SPY WARS: A YEAR OF DISCONTENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 28, 1985
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

STAT
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R0 0600410008-2
28 October 1985
Spy wars: a year of discontent
By Warren Richey
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
Soviet efforts to unleash a new breed of
smooth-mannered, sophisticated Russian
spies in the West may be backfiring.
This assessment by former US intelli-
gence officials comes following an
unprecedentedly large number of arrests,
defections, and countermoves this year
among spies on both sides of the Iron
Curtain.
In the United States:
? John A. Walker is expected to plead
guilty in a Baltimore federal district court
today to charges that he masterminded a
four-man US Navy spy ring for the Sovi-
ets. Included in the plea arrangement is a
purported understanding that Walker will
detail the extent of his alleged 20-years of
spying in exchange for leniency for his
son, Michael, who is also expected to
plead guilty to espionage charges.
? In Los Angeles, Federal Bureau of
Investigation agent Richard W. Miller is
on trial on charges that he passed counter-
intelligence secrets to the Soviets.
? Edward L. Howard, a former Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency employee, last
month apparently fled the US amid allegations that
he told the Soviets the identity of a key US under-
cover informant in Moscow.
The Americans have clearly not been alone in
taking casualties. The Soviet Union is said by ex-
perts to be reeling as a result of the recent defections
of three well-placed Soviet intelligence officers.
"We have had to cope with a small hail storm
and the Soviets have had to deal with an earth-
quake measuring 7 on the Richter scale," says
George Carver. a former senior US intelligence offi-
cial now at Georgetown University's Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
Retired Adm. Bobby R. Inman, former deputy
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, adds,
The defections must he a bonanza to US
counterintelligence."
The recent Soviet defectors are:
? Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior Soviet KGB offi-
cial who defected to the US Aug. 1 while on assign-
ment in Rome. He has extensive knowledge of KGB
operations in North America: It was Yurchenko
who identified Mr. Howard as a Soviet spy.
? Oleg Gordievsky, the top KGB officer in Lon-
don. who had worked for 10 years as a double agent
for the West, defected to Britain sometime last sum-
mer. Using information he provided, the British
government expelled 31 Soviets for spying.
Gordievsky is also reported to have helped uncover
Arne Treholt, a senior Norwegian government offi-
cial convicted last June of passing Norwegian and
NATO secrets to the KGB between 1974 and 1983.
? Ser r o oviet mili-
tary intelligence (GRU) operations in Gree
ce,
defected to the US in May. He is said to have d
e-
tailed Soviet infiltration of the Greek government
and fingered three indivduals who were providing
sensitive information and technology to the Soviets.
Experts stress there is a broader significance to'
these Soviet defections beyond the immediate coun-
terintelligence gains for the west.
"When three rather high-level people defect from
the Soviet Union's intelligence service in a rela-
tively brief period of time ... that is an indication
that there is some kind of malaise within their sys-
tem," says retired Adm. Stansfield Turner, CIA di-
rector during the Carter administration.
Mr. Turner, author of the recent book "Secrecy
and. Democracy:: Th Ain Transition " says tTiat
the spy activities and defections of recent months
ubie Soviets a vulnerable too."
The Soviets' vulnerability stems from what Mr.
Carver calls the "how are you going to keep them
down on the farm once they've seen Paris" syn-
drome. "The major difficulty that the Soviets have
is the stark contrast between the promise of the
1917 revolution and the facts and realities of the So-
viet Union today " Carver says.
Soviet KGB and GRU agents are among the
privileged few in Soviet society, experts say. A
KGB career is viewed among the Soviets' best and
brightest as a means of getting ahead quickly in the
bureaucracy. These ambitious recruits are sent to
the finest schools and are ushered into the ranks of
the Russian elite. They are trained in foreign lan-
guages, given the opportunity to travel, and are in-
evitably posted overseas. Mr.Inman says simply,
they are "people who could mingle" at Washington
social affairs.
"Those intelligence agents who have contact with
the West. who have their eyes and ears open. it
looks like they are very much disillusioned with
communism ... and this brings people to dramatic
decisions," says Zdzislaw Rurarz, a Polish ambas-
sador to Japan who defected to the US in 1981.
"They are seeing the confrontation between the
East and the West and they are changing sides.
This is very significant," says Mr. Rurarz, who
served 25 years as a Polish military intelligence
officer.
"Across the board, the level of sophistication of
KGB agents has gone up," says Inman. He
attributes this in large part to the work of former
Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, who pushed to up-
grade the effectiveness of Soviet intelligence oper-
ations during his tenure as KGB chief. But Inman
says the jury is still out on whether the KGB's new
sophistication and style has made it more vulner-
able to defections and western infiltration.
Carver is less tentative. "Others in the KGB
must be thinking: 'If Gordievsky and Yurchenko
can safely defect why can't we do it? If we can't
trust a Gordievsky or a Yurchenko, who can we
trust'?' "
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
OMAHA CREIGIITONIAN (NE) " nul
Turner talks
about CIA,
covert actions
By Mary Kate Wells
Increasing U.S. involvement in covert ac-
tivities in foreign countries has made head-
lines all over the world, stirring both ques-
tion and concern.
A "covert action" is an ef~ort by a
government to influence the course of
events in another country without being
identified.
Admiral Stanfield Turner, former direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency spoke
at Creighton Tuesday night about the role
the CIA plays in covert activities. He ad-
dressed the terrorism in Beirut and the CIA
support of the Contras against the Sandinis-
ta regime in Nicaragua as two areas of
specific concern.
Turner said that while it is unfortunate
that terrorism exists, the issue is what the
United States can do to stop it.
The CIA spies in efforts to find where and
when terrorists will strike, Turner said.
Technical devices - satellites and elec-
tronic eavesdropping instruments, -and
agents are used to gather this information.
Turner said the CIA predominantly uses
agents to infiltrate and penetrate a terrotist
regime.
Turner advocates a three-fold method to
bring terrorism under control. In addition
to the CIA efforts he recommends an in-
crease in reliance on local circuits and an
increase m attention to physical defense.
Turner said a country's local police by
forming a network of local contacts could
help tip the CIA to unusual activity. "Only
local people can do this," he said. Turner
cited the second bombing of American Em-
bassy in Beirut as proof of need for in-
creases in physical defense. "There is no
reason for this," he said.
The CIA's role is to collect information,
not to enforce foreign policy. However,
when covert action is involved the CIA acts
in three ways, Turner said. The CIA pub-
lishes propaganda in newspapers to sway
public opinion. The CIA takes political ac-
tion through its support of governments
favoring democracy. Para-military action
is given by the CIA through the supplying of
arms.
One iulation on covert actions is the
CIA shall not directly or by influence par-
ticipate in assassinations, Turner said.
A system of checks monitors CIA involve-
ment in covert activities. The president is
briefed on each action and must sign his
permission to the covert act.
Turner is a Rhodes Scholar and prior to
this service as CIA director he served as
Commander, U.S. Second Fleet and Com-
mander in Chief of NATO's Southern Fleet.
More than 200 people attended the lecture
sponsored by the SBG's Films, Lectures
and Concerts Committee..
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 ARTICLE AP EARED CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
ON PAApl&Due,d.For ReleasS 1dckPI-4i 1 dik-RDP91-00901 R000600
Espionage ca heats up press-rights debate
Conviction of Navy analyst seen as restricting public's need to know
By Curtis J Sitomer
1 Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Boston
The recent conviction of Samuel Loring Morison, a
former US Navy intelligence analyst, on espionage and
theft charges, has intensified debate on the issue of na-
tional security vs. the public's right to know
The central question raised by the Morison case is:
Does the United States now have, by judicial fiat, an Of-
ficial Secrets Act (similar to laws in
Great Britain that make it a crime to
disclose government information with-
out proper authorization)? If so, fed-
eral workers, the press, and others
may be more easily indicted for leak-
ing information the government deems
vital to the nation's security.
Mr. Morison was found guilty of
giving secrets to a British military
journal, Jane's Defense Weekly. The
information included US intelligence
satellite photographs of a Soviet nu-
clear aircraft carrier under construc-
tion at a Black Sea shipyard, which
were published by Jane's and widely
distributed.
Many of those on both sides of the
case, which was decided Oct. 17 by the US District Court
in Baltimore, believe results of the trial should lead to
two further actions:
? A congressional probe of the entire system of docu-
ment and information classification with a view to strik-
ing a better balance between restrictions for defense pur-
poses and disclosures in accord with the public's right to
know. President Reagan, for example, used intelligence
satellite photographs of Grenada, during a nationally
televised 1983 news conference, to reveal the construc-
tion of a runway capable of handling Soviet and Cuban
COFt//j(e f
military aircraft.
? A rethinking of how the Espionage Act of 1917 and
its amended version, the Internal Security Act of 1950
are used.
Civil libertarians argue that if an appeals courts, and
ultimately the US Supreme Court, doesn't overturn the
Morison ruling, the press will be stifled in reporting
many government matters which it now routinely
Samuel Morison, Navy analyst
convicted under US espionage law
"It [the decision] is an Official Se-
crets Act," insists Morton Halperin,
director of the Washington office of
the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU). "This is the first indictment
and conviction in the history of the Re-
public for giving things to the press,"
he adds.
"If the Supreme Court upholds the
statute [the Espionage Act of 1917 un-
der which Morison was prosecuted],"
Halperin says the "ACLU will go to
Congress and ask for an amendment
. to make it clear that the Act
doesn't apply to publication."
This alarmed reaction is countered
by the Justice Department, whose
spokesmen insist that the First
Amendment is not threatened by the verdict. Assistant
Attorney General Stephen S. Trott says his department
has no hidden agenda aimed at hampering the media.
"There has been a lot of arm-waving going on," adds
Trott, who heads Justice's criminal division. "But this is
not part of a plot to throw cold water on the press. We're
fully mindful of the First Amendment." But the govern-
ment official does see the decision as a clear signal to the
public that "classified material must not be leaked."
Assistant US Attorney Michael Schatzow, chief pros
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
ecutor in the Morison matter, also hopes
the outcome will have a deterrent effect on
government leaks. He downplays the pos-
sibility of widespread indictments against
members of the press who disclose
unauthorized information.
Robert Becker, staff attorney for the
Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the
Press - an organization that staunchly
defends First Amendment rights - says
he does not now see the Morison ruling as
having a "chilling effect" on journalists.
"This trial won't stop government offi-
cials from leaking stuff to the media. And
reporters are not likely to say: If I publish
this, I might go to jail," Mr. Becker
explains.
But he quickly adds that if the govern-
ment ever tries to impose media restric-
tions, "there would be a tremendous
outcry."
Something of a middle ground is occu-
pied by former Central Intelligence
Agency chief Stansfield Turner. Admiral
Turner feels that something must be done
to plug the dike against the recent rush of
leaks of classified data. But he also la-
ments the "risks" of shutting off media
access and debate about matters which
the public should be aware of.
In his book, "Secrecy and Democracy,
the CIA in Transition," Turner, a Carter
White House appointee, criticized the
Reagan administration for increased use
of covert action around the world. Turner
has also charged the government at-
tempted to "censor" his book by deleting
material it termed classified.
In an interview about the Morison ver-
dict, Turner said, "This administration
has gone to extremes in trying to classify
that which [should not be] classified."
Of Morison himself, he added: "This
man is not a spy. There is no evidence of
[his being a] Soviet agent."
Turner stresses the government should
take action not only against low-level gov-
ernment employees but against "high-
level people who leak things." But he says
this action need not be criminal indict-
ment in the courts. He suggests that
proper alternatives could range from rep-
rimands, to removal of "top secret" clear-
ances, to dismissal.
The former CIA chief suggests that it
might be appropriate to form a national
commission to examine the causes of se-
curity leaks - including "improperly
classified" information and restrictions
on those government officials who require
prior "official" approval of memoirs and
published writings.
The Morison case was only the second
time in history the US government used
espionage laws to prosecute a public em-
ployee for disclosures to the press.
In the mid-1970s, during the Pentagon
Papers case, similar charges were filed
against Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony
Russo who were accused of stealing and
distributing secret government docu-
ments about the Vietnam War.
A mistrial resulted when Watergate-re-
lated instances of government misconduct
against the defendants - including break-
ins and several illegal wiretaps were
revealed.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN DAI y (MI)
ARTICLE APPS oved For Release 200 /212ZJ4obc11A R91-0090 R00v6D0410008-2
ONPAG
`Intelligence is' only the start
By David Buchen
and Mark Weinstein
One year ago, protests against the Central
Intelligence Agency here at the University of
Michigan helped to spark nationwide campus
protests against CIA recruitment. In April,
nearly 500 people were arrested at the
University of Colorado for protesting the CIA.
On campuses everywhere, the CIA has been
met with active resistance to their attempts
at recruitment.
This Tuesday and Wednesday the CIA is
returning to Ann Arbor to recruit. And again
they will be met by large crowds demanding
that they leave.
Why does the CIA get such treatment from
people all across the nation? Aren't they just
an intelligence gathering agency for the
government? What is wrong with that you
might ask?
doing things that I'm ashamed of hearing that
the United States is doing."
In 1984, the CIA mined the harbors of
Nicaragua. This action was in direct conflict
with international laws. Edgar Chamorro
recalls, "After the CIA mined Nicaragua's
harbors, I was awakened at my "safe house"
in Tegucigalpa, Honduras at 2 a.m. by an
anxious CIA agent. He handed me a press
release written in perfect Spanish by CIA of-
ficials.... Of course we had no role in mining
the harbors."
The mining of the harbors, the murder of
health care workers, the rape and murder of
wedding parties, the constant threats of in-
vasion have all been justified by the claim
that the U.S. is trying to stop arms shipments
from Nicaragua to El Salvador. These two
countries have no common border and the
bay that separates them is filled with U.S.
The CIA is the government department in warships.
charge of not only "intelligence gathering" .\ David MacMichael, a former CIA analyst
but also more importantly overthrowing
governments they don't like, assassinating
people they consider a "threat" to our
security, training the secret police of fascist
countries to protect "democracy," influen-
cing the elections of foreign countries,
producing misinformation to manipulate
public opinion in the U.S., keeping track of
U.S. citizens opposed to government policies,
and who knows what else.
? Everything that we know of the CIA's ac-
tivities is vehemently denied by the gover-
nment. The operations of the agency are kept
secret from the U.S. public. What we know of
the CIA is only the tip of an iceberg.
The action of the CIA most prominent right
now is the training, funding, and directing of
the Somocista contra forces fighting to over-
throw the government of Nicaragua. Ac-
cording to Edgar Chamorro, a former contra
leader, the contras "have been subject to
manipulation by the Central Intelligence
Agency, which has reduced it to a front
organization."
The CIA has trained the contras to be a
highly effective terrorist force. The contras
based in Honduras and Costa Rica make
regular runs into Nicaragua with the help of
U.S. air support to destroy farm cooperatives,
health care clinics, schools. Over 7,000 people
have been killed by the Contras.
Stansfield Turner, former director of the
CIA, has said that "The people they're sup-
porting down there are committing murders
and terrorism. and so on. The CIA is suppor-
ting terrorism in Nicaragua. The contras are
Buchen is an Ann Arbor resident.
Weinstein is a junior in LSA.
who had access to all reports from the region
in the time that these arms shipments sup-
posedly occurred, recently testified to the
World Court that these allegations were com-
plete fabrications.
Why then is the United States so involved in
the contra war? Stansfield Turner says,
"There's no doubt about it in anybody's mind.
All along, there's only been one objective --
to overthrow the government of Nicaragua."
Overthrowing the democratically elected gover-
nments may seem like a strange thing for an
"intelligence gathering" agency to be doing,
but unfortunately the CIA has much practice
in ousting democratic governments in favor
of military dictatorships.
In 1954, the CIA brought about the over-
throw of the government of Guatemala. A
man named Arbenz had just been elected and
he was "left-leaning." After he nationalized
some land claimed by U.S. corporations, the
CIA and the corporations worked together
and brought about his overthrow. There have
not been democratic elections since that time.
In 1972, the CIA led the coup which ousted
Chilean president Salvador Allende. General
Pinochet who took over the government still
reigns today.
Of course the Bay of Pigs fiasco was a poor
attempt by the CIA to overthrow Castro in
Cuba. And in Iran, the Shah was put in power
by the CIA in 1953.
The CIA also uses more subltle ways of af-
fecting foreign affairs. In El Salvador, Jose
Napolean Duarte received hundreds of
thousands of dollars in campaign con-
tributions from the CIA. The CIA also subver-
ts foreign labor unions, student groups, and
political parties.
Of course as an "intelligence gathering"
agency, the CIA has the obligation to share
that information with our "friends." The CIA
trained the South African secret police force,
BOSS. In El Salvador and Guatemala, the
CIA trained the right wing death squads
which have killed thousands and "disap-
peared" 38,000 people in Guatemala alone.
The CIA also has trained the secret police of
South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and other coun-
tries such as the Phillipines.
During the Vietnam war, the CIA carried
out the Phoenix program. The Phoenix
program would identify key anti-government
dissidents and then have them assassinated.
This program alone brought about thousands
of deaths. The CIA was also in Vietnam long
before most of our troops were there. They
were there as "advisors."
Pt According to Ralph McGehee, a CIA agent
for 25 years, "The Agency forged documents,
planted evidence of weapons shipments, and
doctored documents to justify military inter-
vention." Sound like Nicaragua?
Here in the United States, the CIA has
illegally kept track of U.S. anti-government
activists. Ralph McGehee says that the CIA's
domestic programs often violated "U.S. law
and the agency's own charter. The Agency
also infiltrated labor, student, youth and
religious groups: It had thousands of college
professors and administrators working for it
on hundreds of campuses."
One example of the CIA gathering in-
telligence was in one program they subjected
U.S. citizens to mind altering drugs without
their knowledge. According to the Church
Commission, a mid-70s Senate committee in-
vestigating CIA abuses, the CIA opened over
28 million pieces of mail between 1953 and
1973. The CIA also has trained police forces
across the United States in special tactics.
When the CIA comes to campus on October
22 and 23, people should realize that it is not
an "intelligence gathering" agency coming to
recruit librarians and analysts.
The CIA is the largest, best funded, best
equipped, and most violent terrorist
organization in the world. A terrorist
organization which overthrows
democraticly elected governments and then
claims innocence in the U.S. media. A
terrorist organization which teaches torture
techniques to the secret police of fascist
regimes to protect "democracy." A terrorist
organization which funds the murder, torture,
and rape of people in Nicaragua. A terrorist
organization which keeps files on you and me.
These are the practices that the CIA is
ultimately recruiting employees for here at
the University.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 ARTICLE A )-wed For Releas~ o /'i1
ON PAGE
A Note to
Gorbachev
By Stansfield Turner
- WASHINGTON - Dear Mr. Presi-
dent:
Abraham Lincoln drafted one of our
country's most historic documents on
the back of an envelope. You can do
the same when you meet with Mikhail
S,.Gorbachev in November.
.,The Gettysburg Address helped
hold our nation together. You could
help avoid nuclear war. On your en-
velope you could write the following:
t'The Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
pypblic and the United States of Amer-
ics hereby agree never again to test a
ballistic missile."
And then slip it to Mr. Gorbachev.
Such an agreement would probably
be the shortest and most explicit in-
ternational protocol in history. It
would also leave one of the most
powerful legacies for peace.
If there were no testing of ballistic
missiles for a number of years, nei-
ther we nor the Soviets would remain
confident about the accuracy of these
weapons. That would mean that we
Stanfield Turner, author of "Secrecy
and Democracy - The CIA in Transi-
tion", was formerly director of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
End testing
of ballistic
missiles
l9
would both be uncertain about being
able to conduct a surprise, precision
attack to disable the other's strategic
arsenal. Creating uncertainty about
the success of surprise attacks would
do much to diminish the most danger-
ous tensions over nuclear weapons
and reduce the risk of mistakes dur-
ing a crisis.
It would also signal your joint de-
sire to curtail the arms race, at least
in ballistic missiles. Today we're pro-
ceeding with the MX missile in order
to catch up with the Soviet capability
to hit hardened targets by surprise.
With this approach, you would simply
lessen the Soviet's hard target capa-
bility. It would not disarm either one
of us, as we could each retain all the
ballistic missiles we wanted. But
these missiles would no longer be use-
ful for surprise attacks.
True, the Soviets may not see this
as an equitable bargain because
about 87 percent of, their strategic
warheads are on ballistic missiles
compared to about 78 percent on our
side. That's not really a big issue, but
you could always have an added
sweetener in your pocket, such as
withdrawing the Pershing missiles
from West Germany. If Mr. Gorba-
chev turned down that combination,
he would almost certainly lose the
contest for world opinion, no matter
what he is holding up his sleeve to
drop on the Summit table.
The alternative to a simple pro-
posal like this would appear to be pro-
tracted negotiations on a traditional
arms control treaty. This proposal
will enable you to get some momen-
tum going more quickly and, in the
process, markedly improve the entire
tone of United States-Soviet relations.
It will also ensure your leaving a
lasting mark for peace.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 ARTICLE APEA M For Release 20 1M K 6f1 -DP91-00901 R
tober 1985
11 O
E
ON PAG
OFFICIALS SAY CIA.
DID NOT TELL F.B.I.
OF SPY CASE MOVES
_ The
following-& iele is based on re-
porting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel
Brinkley and was written by Mr. Brink-
ley.
Sp.dN to The Now Yak Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 - The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency failed'to notify
the Federal Bureau of Investigation
after it learned more than a year ago
that Edward L. Howard was consider-
ing becoming a Soviet spy, Govern-
ment officials said today. .
According to court records, Mr. How-
ard told, two agency employees in Sep- i
tember 1984 that he was thinking of dis-
closing classified information to the
Soviet union.
Soviet Defector Was the Bey
c
In the last few weeks the C.I.A.
transferred the cch~iiief of its oftlce of see
curity, William Itetopish, to a new job
ata level of equivalent seniority, but an
official said the move had been planned
"for some time" and was not related to
the Howard case.
Mr. Howard worked for the agency
from 1981 to 1983. Hewas told of classic
fled American intelligence operations
in Moscow because the agency was
planning to assign him there, officials
According to a criminal complaint on
file in Federal District Court in - Albu-
querque, N.M., Mr. Howard'told two
current employees of the intelligence
agency a year ago last month that he
had "spent hours in the vicinity of the
Soviet Embassy trying to decide
whether to enter the embassy and dis-
close classified information.
An F.B.I. affidavit says the conver-
sation was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four
days before that; the Government con-
tends, Mr. Howard gave his. informa
tion to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Aus-
tria.
r e Lauder, a .Aesmai&
said today that as a result of that coo-
versation "action was taken" within
the agency "and it seemed to be rea-
sonable action at the time." He would
The bureau has sole responsibility for domestic espionage Investigations
and, under Federal law, the intelli- not say what the action was, although
gence agency and all other Govern- an official said the agency kept in con-
ment agencies are supposed to report tact with Mr. Howard after his conver-
suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is sation with the two C.I.A. operatives.
illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Fed- Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the
eral agency to carry out surveillance or time. '
other actions within the United States 'A Few Blatant Cases'
to stop potential spies. The Senate and House intelligence
Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former committees are investigating the ban-
intelligenceiyagency officer who is now dling of the Howard case. A key issue in
a fugitive, has been charged with espio- the study, committee members said,
nage, accused of giving Soviet officials will be how the C.I.A. and other agen-
cies deal with employees who leave
details of American intelligence opera- Government service with detailed,
tions in Moscow. Federal officials have classified knowledge about sensitive
called the disclosures serious and dam- programs..
aging. Another element of the investiga-
'Bad Mistake,' Senator Says dons will be several recent espionage
Federal officials said the C.I.A. told cases in which Government officials
failed to heed warning signs that a cur-
the F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard rent or former employee was planning
until after the bureau began an investi. to spy or was spying, committee mem-
gation this fall based on information hers said.
from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yur-
chenko, who had been a senior official
of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligen
agency,
The bureau began surveillance of
Mr. Howard last month, but he slipped
out of_his home at night and is believed
to have fled the country.
Senator Patrick . J. Leahy, the Ver-
mont Democrat who is vice chairman
of the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not
give the F.B.I. adequate information
about this person, that's a bad mjstake.
It shows' very, very serious problems
within the,. C.I.A."
"We've had a few blatant cases
where we just didn't follow through,
even with alarm bells going off," said
Representative Dave M going , Demo
crat of Oklahoma' y- of the
House committee's Subcommittee on
Oversight and Evaluator.
In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I.
official said Mr. Howard's conversa-
tion with the two C.I.A. officers would
have been sufficient to warrant an in-
vestigation.
"Anytime we get information that
someone has considered such an act,
we would take some action," said Phil-
lip A. Parker, deputy assistant director.
of the bureau's intelligence division.
An intelligence official said the
C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter
internally rather than report it to the
F.B.I. was -- rtudgmeet call," adding,
you repo every fantasy
people have, you'd have everyone
under surveillance."
Law Bars C.I.A. Moves In U.S.
The C.I.A would not say whether it
undertook any form of inquiry after
Mr. Howard told the two C.I.A. em-
ployees he had considered becoming a
Soviet spy. But Federal , law and a
Presidential executive order prohibit
the agency from taking any steps in-
side the United States to investigate
possible cases of espionage.
Mr. Howard was one of tens of thou-
sands of people who retire from Gov-
erm rent or industry each year after
holding positions that gave them ac-
c ess to o ossified materials. More than
4.3 million people in government and
industry associated with government
now have clearances to use classified
information.
Asked what procedures the Central
Intelligence Agency uses to monitor
former employees who have knowl-
edge of classified programs, Mr. Laud-
er, the agency spokesman, said: "We
haven't got, any. procedures. Once a
person leaves here, he is John Q. Citi-,
zen, just- like you and me. We don't
keep a string ort them. It's strictly an
F.B.I. flatter. "
Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota
Republican who is chairman of the Sen-
ate Intelligence Committee, said his
panel would also examine the problem
presented by military officers who re-
tire with knowledge of classified ma-
terials.
Most people with security clearances
work for the Pentagon. At the Defense
Department, L. Britt Snider, director
of counterinteilgience and security
policy, said: "We don't have any juris-
diction of any kind over former em-
ployees, whether or not they had clear-
ances. It's strictly the F.B:I."
At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said, "We
are not concerned about America6s
who have had clearances. We don't .
look at these people unless we detect tin
individual involved in espionage."
Ex-Intelligence Chief's Moves
Senator Leahy said: "I don't think
anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain
surveillance on the several hundred
thousand people who leave the Govern-
ment each year with security cleat-
ances. But there are a certain number.
of people in extremely sensitive post-
tions, a handful of them, that we ought
to do more with."
Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "cer- .
tainly would have been one of those"
because he held highly sensitive Infer-
mation and was being disrnissedfolloW-
ing a polygraph examination that tndi-
cated drug use and petty thievery, 44-
i cording: to Federal officials.
Continued
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
When Adm. Stansfield M. Turned
1 was Director of Central Intelligence in
the Carter Administration, he U$-
missed, transferred or forced to retire
nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who held
highly sensitive positions.
In an interview this week, he said
that others in the him that we ran the risk ohad f Some Of
them selling their information to the
other side." He said he had that some
when it was suggested should be given other jobs, and pi
ceeded with his original plans.
But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't
think my rule should be totally rigid.?It
this guy had just been briefed, I'd sd1Y
let's stick him in the Dominican Repub'
lic or someplace like that for a couplb
of years, until the information isn't
valuable anymore."
Senator Leahy said: "We may need
some sort of turkey farm for some of
these former employees. Make them
translate cables or something like that
for a couple of years."
Admiral Turner said he thought
C.I.A. officers ought to be required tQ
agree when they are hired that "ion
three years or so after they leave, theyY,
will subject
I trusion as s applied when they were jack
government. Make them come back fan
random polygraph examinations. Th >;
would give them one more thing to
worry about before they turn."
A I.A. official said "it's conceive
able" that that idea would work, add,
ing that finding solutions to the prop?
lem "is certainly something were
thinking about now."
A
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 V ARTIC1.er4 Vier Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600410008-2 Vol'
ON PAGE 1-.~d.._ WASHINGTON TIMES
3 October 1985
FBI seeking
former C
agent as a
Soviet mole
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The FBI yesterday issued an arrest warrant
for Edward Lee Howard, a 33-year-old former
CIA officer in Moscow suspected of being a
Soviet "mole."
Howard, who worked for the CIA from Jan-
uary 1981 until June 1983, was last posted in the
Soviet capital, where he posed as a State Depart-
ment budget analyst, according to sources.
He is charged, among other offenses, with
conspiracy to deliver national defense secrets to
a foreign government.
Howard is one of several suspected Soviet
agents implicated as CIA moles by the KGB's No.
.5 official, Vitaly Yurchenko. Mr. Yurchenko
defected last August in Rome and is undergoing
a debriefing by FBI and CIA officials.
Howard, a New Mexico native last
seen near Albuquerque on Sept. 20,
is on five years' probation for a con-
viction for assault with a deadly
weapon.
The FBI searched the Howards'
home and Jeep for code pads, mic-
rodots and other spy paraphernalia
between last Friday and 'lliesday, an
agency spokesman said. Howard is
believed to have fled for 'Ibxas last
week without leaving word with his
wife or friends.
Intelligence experts believe How-
ard might be a "give-away" or rel-
atively unimportant Soviet agent
and that it is too soon after Mr. Yur-
chenko's defection to determine if
other American agents will be
uncovered.
A senior CIA official in Washing-
ton confirmed that Howard had been
a CIA'operative, but that he was
expelled from the agency in 1983.
The official gave no reason for the
ouster.
Former CIA chief Stansfield
Turner, who was director from
1976-80, said in a telephone inter-
view from Norway yesterday that
there were no Soviet agents in the
CIA, "not in the four years I was
there:'
But Admiral Turner asserted that
it is "not impossible" that a Soviet
mole could penetrate the agency.
N. Scot Miler, a former CIA coun-
terintelligence official until the
mid-1970s, said an operational offi-
cer such as Howard would have had
access to "significant" intelligence
data about the CIA that would cause
serious damage if passed on to the
Russians.
While he had no direct knowledge
of the case, Mr. Miler said in an inter-
view that Howard, who has been
identified as an "economic fore-
caster" could have given the Soviets
secret financial data. Howard also
would have known the names and
identities of some U.S. and foreign
agents working for the agency, he
said.
Howard "was a friendly person in
his professional dealings, but his pri-
vate life was very private;" said
David Abbey, an economic analyst
for the New Mexico state Depart-
ment of Finance and Administra.
tion, where Howard worked.
He had close dealings with
economists and other industry ana-
lysts at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, an Energy Department
laboratory operated by the Univer-
sity of California that is involved in
weapons research, said co-workers.
"He was very much a serious-
minded person and always worried
about the declining oil and gas
situation;' said Bob Swerdling, also
a finance department analyst.
In rural Eldorado, southeast of
Santa Fe, a neighbor said Howard
did not participate in neighborhood
activities, though his wife, Mary, did.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 ARTICLE
Edward Jay Epstein
ADMIRAL Stansfield Turner commanded
a destroyer, a guided-missile cruiser,
a carrier task force, a fleet, and the prestigious
Naval War College before he was shunted away to
a NATO post in Italy in 1975. When he was
abruptly summoned back to Washington in Feb-
ruary 1977 by his former classmate at Annapolis,
President Jimmy Carter, he expected to be ap-
pointed to a high naval position or to the joint
Chiefs of Staff. Instead, the new President asked
him to be Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
Although Turner had had little previous ex-
perience in intelligence, he viewed it simply as a
problem of assessing data, or, as he described it to
his son, nothing more than "bean counting." Ac-
cepting the position of "chief bean counter," he
assumed that he could bring the CIA, and Amer-
ican intelligence, to the same standard of opera-
tional efficiency he had brought the ships under
his command. The four-year effort to achieve this
goal is the subject of his book, Secrecy and De-
mocracy: The CIA in Transition.'
He quickly found, however, that the CIA was a
far more complex and elusive entity than he had
expected. To begin with, the acting CIA Director,
Henry Knoche, rather than behaving like a ship's
"executive officer," surprised Turner by refusing
his "captain's" first order: a request that Knoche
accompany him to meetings with congressional
leaders. As far as Turner was concerned, this was
insubordination (and Knoche's days were num-
bered). When he met with other senior executives
of the CIA at a series of dinners, he found "a dis-
turbing lack of specificity and clarity" in their
answers. On the other hand, he found the written
CIA reports presented to him "too long and de-
tailed to be useful." He notes that "my first en-
counters with the CIA did not convey either the
feeling of a warm welcome or a sense of great
EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, whose books include Legend: The
Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald and Inquest: The War-
ren Commission and the Establishment of Truth, is cur-
rently completing a book on international deception. His
articles in COMMENTARY include "Disinformation: Or, Why
the CIA Cannot Verify an Arms-Control Agreement" (July
1982) and "The War Within the CIA" (August 1978),
pproved For ReJ"jf, hJ/14 : CIA-RDP91-009012000600410008-2
October 1985
Who Killed the C IA?
The Confessions of Stansfield
competence"-an asse ' - I
ment of many of these senior officers.
Turner was further frustrated by the system of
secrecy that kept vital intelligence hermetically
contained in bureaucratic "compartments" within
the CIA. Not only did he view such secrecy
as irrational, he began to suspect that it
cloaked a wide range of unethical activities. He
became especially concerned with abuses in the
espionage division, which he discovered was
heavily overstaffed with case officers-some of
whom, on the pretext of seeing agents abroad,
were disbursing large sums in "expenses" to them-
selves, keeping mistresses, and doing business with
international arms dealers. Aside from such petty
corruption, Turner feared that these compartmen-
talized espionage operations could enmesh the en-
tire CIA in a devastating scandal. The potential
for such a "disgrace," as he puts it, was made
manifest to him by a single traumatic case that oc-
curred in the 1960's-one which he harks back to
throughout his book, and which he uses to justify
eliminating the essential core of the CIA's espio-
nage service.
The villain of this case, as Turner describes it,
is James Jesus Angleton, who was chief of the
CIA's counterintelligence staff from 1954 to 1974;
the victim was Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who
began collaborating with the CIA in 1962 and
then defected to the United States in 1964, and
who claimed to have read all the KGB files on Lee
Harvey Oswald. The crime was the imprisonment
of Nosenko, which, according to Turner, was "a
travesty of the rights of the individual under the
law." It all began in 1964, after Nosenko arrived
in the United States. Turner states that Angleton
"decided that Nosenko was a double agent, and
set out to force him to confess. . . . When he
would not give in to normal interrogation, Angle-
ton's team set out to break the man psycholog-
ically. A small prison was built, expressly for him."
Nosenko was kept in this prison for three-and-
one-half years, although he never admitted to be-
ing a double agent. He was then released and sub-
1 Houghton Mifflin, 304 pp., $16.95.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 k ' TlrLE APPEAR
ED ' ~ ber pproved For Releaer v9~~1Ra0
Has Reagan killed CIA ovei
By Stansfield Turner
T HREE times in the past 18 months Ronald
Reagan, by his own admission, has employed the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in ways that he
regretted; and he has acknowledged using the National
Security Council (NSC) staff to substitute for the CIA
when the Congress had forbidden use of the CIA. Al-
though there is no evidence that the President and his ad-
visera have any intention of changing this pattern, the
Congress and its intelligence oversight committees have
done very little to restrict his freedom to misuse the CIA
and the NSC again.
The first error was the President's orders to the CIA
since late 1981 to support the "contras" in Nicaragua,
one result of which was a manual that appeared to con-
done assassination. The President acknowledged that
what he had set in motion had gone awry, and he walked
away from the manual and reaffirmed his public order to
the CIA to eschew any form of support for assassination.
This was clear evidence that the CIA was not under close
co=4trol, but the Congress did nothing.
The second error was a presidential order in late 1983
for the CIA to arrange for the mining of the harbors of
Nicaragua. When this became public in early 1984, the
President's rescinding of the order acknowledged that it
had been a mistake. His agenda for Nicaragua had not
changed, but apparently the reaction of the Congress and
the public made him realize that this was not a reason-
able way to achieve his objectives. There was a short-
lived furor in Congress, but within weeks it had blown
over. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, for instance, with-
drew his resignation as vice-chairman of the Senate's in-
telligence committee.
The third mistake was that of directing the CIA in late
1984 to collaborate with Lebanese intelligence against
terrorism. On March 8 of this year Lebanese intelligence
agents drove a truck bomb into a Beirut apartment build-
ing, killing 80 innocent people in an abortive effort to as-
sassinate one suspected anti-American terrorist. The
CIA argues vehemently that it was not associated with
this action, and I believe it. But the President, in hastily.
canceling the order; acknowledged the poor judgment be-
hind it. The Congress satisfied itself that the CIA had
not been directly involved in the incident, but did noth-
ing to inhibit the CIA from working again with people
who get out of control.
Finally, there was the use of the National Security
Council to substitute for the CIA. Public Law 98-473
stipulates that no "agency or entity of the United States
involved in intelligence activities" may support, "... di-
rectly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua ...." That this prohibition includes the NSC
is clear from the President's Executive Order on Intelli-
gence, which describes the NSC as "the highest Execu-
tive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for
and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelli-
gence...." It certainly appears that the officer of the
NSC who dealt with and for the contras acted illegally.
At the least he was acting in defiance of Congress's in-
tent. Congressional response has been quite restrained.
One does have to appreciate the fact that in many
ways President Reagan has proved that presidents can
be strong despite congressional opposition. Our Consti-
tution forces the executive and the legislative branches
into competition, and one is almost bound to dominate
the other from time to time. There can be problems,
though, when the executive and the legislature compete
too much and cooperate too little over controlling the
most secretive activity of our government, its intelligence
apparatus.
From 1945 to 1975, there was almost no cooperation in
overseeing intelligence, because Congress did not want to
be involved. So there was almost no accountability over
intelligence. When individuals working amid all the
temptations of secret intelligence activities know they
will not be held accountable, mistakes are likely. There
were mistakes during those first 30 years after World War
II, and, as is almost inevitable in our open society, the
errors of government were uncovered. That uncovering
in 1975-76, and the inevitable exaggeration accompany-
ing it, did our intelligence community great harm.
The most serious harm was the least apparent. Ameri-
can human intelligence activities nearly ground to a halt.
The CIA stopped taking the kinds of risks necessary for
effective spying. Hunkering down and avoiding possible
further criticism was the style of the day. The only way to
avoid a repetition of that nadir in our intelligence capa-
bilities is to avoid a repetition of similar errors.
President Reagan's three ill-planned CIA operations
and their sudden cancellations, each within 18 months,
are a disturbing-indicator that we are heading down an
old road. Presidents are tempted to resort to the CIA's
bag of covert tricks when they are frustrated by one ob-
stacle or another in trying to do what they deem neces-
sary. Only Congress stands between such frustrations
and the misuse of the CIA's secret powers. Presidents,
then, should recognize that Congress plays a special role
in overseeing secret intelligence activities and that the
keen competition experienced in so many other areas of
executive-legislative relations must be tempered here.
The Congress should recognize that its oversight of in-
telligence is a scant 10 years old. and does not have strong
foundations. If President Reagan continues to be indiffer-
ent about whether his use of the CIA is supported by
Congress, and if Congress cannot take the bit in its teeth
and exercise the latent authority it has, the oversight pro-
cess will die. With it will go the best chance we have of
averting another severe blow to our intelligence organiza-
tions, one from which recovery will not be easy or as
quick as from the last.
Stanfield Turner, former director of central intel-
ligence, discusses the problems of conducing secret
intelligence in an open society in his new book, "Se-
crecy and Democracy. "
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R00
TOLEDO BLADE (OH)
19 September 1985
Stansfield Turner Looks At Problem Of Secrecy
CIA Ex-Chief Says U.S: Out Of Bounds
In Nicaragua
By JOHN NICHOLS
Blade Staff Writs?
A former head of the Central Intel=
ligence Agency criticized the Reagan
administration's support for covert
activities in Nicaragua in an inter-
view with The Blade yesterday.
When he talks about Nicaragua,
Adm. Stansfield Turner, who headed
the CIA during the Carter adminis-
tration, pulls no punches.
"We've gone far beyond the bounds
of what is useful in Nicaragua," he
said yesterday, in a far-reaching in-
terview that touched on many foreign
policy questions and the latest spy
scandals in Europe and the United
States.
U.S. Aid To Rebels
"I feel that we should draw back on
our activities in Nicaragua in partic-
ular. I- do not believe that the contras
have any hope of overthrowing the
government of Nicaragua and I've
never heard anyone who seriously
thought they could," he said, refer-
ring to U.S.-supported military forces
that are trying to overthrow the Nic-
araguan government.
The United States has given mil-
lions of dollars to the contras, many
of whom are former supporters of
Anastasio Somoza, a much-criticized
dictator who was overthrown in 1979
by revolutionaries known as the San-
dinistas, who now control Nicara-
gua's government. The Reagan ad-
ministration has been alarmed by the
close relations that have developed
between the Sandinistas and the gov-
ernments of Cuba and the Soviet
Union.
That alarm has led to support for
the contras and to several covert
operations that Admiral Turner said
had embarrassed the United States
and may have the effect of undermin-
ing trust in the Government and the
CIA.
Publication Of Manual
He referred, in particular, to the
mining of Nicaraguan harbors and
the publication of a manual instruct-
ing contras on how to carry out
terrorist attacks.
"I don't like to see the country
doing something a large number of
American citizens don't support and
which contravenes our ethics. Some-
thing like mining tie harbors seems
to me to be state-sponsored terror-
ism," said Admiral Turner, who ex-
pressed support for diplomatic . ef-
forts aimed at convincing the
Sandinistas to alter policies.
The emphasis on ethics may seem
out of 'character for a man who once
headed an agency that Admiral
Turner says is responsible for spying
and carrying out covert activities
aimed at destabilizing unfriendly
governments.
Some Secrecy Needed
But Admiral Turner has made the
challenge of reconciling democratic
aims and beliefs with the need for an
agency such as the CIA the subject of
his writings and speeches since he
left the agency in 1981.
"Open societies, such as the United
States, are always more vulnerable
than closed societies. There's got to
be some secrecy, but there also has to
be'a check on the amount of govern-
ment secrecy or there is the potential
for abuse. The question is, how do we
reach the compromise?" he asked,
echoing the theme of a speech he
gave at the Toledo Club last night.
Admiral Turner said that recent
revelations regarding spy networks
that have operated in the United
States, Great Britain, and West Ger-
many made clear the difficulties a
country that is reasonably open has in
keeping secrets.
Widespread Spying
He said the recent revelations
about widespread spying, while not
all that surprising, might have a
positive impact for western nations,
in that they will make them more
careful about who has access to se-
cret information.
The challenge, Admiral Turner ex-
plained, will come in balancing the
new emphasis on secrecy with the
need to maintain basic freedoms.
"You don't want to be totally vul-
nerable. But you also don't want to be
a gestapo state," he said. "The chal-
lenge is to make sure you don't risk
too many of those freedoms you are
working to protect."
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410008-2