TIGHTER CONTROLS ONE LIKELY BY- PRODUCT OF SCANDAL
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CIA-RDP91-00901R000600390004-9
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K
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Document Creation Date:
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Sequence Number:
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Publication Date:
February 7, 1987
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February 19
TIGHTER CONTROLS ONE LIKELY BYPRODUCT OF SCANDAL
BY JUDI HASSON
WASHINGTON
Out of the Iran arms-Contra aid scandal, Congress is likely to draft new
procedures requiring the White House to keep lawmakers informed about covert
operations before they happen.
Lawmakers say it is too soon to predict what legislation they would like to
pass to keep Congress informed about secret executive branch actions, but there
clearly will be changes in the intelligence oversight laws before long.
In 1980, Congress approved legislation requiring the White House to notify
Congress before a covert operation began or in a ''timely fashion'' afterward.
The law was passed in the wake of a series of revelations about domestic and
foreign intelligence operations that went haywire.
Discussing the proposed legislation at the time, CIA Director Stansfield
%4 Turner said, ''The law requires I inform you of covert actions in a timely
manner. I think you can take me to jail if I waited a month or two to tell you
something. "
42 But the word ''timely'' was never defined, according to Sen. David Boren,
D-Oand other lawmakers, and they believe that vagueness has allowed
auses.
A Jan. 29 Senate Intelligence Committee report disclosed details of the
secret sale of arms to Iran that administration officials maintain was suggested
by Israel as a way of opening channels to moderates in Tehran.
The report, however, said the initiative gLickly turned into an
arms-for-hostages deal to purchase freedom for six Americans held in Lebanon.
Congress was not formally informed of the action until nearly 11 months after it
formally started and only after a Lebanese newspaper reported a secret mission
by former National Security adviser Robert McFarlane to Tehran.
The Senate Intelligence Committee report also dealt with disclosures that
profits from the arms sales may have been funneled to the Nicaraguan Contra
rebels, a CIA -formed force fighting to overthrow Managua's leftist Sandinista
government.
Stanley Sporkin, former CIA general counsel, told the panel in a secret
session that administration Officials decided not to tell Congress about the
initiative until the hostages were released "even though they understood this
might mean a lengthy delay.',
''Never again must we hear that an activity of the U.S. government is so
sensitive that knowledge of it must be withheld from the U.S. Congress," said
Rep. Louis Stokes, D-Ohio.
Last week, Stokes introduced legislation requiring the president to notify
Congress in writing before undertaking a covert action and giving him only a
48-hour delay in the case of an emergency.
In the Senate, members of the Intelligence Committee intend to take a close
look at how to toughen reporting requirements and also create a better
relationship between the branches of government.
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Z.
''The executive branch puts its policy in jeopardy when it doesn't seek to
make Congress a partner in the making of the policy,'' said Boren, chairman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee.
"I'm not opposed to some clarifications,'' he said. ''But I think it would
be naive of us to think that by just putting some more rules in the book that
we're going to solve the problem. "
"I think it is obvious that at least the spirit, if not the letter of the
law was not complied with," said Sen. George Mit.ct1gJ1,.-D-Maine, a member of the
select committee probing the scandal.
''We certainly should review that law to prevent it from happening again,''
he said. " At the same time, we must permit some latitude for a genuine national
emergency. This clearly was not the type of emergency that was contemplated at
the time the law was written.''
Mitchell said the argument not to tell Congress to protect the hostages was a
''superficial'' reason ''buttressed by members of Congress who have rushed to
disclose otherwise confidential information'' in the past.
''We, the members of Congress, have contributed to a decline in our own
standing,'' he said. ''But that.'s not a justification for violating the law.''
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. %.?? % 'APKit P POST
31 May 19 8 7
Let's Think
Before We
Go to War
With Iran
By Stanfield Turner
P RESIDENT REAGAN'S remarks about the Per-
sian Gulf situation last Friday were almost bel-
licose towards Iran. This must reflect the depth
of his wounds over the arms-for-hostages fiasco. But his
personal pique should not determine how we go about
fulfilling our commitment to keeping the Gulf open.
When we think about American naval involvement in
the Persian Gulf, we need to take into account three
facts:
^ There is no way to predict whether the Iranians will
challenge our protection of shipping.
? If the Iranians do attack, there is some chance they
will succeed, because in war, there are no 100 percent
defenses.
? In response to a successful Iranian attack, the United
States would be forced to escalate the hostilities con-
siderably.
Unfortunately, we have been reacting to events inl
the Gulf without defining where we may be heading.
Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, was right to warn Friday that we
shouldn't become more deeply involved in the Gulf un-
less we're ready to stay the course.
I'm not suggesting that we should not shoulder re-
sponsibility for protecting shipping in the Gulf. What
little credibility we have in the Middle East would be
shattered if we walked away from what we have repeat-
edly declared to be a "vital national interest." What I do
suggest is that we need to think through how we will
react if we are attacked, and what the consequences
will be.
We aren't commiting American power simply to de-
fend 11 Kuwaiti ships flying American flags. If Iranian
attacks begin to take a substantially higher toll on gen-
eral shipping than they have in the past, we will be seen
to have failed. Our task will be nothing short of ensur-
ing a reasonably normal flow of non-Iranian shipping in
and out of the Gulf.
We have two ways of defending shipping in the Gulf:
riding shotgun for individual ships or convoys (which I
will call "point defense") and attacking the source of the
threat, the Iranian air force and navy, in their bases.
Until the Iranians strike a first blow, we are, for all in-
tents and purposes, limited to the point-defense option.
We do, not want to initiate a war with Iran.
The damage done to the USS Stark raises questions
about the benefits of point defenses. The problems that
the Stark's sister ships will face are clear. On one ex-
treme, any ship is vulnerable if the attacker gets the
first three shots. Modern missiles are lethal. Modern
ships are not ringed with armor and must depend on
their self-defense systems, and those may have only a
few seconds in which to react. On the other extreme,
any ship's self-defense system can be overwhelmed by a
mass attack, perhaps 10 simultaneous missiles.
The Stark was close to the first extreme. Whether
her captain and crew did the most they
could to protect the ship will be determined
by the naval investigation now taking place.
Surely, though, the captain was at the dis-
advantage of being in that twilight zone be-
tween peace and war. A good bit of the
Stark's handicap has been eliminated as we
have moved closer to a war footing.
The risk at the other extreme-of mass
attacks-is not high, primarily because we
do not credit the Iranian air force and navy
with the capability for large, coordinated
attacks.
W e are in between. The issue is
whether the Navy can improve the
chances that our point defenses
will be successful. Under the plan an-
nounced Friday, the United States will in-
crease its Persian Gulf task force by three
destroyer-type ships, including a more so-
phisticated missile cruiser. Whether that
will be suffcient remains to be seen. But
clearly, the new deployment will improve
the prospects for point defense.
We could also attempt to provide air cov-
er during daylight hours, on the assumption
that the Iranian capabilities for night attack
are low. The president's plan includes a
provision for at least partial air cover. But
unless the Navy is willing to bring its air-
craft carriers right into the Gulf or the Air
Force is able to obtain the use of air bases
on land,,it would take a prodigious and very
expensive effort for carriers outside the
Gulf to maintain air cover over shipping
inside the Gulf.
The geography is forbidding. The carrier
would probably be 150-200 miles outside
the Gulf, which is itself some 500 miles
long. That is a lot of territory to cover.
There is also a problem of geometry.
Protected aircraft cannot just be anywhere
over the Gulf. They must be able to race to
a ship under threat faster than an Iranian
aircraft can get from its base to a point 30-
40 miles from the ship and launch a missile.
From one Iranian air base it is only 120
miles across the Gulf and, so, our aircraft
would have to be almost on top of the ships
they were protecting. Land bases are pref-
erable, but they may be ruled out by the
local politics. Even from land bases it would
be an expensive operation.
Iranian air attacks are not the only
threat. The Iranians have missile boats that .
could dash out into the Gulf; they have
Chinese "Silkworm" missiles, which could
be mounted on land near the Straits of Hor-
muz to fire at passing ships; and they have
mines that could be placed in the Straits.
These threats are probably manageable.
Mining a strait that is 30 miles wide is a
large undertaking, which we should be able
to,detect and stop; the Silkworm is a rela-
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tively large missile that our Air Force - That would mean using our aircraft from' we do notlet ourselves be driven by anger
AWACS surveillance aircraft and our ships several carriers ' to attack Iranian air and or political pressures. We shouldn't be ea-
should find easier to detect than air- naval bases. By eliminating as many of the ger for hostilities with Iran. We have a stra-
launched missiles; and the missile boats Iranian aircraft, ships and missile installa tegic interest in reestablishing ties to Iran
take a lot longer than aircraft to get near tions as possible, we could reduce the one day, and' we do not want to leave the
their targets and should be detected. threat appreciably. Such attacks, of course, 'field to the Soviets. Initiating large-scale
It will cost something to defend against would be a major escalation, but they may hostilities with Iran would push the day of
each of these added threats, though. To be necessary: The long-term political con- reconciliation further and further off.
minimize the costs of point defense, the sequences for our relationship with Iran Another reason to avoid hostilities is the
president's plan is to aggregate tankers in could be significant.
small convoys. That, though, has draw- Whether Iran will force us down this the Persian dof the us Soviet ,et Union in
he the . Like of the o Sof the
backs. When a convoy arrives at the oil ter- track by challenging us to combat, I would are the Pn committed to tets
minal, there will likely be too many ships to not want to predict. We Americans have tankers Gulf. They a of some of the
it sir
load all at once. The resulting delay will been abysmally poor at reading the Iranian_ same dilemmas the Gab. They face some
mean that the tankers will remain vulner- mentality over the last 10 years or so. " same dabout what to do if their
able inside the Gulf for longer periods than There is, though, one action the Iranians forces are attacked. Thus, we and the So-
if they proceed individually. could take at small expense that would be viets have a coincidence of interests in
The bottom line is that the U.S. Navy, at very tempting. They could force us to stay bringing the Iran-Iraq war to a halt as soon
a cost, can increase the probability of suc- on this costly alert by making threatening as possible.
cessful defense. But the probability will nev- feints. Even if they. went no,,.,fuxther, that., That will mean, though, that the Soviets
er be 100 percent. There is just too much would keep tensions high and run ttie risk of are going to claim a place at the conference
room for innovative tactics by the enemy to inadvertent hostilities. table, something we have attempted to
surprise us, poor reflexes on our part or just In short, we may be compelled to initiate avoid for years. We have backed ourselves
plain luck. If the Iranians opt to run against broad hostilities against Iran, or . we may into. this corner with the mishandling of our
high odds, they may just damage or sink simply be drawn be drawn into such a con- dealings with Iran over the past several
another U.S. warship. flict. We ought to understand this danger as years. Now, the more deeply we become
we begin our new role in the Gulf. All too' involved in hostilities with Iran, the greal5er
What options would the president often, presidents and their advisers embark the Soviet voice in the eventual Persian
have if the Iranians did take us on on military actions in the hope that the first Gulf settlement will become.
and do serious damage? The pros- step they take will solve the problem. Of- This, then, is no time to let the residual
pects of a third warship damaged or sunk ten, it does not. In this instance, the first resentment we have for Iran-stemming
would loom as a political disaster at home. step of providing defense for shipping may from the 444-day hostage crisis and the
It would also seriously undermine confi- do the job, but we would be foolish to count recent embarrassment of the arms-for-hos-
(lence in whether the United States can pro- on it. tages dealings-dominate our responses.
tect its vital interests in the Gulf. At that The Iranians must also understand that We must be willing to escalate hostilities
point, I believe the president could no long- we will be as aggressive as necessary to with Iran if necessary to fulfill our mission,
er rely on point defenses. fulfill our role. Undoubtedly, the president's but we should do so only as a result of cool
He would have to shift to the tactic of strong remarks Friday were intended for judgments and with a recognition that there
attacking the threat before it was launched. this purpose. We need, though, to be sure will be serious consequences,
Stanfield Turner, a retired Navy admiral and former
director of Central Intelligence, is working on a new
book, "Terrorism and Democracy. "
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AR71CLEAPPM
ON PAGE _ WASHINGTON POST
29 April 1987
-P Nathaniel Davis
Missing Evidence
A four-year libel suit over the book and film
"Missing" seems to be coming to an end in the
federal court of first instance in the Southern
District of New York. It is a controversial
case, even now.
The background is that a young American,
Char ,disappeared and was tragi-
caRy killed in Chile a few days after the
military coup in that country in 1973. The
young man's family brought it ompl federal
court in Washington, suspecting
"The message to public
servants appears evident:
don't sue, even if you
believe you have been
accused of murder."
on my part-l was U.S. ambassador to Chile
at the time-and on the part of several
American officers in Santiago and ' Henry
Kissinger and other Washington luminaries.
In due course the plaintiffs withdrew their
suit. The explanation they )nave wasthat the
U.S. government was hiding the evidence. On
nil} ie CIA Director Stans i 1 urn-
er Secretar f of Defense Harold Brown and
others made depositions to the court a v'
ing that all overnment documents and mate-
rials bearin on Charles Harman had been
even to t court. evidence was present-
e rom any source to support the Homan
family's suspicions.
. in the meantime, alawyer-investigator
named Thomas Hauser wrote a book, pub-
lished in 1978, which revived the case and
the suspicions. In 1982, the famous Greek-
French filmmaker, Constantine Costa-Gav-
ras, turned the book into a movie, titled
"Missing." At its beginning the film stated
that the depiction of events was based on a
true story and that the incidents and facts
were documented. I and two other long-suf-
fering, or criminally evil, U.S. officers-
which we were depends on the credence one
gives the film-brought suit for libel.
We tried to be scrupulous in not assaulting
the First Amendment's guarantee of free criti-
cism of public officials for their acts or policies
in office. Our complaint was based on our belief
that the film showed us in conspiracy to murder
an innocent young citizen of our own country.
The reasons suggested in the film for our
crime were to defend U.S. business interests
in Chile or to cover up U.S. complicity in the
1973 military coup. We did not challenge the
f'1 's ortraval of these alleged policies and
it falls under the constitutional protection of
free debate and controversy. But we do
believe that a person, even a public figure or
official, should not be publicly portrayed as a
murderer without evidence or support for the
charge. If American officials go around fin-
gering innocent U.S. citizens and ordering
foreign generals to execute them, our judicial
system should push to the bottom of the
matter, not brush it away. Killing Americans
in order to further improper policy interests
strikes so directly at the integrity of public
service, including the career U.S. Foreign
Service and the professional U.S. military
services, that it should cry out for an adjudi-
cation of the facts.
Even Gen. William Westmoreland and a
foreign cabinet minister, Ariel Sharon, got
their day in court and the opportunity to
explain themselves to a jury. In the four years
of the "Missing" libel suit, we have never
gotten to a trial; we have never even gotten
to the question whether we were complicit ins
the execution of Charles Harman,
The most recent summary judgment in the
case appeared to rest on two propositions.
First, we could not prove actual= malice in
Costa-Gavras' heart or malice in the corporate
heart of MCA, Inc., and Universal City Studios.
The second proposition was that "Missing" was
a docudrama, and a docudrama does not need
to be true in its specifics-even if the film says
at the beginning that the story is true and the
incidents and facts are documented.
When the film came out, Flora Lewis of
The New York Times interviewed Costa-
Gavras. She reported: "He brushes aside the
distinction between fact and verisimilitude,
proof and suspicion. 'A film is not a court,'
Mr. Costa-Gavras said. 'I can't go into sec-
ondary details.' "
So Costa-Gavras showed no "reckless disre-
gard of the truth" under the law. The barricades
defending free public debate and criticism are
built high. The message to public servants
appears evident: don't sue, even if you believe
you have been accused of murder, accused
without supporting evidence of any kind.
The writer, who is retired from the Foreign
Service, is a professor of humanities at
h arvey Mudd College in California.
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13 April 1937
By Chuck Conconi
W.1,11ingtrni Pn.l tit.iif W r
Out and About
A conversation that would have been
worth eavesdropping on: Former CIA direc-
tor Stansfield Turner having a private talk
with CIA director-designate William Web-
ster at last week's Radio and Television
Correspondents Association dinner at the
Washington Hilton ...
r
LL
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W~
29 May 19 8 7
V.S. Escorts Likely to Trigger
Iranian Response, Experts Say
Military Leaders Warn Sizable Gulf Force May Be Required
By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
A U.S. commitment to protect
Kuwaiti ships in the Persian Gulf Mt
likely to lead to Iranian military and
terrorist responses that could re-
quire a massive deployment of U.S.
military power to the region, cur-
rent and former military leaders
warned yesterday.
Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
according to administration offi-
cials, will present a paper to Pres-
ident Reagan today saying only a
few extra warships are needed in
the gulf to broaden protection to
Kuwaiti vessels flying the American
flag, military officers with extensive
experience in the region predicted
this will turn out to be only the thin
edge of the wedge.
They said several squadrons of
Air Force F15 fighters based in the
Persian Gulf area, together with
more, AWACS (airborne warning
and control system) planes, Will be
needed to cover shipping if the
tanker war escalates. If land bases
cannot be found, they added, at
least two aircraft carriers will be
needed at the southern end of the
gulf to provide protection and re-
taliatory power.
A few extra shins to protect Ku-
waiti tankers "is plenty to out u a
bluff," said Stansfield Turner, former
Navy commander of Mediterranean
forces and CIA director. "but what
happens if they, ca it a ve to
have thou it through w t we'll
Turner sai ran is ce y to-view
U.S. protection for ships of Kuwait,
which supports Iraq in its war
against Iran, "as a chip on our shoul-
der and proceed to knock it off" by
attacking a Kuwaiti tanker or its
American escorts. The United
States, to maintain its credibility in
the region, Turner argued, would
have to retaliate by attacking Iran-
ian airfields and ports, "and then
you're getting into a sizable war."
Elmo R. Zumwalt, a former chief
of naval operations, said the United
States would not only need "at least
two carriers" in the region if land
bases cannot be used but also would
require submarines to guard
against Soviet or other hostile sub-
marines.
He said broadening the U.S. es-
cort role "serves notice that we're
going to protect our jugular."
Zumwalt joined Turner and others
in arguing that strong retaliatory ac-
tion must be agreed upon in advance
to avoid another Lebanon misadven-
ture, where U.S. forces were com-
mitted and then withdrawn.
These concerns came against the
backdrop of Defense Secretary Cas-
par W. Weinberger's statement
Wednesday that the United States
intends to protect the ships of "all"
friendly nations on their way in and
out of the gulf. Pentagon spokes-
man Robert B. Sims said yesterday
that Weinberger was trying to
make the point that it was vital to
keep the gulf open to international
shipping, not that the United States
intends to protect the ships of every
nonbelligerent nation regardless of
whether protection is requested.
Defense Department officials
said the regular Navy escort of the
11 Kuwaiti tankers slated to fly the
U.S. flag will not begin until late
June or early July. In the meantime,
the officials said, Weinberger and
other officials will discuss how
much military force should be com-
mitted to the gulf.
"Weinberger is not going to go in
there naked," said a deputy in ob-
serving that the defense secretary
in the past has sent more force to
troubled regions than the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had recommended.
Retired vice admiral M. Staser
Holcomb, Weinberger's former mil-
itary assistant and deputy command.
er of U.S. naval forces in Europe
during the commitment of Marines
to Lebanon in 1983, said that broad-
ening U.S. protection significantly in
the gulf would be "extremely diffi-
cult, costly, dangerous."
It would be "imprudent" to under-
take the job, he added, unless the
administration had made "a clear
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determination that this is vital to
the national interest."
Holcomb said that if the admin-
istration intends to RLOtect ships
again aircraft attack, even in port,
"you'd heave to have air cover
hours a day. He said it would have
to coneis a con tion sur-
vei ante planes an i ters t at
co rnepk_and shoot down
air-
craft that came witfun missile range
of shins er U.S. RU M-%
Holcomb, in a view shared by
other military leaders interviewed,
said the best way to provide air cov-
er would be with Air Force F15
fighters based in Kuwait, Oman or.
Saudi Arabia-not aircraft carriers
at the foot of the gulf.
These military officers said it
would be enormously difficult, ex-
pensive and exhausting to rely on
planes flying off carriers to provide
round-the-clock air cover because
of the long distances involved. Navy
F14 and F18 fighters flying off car-
riers south of the gulf would need to
refuel in flight several times.
"It's not a job for carriers,' said
one recently retired Pentagon ex-
ecutive in agreeing with the admi-
rals and generals interviewed. "If
Kuwait, Oman or Saudi Arabia
won't let in the F15s, then ....
don't do the escort job at all."
An Air Force general with exten-
sive command experience in the
gulf region said the U.S. AWACS
planes flying out of Saudi Arabia
cannot count, on protection from
Saudi F15 fighters unless they are
over Saudi territory. When an
AWACS is threatened, he said, the
plane's commander is supposed to
"recede" from his orbital track at
the edge of the guff and move inland
to get within range of Saudi Hawk
antiaircraft missiles and fighters.
A field-grade officer, who de-
The Persian Gulf stretches
approximately 600 miles
from the Strait of Hormuz to
the Shaft al-Arab. The width
of the gulf ranges from 30 to
220 miles.
clined to be quoted by name, said,
"It's not rational not to expect
[Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah]
Khomeini to respond to U.S. ships
escorting Kuwaiti tankers .... The
gulf is a small place, full of vulner-
abilities. The Iranians can do all
kinds of things, like attacking us at
night with a suicide force. It's like
being up against a bunch of fleas
who can come from anywhere."
An active-duty admiral with expe-
rience in the gulf struck a more op-
timistic note, saying the only recent
increase in the Iranian threat has
been in the Chinese-supplied Silk-
worm antiship missiles covering the'
Strait of Hormuz. 'The weapons on
our ships can handle them," he said.
"We don't need continuous air cover.
The Iranians don't fly at night."
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Appr v 6! A e 20WJM1-PIATF? 1-0090
21 May 1987
Webster
expected to
rems with quiet efficiency
-- By Bill Gertz abilities cials, THE WASHINGTON TIMES was to set up a covert action
Sen. Chic Hecht evada Republi- review board, similar to a CIA re-
The CIA, subject to unusual pub- can an member of the Intelligence view board, that will periodically re-
lic scrutiny and with a new leader, is Committee, said in an interview that view all such programs.
not expected to undergo radical Mr. Webster's record as FBI chief However, one official said that
changes under William H. Webster, and his good relations with congres- contrary to some reports describing
according to present and former in- sional oversight panels are his best a one-third cutback in covert action
telligence officials. asset and will serve him well as CIA programs, there has been no reduc-
Several intelligence officials, director. tion as a result of the Iran-Contra
speaking on condition of anonymity, "He has in place a tremendous op- affair.
said Mr. Webster, a former federal erations staff over there;" Mr. Hecht Some reports have suggested that
judge who ran the FBI for the past said. "That will be his true test: if he Mr. Webster's friendship with for
nine years, plans to approach his allows the staff in place to continue p
new job with an impartial "judicial" carrying on what [former CIA direc- 19 mer CIA Director Stansfield 'Turner
perspective that they welcome. /9 tor] Bill Casey built up." may signal major o icy c anges at
Mr. Webster was confirmed as r11~ C_as w i,n rjiarl of rnnrnr thie the agency.
CIA director by the Senate 'Tuesday,
by a 94-1 vote.
One senior FBI official said Mr.
Webster will be "coming over light"
to the agency's headquarters in
Langley, Va. The new director is ex-
pected to bring a small staff that in-
cludes FBI Special Assistant John B.
Hotis, FBI Assistant Director for
Public Affairs William Baker, two
taw clerks and his longtime FBI sec-
retary, the official said.
"He will be depending a lot on the
people already over there, espe-
cially [CIA deputy director] Bob
71 Gates," the official said. "He doe' 1rr
-1178MMy strong feelings on the way
the agency should be run:'
The official said Mr. Webster
plans to operate at the CIA in much
the same way he approached the FBI
in 1978, when the bureau was faced
with public and congressional pres-
sure over alleged improper domes-
tic intelligence activities.
"He plans to take a studied look,
to be briefed and briefed and briefed
again," said the official. "And then
he'll make some deliberate moves.
But he's not going in with any fixed
agenda."
The official said Mr. Webster, who
is referred to at the FBI as "the
Judge," does not plan to restrict CIA
activities, but expects to "keep peo-
ple accountable" to the often com-
plex executive guidelines and con-
gressional regulations imposed on
the agency.
As FBI director, Mr. Webster has
been praised by most intelligence
officials for his role in building up
the FBI's counterespionage cap-
month after resigning May 6, di-
rected a major buildup of the agen-
cy's operations capabilities involv-
ing "a top group of dedicated and
professional young people" posted at
CIA stations around the world, Mr.
Hecht said.
Witnesses in the Iran-Contra in-
vestigation in Congress have closely
linked Mr. Casey and a Central
American CIA operative to the case,
but so far broad agency involvement
in the operation has not been uncov-
ered.
One administration official,
speaking on condition he not be iden-
tified, said morale in most parts of
the agency remains high depite the
continuing investigations.
The official said Mr. Webster is
expected to learn his new job
quickly since he has more exper-
ience in intelligence than past direc-
tors brought in from outside the
agency.
However, the Iran-Contra inquiry
has affected the morale of some field
agents in Central America who feel
that "there are more investigators
than case officers," he said.
Officials said Mr. Webster's pres-
ence at CIA will help to ensure that
legal restrictions on agency oper-
ations will be strictly enforced.
The Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee recently informed the CIA and
the National Security Council that
the committee plans to conduct spot
checks of financial records to en-
sure that operations conformed to
legal guidelines.
Another reform recently put in
place by National Security Adviser
Frank Carlucci, according to offi-
Adm. Turner, CIA director during
the Carter' administration, brought
in a large number of Navy officials
to assist him and he dismissed or
transferred many of the agency's
most experienced operatives.
The official pointed out that while
Mr. Webster knows Adm. Turner
from their days at Amherst College,
Mr. Webster also is close to former
CIA Director Richard Helms. an
agency stalwart-well respected by
hard-liners.
One senior CIA operations offi-
cial, who retired in the late 1970s,
described Mr. Webster as
independent-minded official who
"goes by the book" and thus may
have a "tempering affect" on agency
covert operations.
"I don't think he'll abandon it as a
tool, but he may just wait until he's
more comfortable with it," the of-
ficial said.
He said Mr. Webster could have
the greatest impact on developing
CIA counterintelligence, which has
rebounded in recent years from a
decline that began in the late 1970s.
David Atlee Phillins_ former CIA
Latin America operations chief, said
some agency operatives have taken
a "wait and see" approach to Mr.
Webster because of his lack of ex-
perience.
"There's a big difference between
handling a really clandestine type of
operation as opposed to a partially
clandestine type of operation that
the FBI is used to running," he said.
"People in the operations operations director-
ate are wondering if he'll be able to
do that:'
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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
2 April 1987
House Democrats seeking
more say on covert actions
,,f By Charles Green
Inquirer Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - House Democrats
are moving to impose tighter con-
trols over covert intelligence activi-
ties, despite warnings from two for-
mer CIA directors that the rules
would handcuff and possibly endan-
ger secret operations.
The effort - inspired by the Iran-
contra affair - is expected to spark a
confrontation between the House
and the Reagan administration over
the role of Congress in sensitive for-
eign policy decisions.
[louse Speaker Jim Wright (D.,
Texas) yesterday set the stage for a
showdown, endorsing legislation
that would require the administra.
tion to notify congressional leaders
within 48 hours of undertaking cov-
ert actions.
The bill is a direct response to the
shipment of U.S. arms to Iran, which
were kept secret from Congress for
more than nine months despite a
requirement in current law that top
lawmakers be notified of such acfivi.
ties in a "timely fashion."
Wright said the new notification
requirement would guard against
"executive arrogance - the idea
that certain things are too risky, too
important ... to be shared with Con-
gress."
Two former CIA directors, appear- eye and tell him or her that I was
ing at a hearing before the House going to discuss this life-threatening
Intelligence subcommittee on legis. mission with ... people who were not
lation, said the proposed law was an necessarily involved in supporting
overreaction to the Iran affair and the activity," Turner said.
urged Congress to leave the law as it Under the law, the administration
is. is expected to keep the House and
"Every time we have a murder, we Senate Intelligence Committees in-
don't necessarily try to change the formed of covert actions. In special
laws against murder," said Wil!_ Ita n circumstances, notification can be
Fplk~y--who headed the CIA during limited to eight top lawmakers, in-
the Nixon and Ford administrations. cluding the House speaker and Sen-
A
S
dm
tansfielU i Urng the CIAtji l
. ,. ae maortyeader. The notification
director urind g the Carter adminis- is supposed to occur in a "timely
tration, said the notification require- fashion," but there is no definition
ment would make it difficult for the of timely in the law. The proposed
CIA to send agents on dangerous mis- bill, sponsored by Louis Stokes (D.,
sions. He expressed fears that disclo- Ohio), would, in effect, define timely
sure of such missions could endan- as within 48 hours,
ger lives. Prospects for the bill appear less
Turner cited three instances dur- promising in the Senate, where top
ing his tenure when he asked agents members of the Intelligence Commit-
to undertake life-threatening opera- tee have expressed reservations
tions. He said all three, which were about writing new rVstrictions on
not disclosed to Congress at the time, covert, activities Committee Chair-
involved efforts to free American man-Da idl:(b., Okla.) has
hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Iran said it i, hio a 1fnpoi'tant to rebuild a
in 1979 and 1980. relationship of trust between the ad-
One occurred when the CIA sent ministration and Congress.
an agent to, Tehran to engineer the Rep. Matthew F. McHugh (D., N.Y.),
departure of six Americans who chairman of the subcommittee that
were hiding in the Canadian Em- held the hearing yesterday, said the
bassy. The second episode was when main purpose of the bill was to make
CIA personnel flew a light aircraft sure that Congress is kept informed
into the Iranian desert to determine whenever an administration makes a
whether the site could be used as a significant shift in policy. Such con-
refueling stop in an attempted mili- sultation might have persuaded Rea-
tary rescue of the hostages - a mis- gan to abandon the idea of sending
sion that later failed. The third oc- arms to Iran, he said.
currence was when CIA personnel McHugh said the legislation might
went to Tehran to purchase trucks to be revised to reflect Turner's con-
transport the rescuers from their he. cerns. But he said it would be diffi-
licopters to the U.S. Embassy. cult to stipulate in advance what
o
e
cult to look such an individual in the hours.
"I would have found it very diffi- kinds of operations would not have
t
b
disclosed to Congress within 48
Administration officials are sched-
uled to present their position on the
legislation next week. Congressional
Republicans have indicated that the
administration would object to the
measure. House Minority Leader
Robert H. Michel (R., Ill.) termed the
legislation the "functional equiva-
lent of a foreign policy straitjacket"
on the president.
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9 April 1987
Webster-Thrner friendship worries
hard-liners at CIA
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Present and former CIA officials
expressed concern yesterday that
ties between CIA Director-designate
William Webster and former CIA
chief Stansfield Turner may signal
the beginning of another convulsive
era at the agency.
Adm. Turner, as CIA chief from
1977 to 1980, created widespread
controversy by firing hundreds of
the agency's most experienced clan-
destine operators.
Later in his memoirs he said the
agents were fired to remove a net-
work of entrenched "old boy" CIA
operatives. Intelligence sources said
the agency lost "thousands of man-
years" of experience.
Mr. Webster, a former federal
judge, has been consulting Adm.
Turner for advice about the CIA and
possible personnel changes among
senior officials, according to the
sources.
At confirmation hearings before
the Senate Intelligence Committee
yesterday, Mr. Webster, now FBI di-
rector, referred to his longstanding
friendship with Adm. Turner, the
Carter administration's CIA chief,
as one reason for the improved rela-
tions between the FBI and CIA dur-
ing the late 1970s.
The two agencies once clashed
over their respective roles in the spy
game. The FBI, as a law en-
forcement agency, is charged with
arresting foreign spies; the CIA has
a different approach since it func-
tions as the U.S. espionage agency
abroad.
Sources said Mr. Webster be-
friended Adm. Turner at Amherst
College in Massaschussets, where
the two were students during the late
1940s.
"Webster and Turner both took
over their respective agencies about
the same time," one source said.
"They're both forged out of the
1970s' environment of intelligence:'
U.S. intelligence agencies suf-
fered major setbacks in support and
morale during the 1970s as a result
of congressional probes.
The anti-intelligence era waned
after the CIA's station chief in Ath-
ens was murdered by terrorists
after he was named in one of the
anti-CIA publications flourishing at
the time.
The Carter administration recog-
nized the need for better intelligence
when the CIA was caught off guard
by the 1979 revolution in Iran.
- Bill Gertz
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ON PAGE 2 April 1987
Wright Urges Requiring Disclosure of Covert Acts
1 probable that the national embarrass-
By FOX BUTTERFIELD ment of the entire Irangate episode
special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 1 - In an un-
usual move, House Speaker Jim
Wright testified before a subcommittee
of the House Intelligence Committee
today to endorse a bill that would re-
quire President Reagan to notify Con-
gress in writing within 48 hours of
starting a covert operation.
The measure is the first Congres-
sional bill in response to the Iran-con-
tra affair. It is designed to tighten a
legal provision that permitted Presi-
dent Reagan to keep the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees unin-
formed about his secret arms sales to
Iran for 10 months after he signed a
"finding" authorizing the deals.
In other testimony today before the
Subcommittee on Legislation, the bill
was firmly opposed by Robert H. Mich-
el, the House Republican leader, and
three former top-ranking intelligence
officials. They were Adm. Stansfield
Turner and William E. Colby, both for-
mer Directors of Central Intelligence,
and Ray Cline a former deputy direc-
tor oor the -C T for intelligence. Re-
flecting concern in the Administration,
Mr. Michel said it would "put a strait-
jacket on a future President."
But Mr. Wright said that the bill was
only an attempt to clarify existing
legislation, first enacted in 1974, which
requires the President to notify the
House and Senate Intelligence Com-
mittees of a covert operation, generally
defined as a secret foreign military or
intelligence operation, in a "timely
fashion." The new bill would make two
changes, Mr. Wright said. It would re-
quire that the notice by the President
be in writing and that, in "extraordi-
nary circumstances affecting the vital
interests of the United States," the noti-
fication come not more than 48 hours
after the President has approved the
operation.
If the new measure had been in ef-
fect, Mr. Wright asserted, "it is quite
would have been avoided."
Mr. Wright's appearance at the out-
set of hearings was an indication that
he was prepared to put the weight of
the Speaker's office behind the bill, sev-
eral Congressmen said, and reflected
the concern and anger in Congress
over the sale of arms to Iran and the
reported diversion of profits to the
Nicaraguan rebels. It is rare for hear-
ings on a bill to begin with testimony by
the Speaker and the House minority
leader.
sentative Louis Stokes, an Ohio Demo-
crat who is chairman of the House In-
setts Democrat and a former chair-
fied of the operation until it was com-
pleted, he said.
Referring to the proposal that the
President notify the intelligence com-
mittees within 48 hours of a covert ac-
tion, Admiral Turner said: "Timely is
not measured by the clock. Timely is
measured by risk." There should be no
time limit on notification, he suggested,
and instead Congress should rely on
building a better relationship with the
executive branch and the C.I.A. to in-
sure better oversight.
Mr. Colby contended that "there are
tning Congress doesn't need to
know" and that, once a secret opera-
tion was disclosed to even one other
person, it was no longer a secret. "I
think we should look to proper execu-
tion of the law rather than to changing
it," said Mr. Colby.
Representative Robert W. Kasten-
meier, Democrat of Wisconsin, de-
scribed the proposed measure as "in-
deed modest" and a simple "tightening
up of the statute in order to carry out
its original intent."
But Admiral Turner said that the bill
could en a er e'lives of American
intelligence agents and that, if it had
been in effect while he was head of the
C.I.A. under President Carter, it would
have prevented several critical covert
operations. One of these, he said, was
the secret mission to help the six mem-
bers of the American embassy in Tehe-
ran who had hidden in the Canadian
embassy after their compound was l
seized. The operation to arrange their
escape took, three months to plan and
involved sending a C.I.A. agent into Te-
heran at risk to his life, Admiral
Turner related. Congress was not noti-
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