LESSONS OF BEIRUT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600420019-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 3, 1984
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2006/01/17: CIA-RDP91-00901R00
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 October 1984
Lessons of Beirut
By Stansfield Turner.
A . RE three strikes enough? Is it time to call our-
selves "out" and leave Beirut? Just how impor-
tant is it that the United States maintain a diplo-
matic presence in Lebanon? What are the long-term im-
plications of how we react to this latest atrocity?
We can only continue to expose Americans there if we
tighten security procedures markedly. Thus far we have
not been willing to pay the price of the inconvenience in-
volved in rigorous security. Our laxness in this last in-
stance was egregious. We did not take elemental precau-
tions. We sent 901Jnited States marines home just as the
American Embassy was moved to a new building and re-
lied, instead, on Lebanese guards to man the checkpoints
where cars and trucks were inspected. We did not em-
place some barrier as simple as a truck placed sideways
across the road that would have stopped any vehicle until
it was inspected and the barrier opened. We did not ac-
cept the inconvenience of prohibiting any non-US vehicle
from entering the compound at all. We're hearing lots of
excuses. They are just that.
Why were our people on the spot so indifferent when
their own lives were at stake? Because working in a for-
tress environment is repugnant to Americans. We are ac-
customed to and love our constitutional freedoms. We
will never be very good at living under the kind of con-
straints that seem necessary in today's Beirut.
We must acknowledge that terrorists can force large
numbers of people into considerable inconvenience. We
only need to recall the airport security procedures we all
accept every time we take a commercial airline. Even if
we accept greater inconvenience in Beirut, we may not
achieve adequate ,security. There are practical limits to
how much can be accomplished with security procedures.
Any fortress can be breached at some cost, e.g., with air-
craft or helicopters or missiles, if not with trucks loaded I
with dynamite. The terrorist group that calls itself the
Islamic Holy War is likely to pay a high cost to continue
to harass us. The risk of more American casualties m -~
Beirut is very real.
What would we lose by pulling out? Not much by way
of diplomatic activity. We have reduced our diplomatic
presence to only 20 people. That's barely enough to sup-
port an ambassador. He could operate out of Cyprus or
some other nearby spot. Besides, most serious negotia-
tions in the Middle East are conducted by special ambas-
sadors who fly in from Washington. To maintain ours mi-
nuscule presence of 20 in Beirut, we expose 80 more
Americans there to support and protect them and to re-
pair our several shattered embassies.
The only reasonable argument for not withdrawing is
that doing so could encourage terrorists to attempt to dis-
lodge us elsewhere in the Middle East or elsewhere. That
brings us, though, to the crux of the Beirut problem.
We in the US have brought hijacking under control by
instituting good security at airports; West Germany took
strenuous efforts and subdued the Baader-Meinhof ter-
rorists; and Italy did the same with the Red Brigades. In
all three cases the secret of success was that local secu-
rity forces got serious. It takes local people to set up a
network of informants within the indigenous populace to
find out who is new to some neighborhood, who is acting
in suspicious ways, who is not gainfully employed, or !
who is behaving unusually. US intelligence can certainly
help, but only in the most favorable circumstances is it
likely to play the key role. -
Until the Lebanese government performs this role,
American lives will continue to be endangered in Beirut
for little advantage. We should tell President Gemayel
that if he wants the privilege and benefits of a continued
US diplomatic presence, he must establish adequate in-
ternal security. And we should give him our telephone
number so that he can let us know when he's ready.
Pulling out of Beirut temporarily would tell the world
that the US is not going to sacrifice its people because
local security forces are not doing their job. That's a use-
ful message to a number of other countries such as Ku-
wait, Pakistan, and Libya, where we have had similar
problems, and to still others where we might. Let's use
this third tragedy in Beirut to push other nations to grap-
ple with the worldwide problem of terrorism.
M -ra Stansfield Turne SN (Regis a former
director of central intelligence. . 11
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600420019-9