ARRESTING ARAFAT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91-00901R000700060007-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 17, 2005
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 30, 1985
Content Type:
NSPR
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Body:
ST14T
IF Approved For Rele~frr1Z ~C~~DP91-00901
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A warrant for the PLO chief?
ARRESTING ARAFAT
I UST WHEN the Reagan administration thought it had
hit upon a relatively painless approach to the problem
international terrorism, it finds itself juggling a hot
potato. The new approach consists of treating terrorism as
simple criminality and pursuing terrorists with the instru-
ments of law enforcement. The hot potato is the proposal
now bouncing around somewhere between the State and
Justice departments to seek the arrest of Yasir Arafat.
There is considerable circumstantial evidence that Ara-
fat was complicit in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro: he
supplies funds to Abul Abbas's Palestine Liberation Front,
and he conferred with PLF leaders several times during
the weeks that the hijacking was being prepared. But this
is not the crime for which the U.S. government is consid-
ering trying to arrest him. Instead, the State Department is
reexamining the case of the murder of two American dip-
lomats in Khartoum in 1973.
The reexamination has been spurred both by the new
interest in using legal instruments against terrorism and
by revelations that U.S. intelligence possesses a taped
intercept of Arafat personally ordering the Khartoum
murders. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Vernon
Walters recently rmed in an interview with ioumalist
Edwin Black that when he was deputy director of the CIA_
in 1973 he had been told of the existence of such a tape.
Although he had not heard the tape himself (Arabic being
one of those languages that the multilingual Walters does
not speak), he said that the existence of the tape "was
common knowledge at the time among all sorts of people
in the government."
A warrant for Arafat is not likely to lead to his arrest. It
would serve, though, to keep him out of the United States,
and thus away from the U.N. In theory, it could also keep
him out of countries that have extradition treaties with the
United States, although judging from Italy's refusal to
hold Abbas-a much smaller fish-it is hard to imagine
that many of our allies would arrest Arafat on our behalf.
The more important consequences would be symbolic. A
warrant would signal the end of the notion that Arafat can
be transformed into a genuine peacemaker. And because
it would dismay some U.S. allies, it would show that the
administration is willing to incur diplomatic costs in the
interests of a serious counterterrorist policy.
THE KILLINGS in Khartoum occurred after eig t ter-
rorists seized hostages at a reception at the Saudi Ara-
bian Embassy. The eight, who identified! themselves as
members of "Black September," demanded the release
from prison of Sirhan Sirhan, the Baader-Meinhof gang,
and a group of Fatah members being held i4 Jordan. When
their demands were not met, the terrorists selected the
three Westerners among the hostages-U.~. Ambassador
Cleo Noel, Charge d'Affaires George C. Moore, and Bel-
gian diplomat Guy Eid-and methodically machine-
gunned them after first allowing them to write farewell
notes to their families and then beating them,.
A day later, the terrorists surrendered to Sudanese au-
thorities after a lengthy round of transocea
tions involving, among others, Arafat an
Nimeiri, who took the operation as a g
is communica-
the vice presi-
lling affront to
Sudanese dignity, went public at once with evidence
showing that it had been run out of the Kh rtoum office of
Fatah. The top Fatah official in Khartoumn had fled for
Libya the morning after the seizure, leaving behind in his
desk drawer a written copy of the plans for the operation.
His number two led the assault on the err bassy.
It also soon emerged in numerous news reports that the
command center for the operation was inlBeirut, whence
were transmitted both the order to kill the three diplomats
and the subsequent order to surrender. Indeed, according
to the Sudanese government, when the "executions"
were not carried out promptly on deadline, a prodding
message was transmitted: "What are you waiting for?"
A month later the Washington Post reported that Arafat
"was in the Black September radio command center in
Beirut when the message to execute three Western diplo-
mats ... was sent out last month, according to western
intelligence sources." The Post reported that "Arafat's
voice was reportedly monitored and recorded." The Post
said that according to its sources it was 4inclear whether
Arafat himself, or his deputy, Abu Iyad, "gave the order
to carry out the executions.... But they have reports that
Arafat was present in the operations center when the mes-
sage was sent and that he personally cc ngratulated the
guerrillas after the execution...."
The story, which was denied by a spoke man for Arafat,
made less impact then than it might today because Arafat
had yet to achieve the kind of respectability that he en-
joyed after 1974, when the Arab League declared the PLO
"the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian peo-
ple and when Arafat made his triumphat appearance at
the U.N. General Assembly.
And, in the avalanche of news on the Watergate scan-
dals, the Arafat/Khartoum story was larg~ly forgotten un-
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700060007-1