UNITED STATES: NEW FACES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000700090028-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: August 16, 1974
• Content Type: NSPR

LATIN AMERICA
United StatAer:ri:ggrFotraR=se
4111011111101111111111111.
2
The change of administration in Wash-
ington will have consequences for Latin
America, including a better chance of re-
solving the Cuba issue. The choice of
Vice-President and the fate of General
Vernon Walters are also significant for
inter-American relations.
The departure of President Nixon from the White
House has been received with considerable satis-
faction throughout Latin America, and with posi-
tive joy by the Cubans who regarded the former
President as 'a personal enemy of the Cuban
revolution'. Rani Castro said that Nixon's resig-
nation 'permitted serious hopes of a re-establish-
ment of relations between Cuba and the United
States'. The possibility of a solution to the Cuban
question is 'perhaps the major implication for
Latin America. Kissinger has long recognised the
failure of the United States policy of embargo and
blockade, but has been prevented from making
any move on this question by Nixon (see Vol.
Viii, No. 10). Kissinger should now be able to
operate with reasonable freedom in Latin Ame-
rica, without having to worry about Charles 'Bebe'
Rebozo. Among Kissinger's first acts as President
Ford's secretary of state was to send a warmly
personal letter? (Rstirnado -Tony') to Panama's
foreign minister Juan Antonio Tack, assuring him
that the change of President would not affect the
United States' determination to negotiate a 'new
and modern treaty' for the Panama Canal.
in fact, the question of Panama may prove
tougher than the question of Cuba. Congress will
not make it easy for Kissinger to make meaningful
concessions to Panama, where there are still
United States interests to be preserved; with
respect to Cuba it is merely a question
of recognising that the game is lost, some-
thing Nixon never found easy. Under President
-Gerald Ford, it is likely to be harder for Latin
Americans to exploit the contradictions between
the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment in the United States (see Vol. VIII, No. 141..
President Ford will be weaker than was Nixon'
from 1969 to 1973, but at the same time he is,
likely to be treated with greater sympathy and i
understanding by congress. Ford is very much
a man of congress, and in this respect will have!
some of the advantages enjoyed by the late Pre-
sident Johnson during his first term in the White,
House following the assassination of Kennedy 1
There is no reason to suppose, of course, that
the Ford administration will be less conservative
in its outlook than 4ilift&Efrorritelage12005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000700090028-5
sident will certainly be under pressure to deal with
ATRYP8A-RDP91-00901R000700090028-5
inflation, and this could ' easily involve recession
and confrontation with cartels of commodity-pro-
ducing cOuntries. In fact, on fiscal questions Ford
is probably More conservative than his predeces-
sor; almost alone among senior members of con-
gress, he always refused to lard his constituency
with projects from the federal pork barrel.
As far as Latin America is concerned, much
hangs on the appointment of a Vice-President.
Nelson Rockefeller remains anathema in almost
every Latin American country as a result of his
family's long involvement in the affairs of the
continent. Almost anyone else would have a less ,
negative effect on inter-American relations.
Another personal factor which could affect United
States policy in Latin America is the fate of Gene-
ral Vernon Walters, now deputy director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and once mili-
tary attach?n Brazil in 1964. General Walters
acted as Nixon's interpreter on his disastrous tour
of Latin America in 1958, and when he was ap-
pointed to the CIA in March 1972 he was regarded
as being `Nixon's man'. During the Watergate
cover-up, John Ehrlichman described Walters as
a *good friend of the White House'. There is
considerable confusion and conflict of testimony
as to wsbether Walters did or did not tell Patrick
Gray --- acting director of the FBI ?to call off the
investigation into laundered funds coming from
Mexicci. on the ground that covert Cm operations !
might be jeopardised. Walters is not a career CIA
man and his enemies may use the Watererate
affair to be rid of him. This would place on the
sidelines one of Brazil's 'best friends in the United
States'. Walters' part in planning the 1964 military .
coup is notorious and he has many close connec?
tions with the Brazilian high command.
Walters has been active in recent months in
advancing the view that Brazil should follow Ar-
gentina back to some form of constitutional rule.
He visited Brazil at the end of July after going to
Portugal (see last week's issue), and sought
perhaps unsuccessfully ? to use his influence to
bolster President Geisel's sagging political for-
tunes. if Walters goes, there may be less direct
pressure on the Brazilians in this respect, but
KisSinger and Walters share the view that military
governments on their own cannot provide the
institutional stability Latin America needs. The
governments of Argentina, Colombia. Mexico,.
Peru and Venezuela are probably more in line
with Kissinger's view of United States' interests
than are the less stable regimes of Brazil and
Chile.
.1
7T-71
IcL LID ? 1,1 a ko
WASHINGTO:'.; POST
8 AUG 1974
Approved For Relea,e 2005/07/91':Owk,-ffiFli-t999,91v,
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: sation. President Nix.
mentioned that the loves
! gation of former Whi
? I House consultant and t.
.I CIA employee E. 'Iowa
! Hunt in the Watergate ea
I "wdll uncover a lot of thin.
I You open that scab there's
1 hell of a lot of things a
we feel that it would
I vary detrimental to ha
1 , I this thing go any Furth
? 1 This involves the Cuba
.i Hunt and a lot. of hen.,
...... ?..i..
pa nky that we have nothin,g tne watergate. suspects, not;
to do t,vith ourselves..." be expanded into unrelated ;
1 I.Then, 10 pages later in the matters which could lead to I
I transcript, . the President disclosure .of their earlier!
national seculty and. CIA ac, ;
;
il added. almost in passing, ,
. tivities."
1 -
. that Haldeman should tell .
' Haldeman testified
; the CIA: "Look, the problem
I . is that this will open the I ther that he did not recall:
I -whole, the whole Bay of , any discussion at any time !
1
! of a. sug,gestion to involve : Pigs thing and the President
, the CIA in Watergate, mat-
. just feels that, ah, without
II ? ca pt into the details-- 1 t Li e.tc-pt as he described in
I .
1 don't, don't lie to them to his testimony.
I ing! the extent to say. there is no "In summary, the meet
! invcivement, but. just. say of June 23 with thn CIA was!
. this is a comedy of -errors", held at the President's re- .
; witnout getting into it, the I quest in the interest of na-
tional seenrity,": Haldeman:
I - ' President believes that it is..
! going to open up the .whole told. the senators.
I Bay of Pigs thing up again." Haldeman testified in.
;
;
As a result I- of that meet." much the same way before
i
with those-two fleeting
the Senate !Water:tate coat-
. Ing?
. referenc.es- to the CIA, . mittee. He referred the corn- i
I
ve!,,v ; three p Min
erjtery ks in .the mittee to t m
'ne statement lie
10! 0iv ; Haldeman met with CIA of-
t, : Watergate cover-up case for had made bef ore the. Se na te
' ficials i.vith ;what he told the
edge ?of what ; his testimony before. the
Senai-.0 Anpropriations Sub-. APPrepriations Subcom nit- -
.!!'-ii?i ''"?0 vi'i"!e involved in ! -Senate :`,--atergatie cornmit- tee as one c01-0-:aining .
tee. concerning the payment : .c?17::f?ittee Wa3 a ''five'foldI' "ciensiderable detail"on his :
inie no ixiason to behove : e: 'lie an mush cc 1) ; pu,T.ese: ?
account or the mPeting with -
White ; Watergate defendants. CIA oft coals and the reason
iia.;:ilved and. no . The It,,atergate . soer[al asce.rtain
.. -Clue, to
whether there had been any
reason, tirermeirre,. to7spok ! t!)ro r,
seutor t.s. office 'mulel CI.\. Involvement in the
In addition, he testified:
(-..1?Ivev''hI5 a''' III1E,' '1'1 .11I/0,-r" ; not corereent . yesterday \V''I're:-I:'.-.' at air ; meeting, one of the
I?" l'It''''thgal-j-ell ?r?`11 Lile ; about the possit i o to
lify of any !
se." ascertain purposes of the rneeting, as .
"Tw,
. . future perjury . char:40S be- I ;whether the relation -be- assigned to me by the Presi-
At ii....niner point in testi, it filed against Haldeman ! tween r-p, of: the "CiTater- I dent on the morning of Inc before the same for .1-ts senate tesuroorty gate participants and the in addition to ascer- ;
-III-lid-elm" :rald, IIII;e about the June 23 meeting. 332:.-- oi'. Pig6 was a matter of tat ning whether. there was 1
S III ilelie ! DloweyPr, it is knouyn the . concern to CIA; n in . I any CIA involvement, v
ihat we were actig the prosec.utors re-n: