and in
order to get your best comment.
Your presentation has shown that in the intercontinental ballistic
missile field we will continue to lag behind the Soviet Union during
the early years of the 1960 decade. You have argued very eloquently
that we must not consider this as being too significant. You talk
about the POLARIS and you talk about the carriers and you talk
about the bombers. Now let us just face up to it. Is this missile
lag worth worrying about too much, or not; and if it is worth worrying
about, are we doing enough about it? That is the issue as I see it.
Secretary GATES. Mr. McElroy made such a statement in his
testimony last year. He also made that statement on a television
program in December. But he was always very careful to say that
this would be true only if they do what it is estimated they are capable
of doing; and that is the very point that I was talking about earlier.
Secretary McElroy was operating on the basis of capability figures
that produced, on a theoretical capability basis, something that was
like 3 to 1. This new intelligence estimate has narrowed the
differences.
(Statement off the record.)
Mr. MAHON. Percentagewise how much have we narrowed that
gap in the intercontinental ballistic missiles? I am not speaking of
the bombers?other weapons.
Secretary GATES. We have not figured that percentagewise, but
we could do it for you.
General TWINING. Could we give it to you for the record? It would
be a little trying to do it here.
Mr. MAHON. I am speaking only of the ICBM's and I assume that
during part of the period 1960, 1961, and 1962 they will have a sub-
stantial superiority. The most critical years are probably 1961 and
1962.
If we are going to bring this issue out on the record, which we
probably will have to do before it is all over, we might just as well nail
it down now. I do not think that it serves us well to get into a big
argument as to whether or not there will be an ICBM gap. It is a
question of how much it will be and how significant it will be.
Secretary GATES. You asked if we should just not worry about this
point. Obviously we should pay a great deal of attention to it.
However, the numbers alone are misleading because we are dealing
in a complex situation under changing circumstances. Factors that
deal with time of warning, relative hardening, dispersal, mobility,
and most important, accuracy must also be considered. If you change
any factor in this formula you change the result. You require a great
deal more missiles of equivalent yield to knock out a hardened base
than an unhardened base. If you have a half-hour warning the factors
are a great deal more in your favor than if you have a 15-minute
warning. If you have great accuracy you require fewer missiles than
if you have missiles with less accuracy. So, necessarily, the numbers
cannot be evaluated without evaluating the other parts of the story.
Mr. MAHON. I agree.
Secretary GATES. Most important is the reliability and the accuracy.
Mr. MAHON. But for the purpose of this one question, I am seeking
now to evaluate only the matter of numbers in the ICBM field. Of
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course, we have had those numbers presented to us here. I do not
think that you will want to give the numbers in the record because
you have already given them to us off the record, but since you said
last year the ratio would be 3 to 1 then I think you are probably
going to be compelled during this discussion, sooner or later, to say
whatever it might be.
Secretary GATES. I would hope, Mr. Mahon, that we would not
continue to discuss publicly these number problems. I would hope
we would attempt to inform the American people what the real
problem is which brings all these other matters into consideration.
I said in my statement something about the difference of numbers
peaking probably in 1962. Really I am not trying to hide anything,
or not fully disclosing all facts that should be disclosed. But the
numbers are only a part of the intelligence estimate and they do not
mean much unless you consider the other factors that I mentioned.
Mr. MAHON. Before we print this testimony make up your mind as
to what you are willing to state for the record, and if you are later
going to state for the record what the percentage comparison is you
might just as well say it now. If you think that you can avoid saying
it, it is all right with me. You have given us all the facts. You are
not withholding anything at all. I do not want the record to indicate
that.
Mr. THOMAS. Could you not work out two formulas? Why not
work out the numbers of ICBM's. Then work out another formula
putting into effect the other elements involved?the Russians have
so many more targets to hit, the time factor, accuracy of the guidance
systems, and so forth. Let him work it out on that basis and the
probability is it will show that we are 15 or,25 percent stronger.
Secretary Gates. We could make a whole series of statistical
estimates, but the trouble is that we do not know exactly what his
accuracy is. We do not know exactly how much warning time we are
going to have.
Mr. THOMAS. Give him the highest estimate and still you can make
a good showing.
Secretary GATES. We are going to stand on our testimony, which is
based upon the best judgment in the United States, the national
intelligence estimate.
Mr. MAHON. Not for one moment would I urge you to present a
picture that sells the United States short and confuses Congress or the
country. I think we are entitled to know the facts with respect to all
segments of the picture and, insofar as we appropriately can, give
those facts to the Congress and the public through this printed record.
You do the best you can on this thing.
Secretary GATES. Yes.
(The following statement was subsequently submitted:)
It has been stated on previous occasions that the Soviet superiority in
ICBM's could be in the order of 3 to 1 in the period 1960-63. This statement was
based upon estimates of what the U.S.S.R. could produce in numbers of missiles
and was not an affirmative statement of fact that the U.S.S.R. would produce
the number of missiles required to attain this superiority.
On the basis of our current intelligence estimate, which has been presented to
the committee by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, we do not now
believe that the Soviet superiority in ICBM's will be as great as that previously
estimated.
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'RETALIATORY AND DETERRENT FORCES
Mr. MAHON. I do not know that you have made it clear, though
you sought to make it clear?in our calculations, among other things,
we calculated we might, be hit first because we would not be an ag-
gressor.
Secretary GATES. Yes: .
Mr. MAHON. Therefore, you argue that the opponent must not only
be able to launch a massive- attack upon this country, but he must be
able to launch an attack upon specific military targets if he is hoping
to destroy our retaliatory power?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. MAHON. If he fails to destroy our retaliatory power in his.
first blow, of course?
Secretary GATES. He commits suicide. ?
Mr. MAHON. He commits suicide. So be has a different problem
from us?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. MAHON. We would not in our retaliation, of course, have to
locate and destroy ICBM bases and bomber bases in the opponent's
country because our retaliation would be a different type of effort
than the original effort made against us; is that about correct?
Secretary GATES. It is bard to say in a situation of this kind,
involving world devastation, precisely what we would do, sir. How-
ever, it would be correct to say that in order to maintain a valid
deterrent we have to maintain a deterrent force capable of knocking
out his military power and not just bombing his cities. What we
would actually do depends on circumstances, but we are adjusting
our power to a counterforce theory; or a mixture of a counterforce
theory plus attacks on industrial centers and things of that character.
We are not basing our requirements on just bombing Russia for retalia-
tion purposes. Do I make that clear?
The validity of our deterrent must be of such a character?am I
doing all right on this, General Twining??that an enemy will believe
his military power will be devastated. What we actually do in this
sort of period in a real operation is something else. I do not know
for sure.
Mr. MAHON. To some extent you are saying
Secretary GATES. I am saying it is a very complicated matter.
Mr. MAHON. I am not trying to put words in your mouth, but in
a sense you are saying that while we want to be able to inflict massive
retaliation, we want and we will have, or must have, more than a
massive retaliation capability, and ideally we would like to be able to
destroy all his military targets and launching bases in the event of
war? What, is your comment on that?
General TWINING. That is right. The .forces that he will have to
hit are deployed worldwide. ? Our striking forces are deployed world-
wide. Theirs are not. Assuming that he does strike first, we are
going to take some losses in our striking force, ho question.
Mr. FLOOD. The deterrent element is what exists in his mind, not
yours. Deterrence is a function of the mentality of the Russians.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. FLOOD. After he strikes you first he will give you casualties A.
He knows that. Now, you still strike him back. He will take casu-
alties B. What does he think you will have left after he bits you first
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to deliver a ii.ercentage,of.casualties ion him?, If his deterrent is what
he is willing to suffer upf tO.point 9 and, if you get?-to point 8; he will
hit you. If You get totpoint 9 en what he has to take; he will not hit
you. What does he think? What does he thinkle is ,willing,to take?
That is the deterrent quotient.. ' That is not`lhew.: We. have been
talking about that for 5 years.
You told me that, General Twining, 5 years ago.
Mr. MAnoN. You can check the record of last year with respect to
,What appears on that record With respect to this issue: It 'dOes sem
'a little shocking to he talking About poSsible operations that' Could
'take the lives of tens of millions of people as we smilingly approach
the summit, but probably it is best to continue. 'to face the facts of
life because only in that way can We successfully 'approach the summit.
General TWINING:This gets right into our war plans. We have
plans for these things.
Mr. MABGN. You have 'plans for various alternatives in the event
we are attacked?
General TWINING. Yes.
EFFECT OF INFLATION ON DEFENSE SPENDING
? , ;? ?
Mr. MAIION.P Withrespect-to the adeqtiacy of our defense?and We
'seem to feel that we stand on solid ground' now?the budget for the
-16,st few years dn. new. appropriations' and in. spending .have been
approximately at an even level. We all know that defense-costs are
going up. We have inflation and costs are going up, so you are going
to buy less defenselnext year than-you:bought.last:year,, and you are
buying this year, unless you are able to do a better job of the manage-
?inent. of those dollars1' ? Thi. leads .to a4i3estion'as:tO Whether or not,
wider you, 'Secretai?V' Gates, and' your 'succesaor; the ? defense 'postur'e
Will deteriorate. " yoti'Cominent.on that question?
Seeretary GATES. 'Well, I would notl?Wint to' 'fake Credit for this
because I have not 'yet been'cOnfirraed by the 'U.S. Senate.' ,? ?
; Mr. MAI:ION.I(HA,V6 110'fgr. -'1W'. ? e " '
Secretary GATES. But I would think that the managenierit 'had
improved. "fthink that' the Congress, toaSshig ' the., pay bill in-
creaseifer the military people;' has increased the quality and-stabilitY
of 'the' Armed Forces. I thmk ? that science 'and' technology have
given us ways of making more powerful weapons, and these offSet-the
'trends that you referred. ' ? ? '
We believe we have a good well-rounded program and have a ill:1M-
ber of new;' powerful WeaPon''systeniS 'coming along,' or 'hi 'being.
While' We hope 'that. we are .managing ? Well, I am- sure that,ive an
manage even better. than''?Ve a,re.now." ' ' "." ' ", O", '/.' 'P
Mr: MAirok.' DO'Yeti ha,Ve-"the feeling' that for `1960,'1961,' 1962,
1963, and 11964; defense gi3enclingish.ould be'in''.the'tendrall area 'Of
$41 billion?: ."' .1 1. )1 1 ..? .1,I. ;-
Secretary d'ArES:" Yes; because I leel.We'are strug-
gle with these People that .i.haY last' for the 'rest'of'yonr 'lifetime and
? the rest of my lifetime." This is going to be the' kind 'of spending that
is going to be 'required .to"have an adequ'ate' defenSe. Actually, ,the
present level of defense spending' i.S. a' high one-. It is aboirt,';$5M
'billion- higher than What it'iVastiii' 1955,'and, of 'Course; 'several 'times
? what it waS before' the KOien ih fact, it is onlyi'abOtit' $2%
billion under the Korean war peak.
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Mr. MAHON. I think you see my concern as to whether or not we
can keep the ceiling constant and level while the price of everything
is going up. Do you think that at least for the time being we need
not be unduly concerned about that?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
ADEQUACY OF DETERRENT
Mr. MAHON. I would like to ask you this question which is some-
what repititious: Do we have a sufficient force today to deter war, and
does this budget make sure that we are looking after our future
security adequately? That is a question of opinion.
Secretary GATES. In my judgment, we have.
Mr. MAHON. Do you share that view, General Twining?
General TWINING. I do, yes.
Mr. MAHON. You seem to have a very strong conviction that we
do have an adequate deterrent at this time, and you realize the
clifficult period is approaching, but you still have no fear as to our
possessing the strength to hold our own in this 1960 decade?
Secretary GATES. If you will couple with that judgment the fact
we cannot rest in our easy chairs and that we must continually review
the situation, I would say I am confident we are in good shape. We
are also in a kind of position in the world, however, where we should
not hesitate to come immediately back to the Congress if the cir-
cumstances change.
MILITARY USE OF HIGH-THRUST ROCKET ENGINES
Mr. MAHON. I will ask you a few questions more or less at random.
I believe the President said in his message, and you said as much in
your testimony here, that the high-thrust rocket engines of the
Soviets, while helpful to them in the space race, are not significant
from a military standpoint. I have the feeling that that statement
is probably open to question, and I would like to explore that a little.
with you.
If we are going to be able to use outer space to undertake to find out
what goes on worldwide, through reconnaissance satellites and other-
wise, is it not to one's advantage militarily to have the high thrust
engine?
Secretary GATES. I will try to give you a lay answer. Dr. York
might have a more expert answer.
For the satellites we are working on for reconnaissance purposes, or
warning purposes, or other military purposes that we have in mind,
we have no requirement for the kind of thrust in rocket engines that
is needed to make the type of shot the Soviet Union made to the moon.
We hive no present military requirement for the use of space that
we cannot handle with the present ICBM boosters or a slight aug-
mentation of them?a slight increase in their capabilities. I think
that it would be foolish to be backward and turn our eyes from space.
I am confident that someday there will be other military requirements
in space. This will probably occur, according to my scientific friends,
only when man has a place in space.
Now again, space is a confusing issue. We have the capability
to do the type of satellite work we feel is required for military purposes.
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'Phis was made very clear in the decision we had to make as to where
the Saturn project should reside: whether it should stay in the Depart-
ment of Defense or should be transferred to the National Aeronautics
and Space Agency.
We had a review in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we had a complete
military appraisal of our requirements to date. We decided that we
did not have any requirements in space that we could not handle
within the present orderly growth of our own engines. Someday, as
I say, other military requirements will exist in space.
Mr. MAHON. Dr. York, you are familiar with this question that
we are discussing.
Dr. YORK. I am.
Mr. MAHON. I have the feeling space vehicles do have military
significance. To what extent is that military significance applicable
to the mid-1960's?
Dr. YORK. It is applicable. We have already found four rather
specific applications of space vehicles to solving direct defense prob-
lems. I am not talking about psychology, or anything of that sort.
These are in connection with reconnaissance, early warning, naviga-
tion, and communication. The payloads that we presently perceive
as required for these are well within what we can get, using the
ICBM's and the upgraded forms of ICBM's that Secretary Gates
has mentioned. We are talking about requirements of say 2,000
pounds, using the existing boosters or slightly upgraded boosters.
We can get 10,000 to 12,000 pounds into orbit, which is five or six
times what the immediately foreseen requirement is.
Now this, as Secretary Gates mentioned, is assuming that you do
not have to have men aloft in military systems in space. If we do,
then we are going to need bigger boosters. For that reason, we are
very much interested in the Saturn program, and in our discussions
that preceded the transfer we made that clear to everyone concerned?
that we were transferring Saturn on the understanding that another
big booster of that sort would be continued because, although we
foresaw no specific requirement, we could not foreclose on the possi-
bility that one would arise, and lead times are quite long for this
kind of equipment.
Mr. MAHON. The Saturn project involves a cluster of engines that
would give us a thrust of how much?
Dr. YORK. About 1,500,000 pounds.
Mr. MAHON. I think it is well for us to discuss, and for the Presi-
dent and Secretary of Defense and you to discuss?the relationships
between space and the defense program. I think that there is a
rather clouded area here that needs clarification.
I have before me an article in the Washington Post of January 3,
from which I quote:
More than 2 years have passed since the launching of the first Sputnik and
the United States has yet to match what the Soviets did at the very start,
Sputnik II, launched November 3, 1957, weighed 1,120 pounds. The largest
payloads the United States has placed in orbit are the 440-pound capsules of
the military satellite project DISCOVERER.
The Russians have launched three lunar probes weighing respectively 797, 858,
and 614 pounds. Each completed its apparently intended mission, the first
passing close to the moon and going into orbit around the sun; the second hitting
the moon close to the center, and the third going behind the moon to take
photographs of the far side.
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,The largest lunar,probe launched by the United States weighed,only 39,pounds
and it wentionly one-third of the?wiy to the Moon. IA 13.4-pound unit,..WaS Sent
PaSethe' MOOT) into orbit'n'ionnd the &in." , '
;
? FrOin" the tinietable aimoun*cedt bY the National' AeronauticaqndiSpaCe, Ad-
ministration, this country will not attempt to match the Soviet accomplishments
before late 19601 ,Why, is it ,taking,so long? 1, ?,
? These thingg are'having their impact, upon the public mind in this
'country;' and no doubt abroad:, How!do you interpret this ,condition
in relation to our defense posture, arid how doiyou relate the statement
that I read to your statement lieretoday, Mr. Secretary?. .
? Secretary GATES.,l'attemlited to?answer..that'before when,I said' we
had no real military requirement for large payloads and-large boosters
at this time. I . : r .? ?
'MAHo'N.. Werivill not belabor it. 1 !t
Ni military. requirement,t; is that Your 'answer?: Will .you supple-
ment that, Dr. York??
?Dr. YORK That is right!) 'In the case of our.SAMOS and MIDAS
programs; the bottleneck is not rocketry, but the payload development
itself'and the.grbund equipment that.goes With it..f I
r. ' f t ? i ') I
" ? '1' ANTIMISSILE PROGRAM, NIKE-ZEiJS 't ,
/' . ?, !roi ? I
'Mr. MAnoN: I would /like ! tolnow: discuss .itbe; NIKE-ZEUS; tour
antimissile missile. .1: I, I f It ' : I 1,10,)
rGeneral Twining, have?we ever. been able to provide,a:perfect and
complete defense againSt a manned bomber?. r .,;
General TwiNnio.? ;Not 'complete ; no: At number; oft bombers,,will
probably; get, through, -but ,the defense is much?lbetter, than against
,the 1'i ? 'ff',1-0./-' ,?1 I 1 r,:il t'l .1
',Mr: MAnoic.. We can do .better defending ;against .the, bomber than
.we :can against tli.e' missile?.= -; 7, ? . t ,.?. tut ?
,Gellera;TWINING..?Very?much' so: ,rr ct,?1 ?,?[(1 ..!,
..Mr:MAHoN: In .World War III less than 4,percent of our, attacking
'bombers on the overall, as .I.understand,it; Were shot down. Is that
? dorrect; approximatelY?..rr 114 CI r)',, , ; ,!(
-a General .T.WINING.nYCSAHil 1)111.)././ 'ht() ?110 "1;1%1
Mr. MAHON. We would hope to knock down a much larger, percent-
age now?,,p. 141 -hr , I; e!1) Fl t)1,(11,1 frw i,?-' ,,,(T
General TWINING. Yes. ',of!
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Secretary, in view lof theifact,that we haVe never
?beeii!. able to: solve, to totir.complete satisfaction the matter ,ofIdefense
,against the manned -bornber, do you, have much. confidence -in, working
out a,reliableidefenSeragainA,the intercontinental ballistic missile? t,?!
Secretary GATES. Mr., ,Chairman? it is, loaded ;with , every, known
,kindi:of, difficulty land,- problem. ,?This ?isa strange; and t fast moving
world. I hope some day we will learn more about this problem from
the work ,we are doing in the antimissile, field; but what can ,actually
be dthie,,Only time Will tell. ?I`, ?, ,,; ?.? t
? The,NIKE-ZEUS:prograrn?was-given an, enormous ?amount of con-
Sideration by the President's 'Scientifie AdVisory Committee;- byi our
Scientific, Advisory Committee by our Director of Research rhy the
? ? ? -.
I '4. ;.? , . ? ol?
,!,:, .1 r ,,t1II 4,tt,??4a !I ? .4.
I A'11I '14'. .1 ? t '? ? : - t t ?t?i?ric
'I. I id,
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Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was a very important 'decision, firstliom the
standpoint of the defense of the United States and, second, financially.
The first one is much more important than the financial because an
antimissile defense is vital?if it can be successfully developed.
We determined to allocate approximately $300 million in this budget
to carry out a complete full-scale test in the Pacific Ocean area. We
will procure the necessary equipment and radars and target missiles
to test the NIKE-ZEUS system out.
Mr. MAHON. You would not have to use an atomic warhead?
Secretary GATES. No, we would not. The NIKE-ZEUS system
has serious problems about it. One is that it is a point-defense system.
It is an extension of what might be called the NIKE-HERCULES
type system. You have to put a lot of them around the United States,
around SAC bases, or around cities at a cost of maybe $14 or $15
billion. You might be able to protect, if it worked, a certain percentage
of the population of the United States.
(Discussion off the record.)
We will find out more when we test it. I do not want to downgrade
it before we give it its fair chance because it is the only antimissile
system we have that looks promising. I am encouraged to recommend
the allocation of $300 million again this year by the scientific advice
I get, which is that we will gain valuable knowledge in the whole field
of antimissile work through these experiments. This will be highly
useful whether or not NIKE-ZEUS ever goes into production.
Mr. MAHON. IS it true that to some extent we are spending these
vast sums on the NIKE-ZEUS because we feel that we cannot fail
to try to come up with a defense to the ICBM and we feel that for
public relations and propaganda purposes with our own people, if
for nothing else, we must undertake this difficult task? To what
extent does that element enter into this picture?
Secretary GATES. I am not in the propaganda business. I think
we must try to find an antimissile defense for the security of the
United States by whatever means we can. In addition to the NIKE-
ZEUS we are carrying on other programs, mostly research programs,
in a wide field of endeavor. I do not know what they would amount
to?perhaps about a hundred million dollars?in addition to what we
are spending in tackling this NIKE-ZEUS problem. This is a
military. problem.
Mr. MAHON. In your statement you made reference to another
approach to the NIKE-ZEUS.
Secretary GATES. We call it the Defender project. We are
doing really basic research to come up with ideas on this whole area.
This ballistic missile defense is something we just do not know how
to do in a truly effective way at the present time.
Mr. MAHON. Hitting one bullet with another bullet is not easy.? '
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Mr. MAnox. Tell us whether or not this year's expenditure will
provide us with information as to.whether or not we should continue
with the NIKE-ZEUS technique.
Secretary GATES.. This year's money, as I understand it, will pay
the costs of the full-scale tests that we envision conducting in the
Pacific. That will give us a great deal more technical data for where
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we go fronr there. ? ? I.think.by that time we will have enough infortha-
tion,to make up our minds whether or not to go into production.
r,Mr: MAHON: Is it, true the Joint Chiefs of Staff are split on this
issue, the Army wanting to go ahead with construction and an attempt
at operational capability?, ' . . ? ,
., Secretary GATES..?I would think that the Army had a great pride,
and deservedly so, in the NIKELZEITS. They have done a great deal
of competent work on it. However, General Leihnitzer has accepted
this decision. ? . . .
Mr, MAHON. I would not .think the head of the Research and De-
velopment in the Army would be satisfied. Do you know? . .,.
, Secretary GATES. I don't know. .: . .
, . ? .? ,
C . BMEWS PROGRAM I)
.., ?? I,
Mr. MAHON. Is the BMEWS program?by which ,we do not
combat the ICBM but by which we are. able to track ,it?coming
along on schedule? _ .
. . . . ?
,,Secretary Gates., Yes, sir; one, station will be in .operation this
calendar year. and one next,year.. The third, in northern. Scotland,
which isdelayed,pn account of ,international 'negotiations, et?cetera,
will not come in until later. ?, . ,. .1
1
,,, -, , ,COST OF NUCLEAR .CARRIER? 1 I.,
, I .'
? ? , ? , . , I ? 1 . i I.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. ,Seeretatry, we have , had thousands of pages/ of
punted testimony in recent years on the issue'of the, carrier.,
? SecietilrY GATES. Yes, sir. :- ,
Mr MAHON ,We have disCiissed, the desirabiliq'and 'effe'ctir'enels
of the 'Carrier and *liether,or'not the carriers should be atOmi,e:p'6Vere'd
or,; nonatomic ? powered.. ; I do not Iwant to get into' those issife4 at
this time I 'do not think YOU Could', say anything new on it You
have saida 'great 'deal in the past:"
it , , ? , , . ,, , -- , ?
- ,MY only qastion: or is this Approximately 'how much is ,the
nuclear catmei nvihiel is now Under, construction ? 'going to ?cost us',
aCCOMing to the' latest figure?
II'
"Sedetary GATES. I believe the figure as $444 Million fOr ' the Enter-
11
,prtse, which is now under conatiiietion11 ,
,,, ,, .
. Mr. MAHON. I thought that had been revised upivard again. ; It
has' been' revised' upWard several times. . I understand it 'is probably
, --, ,
up $10,million from a few, weeks ago.
SecielarY GATES. YOU may ,be referring to $27 million additional
in development; cOsts. . 1. i,
Mr. MAHON.' HoW,, long . has it been $444 PAiilliOii.?' , Give,Vis't.he
original estimated- &As and the steps of iareris which have 'been
calculated by the' Na'y' 'Put' that' in there'cord. ' ' ' '?' ? ' ? '.
Secretary GATES. I think we started, around $314 bullion, if my
1:, ,
memory of the 'old days is correct. ,It has gone from there to $444
Million, e5iclUding deVeldionient. ' ,, '
r i ... \-: ' 4 ? , .
. Mr. MAHON. You could put that iii' the' record. /
', ? (The infOrination supplied f011oiTS:) ,''
II' .1 1.1i 11 i . 11 ' i :4.1
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Cost of the CVA(N) "Enterprise" as shown in successive budget submissions, 1958-61
[In thousands]
Budget
Construction
Development
Total
1958
1959
1960
1961
(I)(I)
(0
(I)
$444,000
(1)
(I)
$27,471
$314, 000
314,000
393,167
2471,471
Breakdown not shown prior to 1961 budget.
2 1961 figure shows estimated cost to completion, including anticipated future changes, etc. Prior years'
figures reflected only changes, escalation, etc., to date of preparation of estimates.
REORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Secretary, are you going to recommend to Con-
gress at this session legislation providing for Defense Department
reorganization?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Mr. MAHON. Do you have any knowledge that the President will
make any meaningful or substantial recommendations with respect to
any reorganization bill for the military?
Secretary GATES. My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that he will
not.
Mr. MAHON. What do you intend to do within the framework of
present law toward reorganization?
Secretary GATES. Everything I can do administratively to make
the place work more efficiently. I have already taken a certain step
in connection with my relationships with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I am sure there are some other management tools that we could ad-
ministratively put into the Office of the Secretary of Defense that
would improve the coordination and the flow of work on the business
side of the house. I and my associates, particularly Mr. Douglas,
have our eyes on both the military relations and the business manage-
ment relations. I think there is a great deal we can do administra-
tively, if we have time to do it, and thus leave a good legacy for those
who follow us.
EFFECTIVENESS OF JOINT CFIIEFS OF STAFF SYSTEM
Mr. MAHON. I should like to put in the record at this point some of
the statements contained in the report on our defense bill last year.
I think they appear on pages 10 and 11 of the report of last year with
respect to the Joint Chiefs.
(The statements referred to follow:)
ATTAINING A BALANCED FORCE
Achieving a proper balance between general war and limited war capabilities
without greatly increasing the burden upon the taxpaYer and the economy, is
one of the most difficult problems confronting the President, the Department of
Defense, and the Congress. The President said in his budget message that the
1960 Defense budget contains such a balance. Both Secretary McElroy and
General Twining from their overall viewpoints expressed the opinion that the
1960 budget represents such a balance. However, it is obvious from testimony
of the respective members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military officers
throughout the hearings, previously quotdd, that there is considerable difference
of opinion in this regard. Differences of opinion are natural and understandable,
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but the testimony clearly indicates that there is something wrong in our present
military planning. It seems quite apparent that in this regard the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, as a corporate body, is not providing the kind of advice and leadership
which this country requires. The individual members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are able and experienced military men. It is not with these individuals
but rather with the organization and system of operations that the committee is
concerned.
Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief of Staff made this situation quite clear
in his testimony before the committee this year. At one point in speaking of
the work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he stated the problem in very definite terms
when he said:
"* * * I think that our weakness is in not determining standards of suffi-
ciency?how much is enough for the atomic retaliatory force, for air defense, for
limited warfare forces, for strategic airlift and sealift, for reserve-type forces?
all of those categories to which several services contribute. We never look at
the problem horizontally and determine whether each function is properly sup-
ported by the appropriate forces of all contributing services."
? This a most serious indictment of the inner workings of our military organiza-
tion. It makes it easier to understand why there is so much confusion and dupli-
cation with resultant waste in the Military Establishment. The President, the
Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American people have a right to
expect a better job from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the way of military guidance.
As a corporate body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must set up plans for the guidance
of the various commands and the respective services. Hard decisions are required,
and the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs must assume the
major responsibility for tailoring military forces to requirements. Each year the
question which confronts us of "who gets what" is becoming more difficult to
cope with.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff should look at what is available for what purposes and
attempt to match it with the needs. As an example, the Joint Chiefs should take
a look at the combined forces of the Marine Corps and the Army. It is not a
question of combining the Army and Marine Corps. It is merely a question of
looking at the combined strength and the combined capability of these two great
forces in making the final determination as to what our ground force should be
in providing for our commitments throughout the world. The Joint Chiefs
should take a similar look at the combined airpower capabilities of the Air Force
and Navy. Such an approach should be the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in connection with preparation of plans for the 1961 budget request. The costing
out of such determinations can be done by the respective services and through the
usual budgetary process.
Many of the basic military questions which confront the Congress and the
country are apparently never discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For ex-
ample, the hearings reveal that the Joint Chiefs did not discuss specifically in con-
nection with the 1960 military budget whether the Army should be maintained
at 870,000 or 900,000, whether funds should be sought for a Navy carrier, and
what should be done with reference to the B-52 bomber program.
Mr. MAHoN. I have the most profound respect for the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs and his predecessors in that position and for the
members of the Joint Chiefs; but there are many who have felt that
the system has not worked very effectively and that that system must
be improved.
Do you feel that there can be substantial improvement in the
,operation of the system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I believe in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. I believe it is a system that has been successful in two wars.
I am not afraid of divided opinions. I believe they are healthy. I
think the problem arises on how decisions are made as a result of
these divided opinions.
? It is my understanding that, in a sense, two men ran World War II?
Mr. Winston Churchill .and Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt. Both used
the Joint Chiefs of Staff system in a civilian-military relationship,
which validated the effectiveness of this system. They were able to
Make timely decisions when it was critical to make them.
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I have believed most of my time in Washington that the Secretary
of Defense had a great deal of authority. I thought he had a great
deal of authority when Secretary Johnson canceled an aircraft carrier
before I ever came down here. I thought Mr. Wilson had the author-
ity to do almost anything he wanted to do by ordering me to do it
when I was in the U.S. Navy Department. The President requested
the Congress in 1958 for further authority for the Secretary of Defense,
and the Congress gave it to him. So it seems to me that, if there
was any question about authority before, there is no question about
it now.
If civilian control is to be meaningful?and it is meaningful because
the President is Commander in Chief?then civilians must take the
responsibility for making the decisions, and they can only do this on
an informed basis. An informed basis to me means working closely
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that the civilians can be educated
and properly informed. They should not exclude themselves on the
basis that they are not wise enough to make military decisions.
I intend to work that way and I hope it will prove to be constructive.
I do not subscribe to the "cure-alls" that are suggested, such as a
single Chief of Staff. I do not know what good that does. That
ends up in a single opinion. We do not always want a single opinion.
We want good working relations, and I think we have got them now
to a very high degree in the Pentagon.
Mr. MAHON. Certainly, neither you nor I would want to try to
enforce unanimity of opinion among the members of the Joint Chiefs;
but what I have read in the press indicates to me that you are taking
a more aggressive attitude than has ever been taken toward utilizing
to the maximum the Joint Chiefs in the operation of your office as
Secretary of Defense.
Secretary GATES. I have had several private talks with some of the
members of this committee and other people in the Congress. I have
been told they want to find out when the authority that was given
under the Reorganization Act of 1958 is going to be exercised to a
greater degree than it has heretofore.
I am sure Mr. McElroy tried to do this. It is not easy to do. I
intend to make decisions as best I can by sitting in and getting in at
the beginning of discussions where there are strong differences of
opinion on important subjects.
Mr. MAHON. We have gone along, in my opinion, in the past with
a lot of delay as a result of split decisions and opinions in the Joint
Chiefs. Do you think there is a way to overcome that difficulty?
Secretary GATES. I hope so, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. You are taking steps toward that end, I believe.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is in complete accord with this arrangement.
Mr. MAHON. Do you feel that way about it, General Twining?
General TWINING. Yes, sir; I feel definitely we can make a lot of
headway, better than we have done. The question is to make the
decision promptly and get on with the next job. It is difficult to do.
Whether a single Chief of Staff or Secretary of Defense, one man has
to make the decision. I think it is better for the Secretary of Defense
to do it because of the civilian control aspects.
Mr. MAHON. I read in the New York Times arstatement about the
position which you are taking with respect to this problem, Mr.
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Secretary. I must say I was very much encouraged and pleased with
the statement. I have before me, a statement I have not read com-
pletely, which appeared in the Washington Post of January 7, 1960,
by John Norris, which reads:
Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates has directed that he be notified immediately
whenever differences arise in the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that he may sit in and
help settle them promptly.
I do not think it is necessary to read more of the story. Here is
the point. Do you think that it will be possible for you to see to it
that the Joint Chiefs discuss and hammer out as best they can their
own opinions with respect to basic and important questions which
must be acted upon by you and probably which must be acted upon
by Congress?
Secretary GATES. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. I have the feeling that the Joint Chiefs have not
always in the past really faced up to a forthright hammer and tongs
discussion of these issues. I have felt?and this committee has so
said?that these things should be discussed and hammered out, not
that they would have to agree but they should be discussed, and that
the Secretary of Defense and perhaps the Congress should be able to
derive all possible benefit from the procedure.
Secretary GATES. I think the Joint Chiefs have been hammering
quite a while. I think it has been the question of participation?
and it is a very difficult job because there are many distractions?of
civilians in the hammering at early enough stages so that the civilians
will be informed and can make an intelligent judgment.
Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, that is not the point. The point is this.
You have stated very well your conclusion?and I admire you for it,
if and when that happens. If there is a dispute about an important
thing, then you want to sit in with them and settle it. That is not
our problem. Our problem is that for several years we have testimony
from each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of five or six fantas-
tically important matters of policy that they did not make decisions
on. How can you settle that one? They just sit down, agree on it,
and it will never get to you because they never argue about it
themselves.
Secretary GATES. I do not know what they would be, Mr. Flood.
Mr. FLOOD. We will show them to you. For example, B-52 bomb-
ers, POLARIS submarines, aircraft carriers, things we thought were
of tremendous importance.
Mr. MAHON. The size of the Army.
Mr. FLOOD. They made a deal on it. You will never get in on that.
Secretary GATES. Yes, I will.
Mr. FLOOD. YOU must be Houdini.
Secretary GATES. When we review the budget, we review by pro-
grams, not by service budgets.
Mr. FLOOD. My point is this, which is what is worrying us.
Secretary GATES. The B-70, the NIKE-ZEUS, other controversial
issues in this budget, about which you will hear more, including an
aircraft carrier, were reviewed on a program basis by all parties con-
cerned; so that I knew about them and we made decisions on them.
Mr. FLOOD. You missed the point altogether. Perhaps I have not
stated it properly. The only thing we are worried about the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is when they come in here?we never knew this, Mr.
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Mahon conducted the examination, we sat here open-mouthed 2 years
in a row when Arleigh Burke and Taylor and Tom White told us this.
Mr. Mahon said, "Did you talk about this problem in the Joint Chiefs
of Staff? Did you debate it? Did you fight about it?" Each one
of them said, "No." I almost fell off the chair, and so did Mr. Mahon.
He has never been the same since.
Secretary GATES. I know what you are referring to?the participa-
tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the budget formulation.
Mr. FLOOD. This was not budget.
Secretary GATES. These figures come up with the budget.
Mr. FLOOD. This was not that kind of thing. This is long before
that. This is a very fundamental problem.
Mr. MAHON. Please give your best statement on it.
Secretary GATES. I do not think the Joint Chiefs of Staff up until
recently had a very great participation in the determination of the
programs which were financed in the annual budgets.
Mr. MAHON. This is the first year you have really done this.
Secretary GATES. This year they have had a comprehensive
participation.
Mr. MAHON. Did each service feel free to criticize, evaluate, and
discuss the whole program and not just its own program?
Secretary GATES. Yes, and so did the Service Secretaries, and they
were very frank in what they said.
Mr. MAHON. We have not had that before.
Secretary GATES. As Secretary of the Navy I never participated in
it to that extent.
Mr. MAHON. I think this is a good thing. I wonder if you think as
a result of your experience with it that it may be a good thing.
Secretary GATES. It is an excellent thing.
Mr. MAHON. Will you put in the record at this point some directive
or letter you tnay have put out on this subject of better participation
with respect to this matter? I believe it has been in the press.
Secretary GATES. I did put out a letter on it and we will put it in
the record.
Mr. MAHON. I may want to put in other statements with respect
to this matter. I am not complaining, I am pleased.
(The information requested follows:)
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, December R9, 1959.
Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Subject: Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Relationships with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Reference: (a) Department of Defense Directive No. 5158.1.
You will recall that reference (a) assigns the responsibility to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for "Keeping the Secretary of Defense informed on issues
upon which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not been reached, and
forwarding to the Secretary of Defense the recommendations, advice, and views
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including any divergencies."
It is logical to assume that occasional divergencies in views will continue to be
experienced within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In view of the fundamental nature of
matters which come before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for study, such divergencies
are understandable. It is important, however, that such problems be resolved
promptly in order that orderly planning may proceed and, where required, prompt
action taken.
It is requested that I be promptly informed regarding any issue on which a
difference of opinion is developing within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I intend that
either the Secretary of Defense and/or the Deputy Secretary of Defense will
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promptly meet with the Joint Chiefs at such tithes as they consider the issue in
question. This procedure will insure that I am fully informed on the problems
involved with a view, to effecting their resolution in the most expeditious manner
possible, and, where necessary, bringing the matter to the attention of the Presi-
dent for his decision.
I would like to emphasize, however, that the above procedure should not be
interpreted as precluding any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from bringing to
my personal attention any matter affecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff or an in-
dividual service. I look upon such discussions as matters of the highest priority
within the Department of Defense and will gladly make time available in my
schedule for such meetings regardless of any other schedule I may have.
THOMAS S. GATES.
?
Secretary GATES. Mr. Flood is correct in this sense. The Joint
Chiefs, as a corporate body?going back to my service experience?
have been loath to discuss the other fellow's program.
Mr. MAHON. It is understandable.
Secretary GATES. They could not avoid it this year.
General TWINING. As we all know, no member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff is bashful or timid. They say what they want to say when
they want to say it. Now, here is an example of what may happen on
some occasions. The Secretary of Defense may decide he is going to
put in a program. I think he can do it by law. I think he is entitled
to do it. Say he puts in a carrier. Maybe he does not consult the
Chiefs. The Chiefs know it is in there. If they do not like it, why
not talk to the Secretary of Defense? They take it. That means
tacit approval to me. They know the program is there, they do not
like it, they say nothing until they get here and complain to you. The
same thing may occur if a service program of one kind or another is
involved. ?
They know these things are going on, but they do not feel strongly
enough about it to go and fight to the Secretary of Defense or to the
President if they do not like it, although that is their privilecrbe. They
are supposed to do that. They do it on occasion, and with regard to
some programs on which they have very strong feelings they fight to
the last man, but some they do not fight on until they get here and you
ask a question and they say, "No, I didn't know, they didn't ask me
about the carrier."
Mr. MAHON. - We may wish to put in the record further clarifica-
tion of this issue at this point.
Mr. FORD. It is your impression that this new system will obviate
that problem?
General TWINING. It will help a great deal.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Will it overcome mterservice conflict or rivalry?
General TWINING. I think so. I think decision making is the
important thing. The Secretary receives a JCS paper and he makes a
decision; bingo, we move to the next problem. A lot of those have
not been made.
Mr. MAHON. In other words, this is not just a matter for the Joint
Chiefs, but a matter also for the Secretary of Defense?
Secretary GATES. Yes; this is fundamental to the whole Defense
organization, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. The Secretary of Defense cannot have his cake and
eat it, too. He must take the responsibility for the terrific power he
has.
Secretary GATES. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MAHON. That is very interesting and encouraging.
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? B-70 PROGRAM ?
We have been talking about the B-70, not so much about the
13-70 as the B-52 and B-47. In your statement you said you would
he better able next year to make certain basic decisions on the,B-70,
the proposed follow-on bomber. This is a very hot and important
issue and I want to explore it fully.
Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, like the NIKK-ZEUS, the B-70
program was discussed at great length with a great many people,
technical people. Naturally the U.S. Air Force, and most every-
body I know, had an opinion on the B-70. The program for the
B-70, as outlined by the Air Force, was for an operational capability
in certain numbers?I forget the exact numbers?by 1965 at a cost,
according to the Air Force, of $5.5 billion.
? This is a Mach-3 airplane?a whole new "state of the art"?
Mach-3 most of the way from here to target, after it attains altitude.
It involves components, some of which I believe are nonexistent, and
materials that must be researched.
It is a very expensive and very important question. There are a
good many people who doubted that we would have numbers opera-
tional as early as 1965, and there are other people who doubted that
it could be done for $5.5 billion. Some figures ranged considerably
higher.
There are some people who believe that even a Mach-3 airplane of
this size would be an easy radar-identifiable object. The B-70, if it
comes in the late sixties at a cost of $5.5 billion or higher, comes into
direct competition with the four intercontinental ballistic missile sys-
tems which we have been discussing. I include the POLARIS, since
it is hitched to a submarine, as an intercontinental ballistic missile.
They will all be operational by that time.
The B-70 is a retaliatory bombing system. It is true that it is the
next big jump in the state of the art of manned aircraft. We were
loath to ignore completely an advanced-state-of-the-art manned air-
craft at this time, so we have put a modest sum of money?$75
million?in this budget to carry out the research and development to
produce two prototype airplanes. This is a highly emotional subject,
as you have noted, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. Why is it so highly emotional?
Secretary GATES. Because it is related to perhaps the last step in
the advancement of the art of aviation, manned aircraft. It is very
logical that it would be emotional.
General TWINING. It would have a great impact on the course of
airplanes in the future and on U.S. prestige.
Secretary GATES. It has a lot to do with the future of manned air-
craft, whether to stop with the B-58, which also has growth possi-
bilities?or to go into a whole new advance in the art of aviation.
Mr. FLOOD. Military aviation?
Secretary GATES. Military aviation. There are those who believe,
Mr. Flood, that it is possible that a cargo or commercial airliner could
come out of this development also, but we do not consider that the
business of the Department of Defense. So we have gone ahead with
the prototype development of the aircraft and stopped its development
as a complete weapon system.
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Unfortunately, everything /we do now. is so complicated we need
thousands of contractors and a tremendous . amount of money to
develop a weapon system: We are not going to develop weapon
system at.this point. ' I
? Mr. MAHON. Is it true, as 'reported, that you are doing this for
budgetary reasons rather than for defense reasons? 1,
Secretary GATES. No, sir. Everything has, a budget ,siginficance,
and this has a big impact on the budget because it is a lot of money,
?but this is not wholly the point. This is a question of priority, a
question of where you put your resources. ? It is ?'also- a technical
question.
Mr. MAHON. Within the framework of the budget of 'about. $41
?billion there just is not room for the development of the weapon system
at this time of the B-70?
? Secretary GATES. If the B-70 was important to have as a retalia-
tory weapon system and was not in competition with these four other
missile systems and the growth 'poential of the B-58; I think we should
go ahead and purchase it regardless of what it costs. But it i in
competition with these other systems.
- Mr. MAHON. I read here in ?the press that the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, General White, Made a talk this ?week and I quote-the
following:
? His statement on the B-70, together with his renewed advocacy today of dplati
to ,place all? strategic weapons under a single command, appeared to Presage a
Defense debate'along the lines of the controversy 10 years ago- ? ,
and so forth. That quote does not bear on the point I-want to .raise.
Secretary GATES. I Would like to *comment on' that article.' That
is in the New York Times,. is it not?
? Mr.' MAHON.' Yes. ' '
Secretary GATES. It is quite an unfair artieles to General. White.
General White did not start any controversy. .4General White said he
Would support the decision or he Would' not, be before the Preis Club
in uniform. 'However, he said he would state his private opinion,
private ccinvictions, to the appropriate authorities,' Which means this
committee a,nd'other Members of 'COngresS`Wlio interrogate hith: '
? 'General White,' himself, would'prefer 'to' develop the B-70 aiiplane,
but he did not talk at all in.the vein that'that deiaiats him, and
showed absolutely no disloyalty in aily?Way; ,sliap'e, Or form. I- .? '
MA.HON: MY' only intereet here is exploring the .B-70
iiroblern: ? " " t tot t
Secretary GAITS. I have the transcript of exactly ? what he said'.
GenerarTviiisiii46: I was there, and I Would -like to cbricur 'in What
the Secretary just said. ?
? Mr. MAHON. 'In -Other woids,' while General White' would have
-preferred to go further? ,
Secretary GATis. And still 'does.
Mr. MAHON (continuing). With the 'B-70, he still -doe,' he is not.
;ciusading for it? ' ? ,?
Secretary GATES. No, sir; he is not crusading fcir it. '
Mr. MAnor4: He aceepts the decision' that has been made?
Secretary GATES: He will testifSr, I am sure, to this' conunittee that
4 I
his conviction is. we should prodeed-with the B-70.
?
Mr. FORD. Will the chairman yield?
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Ford.
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Mr. FORD. What would have been the alternative in money in
fiscal 1961 if we had followed the recommendations of General White?
Secretary GATES. 1961 money would have been $463.9 million com-
pared to the $75 million with which we are maintaining the program
on a development basis.
Mr. MAHON. What is the evenutal cost of this system in order to
have it in meaningful and adequate numbers?
Secretary GATES. The Air Force figure is $5.5 billion. There are
those who believe it would be higher than that. That is for
airplanes.
Mr. MAHON. We are paying $2 or $3 billion for about
B-58's, are we not?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; we are paying a great deal for B-58's?
even more than you indicated. I have those figures if you want them.
Mr. MAHON. It is not necessary to go into detail on it. General
White apparently said, and I will quote from the newspaper story:
He made plain the tenor of these convictions by pointing out that the B-70
could be an "all-purpose" craft that would make it possible to deliver "three score
troops anywhere on the globe in 5 hours." The B-70 would be capable of hauling
five or six HONEST JOHN Army rockets with their firing crews to Taiwan in
4 hours, General White remarked.
Is it contemplated this weapon would be desirable from other
standpoints than prestige purposes and bombing purposes?
Secretary GATES. We consider it our responsibility, Mr. Chairman,
to review it from the standpoint of the military requirement. It is
possible that this big jump in the state of the art of aviation could be
used for other purposes, but we did not let that influence our decision.
Mr. MAHON. Do you feel that Congress ought to undertake, despite
the recommendations of the Executive to accelerate the B-70
program?
Secretary GATES. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Will the chairman yield?
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Ostertag.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Mr. Secretary, there is money in the budget and
you have not abandoned the program?
Secretary GATES. That is right, sir; $75 million in this budget.
Mr. OSTERTAG. IS it correct to say you have not abandoned thought
or consideration of the B-70?
Secretary GATES. No; we changed its character from a complete
weapon system development to a more limited research and develop-
ment matter.
Mr. MA HON. Of course, I anticipated that your answer to the ques-
tion which I have just asked would be as you answered it. We do
want to get all the reassurance we can with respect to these issues
which will be before us, these controversial issues.
Secretary GATES. Certainly. Dr. York was informing me of the
spending rate in answer to Mr. Ostertag's question.
Mr. MAHON. Proceed.
Dr. YORK. In conjunction with the decision on the 1961 program
for the B-70, adjustments were made in the 1960 program. Thus,
while NOA in 1960 was reduced considerably, there was only a slight
decrease in expenditures from the original program. In 1961, how-
ever, NOA is clown to about one-sixth and expenditures to about one-
fifth of the prior program, that is to about $75 million each M fiscal
year 1961.
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Mr. LAIRD. Will the chairman yield?
MT. MAHON. Mr. Laird.
Mr. LAIRD. The fact that the decision was made to put in the $75
million and to carry the B-70 in research and development in fiscal
year 1961 does not mean that the Air Force program necessarily is
postponed by the 12 months until the 1962 budget period; is that not
correct? Does it not mean only a 6-month delay if you were to go
into production rather than a 12-month delay?
Secretary GATES. I think you are right, although it would be
difficult for me to say for certain. The Air Force might testify
differently because I am not sure what is involved in the lead time of
these very difficult components.
Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much, gentlemen, and we will see
you tomorrow at 10 o'clock.
THURSDAY, JANUARY 14, 1960.
Mr. MAHON. We will resume our hearings.
I have a few more questions, some relating to the cancellation of
contracts; some relating to antisubmarine warfare; perhaps some re-
lating to some allegations made in the book by former Army Chief of
Staff, General Taylor, and the last questions will relate to what was
announced in the morning press about the military plans of the Soviet
Union.
CANCELLATION OF CONTRACTS
First, let us talk about contract cancellations, Mr. Secretary. Can
you defend the cancellation of hundreds of millions of dollars worth
of contracts? Does that indicate poor planning? Is that a reflection
on Congress and/or the military? What are the implications of the
cancellation of contracts involving many millions of dollars? Give
us your philosophy on that problem.
Secretary GATES. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we are living
in a period of great technical transition, the greatest, I suppose, we
have ever seen in our history. We make some good plans based on
sound ideas but they do not always prove to be the proper thing to
have done at the time. They go along for a couple of years and then
are overtaken by events. The seaplane would be a good illustration
of that.
Mr. MAHON. The SEAMASTER?
Secretary GATES. The SEAMASTER. The Navy put a great deal
of stock in the philosophy of having a mobile overseas base for a
bomber. It looked like an extremely attractive military idea, but
then it became difficult to do technically. It became more costly
than we estimated in the beginning and we were disappointed in the
performance of the airplane. Things moved so quickly in the world
of missiles and military technology that the SEAMASTER was over-
taken by events. So it looked as though the intelligent thing to do
was to cancel the contract. The SEAMASTER was a good concept
at the time that it was conceived. I think, in general, that statement
is applicable to most of the important cancellations that we have made.
The F-108 last summer is an important cancellation.
Mr. MAHON. The F-108 was to be a supersonic fighter aircraft
which would cost a few billion dollars, be built by North American,
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and in which the Air Force was very much interested. It was canceled
last fall. How do you defend that?
Secretary GATES. Well, the F-108 was, as you say, sir, a high-
speed, long-range interceptor.
Mr. MAHON. A plane designed to intercept bombers?
Secretary GATES. Yes. To intercept bombers.
Mr. MAHON. And not intercept missiles?
Secretary GATES. No. Not to intercept missiles. It was designed
to intercept bombers out in the forward. area. It looked as though
the F-108 was going to be an extremely expensive venture. Also, it
looked as though this mission could be done better with missiles than
by this airplane. Fortunately, we had not got down the road into
production on this airplane.
Another idea that was very highly endorsed by the Navy and the
Air Force was the high-energy chemical fuel for aircraft. We call it
"ZIP" fuel, a sort of a code name. We built an experimental plant
to produce research amounts of this fuel for high performance bombers.
Two contracts were involved. The Navy had one and the Air Force
had another with Olin Mathison Co. working with sort of a different
approach to the boron derivative problem. This was considered to
be a very important thing because it was intended to improve the
performance of airplane engines. However, it got to be complicated.
It had technical difleulties. It was terribly expensive, and it looked
as though it was not a wise thing to pursue. More important, the
benefits it would have given were achieved by other means. I think,
Mr. Chairman, the technical changes are so great in this period, that
time catches up with some of these programs.
Mr. MAHON. Do we often spend money on these programs after
they should be canceled?
Secretary GATES. Probably, Mr. Chairman, in some cases. We
are not always intelligent enough to act quickly enough.
Mr. MAHON. As Secretary of Defense, you will have a particular
responsibility; and those who work with you, as I see it, in that field.
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr,. MAHON. Are there any weapons in various stages of research
and development, or production, that you think may later be can-
celed?as.you look into the future?
Secretary GATES.? I am sure history will repeat itself in some of
the things we are doing now and we will not carry them through on
the currently contemplated plan. One very helpful thing, I think,
is the establishment of Dr. York's office with direct legal responsibil-
ity and power for decisionmaking in the research, development, test,
and evaluation field. We are moving a great deal of money that
used to be carried in the "Procurement' accounts over into the
"Research, development, test, and evaluation" accounts where Dr.
York has the responsibility. This. permits a much more authorita-
tive and competent technical evaluation of these programs beginning
with a technical review of the military requirements by the technical
people and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With such a review at an early
stage, I think that our performance will be better.
Mr. MAHON. What do you think, about it, Dr. York?
Dr. YonK. I hope it will be so.
? Mr. MAHON. You have a very great responsibility here. We do
not want to cancel projects that should be continued,.but on the other
hand we do not want to throw good money after bad.
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44
Dr. YORK. Right. A few of our big projects are projects where we
are really trying to keep a decision open, because doing the develop-
ment costs only something like 5 percent of what it would finally cost
to make a system. I am sure we have more alternatives in develop-
ment in the category of strategic deterrence than we will build. We
ttre not going to want to pick up all of these development options and
carry them into production. When we drop one of these options in
favor of another, it will be called a cancellation.
Mr. MAHON. Can you foresee such a project as the NIKE-ZEUS
being canceled out?
Dr. YORK. There is always such a possibility.
Mr. MAHON. Are there other cases? ? I think of that first. Can you
think of any other project?
Secretary GATES. The B-70 decision is, you might say, a com-
? promise.
Mr. MAHON. Would you say, Dr. York, you have a decision option
Son the B-70?
Dr. YORK. Yes. If we had dropped it that would have been pretty
final. Keeping a development program going at the level we are?
and we are still, incidentally, reviewing the situation with regard to
what subsystems must be kept going?keeps the decision open.
General TWINING. I think that is important in connection with the
B-70. The decision has not been made to cancel it. I think that that
is very important.
Mr. MAHON. Are there some other areas of special importance?
Secretary GATES. There is the highly controversial and difficult
area of the nuclear-powered airplane which we are still carrying on
in the sense that we are working on developing the components for
the reactor. The nuclear-powered airplane may or may not be built.
Mr. MAHON. What does your present budget do for the nuclear-
powered airplane?
Secretary GATES. I think we have about $150 million in total.
Dr. YORK. The fiscal year 1961 budget estimate for the ANP
program is $79.7 million for the Atomic Energy Commission and $75
million for the Air Force.
Mr. MAHON. In other words, you are not pressing this with all of
your might?
Secretary GATES. We are pressing the important part of it with all
our might, which is to find out how to get a reactor that will do the
job.
Mr. MAnow. But the actual development and production of the
airframe is not being pressed?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Mr. MAHON. We may be beaten to the draw on that by our com-
petitor?
Secretary GATES. It is possible, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. Now we spent about $600 million or $700 million on
the NAVAHO project which was begun a long time ago. It was a
long-range nonballistic missile. When we speak of cancellation, that
is just about the biggest one that I can think of.
Secretary GATES. That was a very large one, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. The Air Force claimed that many lessons were learned
from it and that the money spent was not all money down the drain.
What do you say?
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45
Dr. YORK. That is definitely true. This weapon's development
played a very important part in the development of the guidance sys-
tem now used on our ballistic missiles.
Mr. MAHON. Will you enlarge that answer for the record?
Dr. YORK. It contributed to our knowledge of rocket engines also.
(The requested information follows:)
(d) SM-64 NAVAHO: This program was commenced in March of 1946 and can-
celed in July of 1957. The operational missile was to be a ramjet-powered, super-
sonic, high-altitude cruise type, launched by a liquid fuel rocket booster, and de-
livering a thermonuclear warhead over a range of 5,500 nautical miles. Its
guidance was to be nonemanating pure inertial. The NAVAHO development
program produced a number of highly significant advances. Notable among these
were high thrust, liquid-fueled rocket engines, since employed in the ATLAS,
THOR, and JUPITER; the inertial guidance system employed in long-range sub-
marines and elsewhere; and aerodynamic parameters of the high supersonic
regime, exploited in design of the GAM-77 HOUND DOG, the F-108 and B-70.
Total funds authorized for expenditure on this program were $679.8 million. An
indeterminate but very substantial portion of these funds would have had to be
expended on other programs, had there been no NAVAHO program. A prime
example among many is the development costs for the engines later to power
ATLAS, THOR, and JUPITER.
Mr. MAHON. I think that most of the cancellations have been more
or less money down the drain. The NAVAHO seems to be not quite
that?
Secretary GATES. There has been some financial recovery involved
in the cancellations.
Mr. MAHON. I understand.
Secretary GATES. But there has also been money down the drain.
We have learned something, I hope, from most of the things we have
done.
It is also interesting to note the Russians cancel things too, and so
do our allies. We have instances where Canada and England and
other countries have canceled programs. Mr. Khrushchev canceled
a lot of cruisers and he said that it was a terribly expensive thing to
do. Some were 90-percent complete. That is what he said. We
have not verified the statistics.
This seems to be something that is inherent in the business of de-
fense. We would like to do it better. We would like to make the
decisions earlier. Sometimes these decisions are very difficult to make
and, as Dr. York said, you must carry certain things along even when
better alternatives seem to be emerging so as to ensure that the proper
avenues of scientific research are kept open.
Mr. MAHON. If you think of any other cancellations that have
taken place in the last 10 or 15 years which you think are significant
you can make a reference to them in the record.
Secretary GATES. I have a list of them here that could be put into
the record.
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS CANCELED SINCE JULY 1, 1957
Mr. MAHON. I wish that you would spread on the record at this
point the list of cancellations, the amount of money involved and a
brief sentence or two as to why the cancellation took place.
Secretary GATES. Yes.
(The requested information follows:)
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Major Army procurement contracts1 canceled since July 10 1957
[Millions of dollars]
,... ,..,
Pidgram
Name of contractor
.
Date canceled
.
Amount spent a
Estimated re-
covery at time
of cancellation
Reasons for continuing project up to time of cancellation
'-
PEMA (motor generator,..s only for
NIKE-HERCIILES). ,;
PEMA (CORPORAL)
Air Force production fund-(TALOS)_
P. & P.A. (DART)
-
John R. Hollings-
worth.
Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co.
RCA Defense Elec-
ironic Products.
Curtiss-Wright Utica
Division.
July 7, 1959
Aug. 24, 1959
May 2, 1958
Sept. 15, 1958
?
(3)
10.0
3.1
10.3
(3)
0.16
.75
2.4
Required number of units were obtained.
Project continued until revised requirements were met.
Pending decision as to standardization of system.
Development continued until it was clear another weapon
offered superior advantages.
Defined as having a cost of $10,000,000 or more.
Including termination costs.
This contract had a face value of $57,600,000. Only the TALOS portion was termi-
nated. The amount actually spent for PALOS and the recovery thereunder is being
calculated.
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Major Navy procurement contracts 1 canceled since July 1, 1957
[Millions of dollars]
Program
Name of contractor
Date canceled
Amount spent,
Estimated re-
covery at time
of cancellation
Reasons for continuing project up to time of cancellation
Aircraft:
P6M
. , ..
- -F8T.J=3
Missiles;
" 'REGULUS II
.
? -TRITON
ShipS: AV conversion (seaplane
tender).
Martin
Chance Vought
do ?
McDonnell
Applied Physics Lab-
oratory, Johns Hop-
Philadelphia Naval
Shipyard.
August 1959
.
December 1958
do.
October 1956
September 1957
{ June 1957
{SeMember 1957
September 1957.
Aug. 21, 1959
387.0
136. 5
120.0
3.0
3. 7
1. 5
9. 0
1.0
54.0
75.0
140.0
3. 0
.3
1
18.8
Large investment and promising potential of jet seaplane
concept warranted continuation. Overtaken by other
weapon systems.
Continued until completion of evaluation between F8U-3
and F4H-1 all-weather fighter aircraft. Selection of
F4H-1 resulted in cancellation of F8U-3.
Greatly improved range, speed, accuracy over REGULUS
I. Canceled because of acceleration of POLARIS pro-
gram and its relatively high cost effectiveness.
Development effort supposedly to be follow-on of REGU-
LUS II. Improved components were incorporated in
REGULUS II. Marginal gains in TRITON did not
warrant continuation beyond study and research phase.
Part of approved shipbuilding program in support of P6M
SEAMASTER program.
'I Defined as having a cost of $10,000 000 or more.
I Including termination costs.
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Major Air Force procurement contracts I cancelled since July 1, 1957
[Millions of dollars]
Program
Name of contractor
Date canceled
Amount spent 2
Estimated re-
covery at time
of cancellation
Reasons for continuing project up to time of cancellation
1. SM 63-RASCAL
Bell
November 1958
448.0
7.0
Requirement existed for operational air to surface missile.
Program continued until development delays threatened
operational reliability and technological advances made
it feasible to cancel in favor of GAM 77-HOUND DOG
ASM.
2. SM 73-GOOSE:
Missile development
Fairchild
December 1958
78.5
70.0
Requirement existed for operational long-range decoy to
Engine development
do
do
58.0
20.0
improve penetration capability. As changing concepts
made this system marginal in compatability with the
bomber fleet it was designed to protect, the program was
canceled.
8. SM 64-NAVAHO
North American
July 1957
679.8
134.0
Requirement existed for long range strategic missile. As
the accelerated ICBM program progressed it became
apparent that this earlier "state of the art" system would
be overtaken and its usefulness limited.
4. F-103 experimental fighter
Republic
August 1957
104.0
0
This system was developed as an experimental aircraft.
Designed to meet an operational requirement it was
cancelled when tests findings with other aircraft under
development made continuation unnecessary.
8. High energy fuel
Olin Mathison
August 1959
55.0
28.0
Requirement existed for high energy fuel for advanced
aircraft and missile systems. As the development pro-
gressed it became apparent that the potential increased
performance afforded by the high energy fuel did not
warrant the investment required.
8. I-93-5 engine
General Electric
do
9.0
9.0
Requirement existed for advanced powerplant for super-
sonic aircraft requiring high energy fuel. Decision to
cancel tied in with high energy fuel program discussed
above.
7. B-58-B
Convair (Fort Worth)
do
17.0
1 49.0
Requirement existed for improved capability in speed and
J-79-9 engine
General Electric
do
27.0
f
range in strategic bomber fleet. Priority of this system
in competition with other high priority items in current
programs required cancellation.
8. F-104 fighter
Lockheed
August 1957
668.0
379.0
Operational requirement existed for supersonic day fighter.
Requirements review resulted in decision to limit pro-
gram to 2 wings.
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9. 1`-108iCIAlt 9:
F108
GAR-9
10. ALQ-27 electronic countermeas-
ure system.
11. T-61 engine
12. Q-4b target drone
North American
do
Sperry
Allison
Radioplane
September 1959
do
December 1959
do
do
159.8
30.9
182.6
37.4
" 25.4
167.0
28.8
127.2
17.0
40.0
Requirement existed for long range supersonic fighter inter-
ceptor. Priority of this system in competition with
other high priority items in current program resulted in
cancellation. The GAR 9 development is being con-
tinued on a reduced scale to complete the development
phase for possible use with other fighter interceptor
aircraft.
Requirement existed for improved electronic counter meas-
kure system to increase penetration capability. Priority
of this system in competition with other high priority
items in current program resulted in cancellation.
Requirement existed for turbo prop engine for long range
airborne early warning and control aircraft. Aircraft
abandoned as it would not be available in time period
needed to meet existing threat. Engine development
canceled in favor of turbo fan for use on advanced cargo
aircraft.
Requirement existed for supersonic target drone. Priority
of this system in competition with other high priority
items in current program required cancellation.
I Defined as having a cost of $10,000,000 or more.
2 Including termination costs.
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50
R-58 PROGRAM
Mr. MAHON. I want to mention the 13-58 again. We have dis-
cussed the B-70, but the B-58 we have not covered as well as I would
like.
From what I have heard, in the preparation of your budget the
B-58 was somewhat like "on again off again Finnegan." You had
it in the budget for 1961, you had it out, but as I understand it, your
total proposed purchase of B-58 is less than and I mean for
all time, the total production.
General TWINING. That is right.
Mr. MAHON. Can you comment on that, Dr. York?
Dr. YORK. I do not know that I can add anything especially
pertinent. It was something which was studied quite a bit, as you
said. There was not much of an issue from a technical point of view.
The question involved was?are these kinds of strategic weapons
that we need at this time?
Mr. MAHON. This was not really your baby?
Dr. YORK. No.
Mr. MAHON. I see the point.
Secretary GATES. The B-58 was given a very careful review along
with the other big programs. One of the reasons that it was given a
review is that it is a terribly expensive program. The number of air-
craft is relatively small. I think the decision to go ahead with it was
largely based on the fact it is almost immediately available. There-
fore, it does not come into competition during the same time period
with those other strategic systems that we talked about yesterday in
connection with the B-70. The B-58 is operational and it is flying.
It is a good airplane. We propose to buy airplanes at a cost
of $3,097 million. That is a production rate plan of per
month increasing to per month in January, 1961.
Mr. MAHON. Is that the whole buy out program for the B-58 as
now planned?
Secretary GATES. Yes. However, there is some small amount of
work being done, if my memory is correct, on an improvement of the
B-58. The B-58 has some growth potential in it, and there is some
paperwork and ideas being reviewed?I think in your shop, Mr. York.
Dr. YORK. And there are some company funds going into it.
Secretary GATES. It looks as though the B-58 can be an improved
airplane, and we are looking at that carefully.
Mr. MAHON. I think that it just shocks you to the marrow of your
bones to contemplate we are spending over $3 billion for
airplanes.
If you spend $3 billion for airplanes and then go ahead with
the purchase of 500, that would be more sensible, but to spend such
a vast sum of money to get so little in production just shocks me.
General TWINING. That is what we hoped to do, but times have
changed like the Secretary said. The B-47 is approaching obsoles-
cence now and the B-58 would normally have taken its place if things
had gone along normally. Things have changed and I think the smart
thing to do is what was done to get something out of this. It is a
very good airplane. It will help our offensive effort quite a bit,- al-
though I realize that the cost is terrific.
MT. MAHON. for $3 billion is really, high.
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General TWINING. Otherwise we-would not have any if we had not
done this, but I think of having as bitter than having none
at all.
, Mr. MAHON. I realize it is made in Texas. Texans have a special
interest in it, but I have no special interest other than that of national
defense. You ought to weigh very carefully hether or not you are
following the right course.
Secretary GATES. Of course we should. We have made a decision
not to cancel. We made the decision, as of this time, to put sufficient
money in the program to buy airplanes. That does not mean
that we cannot buy more, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. You do not now plan later to buy more?
Secretary GATES. No; we do not at the moment. This can change.
Also, as I mentioned, there is this growth possibility.
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
? Mr. MAHON. I would like to discuss antisubmarine warfare with.
you a bit. There was a time when the submarine was somewhat
inadequate. It was much slower than a surface ship. There was a
time when the submarine was only a threat to other ships, but we are
moving into an entirely different field. This committee has tried to
alert the people that we have a serious problem here. So we have been
pounding the desk and talking in very loud tones about this threat.
We do not claim we are the only ones aware of it, but we want to make
sure that the Pentagon is aware of it.
There has been a tendency in all the services for certain elements
of the services to be more or less in control?the battleship admirals
and the field generals, and so forth. I think there has been a tendency
to submerge the importance of the submarine through the years. I
think the day of the submarine is dawning and the NAUTILUS is
but the morning star of a much bigger day for the submarine.
? Mr. FLOOD. My, my.
Mr. MAHON. With apologies to David Thoreau.
I think that we must face up to this-. I do not believe the Navy
is facing up to it adequately now, though I think the Navy is increas-
ingly more concerned.
I do not claim to be an expert, but the handwriting on the wall is
too plain for anyone to overlook. We are coming to the time when
the submarine is not only .a threat to our shipping but a threat to our
shoreline and a threat to our interior by reason of the missiles which the
submarine can launch. You have given us information about the
possibilities. Admiral Burke said last year that we have increased
our submarine capabilities in this country, but the defense against the
threat of the submarine is lagging, or words to that effect.
We, as you know, put some additional funds above the budget in
the bill last year in order to accelerate antisubmarine warfare efforts.
With these deep-diving atomic submarines that can throw missiles
about, we are faced with a very serious situation, as I see it. We do
not have anything? approaching an adequate defense against the sub-
marine. Of course, the Soviet Union does not need the freedom of
the seas as we do in the event of an emergency. This is a serious
thing.
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52
I want to know, Mr. Secretary, is the Department of Defense?and
this is a Joint Chiefs of Staff problem, too?facing up adequately to
this issue?
Secretary GATES. We agree with your analysis of the question. We
think that it is serious. We think it is vital. We think that we have
a long way to go to solve the problem. As a matter of fact, the
environment of the ocean is about as mysterious as the environment
of space. Perhaps even more so, because we have a lot to learn about
the temperatures, the depths, the structure of the ocean floor.
In many ways what we found out in our antisubmarine warfare
effort has been what we do not known. Then we move on to find out
more about that. The important part of the antisubmarine effort is
really in improved research. It is improved research that will provide
better identification, better detection, better communications, and all
the aspects that go with commanding, controlling, and operating the
systems for detecting, identifying, and destroying enemy submarines.
The Navy does take it very seriously.
? I have some figures this year that say $1.370 billion of the Navy's
procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation appro-
priations will go into antisubmarine warfare. This exlcudes the costs
of military personnel and operations and maintenance.
Mr. MAHON. Will you list at this point in the record an identifica-
tion of this money?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
(The requested information follows:)
ASW portion of Navy budget
[NOA, in millions]
Navy appropriation
Fiscal year
1959
Fiscal year
1960
Fiscal year
1961
Research, development, test, and evaluation
'$202. 7
2 8225.3
$180. 5
Shipbuilding and conversion
1, 012. 6
485. 7
782.3
Aircraft and related procurement
200.3
476. 8
345. 2
Procurement of ordnance and ammunition
54. 1
50.2
55.2
Major electronics procurement
60. 1
37.9
27.8
Total, all appropriations
1, 595. 8
1, 275. 9
1,370.8
I Includes $20,500,000 DOD emergency funds.
2 includes $45,000,000 Congress add-on.
Secretary GATES. However, it is not all inclusive because we have
hunter-killer task forces and carriers and helicopters, surface ships,
shore-based air, various detection equipment, early warning lines, and
so forth, all tied in together into this overall antisubmarine warfare
picture.
I was very pleased to see that the Secretary of the Navy has recently
established an antisubmarine warfare committee and made himself
chairman of it, which is a little out of channels in the Navy. I think
that shows he is now taking an active part in the direct leadership of
the antisubmarine warfare effort along the lines we did with the
POLARIS some years ago. This is a new thing. I am sure he will
testify to it when he appears here.
I went out with Admiral Thach's task force in the Atlantic for 3
days and I think the Navy is making the most constructive approach
i
to this whole question. They had n being what you might call a
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53
laboratory, to develop doctrine and to put on requirements for addi-
tional research. At the same time they had operating units of all
components under direct command of the admiral of this group who
commanded helicopters, destroyers, submarines, and so forth. So I
think the problem is by no means being neglected, either financially
or in any other way. As a matter of fact, I think it intrigues the
scientific fraternity more than any problem they have.
We got enormous support from Dr. Killian, when he was here, and
now from Dr. Kistiakowski in helping us with special research in
connection with submarine warfare.
However, like space, it is dealing in the unknown. We have a long
way to go.
Mr. MAHON. I believe you said yesterday you were utilizing the
additional funds for antisubmarine warfare which were provided last
year.
Secretary GATES. Yes, the extra money has been made available
for the Navy.
Mr. MAHON. Does it seem to you that what we need to do is to
stress, as you have mentioned, research and development in this
field, plus perhaps an acceleration of our submarine construction
program? There used to be a time when our military did not think
much of using one submarine to combat another submarine, but is
not the picture changing somewhat to where you need a submarine
to combat a submarine more so than you formerly did?
Secretary GATES. I think this is a part of the doctrine being devel-
oped. I am not an expert on the subject, but I think it is true that a
submarine against a submarine is becoming a more effective part of
the kill capability than we ever thought it was before. Maybe it is
the most important part.
Mr. MAHON. In the old days, the submarine could he in wait,
but the ships of the sea could outrun the submarine. Now the
submarine can outrun the ships of the sea. This is a place where
we really ought to splurge, in my opinion, in order to get an answer.
We had a study group of Mr. Laird and Mr. Lipscomb who made
a study of this, and when we have the Secretary of the Navy and
the Navy people before us we will want to go into this in more detail.
Mr. Sam Crosby, clerk of this Subcommittee on Defense Appropria-
tions, worked with Mr. Laird and Mr. Lipscomb on the study.
ADEQUACY OF AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM
Now, I would like to quote from the hearings of the report of last
year with respect to air defense. We said something like this in the
report: We have spent about $30 billion in the last 10 years on air
defense and some plans now would rim this figure up to about $50
billion?or words to that effect. The latter figure is not firm.
Now, Mr. Secretary, I believe we are continuing with the NIKE-
HERCULES and the BOMARC missile.
Secretary GATES. On the basis of the plan that was presented to
you last summer.
Mr. MAHON. The Soviet Union, which is the principal military
threat to our security, apparently is not pushing forward very rapidly
with manned bombers.
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'Do you ,think 'the air defense program is nowlprobably ;in ;proper
focus or not? ?1 ,would, like to lave 'both you :and General Twining
comment on that. ? ? t .p.- ??? ?.,.) ?rir
,Secretaily, GATES. Well, the people' that are responsible forlit just
met with the unified conunand and,the unified commander responsible
Lor it thinks. that it should beqncreased. ,. He Thinks that,the level of
effort is not sufficient. I think ,General ,Twining agrees the balance
is about right on .the basis of ,the? decisions and studies we made last
summer. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, this decision greatly reduced
the plan for BOMARC, for NIKE-HERCULES, ? and for the, very
,extensive SAGE system'. ,. It also reduced the number of control cen-
ters. It reduced the number of BOMARC sites and we came down
to a reduced, but what we considered, an entirely, satisfactory, package
commensurate with the threat. This is supported by.the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, but there are military people who believe that it should be
increased even now.: ? ; ? ? 1 . ? ) ,I*
Youknow this morning Mr. Khrushchev said he is stopping manned
bombers. That was in' a radio speech. It is not in the newspapers.
, Mr.'MAnoN. Yes. , if
? Secretary GATES. He said, "I am cutting out 1,200,000' people." :1
? Well, this is going to be a game. We are going to listen to the record;
first soft and then-harsh, for the next few years. , You-do ?not know
whether he is doing this or not doing_ this. ? Again, we go .by the
national intelligence estimates that General Twining and Mr. Dulles
have given you. ? ? ? ?
I think that the air defense program is ,in good shape. ? I think' that
it, like other programs, ought to be under continuous review..,??
, Mr. MAHON. General Twining. ?
General TWINING. I will concur in what the Secretary said. Gen-
eral Kuter feels very strongly we are not devoting enoughlof our time
or teffort to. air, defense. I feel?and t the other chiefs go along with
me=this.is a,pretty good balance ,that we have now, but .we should
keep watching. it. Maybe the Russians ? will: eliminate their, air
threat completely: , We do not , know: ' We certainly ought .to keep
watching this,and not spend money on,air, defense unnecessarily. ? ,
. : ? , e ?. , - ? It
? :. SOVIET ARMS REDUCTIONS ?r.) ) tf .*,
?et: ? I 't F1 F )..
Mr: AtAHON. I .6;ink: tha it mighi be helpful to .the cominittee
for me to read a press statement. We may delete some of it. This is
from the United Press International, dated today.
,
Moscow.?Khrni II.chev says Russia has greate-st nuclear rocket strikidg force
in the world. ? ? , I? ,
? Moscow.?Premier Khrushchev said today, Russia has built up the greatest
nuclear rocket striking force. in the -World and will cut its conventional armed
force one-third as a result: ' ' ' ' ? ,, ? ,
The Soviety Army wield a such means of warfare and'subli firepoWer as no other
,army, has ever had, ? he icy, ? # ..7.; ? t .? ,
We possess formidable weapons, but those in a state of development are more
formidable still,.which is quite inci:edible. ? -
Khrushchev said Russia had maintained large armies after World War II only
because of "atomic bomb blackmail" by the West but now it?had outstripped the
-West and was "several years': ahead in(the designing andUproductiori of. inter-
-Continental ballistic missiles. j 1, ? ?il n't f.tn '.Joi ri,
? KhrUshchev -Said nuclear "weapons would continue to be .produced until the
Western Powers agree to a ban. In the meantime the rdeket-striking force is
taking the place the air force and the production of some bombers has been
discontinued, he said.
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?
Khrushchev set present strength of the Soviet armed forces at 3,623,000 men
and said they could be slashed by 1,200,000 because of what he called Russia's
growing rocket superiority.
He made the statements before a joint session of the Supreme Soviet, the
Russian Parliament, meeting in its first session of 1960.
The Supreme Soviet unfailingly approves proposals put forth by Khrushchev.
He suggested that the cuts be made 'in the course of 1 or 2 years."
He told the Supreme Soviet, Russia would make the troop reduction irrespective
of any action taken by a forthcoming 10-nation Disarmament Conference in
Geneva.
The two houses of the Supreme Soviet met briefly and adopted today's agenda
"Disarmament?a way to strengthen peace and insure friendship between na-
tions." Then they met in joint session to hear Khrushchev.
He gave the key to the arms cut when he stated, "We are several years ahead
Of all other countries in the designing and production of intercontinental ballistic
missiles of all sizes."
Khrushchev said the numerical strength of the Soviet armed forces would be
lower than the level proposed by the United States, Britain, and France in 1956
when it was suggested the East-West armed forces be fixed at 2,500,000 each.
Khrushchev said Russia was "several years" ahead of the United States in
rocketry and would strive to maintain the lead.
Khrushchev also outlined a new concept of warfare for the Soviet with the air
force eventually abolished in favor of rockets, with the navy built around a power-
ful submarine force and the army made up of small units armed with nuclear
weapons.
Could this mean' if we are given assurances that what is proposed is
done in the Soviet Union, that we might change our own defense pro-
gram as contemplated in the 1961 budget which is now before us, and
which is now being presented to us by you, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary GATES. I do not believe we would change the 1961 budget.
But I believe we would change some of the ideas of the 1962 budget, if
this were verified by national intelligence and turned out to be so. I
do not think people are going to take very seriously the idea that the
Russians are going to throw away all their arms and have a foreign
policy based on no military strength. We are not taking it very
seriously in the Department of Defense.
Mr. MAHON. I do not think that he said he is going to throw away
his arms. He is going to keep his missiles.
Secretary GATES. In his disarmament conversations he is saying
that. In the disarmament proposal he made to the United Nations
it was a pretty blanket elimination of every bit of military power. I
think this is only a tactic and that the long-range objective remains
unchanged.
USE OF ADDITIONAL FUNDS PROVIDED BY CONGRESS
Mr. MAHON. If the record does not show it, will you have the record
show at this point what is being done, or what will be done, with
certain additional funds which we provided last year above the
budget? In your statement, Mr. Secretary, you gave us an account
of what was being done with some of the special money provided last
year.
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. MAHON. And we were very grateful to you for that very com-
prehensive and helpful statement. Last year Congress provided $172
million over the 1960 budget for acceleration and augmentation of the
ICBM program. More specifically, we gave the Defense Department
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$85 million for additional squadrons of ATLAS. I would like for
you to make clear at this point in the record what is being done
toward providing these additional squadrons of ATLAS. We pro-
vided for the beginnings of 17 rather than 9, as presented in the fiscal
budget before us last year. Make that clear for us at this point in
the record.
Secretary GATES. I have two pages which analyze the total ques-
tion, Mr. Chairman. We will put it in the record.
(The information requested follows:)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Analysis of planned utilization of additional appropriations provided by the Congress
over budget request, fiscal year 1960
[Thousands of dollars]
Item and appropriation title
Additional
appropriation
provided by
the Congress
Applied to
add-on pro-
grams
Not applied to add-on
programs
Savings in
1-year
accounts
Applied to
finance fiscal
year 1961
program re-
quirements
Maintaining Army Reserve strength at 300,000
and Army National Guard strength at 400,000_
147, 200
140, 200
7,000
Reserve personnel, Army
29, 700
29, 700
National Guard personnel, Army
43, 000
43,000
Operation and maintenance, Army
48,800
41,800
7,000
Operation and maintenance, Army Na-
tional Guard
5,700
5,700
Procurement of equipment and missiles,
Army
20,000
20,000
Maintaining Marine Corps strength at 200,000_
43, 100
43, 100
Military personnel, Marine Corps__
32, 700
32, 700
Operation and maintenance, Navy
5,900
5,900
Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps_
4, 500
4, 500
NIKE-ZEUS anti-ICBM and/or Army mod-
ernization: Procurement of equipment and
missiles, Army
375, 000
200,000
1 176,000
Increase in ASW capability
137,300
137,300
Aircraft and related procurement, Navy__
21,300
21,100
Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy
64, 200
64, 200
Procurement of ordnance and ammunition,
Navy
6,800
6,800
Research, development, test, and evalua-
tion, Navy
45, 000
45, 000
Advance procurement for nuclear-powered
carrier: Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy__
35, 000
35, 000
Downpayment on additional ATLAS missiles:
Missile procurement, Air Force
85, 000
2 85, 000
MINUTEMAN solid-propellant ICBM pro-
gram
87, 000
87, 000
Missile procurement, Air Force
77, 000
77, 000
Research, development, test, and evalua-
tion, Air Force
10,000
10,000
National Guard construction: Military con-
struction, Army National Guard
12, 219
12,219
Total, Department of Defense
921,819
649, 500
50, 100
222, 219
Recapitulation by service:
Department of the Army
534, 419
340, 200
7,000
187,219
Department of the Navy
215,400
137,300
43,100
53,000
Department of the Air Force
172,000
172, 000
I Related to $137,000,000 add-on for NIKE-ZEUS and $38,000,000 of the add-on for other modernization;
currently unprogramed and applied as a general offset to appropriation requirement for Army's 1961
programs.
2 Applied to ATLAS-TITAN.
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AUGMENTATION OF ICBM PROGRAM
Mr. SHEPPARD. With due respect to the courtesy of adding to the
record, I think that this should be touched upon. I am interested
in seeing what has happened to these funds so that I will have some-
thing to predicate my question on. When we wait to get it in the
record we get the results too late.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Secretary, I will say again what I was in the
process of saying a while ago. More specifically we gave the Defense
Department $85 million for additional squadrons of ATLAS, and/or
TITAN, and $87 million for the acceleration of the MINUTEMAN.
Will you tell us what was done with these additional funds in each
case, and what was the effect of the action of the Congress last year
with respect to this $172 million?
Secretary GATES. The money for the ATLAS missile, the $85 mil-
lion, has been applied to the ATLAS-TITAN program. We changed
the mix of the program. You know that the original TITAN pro-
gram was 11 squadrons. Your committee discussed 17 ATLAS
squadrons last year. The program is now 13 ATLAS and 14 TITAN
squadrons. We moved ahead with the TITAN missile because of
its growth potential, because it could be made to use storable fuel,
and because its sites could be hardened better. Therefore the pro-
gram we are submitting in this budget?which we discussed yester-
day and which I discussed in my statement?is 27 ICBM squadrons.
The money has been used for the same objective, not for 17 ATLAS
squadrons, but rather for the mix.
Mr. MAHON. Last year we said we wanted you to go up to 17
ATLAS squadrons, or TITANS. We wanted that increase. How
many TITANS were in the picture in the 1960 budget?
General TWINING. Eleven.
Secretary GATES. Eleven.
Mr. MAHON. So you have gone up from 11 to 14?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. MAHON. TITANS, and you have gone up from 9 to 13
ATLASES?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. MAHON. Are you doing that at this time, or will you await the
1961 budget funds?
Secretary GATES. This is the 1961 program. We are submitting
it at this time. We are putting the money toward this plan.
Mr. MAHON. You are using funds that we provided for the fiscal
year 1960 in the fiscal year 1960 to carry out a program which you are
projecting into 1961?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. MAHON. In other words, we did not provide that money to
actually finance the whole program, but we tried to provide the
impetus for the acceleration?
Secretary GATES. The MINUTEMAN money was your next ques-
tion, Mr. Chairman. That was $87 million; $77 million has been
applied to the missile procurement program of the Air Force and
$10 million has been applied to research, development, test, and
evaluation.
MACE PROGRAM
Mr. MAHON. If you have not covered the MACE, please do so.
We did not give you any new money last year for the MACE, which
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is a nonballistic missile. We Cut out the Money for it, but it was
agreed in conference with the other body, the Senate, that if you felt
the MACE was imperative, or the continuation of the MACE program
was imperative, then we would not object if you used some of the
procurement funds for that purpose that had been provided otherwise.
Secretary GATES. We used a limited amount., Mr. Chairman, on a
reprogram basis for missiles for NATO and for Missiles to go, I believe,
to Okinawa, and that is all of it. That is the end of the program.
Mr. MAHON. That is the end of the program. How much money
did you require, and where did you get it? You did it through re-
programing, but what was the reprograming that was done in order
to acquire the money?
Secretary GATES. Unprogramed funds from the old account
"Aircraft, missiles, and related procurement" were transferred to
"Missiles procurement." It looks as though we spent $125 million in
1960 and will request $39.8 million in 1961.
That will produce operational MACE missiles in Germany and in
Okinawa by December 1961. As I understand it, this is the end of the
MACE program.
Mr. MAHON. Do I understand that you secured certain funds
through reprograming and that you have in your present budget
some funds for further funding of the MACE?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; $39.8 million.
Mr. MAHON. We can discuss that matter with the Air Force?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Mr. MAnoN. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. MAHON. On the record.
Mr. Sheppard?
Mr. SHEPARD. I do not have very many questions to ask, Mr.
Chairman. I think you have brought out a large portion of the
policy aspects which, to me, are the criteria for all of the expenditures
having requirements, basically speaking.
I do want to compliment you on the presentation of Your statement,
Mr. Secretary, both you and General Twining. It is one of the most
clarifying statements I think I have heard in a long time.
As I interpret your responses to Mr. Mahon, and I want to put the
whole picture together, the actual stress of requirements is definitely
a research, development, and fabrication of results of research and
development in the missiles field; is that a correct assumption?
Secretary GATES. -Y es, sir; overall, that is correct.
Mr. SHEPPARD. How much will the missile when it comes into oper-
ation of being to a reasonable degree more than perhaps at present,
leapfrog our present concepts of military functions?
Either you or General Twining may answer the question, but, to me,
there is a very definite relationship and I say here because of the fact
that we are going from one extremity in our phasing to another.
What is the downgrading of the conventional aspect, proportionately
speaking, to the innovations of incoming missiles from the military
functional requirement?
Secretary GATES. I would say, Mr. Sheppard, when we develop
mobile, relatively invulnerable, satisfactory operational missiles, that
we will put more money on them and we will buy more of them, be
they POLARIS, MINUTEMAN, or the TITAN, which I imagine
we will always keep in our inventory. That is, the big, liquid fuel
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missiles are a piece of the total strategic deterrent. But I think it
would not be wise to go too far with those because we are moving
toward, as you state, the more advanced aspects of the missile age.
However, I would also hope that we would be mindful of the fact
that hopefully we will never fight this war. We may have to meet
other kinds of problems, worldwide, so we would not do this at the
expense of keeping ready deployable forces for limited situations.
I think that answers your questions, sir.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Yes, it does.
I note that in response to interrogation from Mr. Mahon, our
chairman, that closer relationship presently exists between your Office
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I interpreted to mean the Joint
Chiefs of Staff actually make a greater contribution to the composi-
tion of the budget than has been heretofore the case.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. SHEPPARD. In other words, by creating that closer relationship,
it expedites determinations or decisions?
Secretary GATES. It should, Mr. Sheppard.
Mr. SHEPPARD. SO far, it has, has it not?
Secretary GATES. I think it has.
Mr. SHEPPARD. In the discussion just recently, somebody addressed
himself to the cancellation of contracts. I think the experience here-
tofore would indicate that where contracts are canceled that we have
had additional cost factors due to the delay of having that decision
transmitted out to the cancellation aspect of the contract; I mean
its functional aspect.
Secretary GATES. Yes.
EXPEDITING DECISIONS
Mr. SHEPPARD. In your present conclusions of expediting?on the
whole picture, if possible?is it contemplated that you can foresee
the cancellation of those contracts for the preservation of funds as
compared with the experience we have had in the recent past? Is
that a part of the procedure?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir, I think so.
Secretary McGuire who is in this whole procurement area as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics), works very
closely with the Materiel Assistant Secretaries of the services. He is
instituting improvements to expedite decisions in all kinds of matters
on the purchasing side of the business as well as the cancellation side.
I think he has made some constructive progress.
I understand your question is: After we make decisions to cancel,
do we not move fast enough?
Mr. SHEPPARD. That Is exactly my point.
Secretary GATES. If we do not, we ought to..
Mr. SHEPPARD. I agree with you; Mr. Secretary.
There recently was a contract canceled in one of the military
branches in which?using my terminology, the heat was turned on?
and it took just 12 hours and 30 minutes before it was effected in the
field. To me, that Was an outstanding example of efficiency.
When you take that and use it as one parallel for evaluating pur-
poses, as against 60 days in others, it is rather a good time element?
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Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. We ought to shoot for the 12 hours.
Mr. SHEPPARD. I do think we could pick up some of these time ele-
ments and it would be very helpful. Of course, I can see no logical
reason why it should not be done because all of you gentlemen hereto-
fore have very definitely indicated that you are operating under a
tight budget and certain shiftings of expenditures which I think has
been due to the fact that you are operating under a tight budget.
In other words, you have reduced requirements in this field where,
under normal circumstances, and if possible larger budgeting, you
might have pursued it differently.
It depends on the ultimate future.
UTILIZATION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
What is your projected thinking at the moment as to the ultimate
utilization of carrier operations for the Navy? Good, bad, or in-
different? Are we going to get rid of them, are they pass?perations,
or what?
Secretary GATES. Mr. Sheppard, you are an expert on this yourself
and I have testified for a good many years before this committee on
the same subject. I really doubt if anything new could be said.
We do not believe the carriers are obsolete. We believe that, in many
respects, they are probably the country's best limited war capability
initially because they are deployed in the world's trouble zones and
they have on-the-spot ability to react. I would visualize this would
be their primary use. They can, of course, make a contribution,
to the strategic offensive or retalitory forces in time of general war.
The aircraft carrier, deployed and ready, is a very important and
effective cold war instrument. It provides a very effective limited
warfare capability in places where overflight rights for aircraft are
often unobtainable and in places where landing fields often do not
exist.
I think this has been said before, but we feel the same way about it.
I have often wondered why the carrier was so controversial because
its worth seems so obvious to me in cases like Lebanon, Quemoy,
Indochina and various other spots in the world where military force
was required to be present, if not actually fighting.
In those instances the carrier demonstrated its real value and this
I visualize as its primary mission. Of course, the smaller carriers and
the older carriers are indispensable to antisubmarine warfare.
Mr. SHEPPARD. The situation that is rather unpleasant so far as I
am concerned, is that your entire program so far is, in other fields of
procurement, definitely of the ultramodern concept. That goes for
your planes, tanks, and everything else. You are shooting at the
modern concept and yet we find you here going to what? " A reverse
progression concept. I do not understand it.
I am not trying to sell a carrier as against anything else; first, we
establish, is it necessary? Does it have its required functions? If it
does, why do we find ourselves backing away to a semistatus of
obsolescence if it is, as compared to the concept over here?
I cannot make those two things meet. Maybe you can tell me
where they should 'meet.
Secretary GATES. It is a perfectly understandable concern, Mr.
Sheppard. However, the specific kind of propulsion plant is not vital
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to the successful operation of . the cairier: The carrier; with a 'con-
ventional propulsion system, ,can do almost everything that the
nuclear carrier. can do 'except cruise for as long a time.. ? Of course
endurance is an advantage: - ; - ?
There are some other tactical advantages, as you well know, in the
case of nuelear-powered carriers which have. been made a matter of
record before this committee. . ?
think we?have been talking a good, deal about the ultramodern
here because we have been talking mostly about missiles, but we are
not giving up the Marines and we are not giving up ground forces.
We are still using rifles, better rifles, than we had before.
Mr. SHEPPARD. The most,modern ones.' ?
Secretary GATES. The most modern ones. -
The carrier is a modern concept because most people would believe,
I. .think, that; because of the resulting holocaust, general war is less
likely to happen than lesser conflicts?which may arise in the world
where we will be called upon to participate with limited war forces.
I would say the carrier crintribution to. limited war?which I
consider very; very great?ist a modem concept fitting well into the
foreign' policy objectives of the 'United States. ? ?
Mr. SHEPPARD. Then we take the present appraisal, insofar as the
modern raspect .is) concerned, and apply ? it "to the future. '-In other
words, I understand you are going to need other carriers for'replace:.
ment purposes in order ;to keep your carrier force up?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. SHEPPARD. If that is true; then 'am I to assume at this time that
you are setting the pattern in the so-called modern, conventional, and
not the nUclear pattern' for 'the' incoming carriers bend that we are
'Presently discussing? ! ' ' ? . ? ,
SeCretary GATE'S.' AVOUld not be 'completely certain'abont that,?but
I ' think that you Would' ProbablY be crirrect. ? I think'we iiroUld,kno*
more 'about the nueleai: carrier when it is operational than we do now.
The advantages May'be'ao great that, if we ever build another Carrier,
we might Want to build a nuclear one. I" believe that the role of a
carrier in the future?being more and more related to limited war
requirements and less to its strategic contribUtion?would be along
the lin 6 that 'yoUha-Ve 'stated.'" That would be a personal ' ?Pinion. .
'Mr.'SriErkun.' Speaking Of the`temperanient of Some of our con;
gressional friends, who-have the right 'td their opinion's aa well as
anyone else, and I respect them, I 'ask'you thi' question: ' If tlie"sitiia-
tion involved this.partiCular Consideration' and 'determination, rather
than going' to a modern' Carrier Or no carrier; What would your answer
belthert?" - ;
LONG LEADTIME FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR
I SecretarrY)GA;ins. I think my 'answer then on' the basis of - the
difficult situations we have faced, would have to' be that We would
haVe no carrier"because' the Congress, last year, gave' us some money
for? lonVeadtime: components for nuclear reactors,' and we have not
sperit t at money.',1.,' ? ?,. ?
SHEPPARD:' Just a mom' ent;
The reason you have not spent it is what?
- Secretary'GATEs. Because we have decided not to go ahead with
the request 'for a nuclear-powered aircraft 'carrier in the 1961 budget.
?I. U, -
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Mr. SHEPPARD. Is that the factor or was there some other consid-
eration other than the need?
Secretary GATES. As I told the chairman yesterday, Mr. Sheppard,
everything is related to money in a sense. Actually, the Navy felt,
along with the Joint Chiefs and the rest of the people who reviewed
the programs, that a conventionally powered carrier would meet the
purpose. They have a good use for the difference in cost between
nuclear and conventional power in their antisubmarine warfare pro-
gram.
Mr. SHEPPARD. During the interrogation by the chairman yester-
day, the question was directed to you, as I recall it, relative to the
additional cost factor of the nuclear carrier. As you have given the
answer, it is the increased price.
I would like to ask you in your general procurement in all fields of
military requirements, have or have not the increased cost factors
been semiparallel to the increased cost factors here, such as planes
and everything?
Secretary GATES. Yes, they have, Mr. Sheppard.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Insofar as the cost factor is concerned as one part
of our basic evaluations, there is practically no difference in the concept
or if there is, a minor one?
Secretary GATES. There would be a difference depending upon the
weapons system you are talking about.
The general concept that you outline is certainly correct.
COMMENDATION OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Secretary, I am personally very much intrigued
with the manner you have taken over your position and the manner
in which you are beginning to cut out some paperwork, lost-time
elements, and so on. I am very much interested in that. I want to
compliment you accordingly, and 'I hope as time goes on, and as ex-
posure to your present position becomes more evident that you will
make that more of a major requirement and accomplish more.
That is all.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Sikes?
Mr. SIXES. Mr. Secretary, you have one of the most difficult jobs
in the world and one of the most important. This Congressman
thinks that job is in very good bands just now.
Secretary GATES. Thank you, sir.
Mr. SIKES. I want to compliment you on the statements you have
given us and the answers you have given to questions asked. It is a
very fortunate thing for us that we in America have you in the position
that you occupy.
You have had a very fine background with which to prepare for the
exceedingly difficult work you are doing. That, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to say is an important thing in itself because many men
come here to assume work at some secretarial level, highly qualified,
conscientious, and dedicated people; but they do not stay long enough
to more than find their way in and out of the building.
Mr. Gates has been here long enough to be prepared for his work
and with the ability he possesses, I think we are going to have in him
an outstanding Secretary of Defense. We are fortunate also in having
the team of Secretary Gates and General Twining to cope with the
defense problems of our Nation.
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Mr. Gates, you have placed additional emphasis in the 1961 budget
on missiles, antisubmarine warfare, and Army modernization, among
other things, and you are proposing a new, conventional-powered
carrier.
This committee felt last year that additional emphasis was needed
in these same fields and appropriated additional money to provide
more defense and greater progress in these fields. Apparently the
thinking of this committee and the thinking of the Department of
Defense run closely parallel at this time.
ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
You indicated to the chairman the way in which the additional
missile money is being spent. Would you tell me what disposition
is being made of the additional ASW money the committee appro-
priated last year?
Secretary GATES. Of the $137 3 million of additional appropria-
tions provided by the Congress, $21.3 million was applied to aircraft
and related procurement, Navy; $64.2 million, shipbuilding and conver-
sion, Navy; $6.8 million procurement of ordnance and ammunition,
Navy; $45 million :for research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy.
Mr. SIKES. Did you use all of the additional ASW money that
Congress provided?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Mr. SIKES. What emphasis do you now give in comparison with
other activities to the ASW field in this budget? Do you consider it
among the first, second, or third in importance?
Secretary GATES. I certainly do consider it very important.
USE OF ADDITIONAL ARMY MODERNIZATION FUNDS
Mr. SIKES. Tell me what you did about Army modernization.
This committee has been concerned by the fact that our Army has
had little real modernization since World War II and it appropriated
about $200 million to stimulate modernization. In your statement
you make some reference to this subject.
What was done with the additional Army modernization money
which this committee provided in the 1960 budget?
Secretary GATES. There was money added by both the House and
Senate.
Mr. SIKES. That is correct.
Secretary GATES. That money totaled, after conference, $382.6
million. Of those funds, $137 million related to the production of the
NIKE-ZEUS, as I said in my statement, and was held in reserve;
$38 million was applied to finance the fiscal year 1961 Army procure-
ment programs.
Mr. SIKES. Do you mean that amount of money is going into
hardware for the Army?
Secretary GATES. Yes; into hardware.
Mr. SIKES. Modern hardware?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. The rest of the money
Mr. SIKES. Have you provided for the record?I presume you .do
not have it at this time?information showing where that $38 million
would be used?
50026-60-5
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, Secretary GATES. No, sir; we do not have it programed as yet. It
will be programed in 1961.
Mr. SIKES. IS it not being used in the 1960 programs?
Secretary GATES. No, sir; $43.4 million was used to increase'
modernization in the Army over and above the program and $164.2
million was applied to the Army procurement account for the 1960'
program.
Mr. SIKES. Let me see if I understand.
Secretary GATES. Of the total money, $175 million is held in reserve
at the moment.
Mr. SIKES. Is that money for Army modernization or the NIKE-
ZEUS account?
Secretary GATES. $137 million was for NIKE-ZEUS.
Mr. SIKES. So that only about $38 million of the money that was
scheduled for Army modernization is not being used?
Secretary GATES. That is correct, $38 million.
Mr. SIKES. Of the amount that is being used, how much is being
used in 1960 and how much is held over for 1961?
Secretary GATES. All will be used in 1960 except the $38 million
and the $137 million which was made available to finance NIKE-
ZEUS production in fiscal year 1960. These amounts will be carried
forward to finance the fiscal year 1961 program.
Mr. SIKES. IS it being used for the procurement of the type of
weapons and equipment that this committee felt was in shortest
supply?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; I think it is, Mr. Sikes.
Mr. SIKES. Have you submitted for the record a statement showing
that?
Secretary GATES. We have submitted a list of the items for which
Congress added funds.
Mr. SIKES. I would like to have such a list placed in the record.
(The list referred to by the Secretary may be found on page 56.)
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. MAHON. Would you yield?
Mr. SIKES. Yes.
Mr. MAHON. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Secretary GATES. I think the answer to the question, Mr. Chair-
man, is that you are correct. I think $189.6 million was applied to
the Army procurement program to make it whole, you might say, to
purchase the modernization equipment that was required and the
$18 million I referred to was for an increased program.
Mr. MAHON. As I understand it, Mr. Sikes having yielded here,
last year there was an accounting error in the budget. The Army did
not actually request in the budget for fiscal 1960 all of the funds
necessary to finance the programs submitted in the fiscal year 1960
programs?
Secretary GATES. That is my recollection.
Mr. MAHON. This was an accounting error and there are many
complications involved, but the truth is that, as I understand it,you
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used most of this money to finance the accounting miscalculation and
that actually no substantial funds were applied for Army moderniza-
tion beyond the Army modernization program which was presented
in the fiscal 1960 budget?
Secretary GATES. I am informed that that is correct, Mr. Chairman,
with the exception that in addition to straightening out the financial
business, the cutback of $76.8 million in the NIKE-HERCULES
continental defense program was reprogramed and applied to Army
modernization.
Mr. MAHoN. You can clarify for the record, if you wish, any further
technical complications involved here.
Mr. SIKES. Then is it the case, Mr. Secretary, that your choice was
to use this money to correct the account in which there was a shortage
rather than to come back to Congress for additional funds? Was that
the dilemma proposed to you?
Secretary GATES. I think it was, Mr. Sikes.
I think we carried out the 1960 program and, as I understand it,
there was a deficiency, but we carried it out by the money supplied
by the Congress.
Mr. SIKES. Had the money not been used for this shortage, is it
your belief that this would have been expended as Congress desired
for additional Army modernization?
Secretary GATES. Yes, it is.
LONG-LEAD TIME ITEMS FOR NUCLEAR CARRIER
Mr. SIKES. With reference to the money which was appropriated
for long-lead time items on the nuclear carrier, is it true that this
money has been carried over, and that no use has been made of it?
Secretary GATES. It has been applied to the requested cost of the
shipbuilding program in the 1961 budget. No use has been made of
the money.
Mr. SIRES. Was it applied against the 1961 shipbuilding program?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
CONVERSION TO CONVENTIONAL CARRIER
Mr. SIKES. Would it have been possible with the authorization that
you possess to begin the long-leadtime items on a conventional-
powered carrier with that money and thus to save some time?
Secretary GATES. I do not think so, Mr. Sikes.
Mr. SIRES. Is it necessary that you come back to Congress for
authorization and funding?
Secretary GATES. I would think so. I thought it was quite
specifically identified with long-leadtime components of nuclear
reactors.
MAINTENANCE OF NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS
Mr. SIKES, We have not discussed in any detail the problem and
cost of maintenance on nuclear-powered ships. It is my understand-
ing that there have been new developments which indicate that this is
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a much more significant matter than had been previously anticipated
and that the cost of maintenance of nuclear-powered ships is going to
be very high, and this may lessen their desirability, particularly as to
surface ships. Is that correct?
Secretary GATES. I cannot answer the question, Mr. Sikes. I do
not know.
Mr. SIRES. Is there anyone here who knows?
Secretary GATES. We have no nuclear-powered surface ships in
operation yet. I do not think the cost has been excessive in sub-
marines, considering the advantages gained. I have never been in-
formed so and I doubt if we know the answer to the question yet. I
'doubt if anyone knows the answer to the question.
General Twining says this is one of the reasons, one of the many
reasons, that we want to be sure that we know what we have got in
the nuclear-powered carrier.
COMPARISON OF 1960 AND 1961 BUDGETS
Mr. SIRES. This budget is very much in line?costwise?with last
year's budget. Costs, of course, are continuing to go up and that
means program reductions are to be made somewhere in the Depart-
ment of Defense.
Where, in the main, will those reductions be?
Secretary GATES. There was some reduction in the personnel
account. There was a reduction in Air Force personnel, and a reduc-
tion in Navy personnel.
There is no reduction in the Marine Corps or the Army.
Of course, we have mentioned the cutback in the continental air
defense program. We have mentioned the cancellation of the F-108.
We have mentioned the cutback in the B-70 program. I would
imagine the B-58 program was a year ago, or the year before, planned
at a larger rate.
General TWINING. That is right.
Secretary GATES. We have closed installations and will close more
as we go along. I think those were the major operating areas where
the reductions have been made.
SAVINGS FROM REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
Mr. SIKES. Do you propose there will be a reduction in the number
of operating aircraft in the Air Force and the Navy during fiscal year
1961?
Secretary GATES. I am sure there will be in the Navy; yes. There
will be in the Air Force, also.
? Mr. SIRES. What will be the number of planes by which each service
is reduced?
Secretary GATES. Can we supply that?
Mr. SIRES. Yes.
Secretary GATES. I do not have it in my head.
Mr. SIRES. Please supply also some information about the antici-
pated savings as a result of that reduction, and the net effect on our
defense program.
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Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
(The material referred to follows:)
ACTIVE AIRCRAFT INVENTORY (1959-61)
The numbers of operating aircraft in the Air Force and Navy decrease by 578
and 61 respectively during the period June 30, 1960, to June 30, 1961. The air-
craft inventory of each of the services is listed below.
Actual,
June 30, 1959
Planned,
June 30, 1960
Planned,
June 30, 1961
Army:
Active aircraft inventory
5, 199
5, 663
5, 791
Active Army
4,318
4,806
4,913
National Guard, ground
843
807
807
Army Reserve
38
50
71
Navy and Marine Corps:
Active aircraft inventory
9, 649
8,657
8,348
Operating
7, 562
6,852
6, 791
Regular Navy
5, 474
4,898
4,846
Marine Corps
1, 234
1, 157
1, 161
Navy and Marine Corps Reserve
854
797
784
Logistical support (nonoperating)
2, 087
1,805
1,557
Air Force:
Active aircraft inventory
20,890
19, 005
18,348
Operating active
18,260
17,692
17, 114
USAF
15, 276
14,631
14,063
Air National Guard
2,253
2, 301
2,275
Air Force Reserve
731
760
776
Nonoperating active
2,630
1,313
1,232
As a result of the decrease in the aircraft inventory indicated above, there are
reductions in those operations and maintenance accounts wherein direct costs are
relatable to the inventory. Fuel and consumable parts for example, have been
adjusted for the decrease in inventory and related flying hours. One of the major
costs associated with these reductions?depot level overhaul?would not be
realized until late in fiscal year 1961 and primarily in fiscal year 1962.
The directly identifiable savings for fiscal year 1961 are estimated by the
military departments as follows:
[In millions]
Air Force
Regular
MATS
Air National
Guard
Fuel and oil
Unit maintenance
Total
$24.0
5. 0
1 $6.8
J
{ $0.2
0.3
29.0
6.8
0.5
Navy
Regular
Naval Re-
serve
Fuel and oil
Consumable material
Total identifiable savings
$5.5
1. 2
$0.3
O. 1
6.7
0.4
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REDUCTION IN BASES
Mr. SIKES. You mentioned a reduction in bases. Is it anticipated
that there will be further elimination of bases in fiscal year 1961?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Mr. SIKES. Each of the services, I believe, are continuing to build
new bases. I presume that this committee can be assured that you
are screening very carefully the construction of new bases and new
facilities in order that you do not continue to build on the one hand
for activities which you are cutting back on the other hand?
Secretary GATES. I think that I can assure the committee that we
are on top of this situation and gave it a very careful going over, not
only in that respect but also in respect of having interservice use of
bases.
RUSSIAN REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY STRENGTHS
Mr. SIKES. Earlier this morning we had quotations read from
proposals by the Russians for reductions in their military strength.
If, in fact, we should find that they are carrying out disarmament,
how quickly will we react by reprograming our own military require-
ments?
Secretary GATES. I would hope we would not react too quickly,
even though it might be a little more expensive. I would hope we
would make certain that we had a verification of actual performance
on the part of the Russians.
Mr. SIKES. Even if we had a verification of actual performance,
would that be a clear indication that we have a justification for cutting
back?
Let me give you an illustration of what I am talking about? Mr.
Khrushchev was quoted as saying that he is going to materially
reduce the size of the Russian Army. If he were to reduce materially
the size of his army, he could still have a superiority in strength, inso-
far as numbers and equipment are concerned, over our own forces.
We must accept the fact that most of the Russian forces and some
of the satellite forces have been completely reequipped with new,
post-World War II equipment and that our forces and the allied
forces have not.
We must recognize the fact that our ground forces have been
heavily outnumbered from the beginning. If in fact there should be
a cutback of one-third in the Russian Army, our forces still would be
outnumbered and I fail to see that there would be any justification for
any substantial cutback on our part.
Secretary GATES. I will agree with you, sir. The only basis
Mr. SIKES. The ground forces would simply be a little more in
balance.
Secretary GATES. That is correct. Under the policy of this country
the only basis that I could see for a reduction would be if we make
progress toward a controlled disarmament program. Perhaps there
would be some basis under any type of treaty the Senate would
ratify along those lines, but short of that, I do not foresee it.
PROBLEM OF BALANCE WITHIN BUDGET
However, there is one thing that does worry me in this budget, and
I think this committee should look at this. There is around $22
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billion of the total budget going? for the pay of people, and for the
maintenance and operation account.
? This means that less than half of the budget is going for what we
call our capital accounts?about $13 billion is going to procurement,
$4 billion for research, and something over $1 billion for construction.
When you consider the importance of the research and development
effort and the need for weapons in being versus the pay of people and
increased operating costs it begins to be something to keep an eye on
?in the future. It seems to me we may get to the point where we are
not buying enough bullets in relation to the number of people. Either
we have to have less people or an increased budget in the future.
I think we are all right this year, but I think it is something to
watch.
Mr. SIKES. I approve of that. I am very glad to hear you say
that you do not propose to have our defense policies made a weather-
vane; to be shifted back and forth by each passing statement from the
Kremlin.
Secretary GATES. I most certainly do not, sir. I have the complete
support of everyone I deal with in that position.
Mr. SIKES. General Twining, would you like to add anything to
this conversation?
REACTION TO RUSSIAN STRENGTH CUTS
General TWINING. I do feel that anything that Khrushchev an-
nounces requires a great deal of study before we can accept it. For
instance, we have been concerned because he has not come down to
the figure of 2,500,000 already. We do not like the idea of negotiating
in a disarmament conference with him when we are down to 2,500,000
and he is not. He has the edge on this. We feel he should come
down to that and then we are ready to go to conference with him.
You cannot tell what his cuts mean in the case of a powerful nation
like that, where it is controlled practically by him. He is the field
rnarshall and he decides where things are built, why they are built,
and how the money is spent. He runs it. He can change the titles
of these soldiers. He can do anything he wants with them and say
that he is reducing, but we have to make sure he is. He is a tricky
fellow and you know him better than I do. We have to watch him
very carefully but it certainly looks like a good trend if he is honest.
But we must first study it.
DISARMAMENT
Mr. SIKES. This Nation will welcome any genuine proposals for
disarmament, but, as you stated, we want to be sure they are genuine
and to see something done, not just to hear about it.
Secretary GATES. We want to be sure that there is an enforceable
control and monitor it.
MT. SIKES. Exactly.
MT. MAHON. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
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UTILIZATION OF IRBM'S IN FAR EAST
Mr. SIKES. I noted in yesterday's discussion that there are no
plans for the utilization of IRBM's in the Far East. Is that to be
modified? Is there not a plan to base IRBM's to the Far East,
possibly in Japan and in Korea?
General TWINING. No, sir; we do not.
Mr. SIKES. Why not? We hear the Reds have them in that area.
General TWINING. We will have used all of the IRBM's in our
oversea deployments to allied countries. That is the last of them.
Mr. SIKES. Would it not be desirable to have them there?
Secretary GATES. No, sir. I think that the Far East is protected
the same way as the State of Pennsylvania is protected. It is pro-
tected by the Strategic Air Command and our other strategic weapons
systems wherever they happen to be based. Also, we are getting
increasingly worried about the vulnerability of exposed missiles.
We are not developing mobile IRBM missiles, unless you include the
POLARIS?which I would not when it is hitched to a submarine.
General TWINING. The MACE missile will go to Okinawa.
Secretary GATES. You were probably reading about MACE as a
replacement for the MATADOR.
Mr. SIKES. Why would you use the MACE in that area if you do not
need IRBM's?
General TWINING. An IRBM would be all right if we had a military
requirement for it there. We do not want to go ahead and procure
them.
SECOND GENERATION IRBM FOR NATO
Secretary GATES. There is some talk about evolving a second
generation IRBM for NATO. This gets extremely complicated
because, under U.S. law, it involves the matter of controlling the
warheads. We have some proposals under study that might lead to
the development of such an IRBM. It might be a land-based, mobile,
POLARIS-type missile which we would deploy in Europe. General
Norstad has the military requirement for this. If this type of weapon
were developed I would assume that we might consider using some of
them in the Far East, also.
Mr. SIKES. Is it a matter of policy that you think the area is
adequately covered by other weapons and IRBM's as such are not
required there? Certainly there would be no disposition on the part
of this committee to deny them if you feel they are needed there.
Secretary GATES. As a matter of policy, that is correct.
IRBM'S IN GREECE AND TURKEY
Mr. SIKES. What about whether or not we will have IRBM's in
Greece?
Secretary GATES. Turkey, yes, but Greece, no. There were, at
one time, some planned for Greece.
Mr. SIKES. Has the plan to base IRBM's in Greece been given up?
Secretary GATES. Yes, we have gone to Turkey instead of Greece.
REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF MISSILE SHIPS
Mr. SIKES. There has been a reduction in the number of missile
ships that were scheduled for the 1960 program. Since this is the
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missile age, and we are going to have to fund additional ships in the
1961 program, why was there a cutback in the 1960 missile ship-
building program?
Secretary GATES. I presume that this is part of the repricing of the
Navy shipbuilding program to place it on a fully funded-to-completion
basis.
Mr. SIKES. Is it a matter of money, making the dollars cover the
job to be done?
PRICING OF SHIPS
Secretary GATES. Yes. We have been a little disappointed?and
I take some blame for this and I am disappointed personally?in the
record we have been making in our ability to correctly price our
ships. We have been running over, way over, what we have been
telling the Congress.
Mr. SIKES. Do you consider that you need those ships that had to
be canceled?
Secretary GATES. Yes, we will be buying the equivalent kind of
ships as we go ahead.
Mr. SIKES. Will they come in a later budget?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. However, I think there is something
else we should take a more exhaustive look at. Some people are
getting concerned about the level of effort we are putting into fleet
air defense. It is a very large effort when you consider the fighter
planes on the carriers, the missile ships that you referred to, and air
defense missiles.
Mr. SIKES. Is it true then at the moment there is not a certainty
that the problem is a lack of money but instead there are questions
as to whether there is actually a requirement for the canceled ships?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; whether we need that much fleet air
defense.
AIR ALERT PROGRAM
Mr. SIKES. You mentioned ground alert but very little was said
about an air alert. What will be the place of an air alert in the
1961 program?
Secretary GATES. Expenditures for the air alert are, as I understand,
$20 million in 1960 and $90 million in 1961. This is to purchase the
capability?you might say to have an "on the shelf" capability for
an air alert. It is principally for spare parts.
Mr. SIKES. Will we, in fact, have any air alert in 1961?
Secretary GATES. This gets into a question of what you want to do
and for how long you want to do it, Mr. Sikes. You can have an air
alert tomorrow morning You cannot have it for too long a time or
you will wear out your capability. A continuous air alert for some
numbers of aircraft could be had.
Mr. SIKES. Is the Department of Defense satisfied that the amount
of money which is being requested in 1961 is all that is needed at this
stage for air or ground alerts?
Secretary GATES. Yes, the Department of Defense is satisfied. The
Joint Chiefs are satisfied. The Strategic Air Command?General
Powers, who has the Strategic Air Command, is not satisfied.
Mr. SIKES. How much does General Powers want?
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Secretary GATES. I have heard everything from $600 million up,
for one-quarter of the force on a continuous airborne alert. There is no
military requirement at this time to do this. This is insurance that
we are buying here in the 1961 program. We are not now Making
the decision to do it.
Mr. FORD. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. SIKES. Yes.
Mr. FORD. It is my recollection that in fiscal 1960, possibly, during
part of fiscal 1959, you were going to do some experimental work with
an airborne alert. Was that done?
. Secretary GATES. Yes, it is being done and the crews are being
trained. The techniques of an air alert are being worked on and
exercised.
. Mr. SIKES. Will the results of that exercise be reflected in recom-
mendations to Congress to supplement this budget if it appears desir-
able to have an air alert?
Secretary GATES. I am informed we have 12 B-52's right now in
the air on a test.
Mr. SIKES. Will the results of these tests possibly result in a change
in your recommendation to Congress on this budget item? Or do you
think your present recommendation is firm for 1961?
Secretary GATES. 1961 is a long time ahead in calendar months.
If the threat increased and it looked as though we had to fly an actual
air alert, we would probably come back and ask for more money to
do this.
MOUNTING OF MISSILES ON RAILWAY CARS
Mr. SIKES. That is what I thought you would say.
There was some talk of putting missiles on railway cars to reduce
their vulnerability. Are there provisions for such steps in the 1961
budget?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. There is some money for the mobile
MINUTEMAN concept in this budget.
Dr. YORK. It is a part of the MINUTEMAN program.
I could not identify offhand how much goes for that concept in the
MINUTEMAN program.
Secretary GATES. It is in the study and research phase?under-
standing the problem. We even have a miniature, scale-model train,
and that kind of thing. There is some money being spent, and some
programed to be spent, because we definitely plan?as of this time?
to do this.
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE
'Mr. SIKES. What is the current emphasis in the 1961 budget on
chemical, biological, and radiological warfare as contrasted with the
emphasis in previous budgets? Is it greater or less?
Secretary GATES. It is increased.
Mr. SIKES. Will you spell out for the record in what general ways
this emphasis on CBR is being increased?
? Secretary GATES. It is being increased, but I would get into a ques-
tion that is very much in the research and development phase; it is
a very delicate subject.
(The information is classified and was separately furnished to the
committee.)
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AIRBORNE ALERT
Mr. SIXES. I would like to ask what kind of additional training is
necessary and what other increases are necessary to develop an off-the-
shelf airborne alert capability.
Secretary GATES. That is exactly what we are doing. It is a matter
of degree how much you do. We are spending money for the neces-
sary training and for the spare parts that will give us an on-the-shelf
capability.
Mr. SIKES. It would be helpful if you would expand your answer for
the record.
(The information is classified and was separately furnished to the
committee.)
Mr. MAHON. Mr. NOITell.
COMMENDATION OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. NORREIL. Mr. Secretary, I have enjoyed very much your
remarks. I want to agree with Mr. Sikes and others in complimenting
you. I think, as they do, you are going to make a very fine Secretary
of Defense. We have had other Secretaries of Defense and we have
had other generals and admirals who have testified before us. Some-
times when they get in private life I have discovered that they evi-
dently change their minds a little bit.
I realize that as far as our country is concerned, the President,
under our Constitution, has the responsibility for protecting our
Nation. However, the Congress of the United States has the power
to appropriate money. I want to urge all of you, when you are testi-
fying, not to testify to something just because the President wants it.
I think you ought to testify to us as to what you really think.
I have in mind several who have been high up in our defense forces.
When they get in private life, they evidently change their minds to
some extent. We want to appropriate as a Congress what you need
to take care of our country. Whether it is used or not is up to the
President of the United States. I want to say that I think Congress
has always appropriated all the money you say you need. I am not
going to ask you a lot of questions. I have never done that. I have
taken the position that the defense of our country is necessarily up to
the ones who know something about what to do when the chips are
down.
However, I do know that there are a lot of people in this country
who are disturbed. They think that we are now possibly No. 2.
I do not think so. I think we are still No. 1 and I want us to stay
No. 1. At least, I will do what is needed to be done for the United
States of America to always be the No. 1 nation of the world.
Secretary GATES. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, I share that
point of view and I would also like to confirm the fact that we recog-
nize the responsibilities of the Congress and always feel we should deal
frankly with you. Of course, I work for the President. If I dis-
agreed with the President, I would not be here. However, I am
personally convinced that we are on the right track.
Mr. Norrell, I think it is a very fine statement. We want to be
first, too, and stay there.
Mr. N ORRELL. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
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Mr. MAHON. Mr. Whitten.
Mr. 'WHITTEN. Mr. Secretary, I am deeply interested in the various
aspects of our military defense. There is no point in my duplicating
earlier questions.
I would like to say that in my service on this committee we have
dealt with a number of Secretaries of Defense. Without exception,
they were able men and devoted public servants, in my opinion. I
do feel, however, your handling of this Defense Department is now
and will be compared most favorably with your predecessors. I
think we have an excellent Secretary of Defense.
Having made that statement, I would like to get into one issue that
through the years I have frequently raised, not because it is the only
aspect in which I am interested, but apparently I have more fears in
this field than some of my colleagues.
DEFENSE SPENDING AND INFLATION
That is the overall place in our economy of spending more than half
of our national budget on defense. Whatever our military needs are,
we must meet them. But I think any man who gives even a little
attention to economics will realize, other than some benefits perhaps
from research, that that which you have to spend on defense, which is
not producing any consumer goods, is of its very nature inflationary.
That in turn leads to the belief that any needless spending, for which
we do not get real defense, is one of the basic causes of the inflation
with which we are faced in this country. In other words, when defense
takes people out of the normal activities?schoolteachers, scientists,
instructors, laborers?to that extent you create a shortage, and to the
extent you create a shortage others have to try to raise pay to try to
get employees. Defense industries in turn increase pay?and here
we go.
VESTED INTEREST IN DEFENSE SPENDING
The other worry I have in that field is that so many vested interests
get involved in this situation that it is mighty hard to make military
decisions completely objectively. I am sure I do not as a member of
this committee get one one-hundredth or one one-thousandth of the
pressure you do, but with military spending in every State and in
nearly every district, with the immediate economy of that area
wrapped around it, a great problem is presented. I do not have any
military installations in my district, so I do not have the problem, but
I did have, and if you set out to close such an establishment, I am
sure I, too, would have many of the people there wanting to con-
tinue it.
Since over half the national budget is involved and since the Defense
Department makes the determination as to what facilities are going
to be closed and which major companies are going to get contracts,
it becomes highly imperative, if I am right about the inflationary
results of defense spending?and particularly that expenditure for
which we get no real defense?that these things be looked at com-
pletely objectively.
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Last year the committee called on the Department to supply to
the committee a list of retired officers, colonel and above, who were
working for defense contractors. I would like for the record to carry
the exact language which appears on page 42 of last year's report.
(The language of the report follows;)
The committee is seriously concerned over problems which arise as a result of
the acceptance by retired senior officers of employment in responsible executive
positions with defense contractors. The problem has been discussed within the
committee over a period of years. Hearings before the House Armed Services
Committee in previous years have been consulted. The committee is advised
that further hearings before the House Armed Services Committee are scheduled
for the near future. As a prelude to further analysis of this problem, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense is requested to supply the committee, prior to the
1961 appropriation hearings, with a list of retired officers of or above the rank
of colonel, or the equivalent, employed by persons or firms having contracts with
the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
Mr. WHITTEN. Has that information been supplied to the com-
mittee?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like that list to be included
in the hearings so that it will be made a matter of public record rather
than something that is private, perhaps to be forgotten.
Mr. MAHON. Without objection, the request of Mr. Whitten will
be complied with and the information will be placed in the record at
this point.
(The list referred to follows:)
Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials or
employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of contracts with
the Department of Defense
Company
1. American Bosch Arma Corp., 320
Fulton Ave., Hempstead, N.Y.
2. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 195 Broadway, New York,
N.Y.
3. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 50 West
50th St., New York, N.Y.
4. Avco Corp., 750 3d Ave., New
York, N.Y.
5. Bath Iron Works Corp.,* Bath,
Maine.
6. Beech Aircraft Corp., 9709 East
Central Ave., Wichita, Kans.
7. Bell Aircraft Corp.,' Post Office
Box 1, Buffalo, N.Y.
Officer
None.
Capt. Forest M. Price.
None.
Maj. Gen. Herbert M. Johnes, USA.
Lt. Gen. C. S. Irvine, USAF.
Brig. Gen. Monro MacCloskey, USAF.
Rear Adm. Edward L. Woodyard,
USN.
Adm. Robert Bostwick Carney, USN.
Col. Harry Beahan Carney, USAF.
Capt. James 0. Taylor, USNR.
Col. Cliff K. Titus, USAF.
Col. William I. LeVan, USA.
Col. Stuart G. McLennan, USAF.
Maj. Gen. George Olmsted.2
Affiliates:
Bell Helicopter Corp.
Hydraulic Research &
Manufacturing Co.
Wheelabrator Corp.
* Company personnel records do not list military rank attained.
Lt. Gen. William E. Kepner, USAF, acts as consultant to Bell Aircraft. He is currently employed by
Radiation, Inc., Orlando, Fla.
2 Member, board of directors.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
8. Bendix Aviation Corp., Fisher
Bldg., Detroit, Mich.
Affiliates:
Bendix Westinghouse Au-
tomotive Air Brake Co.
Sheffield Corp.
.9. Bethlehem Steel Co., Inc., Bethle-
hem, Pa.
Affiliate: Bethlehem Pacific
Coast Steel Corp.
10. Blue Cross Association, 55 E.
34th St., New York, N.Y.
11. Boeing Airplane Co., Seattle,
Wash.
Officer
Col. A. L. Baylies, USA.
Capt. U. S. Brady, Jr., USN.
Col. C. P. Burton, USA.
Rear Adm. W. E. Cleaves, USN
Capt. E. R. Dare, USN.
Col. W. J. Darmody, USA.
Col. G. W. Dauncy, USA.
Col. E. J. Dorsey, USMC.
Col. E. S. Matthews, USA.
Col. G. A. Morgan, USAR.
Col. J. H. O'Malley, USA.
Capt. G. H. Richards, USN.
Capt. C. H. Shildhauer, USNR.
Col. F. R. Swoger, USA.
Capt. E. C. Burchett, USN.
Rear Adm. H. L. Collins, USN.
Rear Adm. W. R. Dowd, USN.
Capt. G. W. Dick, USCG.
Rear Adm. R. B. Goldman, USN.
Rear Adm. W. T. Johnes, USN.
Capt. A. L. Mare, USN.
Capt. H. C. Nichols, USNR.
Capt. A. G. Schnable, USN.
None.
Col. Charles Armstrong, USA.
Col. Leo W. Bagley, USA.
Col. Robert V. Bowler, USA.
Capt. Portus D. Boyce, USN.
Capt. John L. Brown, USN.
Col. George A. Corneal, USAF.
Brig. Gen. Jack C. Crosthwaite, USAF.
Col. Ralph A. Dutton, USA.
Col. Archie C. Edwards' USAF.
Col. Wendell C. Fields, USA.
Rear Adm. Gerald Galpin, USN.
Capt. James A. Haley, USN.
Capt. Richard D. Harwood, USN.
Col. Theodore Hikel, USA.
Col. Lauri S. Hillberg, USA.
Col. Francis R. Hoehl, USAF.
Col. Arthur L. Logan, USAF.
Capt. Henry M. Marshall, USN.
Col. Ned Joseph Martini, USAF.
Col. Paul B. Nelson, USA.
Maj. Gen. Homer Oldfield, USA.
Capt. James C. Partington, USCG.
Col. Orville Rehmann, USAF.
Capt. Herbert G. Sheplar, USN.
Col. William J. Simons, USAF.
Capt. Riley Site, C&GC.
Col. Harry G. Spillinger, USA.
Col. Fred L. Thorp, USA.
Capt. Warren Vincent, USN.
Capt. Charles S. Weeks, USN.
12. Brown-Raymond-Walsh,' 207 W. None.4
24th St., New York, N.Y.
Joint venture consists of Brown & Root, Inc., 4100 Clinton Dr., Houston, Tex.; Raymond International,
Inc., 140 Cedar St., New York, N.Y.; Walsh Construction Co., 711 Third Aim., New York, N.Y.
4 Applies to the joint venture.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are ?facials
Or ? employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollair amount of con-
kacts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
13. Burroughs Corp., Detroit, Mich.
14. California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, Calif.
15. Cessna Aircraft Co., Wichita, Kans.
16. Chance Vought Aircraft Inc., Dal-
las, Tex.
17. Chrysler Corp., 341 Massachusetts
Ave., Detroit, Mich.
18. Cities Service Co., 60 Wall Tower,
New York, N.Y.
Affiliates:
Cities Service Petro-
leum, Inc.
Cities Service Oil Co.
(Delaware).
Arkansas Fuel Oil
Corp.
19. Collins Radio, 855 35th St. NE.,
Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
20. Continental Motors Corp., 205
Market St., Muskegon, Mich.
Affiliates:
Continental Aviation &
Engineering Corp.
Gray Marine Motor Co__
Wisconsin Motor Corp_
21. Continental Oil Co.,5 Houston,
Tex.
22. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,6 Wood-
Ridge, N.J.
Officer
Lt. Gen. R. J. Canine.
Brig. Gen. Lawrence J. Carr.
Adm. H. D. Baker.
Rear Adm. Stanton B. Dunlap.
Col. R. V. Fite.
Col. C. L. Register.
None.
Capt. Richard J. Greene, USN.
Col. H. R. Jordan, USMC.
Rear Adm. A. H. Perry, USN.
Adm. H. B. Sallada, USN.
Vice Adm. H. Sanders, USN.
Capt. C. A. Briggs, USN.
Col. E. F. Klinck, USA.
Col. Gervais W. Trichel, USA.
Col. Wm. J. D. Espinosa, USA.
Capt. Wm. J. Hickey, USN.
Col. John L. Hornor, Jr., USA.
Brig. Gen. Joseph W. Horridge, USA.
Rear Adm. Duncan C. MacMillian,
USN.
Col. Joseph A. McNerney, USA.
Col. Samuel F. Silver, USA.
Col. Horace F. Sykes, Jr., USA.
Col. Wm. M. Talbot, USAF.
Rear Adm. Rutledge B. Tompkins,
USN.
Col. G. H. McCullagh, USAR.
Col. W. R. Boyd, III, USAFR.
Rear Adm. Janes Ross, USNR.
Col. Wilmer G. Wilson, USAR.
A. S. Born.
L. R. Heron.
E. J. Beller.
R. L. Fulcher.
Charles Kissner.
Capt. C. C. Busenkell, USN.
Col. Harrison H. Hiberg, USA.
Col. E. R. Baker, USA.
Col. R. W. Hird, USA.
Capt. R. J. H. Conn, USN.
Capt. Robert F. Jones, USN.
Capt. A. R. Sanborn, USN.
Capt. H. M. Sartoris, USN.
5 This only includes employees within knowledge of correspondent and does not include a canvass of 9,000
employees.
Time did not permit a review of personnel records.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Companw
23. Defoe Shipbuilding Co., Bay City,
Mich.
24. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., Santa
Monica, Calif.
25. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,7
1007 Market St., Wilmington,
Del.
Affiliates: Remington Arms
Co., Inc.
26. Eastman Kodak Co., Rochester,
N.Y.
27. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.,
Hagerstown, Md.
Affiliate: Jonco Aircraft Corp.,
Shawnee, Okla.
28. Fairbanks-Whitney Corp. (for-
merly Penn-Texas Corp.), 745
5th Ave., New York, N.Y.
Affiliates:
Pratt & Whitney Co., Inc.
Chandler Evans Corp._
Colts Patent Fire Arms
Manufacturing Co.,
Inc.
"Quick-Way" Truck
Shovel Co.
Fairbanks. Morse & Co__
29. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 1200
Firestone Parkway, Akron, Ohio.
7 Mall Tool Co. is now a division of Remington.
Officer
None.
Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker.
Rear Adm. E. H. Ekelmeyer.
Brig. Gen. 0. F. Carlson.
Brig. Gen. S. L. McCroskey.
Capt. Maurice Kauffman.
Capt. J. R. Ruhsenberger.
Capt. J. E. Baker.
Capt. J. 0. Bigelow.
Col. A. D. Dugan.
Col. J. L. Elwell.
Col. A. C. Miller.
Col. J. W. Leonhardt.
Col. R. A. Gardner.
Col. Jerdon Coleman.
Col. S. H. Hankins.
Col. M. B. Chatfield.
Col. L. L. Sailor.
Col. Douglas G. Ludlam, USA.
Maj. Gen. Edward P. Curtis, USA.
Col. Arthur W. Fuchs, USAR.
Col. J. B. Langby, USAR.
Col. J. D. Peet, USA.
Capt. K. D. Gallinger, USN.
Col. Rufus Wesson, USAR.
Col. Philip Foss, USAR.
Col. Frank N. Gunderson, USAR.
Col. B. M. Prince, USAF.
Col. J. J. Griffith, Jr., USAF.
Col. Werner Zugschwerdt, USA.
Brig. Gen. Charles W. Shelburne,
USMC.
Adm. Robert D. Carney, USN.
Gen. Jacob L. Devers, USA.
Brig. Gen. James F. Early, USAF.
Capt. Grayson Merrill, USN.
Capt. Hamilton 0. Hauck, USN.
Capt. Frank E. Escobar, USN.
Brig. Gen. William W. Welsh, USAF.
Brig. Gen. G. H. Drewry, USA.
Col. H. Pierce, USA.
Brig. Gen. A. M. Prentiss, USA.
Rear Adm. Clarence Broussard, USN.
Col. T. M. Belshe.
Col. R. R. Studler.
Capt. William White.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
30. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.,
San Jose, Calif.
31. Ford Motor Co.,8 Dearborn, Mich__
Affiliate: Aeronutronic Sys-
tems, Inc.
32. The Garrett Corp., 9851 Sepulveda
Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif.
33. General Dynamics Corp., 445 Park
Ave., New York, N.Y.
Officer
Brig. Gen. Clifford Sayre, USA.
Col. J. E. Hamm, Jr., USAR.
Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Holly, USA.
Rear Adm. Harold A. Carlisle, USN.
Col. Raymond R. Robins, USA.
Col. Benjamin S. Mesick, USA.
Col. Irving A. Duffy, USA.
Capt. Lewis K. Marshall, USNR.
Col. Carolus A. Brown, USA.
Col. William J. Given, USA.
Col. Zachary Moores, USA.
Vice Adm. Seldon B. Spangler, USN.
Lt. Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe, USAF.
Col. W. T. Abbott, USAF.
Rear Adm. E. P. Abernathy, USN.
Rear Adm. S. H. Armbruster, USN.
Brig. Gen. M. W. Arnold, USAF.
Col. S. Baker, USAF.
Col. R. T. Bankhard, USAF.
Capt. E. L. Barr, Jr., USN.
Brig. Gen. W. L. Bayer, USA.
Capt. A. H. Bergeson, USN.
Capt. W. J. Bettens, USN.
Rear Adm. C. Briggs, USN.
Capt. A. L. Dunning, USN.
Capt. T. H. Dubois, USN.
Capt. R. E. Farnsworth, USN.
Brig. Gen. H. S. Fassett, USMC.
Capt. J. P. Fitzsimmons, USN.
Rear Adm. W. 0. Floyd, USN.
Capt. B. F. Griffin, Jr., USN.
Bear Adm. R. Gross, USN.
Col. 0. B. Hardy, USAF.
Capt. Wm. L. Hoffheins, USN.
Pear Adm C. F. Horne, USN.
Col. N. H. Jungers, USMC.
Rear Adm. J. H., Kaufman, USN.
Pear Adm. T. B.' Makring,-USN.
Capt. C. Van S. Know, USN.
Rear Adm. S. Leith, USN.
Pear Adm. W. A. Lent, USN.
Col. M. R. MacIntyre, USMC.
Rear Adm. A. I. McKee, USN.
Col. E. E. McKesson, USAF.
Gen. J. T. McNarney, USAF.
Col. J. P. Mial, USA.
Col. J. A. Moore, USAF.
Capt. R. J. Moore, USN.
Maj. Gen. F. P. Mulcahy, USMC.
Capt. R. Noisat, USN.
Rear Adm. J. R. Pahl, USN.
Brig. Gen. E. P. Pennebacker,
USMC.
Col. J. L. Perkins, USMC.
Brig Gen. P.. L. Peterson, USMC.
Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Piper, Jr., USMC.
Capt. J. R. Z. Reynolds, USN.
Rear Adm. L. B. Richardson, USN.
s Personnel records do not necessarily include positive data to reflect this type of service.
50026-60-6
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Companv
33. General Dynamics Corp., 445 Park
Ave., New York, N.Y.
34. General Electric Co.,' 570 Lexing-
ton Ave., New York, N.Y.
35. General Motors, Detroit, Mich____
36. General Precision Equipment
Corp., 92 Gold St., New York,
N.Y.
Affiliates:
Kearfott, Co., Inc.
Librascope, Inc.
Link Aviation, Inc.
Reflects company records since 1945.
Officer
Col. S. R. Stewart, USAF.
Rear Adm. H. F. Stout, USN.
Rear Adm. D. J. Sullivan, USN.
Capt. H. M. Sumrall, USN.
Capt. I. D. Sykes, Jr., USN.
Rear Adm. W. V. R. Vieweg, USN.
Rear Adm. W. B. Whaley, USN.
Col. W. D. Wimer, USAF.
Capt. J. E. Wolowsky, USN.
Capt. II. Wood, Jr., USN.
Adair, C.
Bennett, Ralph D.
Berkley, Joseph B.
Cooke, William R.
Coulter, Howard N.
Davidson, Jr., Charles B.
Deyarmond, A. B.
Earl, Charles A.
Fechteler, Wm. M.
Fickel, A. A.
Fouch, George E.
Hansell, H. S.
Hanson, Murray.
Harman, Leonard F.
Harris, John W.
Hoffman, Frank E.
Horton, Paul B.
Johnson, Douglass T.
Kinsella, W. T.
Matthews, R. L.
Messer, H. G.
Messick, Joseph.
Montgomery, J. B.
Murray, C. B.
Paxson, H. 0.
Roper, H. McK.
Root, 'Willard G.
Schmidt, Jr., Louis E.
Schanklin, Elliott W.
Simpson, Robert T.
Smith, Loyd C.
Sneeringer, E. A.
Thorpe, Harlan M.
Watson, Paul W.
Young, D. B.
Capt. Clyde V. Hawk.
Rear Adm. Truman J. Hedding.
Capt. Grant Prue.
Rear Adm. S. E. Burroughs, Jr., USN.
Rear Adm. M. F. Schoeffel, USN.
Rear Adm. James A. McNally, USN.
Rear Adm. James H. Barnard, USN.
Capt. Edward W. Quilter, USN.
Rear Adm. George T. Mundorff, USN.
Rear Adm. John A. Scott, USN.
Maj. Gen. Norris B. Harbold.
Col. Joseph B. Duckworth.
In view of time limit there may be others not on list.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
37. General Tire & Rubber Co., Akron,
Ohio.
Affiliates:
Aerojet-General Corp.
The A. M. Byers Co.
38. Gilfillan Bros., Inc., 1815 Venice
Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif.
39. The B. F. Goodrich Co.,10 Akron,
Ohio.
40. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Akron 16, Ohio.
Affiliates:
Goodyear Aircraft Corp.
Goodyear Engineering
Corp.
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.
43. Greenland Contractors,11 122 East
42d St., New York, N.Y.
42. Grumman Aircraft Engineering
Corp., Bethpage, Long Island,
N.Y.
43. Haves Aircraft Corp., Birmingham,
44. Joshua Hendy Corp., 612 South
Flower St., Los Angeles, Calif.
45. Hercules Powder Co., Inc., Wil-
mington, Del.
46. Hughes Aircraft Co., ?Culver City,
Calif.
Officer
Rear Adm. Calvin M. Bolster, USN.
Col. S. J. Zoller, USA.
Col. Meryl Munoz, USA.
Col. W. R. Stark, USAF.
Col. Howard Means, USAF.
Col. W. E. Benedict, USMC.
Col. Elmore Seed, USMC.
Col. R. D. McLeod, USA.
Adm. Lowell T. Stone, USN.
Capt. Joseph McGoughrem, USN.
Gen. W. G. Wyman, 'USA.
Brig. Gen. Harrison Shaler, USA.
Brig. Gen. David Van Syckle, USA.
Col. Alfred L. Price, USA.
Col. E. M. Libershal.
Gen. A. W. Vanaman, USAF.
Col. Howard A. Moody, USAF.
Brig. Gen. R. W. Hayward, USMC.
Col. Win. Frash, USMC.
Commodore Archibald Hunter, USN.
Rear Adm. R. S. Hatcher, USN.
Rear Adm. J. C. Alderman, USN.
Rear Adm. L. C. Baldauf, USN.
Rear Adm. Robert K. Ashton, USN.
Capt. George E. King, USN.
Capt. W. L. Tann, USNR.
Capt. W. G. Winslow, USN.
Brig. Gen. F. F. Hayden, USA.
None.
Col. George H. Donnelly.
Col. Max Frederic Moyer, USAFR.
Rear Adm. Karl L. Lange, USNR.
Col. Charles L. Bell.
Col. William Joseph Green.
Vice Adm. Joseph F. Bolger, USN.
Brig. Gen. Walter W. Wise, USAF.
Col. C. R. Storrie, USAF.
Col. L. Cornell, USAF.
None.
Col. Robert W. Meals, USA.
Brig. Gen. F. W. Coleman, USA.
Rear Adm. N. F. Carton, USN.
Capt. G. M. Greene, USN.
Col. T. M. Hahn, USAF.
Brig. Gen. S. R. Mickelsen, USA.
Rear Adm. M. A. Nation, USN.
Col. C. H. Welch, USAF.
10 Records of this type not maintained. The 1 name furnished was known to the correspondent.
Joint venture consists of Peter Kiewit Sons' Co.; S. J. Groves & Sons Co.; Al Johnson Construction
Co.; Condon-Cunningham, Inc.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
47. International Business Machine
Corp., 59 Madison Ave., New
York, N.Y.
Affiliate: The Service Bureau
Corp.
48. International Telephone & Tele-
graph Corp., 67 Broad St., New
York, N.Y.
Affiliates:
Federal Electric Corp.
Industrial Products Divi-
sion.
International Standard
Electric Corp.
Intelex Systems, Inc.
Kuthe Laboratories, Inc.
Royal Electric Corp.
49. The John Hopkins University, Bal-
timore, Md.
Affiliates:
Operations Research
Office.
Applied Physics Labora-
tory.
50. The Kaman Aircraft Corp., Bloom-
field, Conn.
51. Peter Kie wit Sons Co.,12 Omaha,
Nebr.
52. Lear, Inc., 3171 South Bundy Dr.,
Santa Monica, Calif.
Officer
Col. J. D. Lee, USAF.
Col. N. M. Martin, USA.
Maj. Gen. T. C. Odom, USAF.
Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey, USA.
Adm. John E. Gingrich, USN.
Rear Adm. Frederick R. Furth, USN.
Col. 0. W. Lunde, USAF.
Col. Houston V. Evans, USA.
Maj. Gen. Francis H. Lanahan, USA.
Maj. Gen. Raymond C. Maude, USA.
Col. Alvin T. Bowers, USA.
Rear Adm. George K. Fraser, USN.
Vice Adm. R. H. Cruzen, USN.
Col. Paul H. Maurer, USA.
Col. P. 0. Vaughn, USAF.
Col. Russell A. Baker, USA.
Capt. R. F. Pryce, USN.
Brig. Gen. Paul M. Seleen, USA.
Col. Frank G. Trew, USA.
Rear Adm. William Organ, USN.
Rear Adm. Jess Sowell, USN.
'Rear Adm. Robert E. Laub, USN.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth E. Fields, USA.
Rear Adm. William L. Freseman, USN.
Maj. Gen. G. Rodney Smith, USA.
Col. C. F. Fiore, USA.
Capt. Roy Jackson, USN.
Maj. Gen. James G. Christensen USA.
Capt. John 0. Dorsett, USN.
Brig. Gen. Lester D. Flory, USA.
Gen. Thomas T. Handy, USA.
Maj. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, USA.
Brig. Gen. John G. Hill, USA.
Rear Adm. Marion N. Little, USN.
Col. Edward M. Parker, USA.
Col. Edward K. Purnell, USA.
Col. ,Harry D. Sheets, AUS.
Col. W. P. Withers, USA.
Brig. Gen. W. R. Currie, USA.
COL Paul Elias, USA.
Col. D. H. Hale, USA.
Rear Adm. M. R. Kelley, USN.
Brig. Gen. W. R. Wendt, USMC.
Rear Adm. James A. Thomas, USN.
Col. Charles L. Bell.
Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles, USAF.
Col. Kenneth R. Rogers, USAF.
12 This firm is a member of the joint venture, Greenland contractors, and Colonel Bell is also listed above
as an employee of the joint venture.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
53. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Burbank,
Calif.
Affiliates:
Lockheed Aircraft Interna-
tional.
Lockheed Aircraft Service,
New York, Inc.
Lockheed Aircraft Service, Inc.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.
Officer
Col. H. J. Bangs, USA.
Col. H. P. Becker, USMC.
Rear Adm. J. F. Beverly, USN.
Brig. Gen. J. S. Blais, USMC.
Rear Adm. W. A. Bowers, USN.
Capt. A. E. Buckley, USN.
Capt. Wm. M. Cason, USNR.
Col. E. J. Cotter, USA.
Col. C. F. Damberg, USAF.
Col. H. 0. Deakin, USMC.
Capt. L. E. Divoll, USN.
Col. J. R. Donovan, USAR.
Rear Adm. George B. Dowling, USN.
Col. Llewellyn G. Duggar, USAF.
Rear Adm. H. J. Dyson, USN.
Capt. J. B. Feder, USCG.
Col. R. L. Finkenstaedt, USMC.
Col. M. H. Floom, USMC.
Rear Adm. T. R. Frederick, USN.
Rear Adm. W. J. Giles, USN.
Col. B. E. Hall, USAF.
Capt. Charles C. Hoffman, USN.
Col. Harold A. Hughes, AUS.
Col. R. D. King, USA.
Capt. F. A. Kinzie, USN.
Rear Adm. W. M. Klie, USN.
Rear Adm. E. E. Lord, USN.
Rear Adm. H. B. Lyon, USN.
Capt. R. H. Maynard, USN.
Col. Robert K. McDonough, AUS.
Col. R. C. McGlashan, USN.
Rear Adm. R. N. Metcalf, USN.
Col. Andres Meulenberg, USAF.
Rear Adm. W. E. Moring, USN.
Capt. J. F. Mullen, Jr., USN.
Vice Adm. M. E. Murphy, USN.
Rear Adm. W. H. Newton, USN.
Col. C. W. O'Connor, USAF.
Capt. E. B. Patterson, USN.
Brig Gen. Hoyt Prindle, USAF.
Capt. J. F. Quilter, USN.
Col. E. L. Robbins, USAF.
Capt. L. P. Scott, USN.
Col. N. J. Senn, USA.
Col. Norman M. Shipley, AUS.
Capt. J. L. Sheenhair, USN.
Adm. G. E. Short, USN.
Col. J. E. Shuck, USAF.
Vice Adm. C. C. Smith, USN.
Rear Adm. W. R. Smith III, USN.
Col. W. S. Stephenson, USA.
Rear Adm. P. E. Summers, USN.
Rear Adm. W. R. Tagg, USN.
Capt. A. E. Teall, USN.
Col. N. M. Towner, USAF.
Adm. A. B. Vosseller, USN.
Col. Charles E. Ward, AUS.
Rear Adm. W. J. Whipple, USN.
Col. Leroy H. Barnard, USAF.
Col. Delevan E. Wolters, USAF
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Compatvy
54. Marine Transport Lines, Inc.,
11 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
55. Marquardt Aircraft Co., Van Nuys,
Calif.
56. The Martin Co., Baltimore, Md_
57. Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Cambridge, Mass.
58. Mathiasen's Tanker Industries,
Inc., Philadelphia, Pa.
59. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., St.
Louis, Mo.
60. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator
Co.,13 Minneapolis, Minn.
61. Motorola, Inc., 4545 Augusta
Blvd., Chicago, Ill.
62. Newport News Shipbuilding Dry
Dock Co., Newport News, Va.
Officer
Rear Adm. William M. Callaghan,
USN.
Col. H. M. McCoy, USAF.
Capt. A. G. Rejebian, USNR.
C. B. Allen.
S. S. Ballentine.
A. J. Cooper, Jr.
L. D. Cooper.
E. G. Daly.
F. R. Dent, Jr.
R. J. Foley.
V. Harvard, Jr.
S. S. Miller.
E. S. Piper.
R. S. Purvis.
M. C. Reeves.
G. D. Stephens.
K. E. Tibbetts.
A. F. Weirich.
Capt. George Watson, USN.
Vice Adm. E. L. Cochrane, USN.
Maj. Gen. James McCormack? Jr.
USAF.
Capt. J. A. Sweeton, USN.
Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers, USNR.
Rear Adm. Lloyd Harrison, USN.
Col. C. M. O'Donnell, USA.
Col. R. S. McConnell, USA.
None.
Col. Charles Dickson, USAF.
Rear Adm. John C. Parham, Jr. USN_
Rear Adm. N. L. Rawlings, USN.
Rear Adm. R. A. Larkin, USN.
Capt. D. J. Cracovaner, USNMC.
Capt. H. J. Hiemenz, USN.
Capt. J. S. Bethea, USN.
Capt. L. G. Richards, USN.
Vice Adm. E. S. Land.14
Vice Adm. E. L. Cochrane.14
14 Record examination did not include Reserve officers serving on duty in World War II and who, pre-
sumably, may be retired.
14 Serves on board of directors.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Compatvg
63. North American Aviation,
Los Angeles, Calif.
64. Northrop Corp., BeVerly
Calif.
Affiliate: Page Communication
Engineers, Inc.
? Officer
Inc., Capt. Markley C. Cameron, USN.
Rear Adm. Stephen W. Carpenter,
USN.
Col. J. H. Carter, USA.
Capt. T. J. Casey, USN.
Col. Paul A. Chandler, USMC.
Col. Richard W. Faubion, USAF.
Col. Wallace S. Ford, USAF.
Col. Robert F. Fulton, USAF.
Col. James H. Higgs, USAF.
Maj. Gen. John H. Hinds, USA.
Col. John S. Holmberg, USMC.
Col. W. C. Hood, USA.
Rear Adm. W. B. Jackson, USN.
Brig. Gen. Harold R. Lee, USMC.
Capt. William Loveland, USN.
Col. Lynn Mapes, USAF.
Capt. W. B. Mechling, USN.
Vice Adm. John L. Melgaard, USN.
Rear Adm. John B. Pearson, Jr. USN.
Capt. Fred D. Pfetenhauer, USN.
Capt. C. A. Printup, USN.
Col. Ben Z. Redfield, USMC.
Col. Maurice M. Stone, USAF.
Rear Adm. Frank Turner, USN.
Col. Ralph J. Watson, USAF.
Col. K. M. Welborn, USA.
Rear Adm. George A. Whiteside, USN.
Hills, Lt. Gen Roger M. Ramey, USAR
Lt. Gen. Patrick W. Timberlake,
USAF.
Col. Stewart W. Towle, Jr., USAF.
Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, USAF.
Capt. Thomas F. Darden, USN.
Capt. Homer K. Davidson, USN.
Col. Paul C. Droz, USAF.
Col. Edmund R. Goss, USAF.
Col. Ralph G. Lockwood, USAF.
Col. Gaspare Frank Blunda, USAF.
Capt. Neil E. Kingsley, USN.
Rear Adm. Michael P. Bagdanovich,
USN.
Capt. Robert Conaughty, USNR.
Col. Kenneth W. Klise, USAFR.
Col. Robert R. Mallory, USAR.
Lt. Gen. Joseph Smith, USAF.
Col. James A. Bonnington, USA.
Capt. N. H. Collisson, USNR.
Col. Edwin B. Garrett, USAFR.
Capt. Harry A. Sosnoski, USN.
Capt. Clarence E. Voigeli, USN.
Col. Richard W. Weaver, USAR.
None.
65. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.,
460 Park Avenue, New York,
N.Y.
66. Oman-Farnsworth-Wright,15 625
Madison Avenue, New York,
N.Y.
15 Joint venture.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
67. Morrison-Knudsen Co. Inc., 319
Broadway, Boise, Idaho.
Affiliates:
International Engineering
Co.
Morrison-Knudsen-Oman-
Farnsworth-Wright-
Kaiser.
Alaskan Plumbing &
Heating Co. Inc.
68. Pan American World Airways Sys-
tem, 135 East 42d Street, New
York, N.Y.
Penn-Texas Corp. (See Fairbanks
Whitney.)
69. Philco Corp., Philadelphia, Pa
Officer
Col. E. G. Herb.
Maj. Gen. Thomas 0. Hardin.
Rear Adm. H. B. Miller.
Brig. Gen. Otis Schreuder.
Col. W. S. Lee.
Col. F. E. Bruhn.
Col. C. E. McClure.
Col. J. T. Kidwell.
Col. J. W. Bowman.
Col. J. F. Hart.
Col. G. W. Porter.
Col. H. H. Jordan.
Col. R. P. Alston.
Col. W. J. Paul.
Lt. Gen. R. E. Nugent.
Rear Adm. F. L. Tedder.
Col. Thomas C. Brubaker, USA.
Gen. M. D. Burnside, USAF.
Col. Kenneth I. Davis, USA.
Col. Ira P. Doctor, USA.
Col. Loren E. Gaither, USA.
Col. Francis E. Kidwell, USA.
Col. Joseph W. Knighton, US MC.
Adm. James Leeper, USN.
Col. Milton M. Lewis, USA.
Adm. Richard Mandelkorn, USN.
Col. James A. Mylod, USA.
Col. Samuel Pierce, Jr., USA.
Adm. Arthur Radford, USN.
Col. Julian E. Raymond, USA.
Col. David Schlenker, USAR.
Col. Patrick A. Wakeman, USA.
Col. Stuart M. Welsh, USA.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
70. Radio Corporation of America, 30
Rockefeller Plaza, New York,
N.Y.
Affiliates:
RCA Service Co.
National Broadcasting Co.
RCA Communications Inc.
RCA Victor Distributing
Corp.
71. The Rand Corp., 1000 Connecticut
Ave., Washington 6, D.C.
71. A System Development Corp.,th
Officer
Maj. Gen. F. L. Ankenbrandt, USA.
Col. D. C. Ashdown, USAR.
Col. D. R. Comm, USA.
Col. F. J. Darke, Jr., USAR.
Vice Adm. E. D. Foster, USN.
Col. A. C. Gay, USAF.
Col. C. W. Gordon, USAF.
Col. G. A. Gould, USA.
Rear Adm. L. M. Grant, USN.
Maj. Gen. H. C. Ingles, USA.
Col. C. J. King, Jr., USA.
Col. E. Knickerbocker, USA.
Capt. L. R. Lampman, USN.
Col. J. H. Madison, USA.
Rear Adm. C. C. Mann, USN.
Col. J. H. Marsh, USA.
Col. R. L. Owens, USAFR.
Maj. Gen. W. L. Richardson, USAF.
Capt. E. Roberts, USN.
Col. J. H. Rothrock, USAF.
Brig. Gen. D. Sarnoff, USA.
Gen. W. B. Smith, USA.
Capt. J. R. Stewart, USN.
Col. J. V. Tower, USA.
Col. D. C. Wallace, USA.
Rear Adm. E. K. Wakefield, USN.
Rear Adm. R. R. Waller, USN.
Rear Adm. T. P. Wynkoop, USN.
Capt. J. H. Brockway, USN.
Brig. Gen. S. P. Collins, USA.
Col. A. L. Cox, USAF.
Capt. L. F. Dodson, USN.
Col. E. B. Ely, USA.
Rear Adm. H. S. Barnly, USN.
Col. J. L. Langevin, USA.
Col. K. F. March, USA.
Col. A. Marcy, USA.
Capt. K. M. McLaren, USN.
Col. M. Moody, USA.
Rear Adm. J. M. Robinson, USN.
Col. H. Rund, USA.
Maj. Gen. R. A. Schow, USA.
Col. H. N. Sturdevent, USAF.
Brig. Gen. T. Tully, USA.
Rear Adm. L. Van Antwerp, USN.
Maj. Gen. F. L. Anderson, USAF.
Maj. Gen. H. G. Bunker, USAF.
Col. G. C. Reinhardt, USA.
Capt. W. W. Cone, USN.
Col. J. P. Evans, USA.
Capt. C. L. Freeman, USN.
Lt. Gen. G. F. Good, USMC.
Col. W. H. Hastings, USA.
Brig. Gen. R. E. Koon, USAF.
Rear Adm. R. G. Lockhart, USN.
Brig. Gen. R. G. McKee, USA.
Adm. S. S. Murray, USN.
Col. K. C. Strother, USA.
Col. M. R. Williams, USAF.
Col. Thomas A. Holdiman, USAF.
le Although corporation has been included as an affiliate of Rand Corp., letter of June 12,7[1959 stated
that organization commenced operation Dec. 1, 1957 as an independent nonprofit corporation.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of D ef ense?Continued
.compatvy
2500 Colorado Ave., Santa
Monica, Calif.
72. Raytheon Mfg. Co., Waltham 54,
Mass
73. Republic Aviation Corp., Farming-
dale, Long Island, N.Y.
74. Richfield Oil Corp.,
Calif.
75. Ryan Aeronautical
Field, San Diego
Los Angeles 17,
Co., Lindbergh
12, Calif.
76. Shell Oil Co., 50 West 50th St.,
New York 20, N.Y.
77. Sinclair Oil Corp.,17 600 Fifth Ave.,
New York 20, N.Y.
Affiliates:
Sinclair Refining Co.
Sinclair BP Sales, Inc.
78. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 150 E. 42d
St., New York 17, N.Y.
Affiliates:
Basin Oil Co.
General Petroleum Corp.
Magnolia Petroleum Co.
Mobil Overseas Oil Co.
Standard-Vacuum Oil
Co.
'7 Report from survey of payroll applications." One name furnished is President of Sinclair PB
Inc. It is not clear on report whether or not he is still active or retired from that office.
Officer
Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, USAF.
Brig. Gen. Francis A. Kreidel, USA.
Col. Mark E. Smith, USA.
Adm. Roy W. Graham, USN.
Capt. Francis J. Blasdel, USN.
Col. Maurice A. O'Connor, Jr., USAF.
Capt. Edward L. Robertson, USN.
Col. Donald J. Bailey, USA.
Capt. John No. Boland, USN.
Capt. Marshall B. Gurney, USN.
Capt. David R. Hull, USN.
Rear Adm. Gill M. Richardson, USN.
Capt. Joseph K. Taussig, USN.
Capt. Mario G. Vangeli, USN.
Capt. Malcolm M. Cloukey, USN.
Capt. A. Peter Hilar, USN.
Col. Arthur Kramer, USA.
Col. Benjamin Whitehouse, USA.
Col. Hugh Heiby Bowe, Jr. USAF.
Brig. Gen. Charles Pratt Brown, USAF.
Capt. Franklin Duerr Buckley, USN.
Col. Carver Thaxton Bussey, USAF.
Maj. Gen. Alden Rudyard Crawford,
USAF.
Brig. Gen. Harley Sanford Jones,
USAF.
Brig. Gen. John Mills Sterling, USAF.
Col. Jesse Fuller Thomas, USA.
Col. Israel Brent Washburn, USA.
Capt. Lester Martin, USN.
Col. T. C. Miller, USA.
Col. H. W. Schmidt, USA.
Capt. J. C. Woelfel, USN.
Rear Adm. K. J. Christoff, USN.
Col. P. H. Kemmer, USAF.
Rear Adm. Leslie E. Gehres, USN.
Vice Adm. C. F. Coe, USN.
Rear Adm. E. R. Sanders, USN.
Brig. Gen. R. L. Schiesswohl, USMCR.
Col. Bethuel M. Kitchen, USA.
Rear Adm. L. C. Chamberlin, USN.
Rear Adm. Harry A. Hummer, USN.
None.
Capt. Carl G. Drescher, USN.
Rear Adm. Thomas J. Kelly, USN.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued.
Companv
79. Sperry Rand Corp.,18 30 Rocke-
feller Plaza, New York 20, N.Y.
Officer
Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Bulger, USAF.
Col. James E. McGraw, USA.
Col. T. L. Gaines, USA.
Col. W. R. Gerhardt, USA.
Affiliates: Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, USA.
Sperry Gyroscope Co., Col. Ernest R. Miller, USAF.
Div.
Remington Rand Div.
Sperry Microwave Elec-
tronics Co. Div.
Vickers Inc.
Wright Machinery Co.
Div.
SO. Standard Oil Co. of California,19
San Francisco 20, Calif.
81. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 910
South Michigan Ave., Chicago
80, Ill.
82. Standard Oil of New Jersey,20 30
Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20,
N.Y.
Affiliates:
Gilbert & Barker Mfg.
Co.
Esso Export Corp
Ethyl Corp
Esso Research & Engi-
neering Co.
Humble Oil & Refining
Co.28
Carter Oil Co
83. States Marine Lines, 90 Broad St.,
New York 4, N.Y.
Affiliates:
States Marine Corp. of
Delaware.
Isthmian Lines, Inc.
84. Sundstrand Corp., 2531, 11th St., Brig. Gen. Robert H. Richard, USMC.
Rockford, Ill.
85. Sundray Mid-Continent Oil Co., None.
Tulsa 2, Okla.
Affiliates:
D-X Sunray Oil Co.
Suntide Refining Co.
86. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., Rear Adm. Frederick J. Bell, USN.
? 1740 Broadway, New York, N.Y. Brig. Gen. Wayne H. Adams, USMC.
Col. Phillip A. Gugliotta, USAF.
Col. Leslie E. Loken, USA.
Capt. Edward G. Mason, USNR.
Col. Leland Gilliatt, USAF.
:87. Temco Aircraft Corp., Dallas 22, Col. W. B. Freeman, USMC.
Tex. Brig. Gen. R. E. Galer, USMC.
Col. M. G. Haines, USMC.
Rear Adm. A. C. Olney, USN.
Brig. Gen. L. S. Smith, USAF.
Col. D. W. MacArdle, USA.
Capt. Knight Pryor, USN.
Col. Paul Walker, USAF.
Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, USA.
Col. E. C. Best, USMCR.
Col. Ray Conners, USA.
Capt. Gordon Campbell, USN.
None.
None.
None.
None.
Maj. Gen. Stephen G. Henry, USA.'
None.
None.
None.
1 General Douglas MacArthur not included.
1' Information not presently available.
20 Effort made to obtain information through affiliates as indicated. Generally the information is not
available from the parent company records of its own employees.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are ofAcials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
88. Texaco, Inc., 135 East 42d St., None.
New York 17, N.Y.
Affiliates:
Caltex Oil Products Co.
Texaco (Brazil), Inc.
Texas Co. (Caribbean),
Ltd.
Texas Co. (Puerto Rico),
Inc.
Texas Petroleum Co.
The Texas Pipe Line Co.
89. Thiokol Chemical Corp., Bristol,
Pa.
90. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc.,
23555 Euclid Ave., Cleveland 17,
Ohio.
91. Tidewater Oil Co., 17 Battery Pl.,
New York 4, N.Y.
Affiliate: Seaside Oil Co.
92. Tishman (Paul) Co., Inc., 21 East
70th St., New York, N.Y.
93. Todd Shipyards Corp., 1 ,Broad-
way, New York, N.Y.
94. Union Carbide Corp., 30 East 42d
St., New York, N.Y.
95. Union Oil Co. of California, 461
South Boylston St., Los Angeles,
Calif.
96. U.S. Lines Co., 1 Broadway, New
York, N.Y.
97. United Aircraft Corp., East Hart-
ford, Conn.
Affiliates:
United Research Corp.
United Aircraft Export
Corp.
Officer
Maj. Gen. David F. O'Neill, USMC.
Capt. J. W. Antonides, USN.
Capt. Albert Joseph Walden, USN.
Col. Fulten G. Thompson, USA.
Col. Warren C. Rush, USAR.
Rear Adm. J. M. Gardiner, USN.
Adm. R. E. Davis, USN.
Col. Hubert deBois Lewis, USA.
Gen. B. W. Chidlaw.
Brig. Gen. William M. Garland.
Lt. Gen. H. L. George.
Maj. Gen. G. P. Saville.
Gen. James L. Doolittle.
Col. H. K. Gilbert.
Capt. Creighton C. Carmine, USNR.
Col. Daniel Eckerman, AUS.
Capt. Geo. Wendelburg, USN.
None.
Col. Charles D. McColl, USA.
Capt. John A. Hayes, Jr., USN.
Rear Adm. George Madden, USN.
Capt. C. R. Watts, USN.
Col. G. B. Farris, USA.
Rear Adm. W. V. Hamilton, USN.
None.
None.
Brig. Gen. Turner A. Sims, Jr., USAF
Capt. Albert R. Weldon, USN.
Capt. ?Wendell W. Suydam, USN.
Col. Edward J. Hale, USAF.
Brig. Gen. Edward C. Dyer, USMC.
Col. Harry W. Generous, USAF.
Rear Adm. J. P. W. Vest, USN.
Capt. Herbert S. Brown, USN.
Rear Adm. Marshall R. Greer, USN.
Capt. James F. Byrne, USN.
Capt. Frank Curtiss Lynch, Jr., USN.
Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, USAF.
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Douglas, Jr.,
USAF.
Maj. Gen. John M. Weikert, USAF.
Col. John B. Jacob, USMC.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Company
98. Westinghouse Air Brake:Co., Pitts-
burgh, Pa.
Affiliates:
Melpar Inc.
Le Tourneau-
Westinghouse Co.
Officer
Anding, James G.
Beckley, Stuart.
Beiderlinden, William A.
Bell, Charlie H.
Bertsch, William H., Jr.
Bradley, William J.
Canan, Howard V.
Cowie, Franklin G.
Denson, Lee A.
Elliott, Richard E.
Gibbs, John S.
Hastings, Kester L.
Herring, Lee R.
Herron, Edwin W.
Holley, James
Irving, Frederick A.
Kastner, Alfred E.
Kurtz, Guy 0.
Lane, Richard.
Larew, Walter B.
Leggett, Aubrey B.
Lowe, Robert G.
Maher, Joseph B.
McAfee, Broadus.
Menoher, William.
Morrison, James A.
Newton, Wallis S.
Packer, Francis A.
Pence, William P.
Pierce, Edward H.
Ping, Robert A.
Rehm, George A.
Riley, Hugh W.
Rittgers, Forest S.
Stafford, Laurance F.
tlamouce, James A.
Sugeant, Russell C.
Shaw, Lawrence E.
Sherman, Wilson R.
Stiegler, Oscar.
Summerall, Charles P.
Wells, Lucien F.
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Retired officers at or above the rank of colonel, or the equivalent, who are officials
or employees of the 100 companies having the largest dollar amount of con-
tracts with the Department of Defense?Continued
Oompamy Officer
99. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Pitts- Adm. Robert B. Carney, USN.
burgh, Pa. Adm. Leonard J. Dow, USN.
Maj. Gen. Albert Boyd, USAF.
Rear Adm. Wm. V. Deutermann, USN.
Rear Adm. Wm. L. Kabler, USN.
Rear Adm. E. S. Keats, USN.
Rear Adm. H. T. Walsh, USN
Brig. Gen. R. G. Pape, USA.
Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, USA.
Capt. L. M. Cockaday, USN.
Capt. Neal Cole, USN.
Capt. Ottis Earle, USN.
Capt. W. S. Ellis, USN.
Capt. C. J. Heath, USN.
Capt. R. M. Huebl, USN.
Capt. H. B. Hutchinson, USN.
Capt. H. J. Islev-Petersen, USN.
Capt. J. J. Moore, USN.
Capt. C. W. Truxall, USN.
Capt. Hugh Webster, USN.
Col. E. M. Buitrago, USA.
Col. Angelo R. Del Campo, USA_
Col. J. L. Dickey, USMC.
Col. 0. F. Forman, USA.
Col. J. A. Gerath, Jr., USMC.
Col. J. J. Godwin, USA.
Col. C. D. Jeffcoat, USMC.
Col. F. B. Kane, USA.
Col. George B. Mackey, USAF.
Col. P. M. Martin, USA.
Col. Francis H. Monahan. USAF.
Col. George R. Oglesby, USA.
Col. Fred Reiber, USA.
100. The White Motor Co., Cleveland, None.
Ohio.
Mr. WRITTEN. We realize that the legislative committee is also,
interested in his overall subject, continuously so, and we understand
this same subject matter is being handled there. However, my pur-
pose here is that since this matter was supplied in connection with the?
request of this committee, we, of course, cannot be dependent upon
some other committee providing information for our record.
ENTERTAINMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS BY INDUSTRY
In that connection and since mention has been made of the Com--
mittee on Armed Services, I refer back to a report by that committee
which reached the press with regard to another matter, the heading
of which is, "Top Military Men Feted in Bahamas by Martin Co."
The article says that 18 high ranking officers?I will not refer to their
names here because it is a matter of public record?were entertained
by the Martin Co. in a plush Bahama Island resort in the past 3 years.
There was a bill of $18,000 which the Martin Co. attempted to deduct
from its income tax as business expense in 1957 and 1958.
The report says that the Martin Co. attempted to get that charged
oil as a business expense and was refused. First, do you have any
regulations in the Defense Department controlling or attempting to?
prevent that type of occurrence? Did you have at the time the trips.
were made?
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Secretary GATES. Yes; each of the military departments has regu-
lations. In no case did the men referred to in that article, I believe,
have anything to do with passing on contracts.
Mr. WHITTEN. You are volunteering a little information I did not
ask for, Mr. Secretary. You are entitled to make any statements you
wish, but my question was: Did you have regulations prohibiting
that?
Secretary GATES. For procurement officers, yes, sir.
Mr. WHITTEN. Only?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Mr. WHITTEN. Since this did not cover those who were bene-
ficiaries of this trip, they were not within the regulations prohibiting it?
Secretary GATES. They were not covered by regulation.
Mr. WHITTEN. Since this occurrence have you adopted any new
regulations so as to bring these top level people within the purview
of such prohibiting regulations?
Secretary GATES. We have adopted them in conversation. We
have no written regulations. We have been waiting to discuss this
with Mr. Hebert's investigating committee. We have discussed it
in relation to the legislation he is about to propose, which will govern
the type of regulation we will issue.
Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Secretary, I wish you would keep this subcom-
mittee informed of the progress that might be made in this particular
area.
Could you tell us when these trips were made; at the time that this
committee was dealing with the question of whether the MACE pro-
gram should be continued? That controversy was quite well reported
in the press, and in the Congress there was a serious question as to
whether procurement contracts should be entered into for this missile.
Am I not correct that the Martin Co. had the MACE contract?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Mr. WHITTEN. Were these trips made in an effort by Martin to
prevent the Congress from insisting on putting off procurement con-
tracts until the missile was proved, or do you know?
Secretary GATES. I do not know, but I can find out the relation of
the time of the hearings and time of the trips. However, I know that
it had no bearing on the MACE contract.
Mr. WHITTEN. That is a matter of opinion, Mr. Secretary. Were
you along?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Mr. WHITTEN. So you are just exercising your judgment and you
do not profess to know personally.
Secretary GATES. I know the people involved, and I have a high
regard for their integrity.
Mr. WHITTEN. I know them, too, and, so far as I know, they are
outstanding, fine Americans, and I am not trying to indict them. I
am talking about a policy. I am also saying when a witness who did
not go along says, "I know," he is getting himself out further on a
limb than I think the circumstances require. You mean you have
confidence in them and you do not believe?
Secretary GATES. That is right.
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Mr. WHITTEN. I know that the Defense Department from time to
time indicates that a big part of its contracting is on the competitive
bid basis. It is my personal view that many of those things that are
said to be that way in actuality are not because specifications are so
drawn as to fit a certain company or, as in the case of the MACE
missile, you give the contract for production and development of a
missile to a particular company and then they are the only ones who
are in position to carry it on. In many of those areas it does not
really end up as a competitive bid.
Now, I ask you this: If the Internal Revenue Bureau refused the
Martin Co. the right to charge this off on their income tax, under your
your contracting procedures could the Martin Co. use this expenditure
as a factor in determining the rate the Government would pay them?
I have developed this in years past where there was not a cost-plus
contract technically, but in effect in many instances there was. Per-
centage of the cost is frequently the criterion. If this element of cost
is a factor, then the profits you may pay would be affected thereby.
What is your regulation or rule with regard to counting it in that field?
Secretary GATES. The regulations would not permit it if it was
identifiable. We have recently issued through the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics, Mr. McGuire, some new
cost regulations which will determine costs on a much more strict and
uniform basis than heretofore. These have only been issued within the
last few months. If any contractor tried to do anything like that, it
would show up under the new costing regulations. This would be a
question of how a man charges his expenses to the Government. We
have a uniform formula for reviewing all aspects of cost. This was
quite controversial with industry, but I think when the appropriate
people come up here, they should testify on it because it is quite
important.
Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Secretary, several years ago?the clerks of our
committee will be able to point out the time?I asked the Department
to put in the record the 10 leading contractors with the Government
and the amount of contracts they had for a 5-year period in total and
what had happened to the market value of their stocks during that
period. General Moore will be familiar with that. I would like that
table brought up to date and inserted at this point in the record.
(The information requested will appear in a later volume.)
CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT
Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Secretary, we find a number of companies have
virtually been organized for the purpose of getting defense contracts.
I know of at least one top ranking ex-Defense official who heads one
of those major companies. Some of those companies have just made
such profits that their stocks have greatly increased in value. Some-
body lucky enough to have gotten in early may have made a killing
in the stock. Do you have any regulation prohibiting the personnel
within the Defense Department, or in the services, from buying stocks
in companies which do business with the Defense Department?
Secretary GATES. I am not aware of any regulations other than the
regulations that apply to myself and other statutory appointees under
the conflict-of-interest law.
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Mr. WHITTEN. I am familiar with that. I am asking if within the
services these procurement officers, and others who are not up at the
level where they are faced with the Conflict of Interest Act, may have
occasion to know that General Dynamics, for instance, is in line to
get a big contract?may I say that I know of no such people, I am not
trying to in theory describe a particular individual, I have no such
knowledge?but I can readily see that a man in that field, if there
were nothing to control it, might in effect get a thousand times more
than a trip to the Bahamas by buying stock. That might be done if
you have no regulation to prevent it. You have nothing in the field
of which you are aware?
Secretary GATES. There is no use of my saying I know; I do not
know. I believe?and I will check?that there are strong regulations
in this respect and in all other respects pertaining to procurement
officers but not to other officers.
Mr. WHITTEN. Not to other officers?
Secretary GATES. That is what I believe, but I will check.
Mr. WHITTEN. I do not want to leave the record without having
what you have. I say whatever you do have, that you should feel free
to include it in the record at this point.
(The information to be supplied follows:)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE
Subject: Conduct of Personnel Assigned to Procurement and Related Activities.
The attached memorandum, which sets forth the policy of the Department of
Defense with respect to situations involving conflicts of interest, is issued as a
Department of Defense Directive for the information and guidance of all con-
cerned.
For the Secretary of Defense:
G. V. UNDERWOOD, JR.
Colonel, USA
Director
Executive Office of the Secretary.
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, January 28, 1953.
Memorandum for The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
The Chairmen of Boards, Councils and Committees.
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense.
The Directors of Offices, OSD.
Subject: Conduct of Personnel Assigned to Procurement and Related Activities.
Under the authority vested in me as Secretary of Defense, you are directed to
bring to the attention of all personnel the laws applicable to situations involving
conflicts of interest. It is the responsibility of each individual officer and em-
ployee to comply with the laws of his country. Particular attention is directed
to Section 434, Title 18, United States Code.
It is a recognized principle that no Government officer or employee who has
the direct responsibility for negotiating and signing contracts or approving the
payment of money to contractors, should have any financial interest in any such
contractor. No Government officer or employee should permit himself to be
exposed to a dual-interest position or to a conflict between self-interest and in-
tegrity. He should clearly be in a position to act to the best of his ability without
fear or favor in the best interest of his Government.
In any case where an officer or employee of the Department of Defense, in-
cluding all of its departments and agencies, has any financial interest in any
business entity, corporation, or partnership, transacting or contemplating trans-
acting business with the Government that officer or employee is disqualified, and
this directive expressly disqualifies him, from having any dealings of any kind
for or in behalf of the Department of Defense with such business entity.
50026-60-7
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While a conflict of interests, as may be defined by the law, is a matter of fact
in a particular case, even if a technical conflict does not in fact exist, it is desirable
to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest from a public-confidence point of
view. The additional problem is how can officers or employees of the Department
of Defense be disqualified in the relatively few cases where they or their superiors
think there is or may be some conflict of interest.
In any case where an officer or employee of the Department of Defense, includ-
ing all its departments and agencies, feels that he should be disqualified from
taking action in a particular matter, it is his duty to so inform his superior or
department head, and he will be relieved of his duty and ,responsibility in that
particular case. The matter will then be assigned to someone else of equal or
higher rank, who clearly hal no conflict of interest for decision and action.
In any case where any superior who thinks that an officer or employee reporting
to him may be involved in a conflict of interest, or an apparent conflict of interest
of importance from a public confidence point of view, he will discuss the matter
with the person involved and may relieve such officer or employee of responsibility
in the case. He will then assign the responsibility for taking action to someone
else of equal or higher rank who clearly has no conflict of interest for decision and
action, or he may take the responsibility for decision and action himself.
In any case where any of the Secretaries or civilian departmental officials
appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate may
be so disqualified in a particular case, the matter will be referred for action and
decision by the Secretary of Defense, or his Deputy, to another departmental
official of equal or higher rank, who has received his appointment from the Presi-
dent by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or the Deputy Secretary
or the Secretary of Defense will rule on the matter himself and take full responsi-
bility for any actions taken.
This directive supersedes any existing departmental directives and regulations
applicable to standards of conduct of personnel assigned to procurement and
related activities to the extent that they are inconsistent with this directive.
C. E. WILSON.
. CC: Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[SECNAV 5371.IA ONM M303A/BGA: alk]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., September 29, 1955.
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5371.1A
From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: All Ships and Stations.
Subj: Standards of conduct for all personnel having business dealings with repre-
sentatives of industry.
End: (1) Copy of SECDEF memo of 28 Jan 1953, Subj: Conduct of Personnel
Assigned to Procurement and Related Activities.
(2) Digest of Applicable Provisions of U.S. Criminal Code, 1948, and
Restrictions Contained in the Current DOD Appropriations Act
Pertaining to Conduct of Presently Employed Government Officials.
1. Purpose
a. To restate and reemphasize standards of conduct required of all personnel
having business dealings with representatives of industry and to direct the use of
certain steps to assure compliance.
b. To limit the reporting requirement of paragraph 4c hereof to instances where
noncompliance with the provisions of this Instruction has been determined in
formal inspections.
c. To require commanding officers to insure that appropriate and prompt
disciplinary action is taken whenever it is determined that there have been illegal
or improper acts by military or civilian personnel within their commands.
2.' cancellation
? This Instruction supersedes and cancels SECNAV Instruction 5371.1 of 30
August 1954.
S. Policy
a. All personnel who represent the Government in business dealings with
representatives of industry are reminded of their position of trust and grave
?
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responsibility. Many practices which may be normal and generally accepted in
the private business world are not acceptable for Government officials and em-
ployees who are conducting the Government's business. Thus, it is essential
that all such persons set for themselves the highest standards of personal conduct
in their relations with business firms and individuals, thereby insuring that these,
relations are above reproach in every respect. Although it is not intended to lay
down a hard and fast rule prohibiting social contacts with business firms or their
representatives, nevertheless it must be realized by all personnel who conduct the
Navy's business that the acceptance of entertainment or gifts or favors of any
kind (no matter how innocently tendered or received) from one who seeks or enjoys
profitable business dealings with the Government, may compromise and embarrass
both the Navy and the Navy personnel concerned to the extent of impairing
public confidence in the integrity of business relations between the Government
and industry.
b. The general policy with respect to standards of conduct for personnel of the
Naval Establishment who represent the Government in business dealings with
private firms or individuals, is as follows:
(1) No person shall allow himself to be placed in a position where a conflict of
interests might arise, or might justifiably be suspected, by reason of the acceptance
of entertainment, gifts, or favors of any kind or by any other action which would
result in financial profit to himself or which could influence or be interpreted as
influencing the strict impartiality that must prevail in all business relationships
where the public interest is involved.
(2) No action shall be taken which might have the effect of conferring special
benefits upon particular individuals or firms, such as by giving them information
of proposed purchases, unless such benefit is also conferred on other individuals or
firms who are justifiably entitled thereto.
c. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for general information and compliance.
d. Although all personnel would be required to govern their conduct by the
foregoing standards of conduct even if there were no statutes on the subject,
attention is directed to the statutory prohibitions and penalties regarding certain
conduct of Government officials as digested in enclosure (2). There are also di-
gested in enclosure (2) the most recent statutory provisions on gratuities which
are contained in section 719 of Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955,
Public Law 458, 83d Congress, 2d session.
4. Action
a. A copy of this instruction and the enclosures thereto shall be kept posted on
appropriate bulletin boards normally utilized by persons of the Naval Establish-
ment who represent the Government in business dealings with private individuals
or firms.
b. It shall be the responsibility of commanding officers to insure that persons of
the Naval Establishment under their command representing the Government in
business dealings with private individuals or firms are familiar with the provi-
sions of this Instruction and the enclosures thereto.
c. An examination shall be made in all formal inspections of activities of the
extent to which personnel are familiar with the provisions of this Instruction, and
so far as can be determined, the extent to which its provisions are complied with,
and reports shall be made with respect to all instances of noncompliance revealed
by such inspections.
d In addition, commanding officers and other senior officials should within
reason make use of the opportunity offered by conferences, meetings, and visits to
subordinate units, to keep the importance of this policy in the forefront.
e. Commanding officers shall insure that appropriate and prompt disciplinary
action is taken whenever it is determined that there have been illegal or improper
acts by military or civilian personnel within their commands.
C. S. THOMAS.
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[Office of the Secretary?Enclosure (2)?SECNAVINST 5371.1A, September 29, 1956]
DIGEST OF APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF U.S. CRIMINAL CODE (TITLE 18, UNITED
STATES CODE, 1948) AND RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE CURRENT DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT PERTAINING TO CONDUCT OF
PRESENTLY EMPLOYED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Sec. 216 (formerly Criminal Code Sec. 112)?Procurement of Contract by Officer or
Member of Congress
This statute forbids Government officers and agents from directly or indirectly
receiving any money or thing of value in return for obtaining or giving any Govern-
ment contract, or rendering any assistance in that connection, under penalty of
a fine of $10,000 and imprisonment for two years, and permanent disqualification
from holding Federal office.
Sec. 281 (formerly Criminal Code Sec. 118)?Compensation to Members of Congress,
Officers and Others in Matters Affecting the Government
This statute forbids Government officers and agents from directly or indirectly
receiving or agreeing to receive any compensation for services rendered in connec-
tion with any Government contract, claim, or other matter in which the United
States is interested, under penalty of a fine of $10,000 and imprisonment for two
years, and permanent disqualification from holding Federal office.
Sec. 283 (formerly Criminal Code Sec. 109)?Officers or Employees Interested in
Claims Against the Government
This statute forbids Government officers and employees from prosecuting or
aiding in the prosecution of any claim against the United States, other than in
the proper discharge of official duties, under penalty of a fine of $10,000 and im-
prisonment for one year.
Sec. 434 (formerly Criminal Code Sec. 41)?Interested Persons Acting as Government
Agents
This statute forbids persons financially interested in any corporation or other
business organization from acting as Government officers or agents for the trans-
action of business with such corporation or organization, under penalty of a fine
of $2,000 and imprisonment for two years.
Sec. 202 (June 25, 1948)?Acceptance or Solicitation by Officer or Other Person
This statute prohibits any Government officer, agent, or employee from seeking
or receiving any thing of value with intent to have his decision or action regarding
any matter within his official capacity influenced thereby, under penalty of a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the thing received and imprisonment
for three years, and permanent disqualification from holding Federal office.
Section 719. Public Law 458, 83rd Congress, second session, dealing with the con-
tract provisions regarding gratuities
Hereafter, no part of any money appropriated to the Department of Defense
shall be expended under any contract (other than a contract for personal services)
entered into after the enactment of this Act unless such contract provides?
(1) that the Government may by written notice to the contractor, terminate
the right of such contractor to proceed under such contract if it is found, after
notice and hearing, by the Secretary of the military department with which the
contract is made, or his designee, that gratuities (in the form of entertainment,
gifts, or otherwise) were offered or given by such contractor, or any agent or
representative of such contractor, to any officer or employee of the Government
with a view toward securing a contract or securing favorable treatment with re-
spect to the awarding or amending, or the making of any determinations with
respect to the performing, of such contract: Provided, That the existence of the
facts upon which such Secretary makes such findings shall be in issue and may be
reviewed in any competent court,
(2) that in the event any such contract is so terminated the Government shall
be entitled (A) to pursue the same remedies against the contractor as it could
pursue in the event of a breach of the contract by the contractor, and (B) as a
penalty in addition to any other damages to which it may be entitled by law, to
exemplary damages in an amount not less than three nor more than ten times
(as determined by the Secretary or his designee) the costs incurred by any such
contractor in providing any such gratuities to any such officer or employee.
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[SECNAV 5370.1?ONM/M02/0Wd:lp October 2, 19581
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C.
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5370.1
Prom: Secretary of the Navy.
To: All Ships and Stations
Subj: Code of Ethics for Government Service
1. Purpose.?The purpose of this Instruction is to insure that all personnel are
aware of the provisions of House Concurrent Resolution 175.
2. Details.?The following Resolution establishing a Code of Ethics for Govern-
ment Service was recently approved by the Congress:
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 175
"Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is
the sense of the Congress that the following Code of Ethics should be adhered to
by all Government employees, including officeholders:
CODE OF ETHICS FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE
"Any person in Government service should:
"1. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty
to persons, party, or Government department.
"2. Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United States
and of all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion.
"3. Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay; giving to the performance of
his duties his earnest effort and best thought.
"4. Seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks
accomplished.
"5. Never discriminate unfairly by the dispensing of special favors or privileges
to anyone, whether for remuneration or not; and never accept, for himself or his
family, favors or benefits under circumstances which might be construed by rea-
sonable persons as influencing the performance of his governmental duties.
"6. Make no private promises of any kind binding upon the duties of office,
since a Government employee has no private word which can be binding on public
duty.
"7. Engage in no business with the Government, either directly or indirectly,
which is inconsistent with the conscientious performance of his governmental
duties.
"8. Never use any information coming to him confidentially in the performance
of governmental duties as a means for making private prat.
"9. Expose corruption wherever discovered.
"10. Uphold these principles, ever conscious that public office is a public trust."
3. Action Required?It shall be the responsibility 'of commanding officers to
insure that persons of the Naval Establishment under their command are familiar
with the provisions of this directive. Reasonable use should be made of the
opportunity offered by conferences and by visits to subordinate units to keep the
importance of this policy in the forefront.
W. B. FRANKE,
Under'Secretary of the Navy.
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AIR FORCE REGULATION No. 30-30
'AFR 30-30
1-2
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington, 6 January 1960
PERSONNEL
GENERAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT RELATING TO CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIVATE
INTERESTS AND OFFICIAL DUTIES
Paragraph
Purpose and Scope 1
Statutory Provisions 2
Conflicts of Interest 3
Dealing with Former Military and Civilian Personnel 4
Retired. Regular Officers 6
Reserve and National Guard Personnel 6
Affidavits 7
Gratuities 8
Prohibition of Contributions or Presents to Superiors 9
Use of Military Titles in Connection with Commercial Enterprises 10
Civil Employment of Military Personnel 11
Reporting Suspected Violations 12
1. Purpose and Scope.?To prescribe the standards of conduct relating to con-
flict between private interests and official duties, required of all military and
civilian Air Force personnel, regardless of assignment; and to, more specifically,
set forth:
a. Prohibitions against certain activities of present and former Air Force per-
sonnel, including retired officers, involving a conflict between private interests
and official duties; and
b. Rules against acceptance of gratuities by Air Force personnel.
This Regulation also contributes to the purpose described in a above, by insuring
that personnel of the Air Force are not knowingly transacting business with per-
sons who are within statutory prohibitions or under circumstances where there
may be a possible conflict of interest between Governmental duties and private
affairs. It is in consonance with the Code of Ethics for Government Service
contained in House Concurrent Resolution 175, 85th Congress, which is applicable
to all Air Force personnel. (See attachment.)
2. Statutory Provisions.--
a. Criminal Statutes Relating to Air Force Personnel. The following activities
may subject Air Force personnel to criminal penalty under the statutes cited:
(1) Asking, accepting, or agreeing to receive as a bribe or graft, directly, or
indirectly, any money, contract, or other thing of value, either (a) with the intent
to have any of their official decisions or actions influenced thereby, or (b) for
giving or procuring, or aiding to procure for any person, a Government contract
(18 USC 202 and the first paragraph of 18 USC 216).
(2) Receiving or agreeing to receive, directly or indirectly, compensation for
services rendered by themselves or another in relation to any proceeding, con-
tract, or claim before any department or agency where the United States is
directly or indirectly interested (18 USC 281).
(3) Acting as agent or attorney in prosecuting any claim against the Govern-
ment or assisting in the prosecution of any such claim otherwise than in the
proper discharge of official duties (18 USC 283).
(4) Transacting business as officers or agents of the United States with any
corporation, firm, or partnership in the profits of which they are directly or in-
directly interested (18 USC 434).
(5) Receiving from any source other than the Federal or any state, county, or
municipal government any compensation in connection with their Government
services (18 USC 1914). However, any Reserve ordered to active duty and any
person inducted into the armed forces under the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, who, before being ordered to active duty or inducted, was receiving
compensation from any person may, while serving on active duty, receive com-
pensation from that person (10 USC 1033, and sec. 4(f), Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, as amended, 50 USC App. 454(f)).
(6) Soliciting, accepting, or offering to accept any commission, payment, or
gift in connection with the procurement of equipment, materials, commodities,
*This regulation supersedes AFRs 30-30, 19 March 19M, 30-30A, 27 September 1954, and 30-30B, 14 July
1955.
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or services under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 in connection with which pro-
curement such personnel are or were employed or performed duty or took any
action during such employment (Sec. 512, Act of August 26, 1954, 22 USC 1764).
b. Statutes Relating Specifically to Former Personnel:
(1) It is unlawful for former personnel, within two years after their incumbency,
to prosecute or to act as counsel, attorney, or agent for prosecuting any claim
against the United States which involves any subject matter directly connected
with which such persons were employed or performed duty (18 USC 284). The
Attorney General has construed this statute to mean that every person who has
been employed in any Government agency, including commissioned officers as-
signed to duty in such agency, is disqualified for a period of two years after such
employment or service has ceased from representing in any manner or capacity
any interest opposed to the United States in any matter with which such person
was directly connected during the time he was in Government service. No
distinction is to be drawn between monetary claims against the Government and
nonmonetary claims, nor between affirmative claims and defensive claims. How-
ever, the Department of Justice has also advised that the statute was not designed
to go beyond specific matters or cases upon which a person worked or concerning
which he gained information while employed by the Government. Where a per-
son acquires or expands his professional knowledge in some particular field while
with the Government, he is entitled to use such professional knowledge in pur-
suing his livelihood after he leaves Government service, so long as he does not,
within the two-year period specified by the statute, employ such knowledge in con-
nection with a SPECIFIC MATTER with which he became DIRECTLY CON-
NECTED while in Government service.
(2) Section 113 of the Renegotiation Act, as amended, prohibits any person
who has been employed in the Department from prosecuting at any time any
claim against the United States involving any subject matter directly connected
with which such person was so employed (Sec. 113, Act of March 23, 1951, as
amended, 50 USC App. 1223). Although this statute does not prescribe any
criminal penalties for violation of this provision, it constitutes a Congressional
policy that former personnel should not prosecute any such claims at any time.
(3) It is unlawful for former personnel, within two years after the termination of
their employment to solicit, accept, or offer to accept any commission, payment,
or gift in connection with the procurement of equipment, materials, commodities,
or services under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 in connection with which pro-
curement such former peisonnel were employed or performed duty or took any
action during such employment as an officer or employee of the Government
(Sec. 512, Act of August 26, 1954, 22 USC 1764).
c. Statutory Provisions Specifically Applying to Retired Regular Officers:
(1) Regular retired officers are "officers of the United States" for the purpose of
bringing them within the statutes cited in a. above. However, 18 U.S.C. 434
relates to representing the Government in transacting business with a private
concern, and 18 U.S.C. 1914 relates to receiving compensation from a private
source in connection with services performed for the Government. Therefore,
neither 18 U.S.C. 434 nor 18 U.S.C. 1914 applies to a Regular retired officer who is
not representing or performing services for the United States. In addition, 18
U.S.C. 202 and the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 216 do not apply to Regular retired
officers who are not representing or performing services for the United States.
18 U.S.C. 281 exempts retired officers not on active duty from its application, but
it prohibits a Regular retired Air Force officer from representing any person in the
sale of anything to the Government through the Department of the Air Force.
18 U.S.C. 283 exempts retired officers next on active duty from its application, but
it prohibits a Regular retired Air Force officer from acting as agent or attorney for
prosecuting or assisting in the prosecution of any claim against the Government,
within two years after his retirement, involving the Department of the Air Force.
It also prohibits a Regular retired officer from acting as agent or attorney from
prosecuting or assisting in the prosecution of any claim against the Government,
at any time, involving any subject matter with which he was directly connected
while on active duty.
(2) Section 1309 of the Act of August 7, 1953 (67 Stat. 437; 5 U.S.C. 59c) pro-
hibits payment from appropriated funds to any Regular retired officer for a period
of two years after his retirement, who for himself or for others is engaged in the
selling of or contracting for the sale of or negotiating for the sale of any supplies or
war materials to any agency of the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, the
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Coast and Geodetic Survey, or the Public Health Service. In 38 Comptroller
General 470, the Comptroller General said, among other things, that this statutory
prohibition applies to a Regular retired officer whose activities were calculated to
induce a nonappropriated fund activity of a military department to purchase
supplies from his employer, even though the mechanical act of negotiating or con-
summating the actual sale was done by some other agent of the retired officer's
employer.
d. Reserve and National Guard Officers. A Reserve who is not on active duty,
and a Reserve who is on active duty for training, is not considered to be an
"Officer of the United States" for the purposes of the foregoing statutes solely
because of his Reserve status or because of his being on active duty for training.
Membership in a Reserve component of the armed forces or in the National
Guard does not, in itself, prevent a person from practicing his civilian profession
or occupation before, or in connection with, any department (Secs. 29 (c) and (d),
Act of August 10, 1956, 5 U.S.C. 30r (c) and (d)).
e. Other related Criminal Statutes Applicable to Conflict of Interests. The follow-
ing activities may subject present and former Air Force personnel to criminal
penalties:
(1) Aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, or procuring another
to commit a crime under the criminal statutes cited above (18 USC 2).
(2) Concealing or failing to report to proper authorities the commission of a
crime under any of the criminal statutes cited above, if such personnel know of the
actual commission of the crime (18 USC 4).
(3) Conspiring with one or more other persons to commit a crime under any
of the criminal statutes cited above, or to defraud the United States, if the person
concerned does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy (18 USC 371).
3. Conflicts of Interest.?
a. General. All Air Force personnel are bound to refrain from any private busi-
ness or professional activity which would place them in a position where there is
a conflict between their private interests and the public interest of the United
States and the Air Force. In addition, Air Force personnel will not engage in
any private activity which makes possible the improper capitalization of informa-
tion gained through an Air Force position. Even though a technical conflict of
interest, as set forth in the statutes cited inparagraph 2, may not exist, it is desir-
able to avoid the appearance of such a conflict from a public confidence point
of view.
b. Disqualifying Financial Interest. In any case where Air Force personnel
have any financial interest in any business entity, or have arranged or are nego-
tiating for their subsequent employment by such entity, they are disqualified
from representing the Air Force in dealings of any kind with such entity. Per-
sonnel charged with the administration of APR 34-21, who own stock in or are
officers of an insurance company, must scrupulously avoid negotiating with such
company in respect to granting authorization to solicit sales. The same restric-
tion will apply in the case of personnel having a financial interest in any other
business enterprise which deals with Air Force personnel on an individual basis.
c. Disqualification Procedure. In any case where, in accordance with b above,
Air Force personnel believe that they should be disqualified from taking action
in a particular matter, they will so inform an appropriate superior and will there-
upon be relieved of their duty and responsibility in that particular case. In
addition, where a superior thinks any personnel responsible to him may have a
disqualifying interest, he will discuss the matter with such personnel and, if he
finds such an interest does exist, he will relieve the personnel of duty and respon-
sibility in the particular case. In cases of disqualification under this paragraph
the matter will be assigned for decision and action to someone else of equal or
higher rank who clearly has no conflict of interest.
4. Dealing with Former Military and Civilian Personnel.?Air Force personnel
will not knowingly deal with military or civilian personnel, or former military or
civilian personnel, of the Government if such action would result in a violation
of a statute or policy set forth in this regulation. For example, Air Force per-
sonnel will not at any time knowingly deal with retired officers or with former
personnel where such personnel are representing any person in the prosecution
of any claim against the United States involving any subject matter with which
such personnel were directly connected while with the Air Force.
5. Retired Regular Officers.?
a. Prosecution of Claims. Under the statutes cited above, a retired regular Air
Force officer may not, within two years of his retirement, act as an agent or at-
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torney for prosecuting any claim against the Government, or assist in the prose-
cution of such a claim or receive any gratuity or any share of or interest in such
claim in consideration for having assisted in the prosecution of such a claim, if
such claim involves the Air Force. Nor may a retired officer at any time act as
an agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim against the Government or assist
in prosecution of such claim, or receive any gratuity or any share of or interest
in such a claim in consideration for having assisted in the prosecution of such
claim, if such claim involves any subject matter with which he was directly
connected while on active duty.
b. Selling or Contracting for Sale. Under the statutes cited above, no retired
regular Air Force officer will sell, contract for the sale of, or negotiate for the sale
of anything to the Air Force. This prohibition extends beyond the mere bargain-
ing which may precede the execution or the modification of a contract. It includes
any activity in a representative capacity on behalf of the prospective contractor
which is directed toward forming the basis of a contract with the Government.
This regulation should not be construed as prohibiting activities which are only
remotely connected with contractual matters. It is not the intent of this regula-
tion to preclude a retired officer from accepting employment with private industry
solely because his employer is a contractor with the Government.
6. Reserve and National Guard Personnel.?
a. Members of the Reserve components of the armed forces who are on active.
duty, other than for training, are 'officers" or "employees" of the United States
for the purpose of bringing them within the statutes cited in paragraph 2a. When
members are released from active duty, they become former personnel for the
purpose of bringing them within paragraph 2b.
b. Members of the Reserve components, whether in the Ready, Standby, or.
Retired Reserve, who are not on active duty are not, solely because of their status
as Reserves, considered to be officers of the United States for the purpose of
bringing them within the statutes cited in paragraphs 2a and 2b.
c. Receipt of retired pay by Reserves or former Reserves does not, in itself,
make such personnel officers or employees, or former officers or employees, of the
United States for the purpose of bringing them within the statutes cited in para-
graphs 2a and 2b. Paragraph 2c does not apply to retired Reserves.
d. Reserves who are on active duty for training do not become officers or
employees of the United States for the purpose of bringing them within the statutes
cited in paragraphs 2a and 2b, solely because they are on active duty for training.
While they are on active duty for training, however, Reserves are subject to the
policies prescribed in this regulation. Air Force personnel who are responsible
for assigning Reserves for training should make an effort to assign them when
they are on active duty for training to duties in which they will not obtain infor-
mation that could be used by them or their employers so as to give them an unfair.
advantage over their civilian competitors.
7. Affidavits.?
a. Obtaining Affidavits. All retired Air Force officers, and former personnel
within two years after leaving the Air Force, seeking to do business with the Air'
Force are required to file an affidavit stating: ?
?
(1) Their former connection with the Air Force and the date of termination
thereof:
(2) The subject matter of the business they are transacting and intend to:
transact with Air Force personnel, and whether their duties in their former con-
nection with the Air Force related to the same subject matter;
(3) Whether they gave any personal attention to the matters under considera-
tion or gained any personal knowledge of the facts thereof while connected with.
the Government.
b. Filing Affidavit. All affidavits prepared on AFPI Form 34 will be sent
directly to the Commander, Air Materiel Command, ATTN: MCPI, for process-
ing. If, from the statements in such affidavit and from such other information as
the Air Force may have in its possession, it appears that a violation of the policy
or statutes as set forth in this regulation is not involved, the affiant will be given
a statement to that effect. Where a clear violation of the policy or statutes as
set forth in this regulation is involved, the affiant will be so advised. In those
instances where the Commander, Air Materiel Command, is unable to resolve
the issues, the matter will be submitted to Headquarters USAF for referral to
the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for consideration and decision. .
8. Gratuities.?Air Force personnel will not accept any favor or gratuity,
directly or indirectly, from any person, firm, corporation, or other entity which
has engaged in, is engaged in, or is endeavoring to engage in, procurement activi-
ties or business transactions of any sort with the Air Force, where such favor or
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gratuity might influence, or might reasonably be interpreted as influencing, the
impartiality of such personnel.
9. Prohibition of Contributions or Presents to Superiors.?No officer, clerk, or
employee in the United States Government employ shall at any time solicit con-
tributions from other officers, clerks, or employees in the Government service
for a gift or present to those in a superior official position; nor shall any such
officials or clerical superiors receive any gift or present offered or presented to
them as a contribution from persons in Government employ receiving a less salary
than themselves; nor shall any officer or clerk make any donation as a gift or
present to any official superior. Every person who violates this section shall be
summarily discharged from the Government employ (R.S. 1784; 5 U.S.C. 113;
see AFBul 9, 1953).
10. Use of Military Titles in Connection with Commercial Enterprises.?
a. All military personnel on active duty, officer and enlisted, are prohibited from
using their military or position titles in connection with any commercial enterprise.
For the purpose of this regulation the term "commercial enterprise" includes any
organization other than a nonprofit or charitable organization which is exempt
from Federal income taxation because it comes within subsection (1), (3), (4),
(6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (13), or (14) of section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended (26 U.S.C. 501), No member on extended active duty
will use his military title or position title in connection with any organization unless
he first determines from the organization involved that it is exempt from taxation
under one of the above subsections of the Internal Revenue Code. Any member
who desires to request an exception to the foregoing limitation will address his
request through channels to the Secretary of the Air Force, setting forth detailed
information concerning the organization involved. ?
b. Authorship of any material for publication is exempt from the limitation in a
above, subject to existing regulations.
c. Retired personnel of both the Regular and Reserve components, officer and
enlisted, who are not on active duty may use their military titles in connection
with commercial enterprises.
? d. Reserve component personnel, officer and enlisted, who are not on active
duty may use their military titles in connection with commercial enterprises.
e. Reserve and retired members and former members who are not on active duty
will not use their military titles in oversea areas in connection with public appear-
ances without obtaining the prior approval of the theater commander.
f. When a Reserve or retired member or former member uses his military title in
accordance with c through e above, his title must show that he is a Reserve or is in
a retired status, or both, as applicable.
11. Civil Employment of Military Personnel.?
a. No commissioned officer of the Regular Air Force may be:
(1) Employed on civil works or internal improvements;
(2) Allowed to be employed by an incorporated company; or
(3) Employed as acting paymaster or disbursing agent of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs;
if that employment requires him to be separated from his unit or organization, or
interferes with the performance of his military duties (10 U.S.C. 8544).
b. No enlisted member of the Air Force on active duty may be ordered or
permitted to leave his post to engage in a civilian pursuit or business, or a per-
formance in civil life, for emolument, hire, or otherwise, if the pursuit, business,
or performance interferes with the customary or regular employment of local
civilians in their art, trade, or profession (10 U.S.C. 8635).
c. Military personnel on active duty will not represent any insurance company
in the solicitation of commercial life insurance on a military installation.
12. Reporting Suspected Violations.?Any person who has information which
causes him to suspect that there has been a violation of a policy or statute set
forth in this regulation will promptly report it to the appropriate commander in
accordance with the procedures prescribed in AFR 124-8. The ? commander
will promptly refer the matter for investigation to the .nearest Office of Special
Investigations District Office if he receives a report indicating a possible violation.
Any question or doubt on the part of the commander will be resolved in favor of
referring the matter to the Office of Special Investigations.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:
THOMAS D. WHITE,
Chief of Staff.
J. L. TARE,
Colonel, USAF,
Director of Administrative Services.
OFFICIAL:
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(Attachment to AFR 30-30)
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 175, 85TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is
the sense of the Congress that the following Code of Ethics should be adhered to
by all Government employees, including officeholders:
CODE OF ETHICS FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE
Any person in Government service should:
1. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to
persons, party, or Government department.
2. Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United States and
of all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion.
3. Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay; giving to the performance of his
duties his earnest effort and best thought.
4. Seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks
accomplished.
5. Never discriminate unfairly by the dispensing of special favors or privileges
to anyone, whether for remuneration or not; and never accept, for himself or his
family, favors or benefits under circumstances which might be construed by
reasonable persons as influencing the performance of his governmental duties.
6. Make no private promises of any kind binding upon the duties of office, since
a Government employee has no private word which can be binding on public duty.
7. Engage in no business with the Government, either directly or indirectly,
which is inconsistent with the conscientious performance of his governmental
duties.
8. Never use any information coming to him confidentially in the performance
of governmental duties as a means for making private profit.
9. Expose corruption wherever discovered.
10. Uphold these principles, ever conscious that public office is a public trust.
AR 600-205
*C 2
PERSONNEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL, ASSIGNED TO PROCUREMENT AND RELATED
ACTIVITIES
CHANGES}
No. 2
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 27 October 1955.
AR 600-205, 3 June 1953, is changed as follows:
1. (Superseded) General. These regulations enunciate Department of the Army
policy regarding personnel engaged in procurement and related activities and are
binding upon all persons, military or civilian, engaged in service procurement and
related duties. Related activities include, but are not limited to, development of
requirements, development of specifications for procurement, stock control opera-
tions, preparation of procurement requests' requisitions, sales and exchanges of
Government personal property, and related coordinating activities in connection
therewith. All such personnel will familiarize themselves thoroughly with the
instructions contained herein in order that they may protect the interests of the
Government.
6. Pertinent criminal code sections. There are certain * * * are as follows:
*These changes supersede C 1 ,9 :rune 1955.
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m. (As added by C 1, 9 Jun 55) Disclosure of confidential information generally.
18 U.S.C. Supp. V, 1905.
[AG 250.1 (27 May 55) (17 Oct 55) LOG/Eli
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.
JOHN A. KLEIN,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.
Distribution: Active Army: C. To be distributed on a need-to-know, basis
to all installations, activities located off an installation, and to all units and head-
quarters down to and including divisions, and units and headquarters of compar-
able size.
NG: State AG (3).
USAR: None.
OFFICIAL:
ARMY REGULATIONS}
No. 600-205
*AR 600-205
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
WAsrfirmToN 25, D.C., 3 June 1958.
PERSONNEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PROCUREMENT AND RELATED
ACTIVITIES
Paragraph
General 1
Personnel selection and instruction 2
Ethics of procurement personnel 3
Unauthorized release of procurement information 4
Unauthorized statements or commitments with respect to award of contracts 5
Pertinent criminal code sections 6
1. General.?These regulations enunciate , Department of the Army policy re-
garding personnel engaged 'in procurement and related activities. They are
binding upon all persons, military or civilian, engaged in service procurement
and related duties. All such personnel will familiarize themselves thoroughly
with the instructions contained herein in order that they may protect the interests
of the Government.
2. Personnel selection and instruction.?The importance of the procurement
function to the Department of the Army makes selection and instruction of pro-
curement personnel a matter of major importance to appointing officials. Selected
personnel are not only responsible for protecting the Government's interest but
also for maintaining the reputation of the Army Establishment for honesty,
courtesy, and fair dealings in all relations with contractors. All procurement
and related activities personnel, military, or civilian, must comply with the provi-
sions of :the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, as amended (62 Stat. 21,
5 U.S.C. 219b, 626e; 41 U.S.C. 151-161), the Armed Services Procurement Regu-
lation, the Army Procurement Procedure, and the Department of the Army
circulars, directives, and other publications pertinent thereto. Every person
engaged upon procurement and related activities must at all times protect the
interests of the Government.
3. Ethics of procurement personnel.?a. The business ethics of all persons
charged with the administration and expenditures of Government funds must
be above reproach and suspicion in every respect at all times. The Supreme
Court has stated aptly that as a general rule all men have a moral obligation to
refrain from placing themselves in relations which excite conflict between self-
interest and integrity.
*These regulations supersede AR 600-205, 3 December 1951.
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? b. The broad policy of the Department of the Army with regard to conflicting
private interests of military and civilian personnel assigned to procurement and
related duties is set forth as follows: Every member of the service, military or
civilian' is bound to refrain from all business and professional activities and
interests not directly connected with his duties which would tend to interfere
with or hamper in any degree his full and proper discharge of such duties. If
a member of the service, military or civilian, has a financial interest in any
business entity which manufactures or sells articles of a kind which it is his
duty to purchase for the Government, or in any business entity with which he
as an officer or agent of the United States in the normal course of his duties
transacts or intends to transact business, or if he finds that his duties require
him to act as an agent of the United States in a manner from which he may
derive financial profit or other benefits, he, or any other member of the service
having knowledge of the circumstances, shall immediately report such interest
to higher authority, stating whether or not he has divested, or intends imme-
diately to divest, himself of such interest. If he does not immediately divest
himself of such interest, or does not disqualify himself from transacting business
with the business entity in which he has a financial interest, appropriate steps
shall immediately be taken to relieve him from his assignment; provided, how-
ever, that a contracting officer having a financial interest in any business entity
which manufactures or sells articles of a kind which it is his duty to purchase
for the Government shall immediately divest himself of such interest or be relieved
from his assignment.
(1) The term "financial interest" shall, for the purposes of these regula-
tions, include but shall not be limited to?
(a) Ownership by the individual of stock, bonds, or other securities
issued by, or a partnership interest or an interest in a contract with, such
business entity or a business entity which owns or controls it:
(b) Status as an officer, agent, employee, or representative of such
business entity;
(c) Any connection with a business entity which would lead a reason-
able man to the opinion that the individual concerned might not fully and
properly discharge his duties to the United States were he to transact
business with such business entity.
(2) The term "transact business" shall, for the purposes of these regula-
tions, include but shall not be limited to?
(a) The ne7otiation (including preaward surveys and awards board pro-
ceedings), execution, or administration of contracts with such business
entity;
(b) Advising or deciding upon a claim or request of such business entity
for financial or other benefits from the United States, such as V-loans,
advance payment loans, hardship claims, use of Government-owned
equipment, etc.; provided that participation in a policy decision af-
fecting a class of business entities shall not ordinarily be deemed to
constitute the transaction of business with a particular member of
such class.
c. Agents of the Government will not accept gratuities from concerns or in-
dividuals with whom they have Government business contacts. Furthermore,
they will not accept, directly or indirectly, gratuities, gifts or courtesies which
influence, or might reasonably tend to influence, the strict impartiality which
must prevail in all Government business relations.
4. Unauthorized release of procurement information.?It is the individual re-
sponsibility of all personnel, t?oth military and civilian, of the Army Establish-
ment to refrain from releasing to any individual or any individual business con-
cern or its representatives any preknowledge such personnel may possess or have
acquired in any way concerning proposed procurements or purchases of supplies
by any procuring activity of the Army Establishment. Such information will be
released to all potential contractors as nearly simultaneously as possible and only
through duly designated agencies, so that one potential source of supply may
not he given an advantage over another. All dissemination of such information
will be in accordance with existing authorized procedures and only in connection
with the necessary and proper discharge of official duties.
5. Unauthorized statements or commitments with respect to award of contracts.?
Only Contracting Officers and their duly authorized representatives acting within
their authority are authorized to commit the Government with respect to award
of contracts. Unauthorized discussion and commitments may place the Depart-
ment of the Army in the position of not acting in good faith. Unauthorized per-
sonnel will refrain from making any commitment or promise relating to award of
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contracts and will make no representation which could be construed as such a
commitment. Army personnel will not under any circumstances advise a busi-
ness representative that an attempt will be made to influence another person or
agency to give preferential treatment to his concern in the award of future con-
tracts. Any person requesting preferential treatment will be informed by official
letter that Department of Army contracts are awarded only in accordance with
established contracting procedures.
6. Pertinent criminal code sections.?There are certain statutes which make it
.a criminal offense for an officer or an agent of the Government to engage in prac-
tices or activities which are at variance with the full measure of duty which he
,owes to the United States as such officer or agent. Applicable criminal statutes
:are as follows:
a. Interested persons acting as Government agents.-18 .U.S.C. Supp. V, 434;
M.L. 1949, sec. 812. (See also 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 168, 31 March 1942.)
b. Officers or employees interested in claims against Government.-18 U.S.C.
Supp. V, 283; ACT,. 1949, sec. 840.
c. Procurement of contract by officer or Member of Congress.-18 U.S.C. Supp. V,
216; M.L. 1949, sec. 841.
d. Compensation to Members of Congress, officers and others in matters affecting
the Government.-18 Supp. V, 281; M.L. 1949, sec. 842.
e. Acceptance or solicitation by officer or other person.-18 U.S.C. Supp. V, 202;
M.L. 1949, sec. 846.
f. Disqualification of former officers and employees in matters connected with
former duties.-18 Supp. V, 284; M.L. 1949, sec. 706.
g. Taking or using papers relating to claims.-18 U.S.C. Supp. V, 285; M.L.
1949, sec. 811.
h. Conspiracy to defraud the Government with respect to claims.-18 U.S.C. Supp.
V, 286; M.L. 1949, sec. 806.
i. False statements or entries generally.-18 U.S.C. Supp. V, 1001; M.L. 1949,
sec. 8061).
j. Official certificates or writings.?] 8 U.S.C. Supp. V, 1018; M.L. 1949, sec. 839.
k. Records and reports; concealment, removal, or mutilation generally.-18 U.S.C.
Supp. V, 2071; M.L. 1949, sec. 852.
I. Sal7ry of Government officials and employees payable only by the Uniled.States.-
18 Supp. V, 1914; M.L. 1949, sec. 1627.
A PPENDIX
TRE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, January 28, 1958.
Memorandum for:
The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The Chairmen of Boards, Councils and Committees
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
The Directors of Offices, OSD
'Subject: Conduct of Personnel Assigned to Procurement and Related Activities.
Under the authority vested in me as Secretary of Defense, you are directed to
bring to the attention of all personnel the laws applicable to situations involving
conflicts of interest. It is the responsibility of each individual officer and em-
ployee to comply with the laws of his country. Particular attention is directed
to Section 434, Title 18, United States Code.
It is a recognized principle that no Government officer or employee who has the
direct responsibility for negotiating and signing contracts or approving the pay-
ment of money to contractors, should have any financial interest in any such
contractor. No Government officer or employee should permit himself to be
exposed to a dual-interest position or to a conflict between self-interest and
integrity. He should clearly be in a position to act to the best of his ability
without fear or favor in the best interest of his Government.
In any case where an officer or employee of the Department of Defense, in-
cluding all of its departments and agencies, has any financial interest in any
business entity, corporation, or partnership, transacting or contemplatinr; trans-
acting business with the Government that officer or employee is disqualifiA, and
this directive expressly disqualifies him, from having any dealings of any kind
f or or in behalf of the Department of Defense with such business entity.
While a conflict of interest, as may be defined by the law, is a matter of fact
in a particular case, even if a technical conflict does not in fact exist, it is desir-
able to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest from a public-confidence
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point of view. ?The additional problem is how can officers or employees of the
Department of Defense be disqualified in the relatively few cases where they or
their superiors think there is or may be some conflict of interest.
In any case where an officer or employee of the Department of Defense, includ-
ing all its departments and agencies, feels that he should be disqualified from
taking action in a particular matter, it is his duty to so inform his superior or
department head, and he will be relieved of his duty and responsibility in that
particular case. The matter will then be assigned to someone else of equal or
higher rank, who clearly has no conflict of interest for decision and action.
In any case where any superior who thinks that an officer or employee report-
ing to him may be involved in a conflict of interest, or an apparent conflict of
interest of importance from a public confidence point of view, he will discuss the
matter with the person involved and may rAieve such officer or employee of
responsibility in the case. He will then assign the responsibility for taking
action to someone else of equal or higher rank who clearly has no conflict of
interest for decision and action, or he may take the responsibility for decision
and action himself.
In any case where any of the Secretaries or civilian departmental officials
appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate may
be so disqualified in a particular case, the matter will be referred for action and
decision by the Secretary of Defense, or his Deputy, to another departmental
official of equal or higher rank, who has received his appointment from the Presi-
dent by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or the Deputy Secretary
or the Secretary of Defense will rule on the matter himself and take full respon-
sibility for any actions taken.
This directive supersedes any existing departmental directives and regulations
applicable to standards of conduct of personnel assigned to procurement and
related activities to the extent that they are inconsistent with this directive.
[AG 250.1 (5 May 53) G4/E1] C. E. WILSON.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:
J. LAWTON COLLINS,
Chief of Staff, United States Army.
Wm. E. BERGIN,
Major General, USA.,
The Adjutant General.
Mr. WHITTEN. Even though you cover procurement officers, with
their close relationships, I do not know that that is going far enough.
Frankly, so far as I am concerned, I would like to see a statute pre-
venting Members of Congress?I do not know of any who have, may
I say?from participating in or buying stock in a company with which
you deal. I think such action could create a bad situation. I think
again we have gotten our immediate domestic activity in the economic
field so tied in with defense spending that the power to control these
things or to benefit from them requires everybody to be as objective
as possible.
Secretary GATES. I agree that the fields are completely intermeshed.
I agree with your remarks about keeping in mind the economic and
inflationary aspects. I have a personal conviction that you cannot
legislate honesty.
Mr. WHITTEN. I thoroughly agree, but I do not know, if there is
no rule preventing it and if it is perfectly legal at the moment
Secretary GATES. It would be awfully poor judgment.
Mr. WHITTEN. I thoroughly agree. I was formerly a district at-
torney, as were many members of this committee, and we have lots
of criminal laws. They do not prevent criminals, but they give the
public the ability to do something about wrongful conduct.
The point I make is that regulations in this instance might not
prevent things from happening, but might enable you to do something
about it, and might enable us to see who may be in this field. It is
OFFICIAL:
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just like this information on retired officers with these firms who are
in turn contracting with you. We need the information, so we can
determine what further to do, because, certainly, if you are dealing
with a man with special interests, you need at least to know he has
this special interest so you can take that into account in your dealing.
I did not mean to lecture, but I do think in this whole field the
Department should give attention to regulations?and perhaps the
Congress should give attention to legislation?because quite definitely
this is an area in which many people have made lots of money. When
they get to making lots of 'money, they put lots of pressure on you
not to cancel a contract. That may be costly and it may lead to
further inflation.
Secretary GATES. I would agree that constructive legislation might
be helpful. I testified as the first witness before this other committee,
and I was mindful of the fact that some kinds of legislation could be
harmful. I think it would be wrong to exclude fine retired officers
from working for industry where they make a unique contribution to
industry. I hope any legislation that does come up will not discrim-
inate against retired officers so that they could not be used where they
make a contribution, not only to industry, but to national defense
indirectly.
Mr. WHIq TEN. I think this should go in the record, but if the chair-
man disagrees, I will take it out. This subject was considered last
year. The very thing you mention I think was the determining
factor that caused our Committee to ask for the information first and
then decide what to do, rather than try to write something to start
with which might not fit what we have in mind. In other words, get
the facts first and then look at it.
Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.
Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We will
resume at 2 o'clock.
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. MAHON. The committee will come to order and we shall resume.
Mr. Andrews, do you have any questions?
Mr. ANDREWS. Just one or two, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to concur in the fine things that have been
said about you and the record you are making as Secretary of Defense.
I have served on this committee for 7 years and I have enjoyed your
testimony more than any I can recall. I think that you know your
subject well and are conscientious and a man of action. I predict a
very successful tenure of office for you.
Secretary GATES. Thank you, sir. I hope I can continue to justify
this confidence.
PRESENT FORCE CAPABILITY
Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to ask you, or General Twining, if you
think our forces have the capability at this time of striking the prin-
cipal Russian targets that you would hope to strike in case of an
all-out war?
General TWINING. Yes, we do. We have that capability.
Mr. MAHON. And as the POLARIS system comes into the service
you will add to that capability?
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`".ifeneral Twiicit'N'd. Yes. ." They Will be fitted into the whole strategic
plan of target attack; that is tight. ; ? .ii
?? Mr. ANDREWS. Do you:think our retaliatory Capability is stronger
today thaii it was last year? ? '1 ' ? ? ?
? , ?
? General TwINING. Yes, I do. ? -
Mr. ANDREws. By comparison, is the -Russian capability stronger
today, in yohr opinion, than it waS wyear ago? - ?
? General TWiNING. Their capability is groWing too, but I think We
are still ahead of them.', ' ' ?
Mr. ANDREWS. I ail sure you know their capability as well as any-
body in the conntrY, and YOu know our capability as well asany person
in the country. :-.:1
What' is your opinion-about the possibility of anall-out nuclear war.
between this country and Russia?
,General TWINING. I think it is very, very slim.
BOMARG PROGRAM . ? '
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr.' Secretary, what about your 'BOMARC pro-.
gram? What progress have you made in the, last year and what' is
the status of the program at this time?
. Secretary GATES. The BOMARC program is consistent With the
decisions, that were made last summer in connection with the retiew,
of the total continental air ?defense picture. At that time we reduced.
the number of .BOMARC squadrons down to a total of 16 for the
United States, ahd 2 for Canada based on the periphery concept
rather than putting BOMARC in in depth We have money in this
budget for a continuation of that same program. We will be buying
the so-called BOMARC B missile. . , .
Mr. ANDREWS. Was there any money in the 1960 bill for BOMARC
!Lk?
Secretary GATES. No. I think the last BOMARC A:Money Was in'
1959.
Mr. ANDREWS. ? That program never, was successful, was it?. ? ,
Secretary GATES. Oh, yes, I think it was successful. I think we. have
BOMARC A's in being that are useful, but they do not have as, high
a performance; as the B's.
Mr. ANDREWS. How many ? B's have been tested?
"" ?
. Secretary GATES. ,I do not have the test facts here.' I will have to
provide them. ,
Mr. ANDREWS,' I suppose there will be some other Witnesses who will
know about the tests of the BOMARC B; is that right, Dr. York?
Dr. YORK., Yes. .., ; . , r
Mr. ANDREWS. How much money is in 'this budget for tbe-pku're?-,
ment of BOMARC B missiles in 1961? , You can supplY that' fOiAlie
record later. There is money in the budget for the procurement of
the BOMARCPB missile?, . ?' ? I ? , f
Secretary GATEs: , Yes, alot,of?it.,-:.$6121,500,006.?1 ?
Mr. ANDREWS. ,How?muclr is in the budget for ,the NIKE-HER-,
. 7 t!i.,
CITLES ? -
Secretary GATES. PU1400,000.! f?, ? ,r )
. Mr. ANDREWS. _Have you finished your.-NIKE instiallation program?
Secretary GATES. I think hotcOmpletely -? -r4
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Mr. ANDREWS. When do you expect to finish the NIKE installation
program?
Secretary GATES. All the HERCULES units will have their basic
equipment by the end of this calendar year, although some improved
equipment will be delivered after this.
Mr. ANDREWS. What about the BOMARC program? ?
.Secretary GATES. The BOMARC program?the whole system?.
will not be completed until 1963.
Mr. ANDREWS. In your opinion, is there a need for both the
BOMARC and the NIKE program?
Secretary GATES. I think our opinion remains unchanged after the
very comprehensive study we gave the problem. The intelligence
on which this judgment is based has not changed except for Mr.
Khrushchev's speech this morning.
Of course, the people responsible for continental air defense feel
that this is not sufficient. They would like to have more. The mix of
the longer range BOMARC's involving ground environment equip-
ment and radar gap fillers in Canada, and the point defense system
provided by NIKE-HERCULES seems to be a good mix. I think
until we review the situation on an overall basis again we would leave
the BOMARC-HERCULES-SAGE system program about as we
have determined it.
Now, it might be well before this budget is spent or committed
further?I mean in the ?course of fiscal year 1961?that we have an-
other reappraisal. Such a reappraisal might change the emphasis
on certain factors, in which case there might be a change in the air
defense plan. I know there have been some further studies on the
air defense problem?not along the lines of the F-108, but along the
line of reconsidering the continued use, in numbers, of aircraft inter-
ceptors. One of the reasons for this is that the BOMARC sites them
selves are vulnerable, as fixed sites, to good accurate missiles. An
enemy could put a few missiles on a BOMARC site and thus knock out
an important part of our continental air defenses. Perhaps fighter
.squadrons because they are mobile will continue to have their useful-
ness as a supplement to BOMARC. The mix we now have, had a very
comprehensive examination by the Congress and by the Department of
Defense only 4 or 5 months ago. I think we should stand by that
program.
Mr. ANDREWS. General, do you know anything about the tests of
the BOMARC B, or do you, Dr. York?
Dr. YORK. I am not as much up to date on that as I might be.
General TWINING. We have had pretty good luck with that as far
as I know. I do not have the details, but I have seen the results of
some of the tests.
Mr. ANDREWS. DO you know how many have been fired, and the
type of tests?
General TWINING. I do not know, but we can get that to you for
the record.
Dr. YORK. It is not proved in. But where we stand so far is en-
couraging. It is not discouraging.
, Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to know the type of tests, and how many
they have had and how successful we have been with them:
[The information requested is classified and was furnished to the
committee separately.]
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HOUND DOG PROGRAM
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Secretary, what about the HOUND DOG pro-
gram? When do you expect to have this missile operational?
Secretary GATES. The HOUND DOG program is coming in this
fiscal year. It is just about fully financed, I think, this year to the
extent of $170 million. At the end of fiscal year 1960 we will have
two squadrons and they go on up from there through 1962.
Mr. ANDREWS. General, that will be a great addition to your arsenal?
General TwiNING.Yes, and it has been very successful so far in its
tests.
Mr. ANDREWS. What range will they have?
General TWINING. Over 500 miles.
Mr. ANDREWS. Are you working on a similar missile with a 1,000-
mile range?
General TWINING. Yes. That is way out in the blue. That is a
ballistic missile.
Mr. ANDREWS. When do you expect to have it.
General TWINNING. That is quite a ways out. That is the advanced
ASM, GAM-87.
Secretary GATES. It is a drawing board proposition but there is
some research money on it in this budget.
Mr. ANDREWS. It is a bigger HOUND DOG.
General TWINING. It is programed to enter force in 1964.
Mr. ANDREWS. It will have the same mission as the HOUND DOG?
General TWINING. That is right.
Secretary GATES. I think it is a little more effective than that. I
think that it is sort of an airborne ballistic missile type of concept.
I think in concept it will have much greater capabilities than the
HOUND DOG.
General TWINING. It is to be supersonic and is planned to have a
1,000-mile range.
(Discussion off the record.)
MINUTEMAN PROGRAM
Mr. ANDREWS. What about the MINUTEMAN program? How
is it progressing and when do you expect to have it operational?
Secretary GATES. The MINUTEMAN program is progressing well
at high priority, and we put into this budget the first money for pro-
duction facilities and some long leadtime components. It is going to
be built out near Salt Lake City.
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE
Mr. ANDREWS. Now, is the money in this budget for only 360,000
National Guard officers and men for the next fiscal year?
Secretary GATES. Yes, for the end of fiscal year 1961.
Mr. ANDREWS. Do you expect to reduce the strength of the guard
below 100,000 prior to next July 1?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Mr. ANDREWS. But you do plan, if this budget is adopted, to begin
the first of next July to reduce the Guard 10 percent?
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Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. ANDREWS. Ana have an end strength of 360,000 at the end of
fiscal year 1961?
Secretary GATES. That is right.
Mr. ANDREWS. How much additional money?and you probably
will not be able to tell me at this time, but I wish you would supply it
for the record?will be needed to keep the guard strength at what it
is at present, 400,000?
Secretary GATES. $72 million.
Mr. ANDREWS. You plan to reduce the Reserve strength by 10 per-
cent?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to know the cost of retaining the Re-
serve at the present strength.
Secretary GATEs. That figure of $72 million is for both.
Mr. ANDREWS. $72 million?
Secretary GATES. Yes. That covers both reductions.
Mr. ANDREWS. The guard and the Reserves?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you again, Mr. Secretary. Those are all the
questions that I have.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Riley.
CLOSER RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Mr. RILEY. Mr. Secretary, I want to add my appreciation and com-
mendation to you and the general for the excellent statements outlined
in the proposed military program for 1961, and the frankness and the
clarity of your answers.
I was very much intrigued by your statement of the closer workings
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff with your office.
I am of the opinion that this should be a teamwork operation and that
assigned missions should be given to each one of the defense forces?
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. They should be given a
mission to carry out and then assigned whatever weapons are nec-
essary to carry out that mission. Then they should develop it, rather
than compete, to a certain extent. I know some rivalry probably is
helpful. I think that we have had too much of it. I am very much
in hopes that between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and your Office there
will be closer collaboration and study of each agency's program and
that it will be coordinated so that we will have a balanced team. I
do not think there is anything secret about that. We do it with our
football teams and baseball teams, and the one that does it the best
is the one that gets results.
Secretary GATES. As you know, from a practical point of view, we
have only had less than a year under the Reorganization Plan of 1958.
The operational forces essentially are now assigned to a unified com-
mand so the service control of forces is really related to logistics and
training. Almost all of the combatant forces are now under a unified
commander at one place or another. I think this will shake down to
a team type of effort which you would like to see, and so would we.
Mr. RILEY. I am glad to hear you say that. In order for the differ-
ent commanders to know what is going on, and to be able to cooperate
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fully, they have to know what the other fellow' mission is and what
he is doing.' f: ? ? ? ?? f?.; r:?; 1 I
Secretary GATES. Certainly. ' ?? '1 ? .
Mr. RILEY. There has to be a meeting Of inindS.therefind, a determi-
nationan, accepted determinatiOn?of these missiOns. ? .
' ; .1? 4 ?
INCREASED RELIANCE OF SOVIET UNION ON MISSILES
?
The news this morning would indicate somewhat that the Soviets,
want us to believe they are placing most Of their reliance on missiles.
Do you buy that? ? . ' ? ? ' r -;? - ?
Secretary GATES. I think be is moving toward a position of in-
creased strength in intercontinental missiles.-??'In. missiles, generally
he has a great many IRBM's and a great many antiaircraft missiles,
so he is in the missile business in a pretty big way. He'-is moving,
as the figures General, Twining Showed you indicate, 'toward some
strength in the ICBM field. Meanwhile lie' 'still ,has ,being large
ground forces. He has in being a lot of navy, inoludingthe,se 400-odd
submarines. .
Mr. RILEY. Do you not believe that Khruslichey's statement this
morning ,was ? an effort to cause' us rth believe that he is. placing his
greatest reliance and hope in the missile program and at the same.
time he is going ahead with these other components of his arthed.
forces? There is no question but that be is building submarines and
there is no question but that he: will' have abig army-left with mod=
ern equipment. .
Secretary GArEs. That is correct. I think he is never unmindful
of the public relatians effect of what he days. '? - ?
' Mr. RILEY. If be depends entirely on missile., I belieVe that our-peo-
ple are smart enough, technically and scientificallY, to eoneentrate on
such a program and find a deterrent for it.
I am nOt ,as pessimistic as some of the 'others. I belief we will
solve the defense against missiles sooner or later. ' ?
Secretary GATES. In 'all history there has always been a 'counter-
measure developed of some character or the other, and sooner or later
we will solve it. It looks very difficult at the moment. ? ?
Mr. RILEY., Do you not think some of these'others looked pretty dif-
ficult, when they first originated? ?
? ,
Secretary GATES. 'Yes. ? I .1.
? Mr. 'RILEY. It has been the same thing all through history. There
is no mystery abOut'it. It looks' dark ai2the present time, but I have.
faith enough in our people to believe they will solve it. know that
it will note done overnight, but I believe it will be done.
? ? I. am glad you have set up a program in research and development
to try to find the answer. I hope it will be pushed..
?
' 'AIRCRAFT ,MODERNIZATION
' Now the Modernization O yonr m ers o 'replace the present
Ones
"ix; '10 th1r. ? t
'Ones diSturbs me. I have heard' Some intimation that the life of the
B-47, is not Much longer and that the 13-52's will PaSs oitt. ?Are we
to have replacements.for theM.? ' , . ?. . ,
Secretary GATg...Tlie'.W5Ws that -vs;e are bil?ying in this budget are-
great& inipiOved, airplanes. .It is tiill the, 1.1752, but it is a better
airplane; the 137-52H. ? ri? ' ? ?? ? , ? ?
Aff.' Dos?it baVe -steed ith`aii' the Pre,si3nt model i'2)
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- Secretary. GATES: i,I do not think so.., More range. .? , ) ? ,
!.Mr. RILEY: But not more speed?.,,.:!, , fir
General TWINING;; Maybe a little more. t, ,?d ? , .11 d
YORK. . 'Primarily:it is , a 11:latter' of more: ran ge;'_be.t:tr ia..ccelera-
tion at takeoff and 'better low, altitude capability.. ? ;, .? ? .,
:General' TIVI-NINCL . The ,main thing is ,.the, new weapons.. It 17ill
have the HOUND,DOGS.- ? ri , ;,r I i ???
Mr. RILEY. Sometime last Mouth or ,so .1 heard, a, . program ,of, the
Douglas people, father and son, on the development of commercial
planes. I believe they have a commercial pa,ssenger plane now which
has a speed of about mach 1.
-1? Secretary .GArEs.. I think it is the DC-8-7theinversion of; the Boe-
ing jet 707, just im der mach 1,Ithink. , ? ' f ' ;;?
; Mr. RiLEY: Pretty close to the speed of sound. ' i ? .
^Secretary GA rEs . Yes. , rr ' ?. :1
RILEY. The 'subject; they, -Were discussing was, that, ,,their
opinion, within the next 8 or 10 years at least, and, maybe,sooner, they
wohld have passengei.lilanes of mach 3 and 4. .If that,is the case, and
we dO not keel) up With thenn in' our military equipment, we may get
behind the times. I am one who does not think the missiles are going
to cure everythingin my ,lifetime. 4.think that it is going to take a
little more than that.
?, Secretary GATES. We c'lo not .know,of any information that would
indicate they are working on such Taj plane.. _The, airplane, we think
that they are working- on; if .they a.reovorking iveryi hard oh..any2 is
somewhat comparable.to our B-58.,, It would be.a general observation
on my part, but I would think, the cost of developing ,a mach 3 coin,
inercial transport would be so great!that .it, would !probably have to be
done ,in conjunction with some program' like ;the. B770., I doubt. if
other than a military program could support the kind. of effort that
would belnecessary, to .develop 'that, type Aif. ,airplane:' , . s;
itAlTe thought .about this in _connection, with the. B40, but we felt it
was not our real 'responsibility to worry about commercial aviation
directly. The B-70 is .the only , program that would. tend to, have a
Possible falloutinthe.form of a mach 3 commercial_ airplane. . ;
Mr. RILEY. That,is not my ,concern, Mr., Secretary. , it occurs to me
if the commercial pet)]* have in mindjthe development of such asplane
then the military people certainly ought have -one .just.as fast and
just as modern. I believe the faster they go the harder they would
be to handle from a defensive standpoint.? ,
Secretary GATES. I do not think that it makes a very great deal of
difference:. ,` - ? , ? ' H'! IF rf fl *f?? ? '!
Mr. RILEY. If Douglas is contemplating a plane of the, speed of
mach '3 or 4, ',certainly' think ithat our, Air -Force ought to. have mili-
tary planes comptirable to ? f i? ,, ? '1 I.?
Secretait ,Giirits: They Tare contemplating it on our money:, ,y1
Mr. Rthiy,. They 'seeni ,to get it when they' want tit: They .-have
developed one a ,'whole lot faster ;than. I'am ;going_ to .ride in already:
But if such a thing is in the mill, I feel very keenly,that_our defense
force ought to haVe the" advantage of it, t ;Wei shoul not.. depen d. upon
these plaiieS.ofthe horse-and-buggy days in-comparison.withthe more
modern developments. hr,Ir
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Secretary GATES. It would be foolish to estimate a figure because
it would be wrong, but I will estimate one anyway, and I will say for
$8 billion and in about 6, 7, or 8 years you might have such an airplane.
Mr. RILEY. They said from 8 to 10 years, if I remember correctly,
but somebody has to be working on it in the meantime.
Secretary GATES. Well, the research that we are doing in the B-70
program will at least build two prototype planes that will show some
indication of direction in this respect.
SPACE PROGRAM
Mr. RILEY. In the discussion yesterday regarding outer space satel-
lites I was glad to hear you make some difference between the two
programs because I think they are decidedly different. I believe that
Dr. York told us of several ways that satellites in orbit could be used
advantageously. To a layman such as I, the best result that we could
get from them would be aerial photography. Some day I think we
are going to have some flying around the world so that we see what
the country they are flying over looks like. I do not think it is too
far away.
Secretary GATES. A reconnaissance satellite is one of the defense
requirements that we are working on.
Mr. RILEY. What other advantage would the satellites, or outer
space vehicles have in your opinion?
Secretary vehicles,
Precise navigation, better communications, per-
haps many so fantastic we do not know what they all are yet, and pos-
sibly missile warning. They are the four that we are working on. Dr.
York has them under his charge because they are all in research and
development, but in effect they have been assigned to the services to
complete the work.
Mr. RILEY. Those qualities would be of far more advantage to us
than shooting the moon or something like that, as glamorous as that
may seem.
Secretary GATES. From a present military point of view that is cor-
rect. On the other hand, we do not want to be second best in anything.
Mr. RILEY. Of course not, but we want to be practical and get some
practical results from our endeavors.
Secretary GATES. That is right.
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE
Mr. RILEY. Do you feel that we have a well-rounded, balanced de-
fense team ?
Secretary GATES. I do so very much, Mr. Riley, having spent several
months really going over these programs, program by program, with
Mr. McElroy, the service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
various other people in the Department of Defense, and reviewing
them up and down. I think that it has been a conscientious and most
thoughtful review.
Mr. RILEY. Do you think that we are getting the equipment and
materials they need to carry out their assignments as rapidly as they
should have it?
Secretary GATES. Yes, I do. As I said in my statement, it does not
include everything that everybody wants.
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Mr. RILEY. No, you will never get that. But the improvement of
the equipment and materials for the services is such as will take care
Of their needs?
Secretary GATES. Yes, I do.
Mr. RILEY. On the long-range projection'?
Secretary GATES. Yes. I have said several times in my testimony
that the transition is so great and so rapid that the budget must be
reviewed continuously, almost on a month-to-month basis.
Mr. RILEY. Thank you very much.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Flood.
Mr. noon. Mr. Andrews has asked for information on BOMARC.
I saw somebody go out. He came back.
Dr. YORK. We are waiting for the information.
Mr. noon. One thing I think that you would like to understand,
and I do not speak for the committee but I certainly speak for my-
self, and I heard most of our members say so as well, with reference
to your reaction to Khrushchev's alleged statement today on unilateral
disarmament?and you do not have to say again what you said this
morning?but I think that you do have a right to feel that most of
us, I believe all of us, were pleased to hear your reaction in that you
must not feel, as far as this very important segment of Congress is
concerned, that we think any different. We think exactly like you,
if that makes you feel any better.
Secretary GATES. It does.
Mr. noon. Certainly, if we did not feel like that you would be un-
happy about it. Since we do feel the way you do, and like the way
you react to Khrushchev's statement, you have a right to know that, I
think.
Secretary GATES. I appreciate that.
ME. FLOOD. I think SO.
Now, I am not going to go into great detail with you, Mr. Secre-
tary, about all this business. I have a library of questions to ask for
the next several months when the uniformed fellows come up, and
all of these other people.
You have only been in this top slot for a short time. Even though
you have been in town a long time, in the rarified atmosphere in which
you now sit, I think even now you realize it is a lot different than
running some other shop across the street.
Secretary GATES. I certainly do.
Mr. FLOOD. Even with your experience. Imagine these poor
jokers who come in here from the airport and sit down. We have
been through a lot of that. They come and go like Greyhound buses.
You know the old story. You see them come to town and a year later
you see their picture at the airport. That has been going on for
years.
Now, here is the thing that I am worried about. As Mr. Mahon
mentioned to you, I have never heard such a happy crowd as you fel-
lows are on our defense posture. Everything is lust, just, too, too
ducky. Well, if you are all hopped up about it, that is good, too. But
do not get carried away with this enthusiasm under all the circum-
stances. Actually, I do not think you are, but out of an abundance
of caution do not go running around being so happy all over the coun-
try about this thing all of a sudden.
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? ' IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC AWARENESS OF REALITY OF POWER
You know you a're missing one point in this business. A nation's
ability to affect the course of events in the world, a great nation like
ours, is dependent upon two things, not just one. You are very bright
and gay about the one. I am concerned about the other one. There
must be a reality of power in a great nation. You say we have that and
General Twining is very happy about it. That is a reality of power.
But the second thing you have not talked about, and you do not talk
about it. I do not think you are aware of it, and that is there must
be, with the reality of power, a public image?general public image
in the minds of others as to the reality of that power. Never forget
that. That is the big thing:
Now it is my personal opinion that in the United States of America,
and throughout the world, there is no public image in the mind of
others about that reality of power. That is the catch in this business.
It is a close analogy to this concept of deterrence that we discussed
yesterday. No matter how good you think you are, it is of no value
as a deterrent unless the other guy does the thinking on deterrence.
He must think that even though he is wrong.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. FLOOD. I think the reason why there is no longer a public
image of supremacy in these matters is because of an attitude here
in Washington. There has been a preaching of "balanced forces."
You say, "Do not get excited." We do not want the people to get
excited. Do not worry about this Russian thing; we have balanced
forces, and catching up to the Russian missile for missile is not that
important." Well, that may or may not all be true. Secondly, you
drew yesterday as clearly as I ever heard it drawn a demarcating line
between the scientific concept of space and the military concept of
space. . You made that very clear. But then I was sitting over there
.in that corner and you were completely satisfied that, because you
understood it clearly, had stated it brilliantly, that you were pre-
senting the public image, which you are not presenting. The public
has no concept of that whatsoever in this country, in the Belgian Con-
go, or the mountains of Laos?none, none, none. That is serious.
Secretary GATES. I agree with you. I am concerned about it also.
Mr. FLOOD. This goes back to sputnik. When that sputnik flew
around the globe and the desert tribes and the mountain tribes and
the coastal tribes?black, white, red, and yellow?all over the world
heard about it, all they knew was this was a public image, a public
manifestation of the ascendency and the primacy of Russian military
.might, not science, not Salk vaccine. They thought, there goes the
new day of Russia's primacy over America. And that has not been
changed up until noon today, in the jungles; in the mountains, and
on the seacoasts of the world. They still think that. So I am un-
happy, not with the record as you present it about the reality of power,
but a great nation must have the other thing or it is not going to do
any good. The mere reality of power in your inventories and arsenals
will not do. There must be a public image in the minds of the peoples
of the world of that reality of power, and there is no such image.
Therefore, we are short one of the two legs that we must have. Placat-
ing our people by this "balance of power" assurance and that we are
not going to do this and that will not do. I do not know the answer.
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I do not know how to do this. I am positive that the administration
is unaware of this essential condition precedent, the second leg, the
public image of the reality of power.
Secretary GATES. In the first place, I would not want to let stand
the impression that we are happy and complacent.
Mr. FLOOD. I overstated that, of course.
Secretary GATES. I have tried to say here throughout the 2 days that
we should have continuous reviews; that we cannot simply rely on
intelligence estimates that are subject to change. We must be able,
when we get breakthroughs in good reliable weapon systems, to move
into them quickly, perhaps faster than we planned. We are satisfied
that we have a balanced power in the first one of your two legs. We
are trying to tell that to you. We are trying to tell it to the country.
I agree the country may be confused between these images that you
speak of. I agree that a moon shot has a psychological impact on the
minds of the people. I think that we have to very clearly separate
this somehow from the military realities. I think there is no question
about the fact that they are separable, but on the other hand I also
think that the United States started behind the Russians in big
boosters. We abandoned the big booster program because we found a
way to package a smaller warhead. We have made remarkable
progress on those programs. We are just behind in big boosters.
Mr. FLOOD. I know. This is the old story of the mailman and the
dog, which is pretty moth-eaten: "I know and you know, but does the
dog know?" Your trouble is the public does not know this. You
are the Secretary of Defense, and in your fantastic lap must sit this
business of establishing the two factors of our control of world events,
and our own national security, the reality of power, and the fact that
there must be a public image of the existence of that reality, and if
you do not do both you have not accomplished your purpose. Merely
doing the first will not be enough; it will not do. You cannot win
that way.
You see, the public goes back 15 years. Russia was devastated;
there were 20 million casualties, her physical plant was destroyed;
there was chaos and disaster. We had the greatest Air Force in
the world, the greatest Army in the world, we had submarines running
out of our ears. Their army was shot to pieces. They had no air
force worthy of the name compared to ours; they had a few coastal
submarines but nothing compared to ours. We had the A bomb;
we had the greatest production plant in the world. They had nothing,
nothing, nothing. Fifteen years ago the public knew all about that.
Now, when you go around saying, "Well, we are only a little bit be-
hind them," that is like being a little bit pregnant. They know that.
What is the matter? I am trying to help you. Understand, this is
not criticism. It may be a critique, but I want to say out loud that
I am not sure what the boys and the girls in the Pentagon say to
anybody as important as you out loud. I am trying to help you.
'Secretary GATES. 'I understand..
Mr. FLOOD. All right.
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PROMOTION OF OFFICERS
Mr. FLOOD. One of the first orders you issued when you put on this
new hat had to do with staff officers, and command officers as a basis
for promotion to flag and star rank.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. FLOOD. That could be a problem.
MP. GATES. Yes, sir.
Mr. noon. You know what happened to the German staff. They
just got too good. When the staff got too smart, they were dumb.
It lacked command. It was all staff, too longhair. The British ran
into that for 50 years and after World War I they cut it out. That is
where the "brass hat" started, in World War I. It got out of control.
It was the British who gave birth to this, I think it was Churchill who
said, "Never were so few staffed by so many as the British Army in
that war." You are aware of "Parkinson's law" in the armies of the
world that "the less you have to do the more people you need to do it."
It is a basic law, "Parkinson's law."
Secretary GATES. Where?
Mr. FLOOD. Any army. You have staffs you have to create to take
care of the staffs. But that is an organization problem. I am talk-
ing about your order on promotion. You say they must have inter-
national or national staff work. I am sure you know of this. You
indicate from your expression that you do. We are not going to
create this clever breed of staff officer now. This thing is going to get
out of control. If you were going to be here a hundred years, I
would feel better, but this business of official emphasis upon the
paper shuifier, official emphasis upon the staff people?they will breed
on that now, and I am just saying this out loud again. For heaven's
sake, if you have forgotten it since you issued the order, think about it
every once in a while. Do not create these staff people. There is
nothing wrong with them as a breed, but look out.
Secretary GATES. The purpose of the order is to assure that as part
of the career planning for an officer he will have some service or a
tour on a staff where the other services are involved. This is needed
so that we will be able to carry out more effectively the Reorganization
Plan of 1958, which set up the unified command line of operating con-
trol under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
We are aware of the fact that this order is not popular with every-
body. A great deal is going to depend upon how it is administered
because there are many good officers who are coming up this year,
next year, and the year after who will not have time to take this kind
of a tour. It is not intended to increase the paper shufflers or build
staffs. It is proposed to expose the Navy to the Army and the Air
Force, and vice versa, in the unified command arrangement.
Mr. FLOOD. And at international levels.
Secretary GATES. And at international levels. This is being done
anyway. We want to do it a little bit faster and make it a recogniz-
able accomplishment. We made a provision in the order for excep-
tions and for wise administration to take care of possible inequities.
Mr. noon. I read it. It is good. I am saying this out loud again.
Secretary GATES. The purpose is not what you attribute to it. It
may be that someone will be foolish enough to permit superstaffs to
develop at the expense of combat officers.
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Mr. FLOOD: That is what I am afraid of.
Secretary GATES. I do not think this order in itself will do it.
Mr. FLOOD. No order does anything in itself, of course. We are
talking the same language. I want to say this out loud. Did you read
this famous crack from the Infantry magazine on what is a staff officer?
Did you ever hear that one? It is classical. I am quoting:
The typical staff officer is a man past middle life; spare, wrinkled, intelligent,
cold, passive, noncommittal, with eyes like a codfish, polite in contact but at
same time unresponsive, cool, calm, and as damnably composed as a concrete
post or a plaster of paris cast; a human petrification with a heart of feldspar
and without charm of the friendly germ, minus bowels, passions, or a sense of
humor. Happily, they never reproduce themselves and all of them finally go to
hell anyhow.
Mr. SHEPpARD. Who is the author?
Mr. FLOOD. It came from the Infantry Journal. I found it in
Hanson Baldwin's column of December 29, 1959. That is overstating
it a little, of course.
DEFENSE IN ALASKA
You know, I spent over 2 months in the Far East and gave it a
going over. I am worried about Alaska. You have been talking about
the Far East and all over Europe and everything else. I was up
there with Gen. Mike Michaelis.
We went into quite a lot of briefings on the Russian posture vis-a-vis
Alaska. The Kamchatka Peninsula is loaded to the gunwales with
everything, IRBM's over there zeroed on Alaska. We are squeezed
into Anchorage and Fairbanks on the littoral shelf. One IRBM can
cause a lot of trouble in Alaska. Why would we not put our IRBM's
in Alaska if you are going to stay there at all? There is serious doubt
whether you could defend Alaska at all, but let us say you can. Why
would you not put a couple of IRBM's there?
I saw these wonderful NIKE-HERCULES installations. They are
terrific, real Buck Rogers stuff, the whole business; but that is NIKE-
HERCULES against aircraft. As to the Russian, I know what he
has got on that peninsula. He knows what I have. He will knock
my brains out. We are not in the same league.
Secretary GATES. Mr. Flood, Alaska is defended by Omaha.
Mr. FLOOD. I know that.
Secretary GATES. It is defended by all the military power of the
United States.
Mr. FLOOD. I know.
Secretary GATES. It is the same as any other American territory.
The Unified Commander in Alaska just met with us in Norfolk.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. FLOOD. You know, you would not dare strike a match on the
whole Kamchatka Peninsula from one end to the other.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. FLOOD. I do not know what you mean by big. Kamchatka is
farther away than the one to the north.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. FLOOD. My opinion would be, without having a photograph in
my hand, knowing his potential in being with IRBM's and mobile
for 2 years in the field with troops, 2 years?you know, as an old
artillery man what it means to have a piece of hardware with troops
for 2 years.
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(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. FLOOD. I do not Care whether it does or not. This is what I
am saying. I have my own intelligence and I have found yours Wrong
so often that I am not that much impressed, although you are right
more often than I am.
You see, there is a clear distinction. This is one on IRBM's,
mobility up to a thousand miles in Western Europe and Kamchatka
that I made, and I was right in Europe, so I was right in Europe
and if I were the Russians, I would have a couple up there. I would
have a couple up there without any question. I would have it there
just out of an abundance of caution. He has got loads of them. So
I think he has got them up there. All right. I think you ought to
have a couple. I think Mike ought to have a couple at Anchorage, no
question about it.
USE OF KOREAN NATIONALS IN 'UNITED STATES FORCES
I am a member of the Holy Name Society, as you know, at St. John's?
Church, so I cannot tell you about what I think of your policy with the
1st Cavalry and the 7th Infantry in Korea or I would have to,
leave that society. Here are these two great combat divisions of the
U.S. Army, no greater in the world?the 1st Cavalry and the
7th Infantry. You cannot beat them?brave and proud and great.
In our table of organization at NATO, our table of organization
with our friends in the Pacific, and the report to the Congress of the.
United States we say we have two divisions in Korea. That is a
sham and a fraud. We do not have two divisions in Korea. You
have two Headquarters Commands there.
So I went there, talked to the troops, talked to the officers from.
the top down. I went up with the 34th Infantry in reserve the
first was in the line. I had generals, 40 of them-8th Army,
corps, division, brigade, they were all with me?we walked out in
the field. I said, "Now, General, will you have Able Company- of
the 34th come out in that field?" He called them out. I walked
around the company and I picked the second platoon on the right
flank. I walked down. There was a big kid there. I said, "Where,
are you from, Mack?" He said, "Oklahoma." He was a lieutenant..
"How long have you been here?" He said he had been there 6 months.
I said, "General, will you get all this company off this field except
that platoon." I picked it out of the air, out of Able Company, 34th
Infantry, 7th Division.
They chased them all off except this one platoon. I said, "LieuL
tenant, will you tell all the Americans in your platoon to kneel down
on the ground." The kid thought I was nuts, but he told all the
Americans to kneel on the ground.
Then I saw the second platoon, A Company, 34th Infantry, Seventh?
Division U.S. Army, was 40 percent oriental mercenaries. The?
mortar team were all Korean. The second sergeant was a Korean.
These are good soldiers, understand that, nothing the matter with the
quality of these troops, not a thing, just as good as ours. Nobody
raises .that question. But I am talking about theU.S. Army. That
never happened in the history of this Nation before. I personally do
not want it to happen now and never, never, never happen again. If
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you want a Foreign Legion, I will introduce a bill for it. It is a
great idea.. But not my divisions.
Mr. Secretary, I say to you, you know as much about this as I do,
if you do not put American troops in those divisions, I want you to
pull them out of there, both of them. That is the way I feel about
it. No reflection upon our allies. They are (rood. They have 20-
some divisions, two (rood Marine divisions. saw the Sixth ROK
Division on our left flank in the line, beautiful looking troops, no prob-
lem, no question about it.
However, President Rhee, this great old man, is 85 years old. I had
a talk with him. He is like this [shaking]. I had dinner with him
the next night. He was worse. There is no successor, nobody coming
up. I do not know what will happen in Korea if he dies. Neither do
you. Nobody does. . I do not know what these Korean troops will do.
in my two divisions, nobody else knows. But that, to me, is secondary.
The important thing is?I think?it is an indelible blot upon the
escutcheon of the Army of the United States and upon the Depart-
ment of Defense. If I were in your chair, the first order I would
have issued after I was sworn in was: Get those Koreans out of those
two divisions tonight or get the divisions out of there.
Do you have any opinion about it? If you have not thought about
it, you do not have to say a word.
Secretary GATES. I have not thought about it as much as I will
now. I talked about it briefly with the Unified Commander at Nor-
folk the first week in January. He believes this arrangement is very
helpful for training Koreans. He also believes, which is not the
principle you are talking about
Mr. FLOOD. I know that story.
Secretary GATES. He also believes he has made great progress with
the Koreans. The Korean army now picks up merchandise around
various stores and returns it so it cannot be resold. A lot of this he
attributes to the close relationship that exists between the Koreans
and ourselves. This is the U.S. Army talking.
Mr. FLOOD. That is all true but completely unimportant; all true
but unimportant. If I had that division there, I would come to you
and say, 'Look, Mr. Secretary, I have to have a couple hundred
Koreans. I need them in this foreign country. I need them in maneu-
ver areas; I need them for scouts, for points. I have to have a couple
hundred Koreans in my division." I am for that. If he wants 500,
(rive him 500. I am completely for that. But I do not want them
shoulder to shoulder in files in my rifle platoons in the ; not in my
divisions; no never.
Secretary no,
I think this is something that I want to look into
further. I think it is something you should discuss with General
Lemnitzer when he appears here. -General Lemnitzer himself has been
in command there and he is now Chief of Staff of the Army, and he
obviously does not oppose this program or it would not be going on.
Mr. FLoon. You understand that does not impress me a bit.
Secretary GATES. I understand.
Mr. FL000. I am just stating my position. I have never been so up-
set emotionally about any one single thing since I have been on this
committee as this outrageous situation.
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Secretary GATES. I am rather surprised that you are so upset about
it and the Army is not. That does not make very good sense to me.
If this violates a principle or Army tradition, they should be upset
about it also.
Mr. FLOOD. That is part of my program. I did my best to upset
the bowels of the State Department yesterday about Panama. All
they want to do is let Panama fly the Panamanian flag on the Canal
Zone. They say, "What is the matter with you, Flood? Let them
fly it; it does not mean anything." Oh, yes, it does.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. MAHON. MT. Taber.
Mr. TABER. NO questions.
Mr. FORD. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. MAHON. In view of the fact that Mr. Laird will be in attend-
ance at another important meeting involving the Defense program in
the morning, we will recognize him at this time to interrogate the
witnesses.
Mr. LAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE
Mr. Secretary, your statement to the committee is the best and
most comprehensive statement we have ever had since I have been a
member, from a Secretary of Defense at the start of hearings on a
Defense appropriation bill. I intend to use it as my guide during the
hearings this year. The intelligence briefing General Twining has
given us has certainly been of great help and very reassuring to me
as we enter these hearings. I have several questions which I would
like to first ask about the statement.
On page 8 of the statement you have one sentence which was of
real interest to me. It is in the first paragraph and I quote:
It can be dangerous to our national security and our position in the world
to allow a false impression to gain ground that the United States is second
to the Soviet Union.
Mr. Secretary, do you think that in view of some of the statements
that have been made publicly by certain individuals, a few Members
of Congress, that we might mislead the Soviet Union into a position
where they might miscalculate our deterrent capabilities?
Secretary GATES. I think it is unfortunate that these statements are
made that give the impression that we are helpless, or open or naked
to a suprise attack, or imply that such is true. I have a good deal of
respect for the Soviet Union's intelligence because they have most of it
given to them for free. I do not think they are going to be misled
by these statements. I think they know what our strength is. I do
not think such statements would lead to that result. But I do think
it is harmful to us in international negotiations, to our foreign policy
discussions, to our position in the eyes of the world, to allow indi-
vidual "horror cases" and false impressions to be circulated.
I do not think it would result in as serious a situation as you think.
I think the Russians are just too smart for that, but I think it is
very dangerous from the standpoint--
Mr. LAIRD. Just how dangerous is it to national security?
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Secretary GATES. I think it is very dangerous from the standpoint
of our international relations and from the standpoint of building
up the collective strength of NATO and similar organizations. We are
engaged in an ideological struggle. Our allies, and even the neutrals
need to have confidence in us and our capabilities. I really do not
think, Mr. Laird, that our own people believe we are as weak as some
people are advertising we are. I do not think they are as concerned
as some people are saying. While we could get very complacent, I do
not think we should get complacent. This country could possibly
move again toward isolationism or a little toward that point of view,
and I think that would be dangerous.
It is very dangerous from the point of view of the "image" Which
Mr. Flood was talking about.
Mr. LAIRD. General Twining, what is your opinion on the matter
of this false impression that might be created?
General TWINING. I agree with what the Secretary said and the
point Mr. Flood brings out. How do we accomplish the second part?
We do not do it by advertising our weaknesses when we do not have
them. Apparently, Khrushchev feels from his intelligence sources
that this rocket rattling may be scaring our people and I am worried
about it.
Sometimes I read these articles myself and I think: What does the
layman think when he reads this stuff from some experts in the United
States who are supposed to have a great background in a certain area
and who are writing these things? ''We will never build up this second
leg Mr. Flood is talking about until we stop this thing. If we have
a weakness, let us get on it and straighten it out.
PREPARING OUR DETERRENT CAPABILITY
Mr. LAI:RI?. Mr. Secretary, as I have listened to the testimony the
last 2 days, I have a feeling that we are approaching the period in
1965 where we could very possibly have overprogramed our deterrent
capability as far as matching the Russians. There is a question in my
mind as to how much retaliatory tracking force you need to deter a
big war. Do you give that thought in your military planning?
Secretary GATES,. A great deal. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Secretary GATES. We have not yet established the force levels for
the MINUTEMAN. W have not yet established the force levels for
the POLARIS. So, we are in the position where we could over-
program if we were unwise, but, at the moment, we probably would
hope to program faster in those two weapons if we were sure of them
technically. I think from the standpoint of what is required we will
just have to review that on an annual basis, watching to see what the
Russians really do.
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DEVELOPMENT OF RETALIATORY CAPABILITY
Mr. LAIRD. On page 17 of your statement you refer to the great
consciousness which you have to the need to develop an "active de-
fense" against ballistic missile attack. It would, seem to me the best
defense against a ballistic missile attack would be sufficient retalia-
tory power on the part of the United States.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. LAIRD To develop an "active defense" against a ballistic missile
attack would certainly cost many billions of dollars, would it not?
Secretary GATES. That is correct also.
Mr. LAIRD. Do you not see that for the foreseeable future that our
retaliatory capability which we have is, in fact, a very positive defense
against a missile attack?
Secretary GATES. Certainly.
Mr. LAIRD. But you do feel that it is also necessary to go forward
in research and development to develop an active defense?
Secretary GAITS. Yes.
Mr. LAIRD. In addition to the retaliatory capabilities?
Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it will be a good many years before
one is developed. I think, also, that, during the intervening period,
our retaliatory capabilities will be the only real missile defense.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Secretary, this is the first year that we have had a
Secretary of Defense come before us who has devoted as much time
on ASW work in his opening statement as you have. I commend you
because I feel this is a much greater danger and a much more current
problem than developing an "active defense" against missiles or
manned aircraft. I believe the ASW program is with us now and
will be with us much longer than an active air defense system.
In your statement on page 24 you state that the $45 million add-on
which this committee made available for research and development in
ASW work was made available for use by the Navy. We have had
considerable difficulty over this particular point with the Navy. We
had an informal hearing a few days before Christmas and the Navy
at that time stated the money had, not been released for their use.
The Defense Department's opinion was they had released these funds
to the Navy, but they had used them in different research and develop-
ment areas and had not used this funding for research and develop-
ment in ASW work.
I felt this was a high priority item. This committee put it in the
budget. I was somewhat disturbed over the fact that the Navy as-
sumed that they should use the money that had been released by the
Department of Defense on the basis of the original submission to this
committee rather than give consideration to the add-on which we
had made.
My question is: The $45 million as of a few weeks ago was not avail-
able to the Navy because they had gone ahead and spent it on other
projects. What kind of control do you have as Secretary of Defense,
or your Department, over the use of these funds by the Navy?
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Secretary GATES. I would like to ask Dr. York how far his review
goes on research funds. His office reviews all research programs and
releases emergency fund money for research programs, but I do not
know whether that review occurs more often than annually.
Dr. YORK. It does, and this is a problem with uS too, as Mr. Laird
probably knows. The way it stands right now dig, additional $45
million has within the last few days been made available to the
Navy. We are in the process of working out with the Navy, con-
sidering their expenditure problems as well as their obligational prob-
lems, the question of bow to make use of this and all the rest of their
.budget. We hope to have this. This $45 million is about 20 percent
of the total amount of money they would have for ASW R. & D., in-
cluding the $45 million. By the end of the third quarter we hope to be
firm on how this money will be spent out for ASW.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Secretary, my point is this. This committee has
authority to make cuts. You follow your cuts. When we make
add-ons to the budget in given areas, I do not believe those add-ons
necessarily should be placed by the individual service in the lowest
priority of their particular budget.
Secretary GATES. I do not, either.
Mr. LAIRD. It 'seems to me this was the way it was 'handled by
the Navy, and it was not the understanding, I do not think, of this
committee that this particular research and development program
would be placed at the bottom of their list as far as the use of their
funds was concerned.
Secretary GATES. I think if it was going to be placed at the
bottom of their list, it ought to be explained to the committee at least
and justified on that basis. I agree with you from the standpoint
of Our joint responsibility.
PARTICIPATION OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN PROGRAM DISCUSSIONS
Mr. LAIRD. Last year in the hearings on the 1960 budget it was
brought out in questioning which I conducted that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff had never passed upon the aircraft carrier, the size of the
Army, the additional B-52 procurement, and additional large items.
From the testimony you have given us here today, this situation has
been remedied in this budget that is before us this year.
Secretary GATES. It has been remedied in that at the same time
the data on programs, both as to money and timing and technical
capabilities, were presented to the Secretary of Defense they were also
presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the same papers virtually on
the same days. So the Joint Chiefs of Staff had complete informa-
tion on all service programs, as did the service Secretaries. They all
participated in discussions with the Secretary of Defense on all of the
big money programs, all of the important programs. They also had
the opportunity to discuss them with the President.
MOBILITY IN THE MISSILE PROGRAM
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a question or
two with regard to the missile program, which is an important part
of our deterrent force along With the manned aircraft. It seems to
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me that the Russians have given a much greater emphasis to mobility
in their missile program than we are giving to mobility, with the
exception of our POLARIS program. We have a big request, which
will be considered tomorrow, on certain hardening of other missile
bases in the United States. It seems to me we are making a target
area out of the United States with some of our big missiles. .
Is there not any more that can be done to try to get these targets
out of the continental limits of the United States?
Secretary GATES. There are people that share your point of view.
I think I share it somewhat. On the other hand, there is another
strong point of view that says that the United States is a target any-
how, that New York City is a target, Washington is a target. This
point of view also says that you cannot remove the threat from the
ignited States by moving our retaliatory force out of the country. The
lad that we have missiles based here does not add much to the attrac-
tiveness of the United States as a target.
There is no way I know of except accelerating the POLA.RIS pro-
gram, which I think we should do when we have it as a more proven
-weapon system. It would be very expensive and very difficult to main-
tain an ICBM system on a little island somewhere. I do not think
that would be necessarily wise either, because that would be a very easy
target in itself. We do not know what the Russians are doing with
their ICBM's because we have never seen a site. It is extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to make anything like the ATLAS or TITAN
mobile. These are enormous liquid-fuel-missiles. The next best thing
to making them mobile is to make them hard.
We .are in favor of the mobility concept and in favor of moving as
rapidly as we can toward a relatively invulnerable deterrent, in the
belief that is the most effective deterrent. That is one reason why, as
soon as we can, we ought to move ahead with more of the MINUTE-
MAN, rail mobile or hardened, and widely scattered. We should also
move ahead with the POLARIS program and not overdo the ATLAS
and TITAN programs. On the other hand, the ATLAS and the
TITAN programs make a contribution at a most important time and
we will long keep them in our inventory.
Mr: LAIRD. They also present a targeting problem that we will long
keep in our inventory, too; is that right?
Secretary GATES. What was the first part, targeting?
Mr. LAIRD. Yes; as far as the Russians are concerned.
Secretary GATES. Yes; certainly. I do not think there is any ques-
tion that they know where our sites are. We put out maps of them in
the newspapers.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Will the gentleman yield for one question ?'
Mr. LAnm. Yes.
Mr.. SHEPPARD. There was a small comment in the paper, I think
yesterday's paper, Mr. Secretary, to the effect that the POLARIS had
fired successfully over a 900-mile range. Do you know whether that
is true or not?
Dr. YORK. That is true. That is the second time.
Secretary GATES. That is true; yes, sir.
Dr. ?YonK. It was fired from land.
General TwiisTimi. Land base.
Dr. Y,ORK. There have been launchings of dummies from .subma-
rines, but the combination has never been done yet.
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Mr. SimerAnn. That was done at Cape Canaveral?
Dr. YORK. Yes.
Mr. SnEprARD. Thank you, Mr. Laird.
PROGRESS IN THE ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE PROGRAM
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Secretary, in the discussions with people who have
had a basic responsibility for ASW work, some of them seem to be
looking for a major breakthrough. My question is: Is the Defense
Department holding back on the ASW program in any way waiting
for such a major breakthrough ?
Secretary GATES. No, sir; there are a variety of scientific and theo-
retical ideas that you are probably familiar with that might lead to
putting alarm systems over wide ocean areas and ocean-bottom areas.
But we are not, to my knowledge, holding back in any way, shape, or
form, and we believe that, as of now, the antisubmarine business can
only be handled by the whole variety of everything we have.
Mr. LAIRD. I think that is quite important that we do go forward
and utilize what we have because if we do not, we might be in bad
shape.
Secretary GATES. I think it might be helpful if General Twining
said something about the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on anti-
submarine warfare if it is appropriate.
Mr. LAIRD. It certainly would be.
General TWINING. Two or three years ago the Chiefs of Staff ex-
pressed great concern about ASW. We had the Navy give us several
briefings. They brought us up to date on what they were doing and
what the problem was. I can assure you that I personally an the
other Chiefs agree that we think this is not only Navy's very important
problem but probably their No. 1. I think Admiral Burke will go
along with that. We are quite concerned about the ASW program
and realize how difficult it is. It is complicated and will take a rot of
money but we must do it and the Chiefs are really behind it and very
much interested in it.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.
Mr. 1VIAnoN. Mr. Ford?
Mr. FORD. Mr. Secretary, as has been said before, this prepared
statement by you for this committee's consideration is, I think, one of
the very best.
I know that you have spent a great deal of time in its preparation
?and it is my understanding that you, to a substantial degree, wrote it
yourself. I assume that you weighed every word because there are
some very significant conclusions, sentences, and phrases in it; is that
correct?
SECRETARY GATES. I would not want to claim a "feather" for writing
it myself, because many people worked very hard to prepare various
drafts of it, including people in the services and people in the Defense
Comptroller's Office. Mr. Douglas and I spent a great deal of time
personally changing words and revising sentences and ideas. We
ended up with a great deal of our own language. It is a combination
effort.
I would not want to claim complete credit for it. We did spend
many hours on many drafts.
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Mr. Fano. I presume in the preparation of it you did have the
benefit of your military advisors from General Twining on down?
Secretary GATES. Yes. They commented on the draft.
Mr. FORD. The import of the crucial statements that are made about
military strength did have the approval of your military advisers?
Secretary GATES. Yes. I received the comments and recommenda-
tions of all my advisers, but not necessarily their approval of my entire
statement.
RELATIVE MILITARY POWER OF UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
Mr. FORD. On page 3 of the statement, the second full paragraph,
you make this statement:
* * * but the impression in some quarters that the Soviet Union has overtaken
or even outdistanced the United States in military power is simply not supported
by the facts * * *
That is a very strong statement, a very reassuring one.
You personally believe that?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. FORD. Would you subscribe to that statement, General Twining?
General TWINING. Yes.
WAR SERVICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. FORD. I think it might be well at this point, Mr. Secretary, to
have you put in the record your own military background which goes
back a number of years, a resume of it. In addition, you might put
in the record your service here in the Pentagon in the last several
years.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
(The material referred to follows*
WAR SERVICE OF THOMAS SOVEREIGN GATES, JR., SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Served on active duty at the Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, R.I., from
April 15, 1942, to August 12, 1942. During this period he was under instruction
at the Naval Air Combat Intelligegnce Officers School. He was graduated from
class 2-42, and was assigned as officer-in-charge of the Atlantic Fleet Air Intel-
ligence Center, assuming his duties in September 1942. During this period he
supervised the activities of the Fleet Air Intelligence Center which furnished
intelligence for air operations of the Atlantic Fleet.
Upon completion of this duty in March 1943, Lieutenant Gates was trans-
ferred from Norfolk, Va., to Camden, N.J., in connection with the fitting out of
the U.S.S. Monterey, of which he was to become the air combat information
officer.
Lieutenant Gates served aboard the Monterey during her shakedown training
In the Atlantic in 1943, and later in the Central and South Pacific when the
Monterey was active in Pacific task forces. He was qualified as officer of the
deck, summary court martial officer, and air plot watch officer. The Monterey
saw action in the Gilbert Islands, New Ireland, the Marshalls, Truk, Tinian,
Saipan, and the Palau Islands.
On May 13, 1944, he was assigned to the Naval Air Station, Quonset Point,
R.I., as air combat information officer, and was promoted at about this time to
lieutenant commander.
In June 1944, he was assigned as flag lieutenant and aide to Rear Adm.
C. T. Durgin who was commander of Task Group 88.2. At this time Lieutenant
Commander Gates participated in Operation Dragoon, the invasion of Southern
Prance. In addition to his duties as flag lieutenant and aide, Lieutenant Com-
mander Gates was air combat information officer and staff watch officer.
From October 1944 to 1945 he continued in his duties on the staff of Admiral
Durgin, who had by this time been designated commander of Carrier Division
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29 and Commander of the Escort Carrier Force. At this time Lieutenant Com-
mander Gates was present during the capture of Leyte, the invasion of Luzon,
and the capture of Iwo Jima. For his performance of duty at Luzon, Lieutenant
Commander Gates was awarded the Bronze Star Medal. He was awarded a
gold star in lieu of a second bronze star for his performance of duty at Iwo Jima
and at Okinawa. (Seep. 18.)
CAPABILITY OF RETALIATORY FORCES
Mr. FORD. There is another sentence on page 3 which I think is very
significant. It is the first full sentence in the third paragTaph which
reads as follows:
* * * Our retaliatory forces are capable of carrying out their assigned
missions * * *.
I assume this statement is what you believe even in a period of
wartime?
Secretary GATES. Certainly.
Mr. FORD. General Twining, would you agree?
General TWINING. That is correct.
Mr. FORD. That is assuming conditions such as the fact that we may
have sustained the first blow ?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. FORD. In other words, there is no doubt that our retaliatory
forces can carry out their assigned mission in wartime?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
General TWINING. That is my opinion.
Mr. TABER. Could I put in one word here?
Mr. FORD. Yes.
Mr. TABER. Would you say that what is included in this budget
would be sufficient to carry on that position through the coming
fiscal year?
Secretary GATES. Yes, I would, Mr. Taber.
General TWINING. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. On page 4 of your statement, Mr. Secretary, there is this
sentence:
= * * It is the conclusion of those who have analyzed this matter that even a
surprise attack by all the missiles the Soviets could muster would not suffice to
destroy enough of our retaliatory striking forces to enable him to make a rational
decision to attack * * *.
Is there any significance in the fact that you use only the word
"missiles"?
Secretary GATES. The airplanes that he has we would probably be
able to get warning of, identify, and intercept. The real element of
surprise would have to involve his missiles against which?if he has
any yet?we do not yet have adequate warning. I think a true surprise
attack would have to be a missile attack.
We have a warning capability against aircraft attack with the
DEW line and other systems. I would assume, if he was going to
attack, he would attack with airplanes as well as missiles.
Mr. FORD. In other words, if you added after the word "missiles"
any striking force that he, the enemy, has, you would still subscribe
to the statement?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Would you, also, General Twining?
General TWINING. Yes.
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Mr. FORD. On page 5 of the statement, the second full paragraph,
this sentence is included, and I quote:
* * * It is also possible that the Soviets might elect to produce and deploy
missiles in larger quantities than is presently estimated. Our analyses show
that even under such circumstances, the resulting differences in numbers in itself
would not enable the Soviets to gain a strategic posture which might tempt them
to initiate a surprise attack * * *.
You are familiar with, and we have been told, what the National
Intelligence Community believes to be their capability in this field.
We have been told that there is some difference of opinion, at least as
far as the Air Force is concerned. Their estimate of their capability
is greater than what the intelligence community believes as a whole.
My question is this:
Even if you assumed the Air Force's estimate, is that statement's
prepared text true?
Secretary GATES. Yes; that statement would be true assuming the
Air Force position, in my judgment.
Now I have to hedge a little bit. This also takes the whole esti-
mate into account, including the circular error probable question.
On the basis of both the Air Force estimate and the total intelligence
estimate, this statement would be correct as of today.
Mr. FORD. What would your comment be on that point General
Twining?
General TWINING. I think so, too. I do not think their planners
would feel that they would escape very, very serious damage to Russia,
even with that kind of attack, and they would not risk it.
Mr. FORD. Yesterday, General Twining, I thought you made as ef-
fective and certainly one of the most vigorous defenses of the total
retaliatory forces as I have heard given. I want to commend you for
it. You pointed out very vividly that a missile capability for us is
but a part, and not the most significant part today, of our total retalia-
tory, or total deterrent, forces.
FUTURE ROLE OF MISSILES IN DETERRENT FORCES
Is there any way that the public can be told what percentage of our
total deterrent force now and in the next 3 or 4 years the missile
portion will be of our total deterrent or retaliatory force?
General TWINING. It is pretty hard to tell. If the missiles prove out
as we think they will, naturally the deterrent will gradually move over
to the missile side and the bomber force will get gradually smaller.
I would not want to say when that will be, but that is the natural out-
come of this. It will probably be several years before the missile will
gradually take over the deterrent role, but I still feel we will always
have a need for bombers, but not in the big numbers we have today.
Mr. FoRD. That is a part of the "mix" theory?
General TWINING. That is right. I think it gives you flexibility. A
missile is very inflexible. Once you push a trigger, it is gone and you
cannot stop it and it is going to be a very serious decision to push that
button and let this terrible thing go. With bombers, you still have
control of them. You can launch them and get them on the way but
you have positive control and can get them back if you have made
a wrong decision. Once a missile is launched, however, it is really
gone. It is very inflexible in that way.
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Mr. MAHON. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. FORD. The point I am trying to make is that I gather, in your
mind today, the missile part of our total deterrent is important, but
it is not the most significant part?
General TWINING. Not at the moment.
Mr. FORD. Even in the next 2 or 3 years, it is not going to become
the most significant part of our total deterrent. The public has the
impression that it is today, and will be tomorrow.
Is there any way that we can show, without revealing our top secret
military program, just what a relatively small part the missile por-
tion is, so that they can be reassured that we have ample deterrent
force in toto
General TWINING. I do not know how we could make it known to
the public. It is pretty hard to explain these things. It is pretty
complicated. It would be wonderful if we could.
Secretary GATES. People do not seem to want to believe this. We
have been telling them that we have great strength in the Strategic
Air Command and have deployed forces all over the world. We have
fighter bombers in Europe' fighter bombers in the Far East, carrier
planes, and so forth, all atomic-capable, but they want to talk about
the difference in numbers of ICBM's.
Mr. FORD. Is there any way that you can take your total payload
capacity, including everything, and honestly say that so much of
that will be carried by ICBM's?
Under program the rest of the total deterrent payload will be car-
ried on its mission by the remainder of our mixed force?
You are not revealing the specific number of any weapons.
General TWINING. It is telling what you have in the stockpile. That
would be pretty difficult.
Mr. FORD. You are saying 100 percent. You are talking percent-
ages, not your inventory.
General TWINING. We can try this: We could take my briefing,
the last part I read, and clean it up some way and declassify it. We
might have something that you could publicize. I think it might
be helpful.
Mr. FORD. I think it is important for our national public opinion.
I think if you could do it, the record would be helped immeasurably.
(Information referred to follows:)
STATEMENT BY GEN. N. F. TWINING, USAF
Once again, let me emphasize that we must be cognizant of numbers, but
not overawed by them. Numbers alone have not, and never will, reflect the
complete picture of capabilities.
The absolute number of missiles possessed by the Soviets is worthy of note
only when considered in relation to the targets which must be destroyed in tt
Soviet attack in order to prevent the Soviet Union from receiving unacceptable
damage in return.
In other words, how many missiles must the U.S.S.R. have on launchers in
order for Soviet planners to decide that they do have the capability to attack
the United States without receiving unacceptable damage in return?
Many factors, other than the absolute number of missiles on hand or on
launchers, must enter into the Soviet calculations. Some of these are accuracy,
warhead size, reliability, in commission rate, number and type of targets in
the United States, degree of advance assurance that a given level of damage
will be inflicted on a specific target, and so on.
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Our own plans and programs will provide a wide mix of weapons strategical-
ly positioned and designed to react from divergent sectors. These will include
ICBM's and manned bombers from the United States; manned bombers from
oversee bases; IRBM's from overseas bases; deployed tactical missiles of our
Army, Navy, and Air Force; missiles from our submarines at sea; and the
contribution to be made by our atomic-capable tactical air force units and at-
tack carrier striking forces deployed in strategic areas.
These forces wil be able to deliver a powerful retaliatory blow to any ag-
gressor. The punch of these forces must be taken into account by a potential
aggressor and do very definitely represent the risk which must be faced by
an aggressor in reaching a decision to attack the United States and its allies.
Furthermore, these forces, deployed worldwide, constitute widely scattered
targets which must be attacked simultaneously with any attack on the United
States.
If an aggressor is to succeed in destroying us, or our allies, his plan must
be designed to knock out at the first blow, and in one mortal blow, the United
States and allied capability to retaliate, or at least reduce it so that his home-
land will not receive unacceptable damage in return.
On the basis of all the information available, and in view of the mix and
strategic locations of our retaliatory weapons systems, I just do not believe
that any nation possesses the ability to destroy us, or attack us, without re-
ceiving unacceptable damage in return.
General TWINING. All I am trying to do is the right thing in this
defense business. You cannot afford to go overboard either way, too
strong or too weak. People have to know the truth about what we
have.
Let them make up their minds.
MEANING OF DETERRENT GAP
Mr. OSTERTAG. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ford referred to a certain part
of your statement with regard to, among other things, the deterrent
gap. That was quoted from your statement. Would you define what
is meant by a "deterrent gap"?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
It is that situation when your total deterrent force ceases to be
sufficient to deter a potential enemy, as contrasted with a simple nu-
merical comparison of a single weapon.
Mr. OSTERTAG. IS it a means of comparison with any potential
enemy?
Secretary GATES. Yes, it is a comparison with a potential enemy?
what he believes your deterrent is. I think Dr. York's shop invented
this term and maybe he can give a better definition than I can. The
way I understand it is: If you can be satisfied that your deterrent
power exists, is real, and will survive a surprise attack, regardless of
what force he can attack you with, then you have no deterrent gap.
But if you believe that the numbers and accuracy of his weapons
are so great that your survivability becomes so small that you worry
about it, then you have a deterrent gap.
Would that be correct?
Dr. YORK. Yes. It was just a term that we invented because of
the statements about the missile gap and the fact that this is almost
irrelevant in terms of what you really need to have. The question
is not whether we have more missiles than they have, but whether
our strategic deterrent can or cannot survive the first attack. If it
cannot, then you would speak of that as being a deterrent gap. If it
can, then there is no deterrent gap.
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The conclusion here, which Mr. Ford mentioned in several places,
is that there is no deterrent gap. Whether there is or is not '.a missile
gap, there is not a deterrent gap.
Mr. FORD. On page 6 of your statement, Mr. Secretary, the state-
ment is made:
* * * The thrust of our present missiles is fully adequate for defense re-
quirements today * * *
General Twining, do you concur in that statement?
General TWINING. Militarily, yes.
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF DEFENSE PROGRAM
Mr. FORD. I do not like to read the next statement because it is
somewhat lengthy, but on page 10, the first paragraph' the Secretary
says that two principal objectives are involved, and so forth.
I would like that put in the record at this point.
(The material referred to follows:)
The two principal objectives of our defense program continue to be: First, to
deter the outbreak of general war by maintaining and improving our present
capability to retaliate with devastating effectiveness in case of a major attack
upon us or our allies; and second, to maintain, together with our allies, a
capability to apply to local situations the degree of force necessary to deter
local wars, or to win or contain them promptly if they do break out.
Mr. FORD. General Twining, would, you concur in that statement?
General TWINING. Yes.
POSITION OF POLARIS IN THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM
Mr. FORD. Mr Secretary, on page 14 of the statement, you are talk-
ing about POLARIS, and you say
* * * progress has been satisfactory and if the POLARIS proves out sooner
than expected, a reconsideration of the program would be undertaken * "
What do you mean by that sentence?
Secretary GATES. It would be my judgment that, if we had opera-
tional success with our test program and were reasonably certain that
we had an operational capability, I think from a defense point of
view we would recommend a larger program for the POLARIS than
the three-a-year proposition.
I think we then would have to face up to what POLARIS force
levels would ultimately be required, and where the POLARIS sys-
tem fits into the total targeting picture. Then we would probably
go out and buy as much toward those force levels as we could.
Mr. FORD. The first POLARIS missile systems will be operational
during this calendar year?
Secretary GATES. Toward the end of it. They go to sea in the
gummer, shakedown, and will be operational toward the end of the
calendar year.
Mr. FORD. That will be toward the end of the fiscal year covered by
this budget presentation?
Secretary GATES. Yes, the middle of fiscal year 1961.
Mr. FORD. Included in this budget presentation we have funding for
POLARIS?
Secretary GATES. Through submarine No. 12.
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Mr. FORD. Fully funded?
Secretary GATES. Yes, and funding for long-leadtime components
for three additional ships, making a total of 15.
Mr. FORD. What is the total included in this budget for the pro-
gram, just in dollars?
Secretary GATES. $952,212,000.
Mr. FORD. Do you mean by this statement which I read from your
text that in fiscal 1961 such a change in program might take place?
Secretary GATES. It could be possible.
Mr. FORD. There would be no hesitancy on your part, as Secretary
of Defense, during the progress of fiscal 1961, to make such a recom-
mendation if you thought it was necessary?
? Secretary GATES. No hesitancy whatsoever.
NIKE-ZEUS PROGRAM
Mr. FORD. In your statement you discuss NIKE-ZEUS and the
matter has been covered thoroughly and comprehensively by other
members of the committee.
You did mention that this problem has been analyzed and re-
analyzed by a number of highly competent, qualified committees.
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Could you pinpoint what those committees were, when
they considered the problem, and what the recommendations were?
Secretary GATES. Yes; we cannot pinpoint it exactly, but sometime
during the summer, I would say approximately August, we asked Dr.
Kistiakowsky, who is assigned as scientific adviser to the President,
to assign a panel of his people to review the NIKE-ZEUS program
independently from the review that Dr. York conducts in the De-
partment of Defense, where he also has a highly competent panel of
different scientists reviewing the program.
The recommendations of both organizations are those that we are
presenting in this budget.
Mr. FORD. Would it be proper to list the names of the members of
the several committees that did analyze the NIKE-ZEUS program,
one committee under Dr. York and the other under Dr. Kistiakowsky?
(Discussion off the record.)
TRANSFERS FROM REVOLVING FUNDS
Mr. FORD. I notice that apparently in fiscal 1961 you intend to get
from the various stock funds and/or industrial funds $350 million.
Secretary GATES. I think it is all stock funds, and principally the
Army stock fund.
Mr. FORD. That seems to be a never ending well of obligational
authority.
Secretary GATES. The large bulk of that money?around $260 mil-
lion?is the Army stock fund.
Mr. FoRn. Last year on page 173 of the hearings you put in a chart
showing how much has been taken from the various stock funds
and/or industrial funds. I think you should continue that chart
and add to it what you are recommending in fiscal 1961.
Secretary GATES. I have it right in my hand, Mr. Ford.
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Mr. FORD. Could you tell us out of the $350 million how that break-
down is for fiscal year 1961?
Secretary GATES. It is $260 million, Army stock fund; $30 million
Air Force stock fund; and $60 million Navy stock fund-totaling
$355 million.
Mr. FORD. Your statement says $350 million
Secretary GATES. That is right; $350 million.
(Information requested follows:)
Transfers from revolving funds in lieu of new congressional appropriations
Fiscal year and source fund
Amount
Appropriation Account to which
transferred
Congress
Public
Law
No.
Fiscal year 1957:
Army stock fund
$202, 000, 000
Military construction, Army
84th
814
Navy stock fund
200, 000, 000
Military construction, Navy
84th
814
. Marine Corps stock fund__
35, 000, 000
do
84th
814
Total
437, 000, 000
Fiscal year 1958:
Army stock fund
350, 000, 000
Military personnel, Army_
85th
117
Army industrial fund
50, 000, 000
do
85th
117
Navy stock fund
100, 000, 000
Military personnel, Navy
85th
117
Marine Corps stock fund_
20,000, 000
do
85th
117
Navy industrial fund
70, 000, 000
do
85th
117
TotaL
590, 000, 000
Fiscal year 1959:
Army stock fund
375, 000, 000
Military personnel, Army
85th
724
Navy stock fund
120, 000, 000
Military personnel, Navy
85th
724
Navy industrial fund
15, 000,000
do
85th
724
Marine Corps stock fund___
25, 000, 000
Military personnel, Marine Corps
85th
724
Total
535, 000, 000
-- -
Fiscal year 1960:
Army stock fund
281, 000, 000
Military personnel, Army
86th
86-166
Navy stock fund
75, 000, 000
Military personnel, Navy
86th
86-166
Air Force stock fund
50, 000, 000
Military personnel, Air Force
86th
86-166
Marine Corps stock fund__
24, 000, 000
Military personnel, Marine Corps_
86th
86-166
Total
430, 000, 000
-----
Total, fiscal years 1957-60.
1, 992, 000,000
NOTE.-No transfers from revolving funds were made during the period fiscal years 1951-56, but during
the period 1954-57 the Congress rescinded $3,400,000,000 for return to the Treasury. Thus, during the
period 1954-60 a total of approximately $5,400,000,000 was realized as a result of the effective management
and control of inventories financed by stock and industrial funds. The fiscal year 1961 budget proposes
an additional transfer of $350,000,000 (Army stock fund $260,000,000, Navy stock fund $60,000,000, and Air
Force stock fund $30,000,000).
? Mr. FORD. As you know, under the space law that was passed by the
Congress in 1958, there was to be a joint liaison committee between the
Defense Department and NASA. Is that an operating committee at
the present time?
Secretary GATES. It is in existence.
Mr. Holaday, who used to be with the Department of Defense, is
chairman of it. I would not say it has had to operate too much be-
cause most of the work has been done directly by the principals con-
cerned; namely, Dr. York and Dr. Glennan ; Dr. Glennan and myself,
and so forth.
Mr. FORD. Do I gather from what has taken place practically that
the military-civilian liaison committee is not necessary?
Secretary GATES. It may not be essential. ?
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STATUS OF EMERGENCY FUND
Mr. Form. Could we have a short statement as to what you have done
with the $150 million in obligational authority for the Emergency
Fund?
Secretary GATES. Yes; we have that. We have an itemized alloca-
tion.
Mr. FORD. Have you used much of it?
Dr. YORK. In 1959 we used almost all of it. In 1960, we have so far
not used very much, but that is a typical history of the Emergency
Fund. Of course, we are asking for it again in 1961.
Is it 1959 you wanted?
Mr. FORD. Did you use all of it in 1959?
Dr. YORK. Yes. Almost all of it.
Mr. FORD. The $150 million plus the additional authority of $150
million, as I recall it?
Secretary GATES. That was on the missile transferability, the other
authority.
Mr. FORD. For the record, bring up to date what the status is as of
now in the program.
Secretary GATES. Yes.
(The material referred to follows:)
Status of fiscal year 1960 emergency fund as of Jan. 15, 1960
Availability:
Appropriation
Transferred in (transfer authority)
Subtotal available
Transferred out
$150,
26,
000,
000,
000
000
176,
35,
000,
170,
000
000
Balance remaining available for transfer
140,
830,
000
Details of transfers in:
From Army
(5,
500,
000)
From Navy
(5,
500,
000)
From Air Force (from prior year unobligated balance)
(15,
000,
000)
(26,
000,
000)
Details of transfers out:
To Army
(650,
000)
To Navy
(0)
To Air Force
To ARPA
Total
(34,
520,
000)
(35,
170,
000)
RETENTION AND REENLISTMENT RATES IN THE MARINE-CORPS
Mr. FORD. One of the most significant developments, in my opinion,
is the statement Made on page 33 of your text, Mr. Secretary, when
you said that the Marine Corps, because of a lower than normal loss
of trained personnel, would be able to reactivate by the end of 1961
the number of battalion landing teams which were cut ont when you
reduced from 200,000 to 170,000 or thereabouts -without any increase
in overall strength. As I recall, there were six battalion landing
teams that had to be deactivated at the time the cut was made and
from what you are saying here this will be---
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Secretary GATEs. It was two per division, if my Memory is right.
I am not sure that they will be able to reactivate the complete six, but
they will be able to go part way at least. They have had very good
luck with the reenlistments and the retention rate in the Marine Corps.
As a matter of fact we have had a marked improvement throughout
the Department of Defense in reenlistment and retention rates.
Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much.
We shall adjourn at this time and continue at 10 tomorrow morning.
FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1960.
Mr. MAHON. The committee will come to order. I believe Mr.
Ford has some additional questions.
PERSONNEL SITUATION
Mr. Fonn. Mr. Secretary, as you well know, we have been concerned
in both the executive branch and the Congress with regard to per-
sonnel problems in the Defense Department. Legislation has been
enacted, appropriations have been made to try to remedy some of
the problems in that area. I am certain through these combined
efforts we have not licked all of the problems.
Would you care to make any comment about the current situation?
Secretary GATES. Yes. I think that it can be stated that the vari-
ous measures that have been taken by the Congress in the last few
years have done a great deal to stabilize our forces and improve the
quality of our personnel. We have fewer people in the lower mental
groups and we have people of better quality. We have increased re-
enlistment and retention rates. The reenlistment rates have been
extremely encouraging in their trend. As you say, we have not licked
all the problems, but in peacetime with the number of men we have,
this will always be a difficult thing to do.
The pay bill we all worked on so hard to get enacted has added to
the improvement and we see a healthy trend in all of the services.
Mr. FORD. Do you have any chart or other material that could be
inserted in, the record to show the improvement in retention and re-
enlistment rates? ,
Secretary GATES. Yes. I have enlistment and reenlistment data
for the fiscal years 1959 and 1960, and planned for 1961 with percent-
ages for first-term enlistments and regular enlistments for each service,
the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force.
Mr. FORD. Unless there is objection, I think that would be helpful
with regard to this point.
Secretary GATES. We will insert it in the record.
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(The requested information follows:)
Enlistment and reenlistment data
Actual, fiscal year
1959 .
Planned, fiscal
year 1960
Planned, fiscal
year 1961
Number
Percent 1
Number
percent 1
Number
Percent Y
Army:
1st term enlistments
105, 800
80, 400
82,400
Reenlistments, Regulars
54, 261
52. 4
51, 800
53.9
65, 000
54.0
1st term
11,283
21. 5
13, 200
26.0
16, 400
26.0
Career
42, 978
83.9
38, 600
85.0
48,600
85. 0
Navy:
1st term enlistments
79, 800
82,000
79, 000
Reenlistments, Regulars
31, 745
34.3
36, 172
36. 9
41,230
44. 1
1st term
18, 149
23. 4
18,838
23. 7
16,778
25.6
Career
13, 596
90. 1
17, 334
92. 8
24, 455
87. 2
Marine Corps:
1st term enlistments
35, 548
39, 441
24, 971
Reenlistments, Regulars
10, 563
31. 9
13, 072
31. 4
9, 900
36. 7
1st term
5,298
20.2
8,048
23. 3
5,320
25. 2
Career
5,265
76. 5
5,024
69. 7
4, 580
78. 8
Air Force:
1st term enlistments
62, 200
79,200
74,200
Reenlistments, Regulars
70,908
61. 5
62, 100
53.2
106, 700
73.0
1st term
34,940
45. 7
25, 600
32.9
29,950
46. 7
Career
35, 968
92. 9
36, 500
93. 6
76, 750
93.8
1 Ratio of total reenlistments occurring in a given period to total separations, eligible to reenlist occurring
In the same period, expressed as a percentage.
IMPROVED RETENTION HAS REDUCED ENLISTED PERSONNEL TURNOVER
A substantial reduction in required intakes of new personnel has been one of
the direct benefits resulting from the uptrend in enlisted retention.
Total new enlisted intakes averaged about 100,000 lower in fiscal years 1958
and 1959 than in 1957. About half of the reduction was due to the strength
reduction during this period. However, the remainder, averaging about 50,000
per year, was directly due to the increase in enlisted retention rates since fiscal
year 1957.
Similarly, projected intakes in fiscal years 1960-63 are estimated at about
60,000 less per year than would have been required under 1957 retention ex-
perience.
These reductions in needs for new personnel are the combined effect of in-
creased reenlistment rates and of longer terms of service.
DISCIPLINARY CASES DOWN SHARPLY
The improvement in personnel quality has contributed directly to a major
reduction in disCiplinary problems.
Between fiscal year 1957 and fiscal year 1959, absentee and court martial rates
in the Department of Defense dropped by about one-fourth, while the prisoner
population declined by about two-fifths. These trends are directly related to
the elimination of marginal personnel from the force, as well as to improved
disciplinary methods.
In addition to direct benefits, such as reductions in disciplinary facilities, the
lower rates reflect?in a broader sense?a higher degree of morale and combat
readiness in the enlisted force as a whole.
MENTAL QUALITY HIGHER
All services have substantially reduced the percentage of new intakes from
mental group IV?the lowest acceptable mental group. These reductions were
made possible by enactment of Public Law 85-564 (authorizing increases in
induction standards), and by higher standards of enlistment under revised
Department of Defense policies.
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In addition, intensive efforts have been made to screen out personnel with
limited potential for training and performance in required military skills.
During fiscal year 1958, over 100,000 low-potential personnel were separated
Under special early release pyograms. Standards of reenlistment were also
generally tightened, based on aptitude and performance criteria.
The combined result of these measures has been a consistent increase in the
proportion of higher quality personnel on active duty.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There has been a substantial improvement in the capability of the armed
services to attract and retain qualified personnel. Specifically:
Recruitment capability has improved, as evidenced by the sharp rise in
Army enlistments.
First-term reenlistment rates have generally increased, including signfi-
cant gains in both technical and combat leadership skills
The enlisted force has become more experienced, with the overall propor-
tion of career personnel rising from one-third to more than two-fifths.
Mental quality is definitely higher in all services, as a result of reduced
group IV intakes and more selective retention policies.
And there has been a gratifying reduction in disciplinary rates.
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
Mr. FORD. In the past I know the Department of Defense has had
what it called its legislative program at the start of each session of
Congress. Sometimes we on this committee that have to do with ap-
propriating the money to pay for what the legislative program
is do not see it in its entirety when we are considering the budget for
the next fiscal year.
Does the Department of Defense have such a legislative program
for the fiscal year 1961 for submission to this session of Congress, and
if so, could you put it in the record and cost it out for us if enacted
into law?
Secretary GATES. I have not reviewed the legislative program in
detail. There is not a great deal planned. We will have a legislative
item involving some costs. We will provide the details for the record.
(The requested information follows:)
We are supporting a legislative proposal to remove inequities in the pay of
certain personnel on the retired list resulting from enactment of the Military
Pay Act of 1958. The proposal will authorize those who retired prior to June 1,
1958, to have their pay recomputed on the basis of the higher rates established in
that Act. The estimate of the funds to be requested for the fiscal year 1961
retired pay appropriation for financing this legislation is $24 million.
SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE
Mr. FORD. Yesterday the committee and the American people were
told for the first time of some alleged changes that Mr. Khrushchev
and the Soviet Union are going to make in their defense setup. Yes-
terday, the day of this announcement, nobody could have had an oppor-
tunity to analyze that speech, or those proposals. This is 24 hours
later. Is there any current analysis or evaluation that the Defense
Department has made?
Secretary GATES. Yes, there is an evaluation that says in effect?do
not dismiss this announcement. Because of the manpower problems
in connection with the 7-year plan Mr. Khrushchev probably intends
to free up some manpower as he has stated. So the present evaluation
is that he probably will reduce his armed forces as he has announced.
50026-60-10
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Mr. FORD. That reduction being made primarily to help him ac-
complish his economic program?
Secretary GATES. His economic program under the 7-year plan; yes.
Mr. FORD. Over the last 3 or 4 years it is my recollection that the
Soviet Union has made other announcements Of proposed manpower
reductions. As I have looked at these manpower charts that have
been submitted by General Twining and others over the years, I can-
not see where there has been any followthrough on those manpower
reductions in the past. Is that impression correct?
General TWINING. Generally I think that is correct. He has taken
them apparently from places not known to us and we have not indi-
cated a reduction in our reports.
Mr. FORD. This year he would intend to take it out of a place where
we do have some information?
General TWINING. I think it interesting because there are a couple
of points here. It is early to judge it. He has gone through the same
process, practically using the same words, that we used when we went
to a new look. Remember our new look about 8 years ago?
We justified, and rightly so, a reduction in forces because of these
improved weapons. It was a justifiable thine,. He is doing that same
thing now. He refers back to the fact that he is not weakening his
overall forces at all and the military has agreed with him, and all that.
He is going through the same process we went through in the new
look.
He has been the great advocate of the deemphasizing or doing away
with nuclear weapons, and also doing away with testing. He has been
preaching this pretty hard, as you know. At the same time he is doing
away apparently with his air force and navy, except submarines, and
he is concentrating solely, as he said yesterday, on his big weapons.
So it looks like there is a little contradiction in there.
Secretary GATES. I have not read the text of the speech, but we
have an analysis this morning in which he apparently makes a refer-
ence to building his ICBM force as a deterrent force. That is the first
time that I have seen that expression, if that is what he really said.
General TWINING. It is early to make a statement like this, but it is
interesting to see how he contradicts himself here.
INCREASE IN ICBM PROGRAM
Mr. FORD. Yesterday or the day before we discussed the ATLAS?
TITAN program, what it was a year ago, what the Congress did and
what now is before us.
To get my own thinking clarified I would like to give you some
figures to see whether or not my impression is correct.
A year ago, the Department of Defense submitted a program predi-
cated upon 9 ATLAS squadrons and 11 TITAN squadrons for a total
of 20 squadrons; is that correct?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
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Mr. Foam The Congress in the appropriation bill for the fiscal
year 1960 provided partial funding for a revised program which
called for 17 ATLAS squadrons and 11 TITAN squadrons, or a total
of 28; is that correct?
Secretary GATES. I am quite sure it is.
Mr. FORD. In the budget before us now we have a program for 13
ATLAS and 14 TITANS, or a total of 27 ICBM squadrons?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
'Mr. FORD. In other words, the Department of Defense on its own
has in a period of a year gone up from a total of 20 ICBM squadrons
to 27?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
MACE MISSILE
Mr. FORD. The chairman discussed the MACE program. I was
not entirely clear as to what you said the operational date would be
for the squadrons proposed for Germany and Okinawa.
General TWINING. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
AIR DEFENSE
Mr. FORD. The problem of air defense is one we have been struggling
with, and I suspect we may struggle during this-session. It has been
testified that General Kuter requested more money for air defense
than is included in the budget for 1961.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. FORD. Do you have an idea or recollection of what he asked
for that he did not get, dollarwise ?
Secretary GATES. I think that his program?according to his fig-
ures which I do not think have been reviewed yet because I think
this is a relatively new study on his part?would run to a cost of
perhaps $5.5 billion per year.
Mr. FORD. Through 1964 or 1965?
Secretary GAITS. For the 2 or 3 years ahead.
Mr. FORD. It was also testified that in the overall air defense pro-
gram submitted in the budget there had been reductions made below
the levels that were forecast a year ago; is that correct?
Secretary GATES. That is correct, as the result of the studies of
last summer. Our totals now run in this budget $3.9 billion.
Mr. FORD. Is that the package of air defense?
Secretary GATES. The package; all identifiable costs?that is the
interceptors, the missiles, the radars, the SAGE, et cetera.
Mr. Form. I know there have been some revisions downward from
the air defense program of a year ago. Could you summarize for the
record the changes in that regard for SAGE, NIKE-HERCULES,
BOMARC, HAWK, and the interceptors? Give us a very brief
summary of what changes or revisions have been made.
Secretary GATES. Yes. Principally some adjustment in some parts
of the overall program. The F-108 has been canceled and the pro-
duction of the NIKE-ZEUS has been postponed.
(The information requested is classified and has been furnished
to the committee separately.)
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B-58 PROGRAM
Mr. Folio. The B-58 program is another big program. How much_
is in the budget for the B-58 program for the fiscal year 1961?
Secretary GATES. Something over $500 million.
Mr. Folio. Were there those who wanted a larger program?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Mr. FORD. What were the alternatives, dollarwise, in this area?
Secretary GATES. I think the original concept of the B-58 program
envisioned a larger number of aircraft and a larger number of winos
to be equipped with these aircraft. This program would have added:
up to a very large figure if it were carried out over the period; $564.7
million looks like the amount that was requested for fiscal year 1961,
which has been reduced to about $500 million in the review.
OPERATIONS UNDER THE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958
Mr. FORD. Mr. Secretary, we have had the Reorganization Act of
?
1958 on the statute books about a year and a half. Could you sum-
marize for the record how it has been implemented what the impact
is, and how it is working at the present time?
Secretary GATES. We got out all of the fundamental directives to,
implement it by the end of calendar year 1958. This, of course, estab-
lished an increased staff for the Joint Chiefs of Stat. It established'
the channel of command from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified
commanders and put the operation into motion as far as the orders
and instructions were concerned. I think it was almost exactly a
year ago from right now this was completed. It took a little longer
than that, after the orders were issued, to get the system operating
and to complete the augmentation of the Joint Staff. I think we can,
probably say it has been in operation about 8 months, or something
of that nature.
I think it has operated well. We have had two commanders con-
ferences, one at Quantico in June and one in the first week of Janu-
ary at Norfolk, where we brought in all the unified commanders to
meet with the Service Secretaries, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,.
the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman and myself. These conferences
were very successful. They were really held without an agenda. We
permitted the individual unified commander to discuss his problems
in his area, and his problems on the overall working of the system.
I think these meetings were healthy.
Meanwhile, Mr. McElroy went on some trips with the Chiefs to vari-
ous unified commands, and I have been to some of them. We intend
to continue these commanders' conferences. We intend to continue?
periodic visits on the part of myself and the Joint Chiefs to these.
headquarters. I think there will continue to be some gray areas that
will take administrative action to straighten out. But I think every-
one is pleased with the operation.
Mr. FORD. Would you care to comment on that, General Twining?
General TWINING. As the Secretary said, we are trying to make this
a gradual transition. I would say about April was when the Joint
Staff itself was completely integrated and ready to go under the new-
system. It has not been working under the new system very long..
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TI think it is going to be a very good setup. It is going to take a little
time to work out some of the bugs, but I think we should take that
-time and not be in too much of a hurry to reorganize again. We
should let this thing ride for a while.
Secretary GATES. As I testified I think yesterday, a very funda-
mental part of this reorganization was the creation of the Office of the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the assignment of
competent people to man it. This has had a great effect on our opera-
tions and the preparation of this budget.
PROJECT WAGMIGHT
Mr. FORD. I would like to ask a question about Project WAG-
MIGHT, which has been in the news and about which some people are
apparently concerned. Could we have an analysis?
Secretary GATES. I do not know all the details, but will furnish a
-statement for the record.
(The requested information follows:)
PROJECT WAGMIGHT
The Office of Naval Research has a contract with Goodyear Aircraft Corp.
-on the "Infiataplane," a small, slow-speed liaison-type aircraft. Ten of these were
-constructed under the contract and are now undergoing tests prior to delivery
to the services.
In 1958 the Navy asked Goodyear Aircraft Corp. to investigate the feasibility
of a project called WAGMIGHT. Goodyear Aircraft Corp. made a study which
they voluntarily gave to the Navy for consideration. The study proposed a
medium range high subsonic weapon system based on an inflated fabric aircraft.
The Navy carefully reviewed the project. From these studies and reviews it
was concluded that the concept of an inflatable airframe "did not lend itself to
application in high performance aircraft carrying essential military equipment
as envisioned by WAGMIGHT." It was determined that the supposed operational
advantages are not technically realizable and it was decided not to pursue the
project any further.
Project WAGMIGHT and the Infiataplane are two separate projects; the first
a proposal developed initially by the Navy, and the second, the Inflataplane, a
contract with the Office of Naval Research.
Mr. FORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and General
Twining.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Ostertag.
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE
Mr. OSTERTAG. Mr. Secretary, I want to join my colleagues in com-
mendation of your fine presentation to the committee. I think it is
one of the finest that has ever been made before this committee. It
certainly is an encouraging word, as well as a clear-cut picture of our
defense posture and the problems involved.
It certainly is an excellent basis for approach to this budget and
the problems this committee faces at this time.
I too am sure you are going to do an outstanding job as Secretary
of Defense, and we are proud of your approach and your leadership in
this important field.
May I say the field has been well covered. Considerable discussion
has been taking place here within the last few days with regard to
comparisons or strength and the problems involved in a deterrent or
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retaliatory power. I do not want to belabor any of those particular
points:
If I analyze the picture correctly, in practically every field of
endeavor, whether it be air power or sea power, we are ahead and are
not second place in any conceivable way. The only area where there
might be some difference, as is pointed out in your statement, is that the
Soviets may enjoy at times a moderate numerical superiority in
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Is that about the sum and sub-
stance of it?
Secretary GATES. That is correct. But they also, of course, have
many more submarines than we, although we are ahead in the tech-
nology of submarines, especially nuclear types. The other area we.
have discussed is the big booster problem, where admittedly we are
behind.
PROGRESS OF THE MISSILE PROGRAM
Mr. OSTERTAG. The ATLAS missile is operational today; is that
correct?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Do we have the capability of having a number of
ICBM's equal to that of the Soviets?
Secretary GATES. It is a question of forecasting the future. As of
now, we have approximately?using the national intelligence esti-
mate?an equal strength. It is a question of judgment where we will
be in 1, 2, or 3 years from now. We are going to go ahead with this
program of 27 squadrons of the two big missiles, ATLAS and
TITAN, and we intend to make the later versions of both missiles
better.
In the case of ATLAS, we will harden some of them to
In the case of TITAN, we will harden all of them to and
introduce an element called the storable propellant. This means
that the missile will be simpler and more ready because it will be
sitting there already fueled. We will put those into silo launchers.
When we get those 27 squadrons in being I think we will always
keep them because they are big and accurate and carry large war-
heads.
However, we are trying as hard as we know how to move forward
with the mobile, smaller, cheaper, easier to handle and easier-to-dis-
perse missiles of the MINUTEMAN and POLARIS types.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Would it be possible for us to have a greater num-
ber of squadrons, ATLAS squadrons or more hardened sites for
operation of these missiles if we so desired and if we felt it was
important?
Secretary GATES. I think from a practical point of view, that is to
build the sites correctly, it would be very difficult to go much faster
than we now are going. If we went on a complete wartime basis of
construction, we could probably accelerate the program, but under
present conditions I think it unlikely that we could do very much
more.
Mr. OSTERTAG. But our program and our numbers are sufficient
to maintain a reasonable balance at this time and yet move forward
toward a new family of missiles that might be coming into being?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
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Mr. OSTERTAG. Of course, that difference will only exist perhaps
during the next 2 or 3 years?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. OSTERTAG. In connection with the space program, the ATLAS
is being used in certain aspects of space exploration, for example, the
ATLAS?ABLE. The National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration, as I understand it, contracts with the Defense Department
for the procurement of these ATLAS boosters; is that correct?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Is there a problem with regard to missile produc-
tion? Is the Space Agency getting whatever it requires for future
tests?
Secretary GATES. No problem has been called to my attention. I
don't think there is a problem.
Mr. OSTERTAG. The hardening of sites for missiles is not a problem,
is it, from the standpoint of moving ahead? In other words, that
is on schedule and there is no need to accelerate that particular phase
of the program?
Secretary GATES. That is right, sir.
Mr. OSTERTAG. In that connection, there has been going through
my mind the comparative difference with regard to the Soviet system
as compared to ours in regard to mobility of ballistic missiles.
(Discussion off the record.)
DEVELOPMENT OF ATOMIC AIRCRAFT
Mr. OSTERTAG. Another thought occurs to me with regard to the
question of airpower. If I understand it correctly, Khrushchav and
the Soviets are, to a large extent, abandoning the manned bomber.
Secretary GATES. That is what he advertises as of yesterday morn-
ing. Our figures indicate that he has continued a modest production
of strategic aircraft?a very modest production.
Mr. OSTERTAG. I think that General Twining or you stated yester-
day that it would appear that they are practically abolishing their
force; is that correct?
General TwiNiNo. No. He implied that, but he would still have
a lot of airplanes left. I do not think he will discard them.
Mr. OSTERTAG. What I was leading up to is this: If that is a part
of the air picture that is developing, where would the development,
or the potential to develop atomic powered aircraft, fit into their
plan?
Secretary GATES. If that proved to be their course of action it prob-
ably would not fit into their picture except for some psychological
purpose.
DEPLOYMENT OF IRBM'S
Mr. OSTERTAG. I would like to explore for a moment the question
of the IRBM and our deployment thereof in other parts of the world.
As I understand it, we have operational IRBM's in England and
plans call for similar locations in Italy and Turkey.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Has not Great Britain developed an intermediate
range ballistic missile which they believe is satisfactory and sufficient
for their own use?
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Secretary GATES. They have been working for some time on a
missile that is somewhere between IRBM and ATLAS. It is more
than an IRBM. It is called, I think, the BLUE STREAK. I do
not think it is operational. I do not think they have completed their
testing, and so forth. They have been developing this system.
? Mr. OSTERTAG. Then it is possible that our allies will have on their
own volition developed a ballistic missile for their own use?
Secretary GATES. That is correct. Also, there is the unresolved de-
cision on what we call the second generation IRBM's for use by the
NATO alliance.
ADEQUACY OF DEFENSE BUDGET
Mr. OSTERTAG. I would like to raise the question about the overall
budget for defense purposes. It seems there have been some changes
made. You, of course, recognize the terrific cost involved in main-
taining our establishment today. Outside of the cost of the develop-
ment of weapons, everyday maintenance and personnel costs are heavy.
You do believe, do you not, Mr. Secretary, that this is a well-
rounded budget and it certainly meets our requirements as they exist
today?
Secretary GATES. I do.
Mr. OSTERTAG. And there is reasonable support throughout the
services for this budget?
Secretary GATES. There is unquestioned support for the total. As
I have testified, everybody would do it a little differently if he were
the sole judge.
Mr. OSTERTAG. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is all that I have.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Lipscomb.
MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE
_ Mr. LIPSCOMB. I want to join with my colleagues in complimenting
you on your appearance before the committee and the manner in which
you have answered the questions.
? On page 26 of your statement you refer to the Military Air Trans-
port Service. It is my understanding that the Department of De-
fense has been working on a study and has prepared a report to be
submitted to the President, which contains certain recommendations
regarding the Military Air Transport Service policy. Is my under-
standing correct?
? Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does this budget contain appropriations to imple-
ment any of those recommendations?
Secretary GATES. It contains, if my memory is right, $50 million
for the modernization of MATS, principally along the lines of de-
veloping a better cargo capability.
Mr. Lirsoomn. Was this a recommendation contained in the report?
Secretary GATES. The $50 million was not contained in the report,
but the concept was. ?
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is that the only recommendation contained in the
report that is reflected in this budget before us?
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Secretary GATES. I believe so, with the exception of the fact that
the personnel numbers and operating aircraft possibly reflect some
of the recommendations of the report. I think the only significant
financial items are the ones we have referred to.
Mr. LIpscoms. You also mentioned much of the present MATS'
fleet is obsolescent. Is it possible for you to point out to us what part
of this MATS fleet is obsolescent?
Secretary GATES. I would rather leave the details of that, if it is
satisfactory to you, for the experts in the Air Force. I can say in a
general way that we are contemplating action after more study on the
overall Reserve forces question. We have already made some moves
in this respect, moving some of the transport aircraft out of MATS
into the Air National Guard. This is the same concept we used with
the Navy, remember, when we transferred a part of the wartime
antisubmarine warfare mission to the Navy Reserve. This will come
up in a more intensive way when we complete the review of the Re-
serve forces that we have asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make. The
older transport aircraft still have some usefulness as a mobilization
base and, as I said, they have been in a small way transferred to the
Air. National Guard. I think MATS is contracting out for a great
deal of its passenger-carrying capability already. I think the primary
deficiency is in cargo lift.
NEW MISSION OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD IN AIRLIFT OPERATIONS
Mr. Lrpscoats. On January 12 the Department of Defense put out
an announcement that the Air National Guard was to receive C-97
4-engine transports. Does this announcement of January 12 mean
there is any change in the role of the Air National Guard?
Secretary GATES. Yes; but only to this extent, that?
Mr. LIPSCOMB. What is the effect of converting the Guard, or Re-
serve, to transport operations on the total air defense posture?
Secretary GATES. The theory would be that the Air National Guard
would be an augmenting backup to the airlift capability for military
purposes in time of tension. The Air Force Reserve already has a con-
siderable airlift capacity.
Mr. LII-scoms. Some of these transports are being transferred to
Van Nuys, Calif. The Air National Guard units stationed at Van
Nuys have been very proud of their performance in their present mis-
sion and have been on 24-hour alert with jet fighters. Of course,
this transfer is changing their mission. It appears that there is a
change in our posture in ready alert on the coast.
Secretary GATES. It would obviously make a difference in their
mission. My understanding from the Air Force is that this concept,
to some degree at least, is acceptable to the Air National Guard. Of
course, the Air Force has been purchasing relatively few fighters in
recent years. Inevitably, you are going to run into a situation where
you will have fewer fighter squadrons in being and a lesser require-
ment to use the Air National Guard in an interceptor role. I do not
want to prejudge the pretty important review of Reserve missions
that we are talking about here. We are making a few small steps
at this point. We are not prejudging the ultimate review.
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Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does this changeover mean any difference in the
reliance of the military on the aircraft and operators that are in the
CRAF program?
Secretary GATES. No, I do not think it does.
Mr. Lirscomn. Mr. Secretary, you indicated in your statement that
the Department of Defense was going to make a reexamination of the
roles and missions of the Reserve components in relation to those of
the Active forces in light of the changing character of warfare. I
believe this is an excellent proposal. I am wondering how compre-
hensive this examination is going to be. Is it going beyond roles and
missions to include types of training, organization, capability, air-
craft, and hardware in use, directives, rules and regulations, and physi-
cal qualifications?
Secretary GATES. Yes it should cover all the things you mentioned.
Mr. Lrescoms. I think this is an excellent move to be made.
UTILIZATION OF SAVINGS THROUGH CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIER
CONSTRUCTION
When discussing the aircraft carrier, it was stated that by.building
a conventional instead of a nuclear-powered carrier, the indicated
savings would be about $130 million, which is the estimated added cost
of the nuclear-powered carrier.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. You indicated this money could be used for other
purposes such as ASW. Does this indicate this money could be used
in the future and not in this 1961 fiscal year budget?
Secretary GATES. No. The shipbuilding program is fully funded
and this money has been applied to the shipbuilding program. It is
a question of buying antisubmarine warfare capability instead of buy-
ing nuclear propulsion for the aircraft carrier. Actually, the funds
would be spent over a leadtime of 3 years on ship construction, but
the money is in this budget.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. This indicates that even beyond your budget request,
the ASW add-on of last year, that you still have additional money that
you can put into the ASW program and intend to.
. Secretary GATES. That is right. The principle has been for some
time in the Navy that the year you buy a carrier, which is very expen-
sive, you buy fewer ships; the year you do not buy the carrier you buy
more ships. You try to get this on a kind of 2-year cycle so that in
the end you keep your balance in your requirements for ships.
We have not spent the money the Congress authorized or that this
committee gave us, I think $35 million, for the long leadtime items for
the nuclear reactors. We have not spent that money. That money
has been held in reserve and will be applied against the cost of the
conventional carrier, with the approval of the Congress.
Mr. Lirscoms. The thing that concerns me about this is that you
mentioned a saving of $130 million, and you say it can be used to much
greater advantage for other pressing purposes such as antisubmarine
warfare. I want to be sure that ASW is fully funded in this budget
with the necessary appropriation. I do not want it to appear that
you have held back on fully funding ASW work because you might
use this $130 million
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Secretary GATES. It is the reverse. The $130 million has been put
-into ASW ships.
ADVERTISING BY GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Secretary, is there a policy in the Department
of Defense regarding advertising by Government contractors in pe-
riodicals, trade magazines, and such, and charging this cost of advertis-
ing against Government contracts?
Secretary GATES. Yes, there is. I cannot quote it to you accurately,
but it is part of the new cost principles that have just recently been
issued through a coordinated effort headed up by Assistant Secretary
McGuire, Supply and Logistics. As part of this setup of cost prin-
?ciples the business of how you charge expenses?which this would be,
is discussed. I think in the free enterprise system it is difficult to be
rigid about your rules on advertising.
I might say some of the advertising that has appeared has been
pretty emphatically frowned upon and the people involved have been
informed of our attitude. This is particularly true when the adver-
tising involves highly controversial and competitive systems.
AIR ALERT
Mr. Lipscomn. I believe you covered this, Mr. Secretary, but I was
interested in the statement regarding air alert and the on-the-shelf
item. Was it my understanding you were going to insert in the record
what "on the shelf" meant?
Secretary GATE& It means extra spare parts and special training.
General TWINING. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secre-
tary.
Mr. MAHoN. Mr. Weaver.
CONTINUED USE OF MANNED BOMBERS
Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Secretary, on page 3 of your statement you say
that manned bombers are still for both the United States and the
U.S.S.R. the principal means of carrying a heavy nuclear punch with
.accuracy to the target. Then, as we discussed, we heard Mr. Khru-
shchev say that the Soviet Union is abandoning its bomber fleet. My
question is:
If we were to take the Russian Premier seriously, does this not raise
a question in your mind as to whether we are not perhaps wasting
time and money in going ahead with NIKE-HERCULES and in-
augurating or carrying forward BOMARC ? What would be your
comment?
Secretary GATES. It will take Mr. Khruslichev quite a long while to
implement this speech as far as manned aircraft are concerned?
assuming he intends to do so. Meanwhile, he will have in being a
significant manned bomber force. I would think that before we com-
pletely finish the program for continental air defense, which we have
reviewed only within the last 6 months, that we ought to take another
look at exactly what he is doing with his manned bombers. But this
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study concerned numbers of sites for BOMARC and NIKE-HERCU-
LES and the relationship they have to manned interceptors and the
relationship they all have to the SAGE control system. These mat-
ters were reviewed in the light of a Soviet Air Force about the size
they have today. There has not been any change in this.
He may stop the small amount of production we think he now has,
but that would still leave a sizable force in being with a pretty long
useful life. He will still be able to use it if he ever intends to attack the
United States. It is true our continental air defense system at the
moment is essentially for use against the manned bomber. It is a
very expensive system but we believe that at this time it is the mini-
mum proper continental air defense system that we should have.
BOMARC
Mr. WEAVER. You feel that even though BOMARC is not perfected,
it is well worth our time and money to go ahead in view of the time
length it is going to take to put it into operation?
Secretary GATES. Yes, and like everything else, to review it cur-
rently.
ATLANTIC BARRIER OPERATION
Mr. WEAVER. Can you tell me a little about the Atlantic barrier
operation? It has been my privilege to see it. How soon can this
be turned from an air watch into an ASW operation?
Secretary GATES. It is already partially an ASW operation. We
have the capability to put in an ASW barrier and have done so in
certain periods of international tension to augment the normal warn-
ing lines from Argentia to the Azores.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. WEAVER. On page 10 of your statement in discussing techno-
logical advances you make the statement that in some programs we
may have "overstayed our time." Is there any indication now for the
guidance of this committee that some of our present programs are
getting into this category?
Secretary GATES. We tried to give you our best judgment on what
our programs should be. But it is worth saying time and time again
that we are living in a world of such great and rapid change that we
just have to keep the program under continual review.
REORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Secretary, I am interested in the possibility of
saving money and perhaps increasing our effectiveness by creation of
a single military service, even with one uniform. Have there been
any studies, even minor ones, made along this line during this past
year?
Secretary GATES. The last time the whole subject of Defense or-
ganization was reviewed was prior to the 1958 reorganization plan
submitted by the President in that year. There have been no overall
studies of the organization of the Department of Defense since then.
Mr. WEAVER. Do you propose to undertake any such studies in the
future?
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Secretary GATES. No. "In the future", however, is a long time.
I do not propose to undertake any this year. I would like to modify
that, if I may. This does not mean we will not do a lot of things
administratively. I presume you were talking about reorganization
actions requiring new legislation.
Mr. WEAVER. That is right.
DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH-THRUST ROCKET ENGINES
Both you and the President, and yesterday particularly, I believe,
General Twining also made the statement that the thrust in these
missiles is of no military significance, even though the Russians out-
perform us in that respect. My question is this: It would seem to me
if we are trying for a bigger payload that thrust would be a very
significant factor.
Secretary GATES. That is correct. It is significant as far as the
prestige of the United States is concerned. We said from the stand-
point of military requirement we have the capability we need with
the TITAN-ATLAS type of boosters. Taking into account their
normal growth potential, we should be able to put into orbit the types
of payloads that are required at this time and as far as we can reason-
ably see ahead.
The bigger payloads would probably be important from a military
point of view when we find a way to put a man in space.
PILFERAGE BY FOREIGN NATIONALS
Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Secretary, one of the problems I ran into while
in the Far East last fall was that of thievery, mostly by local citizens.
I have been told, for instance that our losses in the Philippines
amount to $1.5 million a year. Has the Department of Defense done
anything to correct this sort of situation ?
Secretary GATES. Yes. This has been a problem in Korea. It
has been a problem in the Philippines. In Korea we made some
rather startling progress. I think I testified to it yesterday. The
Koreans themselves ''have taken drastic action. The Korean police
and military now enter stores and confiscate U.S. material on sale
there. So we have really made rather remarkable progress in Korea.
In the Philippines we have also made some progress. I think the
arrangements between U.S. military personnel and the Philippine
police have improved. I think the Philippine Government has in-
creased the number of their constabulary. For the moment, we seem
to be on the upgrade in this respect.
Most of the problem relating to thieving in the Philippines has been
in connection with some Filipinos in our employ who have shot Fil-
ipino thieves. Unfortunately, this got into a rather difficult political
situation in the Philippines. I would say there has been improvement
and we are well aware of the problem. I have never heard a dollar
amount tied to it.
Mr. WEAVER. In other words, you have never made or Defense
never has made any effort to get a dollar count on perhaps our losses
not only in the Philippines but in other places ?
Secretary GATES. I am sure it exists, but I have not heard of it.
I am sure the people at Clark Field and the other installations would:
be able to tell you what was involved.
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Mr. WEAVER. Would it be possible for the Department of Defense
to (=rive the committee in a general way some idea in this respect?
Secretary GATES. I am sure it would be.
(The information will be supplied later for the use of the'
committee.)
Mr. WEAVER. Last November I issued a statement concerning my
trip to the Far East and pertaining to the Philippines, which state-
ment I had cleared with the chairman of this subcommittee. A news,
report carried a statement from a Pentagon spokesman which said
that while I was entitled to my views, they were not shared by the'
Department of Defense.
I am curious to know why the Department of Defense does not agree.
with statements made to me by their field commanders.
Secretary GATES. I am not familiar with the statement, Mr. Weaver..
It might have been the order of magnitude of the problem that was in
disagreement rather than a recognition of the problem, which I aml
sure we would agree with you on.
SAVINGS THROUGH CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIER CONSTRUCTION
Mr. WEAVER. Turning briefly to the aircraft carrier, you mentioned
that a saving of $137 million could be made by having the carrier a
conventional one rather than nuclear. Is that a real saving or is that
something designed to sell this committee?
Secretary GATES. That is a real saving, the $130 million.
Mr. WEAVER. Have you taken into consideration the cost of operat-
ing the tanker fleet needed to keep a conventional carrier in operation?'
Secretary GATES. No. This $130 million is a construction differen-
tial. The cost of operation has not been included in that comparison..
Mr. WEAVER. How about the fuel consumption of a nuclear carrier
compared to a conventional carrier over a period of time? Has that
been taken into consideration?
Secretary GATES. Everything has been taken into consideration,
but the figure we are quoting is purely the construction cost. I think
that the nuclear carrier that we are comparing here is a 4-reactor
carrier, rather than an 8-reactor carrier like the Enterprise. In that
figure we are talking about a carrier using four nuclear reactors for
propulsion, compared to a carrier using conventional propulsion.
Mr. WEAVER. I cannot reconcile in my own, mind how you can say
flatly we are saving $137 million.
Secretary GATES. That is just the difference between buying nuclear
reactors and buying the other kind of powerplants.
Mr. WEAVER. Would it be possible for you to supply us with figures,
as to what it would cost from a fuel-consumption standpoint and from
the standpoint of operating the tanker fleet over a period of time?
Secretary GATES. Yes; we know what a conventionally powered'
carrier costs to operate on a fuel-consumption basis. We do not know
the cost of operating a nuclear-powered carrier because we do not
have one.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Which is the most expensive?
Secretary GATES. To operate?
Mr. OSTERTAG. Yes.
Secretary GATES. Well, as 1. mentioned before, we have not had
actual experience upon which to base a comparison. But, based upon.
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our experience with both nuclear and conventional submarines and
leaving aside the question of military advantages, the fuel costs of
operating a nuclear-powered carrier will be higher than the cost of
fuel for a conventionally powered carrier, although this will be offset
somewhat, as you say, if the cost of operating oilers is included.
Mr. WEAVER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
say to the Secretary I certainly appreciate your frank answers and,
along with my colleagues, I want to commend you on the fine job I
feel you along with General Twining, are doing.
Mr. 4_Arroisr. Mr. Minshall.
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, General, I would be
remiss if I did not join my colleagues in saying to you what an out-
standing job I think you have done before this committee. Your
statements were excellent.
I feel that if you could get to the American 'public and they could
see and listen to you at first hand, a lot of these doubts about our
military posture would be cleared up because your candor and forth-
rightness certainly gets through. You have done an excellent job.
Secretary GATES. Thank you.
Mr. MINSHALL. I have very few questions. Most of my questions
will be placed at the proper time according to the services when they
testify before the conunittee.
STATUS OF BOMARO
There was one thing I would like to ask in carrrying out Mr. An-
drews' request from yesterday. I wondered if we had gotten that re-
port about BOMARC testing program as yet.
Secretary GATES. Yes; we have. We have had five shots of BOM-
ARC?B. The solid fuel booster worked perfectly in all five. The ram-
jet engine failed on all five. We have identified the problem, which
was a problem of a valve functioning. The trouble has been definitely
pinpointed and the tests will start again the end of this month.
Mr. MINSHALL. These are all limited operational tests so far, none
has been accomplished with a simulated warhead?
Secretary GATES. BOMARC?A only; BOMARC?B has not.
Mr. MINSHALL Is BOMARC?A in position or on operational site?
They hoped to have one at McGuire?I think they emphasized the
word "hoped"?by the end of last year.
Secretary GATES. I have the dates of operational units, if I may
look at it for a second. On both BOMARC?A and BOMARC?B,
four squadrons will be operational in fiscal year 1960. These
figures do not count the Canadian BOMARC squadrons.
Mr. MINSHALL. You feel confident that despite the failures in the
BOMARC?B testing program to date you will have in 1961
completely operational?
Secretary GATES. These figures that I have are current programs
and are supposed to reflect any slippages to date.
Mr. MINSHALL. When will the program be completely finished?
Secretary GATES. Completely in being?
Mr. MINSHA LI,. Completely in being.
Secretary GATES. By the end of fiscal year 1963.
Mr. MINS 1-1), LL. How many squadrons will that be?
Secretary GATES.
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REDUCTION OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES
Mr. MINSIIALL. Mr. Secretary, this morning in response to an earlier
query you stated that it was the feeling at the Pentagon that you gave
some faith and credit, as it were, to some of Mr. Khrushchev's remarks
yesterday. You felt that he would reduce the armed forces of the
Soviet Union.
Secretary GATES. I said we should not take it lightly?that it looks,
in a preliminary way, as though he may have to do this to accomplish
his ambitions in connection with his 7-year economic plan.
Mr. MINSHALL. He also stated in his remarks, which I am quoting
now from the New York Times?they have this as a verbatim quote,
Khrushchev speaking?
Almost the whole of the air force is being replaced by rocket equipment. We
have by now cut down sharply and it seems will continue to cut down and even
discontinue the manufacture of bombers and other obsolete machinery.
Would you oil% that the same analysis you gave the general statement ?
Secretary GATES. No.
Mr. MINSHALL If not, why not?
Secretary GATES. My statement, as a preliminary evaluation, deals
with his requirements for manpower in his economic program. It
would not deal with just the manpower required to rim his air force.
We still are going to go on the National Intelligence Estimates and our
own estimates, which have been consistent for quite a long time, on the
size of his air force until we see some other facts.
Mr. MINSHALL. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Thomson.
Mr. THOMSON. At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr.
Secretary, upon your statement presented here, which confirms my
feeling of delight when I saw that you had been nominated as Secretary
of Defense.
Also,
I would like to congratulate General Twining for his presenta-
tion. As last year, it was very helpful.
Now as to this aatement that was just quoted from the New York
Times as to the future disposition of the Soviet as far as aircraft is
concerned. That does not differ greatly from the estimates we have
had in that it says in effect they are going to quit producing but not
quit flying what he already has. Is that not the way you interpret it?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
General TWINING. He has a lot of them, too.
INCREASE IN TITAN PROGRAM
Mr. THomsoN. This committee last year, as set forth in the com-
mittee report, provided funds for a certain program insofar as
ATLAS squadrons and TITAN squadrons are concerned. I notice
a cutback in ATLAS and an increase in TITAN. How many
TITANS have been successfuly shot?
Secretary GATES. Six shots, with two failures.
Mr. THOMSON. A hundred percent successful, achieving all objec-
tives?
Secretary GATES. No. Four successful and two failures.
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Mr. Tuomsox. What is the thinldng that causes us to cut back on
the successful one and to push forward at a greater rate than was
recommended by this committee on the unsuccessful one or the one
not fully successful even as yet?
Secretary GATES. The hardest kind of thinking in the world has
been put on this question because it is a very good and logical, but
difficult, question. The primary reason is that the TITAN has a
greater growth potential in terms of warhead capability and range.
It also has the better potential for the storable fuel which will make it
simpler to handle and also make a much more ready missile. When
it b2comes operationally satisfactory, it will do many things better
than the ATLAS. It will just be a better missile in all respects.
Mr. THOMSON. That is on paper that it is?
Secretary GATES. Yes; so far.
Mr. THomsoN. If it accomplishes the objectives?
Secretary GATES. Yes; that is correct.
Mr. THOMSON. It delivers a larger payload, but we have an adequate
payload in the ATLAS at the present time as far as defense purposes
are concerned, as far as reaction to any potential enemy's move; have
we not?
Secretary GATES. Yes, but it is always handy to have numerous
strings to your strategic bow and the TITAN will signficantly in-
crease the number of megatons you can deliver.
Mr. Tuomsox. If there are any places we should go off the record,
b
please say so. Are there any targets you know of at the present time
that might interest us which the 'X megaton load which the ATLAS
delivers would not be sufficient to kill?
SECRETARY GATES. Again, this gets into the complicated question of
accuracy and What he does with his forces, how much he hardens them,
how much he disperses them. Again, it gets into the question of what
he believes we have and how effective our deterrent is. The TITAN
will give us an improvement in our deterrent posture that will make
it more credible than if we just stuck to the ATLAS program.
General Twining would probably like to augment my remarks.
General Twimicn. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
STORABLE FUELS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES
Mr. THOMSON. On storable fuel that you mention, this circulating
fuel proposition, is that what you mean? I did not have the oppor-
tunity to go into the TITAN program as thoroughly as I would have
liked?and I will try to get a weekend to do it?but on the ATLAS
they are planning on a circulating proposition as far as this liquid
fuel is concerned; is that right? . You circulate it within the missile;
is that right?
Secretary GATES. You are getting,over my, head technically. What
it. means to me, is that an ATLAS missile must be fueled before it can
be fired. A TITAN missile with storable fuels will have its fuel right
in the missile and be sitting there with the. fuel aboard.
Mr. THOMSON. I think probably we should go into this more with
the service involved, but?
Secretary GATES. Particularly with Dr. York. This is very much
in his field.
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Mr. TrromsoN. It was a tough decision for me last year to vote for
or against funds to continue the TITAN program?it is up to you to
do it or not, and it is up to us whether we supply the funds. I went
for the TITAN program because of some of these factors you men-
tioned about such as not putting all our bows on one string or all our
arrows on one bow, or whatever it is, but from what I have been able
to observe and find out since, my thinking is tipping the other way.
Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. THOMSON. General Twining, in your very interesting presenta-
tion you showed a number of Soviet bombers. (Discussion off the
record.)
Mr. THOMSON. One thing that has been of great concern to me as
I have sat on this committee is that perhaps our intelligence infor-
mation, the first step in our evaluation here, or in a field order, is our
principal weakness. Do you see any way of getting more and better
concrete information upon which intelligence could be based, other
than through the mechanism of a reconnaissance satellite?
Secietary GATES. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
TEPEE PROJECT
Mr. THOMSON. While we are on that subject, on about page 10 or 11
of your statement, Mr. Secretary, you referred to this improved in-
formation in communication techniques and that sort of thing. Is
the TEPEE project the Navy talked to us about last year one of
those things that is worthy of consideration?
Secretary GATES. I did not identify the TEPEE by name.
Mr. THOMSON. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Secretary GATES. Oh, yes. This is one of the ideas that come up
from time to time?and we are encouraging any ideas that may pro-
vide increased missile warning capability. This was an intriguing
idea put forward by a scientist in the Office of Naval Research. I do
not think it looks quite as good now as it looked in the beginning.
There are a number of difficult technical problems yet to be solved.
We are going ahead with the research and funds are included in
this budget for that purpose.
Mr. THOMSON. One thing has been particularly annoying to me
since we have all this difficulty with enemy intelligence. I find we
are giving out our intelligence hand over fist. I came back at Thanks-
giving after having been cautioned about this TEPEE project, being
told that it was so simple that any high school physics student could
probably do it. Then it came out and was in all the Washington
papers.
Secretary GATES. No one deplores this more than I.
Mr. THomsoN. It was certainly a shock to me. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
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RELIABILITY OF SOVIET MISSILES
Mr. THOMSON. You compared several characteristics as to what our
missiles were and what we thought the Soviets might have. Re-
liability was not compared.
How do you think they compare in reliability?
General TWINING. Similar to ours.
Mr. THOMSON. I think we were given an estimate of per-
cent on theirs and up to percent on ours.
General TWINING. percent to get to the target area.
Mr. THOMSON. Of the percent that got off?
General TWINING. Yes.
Mr. THOMPSON. Ours is higher.
Secretary GATES. percent in the intelligence.
Mr. THOMPSON. I thought ours was substantially higher than that
now that we have had these continuous successes.
General TWINING. The is exceptionally good in the ATLAS,
and so on.
Mr. TuomsoN. How about the reliability in getting off the pad?
General TWINING. We figure it will be just about what I said.
Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, would it be appropriate to caution
the committee on this discussion? We are talking about some things
here that many people in the Pentagon are not cleared for.
Mr. MAiaox. Proceed as you think best.
Mr. THOMSON. General Twining, I would like to congratulate you
on your statements made, particularly with regard to t us danger of
downgrading our capability. What that gets down to is this thing
that we have all read about?that is the danger of somebody miscal-
culating and setting off a war; is that right? If we give them com-
fort by downgrading ourselves, then they are liable to miscalculate as
they miscalculated in Korea.
Is that what it gets down to?
General MINING. That is right.
I would like to mention here to the committee that I hope that you
have not thought that I am up here trying to make you feel com-
pletely happy about this force that we have. No military man has
ever been happy with what he has, but I want to let you see what we
think the true picture is. I would like to see it a lot stronger.
Mr. THOMSON. I appreciate that, General.
General TWINING. I do not want you to think that I am complacent.
I want to see that you get the picture.
Mr. THOMSON. In the two years I have had the pleasure of listen-
ing to your presentations, I have been particularly impressed by the
realistic approach and objective approach you have tried to take
and in not trying to take credit for something we do not have or
giving credit where credit is not due.
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE
On page 5 of your statement, Mr. Secretary, you make the state-
ment that it is also possible that the Soviets might elect to produce
and deploy missiles in larger quantities than presently estimated.
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If they were to do that, would that produce?as I understood Mr.
Dulles to say it would?the higher levels that were estimated
for any given year in the presentations that were made?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Mr. THOMSON. I would like to also congratulate you, Mr. Secretary,
for making clear on page 8 this: Even with the greater rate of
potential of growth of the economic and industrial facilities in the
Soviet Union as compared to our rate of growth, we still would be
far ahead of them in 1965 and 1969. I appreciate your clarifying that
for the record.
I think there has been too much loose talk and, in fact, I went down
yesterday to the Bureau of Mines appropriations and they were
taking some of these loose figures to justify a bigger appropriation
there. I appreciate that clarification.
I heard statements about this gap in the ICBM, again referring to
the numbers gap. It was not clear in my mind what you were getting
at.
If I understood you correctly, and I would like to have you clarify
it for me, you were saying that even with reference to what was shown
on your chart as to ICBM's, when you compare the two we have a
? slightly smaller number for a slight period in the future?if the
POLARIS missile, though, were to be taken from the water-launch-
ing category and placed up in the ICBM, which you could reasonably
do because you tie a ship together with its range with a shorter range
missile?then we would be up where they are for all practical pur-
poses numberswise.
General TWINING. That would help a great deal, the POLARIS.
In addition to that, we have the attack aircraft on carriers in
the 6th and 7th fleets fully ready.
We have this great preponderance of heavy bombers above theirs.
The whole picture is what I am showing that adds up to this.
In my mind, though I say we would like to have as many to balance
out, we feel, or I feel
Mr. THOMSON. That POLARIS submarine carries 16 missiles.
When you take that times nine, you have 144 and basically you are
saying that although we put them in this separate category of water
launch to be on the conservative side with good logic it could have
gone up in ICBM?
General TWINING. We give the Soviets credit for some of that.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Would you yield'?
Mr. THOMSON. Yes.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Does that mean, General, readiness, operational and
ready to go?
General TWINING. POLARIS?
Mr. OSTERTAG. All of this picture.
General TWINING. Yes, sir; on both sides we have employed the
same comparison criteria insofar as is possible.
Mr. OSTERTAG. Yet, we do not know how ready they are from the
standpoint of launching?
General TWINING. We just assume they are gettinat, ready for them
or they would not be building them.
(Discussion off the record.)
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Mr. THOMSON. Do you give any credit to the Soviets for reload
capability on a practical basis with their missiles?
General TWINING. We do not give ours any either.
Mr. THOMSON. One shot?
General TWINING. Yes.
Mr. THOMSON. Therefore, it would tie in directly to the number of
sites they have as to their actual capability to launch missiles upon
this area that we are interested in defending?
General TWINING. That is right.
Mr. THOMSON. You mentioned that, assuming we are hit first, that
we then do not look to as means of destruction and, number
one, if you first of all have missiles
General TWINING. That is something we should talk about off the
record.
Mr. THOMSON. I am not going to take the time of the committee
again to discuss bow a general war might or might not develop. We
went into that quite extensively last year in the hearings, but do I
take it that as far as the composite thinking is concerned, we still are
thinking of this master retaliation theory and allowing them to fire
the first missile?
Secretary GATES. For a general war?
Mr. THOMSON. Yes.
Secretary GATES. Yes; definitely.
Mr. THOMSON. I still stick to the position I took last year, that
you do not get general wars by somebody thinking about it at night
and saying the next morning, "Push the button."
DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON-TYPE WEAPONS SYSTEMS
I reviewed a little of this and talked to college friends and so
forth who are employed by several different major airplane compa-
nies and I want to congratulate you for the action you have taken on
the B-70 and F-108. It seems to me that if we continue to take half
steps we are never going to take a full stride. We use up the economic
resources we have available by taking these half steps and then it
hampers us in taking a big stride forward to place us way out in front.
In connection with that, is there any thinking going on in the
Defense Department of trying to get a common fighter, a common
bomber, and then to modify that so as to make it adaptable for dif-
ferent services, like the Navy, Marine Corps, or the Air Force?
Secretary GATES. Yes, there is a great deal of thinking and effort
going on in that area. It has been accentuated quite a bit by the estab-
lishment of Dr. York's research and development office. We are
buying the F-105 for close ground support of the Army in the field.
I am sure that if it works out this will be a plane the Marines should
consider. We are also talking about the possibility of more modern
interceptors?not as advanced as the F-108?for continental defense.
In this case one of the three planes under consideration is a Navy
plane, a McDonnell F4H, which is one of the most advanced fighters
in the world.
We are free, completely free, to interchange information and all
services are-
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Mr. TEEGMSON. Mr. Secretary, I hate to interrupt, but I just got
the signal. I will submit some questions for the record, but I would
like to get off in one other area in the time allowed.
PROFICIENCY FLYING
No. 1, proficiency flying. I thought we had that decided last year
and I thought a directive went out. When I was being briefed at
Warren, I was told we had to have more missile crews than I thought
should be required because they had to have some time off for pro-
ficiency flying. When I got out to BMD, a man, whose name I do not i
want to put n the record, brought the problem in focus. I said,
speaking as an individual and. a member of the committee, "I am
ready to give you your flying pay and bring the nonflyer doing a sum-
lar job up by means of proficiency pay to the same level, but I am not
going to give you this airplane for recreational flying."
It costs $120 an hour to fly a C-47. I told him that I liked to ride
a horse but I buy my own horse and feed him my own hay and if he
likes to fly, he ought to do likewise.
He told me that if that were to happen, too, in the next 3 years, he
would quit the service.
They had there about 50 percent rated and 50 percent nonrated
senior field officers.
"How many of you people feel the same way ?" I asked them, and
about 50 percent of the 50 percent who were rated raised their hands.
"Now," I said, "you have really complicated my problem. All we
are trying to do is to put men, money, and materials together to buy
some defense to assure the peace as far as I look at my duty on this
committee. We have taken about all that we can 0-et from the tax-
payer, I think, and sometimes more than is sound to take from him,
but he is putting it up.
"We can buy the materials from these different companies around
us but if you are going to say that I am going to lose men when I take
this money out of your recreational flying, the cost of flying the air-
plane for you, then that makes me take a, new look because that is the
critical item.
"What is the solution to that as long as people are detailed out of
the flying category and over into these missiles which, to me, is long-
range artillery? They take a detail over there because it is the force
of the future.
"What are we going to do about it? Are we going to continue to
take money off missiles to give them this recreational flying, as I view
it?"
Secretary GATES. We reviewed the proficiency flying problem
pretty completely. Somebody had an idea we could save $250 million
a year, and we had a very comprehensive study made. It was the first
paper I signed when my boss, Secretary McElroy, was in Geneva
about the 1st of June. It is true that the proficiency flying pay is the
least of the problem, the pay itself. The real problem from a cost
viewpoint is in the airplane, its maintenance and operation and so on.
Mr. THomsoN. For the record and because of the time limitation,
will you insert a summary of that review and what is now the regula-
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tion as far as proficiency flying is concerned for men not assigned to
flying duty?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
(The material referred to follows:)
PROFICIENCY FLYING
Proficiency flying, as a practice and the numbers of personnel engaged therein,
has been thoroughly reviewed during the past several months. The problem has
been discussed with the White House staff and several presentations given by
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M.P. & R.). We have established a clearly
defined policy in this matter which centers about four major points:
1. Requirements for rated officers will be reviewed and validated annually.
Rated personnel inventories will he adjusted in line with requirements, and
flying personnel engaged in functions not related to flying will be reassigned
to positions where their skills can be more efficiently utilized.
2. Only the minimum necessary proficiency flying will be permitted. Each
service will establish procedures and controls to reduce the total flying activity
of proficiency flyers by granting credit for administrative and support flying
against periodic flying-hour minimums and maximums.
3. Proficiency flying will be performed only by those who need to maintain
flying skills for current or future assignments. Each service will conduct an
annual screening to identify and remove from active flying, personnel who can
no longer be expected to fill positions requiring a rated officer. Personnel will
be identified on the basis of age, grade, occupational specialty, flying experience,
and future aeronautical potential.
4. Each service will implement the provision of the Appropriations Act per-
mitting the payment of flight pay without the requirement to fly to selected
individuals, as determined by the Secretary of each Military Department, who
have held aeronautical ratings for not less than 20 years.
Department of Defense Directive No. 1340.4, May 29, 1959. Subject: "Pro-
ficiency Flying Programs," sets forth in detail the current policy and is
attached to the end of this statement.
Each of the services have reviewed their proficiency flying programs in the
light of the four principles I have set forth above and have issued implementing
instructions. Illustrative of these actions are the following summaries of the
Air Force and Navy:
Air Force Regulation 60-2, "Annual Flying Requirements," has been revised
and published, outlining the Air Force policy that flying time accomplished ex-
clusively for the maintenance of individual proficiency be held to a minimum.
Individual proficiency requirements are fulfilled in conjunction with administra-
tive, support and other type flights to the maximum extent possible, consistent
with operational requirements. Proficiency gained from administrative support
and other type flights serves to reduce the flying hours required for maintaining
individual flying proficiency.
The annual screening to identify and remove from active flying, personnel
who can no longer be expected to fill positions requiring a rated officer has con-
tinued throughout the Air Force. The Central Flight Status Selection Board for
1959 was convened on December 1, 1959, and reviewed the records of 3,399 rated
officers, previously identified through a screening process of all rated officers in
the Air Force inventory. Of the officers identified through the screening process.
over 2,100 have been selected to be removed from flying status. Of the number
selected to be removed from flying status, approximately 1,850 are pilots and 250
are navigator/observers. This emphasizes the continuing vigorous action which
the Air Force has taken annually in this area.
The Air Force has implemented the provision of the appropriation act which
permits the payment of flight pay without the requirement to fly to selected in-
dividuals who have held aeronautical ratings for not less than 20 years to the
following degree:
(1) Pay records of all rated personnel with not less than 20 years rated serv-
ice have been annotated so as to permit the payment of flying pay without flying
as required by Executive Order 10152, dated August 17, 1950.
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(2) In addition, certain rated personnel indicated in the category outlined
in paragraph d. (1 ). above, will be excused from complying with annual profi-
ciency flying requirements as prescribed by AFR 60-2. No flying hours will be
programed or allocated for these selected individuals. The names of the indi-
viduals to be considered have been selected and will be submitted to the major
air commands for review and comment prior to final evaluation by a board of
officers to be convened at this Headquarters. Completion of this process is
expected by February 15, 1960..
In implementation of the Department of Defense Directive, the Navy Depart-
ment has reviewed and revised all current policies, instructions, and regulations
bearing on proficiency flying. As a result of the Navy's review and submission
of revised instructions, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MP&R) on Septem-
ber 25, 1959, notified the Navy that the proposed instructions concerning the
proficiency flying program of the Navy Department had been reviewed and were
approved as being consistent with Defense policy.
In connection with implementing the provisions of the 1960 Appropriations
Act permitting payment of flying pay to selected individuals, who have held aero-
nautical designations for not less than 20 years, without the requirement to fly,
the Navy has established the following categories of naval aviators:
(1) Category I.?Aviators who have held designations as a naval aviator for
less than 20 years and have not reached age 45. (95.5 percent.)
(2) Category 11.?Aviators who have held designations as a naval aviator for
less than 20 years and have reached age 45. (1.1 percent.)
(3) Category III.?Aviators who have held designations as a naval aviator for
20 years or more and have not reached age 45. (0.5 percent.)
(4) Category ITT.?Aviators who have held designations as a naval aviator for
20 years or more and have reached age 45. (2.9 percent.)
In addition, a reduction in maximum annual flight time permitted for profi-
ciency flying by categories was made as follows:
(1) Category 1.-100 hours (no change).
(2) Category IL?From 100 hours to 60 hours.
(3) Category III.?From 100 hours to 60 hours.
(4) Category IV.?From 100 hours to 0 hours if physically qualified.
The Navy does not plan to program aircraft or operations and maintenance
funds to support proficiency flying for category IV aviators. Also category III
and IV will neither be required to, nor permitted to fly any monthly hour mini-
mums although they are entitled to receive flying pay.
As can be noted from a review of the above summaries of Air Force and Navy
action with regard to proficiency flying, the Defense Department is taking aggres-
sive action in this area.
MAY 29, 1959.
NUMBER 1340.4.
ASD (M.P. & R.)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE
Subject: Proficiency Flying Programs.
Reference: (a) Secretary of Defense memo to the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, 1 March 1957, subject: "Proficiency Flying" (hereby cancelled).
I. PURPOSE
This Directive sets forth Department of Defense policy for the administration
of proficiency flying programs to insure that they are operated in an efficient and
economical manner.
U. CANCELLATION
Reference (a) is superseded and cancelled on the effective date of this Di-
rective.
III. DEFINITION
For the purpose of this Directive, proficiency flying is defined as flying per-
formed under competent orders by rated personnel primarily to maintain basic
flying skills while serving in assignments where such skills would normally not
be maintained in the performance of assigned duties.
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IV. POLICY
A. Department of Defense policy recognizes the importance of proficiency
flying as a means of maintaining basic flying skills.
B. Each Service will exert a continuing effort to improve the administration
and management of proficiency flying programs.
I. Requirements for rated officers will be reviewed and validated annually.
Rated personnel inventories will be adjusted in line with requirements, and
flying personnel engaged in functions not related to flying will be reassigned to
positions where their skills can be more efficiently utilized.
2. Only the minimum necessary proficiency flying will be permitted. Each
Service will establish procedures and controls to reduce the total flying activity
of proficiency flyers by granting credit for administrative and support flying
against periodic flying-hour minimums and maximums.
3. Proficiency flying will be performed only by those who need to maintain
flying skills for current or future assignments. Each Service will conduct an
annual screening to identify and remove from active flying, personnel who can
no longer be expected to fill positions requiring a rated officer. Personnel will
be identified on the basis of age, grade, occupational specialty, flying experience,
and futnre aeronautical potential.
4. Each Service will implement the provision of the Appropriations Act per-
mitting the payment of flight pay without the requirement to fly to selected
individuals, as determined by the Secretary of each Military Department, who
have held aeronautical ratings for not less than twenty (20) years.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
A. The Military Departments will review and revise as necessary all current
regulations, policies, and instructions bearing on proficiency flying to insure
that they are in conformance with policies set forth in this Directive.
B. Copies of proposed revisions to regulations, instructions, and policies will
be furnished the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and
Reserve) within sixty (60) days for review and approval, together with a
statement of plans for the implementation of this Directive.
VI. REPORTS
Instructions for the submission of future reports to the Secretary of Defense
will be issued separately, subject to appropriate report control action.
VII. EFFECTIVE DATE
The policies stated in this Directive are effective immediately.
THOMAS S. GATES,
Acting Secretary of Defen8e.
USE OF NONRATED PERSONNEL IN AIR FORCE
Mr. THOMSON. One last question, and you can supply the answer to
this for the record.
I next ran into the proposition from Lowry that the configuration
for a missile wing was going to be two squadrons of airplanes and
one squadron of missiles. Colonels command squadrons, generals
command wings. To me, that was saying to every nonrated man
in the Air Force, when you crank in the proposition if you cannot
fly them, you cannot command them, "unless you can fly you can-
not go above colonel," which is what the level of a squadron com-
mander is. In effect you are saying, unless the man is one of the
one or two fortunate ones who get to be a staff officer or have Gen-
eral Schriever's job, or General Ritland's job, that is it. To me
that raises serious doubts as to whether we can get a defense system,
at any cost. Trained manpower is expensive to obt am n and in some
cases the loss is irreplaceable.
50026-60--13
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Would you comment upon what thinking is going on, what prob-
lems are inherent within the Air Force, as far as the domination of
the flier over the nonflier is concerned and what the effect is upon
manpower retention which is what I consider the most critical in put-
ting men, money, and materials together, to buy defense and assure
peace?
When I got these nonrated people aside and said, "What are you
going to do?" these men on whom we have spent the taxpayer's money
to send them to MIT, Cal Tech, et cetera, and who are the backbone
of the missile program and who now have about 15 to 17 years of
time in and are full colonels?in most instances said to me "We are
going to quit at the end of 20 years."
Secretary GATES. I would be glad to comment for the record if you
would like me to. It would be equally appropriate and perhaps more
appropriate if you were willing to discuss this with the Secretary and
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. This is an important morale
problem and an important personnel problem within the Air Force
itself. I know they are aware of it and I know that they have it under
study. We will comment on the Defense directive on proficiency fly-
ing and Defense thinking about this, but it would be most appropriate
to review this with the Air Force.
Mr. TuomsoN. I made an effort to do that and will continue that
effort.
One last statement. 'When General Olds, who is the commander
of your 15th Air Force which Will have the missiles, and all of them
that we can presently . foresee, as far as I know, under his command,
came to my office in Cheyenne and I presented these two problems to
him. I said, "General, I want you to be helpful to me. How can I
keep both the flier and the nonflier in uniform to provide defense
so we will not have to keep retaining and retraining people for indus-
try, and so forth? I do not See Where we are going to get defense at
any cost that way."
Mr. SixEs. Would you yield to me?
Mr. THOMSON. Just 1 seconcL
General Olds' reply to me was in effect that "I cannot be helpful to
you.'
I am eager to talk to the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force.
I yield. ?
Mr. SIKES. Is it true that in this period when the number of fliers
will be constantly decreasing because ,of fewer numbers of planes in
service that there is almost ,no promotion above the rank of colonel
for a nonflier ?
Secretary GATES. No, it is not true. I have not checked the facts
but I am advised that recent selection boards in the Air Force have
promoted 'to general officers almost half-and-half between fliers and
nonflyers. Certainly, the coming people in all the services, as far as
promotions are concerned, will be these highly skilled technical people
who have postgraduate degrees. It is inconceivable that they would
not be.
'Mr. THomsoN. Inchided'in the Material which you will submit, will
you submit to the committee staff, and a copy to me, the configuration
on the various missile sites that have been so far selected as to?
Secretary GATES. Command?
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Mr. THOMSON. Warren is all missiles; Lowry is all missiles; but
Ellsworth is going to be two and one, and so on down the line.
I was tol.d by one party?now I begin to understand why?the only
site the site-selection team will consider is one with runways. We
cannot get them to look at the ones without runways because they
want to keep this configuration going. I would like to see the sites
that have been selected and what the configuration is going to be at
each site submitted to the committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(The material requested is classified and has been provided the
committee.)
NEED FOR SUPERSONIC MANNED BOMBER
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Secretary, I would like to make a statement and
ask for your comments in regard to a situation which we have dis-
cussed one way or the other several times in this hearing.
In the testimony you have put your best foot forward, so to speak,
with respect to our military strength. It is perfectly proper and
necessary to weigh carefully the elements of our strength, but we also
need to weigh carefully the elements of our weakness. I am sure
that you fully agree with that statement.
It gives me concern that we do not have a supersonic intercontinental
manned bomber. I know that ICBM's are growing more important,
but we plan to rely somewhat on the manned bomber for many years.
Our B-52 is not much faster than some of our commercial airplanes
and in spite of that fact we are downgrading the B-70 supersonic
intercontinental bomber by placing less emphasis on its development
and procurement.
We are not pressing forward as fast as we could on the now
operational B-58 medium bomber which has supersonic capabilities.
I realize that the B-70 project and the B-58 are terrifically, expen-
sive, but I do not want to let budgetary restraints stand between us
and what we need to maintain in the way of military power. . Should
we deliberately slow down in this important field?
I wish you would give your general reaction to this issue that is a
big national issue and a controversial issue within the Pentagon and
outside the Pentagon.
Everybody knows that the Soviets have a great number of fighter
aircraft, far more. than we have. They have ground-to-air missiles.
Of course, the HOUND DOG air-to-ground missile is a significant
element in our attack capability and our retaliatory capability. You
have discussed that And the air-launched ballistic missile but the
HOUND DOG and the other could not be the whole answer. Sub-
sonic bombers are becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack and
that was pointed out last year by General Powers, commander of the
Strategic Air Command, but whether it is pointed out Or not, every-
body knows this. ?
We just do not face a rosy 'picture as to our manned bomber force.
We. are not moving rapidly toward a supersonic bomber force.
Within the framework of these questions which I have raised, I would
like to get, in a nutshell, your reaction to that.
Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, the B-70 project was, like the other
important ones, given every known kind of review by the Joint Chiefs
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170
of Staff, by the technical people, and by all of us. As you have pointed
out, the B-58 and the B-70 are very expensive systems. The Air
Force itself recommended $5.5 billion for the B-70 program to have
some aircraft operational in 1965.
There are many unknowns in this weapons system and there are
many people who believe?and I think probably they would turn out
to be correct?that the B-70 would actually be even more expensive
than that and become operational at a later date than 1965.
This system is designed for the purpose of massive retaliation as
part of our strategic deterrent. But by 1965 we have every reason to
believe that we will have four big missile systems in being and capable
of delivering this same kind of attack. The B-70 would add diversifi-
cation to this attack force as the B-52 bomber does today and will
continue to do for a long period in the future.
It is a matter of prudently choosing where you put your resources
and whether this weapons system, the 13-70, would really be as effective
as the four big missile systems are anticipated to be.
There are problems in the B-70 development. Some of the mate-
rials and components that will be used are not known at this time.
This is a whole new state-of-the-art advance of great magnitude, in-
volving the use of metals and components that are still in the purely
research stage. As to the advantages of increased speed, it is really
a question a judgment because the speed of a bomber does not neces-
sarily markedly reduce its vulnerability. Of course, it reduces its
vulnerability somewhat, but it does not mean that the bomber is
invulnerable. ?
There are some technical opinions that say the B-70 would be quite
a handsome radar target, but since the aircraft does not exist, the
opinions are all theory. But I believe that the B-70 as a complete
weapons system is questionable at this time. The prudent thing to do
is to go ahead with the development of the prototypes and postpone
the complete weapons system. We may not Jose very, much by this
postponement in any event.
Mr. MAHON. Off the record.
? (Discussion off the record.)
Mr. MAHON. During the period when there will be a. gap in the
ICBM area?that is a period which we are approaching?it is argued
very strongly that by a quick acceleration of the B-58 program you
would reduce the hazard, if there is any hazard, in the so-called
ICBM gap.
Have you weighed that carefully?
Secretary GATES. Yes; the B-58 program has had some development
troubles also and we have an enormous investment in the B-58. I do
not think it would quite fit into the so-called gap picture in very
big numbers. It would probably come along a little later than that
and, at the moment, we think the B-58 program recommended in
this budget is the proper approach to it. In this case, we have a very
good opportunity to change our minds at any time because this air-
plane is in production and the research and development work is
principally behind us.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Sikes?
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AIR-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE
Mr. SIKES. I do not believe we have discussed the air-launched
ballistic, missile which General White talked about the other day before
the National Press Club. How soon will the effect of this missile be
felt and how will it be used?
Secretary GATES. This, again, is a research proposition for which
I think there is $60 million in the 1961 budget. That is a pretty hefty
figure for a research proposition. This concept will be pursued. It
has, as a concept, obvious attractions.
Mr. SIRES. IS it still in the design stage?
Secretary GATES. Yes ? as a complete system.
Mr. SIRES. Have we tested some of its components?
Secretary GATES. There have been no test firings of this system.
However, there have been test firings of other test vehicles relating
to this weapon concept.
Mr. SIRES. Will we test components or the weapon itself in 1961?
Secretary GATES. I am sure we will to some extent.
Mr. SIRES. Would it be usable on all of our bombers?
Secretary GATES. The concept is that this would be applicable to the
B-52 and B-58.
Mr. noon. You are talking about a ballistic missile, not the
HOUND DOG?
Secretary GATES. Not about HOUND DOG. This is a ballistic
missile.
MINUTEMAN PROGRAM
Mr. MAHON. When we have the Air Force witnesses before us we
will go thoroughly into the question of whether we are accelerating the
"solid propellant, intercontinental ballistics missile known as the
MINUTEMAN as rapidly as possible.
Would you give us a brief comment as to whether or not we are
doing the maximum in the acceleration of this program?
Secretary GATES. Yes; we are, Mr. Mahon. We are doing it at the
highest priority and have included in this budget money for an initial
production capability.
General Twining reminds me that we have not yet set the force goals
on the MINUTEMAN.
. Mr. MAHON. Is there anything further?
(At the close of this portion of the hearings a series of questions
were propounded to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Mr. Sikes, of Florida; Mr. Flood, of Penn-
sylvania; and Mr. Thomson, of Wyoming. Because of the early print-
ing date for this portion of the hearings, these questions and their
answers will be printed in a subsequent volume.)
Mr. MAHON. It was necessary to start our hearings this year before
the President had formally submitted the 1961 Budget. Therefore,
we have not had the benefit of what the President's budget message had
to say on defense. This might have had some effect on the questions
asked, but I assume that what we have been told is in accord with what
the President will say in his message next Monday. Since the budget
message will be available when these hearings are printed next Mon-
day, I will ask the staff to extract that part of the message pertaining
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1172
to defense and print it as an appendix to this record. It may also be
.well for certain other pertinent tables and segments of the budget to
be printed as a part of tin? hearing record: ' . "
Mr. Seeretary, it has been very helpful' to us sto have your frank and
'very comprehensive presentation. I have noted that all members
interrogating you have, to an unusual degree,' coMplimented you. I
:think these Compliments have been deserved. ,I wish- you every suc-
cess in your extremely important job as 'SecretarY of Defense, and I
Want to thank you for your appearance. Likewise I want to thank you,
General Twining, for again appearing before us this year and giving
us your evaluation of the situation. We feel that we can'rely heavily
upon you in these desperately important matters. ?
') ,
,?
.1 , ; , .1 APPENDIX - .,
. , ? i ,
. BUDGET MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT
. .
' ' ?
Department of Defense?Military.?New appropriations of $40-
577 million are recommended for the military functions of the Depart-
'inent of Defense for 1961.. Expenditures in 1961 are estimated at
$40,995 million. These amounts exclude funds for the development of
`the Saturn space project which I have proposed be transferred to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. ? i ? . .
,
' ? Strategy and tactics of the-U.S. Military forces are now undergoing
one of the greatest transitions in history. The change of emphasis
from conventional-type' to missile-type warfare must be made with
,care, mindful that the one type of warfare cannot be safely neglected
in favor of the other. Our' military forces, must be cap'able of Con-
,tending successfully with any contingency which May be forced upon
US; from limited emergencies to all-put nuclear war.
, ? . ? , ? . 1 ? ::
:Major. national security
?!
?
. ?
Ipiseal.years: ? In millions] r
: I. ? ?
Program or agency
.....
, 1 ,
Budget. expenditm:es.
? r ,
Recom-
mended r
new obli-
gational
' authority,
for 1961
'19591
actual
*I .
rrr 5960 ?
estimate
?
1961
estimate
? ?
Department of DefenseMilitary: ? ,
Military functions: ? ?
Military personnel:
? .,
-11:1
II rri
I,
i?,` ' Present programa`
-$11,801
i$11;959
812,124
'$11,813
I; :Pr oosaendeglaslianttienoni,mrce _etire!nentRay
? 1 Operation
10,384
- -'10,137
22
10, 321
24
10, 527
? v Procurement
? 4 14,410
; 13, 943
13, 602
? 13,085
Research,' development, test, and evaluation_ _
' 2. 859
' 3,680
3.917
' 3,910
Construction
1, 948
.?-? 1, 670
` 1,359
, 1,188
. Revolving funds
--169
?444
? ?350
, . - 30
Subtotal
, 41, 233
40.945
? 40,991
40, 577
Military assistance
2, 340
1,800
L750
- 2,000
Atomic energy
2,541'
2, 675
2, 689
2, 666
Stockpiling and expansion of defense production.
, 312
. , 230
134
39
- ? 1
46,426
45,650
45, 568
2 45, 282
Total?
Additional obligational authority available by trans Cr. $350,000,000.
2 Compares with new obligational authority of $45,517,000,000 enacted for 1959 and $44,749,000,000 in-
cluding $25,000,000 In anticipated supplemental appropriations estimated for 1960. ?? ? ?
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Forces and military personnel strength.?This budget will provide
in the fiscal year 1961 for the continued support of our forces at
approximately the present level?a year-end strength of 2,489,000
men and women in the active forces. The forces to be supported in-
clude an Army of 14 divisions and 870,000 men; a Navy of 817 active
ships and 619,000 men; a Marine Corps of 3 divisions and 3 air wings
with 175,000 men; and an Air Force of 91 combat wings and 825,000
men.
If the reserve components are to serve effectively in time of war,
their basic organization and objectives must conform to the changing
character and missions of the active forces. Quality and combat
readiness must take precedence over mere numbers. Under modern
conditions, this is especially true of the ready reserve. I have. re-
quested the Secretary of Defense to reexamine the roles and missions
of the reserve components in relation to those of the active forces
and in the light of the changing requirements of modern warfare.
Last year the Congress discontinued its previously imposed mini-
mum personnel strength limitations on the Army Reserve. Similar
restrictions on the strength of the Army National Guard contained in
the 1960 Department of Defense Appropriation Act should likewise
be dropped. I strongly recommend to the Congress the avoidance of
mandatory floors on the size of the reserve components so that we
may have the flexibility to make adjustments in keeping with military
necessity.
I again propose a reduction in the Army National Guard and
Army Reserve?from their present strengths of 400,000 and 300.000,
respectively, to 360,000 and 270,000 by the end of the fiscal year 1961:
These strengths are considered adequate to meet the essential roles and
missions of the reserves in support of our national security objectives.
Military personnel costs,?About 30% of the expenditures for
the Department of Defense in 1961 are for military personnel costs,
including. pay for active, reserve, and retired military personnel.
These expenditures are estimated to be $12.1 billion, an increase of
$187 million over 1960, reflecting additional longevity pay of career
personnel, more dependents, an increased number of men drawing
proficiency pay, and social security tax increases (effective for the full
year in 1961 compared with only 6 months in 1960). Retired pay
costs are increased by $94 million in 1961 over 1960, partly because
of a substantial increase in the number of retired personnel. These
increased costs 'are partially offset by a decrease of $56 million in
expenditures for the reserve forces. largely because of the planned
reduction in strength of the Army Reserve components during 1961.
Traditionally, rates of pay for retired military personnel have been
proportionate to current rates of pay for active personnel. The 1958
military pay act departed from this established formula by providing
for a 6% increase rather than a proportionate increase for everyone
retired prior to its effective date of June 1, 1958. I endorse pending
legislation that will restore the traditional relationship between re-
tired and active duty pay rates.
Operation and maintenaince.?Expenditures for operating and
maintaining the, stations and equipment of the Armed Forces are
estimated to be $10.3 billion in 1961. which is $184 million morethan
in 1960. The increase stems largely from the growing complexity
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of and higher degree of maintenance required for newer weapons and
equipment.
A substantial increase is estimated in the cost of operating addi-
tional communications systems in the air defense program, as well as
in all programs where speed and security of communications are
essential. Also, the program for fleet modernization will be stepped
up in 1961 causing an increase in expenditures. Further increases
arise from the civilian employee health program enacted by the Con-
gress last year.
Other factors increasing operating costs include the higher unit cost
of each flying hour, up 11% in two years, and of each steaming hour,
up 15%. In total, these increases in operating costs outweigh the
savings that result from declining programs and from economy meas-
ures, such as reduced numbers of units and installations, smaller
inventories of major equipment, and improvements in the supply and
distribution systems of the Armed Forces.
In the budget message for 1959, and again for 1960, I recommended
immediate repeal of section 601 of the Act of September 28, 1951 (65
Stat. 365). This section prevents the military departments and the
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization from carrying out certain
transactions involving real property unless they come into agreement
with the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives. As I have stated previously, the Attorney Gen-
eral has advised me that this section violates fundamental consti-
tutional principles. Accordingly, if it is not repealed by the Con-
gress at its present session, I shall have no alternative thereafter but
to direct the Secretary of Defense to disregard the section unless a
court of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise.
Basic long-line communications in Alaska are now provided through
Federal facilities operated by the Army, Air Force, and Federal Avia-
tion Agency. The growing communications needs of this new State
can best be met, as they have in other States, through the operation
and development of such facilities by private enterprise. Leg-
islation has already been proposed to authorize the sale of these
Government-owned systems in Alaska, and its early enactment is
desirable.
Procurement, research, and construction.?Approximately 45%
of the expenditures for the Department of Defense are for procure-
ment, research, development, and construction programs. In 1961,
these expenditures are estimated at $18.9 billion, compared to $19.3
billion in 1960. The decreases, which are largely in construction and
in aircraft procurement, and are offset in part by increases for research
and development and for procurement of other military equipment
such as tanks, vehicles, guns, and electronic devices. Expenditures
for shipbuilding are estimated at about the same level as in 1960.
New obligational authority for 1961 recommended in this budget
for aircraft procurement (excluding amounts for related research and
construction) totals $1,753 million, which is $1,390 million below that
enacted for 1960. On the other hand, the new authority of $3,825
million proposed for missile procurement (excluding research and
construction) in 1961 is $581 million higher than for 1960. These
contrasting trends in procurement reflect the anticipated changes
in the composition and missions of our Armed Forces in the years
ahead.
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The Department of Defense appropriation acts for the past several
years have contained a rider which limits competitive bidding by
firms in other countries on certain military supply items. As I have
repeatedly stated, this provision is much more restrictive than the
general law, popularly known as the Buy American Act. I urge once
again that the Congress not reenact this rider.
The task of providing a reasonable level of military strength, with-
out endangering: other vital aspects of our security, is greatly compli-
cated by the swift pace of scientific progress. The last few years have
witnessed what have been perhaps the most rapid advances in military
technology in history. Some weapons systems have become obso-
lescent while still in production, and some while still under devel-
opment.
Furthermore, unexpectedly rapid progress or a technological break-
through on any one weapon system, in itself, often diminishes the
relative importance of other competitive systems. This has necessi-
tated a continuous review and reevaluation of the defense program in
order to redirect resources to the newer and more important weapons
systems and to eliminate or reduce effort on weapons systems which
have been overtaken by events. Thus, in the last few years, a number
of programs which looked very promising at the time their develop-
ment was commenced have since been completely eliminated. For
example, the importance of the Regulus II, a very promising aero-
dynamic ship-to-surface missile designed to be launched by surfaced
submarines, was greatly diminished by the successful acceleration of
the much more advanced Polaris ballistic missile launched by sub-
merged submarines.
Another example is the recent cancellation of the F-108, a long-
rano-6e interceptor with a speed three times as great as the speed of
sound, which was designed for use against manned bombers in the
period of the mid-1960's. The substantial progress being made in
ballistic missile technology is rapidly shifting the main threat from
manned bombers to missiles. Considering the high cost of the F-108
system?over $4 billion for the force that had been planned?and the
time period in which it would become operational, it was decided to
stop further work on the project. Meanwhile, other air defense forces
are being made effective, as described later in this message.
The size and scope of other important programs have been reduced
from earlier plans. Notable in this category are the Jupiter and Thor
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which have been successfully
developed, produced, and deployed, but the relative importance of
which has diminished with the increasing availability of the Atlas
intercontinental ballistic missile.
The impact of technological factors is also illustrated by the his-
tory of the high-energy fuel program. This project was started at a
time when there was a critical need for a high-energy fuel to provide
an extra margin of range for high-performance aircraft, particularly
our heavy bombers. Continuing technical problems involved in the
use of this fuel, coupled with significant improvements in aircraft
range through other means, have now raised serious questions about
the value of the high-energy fuel program. As a result, the scope of
this project has been sharply curtailed!
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These examples underscore the importance of even more searching
evaluation of new major development programs and even more pen-
etrating and far-ranging analyses of the potentialities of future tech-
nology. The cost of developing a major weapon system is now so
enormous that the greatest care must be exercised in selecting new
systems for development, in determining the most satisfactory rate of
development, and in decidinu6 the proper time at which either to place
a system into production or to abandon it.
Strategic forces.?The deterrent power of our Armed Forces comes
from both their nuclear retaliatory capability and their capability to
conduct other essential operations in any form of war. The first
capability is represented by a combination of manned bombers,
carrier-based aircraft, and intercontinental and intermediate range
missiles. The second capability is represented by our deployed
ground, naval, and air forces in essential forward areas, together with
ready reserves capable of effecting early emergency reinforcement.
The Strategic Air Command is the principal element of our long-
range nuclear capability. One of the important and difficult decisions
which had to be made in this budget concerned the role of the B-70,
a long-range supersonic bomber. This aircraft, which was planned
for initial operational use about 1965, would be complementary to
but likewise competitive with the four strategic ballistic missile sys-
tems' all of which are scheduled to become available earlier. The
first Atlas ICBM's are now operational, the first two Polaris subma-
rines are expected to be operational this calendar year, and the first
Titan ICBM's next year. The Minuteman solid-fueled ICBM is
planned to be operational about mid-1963. By 1965, several or all
of these systems will have been fully tested and their reliability
established.
Thus the need for the B-70 as a strategic weapon system is doubt-
ful. However, I am recommending that development work on the
B-70 airframe and engines be continued. It is expected that in 1963
two prototype aircraft will be available for flight testing. By that
time we should be in a much better position to determine the value of
that aircraft as a weapon system.
I am recommending additional acquisitions of the improved version
of the B-52 (the B-52H with the new turbofan engine) and procure-
ment of the B-58 supersonic medium bomber, together with the sup-
porting refueling tankers in each case. These additional modern
bombers will replace some of the older B-17 medium bombers ? one
B-52 can do the work of several B-47's which it will replace. bombers;
are also included in this budget to continue the equipping of the B-52
wings with the Hound Dog air-to-surface missile.
In the coming fiscal year additional quantities of Atlas, Titan, and
Polaris missiles also will be procured. I am recommending funds for
3 additional Polaris submarines to be started in the coming fiscal year
and for the advance procurement of long leadtime components on 3
more?making a total of 15 Polaris submarines and the appropriate
number of missiles. Funds to continue the development and to initiate
production of the first operational quantities of the Minuteman are
also included in this budget.
Thus, four strategic ballistic missile systems will be in development
and production during the coming fiscal year. These, together with
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the manned bomber force, the carrier-based aircraft, the intermediate
range ballistic missiles, and the tactical aircraft deployed abroad, en-
sure our continued capability to retaliate effectively in the event Of
an attack upon ourselves or our allies.
In order to ensure, insofar as practicable, the safety and readiness
of these forces, we have substantially completed the dispersal of
Strategic Air Command aircraft and the construction of alert facil-
ities. These measures will permit a large portion of all our manned
bombers and supporting tankers to get off the ground within 15
minutes after receiving warning of an attack.
I have also authorized the Department of Defense to begin to ac-
quire a standby airborne alert capability for the heavy bombers. This
will entail the procurement of extra engines and spare parts, and the
training of the heavy bomber wings with the ability to conduct an
airborne alert. It is neither necessary nor practical to fly a con-
tinuous airborne alert at this time. Such a procedure would, over
a relatively short period of time, seriously degrade our overall
capability to respond to attack. What I am recommending is a
capability to fly such an alert if the need should arise and to maintain
that alert for a reasonable period of time until the situation which
necessitated it becomes clarified.
Attention is also being given to the safety and readiness of our
land-based strategic missile forces. Except for the first several squad-
rons, strategic missiles will be dispersed in hardened underground
sites. Measures are also beinc, taken to shorten the reaction time of
liquid-fueled missiles. The MINUTEMAN, because it will be solid
fueled, will have a quick reaction time and will lend itself to mobile
use.. the solid-fueled POLARIS to be carried in submarines at sea
is by its very nature highly invulnerable.
Aid defense forces.?Much progress has been made in increasing the
effectiveness of the North American Aid Defense Command organized
in 1957 as an integrated command of the United States and Canadian
forces. The U.S. military elements?consisting of parts of all of our
armed services?are integrated with Canada's Air Defence Command
for maintaining an air defense capability for the entire North Amer-
ican Continent.
While we pay increasing attention to the growing ;threat of a po-
tential enemy's ballistic missiles we should not lose sight of the fact
that for the time being the manned bomber is the major threat. Al-
though some $17 billion has already been invested in defense systems
against manned bombers, excluding the cost of personnel and opera-
tion and maintenance, certain segments have yet to be completed.
These were described in the Department of Defense air defense plan
presented to the Congress last year. The funds recommended in this
budget will substantially complete the programs outlined in that plan.
Specifically, the last major elements of the Nike-Hercules surface-
to-air missile program will be financed in 1961 and the Bomarc inter-
ceptor missile program will approach completion. The related radar
warning, electronic control, and communication systems will also be
further equipped and modernized.
In response to the increasing missile threat, we are pressing to
completion a new system for the detection of ballistic missile attack?
the ballistic missile early warning system. Construction has been
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under way for the last two years and the first segment is expected to
be in operation in about a year.
To provide for an active defense against ballistic missile attack, I
am recommending the continuing development of the NIKE?ZEUS
system, but it will not be placed in production during the coming
fiscal year during which further testing will be carried out.
The NIKE?ZEUS system is one of the most difficult undertakings
ever attempted by this country. The technical problems involved in
detecting, tracking, and computing the course of the incoming ballistic
missile and in guiding the intercepting ZEUS missile to its target?
all within a few minutes?are indeed enormous.
Much thought and study have been given to all of these factors and
it is the concensus of my technical and military advisers that the
system should be carefully tested before production is begun and
facilities are constructed for its deployment. Accordingly, I am
recommending sufficient funds in this budget to provide for the
essential phases of such testing. Pending the results of such testing,
the $137 million appropriated last year by the Congress for initial
production steps for the NIKE?ZEUS system will not be used.
Sea control forces.?Control of sea and ocean areas and sea lanes of
communication is an integral element in the maintenance of our
national security. The naval forces which carry the primary respon-
sibility for this mission will consist of 817 combatant and support
ships, 16 attack carrier air groups, 11 antisubmarine air groups, and
41 patrol and warning air squadrons.
From new construction and conversion programs started in prior
years, the Navy will receive during fiscal year 1961 an unusually large
number of modern ships. These will include the fifth and sixth
Forrestal-class attack carriers, the first nuclear-powered cruiser, nine
guided missile destroyers, seven guided missile frigates, and six nu-
clear-powered submarines. Three more Polaris ballistic missile sub-
marines and a converted guided missile cruiser will also be com-
missioned.
For the coming fiscal year I am recommending the construction of
20 new ships and conversions or modernizations of 15 others. In-
cluded among the new ships is an attack carrier. It is planned to
construct this carrier with a conventional rather than a nuclear
powerplant.
While it is generally agreed that a nuclear-powered attack carrier
has certain military advantages, such as extended range and endur-
ance at high sustained speeds, these advantages are not overriding
as in the case of a submarine. In a submarine, nuclear power pro-
vides the critical advantage of almost unlimited operation, submerged
at high speeds. This enables nuclear-powered submarines to carry
out missions which no conventionally powered submarine, no matter
how modern, could accomplish.
The advantages of nuclear power with respect to the carrier, how-
ever, are not comparable. The primary requirement in a carrier is up-
to-date facilities to operate, safely and effectively, the most modern
naval aircraft. Use of a conventional powerplant will in no way pre-
vent a carrier from functioning as a completely modern and mobile
baSe for fleet aircraft for its foreseeable life. The additional $130
million which a nuclear-powered carrier would cost can be used to
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much greater advantage for other purposes-. I, therefore, strongly
urge the Congress to support this request for a conventionally pow-
ered aircraft carrier.
Tactical forces.?Elements of the ground, naval, and air forces com-
prise the tactical forces which are available to deal with cold war
emergencies and limited war situations, in addition to performing
essential tasks in the event of general war. Recommendations made
in this budget provide funds for modernization and improvement in
the effectiveness of our tactical forces.
Increased emphasis has been given in this budget to improving the
mobility and firepower of the 14 Army divisions and other active
combat elements of the Army and the 3 Marine Corps divisions. Ad-
ditional quantities of new rifles and machineguns employing the
standard NATO ammunition will be procured, as will combat and
tactical vehicles of all kinds, including the new M60 tank, the M113
armored personnel carrier, self-propelled howitzers, trucks and jeeps.
In recognition of the value of artillery in both nuclear and non-nuclear
warfare, an entire new family of self-propelled artillery is introduced
with this budget. This new artillery is lighter, more mobile, and,
utilizing new ammunition, will have a greater range than that of
types currently available.
The Army and Marine Corps will also buy a wide variety of guided
missiles and rockets such as: Sergeant, Honest John, Little John and
Lacrosse for medium and close range ground fire support; Davy
Crockett for an integral infantry-unit close-range atomic support
weapon; and Hawk and Redeye for defense of field forces against air
attack. Army aircraft procurement proposed for 1961 is more than
35% higher than for the current year, and includes funds for sur-
veillance aircraft and for utility and medium cargo helicopters.
The tactical forces of the Army are supported by the tactical air
wings of the Air Force which will also be provided with an increased
capability under these budget recommendations. Funds are provided
for increased procurement of F-105 supersonic all-weather fighter
bombers. These aircraft, with their low-altitude handling character-
istics and large carrying capacities for both nuclear and nonnuclear
weapons, will strengthen significantly the air support available to the
Army ground units.
The three Marine divisions are tactically supported by three Marine
aircraft wings, which will also receive quantities of new aircraft.
(The following is an extract from the highlight statement preced-
ing the Department of Defense chapter in the President's budget:)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY
The 1061 budget for this chapter includes funds both for the military func-
tions of the Department of Defense, as heretofore, and for the military assist-
ance program, formerly carried under the Funds Appropriated to the President
chapter. Although the appropriation for military assistance will continue to
be made to the President, it is now shown with the appropriations for the mili-
tary functions of the Department of Defense.
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_
?t,, , Summary of budget autkoriiationeand expenditures - cit.i
)
0,1. s a '. ? millions] 1`
, . ,?4 - ? a, ' ? ? ' ? 1 n ,.' , t ; .
" Title of appropriation grolips ? ?? ?
? ?
1
''New obligational authority'
, Expenditures
1959
enacted
? . ?
1960 ,.-
estimate
1961
estimate
11959
actual
1960
estimate
1961 ,
estimate
Military personnel-total' ?
$11, 463 '
" $11, 658'
$11, 837
. 511,801
$11, 959
$12, 146
Active Forces I
10;174
10,262
'10,426
' 10,544
" 10.592
10, 741
I 'Reserve Forces - '
649
681
- 612
616
667
611
?
. Retired pay
640
715
799
641
700
794
Operation and maintenance
' ? 10, 195
10,317
, 10,527
', 10,384
10.137
10,321
Procurement-total .
14, 293
. , 13, 090
13,085
14,410
13, 943
13,602
Aircraft ?
? 6;134
'6,343
. 4,75.3
7,658
6670
6,027
Missiles
4, 107
3, 244
3,825
3, 339
3, 500
3,479
'Ships -
1, 947
1, 139
2,035
1, 493
? 1,651
1, 644
Other . .
2, 105
2, 563
. ? 2, 471
1,921
2, 121
2,451
Research, development, test, and evalua-
i
i
tion
3, 775
4, 189
3,910
2,659
3, 680
3, 917
Construction-total,
r 1,384
1,354
1188
1,948
1,670
1,359
'
i .. Active Forces ?
1;358
, 1,291
1,153
, 1,862
1,608
1,302
Reserve Forces
26
73
- 35
86
62
57
Revolving and management funds
57
.30
, 30
' -169
-444
-350
, Total, military functions
41, 168
40,647
40, 577
41, 233
40, 945
. 40,995
. .
r
? r
r
Additional obligational authority available by transfer: 6535,000,000 in 1959; $430,000,000 in 1960;
$350,000,000 in 1961.
, ?
Military personnel.-Total military personnel expenditures (for Active and
Reserve Forces and for retired pay) in 1961 are estimated at $12,146 million,
$187 million higher than 1960 and $345 Million higher than 1959.
Active 'Forces personneZ.-Expenditures for Active Forces military personnel
in 1961 are estimated at $10,741 million, $149 million more than 1960 and $197
million more than 1959. The 1961 program provides for a total strength of
2,489,000 on June 30, 1961, the same as on June 30, 1960, but 14,000 below the June
30, 1959, actual strength. .?
? , ? ?
?
Active Force S military personuel ?
4
, 1In thousands] ?
-
?
June 30, 1959
June 30,1960
June 30, 1961
? -
Total, Department of Defense
.
Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
,
.
. ,
,1
,..
'
e
.
'
II
,
?
'2,503
? ,.
, 2,489
,
2,489
"?
.
' 861
( 626
176
840
'
, i .
870
,. 619
' 175
825
'
'
870
619
. 175
825
Average man-years in 1961 are' estimated' at' 2,488,000, coMpared with an
average of 2,495,0001in 1960 and 2,564,000 in 1959. Despite the decline in 111nn-
years oVer the period, expenditures rise as the estimated average cost per mili-
tary man increases from $4,160 in 1959 to $4,255 in 1960 and $4,330 in 1961. The
increase of $170 per man over the, period is caused 'chiefly by; (1) required in-
creases in the Government's social security contributions as an employer; (2) the
phased increase in the numbers of enlisted men receiving proficiency pay; (3) in-
creased numbers of men in enlisted pay grades E-8 and E-9; (4) a further
rise in the number of dependents; and (5) additional longevity pay reflecting
the rising experience level of the forces.
Most of these factors of increasing cost per man are associated with the
Defense Department's efforts to develop a truly career force. These efforts have
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been successful: recruitment and reenlistment rates have improved; the ex-
perience level of the forces has increased; the average intelligence level of en-
listed personnel has risen; and the rate Of disciplinary cases has been sharply
reduced. However, the very success of this program has produced some in-
creases in personnel costs, which are compensated for by increased overall
effectiveness.
Reserve Forces.?Reserve personnel expenditures in 1961 are estimated at
$611 million, which is $56 million less than 1960 and $5 million less than 1959.
The 1961 budget will provide for about 1,002,000 reservists on paid status at year
end compared with 1,083,000 at the end of 1960 and 1,062,000 at the end of 1959.
The adjusted reserve strengths, as shown in the accompanying table, will con-
tinue to provide an effectively trained military reserve adequate to meet the
requirements of the Armed Forces.
Reserve Forces military personnel in paid status
[In thousands]
June 30, 1959
June 30, 1960
June 30, 1961
Army Reserve
350
358
321
Drill pay status 1
314
300
270
Other paid status
36
58
51
Army National Guard
399
400
360
Navy Reserve
130
137
130
Drill pay status 1
120
129
129
Other paid status
10
8
1
Marine Corps Reserve
46
47
47
Drill pay status 1
45
45
45
Other paid status
2
2
2
Air Force Reserve
65
69
71
Drill pay status 1
57
62
63
Other paid status
8
7
8
Air National Guard
71
72
72
Total
1,062
1,083
1,002
1 Includes 3- to 6-month trainees.
NorE.?Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
Wherever appropriate, the unit organization of the Reserve components is be-
ing changed to conform with that of the Active Forces in order to facilitate their
integration in time of emergency. In the Reserve components of the Army, the
changeover to the Pentomic concept has been virtually completed and, coupled
with other actions, has resulted in considerably higher mobilization readiness.
By the end of 1961, ground elements of the Marine Corps Reserve will be reor-
ganized to conform with the combat elements of the Regular Fleet Marine Forces.
Coupled with the transition to multiple paid drills, this reorganization will effect
a marked improvement in the mobilization readiness of the Marine Reserve
units.
All of the Reserve components participating have benefited from the 6-month
training program. This program, which provides basically trained personnel to
the Ready Reserve, allows the Reserve components to concentrate on advanced
unit or individual training and thus maintain a high state of mobilization readi-
ness. During 1961, the 6-month training program will eontinue to provide the
majority of the necessary input of trained recruits to maintain the Reserve
components at the planned levels.
Many elements of the Reserve components conduct some of their training with
the Active Forces. Other Reserve elements are actually participating in, or
taking over, missions assigned to the Active Forces.
In addition to supporting 27 divisions and numerous other combat units, the
Army National Guard in 1961 will man an increased number of on-site Nike
battalions for the air defense of the United States, thus relieving Active Arniy
units for other duty.
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Also contributing to the mission of the Air Defense Command, the Air National
Guard will continue to maintain a certain portion of its fighter-interceptor force
on "runway alert" and man, on an "around-the-clock" basis, certain aircraft
control and warning radar sites.
Antisubmarine warfare aircraft, destroyers, destroyer escorts, and mine war-
fare ships manned by Selected Reserve crews of the Navy Reserve will continue
to participate in regular fleet exercises. These crews carry standby active duty
orders at all times which, in the event of mobilization, make them and their ships
available for immediate deployment. It is expected that by the end of 1961 there
will be Selected Reserve crews on 58 destroyers, destroyer escorts, and mine-
sweepers, thus making an important contribution to our antisubmarine and mine
warfare potential.
The Air Force Reserve, in addition to providing a pool of skilled individuals
ready to augment the Active Air Force in time of emergency, also maintains a
significant airlift capability in being.
Retired pay.?Expenditures for retired pay in 1961 are estimated at $794 mil-
lion, a total that is $94 million more than 1960 and $153 million more than 1959.
Of the $794 million in 1961, $22 million is associated with proposed legislation
which would authorize military personnel retired prior to June 1, 1958, to receive
benefits consistent with the higher rates of pay provided by the Military Pay
Act of 1958. At the end of 1961, about 289,000 persons will be receiving retired
pay, compared to 254,000 at the end of 1960 and 230,000 at the end of 1959. With
increasing numbers of military personnel who entered service during World War
II becoming eligible for retirement, the numbers and cost of retired persons can
be expected to continue an accelerating upward trend in future years.
Operation and maintenance.?Expenditures for operation and maintenance
activities of the Active and Reserve Forces in 1961 are estimated at $10,321
million, which is $184 million more than 1960, but $63 million less than 1959.
Average man-years for both military and civilian personnel, numbers of
military units and installations, inventories of major weapons such as ships
and aircraft, and the associated steaming- and flying-hour programs, all con-
tinue to decline gradually from 1959 to 1961. Nevertheless, overall operation
and maintenance costs continue to increase. Among the factors tending to offset
the planned reductions in activity levels are higher unit costs per flying hour,
up 11% in two years; per steaming hour, up 15% since 1959; and the higher
unit costs of maintaining and overhauling ships, missiles, aircraft, engines,
etc.. These rising costs are caused chiefly by the introduction of more com-
plex and advanced weapons into the active military forces. For example, the
cost of overhauling a jet engine in the new B-58 is about six times as much as
that for a jet engine in the older B-47. The annual operating costs for a
nuclear-powered submarine are over three times as high as for a conventionally
powered submarine of a similar type.
In addition to these higher unit costs, the expansion of certain going pro-
grams will require increased funds in 1961. The cost of operating and main-
taining the expanding major electronics and communications systems (SAGE,
BMEWS, Missile Master, etc.) will increase by over 70% from 1959 to 1961.
Similarly, funds for that portion of the fleet rehabilitation and modernization
program financed under Operation and maintenance will increase by about 25%
in 1961 over 1960, reflecting continuation of the effort to improve the condition
and readiness of the fleet. The cost of maintaining and furnishing the rapidly
increasing number of family housing units is expected to rise by about 23%
from 1959 to 1961. A modest liberalization of the dependent medicare pro-
gram?through relaxation of restrictions on certain specified medical contin-
gencies?will result in an increased cost per patient.
New activities, such as the civilian employee health benefits program enacted
last year, are a third factor accounting for increased operation and maintenance
costs.
Funds are included to enable the Strategic Air Command to acquire an "on
the shelf" airborne alert capability which, if the need should arise, would permit
a portion of the heavy bomber force to be on continuous airborne alert during
periods of international tension. This program will require indoctrination train-
ing, larger inventories of spare parts (provided for under the Procurement title),
and increased maintenance activities.
Procurement?Because procurement of a major weapons system is so closely
related to the research, development, test, and evaluation of that system a more
accurate picture of the trends from 1959 through 1961 may be obtained by corn-
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bining these two? appropriation groupings. Expenditures for this coMbination
are estimated at $17,519 million in 1961, which is $104 million less than in 1960,
but $250 million more than 1959.
The 1961 budget provides for the procurement of 1,510 aircraft-633 for the
Air Force, 658 for the Navy, and 219 for the Army. The total is 99 greater than
in 1960, although 224 less than in 1959. The reduction from 1959 is, however,
concentrated primarily in trainers and helicopters.
Procurement of both the greatly improved B-5211 heavy jet bomber and the
supersonic B-58 medium jet bomber will be continued during the year, as well as
KC-135 supporting jet tankers. The 1961 procurement will complete the
equipping of 14 B-52 wings. Development work will continue on the B-70
Mach 3 long-range bomber airframe and engines to provide two prototype aircraft
for flight testing in 1963.
An increased number of F-105 supersonic fighter-bombers are planned for
procurement in 1961 over 1960. Because of their all-weather capability, special
low-altitude handling characteristics, and ability to carry a wide variety of con-
ventional as well as nuclear munitions, these aircraft will strengthen signifi-
cantly the close ground support capability of the tactical air forces. Procure-
ment of the 0-130 turboprop transport for tactical airlift will also be continual.
The number of Navy attack aircraft to be purchased, including the supersonic
A3J, will be increased to augment carrier attack and close-support capabilities.
Procurement of the Navy's supersonic FSU-2N and F4H all-weather interceptors
will remain at about the same level as in 1960, but substantially above 1959. An
increased number of the GV-1 tanker-assault transport aircraft and S2F anti-
submarine aircraft will also be procured.
Total Army aircraft procurement in 1961 will increase more than 35% over
1960, including the Mohawk turboprop observation aircraft, the Caribou twin
engine transport aircraft, and the Iroquois utility helicopter used for combat
area movement, medical evacuation, and light cargo. The first production quan-
tities of the Chinook helicopter will also be bought in 1961.
The 1961 budget reflects the continually increasing emphasis on missiles of all
kinds in national defense. Funds for the procurement and production of the
four main strategic deterrent missiles?Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris?
will be further increased. No new funding will be required in 1961 for the
Jupiter and Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles, but procurement of the
Hound Dog and Quail for use by the B-52 strategic retaliatory force will be
continued at a high level.
Funding for the Bomarc and Nike-Hercules air defense missiles will largely
complete the procurement program for these missiles. Procurement of the Tains,
Terrier, and Tartar fleet air defense missiles will continue as additional guided-
missile ships join the fleet.
Funds will also be devoted to continuing the procurement of large numbers of
air-to-air missiles such as Sparrow for the Navy and Marine Corps, Falcon for
the Air Force, and the combat-tested Sidewinder for both the Air Force and Navy.
A wide variety of other missiles for support of the grounds forces is planned
for procurement in 1961. The number of Bullpup air-to-surface missiles to be
purchased in 1961 will be increased considerably over 1960. In the category, of
surface-to-surface weapons, the effort on the longer range tactical missile
Pershing, offering much greater flexibility, accuracy, mobility, and a consider-
ably shorter reaction time than its predecessor Redstone, will continue on a high
priority basis. Additional funds will be provided for the tactical close-support
rockets. Little John and an improved version of Honest John. These, together
with Lacrosse and Sergeant missiles, will provide medium and short range
ground support firepower. A substantial procurement of Hawk missiles, to-
gether with the first production quantity of Redeye?a man-carried air defense
missile?will be made in 1961, to improve the defenses of our ground forces in
the field against low level air attack. For close support of front line troops,
a sizable quantity of Davy Crockett?a man-carried nuclear rocket?will be
procured, and in 1961 the first production buy of an improved guided antitank
missile will be made.
Close ground support firepower will be augmented by the procurement in
1961 of a family of lighter, more mobile, self-propelled howitzers. An increased
quantity of new 7.62-mm. rifles, machineguns, and ammunition will be purchased.
Included in the 1961 procurement program are about 18,000 tactical vehicles;
a third increment of the new 105-mm. armed, diesel powered, medium tanks;
tank recovery vehicles; and lightweight, air droppable, armored personnel
carriers.
50026-60 14
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,The , 1961 shipbuilding program r includes ? the aircraft .carrierifor whin ? ad-
yance -procurement funds were appropriated by the 'CongresSAast /year. How-
ever, it is proposed to construct this carrier with a conventional rather' than a
nuclear powerplant. 'In addition, funds ,are provided for :construction,,of 3
guided-missile ? frigates, 2 ' guided-missile destroyers, 3 nuclear-powered sub-
marines, 3 Polaris fleet ballistic missile 'submarines, and18:other -ships,' for a
'total of 20 ships. ? ? I
,-The buildup of the Polaris fleet ballistic missile submarine force -will continue
at the rate of three submarines per year. The first three were built with funds
made ,available in 1958. , Funds appropriated in 1959 were ? usedi to build six
more--three in 1959 and three in 1960. In addition to the 3 Polaris submarines
scheduled, for 1961, which willi bring .the total to ,12, funding is provided for
the purchase of long leadtime components for 3 more submarines to be started
after 1961. ? ? it - . . .
An additional 14 destroyers will undergo major'. modernization 111111961,
the second annual increment of the fleet rehabilitation. and tinodernization pro-
gram designed, to improve the antisubmarine -warfare capability of the Navy
and to extend the useful life of World War II destroyers.
In the electronics category, additional funds are provided for 'procurement 'of
large radars for two ballistic missile early warning system (MEWS) stations.
Funds are .provided for additional semiautomatic ground 'environment (SAGE)
computers, for the radar improvement program and to extend the air-weapons
control system in overseas areas. The 1961 budget also provides for the develop-
ment of extensive command and control communications for air defense, Strate-
gic Air Command ground forces, and other needs of ,the military services. ?? ?
, ,Research, development, test, and evaluation.?Expenditures for basic and
applied research, and for the development, test, and evaluation of new and im-
proved weapons and equipment under, this title are estimated at 83,917 million
in 1961.
Under the rearrangement of the Defense budget adopted last year, funds for
the development, test, and evaluation of major weapons systems and components
which were previously carried in Procurement accounts, have now been largely
transferred to this title. Those remaining in the Procurement title are sepa-
rately identified. ,
In the aircraft category, the 1961 program emphasizes the development of' a
variety of tactical aircraft,-continues the aircraft nuclear populsion program con-
ducted jointly by the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission, provides for
continuation of the X-15 hypersonic and very high altitude research aircraft,
and increases the development support for the ground launched and manned
Dynasoar vehicle which will have near orbital capabilities.
As in 1960, the category receiving the largest amount of funds will be missiles
and related equipment. Large sums are provided for the improvement of the
range, accuracy, and reliability of the Polaris missile.
Intensive research and .development work will be continued on the Army's
Nike-Zeus antimissile missile. Adequate funds are provided for the full/scale
testing of this system, under, realistic field conditions, in order to ascertain its
-practicability as a weapon system.
Funding is also provided to continue necessary further developmental work on
a wide variety of other tactical missiles just entering the inventory, such as
Pershing and Sergeant; as well as on such more advanced projects as an air-
launched ballistic missile, the Mauler for air defense of the forward area of the
field army, and a new, highly mobile, solid-fuel. missile for direct support of
Army battle groups. . ? ,
Antisubmarine warfare research and development will be continued at 'a high
level, including development of both fixed and mobile submarine detection de-
vices, improved tracking equipment, nuclear depth' charges, and new antisubma-
rine weapons such as surface and submarine launched antisubmarine missiles.
?
,
1. ,
I ? I
? if ' ???? . ?
r .o? ? ! .1..?
?, ,
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Funds are also provided to keep abreast of new developments in chemical
and biological warfare.
For the military space effort funds are provided for satellite systems for
early warning (Midas), reconnaissance (Samos), communications (Notus),
and navigation (Transit). The Department of Defense contribution to the
national space program will also include the development of improved solid and
liquid missile propellants and of advanced guidance and communications tech-
niques, and research in high-altitude phenomena and space medicine. Funds for
the Saturn, a very high thrust booster project, in 1961 are shown in this
budget as a part of the funds requested under the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
Provision is also made for continuation of the present high levels of effort in
basic research in order to add importantly to the share of fundamental knowl-
edge and in advanced research in such areas as materials, seismology, oceanog-
raphy, electronic components, and low temperature physics.
In addition, $150 million is included for the Department of Defense Emergency
Fund?the same amount as in 1959 and 1960. This fund permits rapid exploita-
tion of scientific breakthroughs and unanticipated technological developments
which may occur during the coming year.
Military construction.?Expenditures for military construction in 1961 are
estimated at $1,359 million, $311 million less than in 1960, and $589 million less
than in 1959. Expenditures are continuing to decline as construction of air
defense installations and Strategic Air Command bases move toward completion,
but are expected to level off as missile base construction activity accelerates.
The 1961 program for active forces continues to place increasing emphasis on
missile installations and on electronic facilities for air defense. Funds are pro-
vided for the construction of additional Atlas and Titan operational sites, for
installations to support the initial deployment of operational Minuteman missile
squadrons, and for Polaris weapon system base facilities.
The budget also provides for the improvement of facilities for existing radar
warning and control systems, such as the Pinetree Line, Dewline, and SAGE;
for improved Nike-Hercules radar facilities; and for further extension of the
Loran system.
The program also includes the construction of new research, development, test,
and evaluation facilities. Additional funds are included for the Pacific Missile
Range, and for the construction of development and test facilities for the Nike-
Zeus system.
The existing physical plant of the defense establishment, including water-
front, airfield, maintenance, medical, and housing facilities will be improved and
modernized.
Construction expenditures for Reserve Forces facilities are estimated at $57
million, compared with $62 million in 1960 and $86 million in 1959. The decline
reflects the stabilization of these forces and the tapering off of new facility
requirements. The emphasis is now on urgently needed replacement con-
struction.
Revolving and management funds.?The $30 million of reappropriation shown
under this title for 1961 is the amount to be added to the revolving fund for
Wherry housing. These additional funds will permit the Department of
Defense to continue in 1961 its program of acquiring and rehabilitating Wherry
housing units.
Again in 1961 there will be an excess, estimated at $350 million, of receipts
over expenditures in the revolving and management funds of the Department
of Defense. This excess of receipts will reduce to $40,995 million the Depart-
ment's net expenditures for Military functions estimated under the first six
budget appropriation groups.
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Composition of the Armed Forces.?The 1961 budget for the Military functions
of the Department of Defense provides for major forces as follows:
Department of Defense---Summary of major forces
[Fiscal years 1959-61]
Actual,
Planned
June 30, 1959
June 30, 1960
June 30, 1961
Army:
Divisions
15
14
14
Armored cavalry regiments
5
5
5
Armored combat commands
1
1
1
Brigades (infantry)
2
2
2
Battle groups (infantry)
8
8
9
Field artillery missile groups (heavy) (Redstone)_ _ _
3
3
3
Army missile commands
4
4
5
Army air defense antiaircraft battalions
(85)
(8114)
(87g)
Guided missile battalions (equivalents)
74
7314
8214
Other battalions (gun, skysweeper, automatic
weapons)
11
8
5
Separate surface-to-surface missile battalions
18
24
26
Active aircraft inventory
(5, 199)
(5, 663)
(5, 791)
Helicopters
2,357
2,714
2,840
Fixed-wing
2, 842
2, 949
2, 951
Navy:
Commissioned ships in fleet
(860)
(817)
(817)
Warships
386
383
382
Other
474
434
435
Attack carrier air groups
16
16
16
Carrier antisubmarine air groups 1
11
11
Patrol and warning squadrons
42
42
41
Marine divisions
3
3
3
Marine air wings
3
3
3
Active aircraft inventory
9, 649
8, 657
8, 348
Air Force:
USAF combat wings
(105)
(26)
(91)
Strategic wings
43
40
38
Air defense wings
27
23
20
Tactical wings
35
33
33
USAF combat support flying forces
(145)
(118)
(115)
Air refueling squadrons
60
62
66
MA TS air transport squadrons
27
22
21
Other specialized squadrons
58
34
28
Active aircraft inventory
20,890
19, 513
18, 885
1 Prior to 1960 the carrier antisubmarine capability was represented by 22 carrier antisubmarine squadrons
which have been reorganized into 11 carrier antisubmarine air groups.
Army.?Army forces will total 14 divisions and 25 other major combat units
at end 1961?an increase of 1 battle group and 1 missile command over the force
planned for the end of the current year. There will also be some increase in
the number of separately organized tactical surface-to-surface missile units.
Of the 14 divisions, 7 will be deployed in critical oversea areas and 4 others
(1 in Hawaii and 3 STRAC divisions in the continental United States) will be
ready for immediate deployment to any trouble spot in the world. Other neces-
sary combat and combat-support units will be similarly deployed and ready.
In the air defense guided missile battalions?which increase by nine as anti-
aircraft gun battalions continue to be phased out?the conversion from Nike-
Ajax to the nuclear-capable Nike-Hercules missile will continue at a rapid
pace. The number of Hawk missile battalions for low altitude defense of Army
units overseas will also increase considerably.
The active aircraft inventory will rise during 1961 as modern planes such as
the Mohawk observation aircraft and the Iroquois helicopter are delivered.
During 1961, the Army will also receive significant quantities of new equip-
ment to modernize its ground forces. The new MOO tank, the NATO standard
7.62 family of small arms, the improved jeep, and the M113 armored personnel
carrier will all enter the inventory in quantity for the first time. Also being
received in production quantities for the first time will be the Little John and
Sergeant surface-to-surface tactical missiles, and Davy Crockett, the individual
man-carried nuclear-capable rocket for close support of troops on the battlefield.
Navy and Marine Corps.?During 1961, the Navy will have 817 ships in the
active fleet, the same number planned for the end of the current fiscal year but
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187
a decrease from 1959. There will also be a small decrease in the number of war-
ships, compared with end 1959.
However, during 1961, the fleet will receive from new construction more new
ships than in any year since World War II, except for 1955. Many of these ships
will be either nuclear powered, have a guided missile capability, or both.
During 1961, the fifth and sixth Forrestal-class attack carriers, Constellation
and Kitty Hawk, will be commissioned, replacing older Essex-class carriers. The
first nuclear-powered cruiser, Long Beach, armed with Tabs and Terrier fleet
air defense guided missiles, together with 16 guided missile destroyers and
frigates, will also be commissioned during the year.
The Polaris ballistic missile-firing submarine force will be augmented by three
more submarines during 1961, bringing the total in commission to six by the
end of the year. In addition, six other nuclear-powered submarines will be com-
missioned during 1961.
The antisubmarine warfare forces of the Navy will be significantly improved
during the year. In addition to the previously mentioned new ships, many of
which have improved ASW capabilities, several new items of ASW equipment
will be introduced in 1961. Asroc, a rocket-assisted torpedo and depth bomb;
several new types of sonor equipment; and Dash, a drone ASW helicopter, will
all become operational for the first time. In addition, a new all-weather search
helicopter, the HSS-2, and a new improved carried-based ASW aircraft, the
S2F-3, will be introduced into the fleet during 1961.
While the active aircraft inventory of the Navy will decline, new and improved
aircraft, such as the supersonic F4I1 fighter and the mach 2 all-weather A3J
attack plane, will be introduced into the forces, replacing older models.
The Marine Corps, with three divisions and three air wings, in 1961 will
continue to maintain combat-ready forces organized, equipped and prepared to
deploy immediately anywhere in the world. During 1961, with improved per-
sonnel management and a lower-than-normal loss of personnel the Marine Corps
will be able to allocate a larger percentage of its strength to the combat forces.
This will permit the reactivation by the end of 1961 of a number of battalion
landing teams without any increase in overall strength. In addition, Hawk
guided missile units will be activated for the protection of combat units against
low level aircraft attack.
Combat effectiveness and modernization will be improved during this period
by the delivery of the first increment of the 7.62 mm. (NATO) weapons family
and the introduction of the Davy Crockett weapons system into the Fleet Marine
Forces. Aviation effectiveness will be improved by increased air-to-air guided
missile capabilities; by the introduction of the Bullpup air-to-surface tactical
missile; and by the activation of the first in-flight air refueling squadron, which
will appreciably improve the capability of Air Fleet Marine Forces units to
deploy rapidly to forward areas.
Air Force.?The reduction of two strategic wings reflects a phaseout of older
B-47 medium bombers, and is partially offset by the delivery of the first wing
of the new supersonic B-58 medium bombers and additional quantities of an
improved version of the B-52. Because of their much greater range, larger bomb
load, greater speed, and more advanced electronics systems, a smaller number
of the new B-52's will provide the same or greater combat capability than was
provided by the B-47's phased out. By the end of 1961, 13 heavy bomber wings
will be equipped with B-52's, an increasing number of which will carry the
Hound Dog stand-off missile and the Quail decoy missile. These wings form
the hard core of our nuclear strike force.
More importantly, our retaliatory capability will be further enhanced during
1961 by additions to our long-range missile deterrent force. By the end of that
year, additional units of the Atlas ICBM and the first few Titan ICBM's will
be operational. The number of intermediate range ballistic missile squadrons
deployed abroad with our allies will also increase in 1961.
Important to the security of the strategic force will be the first opera-
tional BMEWS station capable of providing warning of an ICBM attack. This
warning, together with the previously mentioned "on-the-shelf" airborne alert
capability, and the base hardening and dispersal program, will help ensure the
immediate response of our nuclear deterrent force in the years ahead.
The reduction of three air defense wings will be offset by continuing deliveries
of all-weather Century series fighter aircraft and by provision of surface-to-air
Bomarc missile units. By the end of 1961, eight Bomarc squadrons are planned
to be operational, compared to four at the end of the current fiscal year.
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The capability of the tactical wings will be considerably increased by the
availability of additional quantities of the all-weather, supersonic, nuclear-'
capable F-105, and by the growing availability of tactical missiles and im-
proved weapons.
Overall, there will be a decrease in the active aircraft inventory of the
Air Force, primarily through elimination of older aircraft. At the same time,
however, there will be a significant increase in the guided missile inventory.
Summary.?In summary, the 1961 budget for military functions provides for
the Department of Defense as follows:
New obligational authoritg.?$40,577 million, and in addition $350 million
to be derived by transfers from the revolving funds of the Department of
Defense. For the Army there is provided $9,546 million and $260 million to be
transferred from the Army stock fund. For the Navy there is provided $12,013
million and $60 million to be transferred from the Navy stock fund. For the
Air Force there is provided $17,737 million and $30 million to be transferred from
the Air Force stock fund. $1,281 million of new obligational authority is pro-
vided for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Direct obligations.?Total direct obligations are estimated on a comparable
basis at $42,412 million. These are shown by category in the following table:
[In millions]
1959 actual
1960 estimate
1961 estimate
Military personnel
$11, 929
$12, 008
$12, 187
Operation and maintenance
10, 132
10, 300
10,827
Procurement
14, 800
13,605
14, 364
Research, development, test, and evaluation
3, 544
4,268
3,952
Military construction_
1,748
1, 497
1,882
Total, military functions
42, 151
41,679
42,412
By excluding intragovernmental transactions from the amounts in the pre-
ceding table, data can be obtained on obligations which result in the purchase
of goods and services from private individuals and businesses. This measure,
set forth on the following table, more closely portrays the economic impact of
Defense's activity:
Obligations to the public
[Excludes intragovemmental transactions]
[In millions]
1959 actual
1960 estimate
1961 estimate
Military personnel
$11,988
$12, 007
$12, 187
Operation and maintenance
10, 145
10,297
10, 513
Procurement
14,002
13, 265
13,799
Research, development, test, and evaluation
3,550
4,339
3,952
Military construction
1,711
1,504
1,382
Revolving and management funds
?292
?216
?315
Total, military functions_
41,045
41, 196
41, 517
Net expenditures.?$40,995 : Army, $9,383 million; Navy, $11,683
million; Air Force, $18,614 million; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
$1,315 million.
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Recapitulation of budget authorizations, obligations, and expenditures
[In millions]
New obligational authority
Direct obligations
Expenditures
Organizational component
1959 enacted
1960 estimate
1961 estimate
1959 actual
1960 estimate
1961 estimate
1959 actual
1960 estimate
1961 estimate
Army
$9, 381
$9, 679
$9, 546
$9, 555
$9, 966
$10, 008
$9, 468
$9, 349
$9, 383
Navy
11, 820
11,214
12,013
12,147
11,677
12,139
11, 728
11,571
11, 683
Air Force
18, 713
18, 475
17, 737
19, 599
18, 854
18, 994
19, 084
18, 823
18. 614
Office of the Secretary of Defense
1, 255
1, 279
1, 281
851
1, 182
1,271
953
1, 202
1, 315
Total, military functions
41, 168
40, 647
40, 577
42, 151
41, 679
42, 412
41, 233
40, 945
40,995
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k,
LIST OF WITNESSES
Page
Gates, Hon. T. S
1
Glass, Henry
1
Gray, Capt. L. P
1
Lanman, M. H
1
Lincoln, F. B., Jr
1
Logan, H. R
1
Moore, Maj. Gen. R. S
1
Sprague, J. M
1
Twining, Gen. N. F
1
York, H. F
1
(1)
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INDEX
A
Additional appropriations over budget, 1960, utilization of
Air alert program
Aircraft carriers:
Page
56
71
Conventional carrier, savings through construction of
152,
156
Nuclear carrier:
Conventional carrier, savings through construction of
152,
156
Cost of
32
Long leadtime funds for
61,
65
Utilization of
60
Aircraft reductions, savings from
66
Air defense program, adequacy of
53,
145
Air Force:
National Guard, new mission in airlift operations
151
Nonrated personnel, use of
167
Alaska, defense in
123
Antisubmarine warfare:
Additional funds for
63
Conventional carrier, utilization of savings through construction of__
152,
156
Importance of_
51.
Portion of Navy budget
52
Progress of program
131
Research and development
128
Army:
Modernization, additional funds for
63
National Guard and Reserve
114
Atlantic barrier operation_
154
Balance within budget, problem of
68
Bombers:
B-58 program
50,
146
B-70 program
39
Continued use of
153
Modernization of
116
Supersonic manned bomber, need for
169
Budget message and tabular matter
172
Budget, 1961, development of
17
Chemical, biological, and radiological warfare 72
Common type weapons systems, development of_ 163
Conflict of interest policy 94
Contracts, cancellation of 42, 59
Defense capabilities, present 20, 28, 111, 126, 133, 147, 161
Defense program, objectives of 137
Emergency fund, status of 140
(m)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/23:
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/23:
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Ground and tactical forces, levels of
Page
14
High thrust rocket engines, military use of
28,
155
Inflation, effect on defense spending
27
J
Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Chairman, statement of
20
Effectiveness of system
33
Program discussions, participation in
33,
129
Secretary of Defense, closer collaboration with
33,
115
M
Marine Corps, retention and reenlistment rates in
140
Military Air Transport Service
150
Military posture of the United States 20, 28, 111, 118, 126,
133,
147,
161
Missile program:
Additional appropriations over budget, 1960, utilization of
57
Air-launched ballistic missile
171
Antimissile program (see also NIKE-ZEUS)
30
BOMARC program
112,
157
HOUND DOG program
111
ICBM program:
Adequacy of
22
Augmentation of
55,
144
IRBM's; deployment of
70,
149
MACE program
57
MINUTEMAN program
114,
171
Mobility in program
129
NIKE?ZEUS:
Analysis of program
138
Defense capability of
30
POLARIS, position in program
137
Progress of
148
Railway cars, mounting on
72
Retaliatory forces, future role in
134
Storable fuels for ballistic missiles
159
Naval Forces, strength of
12
Nuclear-powered ships, maintenance of
65
0
Officers:
Conflict-of-interest policy
94
Entertainment by industry
92
Promotion of
122
Retired officers employed by industry
75
Personnel situation
141
Proficiency flying
164
Public awareness of reality of power, importance of
120,
126
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/23:
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Page
Reorganization Act, 1958, operations under
146
Reserve forces, levels of
15
Retaliatory and deterrent forces:
Adequacy of
28, 111, 127,
133
Basic requirements for
26
Capability of
133
Defense program, objectives of
137
Missiles, future role of
134
Retired officers employed by defense contractors
75
Revolving funds, transfers from
138
Secretary of Defense, statement of
2
Soviet Union:
Arms reductions
54, 68, 69,
158
Military posture of
143
Missiles:
Increased reliance on
116
Program, status of
22
Reliability of
161
Spending, vested interest in defense
74
Technical organizations, strengthening of
16
WA GMIGHT project
147
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/23:
CIA-RDP91-00965R000601140001-1