DIA DEFICIENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600400040-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: January 19, 1986
• Content Type: NSPR

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~~!~?r WASHINGTON POST
19 January 1986
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
DIA Deficiencies
Adm. Stansfield Turner was. right
on target in his comment on the defi-
ciencies in the Defense Intelligence
Agency ["The Pentagon's Intelligence
Mess," Outlook, Jan. 121. He stated,
"Often the DIA simply defaulted to
the services." In my own experience'it
may have gone further than that: it
often appeared that some senior offi-
cers in the DIA actively sided with the
service views to ensure that the DIA
did not assume a strong role in i*elb-
gence and counterintelligence.
As an early civilian employee of the
DIA engaged in initial planning for.a
DIA counterintelligence missiion, , I
soon became aware that the process.
was indeed one of constant retreat in
the face of service objections to the as-
sumption by the DIA of any substantial
mission or authority. It was finally
agreed that the DIA would not engage
in counterintelligence operations or
collection activities. Secretary of De-
fense Robert McNamara was not
happy with this decision, and he ord-
ered DIA to take over all counterintel-
ligence operations from the services.
This met with vehement service and
opposition from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who finally succeeded in scut-
tling Mr. McNamara's order.
As a consequence, counterintelli-
gence remains fragmented among the
services. This is largely responsible
for many of the deficiencies, particu-
larly in counterespionage, that are
now the focus of much criticism in
Congress and elsewhere.
The problem is not differing views
of the threat; the need still is to cen-
tralize these functions in the interern
of efficiency, economy and, above all,
effectiveness to deal with espionage
aimed at the United States. As Adm.
Turner said, "It's time to put the DIA
back on the track McNamara intended
by making it the center of the Penta-
gon intelligence process." In fact the
time is long past.
JAMES E. STILWELL
Bethesda :
The writer is former deputy chief of the
office of counterintelligence and se-
curity at the the Defense Information
Agency.
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~'q1 ~ L GAINESVILLE TIMES (GA)
14 January 1986
Expert says `bad assumption' by CIA
led to 1978 Iranian hostage incident
By ALAN HOPE
of The Times
A "bad assumption" by the CIA in
1978 was partially responsible W the
taking of American hostages in Iran,
says the former head of the agency at
that time.
Former CIA director Admiral
Stansfield Turner, speaking at Young
Harris College last night as part of
the institution's Centennial cele-
bration, offered some insight into the
days leading up to the hostage-taking
incident that was partially responsi-
ble for the downfall of former Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter, who appointed
Turner in 1977.
In the intelligence business, Turner
said, there "seldom is any piece of in-
telligence that is conclusive in itself."
"It was pretty clear in the summer
of 1978 that the Shah of Iran was in a
lot of trouble. There were dissident
elements in the clergy and in the
business and political community,"
Turner said.
"But we made an assumption in the
CIA. Here was a powerful leader with
a large army, strong police force and
intelligence," he said.
And Turner said he, as well as oth-
ers in the agency, believed that al-
though there might be "blood in the
streets," any uprising would be
crushed.
"When the time came, we believed
(the Shah) would step in with all that
power and knock these dissident el-
ements down."
"As we all know, that was a bad as-
sumption," Turner said.
To this day, he said, it is not known
why the Shah didn't take action.
"Maybe he was out of touch with
what was going on in his country. Or
he could secretly have been advised
he was a dying man, and he couldn't
face the difficult decision that would
lead to blood in the streets."
The CIA is a "risk-taking business,
you are going to win some and lose
some."
Turner said he believes the same
situation is brewing in the Phil-
ippines.
"It's another Iranian bombshell,"
he said. And because of the commu-
nist influence in that country it will
remain for some time, the former di-
rector said.
Turner said he will soon publish an
article that will say, "For heaven
sakes, let's get our (military) bases
out of there."
The bases are only causing political
problems for the U.S., and "whoever
is in power (in the Philippines) will
use those bases to help keep them in
power."
Although costly, Turner said, the
military needs in that area could be
met by other means.
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A zi 3.
WASHINGTON POST
10 January 1986
Rowland .Evans and Robert Novak
Trouble Stalks the NSC
Adm. John Poindexter's unan- ence may cost him dearly in dealing
nounced choice to fill a key National with the bureaucracy and Congress.
Security Council job has met resist- Poindexter sought Pentagon ap-
ance both inside and outside the proval in 1984 to have McDaniel,
White House, a mini-revolt that sug- then a Navy captain, routinely as-
gests new difficulties for President signed to the NSC staff. White House
Reagan's troubled NSC staff. sources told us that Navy Secretary
The admiral's decision to elevate John Lehman refused, not on grounds
his longtime Navy friend, Rodney of McDaniel's competence but be-
McDaniel, to the job of NSC execu- cause of his long and close relation-
tive secretary is the leading edge of ship with Turner, whom he had
new problems besetting the-once-po-
tent national security staff. a root
of ievances about McDaniel's a
pointment is not his ability but his
close relationship w rest m.
Stans a urner, esr ent Jimmy
Carters director, w opposi-
tion to coVfirt o ra ns was t
in Rea n's 199 ca r
That oindexter's first major staff
decision is in trouble has raised con-
cern that his lack of political experi-
served as executive secretary.
Poindexter refused to accept Leh-
man's "no." He persuaded McDaniel
to retire from the Navy and join the
NSC staff as a civilian. His work there
as chief planner for crisis manage-
ment has been exemplary,
But Reaganites are far more
alarmed over the implications of the
new job Poindexter has in store for
McDaniel. As NSC executive secre-
tary, and deputy assistant to the
president, he would become No. 3
after Poindexter and chief deputy
Donald Fortier. That would give him
Oval Office access, control of the
NSC paper flow, influence over hiring
and firing and major policy input.
Poindexter himself is viewed by
Reaganites as a staunch conservative,
but one who is singularly devoid of his
boss' strong ideological convictions.
He has been unmoved by alarm bells
sounded by some of his own staffers
about implications of the McDaniel
appointment.
A firm working relationship with
the Pentagon is clearly imperative for
any well-functioning national security
staff. Bitter disputes between the De-
fense and State departments over
SALT II, technology transfers, re-
gional conflicts and covert operations
can be mediated only by an NSC staff
that is respected and feared,
Poindexter's own allies warn him
that any taint o w at t y call
"Turnerism" in Rod McDaniel could
undermine the national security
staff's political clout, renderin the
president less protects rom paro-
chial bureaucrats.
That argument is being quietly
reinforced inside the White House b
the presence of another urner
protege as chi o o s a o e enafe
Intelligence Committee. - etR ired
N__~+v Main Bernard F. McMahon,
an inted a ear a o wFen-yen. avi
nber er - inn, scams com-
mittee chairman, has ma a no secret
of his strong opositton to covert
opera ons.
Reaganite critics are claiming that
McDaniel's appointment would
strengthen forces across the board
that oppose all clandestine aid. More-
over, they believe that Reagan right
now is planning such sub rosa opera-
tions against Libya.
Longtime specialists with no ax to.
grind have advised Poindexter that,
what he needs more than a controver-
sial executive secretary is a top-flight
operations officers-a tough staff man
to do for him what he successfully did'
for Bud McFarlane, "John Poindexter
needs a John Poindexter," one long'
time NSC staffer who recently rew
signed told us: he needs time to move
out of the NSC cocoon that contained
him during the McFarlane era and into
the rough world of congressional poli-
tics, bureaucratic feuding and media
vantage points.
If. instead of heading toward that
sensible goal, Poindexter appoints his
controversial colleague as executive
assistant, he may he moving himself
in the opposite direction.
11$d. News AM,rica svndlcate
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 ed
OWAGE
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_. - MODERN MATURITY
December 1985-January 1986
When President Carter nomi-
nated Admiral Stansfield Turner to
direct the Central Intelligence
Agency in 1977, the Washington ex-
perts thought they had the career of-
ficer figured out. Sure, they con-
ceded, he was bright, sophisticated,
polished. And yes, they went on to
agree, he certainly looked the part.
But was he tough enough? Some
questioned whether he possessed the
qualities to tame an agency that had
been under fire in the press and in-
vestigated by Congress for illegal ac-
tivities. Rather than run the "rogue
elephant," as the agency had come
to be known, it would run him, crit-
ics feared. He was, they contended,
too nice. "[He] is not Billy Mitch-
ell," the New Republic lamented.
"For his many strengths, he remains
very much a man of the system."
The New Republic needn't have
worried. Army Brigadier General
Billy Mitchell always had been one
of Turner's heroes. Like Mitchell-
who was court-martialed in 1925 for
championing the cause of air power
in heretical ways-Turner also rel-
ished dissenting from conventional
military viewpoints.
Moreover, as part of the team as-
sembled by Admiral Elmo (Bud)
Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Opera-
tions from 1970 through 1974, he
helped the contentious Zumwalt
modernize an aging, tradition-
bound--and often resistant-Navy.
Along the way, Zumwalt dubbed
Turner his "resident S.O.B.," his
devil's advocate.
As CIA director, Turner re-
mained in character. Rather than
function as just another figurehead,
a trap into which some directors re-
portedly had fallen, Turner did what
few people expected: He turned out
to be the maverick.
CHIEF OF
Spies
For example, he reasserted the di-
rector's authority over the so-called
"old boy" network that long had
dominated the agency. Consisting of
the top men of the CIA's three major
operational branches-espionage,
analysis and technical development
and operation--that network func-
tioned very nearly as a closed and
independent fiefdom, apparently re-
sisting all outside interference. In-
cluding, incidentally, that of the
CIA director himself.
All of that changed under Turner.
During the ensuing four years, he re-
instated, on a limited basis, "covert"-
type intelligence operations (an ac-
tivity that had fallen into disuse),
took steps to open up the agency to
greater Congressional oversight, in-
creased the role of technology in spy-
ing, and, in one abrupt and fiercely
criticized stroke, slashed 820 job
slots from the agency's espionage
branch.
Such moves embittered a sizable
portion of the intelligence work
force. One ex-CIA man, John K.
Greaney, likens 'Turner to a "Cap-
tain Queeg type" who was suspicious
of the more experienced agency em-
ployees and ignored their advice.
"He thought they were out to tor-
pedo his ship," says Greaney, now
executive director of the Association
of Former Intelligence Officers
(AFIO), a group of 3,200 ex-intelli-
gence personnel. "The trouble with
Turner," he adds, "is that he was an
outsider who just didn't understand
the workings of the intelligence
community."
Nonsense, retorts Turner. Pre-
cisely because he was an outsider, he
maintains, he often was better able
to perceive the need for change in
intelligence operations than en-
trenched agency veterans. "The 'old
boys tried to create a mystique
around the idea of intelligence," he
says, "and give the impression that
only-they could understand it. But it
isn't that hard for an outsider to
grasp--
By this time, you would think, the
unseemly tussle between Admiral
Turner and the old boys of the CIA
would be ancient history. Not so.
Five years after leaving "the com-
pany," as the CIA is amiably known
in Washington, Turner remains em-
battled. Not as a top government of-
ficial, but this time as a writer, lec-
turer and, most particularly, as a
critic of America's current intelli-
gence and military policies.
At 62, an age when most retired
admirals are easing into lives of com-
fortable obscurity, Turner once
again is departing from the usual
pattern.
Still the outsider, and still the
quintessential maverick, he very
nearly is turning iconoclasm into a
third career. For example, early in
1985 he published his first book, Se-
crecy and Democracy: The CIA in
Transition (304 pages, Houghton
Mifflin Company, Boston, $16.95).
The book reflects Turner's worry
that the agency he believes he helped
reform and modernize in the late
1970s is backsliding-returning to
the controversial ways that got it into
trouble with Congress.
Gadfly though he may be, he is
also, as the New Republic was at
least partly right to suggest, a man of
the system. If he were not, Turner
probably would not be found sitting,
along with many other retired admi-
rals and generals, on the boards of
giant corporations. Turner, for ex-
ample, is a member of the board of
directors of such firms as the
Monsanto Chemical Company, the
Ct cd
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National Life Insurance of Vermont
and the Times Fiber Communica-
tion Inc.
But that's where the stereotype
ends. Unlike many of his retired col-
leagues, who seem to combine board
activity with little more than leisure-
time pursuits, Turner remains fasci-
nated with public issues and, indeed,
the entire world of political action.
"To rusticate and not make a con-
tribution would be terribly frustrat-
ing," he tells a visitor. "I think I'd
die."
To discuss his activities and goals,
Turner recently invited MODERN MA-
TURITY to his three-story, luxury
townhouse in Washington's Virginia
suburbs, which he shares with his
second wife, Karin, whom he mar-
ried early in 1985.
Located just a short drive from
CIA headquarters in McLean, Vir-
ginia, and about 10 miles from
downtown Washington, the spacious
townhouse is where Turner now
works and relaxes.
In contrast with the demanding,
sharp-tongued perfectionist de-
scribed by at least some former
subordinates, Turner is engaging
and courtly. While he does have a
tendency to lecture, he clearly enjoys
conversation, and he discusses his
ideas openly and enthusiastically.
Almost uninhibitedly. He puts no
subject "off limits," and he sets no
restrictions for use of quotes.
Although his full head of hair con-
tinues to whiten, he shows few signs
of age and, in fact, still maintains a
distinct military bearing. He stays
trim by swimming, hiking and play-
ing tennis. A Christian Scientist who
takes his religion seriously, he nei-
ther smokes nor drinks. He relaxes
by reading ("voraciously," says a
colleague) and, when he has the
time, socializing with old friends.
But Turner seems to draw his
main pleasure from the interplay of
ideas and the give-and-take of public
life. His need for such activity be-
came clear shortly after Jimmy Car-
ter relinquished the Presidency to
Ronald Reagan in January 198 I.
Turner and his first wife, Patricia,
then spent two winters in Sedona,
Arizona, a quiet town of 9,000 about
100 miles from Phoenix. Mrs.
Turner found the peaceful commu-
nity to her liking after the traumas of
Washington and wanted to stay.
Turner didn't.
"Sedona's a wonderful town-
great for a vacation-but it's not the
sort of place where you can lead the
kind of life that I want to lead," he
says. The Turners' 31-year marriage
ended in divorce in 1984.
"I think there's a lesson here for
older people," he suggests. "Yes, it's
nice to retire, particularly to retire
gradually from the pressures and to-
tal preoccupation with business that
some people seem to have." At the
same time, he admonishes, an indi-
vidual must maintain some ambition
and desire to go on contributing.
If life is just a matter of eating
three meals a day, going to the mov-
ies and enjoying life, well, I can't do
that," he says. "That's too selfish for
me. I think you've got to do some-
thing worthwhile."
For Turner, that means bringing
to bear on the burning issues of the
day the unique perspective he be-
lieves he acquired as an admiral and
as CIA director. "I'm grateful to this
country," he explains. "It's given me
marvelous opportunities to serve in
ways that have been exciting, thrill-
ing and expanding. And now I want
to plough back into the country's res-
.
o
y
ervoir of information some of the les- doubts that the agency is slipping out
sons I've learned." of control. "Covert action is a policy
The lessons that Turner is initially thing that comes from the Adminis-
concerned with involve the CIA. Se- tration. If the Administration wants
crecy and Democracy chronicles the to do it, then the CIA is going to do
extent to which the nature of intelli- it." The fact of the matter, he adds,
gence activity changed during the is that the Carter Administration
years of the Carter Administration. didn't really want to do much covert
It also explores the dilemmas posed action while the Reagan Adminis-
by an agency like the CIA in a dem- tration does.
ocratic society. Turner believes that Lawmakers see little cause for
secrecy can be reconciled with de- alarm "There have been times dur-
mocracy, but he is alarmed by the ing the past four or five years when
direction the CIA is taking under his people from the CIA weren't as
successor, William Casey forthcoming as they should have
According to Turner, Casey has been, especially with regard to activ-
given covert-type operations an "ex- ities in Central America," says Sen-
aggerated" role. As a case in point, ator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), a
he cites the much-publicized "co- Onlinud
vert" campaign against Nicara-
gua-an operation that, he charges,
has degenerated into a public
spectacle.
Turner also cites the March 1985,
car-bombing in Beirut that killed
more than 80 people-an act that
was traced to individuals who turned
out to be backed by the CIA. While
he carefully notes that the CIA
didn't order the bombing, Turner
points out that the car-bombers nev-
ertheless had been supported by the
agency. "This opens us up to the ac-
cusation that we're supporting ter-
rorism" he argues. "What we've
done is exactly what we've con-
demned the Iranians for doing. This
is a disgrace to the country, and to
the CIA."
Such activities, Turner contends,
reflect a disregard for Congressional
oversight, and run the risk of making
the agency the focus of the kind of
public criticism that debilitated it in
the mid- I970s.
Not everyone agrees. In fact, most
experts and Congressional sources
interviewed for this story believe the
oversight process is working. More-
over, they say the impetus for covert
action derives from the White
House, and they go on to point out
that there's no evidence the CIA is
acting without Presidential approval.
"Stan is correct in raising a cau-
tionary signal," says former CIA Di-
rector William Colby
But C
lb
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former chairman ~ip[Re ena?e Se- left guard on the football squad. He of a carrier task group o the Sixth
lect Committee on Intelligence. "But and Jimmy Carter were in the same Fleet in the Mediterranean. Not
when those activities were noted, the class at Annapolis, but according to long afterwards, Zumwalt arranged
Congress, especially the Senate, re- the former President, they did not for Turner's promotion to vice admi-
sponded rather violently. So to sug- know each other. "He was so far ral and assigned him to be president
gest that the committee isn't carry- ahead of us," Carter once told his of the Naval War College in New-
ing out its oversight functions Cabinet, "that we never considered port, Rhode Island.
wouldn't be completely correct." him competition, or even a peer." With his customary independent-
Whoever is right about the CIA, (Turner finished 25th in a class of mindedness, Turner promptly dis-
there is one thing that nearly all ob- 820, while Carter ranked 59th.) pensed with uniforms at the college,
servers are agreed upon: Turner Just out of Annapolis, Turner revised the curriculum to increase,
bears little resemblance to the bland spent a year aboard a cruiser, then for example, the reading require-
and somewhat amiable conformist went to Oxford. He says he particu- ments, beginning with Thucydides'
that be was thought to be by some larly relished the work he did in phi- History of the Peloponnesian War,
back in 1977. His prickly indepen- losophy because of its emphasis on and called for examinations in strat-
dence is now taken for granted. But reasoning. "You'd sit down with egy and tactics. Military observers
Turner insists his independent-mind- your professor in a one-on-one situa- credit him with helping transform
edness is nothing new, and he traces tion and have to justify your opin- the college from a leisure-oriented
it back to his parents and specific ac- ions," he remembers. "It was a mar- reprieve from sea duty into a truly
ademic experiences he had first at velous experience. So when I look at rigorous institution.
Amherst College and later at Oxford some of these issues today, I believe I "Turner made a really important
University, where in 1950, as a do so a little more logically and ob- contribution to the intellectual life of
Rhodes scholar, he earned his mas- jectively than I would have the armed forces," says James Na-
ter's in philosophy, politics and otherwise." than, professor of political science at
economics. Turner rose gradually through the the University of Delaware. "The
Turner says he was particularly naval grades. He earned a Bronze kind of structure he gave to the insti-
influenced by his father, Oliver Star and other service decorations in tution allowed people to think more
Stansfield Turner, who came to the the Korean War. Between com- about the political uses of naval
U.S. in 1909 at age 10 from mands at sea he had assignments in power."
Ramsbottom, Lancashire, England. Washington. Along the way he en- Successful as he was, Turner by
Oliver later became successful in the countered the reform-minded the summer of 1976 felt his Navy
real estate business. Turner recalls Zumwalt, and the two hit it off. career had stalled. With Zumwalt
that he was especially impressed by "Zumwalt was sort of the inspiration no longer naval chief, he says, the
the feistiness and independent spirit for the maverick, logical-thinking Navy was starting to turn back the
displayed by his father when he once young naval officer," says Turner. clock as "old-line" Navy men re-
quit his job on the spot because he "We looked up to him as a person turned to prominence. Although he
didn't like the size of an annual bo- who could think and be different and had been promoted to full admiral,
nus. (He quickly found a better job.) still get ahead." and sent to Naples, Italy, as Com'
Raised in the staunchly Republi- When Zumwalt in 1970 became mander of the Southern Flank for
can community of Highland Park, Chief of Naval Operations, he NATO, he felt relegated to the Na-
Illinois, Turner says his parents were looked to Turner for help. "He gave vy's periphery. The NATO job, he
Republicans who voted for Herbert me an absolutely unbelievable job," notes, was out of the Navy's main-
Hoover in both 1928 and 1932. But recalls Turner. "He turned to me stream. "Because I had been a mav-
in 1936, he remembers, his parents and said, `Turner, you've got 60 days erick," he explains, "I thought l was
did the unthinkable: voted to give and I want you to write a plan for the being pushed to one side."
Franklin D. Roosevelt a second Navy."' The plan that Turner even- Turner considered quitting. "I
Presidential term. "They weren't os- tually submitted led the Navy at the stayed in the Navy not because of an
tracized, but they were certainly out time to put more emphasis on "sea overwhelming desire to be a naval
of step in that community," says control"-the ability to control sea officer, or because of a plan or vi-
Turner, who is a Democrat. "What lanes during times of emergency- sion," he confides. "I had made a
impressed me is that they were will- and somewhat less on its tendency to rule that I would stay only so long as
ing to judge issues on the merits build large carriers and ships aimed the next job was more challenging
rather than accept a set pattern." at projecting military power inland. than the last. If I peaked out, then I
After two years at Amherst Col- Controlling sea lanes had been ne- would drop out, and do something
lege, in which he had enrolled in glected, he says. else."
1941, Turner transferred to the U.S. As Turner is the first to admit, Then Jimmy Carter, with whom
Naval Academy, where he made his Zumwalt accelerated his advance- he had remained acquainted, re-
mark as an outstanding student and ment. In-1970 he assumed command 04t',lis.CW
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ceived the Democratic nomination
for President. Turner decided to de-
fer any decision on his own career
until after the election. "So I sort of
stumbled along from decision point
to decision point," he says.
In the end, he was glad he waited.
Carter summoned Turner to Wash-
ington after his first choice for the
CIA job, Theodore Sorensen, a
speech writer and White House aide
to President Kennedy, ran into oppo-
sition from foreign policy hardliners.
Although he hoped the President
would offer him the Navy's top job,
the post that Zumwalt had occupied,
Turner accepted the CIA position.
He was quickly and easily confirmed
by the Senate.
Carter granted his new CIA chief
unusual authority. For example, in
addition to direct control over the
CIA, he gave Turner budget control
over all of the country's intelligence
agencies.
But no sooner did Turner assume
command than he noticed a gap be-
tween his official power and the way
things actually worked. "When the
first annual budget came to me for
approval, everything had been de--
cided," he writes in his book. "The
three branches expected me to rub-
ber stamp what they wanted."
Shortly afterwards, Turner's dep-
uty, Frank Carlucci, compared the
director's office with the control
room of a power plant-except that
all the switches were disconnected.
The situation wasn't one that Turner
could abide, and very quickly he
started reasserting the director's au-
thority and taking the steps that
made his four-year reign such a
controversial one.
Of all the actions taken by Turner,
none stirred greater rancor than the
so-called "Halloween Massacre"-
his decision to eliminate 820 job slots
from the espionage branch over two
years. The step proved troubling in
two ways. It seemed to lend credence
to a view of Turner as a little ruth-
less, and it fostered the impression
that he emphasized technology at
the expense of human agents.
"That's the usual charge against
Turner and it's all wrong," says for-
mer CIA director Colby. "Along
with new technology, he also put in
human intelligence."
Turner believes the incident has
been blown out of proportion. Al-
though 820 positions were elimi-
nated, he swears that only 17 people
were actually fired, while another
147 were forced into early retire-
ment (the other cuts occurred by at-
trition). While he concedes the dis-
missals could have been handled
more sensitively, he insists the action
had to be taken.
Not only was the CIA swollen
with excess personnel, he says, but
many of the individuals affected had
an obsolete view of their craft. "I
think there's a lesson here for older
persons, in that a lot of these people
hadn't changed with the times," says
Turner. "Some of the more veteran
employees wanted to run intelligence
the way it was run back in the days
of World War II"-when the CIA's
predecessor agency, the Office of
Strategic Services, had leeway to do
just about anything it wanted.
"Intelligence had changed over the
years but these people hadn't."
Turner isn't spending all of his
time now re-fighting old campaigns.
He's moving on to new ones. For ex-
ample, he doesn't like the way mili-
tary decisions are made in the U.S.
He feels planners are preoccupied
with the Congressional budgetary
process and give short-shrift to over-
all strategy-an approach that, he
fears, is leading to distortions in
spending and gaps in our security.
The book he is now writing about the
problem undoubtedly will raise
hackles, but he is unfazed by the
prospect.
Says Turner: "I
be myself if I didn't
battles."
would not
enjoy these
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ON PAGE NEW REPUBLIC
20 January 1986
PLANTING SEEDS OF FREEDOM
Democracy may be less a choice that societies make than
the result of a very limited variety of circumstances and
histories. If this is so, one consequence is that the number
of democracies in the world, and their resilience, is not
likely to increase greatly. Another consequence is that the
longtime grievance against American foreign policy--that
the U.S. reflexively allies itself with undemocratic regimes
and movements in parts of the world not yet at home with
modernity or constitutionalism-loses much of its moral
force. For if arbitrary rule is the destiny of the billions of
people born outside the ambit of John Locke, then the
character of our ties to other states may be judged primari-
ly by the standards of realpolitik.
Those who reject the standards of realpolitik as callous
and counter-historical must have a theory of how the great
transformation can take place from governments that dis-
regard the rights and trample the liberties of their people
to governments that respect them. How does it happen?
Before 1917 and since, it has been thought by many mil-
lions of militants, and by more timid folk too, that revolu-
tion would do the trick. But in most countries that have
experienced revolution, the result has been the increasing
immiseration of the populace and its submission to forms
of domination that are often more brutal, and only occa-
sionally more subtle. The spark ignited by Lenin in Russia
70 years ago, therefore, no longer glows so brightly. The
fires that spread from it have consumed too many lives and
too much hope. The moral cachet of revolution hasn't sur-
vived the conflagration, at least among people who have
seen it up close. This is the meaning of Solidarity, and of
Charta 77, and indeed of the whole incandescently non-
violent underground in Central and Eastern Europe.
But from afar, the prospect of salvation by fire still has
its enthusiasts. Thus the El Salvador guerrilla movement
recently proclaimed itself to be what any astute observer
already knew it was, a Marxist-Leninist vanguard. Given
the bloody histories of such vanguards, this is uncommon
fair warning. More often these days, the agrarian reformer
disguise is not shed until the rebels sit in the seats of the
mighty. By then it is too late; a democratic future is all but
foreclosed.
Of course the struggle for democracy must still be
waged against traditional privilege, as well as against the
mesmerizing delusions of revolution. But democrats are
always at a disadvantage when they compete with the
ruthless. That is one reason why indigenous democratic
forces are justified in expecting more than mere hand-
wringing and moral support from mature democratic soci-
eties. They are entitled to concrete assistance. The United
States succored the revival of democracy in postwar Eu-
rope and presided over its very creation in postwar Japan.
Surely we should not be indifferent to the ordeal of strug-
gling democrats around the world today.
The National Endowment for Democracy, a govern-
ment-funded independent foundation, is an appropriate
vehicle for solidarity with precisely such democrats who
need help. It is an instrument of practical justice. The
existence of NED does not preclude similar voluntary ef-
forts by the vast networks of voluntary associations so
characteristic of our democracy. What American churches
are doing in South Africa is very similar to the mission
envisioned by the legislation establishing the Endow-
ment. But great public goals are never fulfilled solely by
private action. Those who rightly criticize President Rea-
gan's instinct to "privatize" every public purpose in the
domestic arena seem worse than silly-and perhaps even
insincere-when they argue that public solidarity with
struggling democrats in the international arena should not
be expressed in public acts or with public funds. Such
abnegation would help only the dictatorships. The demo-
crats of Spain and Portugal, once right-wing authoritarian
regimes that are now full members of the brotherhood of
democratic states, know just how important U.S. govern-
ment assistance was in keeping them alive during the
Franco and Salazar years. That assistance was directed to
them by the CIA-yes, the CIA. And these were precisely
the people who steered their countries away from the
habits of fascism and the temptations of communism into
the constitutional mainstream of Western Europe. NED
hopes that its support will sustain similar circles of demo-
crats and their democratic activities in countries where the
future has not vet been settled.
If you scrutinize any public or"private bureaucracy, you
are likely to find that it has made some mistakes. This is
particularly so with a new agency. It turned out, for exam-
ple, that the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute, using
NED funds, has appropriated large sums to two French
organizations, one of which has a shadowy history dating
back to the pieds noirs of French Algeria. Reasonable ques-
tions might be raised about why U.S. money should be
spent in vibrantly democratic France at all; there are also
reasonable justifications for doing so. In any case, these
particular errors, if errors they were, resulted from the
initial legislation that gave NED little direct control over
the congressionally mandated appropriations to the FTUI.
In the new legislation continuing NED funding, this struc-
tural flaw has been corrected. (The flaw that puts arms of
the Democratic and Republican parties into the decision-
making process has not been corrected.)
By focusing on the French cases, however, critics tried
to put into question the entire enterprise. This is fair nei-
ther to FTUI nor to NED. A few idiosyncratic connections
notwithstanding, the historic role of the American trade
union movement in bolstering trade unionism and demo-
cratic values internationally-and especially in the Third
World, where a special sensitivity to the peasant sensibil-
coNttNUEp
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ity was required-is nothing less than exhilarating.
NED has been functioning for a bit more than two years.
It has assisted democrats in the Communist world and
those driven into exile from it. The proportion of funds
expended in such work has been small. In fact, the great
burden of its funded activities has been in the less devel-
oped countries where false cliches have the U.S. collabo-
rating against social and political change. Here the very
idea of pluralist institutions must seem like something of
a dream. But encouraging the critical habits of the press
or the adversary stance of lawyers is just the kind of
encouragement these societies need if freedom is to have
a chance. Often NED supports democratic developments
in countries whose governments, hardly unfriendly to the
U.S., would prefer not to see democracy developing at
all. This is essential to NED's purpose. This is the case
now in the Philippines, where fully ten percent of NED's
money is going. It is also the case in Paraguay, Chile,
South Africa, and other countries where it takes bravery
to want social and political change. To match the bravery
of the kind of people we should want to help, NED may
have to be more daring than public agencies are prone
to be.
In Guatemala, NED aid was critical in mobilizing the
population for the recent election, which has given that
country its first hope in decades of ending the reign of
terror. The election won't guarantee that democracy will
flourish. But it has emboldened vast numbers of people,
across the rigid stratifications of a poor and frightened
polity, to believe that there is another way to live.
Such emboldening is the absolute precondition for dem-
ocratic change. Without NED, the U.S. has no way to
embolden the hopeless except with empty rhetoric or with
guns.
2.,
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