TIGHTER CONTROLS ONE LIKELY BY- PRODUCT OF SCANDAL

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CIA-RDP91-00901R000600390004-9
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December 19, 2016
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December 2, 2005
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February 7, 1987
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Approved For Release 2Yif5Fc kbWf February 19 TIGHTER CONTROLS ONE LIKELY BYPRODUCT OF SCANDAL BY JUDI HASSON WASHINGTON Out of the Iran arms-Contra aid scandal, Congress is likely to draft new procedures requiring the White House to keep lawmakers informed about covert operations before they happen. Lawmakers say it is too soon to predict what legislation they would like to pass to keep Congress informed about secret executive branch actions, but there clearly will be changes in the intelligence oversight laws before long. In 1980, Congress approved legislation requiring the White House to notify Congress before a covert operation began or in a ''timely fashion'' afterward. The law was passed in the wake of a series of revelations about domestic and foreign intelligence operations that went haywire. Discussing the proposed legislation at the time, CIA Director Stansfield %4 Turner said, ''The law requires I inform you of covert actions in a timely manner. I think you can take me to jail if I waited a month or two to tell you something. " 42 But the word ''timely'' was never defined, according to Sen. David Boren, D-Oand other lawmakers, and they believe that vagueness has allowed auses. A Jan. 29 Senate Intelligence Committee report disclosed details of the secret sale of arms to Iran that administration officials maintain was suggested by Israel as a way of opening channels to moderates in Tehran. The report, however, said the initiative gLickly turned into an arms-for-hostages deal to purchase freedom for six Americans held in Lebanon. Congress was not formally informed of the action until nearly 11 months after it formally started and only after a Lebanese newspaper reported a secret mission by former National Security adviser Robert McFarlane to Tehran. The Senate Intelligence Committee report also dealt with disclosures that profits from the arms sales may have been funneled to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, a CIA -formed force fighting to overthrow Managua's leftist Sandinista government. Stanley Sporkin, former CIA general counsel, told the panel in a secret session that administration Officials decided not to tell Congress about the initiative until the hostages were released "even though they understood this might mean a lengthy delay.', ''Never again must we hear that an activity of the U.S. government is so sensitive that knowledge of it must be withheld from the U.S. Congress," said Rep. Louis Stokes, D-Ohio. Last week, Stokes introduced legislation requiring the president to notify Congress in writing before undertaking a covert action and giving him only a 48-hour delay in the case of an emergency. In the Senate, members of the Intelligence Committee intend to take a close look at how to toughen reporting requirements and also create a better relationship between the branches of government. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 ' 'tirr Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 Z. ''The executive branch puts its policy in jeopardy when it doesn't seek to make Congress a partner in the making of the policy,'' said Boren, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "I'm not opposed to some clarifications,'' he said. ''But I think it would be naive of us to think that by just putting some more rules in the book that we're going to solve the problem. " "I think it is obvious that at least the spirit, if not the letter of the law was not complied with," said Sen. George Mit.ct1gJ1,.-D-Maine, a member of the select committee probing the scandal. ''We certainly should review that law to prevent it from happening again,'' he said. " At the same time, we must permit some latitude for a genuine national emergency. This clearly was not the type of emergency that was contemplated at the time the law was written.'' Mitchell said the argument not to tell Congress to protect the hostages was a ''superficial'' reason ''buttressed by members of Congress who have rushed to disclose otherwise confidential information'' in the past. ''We, the members of Congress, have contributed to a decline in our own standing,'' he said. ''But that.'s not a justification for violating the law.'' Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 p, roved For F$AgISGTFN2/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0006 . %.?? % 'APKit P POST 31 May 19 8 7 Let's Think Before We Go to War With Iran By Stanfield Turner P RESIDENT REAGAN'S remarks about the Per- sian Gulf situation last Friday were almost bel- licose towards Iran. This must reflect the depth of his wounds over the arms-for-hostages fiasco. But his personal pique should not determine how we go about fulfilling our commitment to keeping the Gulf open. When we think about American naval involvement in the Persian Gulf, we need to take into account three facts: ^ There is no way to predict whether the Iranians will challenge our protection of shipping. ? If the Iranians do attack, there is some chance they will succeed, because in war, there are no 100 percent defenses. ? In response to a successful Iranian attack, the United States would be forced to escalate the hostilities con- siderably. Unfortunately, we have been reacting to events inl the Gulf without defining where we may be heading. Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was right to warn Friday that we shouldn't become more deeply involved in the Gulf un- less we're ready to stay the course. I'm not suggesting that we should not shoulder re- sponsibility for protecting shipping in the Gulf. What little credibility we have in the Middle East would be shattered if we walked away from what we have repeat- edly declared to be a "vital national interest." What I do suggest is that we need to think through how we will react if we are attacked, and what the consequences will be. We aren't commiting American power simply to de- fend 11 Kuwaiti ships flying American flags. If Iranian attacks begin to take a substantially higher toll on gen- eral shipping than they have in the past, we will be seen to have failed. Our task will be nothing short of ensur- ing a reasonably normal flow of non-Iranian shipping in and out of the Gulf. We have two ways of defending shipping in the Gulf: riding shotgun for individual ships or convoys (which I will call "point defense") and attacking the source of the threat, the Iranian air force and navy, in their bases. Until the Iranians strike a first blow, we are, for all in- tents and purposes, limited to the point-defense option. We do, not want to initiate a war with Iran. The damage done to the USS Stark raises questions about the benefits of point defenses. The problems that the Stark's sister ships will face are clear. On one ex- treme, any ship is vulnerable if the attacker gets the first three shots. Modern missiles are lethal. Modern ships are not ringed with armor and must depend on their self-defense systems, and those may have only a few seconds in which to react. On the other extreme, any ship's self-defense system can be overwhelmed by a mass attack, perhaps 10 simultaneous missiles. The Stark was close to the first extreme. Whether her captain and crew did the most they could to protect the ship will be determined by the naval investigation now taking place. Surely, though, the captain was at the dis- advantage of being in that twilight zone be- tween peace and war. A good bit of the Stark's handicap has been eliminated as we have moved closer to a war footing. The risk at the other extreme-of mass attacks-is not high, primarily because we do not credit the Iranian air force and navy with the capability for large, coordinated attacks. W e are in between. The issue is whether the Navy can improve the chances that our point defenses will be successful. Under the plan an- nounced Friday, the United States will in- crease its Persian Gulf task force by three destroyer-type ships, including a more so- phisticated missile cruiser. Whether that will be suffcient remains to be seen. But clearly, the new deployment will improve the prospects for point defense. We could also attempt to provide air cov- er during daylight hours, on the assumption that the Iranian capabilities for night attack are low. The president's plan includes a provision for at least partial air cover. But unless the Navy is willing to bring its air- craft carriers right into the Gulf or the Air Force is able to obtain the use of air bases on land,,it would take a prodigious and very expensive effort for carriers outside the Gulf to maintain air cover over shipping inside the Gulf. The geography is forbidding. The carrier would probably be 150-200 miles outside the Gulf, which is itself some 500 miles long. That is a lot of territory to cover. There is also a problem of geometry. Protected aircraft cannot just be anywhere over the Gulf. They must be able to race to a ship under threat faster than an Iranian aircraft can get from its base to a point 30- 40 miles from the ship and launch a missile. From one Iranian air base it is only 120 miles across the Gulf and, so, our aircraft would have to be almost on top of the ships they were protecting. Land bases are pref- erable, but they may be ruled out by the local politics. Even from land bases it would be an expensive operation. Iranian air attacks are not the only threat. The Iranians have missile boats that . could dash out into the Gulf; they have Chinese "Silkworm" missiles, which could be mounted on land near the Straits of Hor- muz to fire at passing ships; and they have mines that could be placed in the Straits. These threats are probably manageable. Mining a strait that is 30 miles wide is a large undertaking, which we should be able to,detect and stop; the Silkworm is a rela- Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9e.5; Approved For Release 2005/12/23: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 at tively large missile that our Air Force - That would mean using our aircraft from' we do notlet ourselves be driven by anger AWACS surveillance aircraft and our ships several carriers ' to attack Iranian air and or political pressures. We shouldn't be ea- should find easier to detect than air- naval bases. By eliminating as many of the ger for hostilities with Iran. We have a stra- launched missiles; and the missile boats Iranian aircraft, ships and missile installa tegic interest in reestablishing ties to Iran take a lot longer than aircraft to get near tions as possible, we could reduce the one day, and' we do not want to leave the their targets and should be detected. threat appreciably. Such attacks, of course, 'field to the Soviets. Initiating large-scale It will cost something to defend against would be a major escalation, but they may hostilities with Iran would push the day of each of these added threats, though. To be necessary: The long-term political con- reconciliation further and further off. minimize the costs of point defense, the sequences for our relationship with Iran Another reason to avoid hostilities is the president's plan is to aggregate tankers in could be significant. small convoys. That, though, has draw- Whether Iran will force us down this the Persian dof the us Soviet ,et Union in he the . Like of the o Sof the backs. When a convoy arrives at the oil ter- track by challenging us to combat, I would are the Pn committed to tets minal, there will likely be too many ships to not want to predict. We Americans have tankers Gulf. They a of some of the it sir load all at once. The resulting delay will been abysmally poor at reading the Iranian_ same dilemmas the Gab. They face some mean that the tankers will remain vulner- mentality over the last 10 years or so. " same dabout what to do if their able inside the Gulf for longer periods than There is, though, one action the Iranians forces are attacked. Thus, we and the So- if they proceed individually. could take at small expense that would be viets have a coincidence of interests in The bottom line is that the U.S. Navy, at very tempting. They could force us to stay bringing the Iran-Iraq war to a halt as soon a cost, can increase the probability of suc- on this costly alert by making threatening as possible. cessful defense. But the probability will nev- feints. Even if they. went no,,.,fuxther, that., That will mean, though, that the Soviets er be 100 percent. There is just too much would keep tensions high and run ttie risk of are going to claim a place at the conference room for innovative tactics by the enemy to inadvertent hostilities. table, something we have attempted to surprise us, poor reflexes on our part or just In short, we may be compelled to initiate avoid for years. We have backed ourselves plain luck. If the Iranians opt to run against broad hostilities against Iran, or . we may into. this corner with the mishandling of our high odds, they may just damage or sink simply be drawn be drawn into such a con- dealings with Iran over the past several another U.S. warship. flict. We ought to understand this danger as years. Now, the more deeply we become we begin our new role in the Gulf. All too' involved in hostilities with Iran, the greal5er What options would the president often, presidents and their advisers embark the Soviet voice in the eventual Persian have if the Iranians did take us on on military actions in the hope that the first Gulf settlement will become. and do serious damage? The pros- step they take will solve the problem. Of- This, then, is no time to let the residual pects of a third warship damaged or sunk ten, it does not. In this instance, the first resentment we have for Iran-stemming would loom as a political disaster at home. step of providing defense for shipping may from the 444-day hostage crisis and the It would also seriously undermine confi- do the job, but we would be foolish to count recent embarrassment of the arms-for-hos- (lence in whether the United States can pro- on it. tages dealings-dominate our responses. tect its vital interests in the Gulf. At that The Iranians must also understand that We must be willing to escalate hostilities point, I believe the president could no long- we will be as aggressive as necessary to with Iran if necessary to fulfill our mission, er rely on point defenses. fulfill our role. Undoubtedly, the president's but we should do so only as a result of cool He would have to shift to the tactic of strong remarks Friday were intended for judgments and with a recognition that there attacking the threat before it was launched. this purpose. We need, though, to be sure will be serious consequences, Stanfield Turner, a retired Navy admiral and former director of Central Intelligence, is working on a new book, "Terrorism and Democracy. " Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 AR71CLEAPPM ON PAGE _ WASHINGTON POST 29 April 1987 -P Nathaniel Davis Missing Evidence A four-year libel suit over the book and film "Missing" seems to be coming to an end in the federal court of first instance in the Southern District of New York. It is a controversial case, even now. The background is that a young American, Char ,disappeared and was tragi- caRy killed in Chile a few days after the military coup in that country in 1973. The young man's family brought it ompl federal court in Washington, suspecting "The message to public servants appears evident: don't sue, even if you believe you have been accused of murder." on my part-l was U.S. ambassador to Chile at the time-and on the part of several American officers in Santiago and ' Henry Kissinger and other Washington luminaries. In due course the plaintiffs withdrew their suit. The explanation they )nave wasthat the U.S. government was hiding the evidence. On nil} ie CIA Director Stans i 1 urn- er Secretar f of Defense Harold Brown and others made depositions to the court a v' ing that all overnment documents and mate- rials bearin on Charles Harman had been even to t court. evidence was present- e rom any source to support the Homan family's suspicions. . in the meantime, alawyer-investigator named Thomas Hauser wrote a book, pub- lished in 1978, which revived the case and the suspicions. In 1982, the famous Greek- French filmmaker, Constantine Costa-Gav- ras, turned the book into a movie, titled "Missing." At its beginning the film stated that the depiction of events was based on a true story and that the incidents and facts were documented. I and two other long-suf- fering, or criminally evil, U.S. officers- which we were depends on the credence one gives the film-brought suit for libel. We tried to be scrupulous in not assaulting the First Amendment's guarantee of free criti- cism of public officials for their acts or policies in office. Our complaint was based on our belief that the film showed us in conspiracy to murder an innocent young citizen of our own country. The reasons suggested in the film for our crime were to defend U.S. business interests in Chile or to cover up U.S. complicity in the 1973 military coup. We did not challenge the f'1 's ortraval of these alleged policies and it falls under the constitutional protection of free debate and controversy. But we do believe that a person, even a public figure or official, should not be publicly portrayed as a murderer without evidence or support for the charge. If American officials go around fin- gering innocent U.S. citizens and ordering foreign generals to execute them, our judicial system should push to the bottom of the matter, not brush it away. Killing Americans in order to further improper policy interests strikes so directly at the integrity of public service, including the career U.S. Foreign Service and the professional U.S. military services, that it should cry out for an adjudi- cation of the facts. Even Gen. William Westmoreland and a foreign cabinet minister, Ariel Sharon, got their day in court and the opportunity to explain themselves to a jury. In the four years of the "Missing" libel suit, we have never gotten to a trial; we have never even gotten to the question whether we were complicit ins the execution of Charles Harman, The most recent summary judgment in the case appeared to rest on two propositions. First, we could not prove actual= malice in Costa-Gavras' heart or malice in the corporate heart of MCA, Inc., and Universal City Studios. The second proposition was that "Missing" was a docudrama, and a docudrama does not need to be true in its specifics-even if the film says at the beginning that the story is true and the incidents and facts are documented. When the film came out, Flora Lewis of The New York Times interviewed Costa- Gavras. She reported: "He brushes aside the distinction between fact and verisimilitude, proof and suspicion. 'A film is not a court,' Mr. Costa-Gavras said. 'I can't go into sec- ondary details.' " So Costa-Gavras showed no "reckless disre- gard of the truth" under the law. The barricades defending free public debate and criticism are built high. The message to public servants appears evident: don't sue, even if you believe you have been accused of murder, accused without supporting evidence of any kind. The writer, who is retired from the Foreign Service, is a professor of humanities at h arvey Mudd College in California. motivationA YVbd+VrW g~'MO5/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 proved For Rel e114?3P -RDP91-00901 R0006003~ 13 April 1937 By Chuck Conconi W.1,11ingtrni Pn.l tit.iif W r Out and About A conversation that would have been worth eavesdropping on: Former CIA direc- tor Stansfield Turner having a private talk with CIA director-designate William Web- ster at last week's Radio and Television Correspondents Association dinner at the Washington Hilton ... r LL Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP9.1-00901 R000600390004-9 ' rftltuffy!?o " Approved FFrSHIN~TRRee1~e seOI~I 220 ~1 3 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600 W~ 29 May 19 8 7 V.S. Escorts Likely to Trigger Iranian Response, Experts Say Military Leaders Warn Sizable Gulf Force May Be Required By George C. Wilson Washington Post Staff Writer A U.S. commitment to protect Kuwaiti ships in the Persian Gulf Mt likely to lead to Iranian military and terrorist responses that could re- quire a massive deployment of U.S. military power to the region, cur- rent and former military leaders warned yesterday. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to administration offi- cials, will present a paper to Pres- ident Reagan today saying only a few extra warships are needed in the gulf to broaden protection to Kuwaiti vessels flying the American flag, military officers with extensive experience in the region predicted this will turn out to be only the thin edge of the wedge. They said several squadrons of Air Force F15 fighters based in the Persian Gulf area, together with more, AWACS (airborne warning and control system) planes, Will be needed to cover shipping if the tanker war escalates. If land bases cannot be found, they added, at least two aircraft carriers will be needed at the southern end of the gulf to provide protection and re- taliatory power. A few extra shins to protect Ku- waiti tankers "is plenty to out u a bluff," said Stansfield Turner, former Navy commander of Mediterranean forces and CIA director. "but what happens if they, ca it a ve to have thou it through w t we'll Turner sai ran is ce y to-view U.S. protection for ships of Kuwait, which supports Iraq in its war against Iran, "as a chip on our shoul- der and proceed to knock it off" by attacking a Kuwaiti tanker or its American escorts. The United States, to maintain its credibility in the region, Turner argued, would have to retaliate by attacking Iran- ian airfields and ports, "and then you're getting into a sizable war." Elmo R. Zumwalt, a former chief of naval operations, said the United States would not only need "at least two carriers" in the region if land bases cannot be used but also would require submarines to guard against Soviet or other hostile sub- marines. He said broadening the U.S. es- cort role "serves notice that we're going to protect our jugular." Zumwalt joined Turner and others in arguing that strong retaliatory ac- tion must be agreed upon in advance to avoid another Lebanon misadven- ture, where U.S. forces were com- mitted and then withdrawn. These concerns came against the backdrop of Defense Secretary Cas- par W. Weinberger's statement Wednesday that the United States intends to protect the ships of "all" friendly nations on their way in and out of the gulf. Pentagon spokes- man Robert B. Sims said yesterday that Weinberger was trying to make the point that it was vital to keep the gulf open to international shipping, not that the United States intends to protect the ships of every nonbelligerent nation regardless of whether protection is requested. Defense Department officials said the regular Navy escort of the 11 Kuwaiti tankers slated to fly the U.S. flag will not begin until late June or early July. In the meantime, the officials said, Weinberger and other officials will discuss how much military force should be com- mitted to the gulf. "Weinberger is not going to go in there naked," said a deputy in ob- serving that the defense secretary in the past has sent more force to troubled regions than the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended. Retired vice admiral M. Staser Holcomb, Weinberger's former mil- itary assistant and deputy command. er of U.S. naval forces in Europe during the commitment of Marines to Lebanon in 1983, said that broad- ening U.S. protection significantly in the gulf would be "extremely diffi- cult, costly, dangerous." It would be "imprudent" to under- take the job, he added, unless the administration had made "a clear Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 1.. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 determination that this is vital to the national interest." Holcomb said that if the admin- istration intends to RLOtect ships again aircraft attack, even in port, "you'd heave to have air cover hours a day. He said it would have to coneis a con tion sur- vei ante planes an i ters t at co rnepk_and shoot down air- craft that came witfun missile range of shins er U.S. RU M-% Holcomb, in a view shared by other military leaders interviewed, said the best way to provide air cov- er would be with Air Force F15 fighters based in Kuwait, Oman or. Saudi Arabia-not aircraft carriers at the foot of the gulf. These military officers said it would be enormously difficult, ex- pensive and exhausting to rely on planes flying off carriers to provide round-the-clock air cover because of the long distances involved. Navy F14 and F18 fighters flying off car- riers south of the gulf would need to refuel in flight several times. "It's not a job for carriers,' said one recently retired Pentagon ex- ecutive in agreeing with the admi- rals and generals interviewed. "If Kuwait, Oman or Saudi Arabia won't let in the F15s, then .... don't do the escort job at all." An Air Force general with exten- sive command experience in the gulf region said the U.S. AWACS planes flying out of Saudi Arabia cannot count, on protection from Saudi F15 fighters unless they are over Saudi territory. When an AWACS is threatened, he said, the plane's commander is supposed to "recede" from his orbital track at the edge of the guff and move inland to get within range of Saudi Hawk antiaircraft missiles and fighters. A field-grade officer, who de- The Persian Gulf stretches approximately 600 miles from the Strait of Hormuz to the Shaft al-Arab. The width of the gulf ranges from 30 to 220 miles. clined to be quoted by name, said, "It's not rational not to expect [Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini to respond to U.S. ships escorting Kuwaiti tankers .... The gulf is a small place, full of vulner- abilities. The Iranians can do all kinds of things, like attacking us at night with a suicide force. It's like being up against a bunch of fleas who can come from anywhere." An active-duty admiral with expe- rience in the gulf struck a more op- timistic note, saying the only recent increase in the Iranian threat has been in the Chinese-supplied Silk- worm antiship missiles covering the' Strait of Hormuz. 'The weapons on our ships can handle them," he said. "We don't need continuous air cover. The Iranians don't fly at night." Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 Appr v 6! A e 20WJM1-PIATF? 1-0090 21 May 1987 Webster expected to rems with quiet efficiency -- By Bill Gertz abilities cials, THE WASHINGTON TIMES was to set up a covert action Sen. Chic Hecht evada Republi- review board, similar to a CIA re- The CIA, subject to unusual pub- can an member of the Intelligence view board, that will periodically re- lic scrutiny and with a new leader, is Committee, said in an interview that view all such programs. not expected to undergo radical Mr. Webster's record as FBI chief However, one official said that changes under William H. Webster, and his good relations with congres- contrary to some reports describing according to present and former in- sional oversight panels are his best a one-third cutback in covert action telligence officials. asset and will serve him well as CIA programs, there has been no reduc- Several intelligence officials, director. tion as a result of the Iran-Contra speaking on condition of anonymity, "He has in place a tremendous op- affair. said Mr. Webster, a former federal erations staff over there;" Mr. Hecht Some reports have suggested that judge who ran the FBI for the past said. "That will be his true test: if he Mr. Webster's friendship with for nine years, plans to approach his allows the staff in place to continue p new job with an impartial "judicial" carrying on what [former CIA direc- 19 mer CIA Director Stansfield 'Turner perspective that they welcome. /9 tor] Bill Casey built up." may signal major o icy c anges at Mr. Webster was confirmed as r11~ C_as w i,n rjiarl of rnnrnr thie the agency. CIA director by the Senate 'Tuesday, by a 94-1 vote. One senior FBI official said Mr. Webster will be "coming over light" to the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va. The new director is ex- pected to bring a small staff that in- cludes FBI Special Assistant John B. Hotis, FBI Assistant Director for Public Affairs William Baker, two taw clerks and his longtime FBI sec- retary, the official said. "He will be depending a lot on the people already over there, espe- cially [CIA deputy director] Bob 71 Gates," the official said. "He doe' 1rr -1178MMy strong feelings on the way the agency should be run:' The official said Mr. Webster plans to operate at the CIA in much the same way he approached the FBI in 1978, when the bureau was faced with public and congressional pres- sure over alleged improper domes- tic intelligence activities. "He plans to take a studied look, to be briefed and briefed and briefed again," said the official. "And then he'll make some deliberate moves. But he's not going in with any fixed agenda." The official said Mr. Webster, who is referred to at the FBI as "the Judge," does not plan to restrict CIA activities, but expects to "keep peo- ple accountable" to the often com- plex executive guidelines and con- gressional regulations imposed on the agency. As FBI director, Mr. Webster has been praised by most intelligence officials for his role in building up the FBI's counterespionage cap- month after resigning May 6, di- rected a major buildup of the agen- cy's operations capabilities involv- ing "a top group of dedicated and professional young people" posted at CIA stations around the world, Mr. Hecht said. Witnesses in the Iran-Contra in- vestigation in Congress have closely linked Mr. Casey and a Central American CIA operative to the case, but so far broad agency involvement in the operation has not been uncov- ered. One administration official, speaking on condition he not be iden- tified, said morale in most parts of the agency remains high depite the continuing investigations. The official said Mr. Webster is expected to learn his new job quickly since he has more exper- ience in intelligence than past direc- tors brought in from outside the agency. However, the Iran-Contra inquiry has affected the morale of some field agents in Central America who feel that "there are more investigators than case officers," he said. Officials said Mr. Webster's pres- ence at CIA will help to ensure that legal restrictions on agency oper- ations will be strictly enforced. The Senate Intelligence Commit- tee recently informed the CIA and the National Security Council that the committee plans to conduct spot checks of financial records to en- sure that operations conformed to legal guidelines. Another reform recently put in place by National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci, according to offi- Adm. Turner, CIA director during the Carter' administration, brought in a large number of Navy officials to assist him and he dismissed or transferred many of the agency's most experienced operatives. The official pointed out that while Mr. Webster knows Adm. Turner from their days at Amherst College, Mr. Webster also is close to former CIA Director Richard Helms. an agency stalwart-well respected by hard-liners. One senior CIA operations offi- cial, who retired in the late 1970s, described Mr. Webster as independent-minded official who "goes by the book" and thus may have a "tempering affect" on agency covert operations. "I don't think he'll abandon it as a tool, but he may just wait until he's more comfortable with it," the of- ficial said. He said Mr. Webster could have the greatest impact on developing CIA counterintelligence, which has rebounded in recent years from a decline that began in the late 1970s. David Atlee Phillins_ former CIA Latin America operations chief, said some agency operatives have taken a "wait and see" approach to Mr. Webster because of his lack of ex- perience. "There's a big difference between handling a really clandestine type of operation as opposed to a partially clandestine type of operation that the FBI is used to running," he said. "People in the operations operations director- ate are wondering if he'll be able to do that:' Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 App Vt1fWP 01N PAGE _L se 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600 90004-9 PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 2 April 1987 House Democrats seeking more say on covert actions ,,f By Charles Green Inquirer Washington Bureau WASHINGTON - House Democrats are moving to impose tighter con- trols over covert intelligence activi- ties, despite warnings from two for- mer CIA directors that the rules would handcuff and possibly endan- ger secret operations. The effort - inspired by the Iran- contra affair - is expected to spark a confrontation between the House and the Reagan administration over the role of Congress in sensitive for- eign policy decisions. [louse Speaker Jim Wright (D., Texas) yesterday set the stage for a showdown, endorsing legislation that would require the administra. tion to notify congressional leaders within 48 hours of undertaking cov- ert actions. The bill is a direct response to the shipment of U.S. arms to Iran, which were kept secret from Congress for more than nine months despite a requirement in current law that top lawmakers be notified of such acfivi. ties in a "timely fashion." Wright said the new notification requirement would guard against "executive arrogance - the idea that certain things are too risky, too important ... to be shared with Con- gress." Two former CIA directors, appear- eye and tell him or her that I was ing at a hearing before the House going to discuss this life-threatening Intelligence subcommittee on legis. mission with ... people who were not lation, said the proposed law was an necessarily involved in supporting overreaction to the Iran affair and the activity," Turner said. urged Congress to leave the law as it Under the law, the administration is. is expected to keep the House and "Every time we have a murder, we Senate Intelligence Committees in- don't necessarily try to change the formed of covert actions. In special laws against murder," said Wil!_ Ita n circumstances, notification can be Fplk~y--who headed the CIA during limited to eight top lawmakers, in- the Nixon and Ford administrations. cluding the House speaker and Sen- A S dm tansfielU i Urng the CIAtji l . ,. ae maortyeader. The notification director urind g the Carter adminis- is supposed to occur in a "timely tration, said the notification require- fashion," but there is no definition ment would make it difficult for the of timely in the law. The proposed CIA to send agents on dangerous mis- bill, sponsored by Louis Stokes (D., sions. He expressed fears that disclo- Ohio), would, in effect, define timely sure of such missions could endan- as within 48 hours, ger lives. Prospects for the bill appear less Turner cited three instances dur- promising in the Senate, where top ing his tenure when he asked agents members of the Intelligence Commit- to undertake life-threatening opera- tee have expressed reservations tions. He said all three, which were about writing new rVstrictions on not disclosed to Congress at the time, covert, activities Committee Chair- involved efforts to free American man-Da idl:(b., Okla.) has hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Iran said it i, hio a 1fnpoi'tant to rebuild a in 1979 and 1980. relationship of trust between the ad- One occurred when the CIA sent ministration and Congress. an agent to, Tehran to engineer the Rep. Matthew F. McHugh (D., N.Y.), departure of six Americans who chairman of the subcommittee that were hiding in the Canadian Em- held the hearing yesterday, said the bassy. The second episode was when main purpose of the bill was to make CIA personnel flew a light aircraft sure that Congress is kept informed into the Iranian desert to determine whenever an administration makes a whether the site could be used as a significant shift in policy. Such con- refueling stop in an attempted mili- sultation might have persuaded Rea- tary rescue of the hostages - a mis- gan to abandon the idea of sending sion that later failed. The third oc- arms to Iran, he said. currence was when CIA personnel McHugh said the legislation might went to Tehran to purchase trucks to be revised to reflect Turner's con- transport the rescuers from their he. cerns. But he said it would be diffi- licopters to the U.S. Embassy. cult to stipulate in advance what o e cult to look such an individual in the hours. "I would have found it very diffi- kinds of operations would not have t b disclosed to Congress within 48 Administration officials are sched- uled to present their position on the legislation next week. Congressional Republicans have indicated that the administration would object to the measure. House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R., Ill.) termed the legislation the "functional equiva- lent of a foreign policy straitjacket" on the president. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 AT01p 0 ase 2005/12/23 :CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600 W;',31"111VU I UN 1 1 Mr-3 9 April 1987 Webster-Thrner friendship worries hard-liners at CIA THE WASHINGTON TIMES Present and former CIA officials expressed concern yesterday that ties between CIA Director-designate William Webster and former CIA chief Stansfield Turner may signal the beginning of another convulsive era at the agency. Adm. Turner, as CIA chief from 1977 to 1980, created widespread controversy by firing hundreds of the agency's most experienced clan- destine operators. Later in his memoirs he said the agents were fired to remove a net- work of entrenched "old boy" CIA operatives. Intelligence sources said the agency lost "thousands of man- years" of experience. Mr. Webster, a former federal judge, has been consulting Adm. Turner for advice about the CIA and possible personnel changes among senior officials, according to the sources. At confirmation hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee yesterday, Mr. Webster, now FBI di- rector, referred to his longstanding friendship with Adm. Turner, the Carter administration's CIA chief, as one reason for the improved rela- tions between the FBI and CIA dur- ing the late 1970s. The two agencies once clashed over their respective roles in the spy game. The FBI, as a law en- forcement agency, is charged with arresting foreign spies; the CIA has a different approach since it func- tions as the U.S. espionage agency abroad. Sources said Mr. Webster be- friended Adm. Turner at Amherst College in Massaschussets, where the two were students during the late 1940s. "Webster and Turner both took over their respective agencies about the same time," one source said. "They're both forged out of the 1970s' environment of intelligence:' U.S. intelligence agencies suf- fered major setbacks in support and morale during the 1970s as a result of congressional probes. The anti-intelligence era waned after the CIA's station chief in Ath- ens was murdered by terrorists after he was named in one of the anti-CIA publications flourishing at the time. The Carter administration recog- nized the need for better intelligence when the CIA was caught off guard by the 1979 revolution in Iran. - Bill Gertz Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9 ART162RR or Release 2T &/l YOR3K: F,tA- DP91-00901R0006003 ON PAGE 2 April 1987 Wright Urges Requiring Disclosure of Covert Acts 1 probable that the national embarrass- By FOX BUTTERFIELD ment of the entire Irangate episode special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, April 1 - In an un- usual move, House Speaker Jim Wright testified before a subcommittee of the House Intelligence Committee today to endorse a bill that would re- quire President Reagan to notify Con- gress in writing within 48 hours of starting a covert operation. The measure is the first Congres- sional bill in response to the Iran-con- tra affair. It is designed to tighten a legal provision that permitted Presi- dent Reagan to keep the House and Senate Intelligence Committees unin- formed about his secret arms sales to Iran for 10 months after he signed a "finding" authorizing the deals. In other testimony today before the Subcommittee on Legislation, the bill was firmly opposed by Robert H. Mich- el, the House Republican leader, and three former top-ranking intelligence officials. They were Adm. Stansfield Turner and William E. Colby, both for- mer Directors of Central Intelligence, and Ray Cline a former deputy direc- tor oor the -C T for intelligence. Re- flecting concern in the Administration, Mr. Michel said it would "put a strait- jacket on a future President." But Mr. Wright said that the bill was only an attempt to clarify existing legislation, first enacted in 1974, which requires the President to notify the House and Senate Intelligence Com- mittees of a covert operation, generally defined as a secret foreign military or intelligence operation, in a "timely fashion." The new bill would make two changes, Mr. Wright said. It would re- quire that the notice by the President be in writing and that, in "extraordi- nary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the United States," the noti- fication come not more than 48 hours after the President has approved the operation. If the new measure had been in ef- fect, Mr. Wright asserted, "it is quite would have been avoided." Mr. Wright's appearance at the out- set of hearings was an indication that he was prepared to put the weight of the Speaker's office behind the bill, sev- eral Congressmen said, and reflected the concern and anger in Congress over the sale of arms to Iran and the reported diversion of profits to the Nicaraguan rebels. It is rare for hear- ings on a bill to begin with testimony by the Speaker and the House minority leader. sentative Louis Stokes, an Ohio Demo- crat who is chairman of the House In- setts Democrat and a former chair- fied of the operation until it was com- pleted, he said. Referring to the proposal that the President notify the intelligence com- mittees within 48 hours of a covert ac- tion, Admiral Turner said: "Timely is not measured by the clock. Timely is measured by risk." There should be no time limit on notification, he suggested, and instead Congress should rely on building a better relationship with the executive branch and the C.I.A. to in- sure better oversight. Mr. Colby contended that "there are tning Congress doesn't need to know" and that, once a secret opera- tion was disclosed to even one other person, it was no longer a secret. "I think we should look to proper execu- tion of the law rather than to changing it," said Mr. Colby. Representative Robert W. Kasten- meier, Democrat of Wisconsin, de- scribed the proposed measure as "in- deed modest" and a simple "tightening up of the statute in order to carry out its original intent." But Admiral Turner said that the bill could en a er e'lives of American intelligence agents and that, if it had been in effect while he was head of the C.I.A. under President Carter, it would have prevented several critical covert operations. One of these, he said, was the secret mission to help the six mem- bers of the American embassy in Tehe- ran who had hidden in the Canadian embassy after their compound was l seized. The operation to arrange their escape took, three months to plan and involved sending a C.I.A. agent into Te- heran at risk to his life, Admiral Turner related. Congress was not noti- Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600390004-9