SELECTION OF A NEW CIA DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600390007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 3, 1987
• Content Type: TRANS

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Good Morning America STATION ' JLA-TV
ABC Network
DATE MIarch 3, 1987 7:39 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
CHARLES GIf35 0N: As you've seen in the news and seen in
the headlines, yesterday Robert Gates, the number two man at CIA
under William Casey and the President's choice to head the
Agency, withdrew his nomination. And that leads, of course, to
some questions about the agency. How much has the CIA been
damaged by all the negative ;publicity of recent months?
Wel I, we have two former CIA Directors with us this
morning. Admiral St ansfield Turner. joins us from our Washington
Bureau. And William Colby is with us from our ABC affiliate in 14
Austin, Texas, KVUE-TV.
Good morning to hoth of you. And you're nice to join uJs
this in orninI.
'r. Casey, let me start with you -- I'm sorry. Mr.
Colby, let ne start with you.
How Sad a blow Js this, do you think, to the Agency
WILLIAM COLBY: Well, I think you're getting a
repetition of the sensatonalism and attacks on the Agency. But
when the investigations are finished. I think you'll find that
the Agency essentially stuck to its business, that on Iran it did
what the President said, and that it essentially stayed out of
the Contra thing. You'll find a fingerprint or so along the edge
of what it should do, and maybe over. But that's about all.
GIBSON: Admiral Turner, though there may just he a
fingerprint or two from the Agency on this case, nonetheless this
looks bad, does it not, having the withdraw the nomination of Mr.
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OFFICES IN. WASHINGTON D C ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES 9 CHICAG 0 DET I ? AND THER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Oh, yes, it does. I think
Gates is a fine prufessiunal. But the Congress is uncertain at.
this time just what shape the CIA is in. If it needs a major
overhaul, Gates, of course, is not the man to do it. He was too
closely associated with Casey. If it just needs some touching
up, he could have done the job. But they're just not sure in the
Congress, and they won't know until all the investigations are
completed.
I think there are at least two examples of very likely
illegalities that the CIA did, and at least two examples of
people in the CIA who were out of control. How bad those are,
we're going to have to wait and see.
GIBSON: So you think it was more than Mr. Colby said, a
fingerprint or two.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm afraid it's a little more than
that, in my opinion. Because when you break the law, like
carrying out a covert action without a presidential finding, or
like having a chief of station of the CIA in Costa Rica who had
to be withdrawn and removed from the Agency because of what he
Nas doing in support of the Contras, I'm concerned. People nave
to be under firm control.
GIBSON: All right, Let we come back to that, Mr. Colby.
Mistakes shuuld be...
C 0 L 6 Y : I certainly agcee with the need for full
control. There's no doubt about that. And as I say, I think
you'll find a few fingerprints on the wrung side of the line
here. But I don't think that passing a message from 011ie North
to a Cunt ra leader is any huge involvement of the CIA in Costa
Rica. I think that's the point. We'll find sone things that
uhuuld not have happened.
It's more oc less like Matergate. In Watergate, John
Ehrlichman tried to blame the CIA fur the whole operation. And
what actually developed was that, yes, the CIA had dune a couple
of fuulish things that it should nut have done, but essentially
it stayed away from the White House capers and activities. And I
think it's very similar in this situation.
GIBSON: Mr. Gates said +e withdrew because there was
going to be a long delay, that the Senate was not going to act on
his nomination until after their investigation by the Select
Committee on the Iran-Contra Affair was over.
Would the CIA have suffered from that kind of a delay,
or was it just the President who was going to suffer?
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ADMIRAL TURNER: I think both would have suffered. I
think the CIA doesn't need tube dragged through more controversy
than is absolutely essential under these circumstances. But I
believe the primary consideration was the presidency, the desire
to let Mr. Baker get things back on an even keel.
GIBSON: Do you agree with that, Mr. Colby? Do you
think Mr. Gates thus becomes a scapegoat?
COLBY: Well, I think Chairman Boren of the Senate
Committee expressed it best when he realty gave high praise to
Gates for withdrawing, because of the fact that the Agency and
its leadership fur the next several months would be ambiguous.
And you can't leave an important agency like the CIA with
ambiguous leadership. It's got too many critical problems for
our country over the next days. And if the Senate wasn't going
to work its will until it gut the full answer, then that meant a
lung period of confusion. And I think Mr. Gates deserves great
praise for withdrawing in that situation.
GIBBON: Let me put you both in a realm that you don't
otherwise sit in. Let me have you choose who the person now is
to head the CIA. Do they need a white knight to lead it, and who
should that be?
Mr. Colby?
COLBY: Well, I think they need a very good man with
impeccable credentials. I heard the name Brent Srowcroft earlier
on the program, and he would, of course, he a superb nominee.
There's no question about it.
There are military people, ex-military people. There
are some political people that would be quite gouri, with impec-
cable backgrounds. I think they'll find somebody pretty good.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think you nee somebody, first of
all, who's going to be able to work well with the Congress:
secondly, who's going to put covert actions into a better
perspective; and thirdly, who's going to be a good manager and
will keep the Agency under full control.
I'd name Brent Scowcroft and Bill Webster as my choices.
GIBSON: From the FBI.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
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GIB SUN: Admiral Turner, Mr. Colby, thank you ever so
much for being with us this morning. Very interesting. And we
hupe to see you again 3oun.
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 ARTICLE APP Ep
S.ciease 200440slir Fa lh-,f Lj@ P-00901RO
Gates ram
doubts on
Casey's role
By Adam Pertman
and Michael Kranish
Globe Staff
WASHINGTON - Robert M.
Gates yesterday appeared headed'
or cc5'ffi irmation as the new direc-
tor of central intelligence, but key
legislators and other analysts said
his two days of testimony raised
serious new questions about the
role former director William J. Ca-
se layed in the Iran-contra af-
air
In addition, they said Gates' re-
marks before the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee had left some,
members skeptical about Gates'"
candor and about whether they
had yet learned the extent of the
CIA's actions In the affair.
Of particular interest to both
Republicans and Democrats on
the committee were Gates' repeat-
ed denials - often to accusatory,
sharp questions - that he should
have done more to initiate an in-
vestigation once he had clues that
money was being diverted to the
contra rebels in Nicaragua.
Responses to this line of ques-
tioning raised doubts about Ca-
sey's role because Gates repeated-
ly said it was Casey who oversaw
matters relating to both Iran and
Central America.
For the first time in any testi-
mony he has given this year or
last, Gates said he had told Casey
last September that he thought
the Iran deal was a "bad idea"
and should be discontinued. That
served to focus more attention on
Casey's role, because it appeared
to indicate that Casey had single-
handedly upheld the CIA's end of
the Iran program, which contin-
ued through last October.
In his testimony, Gates also
cited at least three written indica-
tions Casey received last October
that money had been funneled to
the contras. But Casey left out any
mention of the diversion when he
testified about the Iran arms sale
last Nov. 21.
Gates acknowledged that the
information was intentionally
omitted, but he said it was be-
cause only an "illegality," not an
"impropriety." had to be disclosed
under the law.
He also said, both Tuesday and
yesterday, that he did not feel a
need to press the matter with Ca-
sey because he felt the evidence
was inconclusive.
The contra plan was disclosed
publicly by Attorney General Ed-
win Meese 3d on Nov. 23, and sev-
eral senators argued with Gates
yesterday that he should have had
reason almost two months before
that time to believe that the diver-
sion was going on.
"The testimony that was given
by Director Casey on Nov. 21 ...
was skimpy, scanty, uninforma-
tive and really misleading," a
clearly irate Sen. Arlen Specter (R-
Pa.) told Gates during his appear-
ance yesterday.
Specter. along with other mem-
bers of the committee, chastised
Gates for not pursuing the matter
with Casey when he helped his
former boss prepare for his Nov.
21 appearance. And they rejected
Gates' explanation that he be-
lieved that the material involved
was too "flimsy" to spark his in-
terest.
''Why didn't an electric shock
go through your body?" Sen. Bill
Bradley (D-N.J.) asked Gates, re-
ferring to an analysis that a CIA
official gave him Oct. 1. 1986. The
analysis told of overcharges in the
Iran arms sales and said the con-
tras may have been getting money
but did not explicitly link the two.
Gates said he took that informa-
tion to Casey.
Specter later tangled with
Gates about a draft authorization
that the CIA's counsel had written
to approve retroactively the agen-
cy's assistance on a weapons
flight to Iran in late November.
The draft "finding" was never STAT
submitted for President Reagan's
signature, but it Is controversial
because critics say it was intended
to legalize a dubious action after
the fact.
Gates insisted that the finding
was put together to deal with fu-
ture CIA activities, but Specter
strenuously disagreed. At one
point" he said to Gates: "You're
flatly wrong." Gates stood his
ground, however, and told Specter
that he would have to talk to the
counsel if he wanted more infor-
mation.
Regarding diversion to the con-
tras, in addition to the incident on
Oct. 1. Gates said he had a hint of
the program when Lt. Col. Oliver
L. North made a "cryptic refer-
ence" to Swiss bank accounts dur-
ing a luncheon with him and Ca-
sey on Oct. 9. He said he later dis-
cussed this with Casey, too, but
added that Casey was uninterest-
ed so he dropped the subject.
Gates said a third indication of
a money diversion came on Oct.
21, when a New York business-
man who was a friend of Casey's
told the former CIA director of sus-
picions he had about money going
to the contras.
Senators' doubts about the CIA
and Casey were fueled by these
episodes and by the CIA's role in
assisting some of the weapons
supply missions. Gates asserted
that the operation was conceived
and discharged by the National
Security Council, while the spy
agency provided only logistical
support when asked.
He conceded, however, that he
had erred in not asking specific
questions about what was going
on and vowed never to allow the
CIA to be used in such a manner
again. Gates maintained that he,
along with other agency employ-
ees, made a conscious effort not to
know about the contra program
in order not to run afoul of laws
mandating that they not support
supply efforts for the rebels.
While that explanation seemed
intended to allay the fears of com-
mittee members about the legality
of the CIA's actions, it often served
to make the legislators dubious
about whether they were getting
the whole story.
Perhaps more important, it
also raised questions about
whether Casey had simply made
the Iran-contra project his own
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and excluded his subordinates
from the process.
"They didn't want to know,
they didn't want to get involved,"
Sen. William Cohen (R-Maine).
vice chairman of the intelligence
panel, said of the agency's employ-
ees. Cohen said he believed that
the NSC was chosen to run the
project because it is not required
to report to Congress. as is the
CIA.
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), who
was a member of the Intelligence
Committee until last month, add-
ed in an interview: "Casey knows
a lot more than he has said, but
now we will never know" because
he is hospitalized. Leahy added
that the CIA, in its effort to avoid
telling Congress about the diver-
sion to the contras, "worked hard-
er on avoiding information than
collecting it."
Despite the tough questioning
of Gates, Cohen was among those
who said Gates' experience and
cooperativeness probably would
lead to his confirmation. The com-
mittee is to vote on the nomina-
tion in about two weeks, and the
full Senate will vote soon there-
after.
Gates did not criticize Casey
during the hearing. However, he
said repeatedly that the CIA made
numerous mistakes in the Iran
dealings. In particular, he said,
the administration made a serious
mistake in not informing Con-
gress of the enterprise for more
than 10 months. after it began.
Gates depicted the CIA under
Casey as an agency that sought to
avoid obeying the letter of the law
on numerous occasions, including
by telling his staff to remain unin-
formed about matters relating to
the contras.
That shocked not only some in-
telligence Committee members,
but also such analysts as Adm.
Stansfield Turner, a former direc-
tor of central intelligence.
Turner said in an interview
yesterday that he would never
have told his staff to avoid learn-
ing about an intelligence oper-
ation. He said Casey's CIA, which
performed some work on the con-
tra operation despite a congres-
sional prohibition, should have .
sought to find out why at least one
of its agents was involved in an
apparently illegal program.
"It is very serious," he said.
"when a secret agency is not un-
der its own control."
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WASHINGTON TIMES
e'?3February 1987
Reagan names Gates
to succeed Case
Little `cloak-and-dagger'
on deputy cheers resume
77- By Bill GeaZ_- officer for strategic programs.
..c I r4 IUN TIMES
Robert Michael Gates, President
Reagan's nominee for CIA director,
has a reputation as an intelligence
bureaucrat with a wealth of knowl-
edge about analysis but scant exper-
ience with clandestine operations -
often considered the heart and soul
of the spy business.
A career CIA analyst who special-
izes in Soviet affairs, Mr. Gates, 43,
became acting director last month
when William Casey underwent
brain surgery to remove a cancerous
tumor. Mr. Casey resigned yesterday.
The announcement of Mr. Gates'
nomination drew praise from most
intelligence experts, with the excep-
tion of some critics who felt he might
derail Mr. Casey's large-scale covert
action programs in support of anti-
communist resistance movements.
David Atlee P.jli ,s a former CIA
cianaestine services officer, praised
the Casey era for what he called "the
revival" of both the agency's morale
and the funds alloted for covert op-
erations.
But Mr. Phillips said he believed
Mr. Gates, who would be the first
CIA analyst to become the agency's
director, would not provide the same
level of support for covert action.
"Since his background is devoid
of all covert action experience, we
will assume there will be very little
of that in the last two years of the
Reagan administration," Mr. Phillips
said yesterday.
Born in Wichita, Kan., Mr. Gates
attended the College of William and
Mary and Indiana University. He
earned a doctorate from George-
town University. He joined the CIA
in 1966 and then spent three years in
the Air Force before becoming a CIA
analyst.
In 1971 he joined the U.S. SALT
negotiating team as an intelligence
adviser, and in 1973 became the
tie was detailed by the agency to
the National Security Council dur-
ing the Nixon and Ford administra-
tions and later became an executive
assistant to Carter administration
National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski.
Mr. Brzezinski, now with the Cen-
ter for Strategic and International
Studies, described Mr. Gates as "a
shrewd, experienced professional"
who advocated close cooperation be-
tween the White House and CIA.
"One of the things he always
stressed to me was that the CIA and
National Security Council should be
natural allies," Mr. Brzezinski said.
"I think that analysis will serve him
well as DCI."
Former Carter era CIA Director
Adm. Stansfield Turner, who chose
r. Gates as a po Icy adviser, said
the director-designate would have a
hard time repairing the agency's
poor relations with congressional
oversight committees following the
Iran arms deal controversy.
"I think the president was right to
put someone in there who is fully
familiar with what went on," Adm.
Turner said. "He's imaginative and
he helped me originate many of the
innovative things I tried to do for the
CIA."
Adm. Turner has been criticized
by some former CIA officials for
summarily dismissing hundreds of
the agency's most experienced clan-
destine services operators.
Mr. Gates was chosen by Mr.
Casey to be an executive assistant in
1981, but later returned to his post as
the top intelligence analyst on the
Soviet Union.
He became CIA deputy director
for intelligence in 1982 and assumed
the No. 2 post at the agency last sum-
mer.
During confirmation hearings,
Mr. Gates supported the administra-
tion's large-scale paramilitary pro-
grams but noted the agency was re-
STAT
sponsible only for implementing
such programs.
"It [covert action] is a decision
made by the National Security Coun-
cil, and CIA is an instrument by
which it is implemented," Mr. Gates
told the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee. 'And I believe that when that
decision is made, the CIA has an ob-
ligation to implement it as effec-
tively and as efficiently as possible."
Intelligence sources said sugges-
tions for covert action programs
often began with plans developed by
the CIAs operations directorate.
One intelligence source, who de-
clined to be identified, said the nomi-
nation of Mr. Gates was a sign that
agency enthusiasm for covert action
has ended.
"The agency will be very, very
hesitant to engage in anything with
a flap potential unless they have
someone like Casey willing to take .
the heat," the source said. "He was
willing to give things a whirl, but I
don't think anybody sees Gates that
way.
"If I were a covert action oper-
ative," the source continued, "I
would think about early retirement,
or not working very hard until some-
one is in there who will support the
programs."
Another source said the nomina-
tiogdid not have the support of clan-
destine services branch officials, al-
though a CIA official said Mr. Gates
had the backing of CIA Deputy Di-
rector for Operations Clair E.
George.
0rmer CIA Deputy Director
Bobbyy Inman disagreed and
sai Mr. Gates was "absolutely the
best appointment the president
could make,"
"He is the first director of central
intelligence from the analytical
side," Mr. Inman said. "But I'm com-
fortable he will call on the depth of
competence from inside DDO [oper-
ations directorate] to operate it and
operate it efficiently."
Senate Intelligence Committee
member Sen. Chic Hecht, Nevada
Republican, s' ou not ex-
pect Mr. Reagan to have nominated
Mr. Gates without Mr. Casey's full
support.
"Bob Gates has big shoes to fill,"
said Mr. Hecht, who praised Mr.
Casey for "rebuilding" the CIA. "He
has got a top staff of people at the
CIA that he can rely on:'
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