REAGAN'S NEW SWEETHEART

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000700060089-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: January 1, 1981
• Content Type: NSPR

.STAT
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-0090
NEW 3T,L TFSMAN
1 Januar,r 1981
w eethe,art
RABAT An important new-liaison is flourish- !
ing between the United States, and Morocco.
The Americans are prepared to supply King
Hassan with weapons to enable him to escalate
the'fighting in the Western Sahara again-st'the
Polisario.In return, the CIA is stepping up.its
strength in Rabat, as a useful base for covert
operations in the Maghreb and Western Africa.
During 1981, the Reagan administration sent
a very unusual number of high-level officials to
Morocco.' General Vernon Walters, Deputy
Director of the CIA between 1972 and 1976 and
now a roving ambassador for the State Depart-
ment, visited Rabat in March and again in Otto-
ber_and December. Lannon Walker, then acting
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, was
there at the same time in March. Francis West;
Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of in-
ternational security and military sales, made tivo
visits, one of them in November at the head of a
delegation of 23 military advisers and experts.
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense;
arrived in midsummer. Vice Admiral Bobby
Inman, the current deputy actor of the CIA;
ma e. a secret visit to Rabat not long after:` In
December the.Secretary of.' 'Defense, Caspar
Weinberger, met with the King in Fez. And he
was 'followed, on 19 December; by Senator
Charles Perry;:-Republican Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee. Presenting his
credentials to King Hassan in November,. the
new US Ambassador Joseph .Verner Reed Jr., a
Chase Manhattan Bank official and Long-time
friend of the King's,,declared: 'The United
States will do its best to be helpful in every area
of need that may arise. Count on us.'
This represents-a significant shift in US policy
since President- Carter's days. As Morris
Draper, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
testified before a Congressional committee last
March, Carter's policy had been `neutral as re-
gards the final status of the West Saharan tern.
tory', taking the view that'a military solution to
this conflict is neither possible'riordesirable'.
- Morocco has enjoyed unusual access in Wash
ington since Reagan's election: Two key officials
in the Reagan' team - General 'Walters and
Robert Neumann (a former ambassador to Mo-
rocco and director of the State Department in
the transition period which followed the elec-
tion) - were associated- with: DGA Interna-
tional, a Washington firm that had lobbied the
Carter administration and Congress' to supply
Morocco' with 108 M-60 tanks, together with
other weaponry and surveillance equipment
suited for Saharan conditions. Carter would only
go so far as to supply 20 F-5 fighter aircraft and
CLAUDIA WDIGHT investigates
the North African connection
Two developments have facilitated the change
in US policy. One was King Hassan's announce-
ment to the OAU summit in Nairobi that he
would accept a referendum on Moroccan sove-
reignty in the contested Saharan territory. His
offer ruled out direct talks with the Polisano and
the terms of the referendum are unlikely to
satisfy them; however, the gesture was good
enough for.the-Reagan team 'who have ap-
-ptauded it- publicly as a legitimate, means of
settling the dispute, and welcomed it privately as? j
a device for confirming Hassan's military occu-1
pation of the old Spanish territory_
The second, development was the Polisario's
October victory at the battle of Guelta Zem
.mour. In a surprise ..attack, the Polisario des-
troyed the 2,000-strong Moroccan garrison in
the town, captured a great deal of equipment
and downed five Moroccan planes.. Hassan?'s
army was forced to'retreat northwards behind
the wall of sand, ditches, barbed wire and mine-
fields that has been under construction for just
over a year. (The wall encloses the phosphate-
rich centres of the Western Sahara that make the
sand worth fighting over.) The` United Staten
and Morocco have since claimed that SAM-6
missiles and Soviet-built T54 and.T55 tanks were
used against Morocco in the battle, King Hassan
has alleged that 'Non-African specialists' were
fighting alongside the Polisario. Libya and the
Soviet.Union have been blamed for supplying
the missiles and tanks.
The Libyans deny supplying the Polisario with
the SAM-6, and the French"in Morocco confirm
that the aircraft at Guelta.Zemmourcould have-
been brought down ? by- less sophisticated.
weapons.. The Soviet tanks that may have ap=
peared at the battle were almost certainly,cap-
tured two years ago frgm the Moroccan army
itself: they originally.came from Egypt. Wafer-,
thin though the allegations may be, they provide
public justification. for the American decision to
step up the supply of arms tq Morocco.
According taAmerican officials, the delivery
of M60 tanks, initially scheduled for 1984, is to
be accelerated and new equipment for defence
against ground-fired missiles and night fighting
are also to be shipped soon. Assistant Secretary
West promised in?early November to consider
despatching radar-detection and jamming equip-
ment for the Moroccan airfotce..And a month
ago, he offered a substantial increase in military
advisers to train pilots and troops for the war. At
least a dozen US military advisers have already
been spotted wearing Moroccan uniform in
Smara and Al Auin in the war zone: Polisario.
officials in Algiers say 'they 'are operationg
ground-to-air communications and radar,' in-
six OV-10 survelliance planes. But within'days
of taking over in January 1981; General Haig
announced that the tank sale would eo ahead.
@presentativesof the Reagan administration
in Morocco recently expressed confidence to inc
that the war would be won. They have certainly.
dropped any pretence of neutrality. As far as the
'Reagan administration is concerned, the Polisa-
rio 'don't exist'- they are just mercenaries,-
Mauritanians and Algerians'. The war itself is
seen 'simply as an extension of Libyan ambitions
to destabilise American allies in the region.-
The CIA is thought to be increasing the size of
its station in Morocco to compensate for its
losses elsewhere. In 1979 it lost its Libyan post
after the embassy withdrew and in July 1981
Norman Descouteaux, CIA chief in Algiers, was
exposed by the Algerian authorities and ex-
pelled. Covert Action Irfor nation Bulletin in
Washington has identified three senior agents in
Morocco. The latest, Joseph Pettinelli, arrived
last February. David Wilson and Arthur Nimer
Jr were spotted in Casablanca and Rabat two
years ago; both are known to have had prior
experience of Qaddafi's Libya. ? ? ? ..
There is little doubt that the increased CIA!
activity in Morocco is aimed at Qaddafl, the,]
other major target being Angola. III Morocco 1
last March Jonas Savimbi of Unita had talks vath
General Walters, Lannon Walker and two CIA'
men. from Rabat. The new arms flow to Mo-
rocco for the Sahara enables the Reagan Admin-
istration to evade Congressional prohibitions
still in force against covert aid to Unita. Arms ;
intended for Savimbi are to be passed to Mo-!
rocco legally and transferred while Washington 1
looks the other way. As long as the White House
can convince doubters in Congress that 'Soviet,
surrogates' such as the' Libyans are behind the.
Polisario, the Saharan conflict vill remain a use-
ful front for covert operations of this kind.:-. D'?!
Initially, this was on condition,~?at the to ~
would note be used. in the S al~ r Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700060089-1
~r;
Moroccan officials say they will accept no res-
trictions on their deployment and the Americans