(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000200040023-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: PREL

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FROM THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C. -- Col. Pawel Monett, top Polish irtelligence officer
who defected to the West a year ago, gives an up-to-date description of Iron
Curtain intelligerce,operations in the United States in testimony released
today by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.
Chairman Janes O. Eastland (D-Miss.) released the closed session
testimony approved by vote of ftbcommittee members. It is titled "Soviet
Espionage Through Poland."
The Polish Communist Party newspaper Trybuna Ludu reported on June 19
that Colonel Monet has been condemned to death in his absence for desertion.
Col. Monat told the Subcommittee that collection of United States
military information has "top priority" with Z-II, the Polish military
intelligence agency. Operations, he said, are carried on in the United States
and in every country where United States troops or installations are located.
He said there is also a special mission of Z-II to collect information
about all NATO forces throughout the world, and another to evaluate and
disseminate all intelligence about NATO forces.
"The methods used by Z-II are similar to those of Soviet Military
Intelligence," Col. Monet said. "This similarity, of course, is
attributable to the direct control of 2-II by the Soviet between 1951
and 1956, and to the fact that Polish staff officers were given excellent
training by the Soviets during this same period." Since 1956, the control
has been more indirect, Monet said.
He said 2-II uses the offices of military attaches abroad as bases
for directing intelligence activities, They are used in all countries
except those behind the Iron Curtain.
Colonel Monat occupied such a position in Peiping from June 1952
to August 1955, and in Washington from September 1955 to May 1958. He
had returned to Poland when he decided to defect in 1959.
"As attache in Washington," he said, "my activities were like those
of most Polish attaches stationed in Western countries. The cultivation
and recruitment of agents, of course, is one of an (attache's) primary
responsibilities."
(more)
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Included in his duties, he said, was collection of periedicals and
information from reconnaissance and attendance at technical conventions
and exhibits. Colonel Monat and his fellow agents also were required to
purchase technical material and electronic equipment in the United States.
"Our reconnaissance trips were made to gain all information of an
intelligence nature available concerning United States military installations,"
he testified. "Polish military officials would attempt to drive around
the perimeter of an installation making notes and sometimes taking
photographs of the area. . .When military manuevers are being held, Polish
officials attempt to observe the maneuvers and then compare their
observations with the American press reports to determine if such reports
are accurate and true."
Polish intelligence continues to operate against the West regardless
of the current Soviet diplomatic approach, he pointed out.
Besides embassy officials, Monat said Polish intelligence uses
positions in the Polish United Nations delegations and to other international
organizations -- the International Control Commission in Vietnam, and the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea.
Colonel Monet said that the Polish-language weekly newspaper,
&los Ludowy, published in Detroit, is "financed and supported by the
polish Embassy on a monthly basis." The amount paid to the weekly each
month varies "between approximately two and four thousand {dollars) a month,"
he said. The money comes from a sum sent from Poland for use ef the
Embassy in its work.
The witness said he believes the quality of intelligence gathered
by his organization when he was in Washington was "quite good."
For instance, he said "in 1950, 1951, and 1952 the Polish intelligence
got some reports about the American missiles sent over to Germany from
the United States. We learned all of the details -- all of the technical
details about the new missiles. As far as I remember, the missiles were
the Honest John and, probably, the BOMARC."
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TESTIMONY OF PAWEL MONAT
JUNE 13, 1960
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
173540 WASHINGTON : 1960
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COMMITTEE OX THE JUDICIARY'
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
ESTES KEFA V ER, Tennessee
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., Vitssouri
JOHN L. MeCLELLAN, Arkansis
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wytming
SAM J. ER TIN. J5., North Carolina
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
EVERETT MeKINLEY DIRICSEN, Illinois
ROMAN L. IIRUSKA, Nebraska
KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire
SuBoousirrrez To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT A:VD OTHER INTERNAL. SECURITY LAWS
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vire Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansis EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
SAM J. ERVIN, Jst., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire
J. 0. SOUR WINE, Counsel
BEN.A IN M ANDEL. Director of Research
II
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
Monday, June 13, 1960
United States Senate,
Subcommittee to I vestigate the Administration
of the In. rnal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, of
the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice at2:00 o'clock
p.m., in Room 2241, New Senate Office Building, Washington,
D. C., Senator James O. Eastland, p
Present: Senator Eastland.
Also Present: J. G. Sourwine, Chief Counsel; Benjamin
Mandel; Director of Research, and Frank Schroeder, Chief
Investigator.
Senator Eastland. Will you stand up and be sworn?
You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about
to give the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Monat. I do.
Senator Eastland. You proceed, Mr. Sourwine.
1
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2 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
TESTIMOIY OF PAWEL MONAU
Mr. Sourwine. Ct,onel Monet, would ycua please identify
yourself and give thee subcommittee a little information about
yourself?
Mt. Monet. Yes, 31r; my name Is Pavel Monet, I late born
on January 24, 1921 in Stanislauov, Poland. This town is
now known as Stanislav and is part of the Soviet Union. My
father vae a farm overseer on a large estate. After attending
elementary school and completing my Gymnasium studies in 1940,
I attended medical school at the University of Lvov but
dropped out after a few months for financial reasons. After
the Soviet Army had moved into Eastern Poland, I was drafted
into the Soviet Army and attended the Soviet artillery officer
candidate school at Sway in the Kharkov area. In March 1942
vas graduated with the rank of Lieutenant in the Soviet
Army, and served in the Crimea, Stalingrad and Chkalov. In
August 1943 I transferred to the Polish Army of General
Berling and as an artillery battery commander of the First
Heavy Artillery Brigade in the Polish Army First Corps, I
fought from Smolensk to within 50 miles of Berlin. I was
promoted to captain in 1945.
After the war, I continued by career in the Polish
Army, serving successively as a chief of reconnaisance of an
artillery bridage, chief of staff of an artillery division,
and finally, commander of an artillery division. Than from
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 3
November 1947 to February 1950 I studied at the Polish General
Staff Academy in Warsaw. In early 1950 I was selected
along with about ten other field grade officers and five or
ten civilians to be assigned to Polish Military Intelligence,
or 0-11, as it was called at that time. I had been promoted
to major back in 1946 or 1947.
My career in 0-II continued from February 1950 up until
I decided to leave Poland in June 1959. Of my nine years in
Military Intelligence, I spent about six years abroad: From
June 1952 to August 1955, I served as Polish Military Attache
in Peiping and was accredited to both Communist China and
North Korea. Then from September 1955 to May 1958 I was
stationed here in Washingtor. as the Polish Army, Navy and Air
Attaahe. my assignments to 0-II Headquarters in Warsaw
included the positions of Deputy Chief and later chief of
the American Section of 0-II Reports Branch, Chief of the
Military Foreign Affairs Branch, and finally, Chief of the
Military Attache Branch. I was promoted to lieutenant colonel
in 1951 and then full colonel in 1952.
Mr. Sourmine. Colonel, since you apparently were in the
midst of a successful career in Poland -- I note you were
only 31 years old when you were promoted to full colonel --
why did you decide to leave and seek asylum in the United
States? Were you in any kind of trouble after returning to
Poland from your assignment as attache in Washington?
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4 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
Mr. Monat. No, air, not in any way. On the contrary,
my superiors were pleased with my work and had no doubts
about my reliability. I started to doubt the Communist
system during my assignment in North Korea during the Korean
War. Then, reading the secret speech of Khrushehev to the
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, I found many terrible facts about communism which
shattered' faith in it. The Soviet suppression of the
Hungarian uprising served to increase my doubts. But with
the October revolution in Poland and the appearance
that Communism might become more human, I again started to
take hope. Upon returning to Poland in 195B, I found that
all my hopes were not being realized and, what's more, the
last glimmers of freedom brought by the so-called Polish
October were being extinguished. I felt I had to sacrifice
my promising career in the service for ideological reasons
and start a new, uprooted life. Therefore, when the opportunity
arose, I left Poland with my wife and son and asked for
asylum in the United States.
Mr. Sourwine. Ve are sure you will not regret your
decision, Colonel. to you know, we are primarily interested
in hearing your testimony about the activities and methods
of operation of Polish Military Intelligence insofar as they
affect the interests of the United States. What is the
mission of 0-II Colonel?
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 5
Mr. Monat. When 0-II was first established in 1944 as
the Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish
Army., it had as its original mission the collection of tactical
intelligence behind the lines of the German Army for the
Polish and Soviet Armies. At the end of the war, the mission
was changed to include the collection of military information
from overt and semi-overt sources, the establishment in
Western countries of long-term, clandestine sources of
positive information, and the dispatch of agents from Poland
on short observation and collection trips.
Mr. Sourwine. What is the actual size of Polish Military
Intelligence, Colonel?
Mr. Monat. 0I or Z-II. as it has been Called since
January 1953, actually has about 500 staff members assigned
to it. Of these about 80 or 90 are assigned abroad as Military
Attache personnel. Most of the remainder work in Z-II Head-
quarters in Warsaw, in the various components of the organiza-
tion. Among these are the Operational Branch, which actually
is responsible for the conduct of operations to collect
foreign intelligence; the Reports Branch, a technical support
branch; a codes and cipher branch; a ccmmunications unit;
and the usual administrative and support branches. In
addition, there are about 1200 other personnel who are under
the operational and administrative control of Z-I: In
attached units like the Special Parachute/Sabotage Battalion,
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6 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
The Radio Battalion, and Unit 2000. The total, therefore,
runs to about 1700 people.
Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, to that extent is the United
States a priority target for Z-/I
Mr. Monat. The collection of Military information about
U. S. forces is one of the highest priorities 2,11 has. 7-11
operates against the United States not only from the office
of the Military Attache in Washington, but also in every
country in which there are U. S. troops or installations.
For example, part of the mission of theZ representatives
assigned to Great Britain is to collect military information
concerning U. S. Air Force bases, guided missile bases,
munition stockpiles, atomic and conventional Installations,
and U. S. AAA installations on British soil. Similarly, Z11
has a special mission to collect information about all NATO
forces throughout the world. There is even a special section
in the Reports Branch which is responsible for evaluating,
collecting, and disseminating all intelligence about NATO
forces wherever they might be stationed.
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 7
Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, by what means is Z.-II able to
collect information?
Mr. Monet. Z-II collects information from recruited agents,
witting and unwitting informants, overt and semi-overt
publications, and reconnaissance by Z-II personnel stationed
abroad.
Mr. Sourwine. How does Z-II recruit its agents?
Mr. Monat. In several ways. Some agents of course, are
Polish nationals who travel abroad either as tourists,
government representatives, or as merchant seamen. Some agents
are recruited within their own country by members of the Polish
MA's office assigned to that country. These people are care-
fully cultivated before recruitment and eventually asked to ?
supply information about their own military forces, those of
a neighboring country, or on NATO forces stationed nearby.
In carrying out its mission against Western forces, Z-II also
attempts to recruit civilian and military visitors to Poland.
Mr. Sourwine. Please tell us a little about how this is
done.
Mr. Monat. In order to develop leads for the recruitment
of visitors to Poland, the official diplomatic representatives
responsible for issuing visas prepare lists of all visa
applicants and makes these lists available to the Z-II
representative there. That would be either the MA or another
Z-II officer assigned to the prospective visitor's country.
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8 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
The lists are forwarded to Z-II headquarters in Warsaw where
appropriate action is taken for possible recruitment. In
order to ascertain information concerning the background or
the visitor, Z-II initiates the necessary action with the UB
(Polish Security Police) to place mail coverage on the
visitor's relatives residing in Poland. The information
received from the mail coverage is then furnished to the Z-II
staff officer who is responsible for the conduct of the
operation. Any Z-II attempt to use information pertaining
to foreign visitors in Poland is coordinated with the UB in
order to preclude a duplicate recruitment attempt by both of
these organizations. The method of cultivating and approaching
visitors varies in each case. Z-II may not necessarily
approach a foreign visitor while he is still in Poland; rather
Z-II might decide to wait until the visitor has returned to
his own country. It is also possible that some of the
persona recruited as a result of trips to Poland would assume
the status of sleeper agents until such time as Z-II desires
to activate them.
Mr. Sourwine. Does Z-II direct any agents against this
country from any bases outside the United States?
Mr. Monet. Yes, sir. In aline 1959 Z-II was seriously
considering using the so-called third country technique in
order to improve its intelligence collection activities in
various parts of the world. The discussion centered primarily
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 9
on the utilization of this technique in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. These three countries will be considered
as one area of operations for the purpose of utilizing agents
developed in one country in operations directed against the
other countries. For example, A Z-II Mexican agent would be
utilized against the United States and Canada. During June
1959 a deputy chief of Z-II, visited the United States and
Canada for the explicit purpose of Observing and evaluating
the existing conditions of these countries to determine the
feasibility of implementing the third country operational
technique. It is possible that this technique will be used
in European countries as well as on the North American
continent. Z-II is now contemplating the establishment of
additional MA offices in Iran, Greece, Norway, Japan, and
Argentina. A MA office in Argentina would act as a spring-
board for intelligence activities directed not only against
Latin America but also against the United States.
Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, is it possible to make a
comparison between the methods used by Z-II and those used by
Soviet Intelligence?
Mr. Monet. The methods used by Z-II are similar to those
of Soviet Military intelligence. This similarity, of course,
is attributable to the direct control of Z-II by the Soviet
between 1951 and 1956, and to the fact that Polish staff
officers were given excellent training by the Soviets during
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10 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
this same period.
Mr. Sourwine. To what extent would you say there is
guidance and exploitation of Z-II by the Soviet Union?
Mr. Monet. From the inception of 0-II in 1944, Soviet
military intelligence has maintained either direct or indirect
control of O-II activities. Between 1951 and 1957, the
Soviets were in complete control of 0-II. After the transfer
of General Waclaw KOMAR from chief of 0-II to Quartermaster
General in September 1951, a Soviet officer, Major General
KASZNIKOW, was appointed acting chief of 0-II. He had
formerly served as an advisor to KOMAR. Until the beginning
of 1950 there were only three Soviet advisors in 0-II. At the
time of KASZNIKOU's appointment as chief, two Soviet staff
officers were aseianed directly as 0-II staff officers -- not
Just as advisors. The Soviets then adopted a policy of
strengthening the 0-II organization by the replacement of
various military personnel in important positions and by the
application of strict security regulations. In November 1951
about 15 Soviet staff officers from the RU (Soviet Intelligence
Directorate) were assigned to 0-1I. Included among these
officers was Colonel Aleksander SUCHACKI. These officers
were highly qualified in military intelligence and wore Polish
uniforms and assumed Polish military ranks. They were placed
in every responsible position in the 0-II organization. The
Soviets improved upon the 0-I1 organization and introduced
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 11
Soviet intelligence techniques into 0-II operations. 0-II
was under the complete control of the RU. Polish officers
assigned to 0-II were used in minor positions and were advised
to take advantage of the Soviets presence and learn from
their superior training and experience in the military
intelligence field. During this period the Soviets were in a
position to take over any 0-II agents they wanted. I assume
these agents remained under Soviet control when Z-II reverted
to Polish direction.
In January 1952, KASZNIKOW was recalled to Moscow and
Colonel SUCHACKI became chief of 0-II. During SUCRACKI's
tenure as chief, he continued to Guide 0-II from a relatively
ineffective intelligence organization to a highly efficient
military intelligence agency, patterned after the Soviet
military intelligence service. In 1953, SUM-1AM was
replaced by a Colonel WIEDZMIEDZ, another Soviet officer.
Between 1955 and 1956 the majority of Soviet officers
assigned to Z-II were recalled, to the Soviet Union; only three
or four Soviet officers remained, and they were then redesignated
as advisors, Upon the removal of the Soviet officers, all
Positions of responsibility were filled by Polish professional
military officers. In November and December 1956, all remain-
ing Soviet advisors left Z-II. Since then Soviet control over
Z-IX has been indirect rather than direct. There is now only
a Soviet Liaison Officer assigned to Z-II, Commander Igor
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12 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
AMOSOW.
Mr. Sourwine. Excuse me, Colonel, but is this the same
AMOSOW who was assigned to the Soviet Military Office in
Washington, D. C., as Assistant Naval Attache and declared
persona non grata by our Government in 1954?
Mr. Monet. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Are the Soviets now able to exert any
influence on Z-II through him?
Mr. Monat. Yes, sir. After the departure of the Soviet
officers and advisors, RU learned that it is still possible
to exercise a more sophisticated and indirect control through
the person of AMOSOW.
Mr. Sourwine. Please describe to us the mechanics of
Soviet guidance and exploitation of Z-II as it exists today.
Mr. Monet. The method the Soviets use always varies
from time to time, and is dependent on the relationship
between the chief of Z-II and the RU. This relationship with
the present chief of Z-II, General Grzegorz KORCZYNSKI, is
not a good one so far as the Soviets are concerned. As a
result, the RU exerts much of its influence through General
Jerzy BCEDZILOWSE1, the Polish Chief of Staff who still holds
his Soviet citizenship. The Soviets are also assisted in
maintaining their influence over Z-II by the presence within
Z-II of many pro-Soviet Polish staff officers. Through
AMOSOW and BCEDZILOWSKI, the Soviets levy intelligence
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 13
requirements on Z-II. In addition, copies of all reports
prepared by Z-II are furnished to the RU; information concerning
all Z-II sources is also available to the RU. Although the
Soviets do not designate specific areas of operational
responsibility to Z-II or other satellite intelligence
services, the Soviet services can force any of the Satellite
services, including Z-II, to concentrate their operations on
certain geographical areas merely by levying on the services
intelligence requirements pertaining to those areas. The RU
furnishes Z-II with a considerable amount of intelligence
information, which is used primarily by the Reports Branch of
Z-II. Information furnished by Z-II to the RU is evaluated
by the Soviets, and results of the evaluation are made known
to Z-II. I believe Z-II contributed quite a bit of information
to the RU which the RU has officially reported as being of
enormous value.
Mr. Sourwine. Do the RU and Z-II conduct any joint
operations?
Mr. Monet. No, sir;.not to my, knowledge.
Nr. Sourwine. Colonel Monat, for what purpose does Z-II
use the Military Attaches abroad?
Mr. Monet. The Operational Branch of Z-II uses the offioea
of MAls abroad, except those in the USSR, CSR, Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary, China, and North Korea as bases for directing the
covert intelligence activities against all countries considered
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14 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
as potential enemies in any future conflict involving Poland.
Mr. Sourwine. You stated before that Z-II does not use
the Polish MA's stationed in countries of the Eastern Bloc
to direct covert intelligence activities; by this do you mean
the Z-II does not conduct operations at all against the USSR
or other satellites?
Mr. Monet. Yes, sir, that is correct. The only Polish
Military Attache to a Bloc country who conducts operations is
assigned to the Polish MA's office in East Berlin. And his
operations, as well as those of the Polish Military Attache
in the Polish Military Mission in West Berlin, are directed
against West Germany and the Allies in West Berlin and the
Federal Republic.
Mr. Sourwine. What were your duties in behalf of Z-II
while you were assigned as Military Attache to the United
States?
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
15
Mr. Monat. As Attache in Washington my activities were
like those of most Polish Attaches station in Western
countries. The cultivation and recruitment of agents, of
course, is one of an MA's primary responsibilities. In
addition to the collection of overt periodicals, I and
personnel of my office also collected information through
reconnaissance and attendance at technical conventions and
exhibits. Z-II Headquarters also levied on us the require-
ment to purchase technical material and electronic equipment
in the United States.
Our reconnaissance trips were made to gain all informa-
tion of an intelligence nature available concerning United
States military installations. Polish Military Officials
would attempt to drive around the perimeter of an installation
making notes and sometimes taking photographs of the area.
They frequently stop in the city nearest to the installation,
where they usually would visit the Chamber of Commerce office,
the American Automobile Association office, and often, local
drug stores and book stores where they secured the available
published items that concerned that particular installation
and area. At an Installation such as Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
Polish Military Officials visit the museum there and obtain
all pamphlets and publications available to the public.
When military maneuvers are being held, Polish Officials
attempt to observe the maneuvers and then compare their
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observations with the American press reports to determine if
such reports are accurate and true.
As I indicated, it is the practice of Polish Military
Officials to attend many of the various technical conventions
held in cities throughout the United States. Officers gather
all of the data available to the public at the particular
convention and examine items on exhibit at the various booths.
Reports of the observations, along uith any technical material
obtained, are furnished to the Polish Military Attache for
transmittal to Warsaw in the diplomatic pouch.
Many trips performed by Military Attache personnel in
the United States are performed for the purpose of buying
technical publications and electronic equipment. About
the first of each year the Military Attache receives a list
of electronic tubes and other equipment needed by Polish
intelligence. This list of items, prepared in Warsau, is
furnished to the officers assigned to the Military Attache's
office and they are given as,-;ignmenva to purchase the needed
items; in purchasing this equipment the Military Attache
personnel usually do not identify themselves as being from
the Military Attache's office. If an item is ordered for
future delivery, the officer's last name and home addres
or the address of the Polish Embassy annex are all that are
given the store of purchase. Similarly, Polish Military
Attache personnel have ordered by mail United States Army
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 17
training Manuals and subscriptions to military and technical
periodicals without identifying their official connection
with the Polish Government.
I was told that in 1954 the State Department sent a note
to the Polish Embassy in Washington announcing that failure
of official representatives of the Embassy to identify them-
selves as such in correspondence with American citizens or
companies would be considered a violation of the accepted
norms of diplomatic conduct.
Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, how valuable to 'Z-II are the
overt and semi-overt sources available to Military Attache
personnel in this country?
Mr. Monat. Extremely valuable. The United States is
the only country in the world where an intelligence agent
or staff officer can obtain so much information free or
for the expenditure of a nominal sum of money. In other
countries he would have to spend 90% of his time acquiring
such material, and he would never roach the quantity or the
quality of such material obtained so easily in the United
States. Por example', in late 1956 or early 1957 the Polish
Military Attache's office purchased from the Government Print-
ing Office in Washington, D. C., an 18 volume set of books
written by the United States Army Engineers; these books
contain complete information on all United States ports. If
this information had been obtained piecemeal through an agent
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18 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
operation, the Military Attache's office would have been
willing to pay the agent about $50,000. Z-II obtains more
technical material and information in the United States than
in all other countries in the world combined.
Mr. Sourwine. How successful, Colonel, have Z-II
representatives in this country been in their efforts to
recruit Americans as agents for Z-II?
Mr. Monet. Based on material I read in Warsaw, I have
concluded that the Z-II representatives were relatively
successful in the recruitment of agents for military
intelligence, especially in late 1940s and early 19500s.
/ do know that during my tour here, Z-II did not have any agents
being run out of the MA's office. The recruitment of agents for
political and economic information is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, or UB as it is commonly called.
Mt. Sourwine. What specific efforts do you know of
that have been made by Z-II to recruit agents here? What
is their approach?
Nt. Monet. There are many different methods. For example,
I remember one which required a lot of effort but was un-
successful. During the fall of 1956 and early 1957, Z-II
Headquarters decided to furnish the MA's office here with
letters written by people in Poland to rellativee in the United
States. Z-II instructed the MA's office that these lettere
were to be personally delivered by Polish officials. Z-Ille
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 19
plan was that in this manner, friendships with the relatives
here could be developed with the aim of eventual recruitment
of these people for Polish Intelligence. Most of the officials
assigned to the MA's office during this period participated
in this program. The officials did not identify themselves
to the relatives as being co nnected with the Polish Military
but only as officials of the Polish Embassy: Many of these
letters were delivered in various cities in the Eastern part
of the country, from Washington, D. C. to Massachusetts. I
don't recall any of the names of the recipients of the
letters, but dux1r4g the duration of this project, no one from
the MA's office here was successful In recruiting anyone.
Frankly, I thought the idea was a crazy one. ,Because of the
apparent lack of success,the woject was abandoned early In
1957.
Actually, there were two theories in Z-II on how to.
run operations in the United States. I maintained that Z-II
should confine its recruiting activities to native-born
Americans oho do not have a Polish background. I felt that
even though these people may be harder to recruit than Polish-
speaking Americans, they are less likely to fall under the
suspicion of the FBI. Most of the Z-X/ staff, on the other
hand, wanted to concentrate on the Polish-American colonies
here. They argued only that emigre groups are more likely
to be receptive to recruitment because of their hereditary
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20 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
ties with Poland. In my opinion, their theory an based less
on reason than on an incomplete understanding of the situation
in the United States.
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Mr. Sourwine. Colonel Monet, from your experience what
courses of action does Z-II take to neutralize agents they suspect
to have been doubled?
NV. Monat. In cases in which a controlled Z-II agent is
suspected of operating against Z-II on behalf of a foreign
intelligence service, Z-II has four alternatives open to it.
They can "freeze" the agent in place, explaining to him that he
is to remain frozen until recontacted. The purpose of this
action is to confuse the hostile intelligence service since
Z-II would eventually sever all contact with the agent without
informing him to this effect. Or Z-II could maintain contact
with him in order to feed misleading information through him
to the intelligence agency of the foreign power. A third
method used by Z-II is to lure the agent into Communist
controlled territory in order to seize him for a detailed
interrogation and eventual imprisonment. Finally, in cases
wherein the security of ZAII's operations have been consider-
ably jeopardized, Z-I/ will coordinate with the UB to arrange
for the assassination of the agent.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you believe that Z-11's operations are
affected to any great extent by the alternating political
atmosphere between East and West? By that I mean do you
believe that changes in the Soviet tactical propaganda line
have any influence on the degree to which Z-II directs its
operations against the United States?
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Mr. Monet. No, there is no connection other than to
increase the delicacy of an operation. Polish intelligence
continues to operate against the West regardless of the current
Soviet diplomatic approach. In early 1959, I remember I
attended a talk given to Z-II by General BORDZILCWSKI. He was
angry with Z-II and said we were not fully carrying out our
mission. BORDZILOWSE1 said that Z-II would have to become
more aggressive in every way. For one thing, he ordered Z-II
to start using friendly Polish-Americans as a means of access
to native Americans for recruitment purposes. He also added
that 2-Il should see to it that an aggressive arm take care
of kidnapping or liquidation of former Z-II officers who had
emigrated or fled abroad and are now working with the West
against the East.
Sourwine. What is the attitude of the Polish
intelligence services toward the use of Communist Party members
in the Mated States?
Mr. Monet. The MAts office does not have any official
contact with the Communist Party of the United States.
Furthermore, there are no special orders issued to Z-II
representatives here to use Party members as agents. There are
two reasons for this policy: first, to avoid compromising
the Communist Party; second, Z-II feels that more than half
of the CP-USA members are working with the FBI. Although I
do not know definitely the policy of the UB in this regard,
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 23
there is a general inclination in Polish intelligence to not
use CP members as agents. One reason for this feeling is
based on a belief that CP members are used by the Soviets.
Therefore, there might be a danger of comprising a Russian
operation if the Poles tried to develop CP members for their
own purposes. However, in a particular instance, if Polish
intelligence know of a CP member who would make a good agent,
worth the risk involved, efforts would probably be made to
recruit him -- but only after the Warsaw authorities had
cleared their intention with the appropriate authorities in
Moscow. This would not be done though just in order to use a
person at the level of a mere informant.
Mr. Sourwine. Are there any other cover positions
besides the Military Attache's office to which Z-II can assign
its staff officers in the United States?
Mr. Monta: Yes, in 1958 Z-II also had two slots available
to them as staff members of the Polish Delegation to the
United Nations. These positions were being held by Z-II
staff officers with the ranks of captain and major. In 1959
Z-II decided to give up one of its UN slots in return for one
in the Polish Embassy in Washington.
Mr. Sourwine. Are there any other Polish delegations to
international organizations which are used as cover for Polish
intelligence?
Mr. Monet. Yes, sir. t believe I mentioned Unit 2000 as
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24 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
one of the organic components of Z-II. This is the administra-
tive body to which are assigned all Poles on the International
Control Commission in Vietnam and the Neutral Nations Super-
visory Commission in Korea. From its origin in 1953 until
April 1959, Military Unit 2000 was under the administrative
and operational control of Z-I, the First or Operations
Directorate of the Polish General Staff. In about December
1958, Z-II decided it would be to their advantage to assume
the administrative and operational control of the Unit. /n
about January 1959, General KORCZYNSKI, as chief of Z-II,
wrote a letter to General Bordzilowski, the Chief of Staff,
recommending such a transfer of authority. .In his letter,
KORCZYNSKI justified this transfer by stating that members of
this unit in Vietnam and Korea have intimate contact with
other foreign representatives to thece countries. The real
reasons KORCZYNSKI desired the change -- although he did not
mention it in the letter -- was that in 1958, Z-II had begun
to use Dbit 2000 for three purposes: first, to secure back-
ground information about the non-Polish representatives on
the commissions; second, to provide experience to young
inexperienced intelligence officers through contact with
foreign nationals; and, finally, to spot potential staff
officers for Z-II from among the non Z-II Poles on the
delegations. BORDZILONSKI concurred in Z-II's request, and
the administrative and operational control of Unit 2000 passed
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 25
to Z-II in.April 1959. The Unit is still dependent on the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for policy guidance, just as it
has always been since its inception. At the time of the
transfer of authority, Unit 2000 abroad consisted of approxi-
mately 120 people. Of these about 40 were regular, uniformed
Polish Army officers, one was a member of Z-II, and the
remainder were from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UB
and the Army's counterintelligence service.
Mr. Sourwine. Aside from the positions you have already
mentioned, what other official Polish positions abroad are
available to Z-II for cover purposes?
Mr. Monat. Z-II also uses the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Ministry of Foreign Trade for cover purposes. Until
November 1958 only a verbal agreement existed between Z-II
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding cover for Z-II
staff officers in diplomatic offices abroad. In November 19546,
a conference was held in the Polish Foreign Ministry and was
attended by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, the chief of
Z-II, General KORCZYNSEI and another Z-II staff officer. The
conference resulted in a written agreement which alloted to
z-II a certain number of cover positions in diplomatic installa-
tions in various Western countries.
Although no such written agreement exists between Z-II
and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, there is a verbal agreement
which allows Z-II to send its staff officers abroad in the
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26 SOVIET ESPIONAGE lint?UGH POLAND
guise of legitimate representatives of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade.
In September 1958 about twenty Z-II staff officers were
placed in various positions in the two ministries and
stationed in Poland. These officers are being trained in
these ministries for eventual cover positions abroad. These
officers are retained by the minietries until such times as
Z-II assigns them to positions abroad as legal representatives
of the ministries. These Z-II officers will utilize their
employment with the ministries as cover for Z-II and cannot
be arbitrarily assigned by the ministries without prior
approval of Z-II. In order to preclude compromise or mis-
assignment, the identities of these Z-II personnel are limited
to a very few official!) in the ministries and Z-II Headquarters.
Other than approving the assignment of these personnel abroad,
Z-II is not responsible for any of the administrative
processing, such as paasport applications, and so forth. This
responsibility lies with the appropriate ministry. These
personnel are used in a civilian cover and are not affiliated
with the military, as are the Military Attache personnel.
Mr. Sourwine. In describing the organization of Z-II,
I believe you mentioned a Radio Battalion. What are the
functions of this unit?
Mx. Monet. The Radio Battalion has its headquarters in
Wales, which is about one hundred miles east of Szczecin,
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 27
Poland. I believe the equipment used by the Battalion is
capable of covering any part of the world in which Polish
Intelligence has an interest. The Battalion is responsible
for the constant monitoring of military broadcasts of Western
armies in Europe and for the operation of radio direction
finders to locate communication facilities of Western armies
in Europe. In the event of a war involving Poland, the Radio
Battalion will be used to maintain communications between
Z-II Headquarters and Z-II agents operating in Western
countries. This unit is the best equipped and most effective
Polish communications unit in Poland.
Mr. Sourwine. How does the Radio Battalion procure its
equipment?
Mr. Monat. Most of the equipment is obtained from the
Soviet Union and is of extremely high quality. Some parts such
as electronic tubes are purchased in Western countries by Z-II
representatives stationed abroad. I have already mentioned
the way in which MA personnel in the U. S. are able to
purchase electronic equipment. Most of this is destined for
the Radio Battalion.
Mr. Sourwine. Colonel Monet, you have been discussing
the way in which the Operational Branch collects its informa-
tion against the Western defense establishments. Would you
tell us please what is done with this information when it
reaches Warsaw? I presume this is where the Reports Branch
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28 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
you mentioned comes in.
Mr. Monet. This Js correct. The Reports Branch evaluates
all the information received from the Operational Branch's
covert and overt sources. Among these would be agent reports;
newspapers, books and periodicals; and the information gained
through the monitoring of foreign commercial and military radio
broadcasts. The Reports Branch also is responsible for the
editing of military field manuals pertaining to the table of
organization, order of battle, and tactios of Western armies.
It also prepares and disseminates training material about
Western armies, and annual and special intelligence require-
ments for the guidance of the collectors. The Reports Branch
also edits and disseminates intelligence publications for use
by the Polish General Staff. Finally, it prepares military
intelligence studies on all Western countries and special
studies for use by other Polish governmental agencies.
me. Sourwine. Specifically, what other Polish govern-
mental agencies would receive these special studies?
Mr. Monet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of Internal Affairs or UB, as it is known, and the PZPR, the
Polish 'United Workers' (Communist) Party.
Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, this brings up an interesting
point; what influence, if any, does the PZPR have on the
overall operations of Z-II?
Mr. Monst. Although Z-II is responsible to the chief
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 29
General Staff for its activities, the PZPR has always exerted
considerable influence on the overall operations of the Z-II
organization. The two Polish chiefs of Z-II since 1946,
Generals Waclaw KOMAR and Grzegorz KORCZYNSKI, were appointed
an the basis of their high political standing. It was not
unusual for the chief of Z-II to receive instructions from
the PZPR Central Committee to either lessen or intensify
operations against a particular country. Instructions from
the PZPR Central Committee did not necessarily come through
channels, that is, from the Ministry of Defense. Rather they
were given directly to the chief of Z-II from the Central
Committee in the form of high level political advice. The
PZPR is also instrumental in influencing the Chief of 2-Il
in the assignment of individuals as military attaches abroad.
Mt. Sourwine. Colonel, while you were stationed in
Washington, to what extend did you coordinate your activities
with the Soviet and other Satellite military attaches stationed
here?
Mr. Monet. Well, generally a Polish MA maintains no
more than a social contact with the Soviet MA, and this was
true in my case. The Polish MA is not required to coordinate
any Intelligence activities with the Soviet MA. There is no
official exchange of information between the two. It is
possible, however, that a Soviet MA might unofficially request
the Polish MA to furnish information concerning the results of
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30 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
a field trip which the Polish MA might have made. This is
strictly an unofficial request and the cooperation of the
Polish MA depends entirely on his personal relationship with
his Soviet counterpart. Caeca of cooperation aro very rare
duo to possible embarrassment to the Polish MA. For example,
if a Polish MA furnished certain information to a Soviet MA,
this information would be quickly transmitted to Moscow by the
Soviet MA and also to Warsaw by the Polish MA. The informa-
tion from the Polioh MA would eventually also be transmitted
by Z-II Headquarters to Moscow. Upon receipt of this informa-
tion, Moscow would ay the information Is old and already in
their hands." Such a reaction would be embarrassing and
disconcerting to the Polish Military Attache involved. Thus
few Polish Military attaches cooperate with ouch requests
since a fulfilment might reflect right back on them unfavor-
ably.
Mr. Sourwino. What is generally the relationship between
Satellite MA's stationed in the West?
Mr. Monet. Primarily this is only a social relationship;
some intelligence information is exchanged and, if necessary,
assistance given by the Bloc MA's to help in the accomplish-
ment of their respective missions.
Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you said you were at one time the
chief of the Military Foreign Affairs Sub-Branch. Would you
toll us please the mission of this organization?
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31
NV. Monat. I was the head of this branch for a brief
period in 1952 while it was still an organic part of Z-II.
in 1953 it was removed from the Z.-II organization and placed
directly under the General Staff of the Polish Army. Its
basic mission, however, has always remained the same. The
Military Foreign Affairs Branch is responsible for the official
contact and necessary liaison between the Polish Army General
Staff and the foreign military and attache personnel assigned
to Poland. In addition to its protocol type activities, the
branch is also responsible for maintaining current information
on the foreign military personnel and their families assigned
to Poland. These files include all available personal data
and reports of attache activities as furnished by the UB.
About two and a half years ago there was a strong possibility
that the Military Foreign Affairs Sub-Branch and the Military
Attache Branch would be consolidated under Z-II. There is a
good chance this consolidation may have occurred since I left
Poland. This would be a great advantage for the Z-II since
it would thereby gain complete jurisdiction over the Military
Foreign Affairs Sub-Branch.
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32 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, in addition to the material that
you have covered so far, there are some matters that Mr. Mandel,
our Director of Research, wishes to inquire about. And with
the permission of the Chairman, Mr. Mandel may go ahead.
Mr. Mandel. Colonel, will you tell us a little bit about
the relationship between the Polish Embassy and the Polish
Communist paper in this country as you know about it?
Mr. Monet. Yes. I know about the relation between the
Polish EMbassy and the Glos Ludowy. This newspaper is financed
and supported by the Polish Embassy on a monthly basis.
Mr. Mandel. Do they contribute directly to the paper
from the Embassy or is it done in some indirect manner?
Mr. Monet. This is done in a covered way to the newspaper.
Mr. Sourwine. DD you know how these payments are made --
are they made in cash?
Mr. Monet. Yes; those payments are made--
Mr. Sourwine. In United States currency?
Mr. Monat. Yes; in United States currenoy.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where this currency comes from?
Mk. Monet. It comes from Poland.
Mr. Sourwine. It is actually shipped to the United States?
Mr. Monet. No. They do not ship it. It is included in
the sum sent by the Polish National Bank to an American bank
for the use of the Embassy in its work.
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 33
, Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether it is transmitted by
EMbassy personnel or through other channels?
Mr. Monat. That depends, but mostly it is transmitted
through the Embassy personnel in Washington.
Mr. Sourwine. Is this a fixed amount each month or do
they seek only to meet a deficit?
Mr. Monat. No, it is not a fixed amount. It varies
between approximately two and four thousand a month.
Mr. Sourwine. Monthly?
Mr. Monat. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Nat Einhorn?
Mr. Monat. Yds. I know Nat Einhorn. I met him for the
first time in 1955 in the Polish EMbassy, Washington.
Mr. Sourwine. Does he hold a position with the Polish
EMbassy?
Mr. Monet. Yes; he is working in the Polish EMbassy
in the Consular Section.
Mr, Sourwine. Colonel, for a period of about two years,
in 1950 and 1951, you were head of the Reports Section of
is that right?
Mr. Monett, Yes,
Mr, ? Sourwine. The American Section?
Mr. Monet, Yes; American Reports Section in the Polish
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34 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
Military Intelligence.
Mr. Sourwine. Dur:.ng that time what can you tell us about
the types of material Which came in in the reports that
crossed your desk?
Mr. Monet. Most of the material which crossed my desk
came from various sources from the United States, Canada,
and from West Germany. And they all were concerned with the
American Army, the Navy and Air Force and the military economy
of the United States. They dealt primarily with the organization
and order of battle of American units around the world, with
technical data concerning new armaments introduced in the U.S.
armed forces, and with American military personnel - especially
in high positions.
Mr. Sourwine. Was your intelligence good with regard to
the top level in our military organization?
Mr. Monat. Yes, I think, yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did this intelligence include predictions
with respect to coming changes in our top military organization
or was it concerned entirely with changes which had taken place?
Mr. Monat. It was concerned with changes which had
taken place and with predictions of the future.
Mr. Sourwine. Were the predictions good, so far as you -
remember, that is, did the predictions turn out to be accurate?
Mr. Monat. Not always.
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35
Mr. Sourwine. What was the general level of accuracy of
those predictions, good, indifferent or bad?
Mr. Monat. I think the general level was quite good.
Mr. Sourwine. In other words, the Polish intelligence
about this country is good enough to be able to predict with
a relatively high degree of accuracy the changes which are
about to be made in our top level military organization?
Mr. Monat. That is very difficult to answer, because
there were some predictions that were correct -- there were
others that were completely false -- but if I may state
generally, there were many correct predictions.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember any specific predictions
that were made which turned out to be accurate?
Mr. Monat. I remember several, not concerned with
personnel, but rather with changes in organization, order of
battle of the American troops, and technical data; those were
fairly correct.
Mr. Sourwine. You say you remember them -- you remember
that there were such instances, or do you mean that you remember
the specific details?
Mr. Monet. Oh, no, I remember there were such instances.
I do not remember the specific details.
Mr. Sourwine. With regard to new armaments do you
remember any particular instances of reports concerning new
armaments?
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36 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
Mr. Monet. Yes. I remember talks and reports about new
American planes,-the F-86, P-84, F-100, and the H-36 and B-47.
I remember, also, early reports about the possibility of using
atomic warheads with the field forces.
Mr. Sourwine. The practical use of atomic weapons?
Mr. Monet. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. How early did you get these reports?
Mr. Honat. It was about 1951. There was speculation
about the possibilities of using them.
There were, also, reports about new American aircraft
carriers and new American airplanes.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall about when you had your first
reports respecting the tactical use of atomic weapons in the
American forces as more than speculation?
Mr. Monet. I read the first speculations in various reports
in 1951 and 1952. Then when I returned from my assignment to
China in 1955, there was a general conviction that the American
Army had tactical atomic weapons. Also, in 1950 and 1951 and
1952 the Polish intelligence got some reports about the American
missiles sent over to Germany from the United States. We learned
all of the details -- all the technical details about the new
missiles. As far as I remember the missiles were the Honest
John and, probably, the BOMARC.
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND 37
Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell us, please, what you know in
detail about the special parachute sabotage battalion of 0-II?
Mr. Monat. It is the only separate battalion of this kind
in the Polish Army. It is comprised of about 500 men stationed
in Wroclaw. The mission of that battalion is to prepare
sabotage and paratroop groups which will be used during wartime
in Western Europe, especially in Germany.
Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you have given a good deal of
information about the role of Red China and the Soviet Union
in the Korean War. This is a subject upon which you have
written an article which will appear in an upcoming issue of
Life Magazine, is that correct?
Mr. Monat. Yes. That is correct.
Mr. Sourwine. Is all of the material in your Life Magazine
story entirely factual?
Mr. Monat. Yes. This material is entirely factual,
based on my own personal experience in North Korea and China
between 1952 and 1955.
Sourwine. With the permission of the Chairman we
will endeavor to get a copy,of this material and offer it as
an annex to this record.
For the present time, Colonel, would you just outline
what you have said with regard to those matters?
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Approved For Release 2006/12/04: CIA-RDP91-00965R000200040023:9
38 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
Mr. Monet. My artiole, "Korea From the Other Side", in
the June 27th issue of LIFE Magazine deals with my personal
experience in Korea, where I served as the Polish Military
Attache between 1952 and 1955. I show there the important role
played by the Soviets in preparing and conducting the war, and
describe my contacts with the Russian officers and men who took
active part in the conflict. Another topic covered is the
Chinese take-over from the Koreans of the real burden of
pursuing the war.
I also stress the relations between the Chinese and
Russians, Russians and Koreans, and Koreans and Chinese. The
desire of the Korean people to stop the war against the will
of their rulers is also described.
A part of the article pertains to the diplomatic colony
in Pyongyang and to the attempts by Polish intelligence to
gain as much information as possible about the Western forces
- especially American - taking part in the fighting. The
final portion of the article is devoted to the work of the
Neutral NationeSupervisory Commission, and especially to the
method by which the Polish and Czech members of the Codmission
helped the Sino-Korean side to conceal violations of the
armistice agreement.
Senator Eastland. Is that all?
Mt. Sourwinc. Yes, for the time being.
Senator Eactlend. The hearing will be adjourned subject
to the call of the Chair.
And we thank you, Mt. Monet, for your appearance hero
today.
(Whereupon, at 2:45 o'clock p.m., 4-J,
3 Ube 01:31311t tee
adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)
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Approved For Release 2006/12/04: CIA-RDP91-00965R000200040023-9
INDEX
(Nom?The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no signifiance to
the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organiza-
tion in this index)
A
American Automobile Association
Page
15
Amosow, Comdr. Igor
11,
12
Argentina
9
Berlin
2
West
14
Berling, General
2
BOMARC
36
Bordzilowski, Gen. Jerzy 12,
22,
24
Bulgaria
13
Canada
9,
34
China
13,
36
Red
3,
37
Chkalov
2
CP?USA
22
Crimea
2
CSR
13
Einhorn, Nat
33
FBI
19,
22
First Heavy Artillery Brigade
2
G
German Army
5
Germany, West
14,
34
Glos Ludowy (newspaper)
32
Great Britain
6
Greece
9
Hungarian uprising
4
Hungary
13
International Control Commission
24
Iran
9
Japan
9
IC
Kasznikow, Maj. Gen
10,
11
Kharkov
2
Khrushchev (secret speech to 20th Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union)
4
Komar, Gen. Waclaw
10,
29
Korczynski, Gen. Grzegorz 12, 24,
39
25,
29
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40 SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
Korea
"Korea From the Other Side" (article)
Page
24
38
Korean war
4, 37
Latin America
9
Life magazine_
38
M
MA's
14, 15, 19
Mexican agent
9
Mexico
9
Military attach?
5, 8
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
25, 28
Ministry of Foreign Trade
26
Ministry of Internal Affairs (UB)
18,
21, 22, 25, 28
Military Foreign Affairs Branch
31
Monat, Col. Pawel (testimony of)
1-39
Moscow
11, 23
NATO forces
6
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
24, 38
North Korea
3, 4, 13
Norway
9
0
Oak Ridge, Tenn
15
October revolution in Poland
4
I'
Peiping
3
Planes (American)
36
Poland
3,
4, 7, 8, 18, 20
Polish Army
2, 3
Polish Army First Corps
2
Polish Army General Staff
31
Polish Army, Navy, and Air Attach?
3
Polish Delegation to the United Nations
23
Polish Embassy in Washington
l'olish General Staff Academy
16,
17,
19, 23, 32, 33
3
Polish Government
17
Polish Intelligence
19
Polish MA _
29, 30
Polish Military Attach?
3, 16, 17, 38
Polish Military Intelligence
3, 4, 5, 6, 7
0-II established in 1944
5, 10, 11
Z-I
24
Z-II since January 1953 5,
10,
11,
12,
13,
14,
15, 17, 18, 21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26,
27, 28, 29, 30
Administrative and support branches
5
Codes and cipher branch
5
Communications unit
5
Headquarters in Warsaw
3, 5, 8
Mexican agent _
9
Operations branch
5
Recruit agents
7
Reports branch
5
Polish Military Mission in West Berlin
14
Polish National Bank
32
Polish United Workers' (Communist Party)
28
Pyongyang
38
PZPR
28
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE THROUGH POLAND
Radio Battalion
41
Page
6
RU (Soviet Intelligence Directorate)
10,
11, 12,
13
Rumania
13
S
Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Army
5
Smolensk
2
Soviet Army
2
Soviet artillery officer candidate school
2
Soviet Intelligence
9
Soviet Intelligence Directorate (RU)
10,
11
Soviet MA
29
Soviet Union
37
Special Parachute/Sabotage Battalion
5
Stalingrad
2
Stanislawow, Poland (now known as Stanislav,)
2
State Department
17
Suchacki, Col. Aleksander
10,
11
Sumy
2
Szcezecin
26
T
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
4
UB. (See Ministry of Internal Affairs.)
UB (Polish Security Police)
8
Unit 2000
United States
9
U.S. Air Force bases
6
U.S. Army Engineers
17
University of Lvov
2
V
Vietnam
24
Walcz
26
Warsaw
3, 5,
8, 16,
18
Washington
3, 6,
23
Wiedzrniedz, Colonel
11
Z-I. (See Polish Military Intelligence.)
Z-II. (See Polish Military Intelligence.)
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Approved For Release 2006/12/04: CIA-RDP91-00965R000200040023-9
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Remarks: Attached is a copy of the testimony of
Colonel Pawel Monat, the Polish defector, who
appeared before the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee in executive session last week. Als4
attached is a copy of the Subcommittee's press
release on this testimony. Monat's article on
his experiences in Burma and Korea is in the
current issue of LIFE magazine.
STATI NTL
Assistant Legislative Counsel
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