COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000200020027-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 5, 1960
• Content Type: OPEN

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COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
PART III
TESTIMONY OF GEN. C. P. CABELL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AGENCY
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1900
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
ESTES KEFATJVER, Tennessee ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., Missouri ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
JOSEPH 0. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming
SAM J. ERVIN, Ja., North Carolina
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
J. G. Sou wi rE, Chief Connect
BENIAMIN MANDEL, Director of Research
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Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, That the testimony of Gen. C. P. C'abell given
in executive session on November 5, 1959, with the consent of the
witness, be printed and made public.
DEcEMSER 14, 1959.
JAMES O. EASTLAND.
THOMAS J. DODD.
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN.
OLIN D. JOHNSTON.
EVERETT M. DIRI{SEN.
ROMAN HRUSKA.
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.
K. B. KEATINO.
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COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1959
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTi-noi
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
TVasliington, D.C.
The subcommittee met., pursuant to call, at 10: 30 a.m., in room
2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chair-
man.) presiding.
Present : Senators Eastland, Olin D. Johnston, and Roman L.
IIruska.
Also present : J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel ; Benjamin Mandel, di-
rector of research; and Frank W. Schroeder, chief investigator.
The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN. C. P. CABELL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General CABELL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this op-
portunity to appear before your committee.
My subject today is, of course, communism in Latin America.
Boris N. Ponomarev, a key member of the central committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet, Union, wrote the following regarding
Latin America in the October 1958, issue of Kommunist, the most
important official Communist Party, Soviet Union, theoretical inaga-
zine, and I quote :
Latin America is a seething volcano. As in one country, so in another * * *.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you got another copy of this? I do not have
that one. I would, like to follow you.
General CABELL. I have made a few changes, Senator, but I do not
have another copy. This is the only copy that I have. [Reading:]
Latin America is a seething volcano. As in one country, so in another, out-
bursts are taking place which are sweeping away reactionary regimes and loosen-
ing the nooses which U.S. monopolies have thrown on their economy. The Com-
munist Parties of Latin America ever more closely coordinate their activities in
the struggle against the common enemy-U.S. Imperialism. The revolutionary
movement is of a universal nature. Its main support is the socialist camp.
Collaboration with and infiltration of popular movements, for ex-
ample that of the Batista in the thirties, and of Castro in the fifties-
has been communism's most effective weapon in Latin America.
The Communists base their present strategy on what they call the
national liberation struggle.
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142 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
The CII UIItir. _ When he said its main support. is the Socialist
camp, he meant the Communist camp
General CAnr?..L. That is their innocuous term or polite term for the
Communist camp, Senator.
The CnaraauN. Yes.
General CABL .I.. The so-called national liberation strategy seeks to
offset Communist numerical and political weakness through inter-
national organizational support and clandestine techniques of infil-
tration and coordination.
The immediate objective of the strategy is to provoke political or
revolutionary action by sympathetic non-Communists, but politically
influential elements, for the purpose of establishing an environment
within which th, Communist Party is free to organize and expand.
The Commun sts hope for the establishment of governments which
are, at least, ne-itral in the East-West struggle, if not actively pro-
Soviet, and which will guarantee them political opportunity equal to
that enjoyed by genuine political parties.
It is within such a framework that the Communists then hope to
achieve the so-ailed peaceful transition to socialism, which will find
a tell l,orary alliau,ce with the national bourgeoisie within it, govern-
ment of national units' gradually replaced by it Communist-controlled
"people's democracy.'
The program of communism in Latin America is designed to de-
velop unity of a.?tion around popular issues such as antipathy to dic-
tatorships, inflation, a desire popular
greater industrialization, nationa.li-
zatiorn of resources, and wider and more stable markets.
It particularly strives to develop international and national labor
unity in support of Communist objectives.
The program seeks to promote neutralism through exploiting the
fear of wars, nn-lear dangers, unpopular treaty obligations, and ter-
ritorial sovereignty issues.
It encourages Opposition to U.S. participation in regional programs
affecting Latin . merica.
The program also involves expansion of the Communist propa-
ganda ap paratus to include a network of news correspondents who
will develop support for the "national liberation" strategy, while
discrediting free world news agencies as agencies of imperialist
propaganda.
The technique:' of Communist action are both overt and clandestine,
legal and illegal, national and international.
techniques are carried out by the national Cpnnnunist Parties
and their fronts, with support from the "fraternal" Communist
Parties abroad, and the international Communist f ronts. All of these
operate through known Communist Party members and secret party
members in nominally non-Communist organizations.
The actions of these national Communist Parties are supported or
paralleled by actions taken by the Soviet and satellite diplomatic and
commercial missions and their agents.
The Communist Party enjoys legal status or de facto legality in
nine Latin American countries. However it is able to operate with
relatively little opposition in a number of other countries, and it is
organized and active on a clandestine basis in virtually all countries.
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 143
Where it operates legally or semilegally, as in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico, and Ecuador,
it strives to expand its membership and its propaganda organs.
It uses such countries as operational bases for the support of activ-
ities in countries where the party is proscribed. Thus, activities in
Paraguay are supported from Argentina and Uruguay. Activities in
Central America and the Caribbean from Cuba and Venezuela.
The clandestine organization of the Latin American Communist
Parties is being improved with the help of training by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, and of China.
Where necessary, international and national communication is by
encoded letters sent through accommodation addresses or by couriers,
who may travel under falss names and with fa]se documentation.
Communist literature may be imported under false inventories;
financing is accomplished through a great variety of channels which
conceal the extent and origin of funds.
Mass recruiting, as attempted several years ago, has in some cases
been deemphasized, while emphasis has been given to selective recruit-
ing of key individuals and secret members.
More effective use is being made of opportunities to engage in legal
activities, despite illegal status, such as the development of publica-
tions defending all points of view.
Many parties are developing secret directive bodies paralleling the
overt organizations.
The actions of the Soviet-bloc governments support the "national
liberation" strategy, thereby complementing the activities of the
national Communist Parties and fronts in Latin America.
These actions involve propaganda support, the expansion of official
representation, the broadening of cultural contacts, and development
of commercial relations.
Official bloc propaganda and news services applaud the role of
nationalists in revolutions, strikes, and demonstrations to show that
the masses are in revolt against "North American monopoly capitalism
and its allies."
They denounce cooperative actions to defend Latin America against
communism, or to strengthen national economies without Communist
participation or Soviet aid.
Bloc propaganda dissemination is being improved through expan-
sion of book stores, cultural and friendship societies, and other outlets.
China, for example, has recently established a press outlet in Latin
America, and has given more radio time to Latin American broadcasts.
. In addition, Communist propaganda prepared in Western Europe,
Africa, and Asia, based upon and supported by Soviet-bloc efforts,
also supports the "national liberation" struggle in Latin America.
The Communist-bloc countries are also seeking greater official rep-
resentation and wider official contacts.
At present, the Soviet Union has diplomatic missions in only three
Latin American countries, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico.
Missions of satellite countries of a diplomatic, consular, or commer-
cial nature are located in these countries, as well as Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, and Colombia.
Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam have no rep-
resentation.
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144 COMMJNIST 'THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
In this effort t.lro Communist governments are using every oppor-
tunity and charnel to urge an expansion of official diplomatic and
nondiplomatic representation, dangling the bait of profitable trade
with the bloc be1'ore both governments and private interests.
I, or example, n 1058 the holding of the meeting of the Interparlia-
mentary Union in Rio do Janeiro gave bloc delegations it chance to
campaign for tl exchange of diplomatic missions and to hint at great
trade possibilities.
The cooperation of influential legislators or other officials is en-
listed through general campaigns and discreet efforts by visiting
groups from the bloc or by local friendship societies.
The CIrAIrrlr:t:c, Could I ask you a question there?
General CAnut.r,. Certainly.
The Cimin-.i .t:c. What do you think of the possibilities of trade be-
tween Latin Anu?rica. and the Soviet Union?
General C.tnrMeaning do we think that there is a large market
in Latin nieric ,?
The Clr:tritlr:\ .. Yes, sir; for Soviet goods.
General ('anEI L. I tlrinlc there is a market there, Mr. Chairman, be-
cause they are p??oducers of many raw materials. The Soviet Union
is expanding its _ndustrial base. It would like to get more foreign ex-
change. It would lilac to use their trade opportunities as a cover
for other and more sinister operations.
do I think that they would seek to force the pace of trade with Latin
~ltnerien, altlton.li it aright not be completely economically sound
otherwise.
The Cii,trmr.t:, In outer words, you think they would take com-
ruodit ies that. are needed in the Soviet Union by the Soviet people and
trade with Latin America in order to further political ends of the
Soviet Goverrnnt at in Latin America?
General ('anr:JJ,. Yes. 1 anm sure of that. That is their aim.
The ('ir.tiaM.ty-. Yes.
Senator IUu 5r__t. General, do you have any knowledge of any offer
reportedly made recently by representatives of the Russian Govern-
nient of :a $200 million credit. to be expended in Russia. in the acquisi-
tion of any type of Russian industrial products?
A second part to that question would be whether or not that related
in any way to the suna.r business in Cuba.
General Cmmr t? We are not aware of a $200 million offer. We
have heard rccer thy of several offers which, altogether, might total
around $300 million. It. is not unlikely that such a large offer might
be made for prol.:rgancla purposes and that. the implementation might
bo in terms of smaller credits arranged through Communist "cover"
firans of Soviet. b:oc. commercial representatives in Western countries.
These might be a rranged directly with some autonomous agency of
the Cuban Goveriunent, such as the Agrarian reform Institute. We
seek to be alert to such reports and attempt to confirm them and
establish the principals involved. We are also aware of the possi-
bility that the Cuban Government. may turn to the Soviet bloc for
purchases of jet aircraft or other nrilit.a.ry equipment.
Offers, or rumors, of extremely large Soviet credits could not help
but be related to sugar, Cuba's cllief source of income. The Com-
munists have long advocated less dependence on the U.S. market and
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 145
have. propagandized the advantages of trade with the Soviet bloc.
The Soviets certainly have an interest in supporting the Cuban Com-
munist Party program. On the other hand, it is true that anti-
Communists have an interest in rumors which will increase our alarm
over Communist influence in Cuba.
Shall I continue, Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
senator, JoHNsToN. Are they having an trouble in disposing of
their sugar in Cuba, all that they produce
General CABELL. Yes; they have to sell. They cannot possibly dis-
pose of the Cuban
The CHAIRMAN. Would you speak a little louder, please, sir?
Senator JOHNSTON. What I have reference to is: have they sold
or are they able to sell all of the sugar?
General CABBLL. About a month ago the Cuban Sugar Stabilization
Institute stated that the holdover this year would be between 1 mil-
lion and 1.2 million tons. This will be large compared to last year's
holdover of some 600,000 tons.
The CHAIRMAN. That sold to us is at a price level that is roughly
a hundred percent above the world price.
General CABBLL. I am not knowledgeable on that.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator JOHNSTON. That is about what it amounts to.
General CABFILL. To continue, Mr. Chairman
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
General CABELL. Nearly all the bloc governments have been active
in the promotion of cultural contacts. They have used these con-
tacts to discredit the charges against Communists and derogatory de-
scriptions of the Communist countries, as a means of cultivating and
converting carefully selected non-Communists, and as a means of
establishing a precedent for the development of official contacts.
The development of a campaign for increased trade with the Soviet
bloc is presented as a means of freeing the Latin American countries
from their dependence on the U. S. marlet.
This campaign is designed primarily to appeal to bourgeois elements
in official and business circles, but is also used to appeal to worker
groups, to whom it is described as the solution to wage and living
standard problems. This trade campaign has, as yet, had little real
impact in Latin America.
The major role of the bloc diplomatic establishments is to comple-
ment, rather than direct, the activities of the local Communists,
through implementation of overt Soviet foreign policy.
The bloc establishments concentrate on usual objectives, that is,
cultural interchange, the development of commercial relations, and
the presentation of Soviet positions on international issues, as a means
of improving the climate for the growth of the local Communist
organizations and increasing their prestige.
Through binational centers, such as the Mexican-Russian Cultural
Exchange Institute, they distribute Marxist literature and propa-
ganda films, and arrange for the exchange of visits by the various
individuals and groups.
Under the cover of the binational centers, the diplomatic establish-
ments are able to maintain close contact with key Communists or
Communist sympathizers.
43354-60 Pt. 3-2
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146 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
However, the n:ain purpose of these contacts is to develop sympathy
for the Soviet Union among non-Communist elements rather than to
direct local Coma unitt Party activities.
The direction cf the various local Communist Parties and the vari-
ous national affiliates of the international fronts is achieved primarily
through international meetings held in conjunction with a Communist
Party congress or Plenum, or at. an international front meeting, or bi-
latoral meetings of Communist Party representatives in Moscow.
There is good evidence, however, that certain diplomatic officials are
also Communist Party of the Soviet Union representatives, who have
the responsibility for monitoring the activities of national Commu-
nist Parties and tieir leaders, and for reporting on these developments
to Moscow.
These representatives also maintain clandestine contact with various
Communist Part ,.r leaders for the purpose of clarifying the Moscow
line, advising on its application, approving the travel or training of
party members it the Soviet Union, and attending to minor financial
details. There is also evidence that certain officials are engaged in
espionage.
Soviet and satellite subsidization of national Communist Parties
through diplomatic missions is known to occur.
In Latin America, however, such direct subsidization appears less
significant than financing through any of a number of indirect
channels.
The origin of Funds is concealed. Promises of financial aid made
by the Soviet or ';hinese Communist officials to party leaders are in-
tentionally vagu(, and implementation is apt to be achieved through
a variety of devices, such as payment through the translation of books,
the awarding of a "peace prize' to a local sympathizer, the negotiating
of it lucrative coitract with a local sympathizer, gifts attributed to
popular collection campaigns and fraternal fronts abroad, or the inter-
national solidarity fund of the World Federation of Trade Unions,.
the awarding of cholai hips or tours on an expense-paid basis.
On the other hind, the diplomatic establishments do purchase serv-
ices which may bnefit individual Communists, or may negotiate con-
tracts through which local Communists or sympathizers are enabled
to realize sonic inancial gain or which may indirectly benefit the
party.
There are cases, however, where Soviet officials have been reported
to have made lane direct payments to local Communists in an effort
to promote strike activity or other types of unrest.
The adoption of the `national liberation struggle" with its concen-
tration on unity )f action with the. non-Coniinnist nationalist bour-
geoisie has been paralleled by an intensive campaign to strengthen the
internal organization of the national Communist Parties in Latin
America, and to train the party leaders, as well as the membership,
in basic Marxist-[.eninist theory, and its application.
The training rf Latin American Communist Party leaders at the
higher party school of the Conununist Party of the Soviet Union has
been going on continuously since 1953, with an increase noted since
1956.
The usual curriculum is based on a 2- or 3-year course of training,
and the students arc active party leaders and functionaries who have
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 147
been selected by their parties and approved by the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union.
It is probable that most of the Latin American Communist Parties
now have a number of leaders who have received this special training.
Beginning in 1956, the Communist Party of China also undertook
to give training to Latin American Communist Party leaders.
They emphasize, among other subjects, the special contributions of
the Chinese party in the field of clandestine work, agrarian reform
and peasant affairs, guerrilla warfare, and the manipulation of the
bourgeoisie and other elements in the "anti-imperialist struggle."
Since 1956, there is evidence that the organization of such training
has been improved, and that the Chinese Communist Party is now
giving regular courses specifically for Latin American Communist
students, thereby paralleling the Soviet effort. In addition to the
training offered by the Soviet-
Senator JOHNSTON. Is that in all the South American countries or
some place
General CABELL. Pretty much so. Their aim is to make it in all of
the Latin American countries.
Senator JOHNSTON. I see.
General CABELL. In addition to the training offered by the Soviet
and Chinese Communist Parties, the better organized and stronger
Communist Parties have, in accordance with recommendations, from
Moscow, offered training to Communist Party members from the
smaller and weaker Communist Parties.
Thus, the Communist Party of Argentina, in 1958, accepted stu-
dents from a number of other Latin American countries, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, and Columbia, into its cadre school,
which was raided by the Argentine police in October of 1958.
. It has been reported that other Communist Parties, such as those
of Chile and Cuba, have also undertaken to train Communists from
other countries.
This is in further answer to your question, Senator.
Mr. SoURwINE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a question?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. SoURwINE. General, there has been some training of Com-
munists from Latin America in Warsaw, too, has there not?
General CABELL. The training of Latin Americans is centered in the
U.S.S.R., China, and (to, a lesser extent) in East Germany. There is
no evidence of a Polish program in this regard, and there are no inter-
national front headquarters in Warsaw which might offer on-the-
job training. However, we are aware of cases where the Interna-
tional Union of Students (IUS) has given scholarships to Latin
American students for study in Poland.
Mr. SouRwiNE~,,. When they go to Europe they go to Moscow?
General CABELL. Generally, they want to.
Mr. SOURWINE. When they go to. red China, wheere do they go,
Peiping
Genera$l CABELL. They go to Peiping, via Moscow, usually.
Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, sir.
General CABELL. There is more prestige connected with going to
Moscow or Peiping than going to any of the satellites.
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The C,`IL1IRiar. Is the=re tiny training of Communist students, Latin
American Communist students, in the United States?
General CABEI,L. We would not be the repository of that informa-
tion, Mr. Chainian. That would be the FBI.
The CHAIR3i.tN. I wanted to know whether you had that
information.
General CABEI L. No, sir; I do not have it. at niy fingertips.
The above tralung is carried on by schools conducted by the Com-
intulist. Parties themselves.
However, the intensified training program is also being undertaken
by the Communist fronts. The World Federation of Trade Unions
held a training :school for Latin American labor leaders in Budapest
from 1953 to 191.5, and subsidized a Central American training school
in Costa Rica in x958.
The World Ft:deration of Democratic Youth, and the International
Union of Students have provided on-tlie-job training for Latin
Americans at. tl eir international headquarters, as has the Wronien's
International Dtmocrat.ic Federal ion.
Marxist training centers, such as the Workers' University in Mex-
ico City, are bengr expanded in an effort to broaden the appeal of
Marxism, and tostiniulat i nationalism.
Efforts to inti-crate the educational field have been intensified in an
effort to gaiii rvspectability and recognition for Marxist thought-, a
drive which has achieved success in several countries. A notable ex-
ample is the Brazilian Institute for Advanced Studies. In addition,
nonpolitical scholarships are offered by the Soviet Union and satellite
countries for training in the arts and sciences.
Thus,, the international Communist training effort is com rehensive,
ranging from ti e political indoctrination of the militlint. Communist
nucleus to the provision of opportunities to non-Communists which
will orient their towards the Communist bloc in their future profes-
sional careers.
The coordinat ion of Latin :American Communist action is planned
through international, regional, and national meetings of Communist
Parties or front,)rganiz:_ttions.
This is done at. bilateral meetings between the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union and the La-(-in Aniericmui Communist. Party leaders,
through diet cxcltaimge of publications, through t the, travel of party lead-
ers, and through continuous training and indoctrination of party mcin-
hers.
The fundamental line is established in discussions with Communist
Party of the Soviet Union officials, and an authoritative---or in au-
tltoritat.ive jourtials such as Problems of Peace and Socialism (the
World Marxist Review) which is published in 19 languages, and the
various party theoretical organs.
Fundamental Marxist, texts, both current and classic, are available
in Spanish; son e are translated and published in Latin America, to
provide a standardized basis for internal Party training and for in-
doctrination of -ion-Communists.
Spanish tran'.lations of Chinese Communist works are increasingly
used in the efIott. to apply Chinese tactical lessons in Latin America.
Latin Aineri an delegates to Soviet Communist Party congresses
have also attended Chinese Communist Party meetings or have met
with Chinese leaders.
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 149
The general strategy for Communist activity in Latin America in
1958 was outlined at the Moscow meeting of November 1957.
Activities in 1959, in continuation of the 1958 program, are believed
to have been discussed at meetings between Latin America and Soviet
Communist Party representatives held in Moscow at the time of the
21st Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress, and at meetings
between the Latin American and Chinese Communists shortly after-
ward, in Peiping.
Mr. SouxwiNE. That was in January of this year?
General CABELL. Late January and early February.
Mr. SoUnwINB. All right.
General CABBLL. The current program involves the exploitation of
the Cuban Revolution as an example of a successful "liberation strug-
gle," which should be emulated by "anti-imperialist" elements in other
Latin American countries.
A significant element of the Communist program for 1959 appears
to be the support of a "People's Congress," ostensibly sponsored by
non-Communist patriots and liberals, but oriented by Communist or
pro-Communist delegates so as to pass anti-U.S. resolutions.
The Cuban Communist newspaper IIoy recently quoted Raul Castro,
Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces, as giving his support to such a
congress.
The CIIAI aMAN. These congresses, while they are composed of lib-
erals who are not members of the Communist Party, yet the congress
and its membership are manipulated by the Communists; is that
correct?
General CABELL. That is the purpose of them and the fact of them.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
General CABBLL. Mr. Chairman, this type of approach, the exploita-
tion of non-Communists and the infiltration of crypto-Communists,
or secret Communist Party members into progressive movements, is
an old technique, but one which has been particularly emphasized by
the Chinese.
It is believed that all Latin American Parties are now tinder orders
to recruit new members on a "secret" basis, so that they may remain in
or be infiltrated into non-Communist groups.
In 1958 and 1959 there has been increasing emphasis on the need
for communism to adapt its tactics to the regional and national situa-
tion in which it works.
In Latin America where the "national liberation" strategy is aimed
at influencing non-Communist liberals, nationalists and intellectuals,
Communist-front activity and subversion of non-Communist organi-
zations has been increasingly emphasized.
The international Communist-front organizations, such as the
World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Union of Stu-
dents, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's Inter-
national Democratic Federation, and so forth, have tried in their pro-
grams aimed at Latin America, to pay more attention to national
questions and peculiarities, and thus to deemphasize Soviet direction,
while developing the basis for unity of action.
Mr. SOURWINE. General
Mr. Chairman, may I inquire--
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
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150 COMN171NIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
Mr. SounwINX. General, is it true that the increasing emphasis of
which you spent: in adaptation to national situations is a tactic; it is
not a trend towt.rd a development of true so-called national Commu-
nist parties? That is, it, is not a Communist schism; it is simply a
tactic which thesingle world conspiracy is using?
General CABE-.L. That is correct. Their emphasis is on that ap-
proach; that is, of developing these front organizations, rather than
the more direct cne of open Communist parties themselves. They are
not in any way_diny ing these Communist parties, but they are Nutting
their effort in this indirect approach because they think it will bring
them a better return.
Mr. SoURwiNi;. And within the Communist parties themselves of
these various La-.in American countries, Moscow still clamps down on
any deviation. They still have to follow orders from Moscow; is that
right?
General CtBEu L. Yes.
Senator I[IWSJA. What you have described here is the very essence
of the "national liberation" movement, is it not ?
General CABELI,. Yes.
Senator IIRUs iA. In gross, isn't that exactly what that "national
liberation" move rent is?
General CanErJ.. That is right. to surround its own Communist ef-
forts by this aura of nationalism.
Senator ILrusKA. And then it breaks down into different segments,
in schools, labor unions, and what not ?
General CRUEL. That is right.
Senator JOHNSTON. They use all kinds of popular movements to
join them in order to further their cause.
General C:IBEn . Any movement that they can possibly grasp, Sen-
ator, whether the:_t popular movement has been in existence or whether
they attempt to create a popular movement for the purpose. They
use both kinds.
Senator Jorixs'cox. If they cannot get into a country one way, then
they will come in b say ng, "We want to put down the dictatorship."
General LABEL',. That is right.
Shall f continua', -Mr. C hairman ?
'l'ife Ci tinlt.tX'. Proceed. General.
General ('AIIEti.. In Cie Held of labor increased efforts have been
rondo to regain :lie influence lost during the postwar decade. The
World Federatio!e of Trr:de ITnions leas a regional liaison bureau called
the Latin Amer Clan Confederation of Labor, or Confederacion de
Trabajadores de America Latina. to give time Spanish name.
Discussions arc underway to strengthen and reorganize it, and so to
iuake it a more effective organization.
A number of instances of international Communist financing of
Latin American t jade unions also has been noted by its.
Visits of the World Federation of Trade T7hion and bloc trade
union officials to Latin American countries have increased, as have
invitations to Latin Arieric_an trade unionists to visit Communist
China, the Sovict Uiiio'i. and other bloc countries.
These efforts are designed to increase Communist influence and
strength in the trade union movement, and are an integral part of the
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 151
Communist strategy which, to be successful, is essentially depend-
ent upon mass support.
The tasks of the trade unions in the "national liberation struggle"
were set forth by the vice president of the World Federation of
.Trade Unions, who is the Indian Communist, S. A. Dange, at the
Fourth Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1957.
These tasks constitute a blueprint for Communist labor action.
Trade unions are called upon to support measures taken by the
national bourgeoisie if these measures are directed against imperi-
alism and are intended to strengthen the country's independence, and
develop its economy.
The unions are advised to oppose military pacts, to support the
peace movement, to promote nationalization of foreign enterprises,
and to link economic demands with political actions.
They are to seek alliances, particularly with the peasantry, as well
as trade union "unity."
Finally, those trade unions with a record of success in the "na-
tional liberation struggle" should advise less experienced unions, and
the World Federation of Trade Unions promised to strengthen its
own role in the international exchange of tactical experience.
Close adherence to these directives is seen in the Communist propa-
ganda and organizational work in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba,
Mexico, and other Latin American countries.
Aid and support from the World Federation of Trade Unions and
its trade departments the Trade Unions Internationals, as well as
from trade unions of bloc countries, is apparent.
Representatives of the Trade Unions Internationals of the World
Federation of Trade Unions have been particularly active in Latin
America.
Giacomo Adduci, Italian labor leader, and Secretary General of
the Metal and Engineering Workers of the World Federation of
Trade Unions, attended the 1958 May Day celebration in Brazil. He
promised increased World Federation of Trade Unions aid to the
Brazilian labor movement. Adduci again visited Brazil in April of
1959 to attend a National Metal Workers Congress, also attended by
fraternal delegates from neighboring South American countries.
Paolo Scarponi, a representative of the Trade Unions Interna-
tional of Textile and Clothing Workers, visited Rio de Janiero, Mon-
tevideo, Buenos Aires, and Santiago, Chile, in March and April of
1958.
Paul Delanoue, secretary general of the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Teachers' Unions, visited Chile in May 1959
to "attend the 12th National Convention of the Chilean Teachers
Union. That is the Union de Profesores de Chile.
Maurice Boye, a member of the secretariat of the Trade Unions
International of Public and Allied Workers, was reported to be vis-
iting in Chile in June 1959 at the invitation of the National Associa-
tion of Semi-Public Employees, the Asociacion National de Empleados
Semi-Fiscales. .
` The CI3AIR1AN. General, have American Communists attended
meetings in Latin America?
General CABELL. Yes.
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152 COMMJNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
The CnAiw%m-,, Could you tell us which Communists, what meet-
ings they attended?
General CABF=a.. Elbe Magil was CPUSA representative at the
Twelfth CP-Me:aco Congress, in September 1954.
But as a mat `er of fact, the attendance has not been notable at
these congresses' mainl} because they wished to avoid attention.
Senator I Iizus c. By "notable" do you mean heavy in numbers?
General CABETL. Either that or frequent. It has been neither heavy
in numbers nor f ?equent.
Senator Iinus:IA. General, you have given the names of several in-
ternational associations and so on, down in Latin America, like the
teachers, time public workers, and the inetalworkers. Where do these
nien come from?
General C:lrirr L. These men come front various countries and they
are oflicials in various of the unions, and particularly the World
Federation of Trade Unions and its subsidiary organizations.
Senator Ilitu.i k. Where are the headquarters for the interna-
tional-the Wo:?ld Federation of Trade Unions that you just
mentioned?
General (nvi i,. Prague. Prague. is a big center for these various
unions.
Senator IlitusnA. So that many of these leaders come from Europe?
General CABEL`,. Yes, sir.
Senator IIirusiA. from either Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Russia?
General CABEI.r,. Yes. Many are from Western Europe.
Senator IIrrt'SXA. You have not named, so far, any Chinese. Are
you conning to tht m?
General CABELI,. I do not believe I named any Chinese. They are
not as well knowi to us as the European ones.
Senator IIRusiLA. 'T'hey are relatively recent arrivals on the scene
then?
General Yes. I would like to say, as I have said, they
simply have not t raveled in the same or similar capacities as the others.
They are not heavily represented, you see, in the same organizations,
like the WFTI' and I1'S.
The people who travel for the WFTU and other front organizations
are, in the main, WW'esterners, by culture and background, and people
who have some linguisti(: connection with the West.
The Chinese started their intensified drive in Latin America only
since 1956, and then only by stages. Just- a handful of correspondents
carne out.
They are dependent wholly upon the local Communist Party and
the network of correspondents which I have mentioned.
Senator II zuss.k. The tempo of their activity has steadily increased ?
General CABELF.. That is correct.
Senator Ilitusii.A. When I say they, I mean those people from China.
Isn't that true?
General CAnrrL. Chinese activity, both in drawing Latin Amer-
icans into China for training and consultation, and now coming out
for the first time, .ipart from a few cultural acrobatic and ballet troupes
and things like that; but they are now sending out Red Chinese news-
ppaper correspondents to actually set up headquarters, for example, at
Ilavana; that is true.
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COMMUNIST. THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 153
Senator IIRUSKA. To what extent is that done to avoid the appear-
ance of direct Russian interference in the Western Hemisphere?
General CABELL. Well, actually the Chinese are operating very
strongly on their own. They have their concept of their rights within
the movement, and they send out their representatives as a sovereign
power within the movement.
Senator HRUSKA. Do you think a part of their increased activity
is due to a desire to not counteract, but to-but in recognition of our
policy in Formosa, for example, and Quemoy? Do you think that is
involved?
General CABELL. I would suggest that is a small part of it. I think
the basic reason for it is that they are feeling their oats.
Senator HRUSKA. They want to go into business on their own?
General CABELL. They want to go into business on their own, and
they want to establish themselves and be recognized as Communist
ideologists on their own hook.
Senator JOHNSTON. In other words, it is a religion with them?
General CABELL. That is right.
Senator JOHNSTON. It is almost like the churches sending out the
missionaries?
General CABELL. Yes.
In organizing Latin American Youth, the International Communist
movement works through the World Federation of Democratic Youth,
and the International Union of Students.
At their fifth, congress in Pieping in September of 1958, they gave
greatly increased importance to Latin America, adopting seven reso-
lutions of solidarity with students in nine Latin American countries
or colonies. These are British Honduras, which they described as
Guatemalan territory, Brazil, Cuba, Guadalupe, Guiana, Martinique,
Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. They also adopted a separate two-
page resolution on Latin America as a whole.
Young Latin American leaders are working at the World Federa-
tion of Democratic Youth, and International Union of Students head-
quarters in Budapest and Prague.
For example, the Brazilian Communist youth leader, Orlando Fun-
cia Gomez, headed the important Latin American commission at
World Federation of Democratic Youth headquarters, and then he
returned to Brazil.
He was replaced by Ruben Guedes, also from Brazil.
Another Latin American World Federation of Democratic Youth
official, Otto Cesar Vargas Girete, helped organize Latin American
participation after the Seventh World Youth Festival held in Vienna
on the 26th of July to the 4th of August of this year.
Latin American Communists known to have worked at Interna-
tional Union of Students headquarters include individuals from Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela.
The important International Union of Students secretariat includes
an Ecuadoran, Jorge Galarza, who replaced a fellow Ecuadoran,
Efrain Alvarez Paredes.
Cesar Alonso Alvarado, a Colombian, has been working at Interna-
tional Students headquarters in Prague as the Spanish editor of the
union's monthly organ, World Student News, since January of 1959,
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when he replaced Antonio Miassip, a Cuban. Massip quickly returned
to Cuba after the Fall of the Batista regime.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what he is doing there now?
General CAn .=,. Our most recent information indicates that An-
tonio 11assip is -=ngaged in propaganda work for the army at La
Cabana Fortress n Havana.
Some of the Latin American Communists who have worked with
the World Federation of Democratic Youth or the International
Union of Students headquarters--worked at those headquarters-
have also received training in party schools in the Soviet Union, and
on returning to Latin America have been made responsible for clan-
destine propaganda distribution, and for the organization of strikes
and demonstratic us.
In the appeal to non-Communist. youth, probably the most impor-
tant of all World Federation of Democratic Youth and International
Union of Students tactics, are the world youth festivals held every
other year.
Since the natio:ial liberation strategy was initiated about 1954, over
3,300 young people from Latin America and the European Caribbean
dependencies ha.v attended these festivals.
Relatively, Latin '1merican attendance increased sharply at the 1959
festival in Vienna.
The festivals are primarily propaganda efforts, but serve to
strengthen the 'World Federation of Democratic Youth and the In-
ternational Unio_z of Students organizationally through the experi-
ence received b~ those working on the various preparatory com-
mittees.
We believe that close to $1 million was expended for Latin ineri-
can delegates' travel to the Sixth Youth Festival in 1957, of which
less than $100,000 was contributed from Latin America.. That, is $1
million cost, but the Latin Americans contributed $100,000 of it.
I n 1958, the bl .'c expended about $500,000 in order to subsidize the
travel of Latin American Communists and sympathizers to the bloc.
This was not at youth festivals, but just travel to the bloc.
The Youn C(mmuni;t, youth and student leaders associated with
and trained by t ie World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the
International Ur ion of Students, are instrumental in the coordination
of the liberation struggle.
In 1958 the tswwO) organizations sought to emphasize the, participation
of the students in the anti-Batista struggle in Cuba, and in their
publications called for international support and solidarity with
the Cuban students.
In the antipathy to existing dictatorships in Latin America, this
Communists have found a popular issue which allows them to infil-
trate, or work closely with non-Communist youth and student groups.
W` herever posssible, they have sought to provide the initiative and,
With the aid of Communists abroad, to develop international sup-
port and coordii ation.
For example, ?t mmnber of meetings of youth and student lenders
were held in Cu',a earlier this year, some, under Communist sponsor-
ship or with Coipimunist participation.
At these meetings, international coordination of antidictatorial ac-
tion was discussed, including plans for an antidictator congress to be
held in Havana.
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE. CARIBBEAN 155
Similar meetings have been held in other countries, such as that
held in April by the Uruguayan Communist Youth:
Some government officials
The CHAIRMAN. General, right about there, what about the Cuban
Government, has it encouraged those Communist meetings?
General CABELL. I think the Cuban Government gives them every
facility for those meetings, and any number of Cuban officials give
them encouragement. But I think it would be improper to say that
the Cuban Government, as such, gives them the encouragement. It is
not necessary for the Cuban Government, as such, to give them
The CHAIRMAN. No; but the officials in a private capacity do?
General CABELL. Or the officials in the Government capacity, but it
might not be the Government official's. responsibility for a certain
thing that gives these Communists such encouragement, because the
Government is so disorganized that there is continual crossing. of lines
by one official of the Government into other departments. So I would
not want to give the impression that it is governmentally organized en-
couragement that is taking place. It is rather the encouragement of
officials and elements within the Government.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not see the difference.
General CABELL. Well, there is just a legal difference; that is all.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Senator JOHNSTON. In other words, the Government is doing noth-
ing to prevent it?
General CABE, LL. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. No ; they are encouraging it.
General CABELL. I would say even more than that.
The CHAIRMAN. They take affirmative action, the officials of the
Government take affirmative action in promoting it.
General CABELL. I just did not want to give you the impression that
the Government has officially organized that kind of action.
Senator JOHNSTON. They encourage it as long as it helps them to
stay popular.
General CABELL. Oh, yes.
Senator HRUSKA. Well, of course, in Cuba, since Castro took over,
the Popular Socialist Party, for example, which had previously been
banned, was allowed to come out in the open. Of course, that is not
official, that does not make them officially Communists, but it cer-
tainly is along the same line; is it not?
General CABELL. And there is no inhibition or prohibition of such
movement whatsoever.
Some Government officials may be providing the Communists with
readymade opportunities for expanding their propaganda.
Senator JOIINSTON. When anybody tries to oppose it they meet it
by saying, "Oh, we agree; we give everybody freedom."
General CABELL. That is right. They oppose it on "freedom"
grounds.
For example, Raul Castro, who supported the People's Congress in a
recent speech,. as previously mentioned, also supported the idea of
holding a Latin American Youth and Student Congress in Havana,
in the name of defending the Cuban Revolution.
He did not publicly use the earlier antidictatorship theme, pre-
sumably to minimize the international aspects of the meeting.
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156 COMMI KIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
It remains to he seen wh ther this congress, when held, will reveal
Communist hanc;iwork through violent attacks on the United States
in an effort to apply (lie theme of "national liberation" to other
countries.
The CIIAMIAA What; it is is a Communist meeting; is it not?
General CAnEr.r,. It is a Communist-influenced meeting, Mr. Chair-
man.
The CIIAmx rAl . Yes.
Cuba has a Br'`'at many Chinese and other orienta.ls. Do you have
any information t.ha.t ]led China has attempted to mobilize them
or to
General CABEir,. Mr. Chairman, I have got a little piece on that, if
you don't mind, which I will come to a little later.
The CIrAMNrA-c. Yes, sir. Proceed, General.
General CABELr.. The Communist. journalists in Latin America have,
particularly since 1956, been encouraged and assisted in broadening
their influence ly the Communist-front International Organization
of Journalists.
Since that tirre, Communists and their supporters have sought to
bring national press associations closer to the International Organiza-
tion of Journalists, and to sponsor a Latin American Congress of
Journalists at w`riclt t1my could exploit Latin American nationalism
and regionalism to the detriment of the United States.
Important national press associations in Brazil, Peru, and Vene-
zuela have given some official recognition to the International Organi-
zation of Journalists.
In October of 1958, the Venezuelan National Press Congress invited
Jaroslav Knobla ?lt. of Czechoslovakia, the International Organization
of Journalists' I resident, and Renato Leduc, of Mexico, a vice presi-
dent, to speak. Leduc used this forum to attack the Latin American
coverage of the ~o-called commercial news agencies, and called for a
truly Latin American organization.
As if in answer to this, the Prens.a. Latina Agency was organized,
with headgnarte?s in Cuba, in early 1959.
This agency .denies Communist sponsorship, -while claiming the
backing of Mesi'--an industrialists and promoting the ultranationalist
line.
Prensa Latina now has correspondents, and sells its servicethrough-
out Latin Amen i ?a and in the united States.
The CHAIRMAN. You think that. is a Communist-controlled news
service?
General CABS .L. This came, out very quickly after the encourage-
ment in the spe-clt by the Communists that such an institution was
needed.
We also call attention to the fact that its line plays this very ultra-
nationalist line, which is the Communist line.
Other than tl nt, at. this present moment., I do not think we could
testify to you that it is a Communist organization.
General CABE'L. It is under intensive investigation along the lines
we have indicat'd, and it is just ripe for exploitation because of its
intensely nationlilistie character.
The CrrAn-rMA X. But, in your judgment., it, is Communist-influenced?
General CABE-.L. We do not have the evidence to make such a firm
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 157
conclusion, Mr. Chairman. But we certainly strongly suspect that
is the case, and we are watching it like a hawk.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Senator HRUSKA. It has many badges which would indicate that?
General CABF.nL. That is right. The Communists undoubtedly en-
couraged or even inspired the organization of Prensa Latina, have
infiltrated the organization, and have aided it both by providing news
and utilizing its services. Its correspondents include some known
Communist Party members, a number of cry to-Communists, and a
good many ultranationalists. To date, one ofpthe chief customers of
Prensa Latina appears to be the Cuban Communist newspaper by.
However, because of its access to Communist and nationalist circles,
it has also been able to supply material of interest to other newspapers
and news services, including non-Communist ones.
The Communist-bloc countries have increased their press activities
in the area.
Tass correspondents are located in. Mexico, Uruguay, and Argen-
tina. The Czechoslovakian News Agency has established an office in
Argentina.
A group of Soviet journalists visited Argentina, Uruguay, Chile,
Peru, and Panama in April and May of 1958, establishing contact
with pro-Communist writers and newsmen.
In early 1959, the New China News Agency began building a net-
work of correspondents in Latin America, and established a head-
quarters in Havana, adjacent to that of the Prensa Latina. In con-
nection with this effort, a group of Communist Chinese journalists
traveled to various key Latin American countries.
Not only have their gains in the field of journalism been significant,
but Communists have also increased their propaganda in other fields.
Wherever possible, as in Cuba, Communists have quickly exploited
opportunities to utilize local radio and television.
At the special conference held in Moscow in November 1957, em-
phasis was placed on the revival and diversification of the peace move-
ment.
It was concluded that its main objective in Latin America should
be to weaken the "war economy" of the United States. Thus, economic
nationalism was established as a major "peace" objective.
In accordance with instructions, the Argentine Communists held, a
"Congress for International Cooperation, General Disarmament, and
National Sovereignty" in May 1958, attended by leaders from through-
out the hemisphere.
This served to prepare for Latin American participation in the
subsequent world meeting in Stockholm and also to coordinate re-
gional planning.
In accordance with a Soviet goal of several years standing, it resolved
to promote a "Congress of the Peoples of Latin America" which would
"meet the imperative necessity of integrating the national economies,
strengthening the homogeneous elements of Latin American cultures,
and organizing joint action to preserve world peace."
Originally planned for December 1958, this "People's Congress"-
which I mentioned earlier-was postponed, and it now appears that
the Communists are capitalizing on the appeal made by Cuba's youth-
ful Minister of Education, Dr. Armando Hart, for just such a "Peo-
ple's Congress." ,
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This has give:r them the non-Communist sponsorship which they
desire, and has alallowed them to develop the "defense"of the Cuban
revolution as an additional basis for attracting the support of Latin
American nationalists, and anti-U.S. elements.
Senator Ilut s Htia. Let me ask, do you know any new date for the
meeting of that ingress?
General CABEr?L. Luis Carlos Prestes, the secretary general of the
Communist Parry of Brazil, said in August that he expected it to
come off in the v;;ry near future in Cuba, and that is the last date we
have.
The national peace, movements have also been active in more con-
ventional "peace" activities such as opposition to military pacts,
nuclear testing, and activities of U.S. military missions.
The current trend, however, suggests that the main purpose of the
national peace comnritt&es has become that of coordinating activities
in behalf of the "liberation struggle" within a wide variety of organ-
izations, particu'arly those of an economic and cultural nature..
Under the he= ding of other front activities, the labor, youth and
student, journalistic, and peace-front activities are the most important
in Latin America.
There are mart' others, however, in which increased organizational
activity is also apparent.
The Women's International Democratic Federation for example, is
seeking to develop a First Latin American Congress o? Women, sched-
uled to be held Tn Santiago, Chile, between November 19 and 20 of
1959.
Coordination of the activities of the various Soviet friendship
societies or binational cultural exchange institutes may have been the
purpose behind -he organization of a Soviet Federation for Friend-
ship and Cultural Cooperation with Latin America in January 1959.
In addition to the world fronts, the Communists have organized or
infiltrated nume-ous national or regional organizations to aid in the
"national l iberat ion" struggle.
For example, he Union of Latin American Friendship, Union de
Amistad Latino Americana, recently established with headquarters
in Mexico, serves to coordinate and disseminate information from vari-
ous countries, :uch as the Dominican republic, Nicaragua, and
Honduras.
For each of tl ese countries, and for others as well, there is at least
one Communist- :?ont rolled front, among the various political opposi-
tion groups, whit-h advocates unified action based on a minimal pro-
gram for `national liberation."
Such a front i., the IIaitian National Liberation Movement, founded
by the. Commtmit leader Rene Depestre, but claimed to be "composed
of young persona: from all patriotic groups and of all political tenden-
cies." The program of this group was recently published in the
Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy.
To conclude, it. is evident that the Communists have an extremely
useful formula in the strategy of the "national liberation struggle."
They have difficulties and are still having problems in allaying the
distrust of non-Communist elements, which either recognize the true
nature of communism and the opportunistic nature of the Communist
alliance which hi being offered, or which recognize the beneficial as-
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 159,
pects of their national ties with the United States and prefer to nego-
tiate political and economic differences rather than to destroy these
ties.
To counteract this opposition, the local Communists, with the help
of the international Communist apparatus and the Soviet Union, are
attempting to show, first, that the Communists are sincerely dedicated
to democracy and "national liberation" and are willing to fight to
achieve these goals; and, second, that the United States needs no
longer to be feared, as its influence has been matched by the Soviet
Union.
Mr. SoURwINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. General, the committee has received from a very
knowledgeable person, who has been a lifelong student of China, an
appraisal from which I would like to read two paragraphs, and ask
whether you concur or if there is any comment you can give us on
this :
Talk of an allegedly "inevitable" Sino-Soviet schism may serve as intellectual
aspirin to repress our policy headaches with both Moscow and Peiping. Like
aspirin, however, the repressant only postpones coping with the problem ; it
does not eliminate it.
All the component parts of the Soviet Empire, including Red China, may be
compared to the members of a baseball team. Each has a part to play in trying
to win the game, although each occupies a different position and is called upon
to do a different sort of thing. Moscow is on the team, too, but its position is
that of a player-manager, and it flashes the signs. In a given situation, the
player-manager may call for all kinds of play-squeeze, sacrifice, and so on.
The player asked to play a certain way cannot give any consideration to his
own personal record. Mickey Mantle cannot go up to Casey Stengel and say to
him that, since he (Mantle) is well on the way to beating Babe Ruth's home-run
record, he had better be given the chance to try the long ball rather than bunting
for a sacrifice. If the particular situation appears to the manager to call for a
bunt, Mickey Mantle must bunt, home-run record or no. home-run. record. The
idea is to try to win the game, not to achieve a personal glory. Khrushchev is
a better team player than Stalin. Hence his denunciation of the "personality
cult." Liu Shao-chi is a better team player than Mao Tze-tung. Hence Mao's
displacement. Chou En-lai, with his many faces which so baffle Western ob-
servers, is an excellent team player. Western estimate of world communism
suffers considerably by paying too much attention to personalities and too little
to the team concept. To win the game is the all-important thing, and the Com-
munists, whether Russian, Chinese, Polish, or Albanian, mean to win it.
We must also be careful to draw the proper line of distinction between "total"
and "limited" wars. The Russians, and to a lesser extent the Chinese, under-
stand that a "total" war with nuclear weapons may spell the doom of every-
body, especially the Communists. I say "especially the Communists" because
of the ring of strategic bases around Russia and mainland China. Their propa-
ganda has been to induce the United States to give up the bases. Before they
succeed in doing that, the Communists are not likely to risk total war. But
limited wars are an entirely different thing. They are not hesitant in provoking
them here and there as long as they are sure they will not explode into a total
war. Russia at present has very little room to stage limited wars. The moment
she touches Western Europe, total war is on. On the other hand Red China has
plenty of room to risk limited wars. Surely no total war will break out on
account of Sikkim or Bhutan for the Indian border. So, on the surface, Russia
may appear to be pursuing one line and Red China another. To return to the
baseball analogy, one player may be bunting and the other swinging for the
fences. The thing to remember is that all are on the same team, putting on
obviously different plays under different circumstances, but the ultimate objec-
tive is to win the game.
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160 C0147MiJNIST 9M EAT TIhROUGII THE CARIBBEAN
General CABE`.L. Mr. Sourwine, I cannot comment on the whole
piece. But I will make some comment on it.
In the first pla,e, I think the aspirin analogy is not a bad one.
As I pointed cut earlier, I think this is a very comforting thought,
this schism betwen the two, but I think it is more potential than actual
at the present time.
With respect t) the baieball team analogy, I would not be as extreme
as that, because I do not believe that the response to discipline or orders
is quite as immediate and complete and unquestioning as the ballplayer
to the manager.
It is true,lowl ver, that the team aspect of international communism
is often insufficiently considered. One of the chief objectives of com-
munism in the I ist few years has been to improve international co-
ordination. Both the Soviets and the Chinese have been doing this,
with some success This is particularly true in the undeveloped areas
where the strengthening of the regional and local Communist move-
ments is the immediate goal.
I think, as time goes on, the sensibilities of the Chinese will have
to be taken more into consideration and the willingness or ability of
their team manager to give firm orders and sacrifice, hit instructions,
and things like tl at, are;;ping to be somewhat eroded.
With respect to the limited war elements of your question, I think
it would take up a long time to deal with that aspect, and I would just
suggest that we c -ieck on that.
b r. SouliwIxE. General, what is the numerical strength of the Com-
munist movemen in Latin America?
General CABEI T, I would say that, in general the Communist Par-
ties have increased their membership. The number of Latin American
Communists is estimated now at about 220,000 to 240,000, which is
about a 10-pirce at increase over our 1958 estimates. The number of
sympathizers is e-,timatcd at about 650,000 to 700,000.
It should be cinphasized that the Communist threat continues to
be based on the organizational ability and international connections
of the Communist Parties and their fronts, and individual leaders,
ratlier than numerical strength.
The CIIAIRNIA2. That is true all over the world?
General CABELT.. Yes; but I would say it is particularly true in. Latin
America.
The CIIAraMiA'\. Is the Commmnist. drive in Latin America similar
to their drive in Africa and the Middle East; is it more intense?
General CABEI.L. Yes. sir; but I think it started sooner in Latin
America.
The CII. nc rAN. You think it is more intense in Latin America?
General CAIIELL. Yes, sir.
Thief CIIAinM:A-F. It started. sooner there?
General CAnELL. Yes, sir.
Senator IIIIus1A. how much sooner?
General CAnEI.L. I would say in the nature of several years, sir;
and I think they. too, realize that the United States is more susceptible
to hurt in this area, than elsewhere.
The CHAIRMAN. They can weaken us more easily in Latin America.
General CAnE?.L. And there is no doubt about who the principal
enemy of the So-viet Union is and of the Communist Party. There is
no doubt about t?iat whatseoever, and that is the United States.
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH TIDE CARIBBEAN 161
Mr. SouuwxE.; In other words, the drive in_ Latin America is
pointed at us?
General CABELL. More than anything else; yes.
Senator HRUSKA. General, you say it is several years; it is a. fact,
is it not, that there has been organized Communist activity and move-
ment in Latin America for 25 years?
General CABELL. Oh, yes; I was talking in terms of a drive.
Senator HRUSKA. And the intensification that we now witness?
General CABELL. That is right.
Mr. SoURwINE. General, would it be possible for your agency to
furnish the committee a table showing the estimated strength of the
Communist Parties in various countries in Latin America
General CABELL. Yes; I can do that.
The following table contains approximate figures on Communist
Party strengths. These figures are constantly under review, and are
subject to changes in response to new and more reliable information.
COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP
Argentina-------------------- 80,000
Haiti------------------------ 15
Bolivia---------------------- 5,000
Honduras -------------------- 700
Brazil----------------------- 40,000
Mexico ---------------------- 2,500
Chile------------------------ 30,000
Nicaragua------------------- 50
Colombia-------------------- 6,000
Panama------------------- 110
Costa Rica ------------------- 300
Paraguay-------------------- 3,000
Cuba------------------------ 17,000
Peru------------------------ 6,000
Dominican Republic ---------- 50
Uruguay --------------------- '3,400
Ecuador--------- _---.-----__ 3, 000
Venezuela -------------------- 40,000
ElSalvador ------------------- 500
Guatemala ------------------- 1,100
Total__________________ 238,725
General CABELL. But again let me point out that this table does
not include the Communist-front parties, such as Lombardo Toledano's
Popular Party in Mexico. These in the table are the Communist
Parties themselves, and not the front parties.
Senator JOHNSTON. The front parties are kind of a training party?
General CABELL. It is an influence party.
Senator JOHNSTON. It kind of breaks them off.
The CHAIRMAN. General, are you familiar with a.dooiament purport-
ing to be a Castro directive laying the groundwork for the extinction
of the Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic,?
General CABELL. No ; I am not.
Mr. SomiwINE. General, what are your estimates on the scope of the
subsidies which the Communist movement in:Latin AmoriCajs.l;eceiv-
ing from the bloc?
(general CABELL. The truth about. Communist finances is generally
known only to a very small number of Communist leaders within
each local Communist Party.
Even within the apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and China there are only a few. functionaries who J andle the
problem of subsidizing foreign Oommunist Parties.
In addition, the transmission of funds from the Soviet Union, as
was pointed out earlier, proceeds through a multitude of channels and
under a multitude of disguises.
It is, therefore, very :difficult to wake an accurate estimate. on hew
much money the Soviets or the Chinese spend on Communist subver-
sion in Latin America.
43354-00-pt. 3-4
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162 CODS JNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
In general, it c ppears that the bulk of Soviet subsidies is poured into
the promotion cf Communist front activities, rather than into the
Communist Parties themselves.
This is, of cot rse, only a technicality since Communist fronts and
Communist Parties work hand in hand.
Nevertheless, t is another indication of how seriously the Soviets
intended to create a favorable climate for communism in Latin
America.
On the basis of similar observations in other areas, it would be fair
to state that the Soviets heavily subsidize the Communist Party press
in Latin Ameriei.
The cost of tr fining Latin American Communists is also borne by
the Soviets whc, obviously, desire that the Communist Parties in
Latin America b ; strengthened for the long haul.
The cost of the Soviets' overall training program for Communists
in the free world has been estimated at, conservatively, $500,000 per
year. This is in addition to the approximately $500,000 mentioned
already as having- been spent for travel expenses alone in 1958.
Indications are that the Chinese Communists may complement
Soviet subsidies. The Chinese Communist Party bears all expenses
for the training of Latin American Communists in China, and has
given the impression of having ample funds for the "fraternal" sup-
port of foreign Communist Parties.
Mr. SOURWINF. General, is the U.S.S.R. or any of its satellites pro-
viding military aid to the Communist or pro-Communist forces in
Latin America I
General CABELL. Not to our current knowledge.
The CrIAnu A17. It is said that roughly 750 North Korean and
Communist Chinese fought with the Castro forces. These people
were not soon in the cities of Cuba, but were kept in the interior of
Cuba.
Do you hare ary knowledge of that 9
General CABEI L. No, sir; we do not, and we would seriously doubt
the authenticity of any such figure. We have no evidence of any
participation in the revolution. Nor do we have any knowledge of
Chinese Commur ist No. I participation.
The CIIArxMAY. All right.
What do you have information about? About what Communists
fought in Castro's forces?
General CABELT... In Cuba?
The CHHATRMAr. Yes, sir.
General CABELL,. That question is related to the question. Is Cuban
Prime Minister Fidel Castro a Communist 4
Let me develo p that thought for you, sir. Our information shows
that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party
member, or even it pro-Communist.
On the other hand they are delighted with the nature of his gov-
ernment, which l as allowed the Communists opportunity, free oppor-
tunity, to organise, to propagandize, and to infiltrate.
We know that the Communists consider Castro as a representative
of the bourgeoisie, and were unable to gain public recognition or com-
mitnrients from him during the course of the revolution.
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE 'CARIBBEAN 163
We know that the Communists were concerned when, at the time
of his trip to the United States, he showed evidence of a friendly
attitude toward the United States.
We know also that it has been the assigned task of the Cuban Com-
munist Party to prevent Castro's revolution from going to the right,
that is; from establishing friendly relations with the United States,
or ending its tolerance of Communist activities.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist;
however, lie certainly is not anti-Communist. His extreme policies,
including confiscation of private property, lead him to take positions
and make statements such as his violent anti-U.S. outbursts which are
extremely useful to international communism and are being exploited
by the Communists to the maximum extent.
He has delegated authority in key areas to persons known to be pro-
Communists or who are susceptible to exploitation by Communists.
In turn, he appears to be increasingly susceptible to Communist
propaganda, which is designed to exploit "evidence" that the United
States is an enemy, to discredit charges of Communist influence in
Cuba and witch hunting-or as they call it, maccartismo-and to
glorify the Cuban revolution, and particularly the agrarian reform
as a pattern for the "liberation" of the masses in other Latin American
countries.
It is questionable whether the Communists desire to recruit Castro
into the Communist Party, that they could do so if they wished, or
that he would be susceptible to Communist discipline if he joined.
As I say that is subject to question.
The 6ommunist viewpoint is that he represents leadership of a
nationalistic, bourgeoise-democratic revolution which precedes a Com-
munist rise to power.
The Communist interest is to help further the nationalistic aspects
of his regime and to preserve a climate of tolerance which will allow
the Communists to organize and build the foundation for their future
control.
At present, therefore, their primary interest is to influence Castro
in favor of an aggressive, "anti-imperialist" nationalism supported by
non-Communists, but which will defend the rights of Communists
to express their views openly and engage in legal activity.
In their attempt to influence Castro, the Communists are known to
be utilizing five principal channels.
First, they are seeking to influence him through his close associates
who are generally known to be pro-Communist.
Fidel's brother, Raul, and his close adviser, Ernesto (Che) Guevara,
are both strong friends of the Communist Party.
Second, the Communists have sought to guide the program and the
policies of the Government and of the 26th of July movement.
They have been able to exert considerable influence through pro-
Communists or sympathizers who have been appointed to key posts
and who have virtual autonomy in their fields.
Such persons have been appointed by Fidel on the basis of friend-
ships, trust, and loyalty established during-the revolution, and he is
committed to defend their policies.
Third, the Communists and their sympathizers are seeking to im-
plant 'elementary Marxist concepts within the political indoctrination
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courses established by the 26th of July movement, thereby establishing
the foundation for a pro-Communist-Marxist political plrilosopli to
eventually replace the highly personalistic philosophy represented by
Fidel.
Fourth, through their overt propaganda organs, radio and television
commentary, and selective or false news reporting, the Communists
hope to shield File], and the Cuban public, from news favorable to
U.S. policies, and to exploit news unfavorable to the United States.
Fifth, tlrrfougborganizational activity among the peasants, within
the army, and within labor, they hope to gain control of the public
demonstrations, iiass meetings, and strikes which Fidel is wont to
call in evidence cf the solidarity of the Cuban people with him and
his policies.
Although it is evident t rat the Communists have- been able to exploit
Castro in his movement for their own benefit through these channels,
as yet they do not appear to control him or his government. In terms
of mass following, they still represent a, minority, though a very well
organized one.
In certain arex-s, as in organized labor, there are experienced non-
Communist len.dirs who form an obstacle to rapid Communist
progress.
There are student. and professional groups which are also non-
Communist although firmly supporting Fidel, and -within the 26th
of July movement there is considerable evidence of opposition to
communism.
As evidenced n the recent demonstrations, however, these groups
are prepared to rally to the defense of the regime.
Senator Join: Tow. Is it not true that he is more dangerous than
if lie would come out and let them know that he was a Communist?
General C'= r4Fr r.. I personall , would a ree that Castro would prob-
ably lose much, or even most, of his popular support should this occur.
However, we beieve that Castro is not a member of the Communist
Party, and does not consider himself to be a, Communist.
Senator Jou sroN. Ile knows himself that, if he would come out
openly for the -,ommunists he- would lose his usefulness. -
General CA13F-,r.. That is right. Insofar as lie loses public support,
he loses the cannbility to achieve his goals-though he could still be
portrayed as vi.stim of counterrevolutionary machinations.
The CHAranr?r,*. To say the least, the Communist movement has
made very grew` progress in Cuba since Castro took over the Cuban
Government; h is it not?
General CABI LL.. Th:it is correct; yes, sir,
;tar. SOURS-INE. General, what type. of aid is the U.S.S.Pt. provid-
ing to revolutionary elements, such as those in the Caribbean?
General CAnr:r... Primarily advice--primarily they are furnishing
advice and moral support., propaganda materials and services.
Soviet support to revolutionary elements is channeled through the
Communist Parties, through the Communist fronts, and through key
Communists w thin other organizations.
The sending :pf military shipments to Latin American revolut ionary
elements or serding Soviet military advisers is not yet evident..
Mr. Sorxwrr-F. To what extent are the Communists responsible for
thee, re.volntionsry expeditions which have appeared in the Caribbean
area in the part. few years?
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 165
General CABELL. The Communists have participated actively in
such expeditions, but we, do not believe that they have organized them
nor dominated them.
Communist participation in such expeditions is demanded by their
"national liberation" strategy and tactics. Such participation is also
fully in keeping with specific items and encouragement given them by
both the Soviet and Chinese Communists in early 1959.
Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us, General, what is the extent of
Chinese Communist penetration in Latin America?
General CABELL. I think this is essentially the question that you
were driving at, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIR MAN. Yes, sir.
General CABELL. Since 1952, the Chinese Communist penetration in
Latin America has been increasing.
In that year the Chinese Communists invited delegates from the
Pacific coast countries to attend a Peace Congress of Asian and Pacific
peoples in Peiping.
In 1956 the Chinese Communist penetration effort was intensified
through the establishment of direct relations. with Latin American
Communist Party representatives and the founding of a training
school in Peiping for Latin American Communists.
Chinese Communist revolutionary instruction is well received by
Latin American Communist students who find it practical and well
suited to the conditions in which they operate in Latin America.
They especially appreciate the fact that the Chinese Communists pay
even their travel expenses.
In February and March of 1959, Latin. American Communist repre-
sentatives received specific advice and guidance from Mao Tze-tung
and other leading Chinese Communists concerning international Com-
munist policy and effective methods of carrying on clandestine
activities.
Notably increased "cultural" exchanges and the formation of addi-
tional "friendship" societies have contributed to further Chinese Com-
munist penetration of Latin America.
With the aid of local Communist Parties, the Chinese: Communists
have taken effective steps to establish throughout Latin America a
network of correspondents for their official New China News Agency.
Chinese Communist broadcasts to Latin America have been stepped
up to 14 program hours per week. Trade with Latin America is
also expanding.
Senator HausKA. General, what would you know or what would you
care to tell us about any interaction between the so-called China
Friendship Societies in Latin America and those here in America,
in the United States? Is there, any interaction?
General CABELL. I do not think that we have been able to detect
any.
We have no evidence. The way they do that-they have that inter-
action, and certainly it occurs-is that the people from here will go
to a meeting in Moscow or Peiping, and the people from there! will
go to the meeting in Moscow or Peiping, and then subsequently get
together and get their orders and philosophy and all at that point,
so that the exchange or the indoctrination does not actually takee place
on U.S. soil. But we know that they attend these joint meetings of
those various front organizations.
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166 COMMUT'1ST rn REAT TIIROUGII THE CARIBBEAN
Mr. SornwiNE. General, are the Chinese groups resident in Latin
America, significant with respect to Communist penetration?
General CABET L. There are numerous Chinese colonies in Latin
America, mostly located in the principal cities. Many of these Chi-
nese are second generation or more.
In Peru, where the largest Chinese population exists, the total, in-
cluding second generation, is about 50,000. Of these, some 14 000
are Chinese nationals, that is, immigrants retaining Nationalist ahi-
neso documentation, and 11,000 are. located in Lima, the capital.
In Cuba, the total Chinese population is about 40,000, of which
some 20,000 are ir: Havana.
In Guayaquil, Ecuador, there are over 5,000; in Sao Paulo, Brazil,
there are over 1,0.)0.
Mr. Sou-rtwINs. General, may I interrupt at that point, you say of
the 50,000 Chine.F.; in Peru approximately 14,000 are Chinese Nationals
and 11,000 are. ]seated in Lima. You do not. mean 11,000 out of the
14,000, but 11,000 out of the50,000?
General CAnEr.'.. 11,000 out of the 50,000 is correct.
Mr. Sourtwrst, Please; go ahead, sir.
General C.unFrr,. In general, these Chinese are non-Communist and
relatively unimrortant in terms of national politics. Many actively
favor the Nation ,lists.
There are, of course, some pro-Communist elements, although very
few are known to be members of the Communist Party, and the various
parties have male no significant effort to expand their membership
within the local i_:hinesc communities up to now.
However, in s~eking to expand its commercial and propaganda re-
lations, the Chi -eese communist. Government is seeking to use these
people.
One of the p irposes of the recent trip by Chinese journalists to
various Latin American countries was to establish contact with
friendly members of the local Chinese communities.
It is also known that Chinese have used false documentation, ob-
tained through members of the resident Chinese communities. as a
means of illegally obtaining docuntent Well, there was no office or agency for the investi-
gation of Communist Party and international Communist conspira-
torial activities. There were investigative agencies, such as the De-
partiuent of Investigation, but these were not primarily interested in
communism.
The CIIA1RMMA2:. What caused Batista to fall ? Just what hap-
pened?
General CABEI.1.. Well, Mr. Chairman, lie did not have a sound base
for his regime.
Was CIIATRIrAN. as his army whipped in the field? Was he de
posed by his generals?
General CABELS? The army disintegrated. Its morale just com-
pletely disintegrated in the face of the growing numbers in the Castro
movement. It. became helpless.
Senator JoHi.Ns ,o.. Did they continue to pay the soldiers?
General CABELI.. Essentially; yes. I do not think that it disbanded
through lack of p,Ey. That was not it.
Their heart, way not in It. They recognized the. Batista regime as
being corrupt, an I they were generally impressed by the slogans that
the revolutionari(s were putting out., and so they did not have the will
to fight or the leaders did not have the courage to attempt to right, so
there really was n ) fight.
The CIIAIRMAY. We received testinu}ny from [lie President-elect
of Cuba, who never took office, that representatives of the American
Government in November or December, which was it
fir. SOL'RWINE. Sir, I think it was November.
The CI1AiRM.' . Called on the generals and stated that our Govern-
ment would not r.; cognize the election of the new government in Cuba
and that, therefore, the Army lost confidence, and that the Army
caused Batista to leave the country and attempted to make it deal with
Castro.
General CABarr . Are you asking me the question, Mr. Chairman ?
The CraAIRMAN. If you have any information about it.
General CABrLi.. Mr. Chairman, there was no such approach made
by members of CIA. I do not know whether or not any such ap-
proach was made by any Government agencies, but my best belief is
that it is incorrect. It did not happen.
And, as a. matt( r of fact., the lack of an army forced him to run, but
not the army.
The CIIAni 1AN. Yes, sir.
But what I got was just the sense of what he said, as I remember it.
I think lie said `he army then caused Batista. to leave. They at-
tempted to make a deal with Castro, and each one of those generals
was killed.
General CABEL-.. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, Batista put
in arrest several of his principal army leaders before his flight.
Senator IIRUSSA. General, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are
pretty much down in that neighborhood where there is a lot of ac-
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COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 179
tivity. Has anything come to your attention as to any efforts along
subversive lines there along the same approach you have described
in other countries ?
General CABELL. Senator, we are not knowledgeable or expert in
that.
Senator HRUSKA. If there were not any such activities they would
have to start someplace and end there. I just wondered if there was
anything that came to your attention in connection with the effort
that you make.
General CABELL. I do not know of any concerted or organized move-
ment against the Virgin Islands or against Puerto Rico or against
U.S. interests in those places, based outside the area.
Senator JOHNSTON. What was Batista's attitude toward the Com-
munists?
General CABELL. Batista was opposed to the Communists, but with-
out a great depth of feeling.
As a matter of fact, it was in Batista's regime that BRAC was estab-
lished for the purpose of combating the Communists.
Senator HRUSKA. Might it be said that his opposition to them was
that he conceived of them as a political enemy of his own?
General CABELL. That is right. He was not really interested in-
he did not hoist aboard the idea of an international Communist
movement.
Senator JOHNSTON. Isn't that also true now of Castro? A lot of
those were leaders with him against Batista, and he is appointing
them in the Government.
General CABELL. But I would say in the case of Batista there was
just an unawareness of it. But in the case of many of the leaders
around Castro they do not seem to care.
The CHAIRMAN. They cooperate with them.
General CABELL. Yes.
Senator HimsKA. In connection with Puerto Rico, particularly, we
have heard evidence that there were mailings of Communist literature,
emanating from presumably Mexico, made into Puerto Rico on a basis
not as large as in some other countries, because it is a smaller area, but
we do have evidence on that score.
Senator JOHNSTON. We do have evidence that it is coming into the
United States, too.
General CABELL. Yes.
Senator JOHNSTON. In New York, if you go up there, you see a room
three times as big as this, covered with such mailings.
The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?
Gentlemen, we thank you.
General CABELL. It is a pleasure, Mr. Chairman.
(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.)
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INDEX
Nov: aThe Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to
the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization
in this index.
A
Page
Adduct, Giacomo (Italian labor leader) -------------------------------- 151
Africa ------------------------------------------------------------- 143
Agrarian reform----------------------------------------------------- 163
Agrarian Reform Institute-------------------------------------------- 144
Alvarado, Cesar Alonso---------------------------------------------- 153
Anti-Batista struggle------------------------------------------------- 154
"Anti-imperialist struggle"----------------------------------------- 147,149
"Anti-U.S. Mobs Riot in Panama" (New York Times, November 1959)
(by Paul P. Kennedy) --------------------------------------------- 174-176
APLE (Agrupacion per la Libertad de Espana-Group for the Liberty
of Spain) ---------------------------------------------------------- 174
ARDE (Accion Republicana. Democratica Espanola) -------------------- 174
Argentina----------------------------------------- 143, 151, 157, 167, 170, 177
Armenians ---------------------------------------------------------- 167
Asia ---------------------------------------------------------------- 143
B
Batista---------------------------------------------------- 141,176,178,179
Bayo, Gen Alberto---------------------------------------------------- 174
Betancourt, President------------------------------------------------ 170
Bhutan -------------------------------------------------------------- 159
Bogota ------------------------------------------------------- 169
Bolivia------------------------------------------------ ------ 143,147,171
Boyd, Aquilino (former Foreign Minister of Panama) ------------------ 174
Boye, Mau,rice------------------------------------------------------- 151
BRAC (Bureau of Resistance to Communist Activities) -------------- 177-179
Brazil-------------------------------------------- 143, 151, 153, 156, 167,169
(Sao Paulo) --------------------------------------------- 166
Brazilian Institute for Advanced Studies---------------------------- 148
British Honduras---------------------------------------------------- 153
Buenos Aires------------------------------------------------------ 169, 172
Budapest ---------------------------------------------------------- 148
Buenos Aires-------------------------------------------------------- 151
C
Cabell, Gen. C. P. (Deputy Director, VIA), statement of---------------- 141
Canal Zone--------------------------------------------------------- 172,176
Caribbean waters --------------------------------------------------- :_ 176
Castillero, Ernesto, Jr------------------------------------------------ 175
Castro, Fidel------------------------------------ 141, 155, 161, IG3,164,174,179
Castro forces-------------------------------------------------- 162,174,176
Castro government--------------------------------------------------- 173
Castro, Raul (Chief of Cuban Armed Forces) ----------- 149, 155, 163,166, 174
"Che" Guevara-------------------------------------- --------------- 174
Chile --------------------------------------------- 147, 151, 153, 157, 167, 168
Santiago ------------------------------------------------------ 151,158
Chilean-Czechoslovakian Cultural Institute---------------------------- 168
Chilean Socialists ----------------------------------------------------- . 167
Chilean Teachers Union (12th National Convention of) ------------------ 151
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China/Chinese------------------------------------- 143, 149, 152, 153, 159, 101
Red China ------------------------------------- 147,150,152, China FriendshpL} Societies------------------------------------------- 145
Chou En-lai --- --------------- --------- ------------- ------------ 159
CIA---------------------------------------------------------- 178
Colombia -------------------------------------------------- 143, 147, 153, 176
Communist Part;,:
Argentina--------------------------- --------------------------- 147
Brazil ----------------------------------------------------------- 158
China---------------------------------------------- 143, 147, 148, 162,105
Cuba----------------------------------------------------------- 145, 178
Latin Ameri"n--------------------------------------------- 143,148,149
Mexico 169
Of Soviet Union ----------------------------------- 141, 143,146-149,105
Communist Purta membership in Latin America (table) ----------------- 101
"Congress for Iuternatioiial Cooperation, General Disarmament and Na-
tional Suverelgaty----------------------- - - 157
"Congress of the Peoples of Latin America------------------------------ 157
Costa Rica----------------------------- 148
Cuba -------------- 143-145, 147, 151, 153, 15.1, 156, 158, 162, 106, 171, 173, 174, 177
Cuban Governmei.t--------------------------------------------- 144, 155, 176
Havana----------------------------------------------- 152, 166, 167,172
Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute--. --------------------------------- 145
Cuban Revolution------- ----------------------------------------- 149,155
Cuban waters--------------------------------------------------------- 176
"Cultural" excha iges----------------------- 105
Cultural Institults and Centers (pro-Communist in Chile)--------------- 168
Czechoslovakia - -- ---- ------ --- ------------------------------- 152,150
(Czechs) --------------------------------------------------------- 167
Czechoslovakian News Agency----------------------------------------- 157
Dange, S. A. (Indian Communist)------------------------------------- 151
Darden, Maj. B, t,. (Canal Zone's police chief)_________________________ 175
Delanoue,Paul --------------------------------------------------------- .151
Del Pino, Rafael ----------------------------------------------------- 177
Department of Investigation--------------- ------------------------------------------ 178
Despestre, Rene------------------------------------------------------ 158
Dominican Repullie ------------------------------------------------ 155, 161
Eastland, Senator James 0------------------------------------------ 141
East-West strugglr'--------------------------------------------------- 142
Ecuador------------------------------------------------------ 143, 147, 153
(Guayaquil) ----------------------------------------------------- 166
Editorial Atlnntc---------------------------------------------------- 170
Editorial GrtJalbc (Communist publishing house) ---------------------- 169
Europe------------------------------------------------------------ 147, 152
(Western) ---------------------------------------------------- 147, 152
F
FBI - - -- - - ----- ----- -------------------------- 148,108
First Latin Amer[ --an Congress of Women---------------------------- 158
Florida------------------------------------------------- ----------- 176
F'ondo de Cultura Popular, A.C. (Editorial Popular)-------------------- 169
Formosa------------------------------------------------------------- 153
"Friendship" societies---------------------------------------------- 105, 107
Frondizi, President--------------------------------------------------- 170
FUDE (Frente Ufldo Democratico Espanol-United Spanish Democratic
Front) ------------------------------------------------------------- 174
Gaiarzn, Jorge------------------------------------------------------- 153
Germany (East)-.----------------------------------------------------- 147
Girete, Otto Cesar t'argas-..------------------------------------------- 153
Gomez, Orlando Funcia (Brazilian Communist youth leader) ------------ 153
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Guadalupe----------------------------------------------------------- - 153
Guantanamo Bay-------------------------------------------------- 172, 173
Guatemalan territory------------------------------------------------- 153
Guedes, Ruben------------------------------------------------------- 153
Guevara, Ernesto (Che) ---------------------------------------------- 163
Guiana-------------------------------------------------------------- 153
,
"Historical Materialism"---------------------------------------------
169
Honduras -----------------------------------------------------------
158
Hoy (Cuban Communist newspaper) ------------------------ 149, 157, 158,
166
Hruska, Senator Roman L--------------------------------------------
141
Hungarians----------------------------------------------------------
167
I
Imprenta Cosines----------------------------------------------------
169
Impresiones Modernas------------------------------------------------
170
Information Bulletin (of Soviet Embassy) -----------------------------
169
Institute of Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange-----------------------
169
Intercambio Cultural-------------------------------------------------
169
International Communist movement___________________________________
153
International Organization of Journalists______________________________
156
International Union of Students (IUS)---------------------- 147-149 153
154
Interparliamentary Union-----------------------------------------'--
-
144
IUS-------------------------------------------------------------------
152
Jaroslav Knoblock------------------- -- ------ ---- --------------
156
Johnston, Senator Olin D---------------------------------------------
141
K
Khrushchev------------------------------------------------------- Kommunist (Soviet Communist Party magazine) -----------------------
141
.Konstantinov--------------------------------------------------------
169
Korea, North------------------------------------------------------ 143,
162
Kotchergin, Vadim---------------------------------------------------
171
L
La Cabana Fortress (Havana) ----------------------------------------
154
Lanz, Pedro Diaz----------------------------------------------------
Latin American C
f
d
ti
f
176
on
e
era
on o
Labor (CTAL) (Confederacion de
Trabajadores de America Latina) ---------------------------------- 150,170
Latin America Congress of Journalists_______________________________ 156
Latin American Youth----------------------------------------------- 153
Latin American Youth & Student Congress----------------------------- 155
Leduc, Renato------------------------------------------------------- 156
"
Lessons in Reading and Writing" (book).----------------------------- 173
Libreria Nacional---------------------------------------------------- 169
Libreria Navarro---------------------------------------------------- 170
Lithuanians--------------------------------------------------------- 167
Liu Shao-chi-------------------------------------------------------- 159
Lombardo Toledano's Popular Party in Mexico----------------------- 161
M
Magil, Abe (CPUSA representative at 12th CP-Mexico Congress)
152
-------
Mandel, Benjamin--------------------------------------------------- 141
Man-Shing-Po (anti-Communist newspaper) ---------------------------- 166
"Manual of Political Economy"--------------------------------------- 169
Mao Tze-tung------------------------------------------------------ 159,165
H
Haitian National Liberation Movement-------------------------------- 158
Harrington, Julian P. (U.S. Ambassador) ----------------------------- 175
Hart, Dr. Armando (Minister of Education) --------------------------- 157
172
Havana--------------------------------------------------- 152,166, 167
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Martinique ------- --------------------------------------------------- 153
..Marxist/ism------------------------------------------------------- 145,148
Illnrxist-Leninist theory______________________________________________ 146
3iassip, Antonio ------------------------------------------------------- 154
Mexican-R ussian Cultural Exchange Institute------------------------- 145
Mexican Workers' and Peasnnts' Party -_------------------------------ 169
Mexico----------------------------------- 113, 151, 153, 156-158, 170, 172, 179
Mexico City---------------------------------------------------------- 1139
ML) (Movimiento por In Libertad de Espana-Movement for the Liberty
of Spain) --------------------------------------------------------- 174
Montevideo---------------------------------------------------------- 151
+Ioscow---------------------------------------------- 140, 147, 149, 105, 168
N
National assembly ----------------------------------------------------- 175
National Associati"n of Send-Public Employees (Asoclaclon Naelonal de
Empleados Semi-Fiscales)------------------------------------------- 151
"National lilieration" struggle-------------------------- 143,140,149--151,158
"National liberation" strategy and tactics--------------------------- 165, 170
National Metal Workers Congress------------------------------------- 151
National Universil-v i -------------------------------------------------- 175
New China L>emoc:`atic Alliance_______________________________________ 166
New China News Agency. ------------------------------------- 157, 105, 167
New York----------------------------------------------------------- 179
Nicaragua -------------------------------------------------------- 153, 158
0
1058 May Day celebration------------------------ -------- 151
Othon, Pablo---------------------------------------------------------- 175
P
Panama ------------------------------------------------- 147, 157, 172, 174
(Canal) ------------------------------------------------------- 172,173
(Colon) --------------------------------------------------------- 175
Pan American Alr-vays ----------------------------------------------- 175
Paredes, Efrain A-varez---------------------------------------------- 153
Paris ---------------------------------------------------------------- 174
Peace Congress of Asian and Pacific peoples--------------------------- 165
"Peaceful invasior"-------------------------------------------------- 175
"Peace prize"-------------------------------- ---------------------- 140
Peiping ---------- -------------------------------------- 147, 149, 153,159, 165
"People's Congress'--------------------------------------------- 149,155,157
Peru ---------------------------------------------------------- 153,157,166
Poland ------------------------------------------------------------ 147,152
Poles ----------------------------------------------------------- 167
Ponomnrev, Boris \------------------------------------------------- 141
Popular I'arly in iIexico--------------------------------------------- 161
Popular Party of Lombardo Toledano and Workers' University---------- 170
Popular Socialist L'arty----------------------------------------------- 155
Portuguese ---------------------------------------------------------- 169
Portuoudo, Dr. Erulllo Nunez------------------------------------------ 177
Potter, Maj. Gen. William E. (Governor of Canal Zone) --------------175
I'rague_. --------------------------------------------------------
------------
------------------------------------------- 152, 108
Presna Latina Agency____-.------------------------------------ 150, 157, 166
Prestos, Luis Carl's--------------------------------------------------- 158
Problems of Peace and Socialism (World .Marxist Review) ------------ 148, 109
Puerto Rico------------------------------------------------------ 178, 179
Q
Quemoy-------------------------------------------------------------- 153
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Rio de Janeiro----------------------------------------------------- 144,151
Rumanians----------------------------------------------------------- 167
Russia------------------------------------------------------- 144, 152, 172
Russian submarines__________________________________________________ 176
S
Scarponi, Paolo------------------------------------------------------ 151
Schroeder, Frank W------------------------------------------------- 141
Seventh World Youth Festival---------------------------------------- 153
Sikkim ---------------------------------------------------------------- 159
Sixth Youth Festival----------------------------------- 154
Slav/s:
(Communist----------------------------------------------------- 167
(Union) ----------------------------------------------------------- 107
(Canadian) ------------------------------------------------------168
(South American) ------------------------------------------------ 168
Spanish-------------------------------------------------------------- 169
Sourwine, J. G------------------------------------------------------- 141
Soviet Embassy---------------------------------------------------- 169, 172
Soviet Federation for Friendship and Cultural Cooperation-------------- 158
Soviet/s------------------------------------------------------------- 145
Soviet/s foreign policy----------------------------------------------- 145
Soviet Union-------------------------- 143, 144, 146-148, 150, 154, 159-161, 169
Stalin--------------------------------------------------------------- 159
Stockholm------------------------------------------------------------ 157
T
Talleres Graficos de Libreria Madero S. A------------------------------ 169
Tass----------------------------------------------------------------- 157
Toledano, Lombardo__________________________________________________ 161
Trade Unions International of Public & Allied Workers----------------- 151
Trade Unions International of Textile & Clothing Workers------------ 151
Trade Unions Internationals----------------------------------------- 151
Twelfth CP-MexicoCongress ------------------------------------------ 152
21st Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress-------------------- 149
U
UCE (Union do Combatientes Espanoles-Union of Spanish Combatants) - 174
Union Eslava-------------------------------------------------------- 167
Union of Latin American Friendship (Union do Amistad Latino Ameri-
cana) -----------158
Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations----------- 167
United Nations, Security Council of------------------------------------ 177
Uruguay-------------------------------------------------- 143, 157, 167, 172
Uruguayan Communist Youth----------------------------------------- 155
Uruguayan-Soviet Cultural Institute---------------------------------- 167
U.S. Embassy-------------------------------------------------------- 175
U.S. Information Service--------------------------------------------- 175
U.S.S.R----------------------------------------------------------- 162, 164
V
Venezuela--------------------------------------------- 143,147,153,156,170
Venezuelan National Press Congress----------------------------------- 156
Vienna-------------------------------------------------------------- 153
Vietnam (North) ---------------------------------------------------- 143
Virgin Islands----------------------------------------------------- 178, 179
Voice of the Chinese Colony------------------------------------------ 166
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Warsaw------------------------------------------------------------ 168
Western Hemisphere-------------------------------------------------- 153
WFTU------------------------------------------------------------ 152
Women's Internati. nal Democratic Federation ------------------ 14-8-,-1-49, 168
Workers' University (Mexico City)----------------------------------- 148
World Federation of Democratic Youth------------------------- 149, 153, 164
World Federation cxf Teachers' Unions--------------------------------- 161
World Federation of Trade Unions--------------------- 148, 148-150, 152, 170
(4th Congressof) ----------------------------------------------- 161
(Metal & Engiieering Workers of) ---------------------------- 151
World Student Neff s (monthly organ of International Union of Students) - 153
World Trade Union News-------------------------------------------- 170
Y
Yugoslav/s/ia------------------------------------------------- ----__-- 187
Yugoslav Embassy .-------------------------------------------------- 167
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