CHECKS AND BALANCES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600340001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1966
• Content Type: SPEECH

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14 Nov 1966; .
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Goodwin
This is the first draft of a
speech Admiral Taylor is to give in
St. Louis on 28 November. Inasmuch
as the audience is to be a public one,
I thought you might be interested in
a copy of the draft. Content leans
heavily in a number of places on the
US News E World Report Raborn interview.
Chief, Presentations,
(DATE)
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DRAFT SPEECH FOR DDCI
ST. LOUIS, 28 Nov 66
CHECKS AND BALANCES IN INTELLIGENCE
Last August President Johnson, in a ceremony
honoring Admiral Raborn.for his services as Director
of Central In.telligen.ce, remarked:
"It is the lot of those who direct our intel-
ligence agencies, and those who work for them, that
you work in silence, you sometimes fail in silence,
and more often you succeed in silence."
Our critics and our detractors, unfortunately,
are under no such in.junction.s. For the most part,
they are neither restricted by security regulations,
nor circumscribed by knowledge of the facts.
As a result, the Central Intelligence Agency
has been blamed, or credited as the case may be, for
just about everything that happens anywhere in the
world, and I suppose I should be opening with a
disclaimer of responsibility, just in case anything
catastrophic happens in St. Louis while I am here.
I am on firm ground here in falling back on the
reliable old Navy saying, "It didn't happen on my
watch." We are in the domestic United States, and
CIA has no charter for operations here--they belong
to the FBI and Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.
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We have, however, been blamed for a variety of
events ranging from the course of a hurricane over
Cuba, and the collapse of a bank in Lebanon., to the
difficulties of the French in. their former African.
empire, and the seizure by Ghana of a plane-load of
diplomats from Guinea.
It is a cardinal rule in the tradecraft of
intelligence that you neither confirm nor deny
involvement. From time to time, of course, there
are events where it may appear both logical and
obvious that CIA is involved, and where it would
seem relatively harmless to acknowledge responsibility.
The trouble is that once you begin to confirm or
deny, you begin. to build a pattern.. The time will
come when., at some critical juncture, your answer
or even your silence is going to give the opposition
useful information.
This creates problems for the intelligence service
of a democracy. Senator Salton.stall of Massachusetts,
in. a lettter to his constituents earlier this year,
commented: "We Americans like to know what's going
on., but sometimes in the interest of our own. security
all the facts cannot be made public. Remember, in a
free country, when we tell our own citizens we are
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also informing our enemies, for they read our news-
papers too."
So I am not going to tell you whether CIA did
or did not send a couple of hurricanes in the past
three years zigzagging back and forth across Cuba,
although it appears rather obvious that if we have
the ability to steer hurricanes, we could steer them
away from Florida and the Gulf Coast.
There has, however, been. one persistent line of
criticism, originating to a large degree within our
own country, that can.n.ot go unanswered. That is the
charge that the Central Intelligence Agency consti-
tutes an. "Invisible Govern.men.t," making its own. rules
and policies, and answerable to no one.
This has been refuted by every President since
Mr. Truman., and the actual facts are a matter of open.
record in. the laws of our country.
So, while we are supposed to be the silent serv-
ice, in. this particular matter we can and do speak
out, because we can do so without giving anything
away to the enemy; because we do not have to violate
security to answer; and because we are an. instrument
of a democracy whose people are entitled to know how
they are being served.
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We do not make policy; we support the policy of
the government and are bound by it.
And we do not carry on. operation.s except at the
behest of, and with the approval of, the duly consti-
tuted leaders of our government.
Let me dispose first of the charge that the Central
Intelligence Agency is under no controls.
The CIA was created by the Nation.al Security Act
of 1947, which gave the Agency five fun.ction.s:
1) To advise the National Security Council--an.d of
course the President--on intelligence matters relating
to national security;
2) To co-ordinate All foreign. intelligence activities
of our government;
3) To produce and disseminate finished national
intelligence within the government;
4) To provide what we call "services of common. con-
tern"--fun.ction.s which serve all of the intelligence
elements in. the government, but can. best be undertaken
centrally; and finally,
5) To perform such other services as the National
Security Council may direct.
In. the "Cold War" which has existed for even
longer than. there has been. a CIA, we face an. enemy
adept at conspiracy and subversion, with worldwide
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clandestine assets, skilled agents, and no compun.c-
tions about undermining or overthrowing any government
which resists the spread of Communism.
In order to counter these efforts, there are
going to be occasions when. it will be necessary for
the United States to take covert or clandestine action.
This is not necessarily because the United States
would be ashamed of either the objectives or the
methods. It is primarily because it sometimes takes
clandestine methods to beat clandestine methods--just
as a killer submarine is one of the best weapons to
use against another submarine.
This is thew shadowy, twilight zone of government
operations that Congress had in mind when it directed
the CIA to perform "such other services" as the
National Security Council might direct.
Our critics would have you believe that ever since
Congress gave CIA this authority in 1947, we have done
as we pleased, without regard to official policies or
objectives of the United States government,, and some-
times in diametric opposition to those policies.
Whenever the CIA carries out a covert operation.
overseas, it is with the prior approval of an. Executive
Committee of the National Security Council. This com-
mittee has had various names and various incarnations
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through the years, but essentially it is chaired by
the Presiden.t's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs, represen.tin.g the President. He meets once a
week--or more often. if necessary--with the Director of
Central Intelligence and representatives of the Secre-
taries of State and Defen.se--normally the Under Secre-
taries or Deputy Under Secretaries of those two de-
partments.
Each and every operation which the Agency is going
to conduct overseas, whether it is political, psycho-
logical, economic, or even paramilitary, is presen.ted
to this committee. It either wins the approval of the
committee, or it does n.ot take place.
When. covert opeation.s are approved in advance
by representatives of the President, the Secretary of
State, and the Secretary of Defense, it is obvious that
these operations are not going to be contrary to or
outside of the guidelines established by United States
Government policy.
In the field, CIA's overseas personnel are
subordinate to the US ambassadors. We complement and
supplement the "country team" approach of the Embassy
to official US activities, and we operate with the
foreknowledge and approval of the Ambassador. In a
military theater of operations, our people in. effect
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become a service component under the control of the
Theater Commander.
Another form of prior approval for our opera-
tions is the requirement that we obtain. the approval
of the Bureau of the Budget. Specific individuals
of that Bureau have been. given, full clearance to in-
quire into all of the activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency in detail, and believe me, they
make full use of that authority.
In addition. to such prior approvals, there are
other elements of the executive branch which have the
same full clearance to monitor our continuing opera-
tions, and conduct post-mortems on those which have
been completed. Some of these have been ad hoc
groups--the Clark Committee and the Doolittle Com-
mittee, Hoover Commission Task Forces, and several
special investigating bodies for specific purposes.
On. a permanen.t basis, all of the intelligence opera-
tions of the US Government are under the continuing
scrutiny of the Presiden.t's Foreign. Intelligence
Advisory Board, formed in January 1956 under the
chairmanship of Dr. James Killian. Of M.I.T., and
now headed by Mr. Clark Clifford. This is a very
knowledgeable and distinguished board of private
citizens appointed by the President. It meets for
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two or three days every six weeks to examine--in
depth and detail--the work and the progress of the
entire US intelligence program. The present member-
ship includes General Maxwell Taylor; Ambassador
Robert Murphy, the former Under Secretary of State;
Mr. Frank Pace, Jr., the former Secretary of the
Army and Director of the Budget; retired Admiral
John Sides; Professor William Langer of Harvard;
Mr. Gordon Gray, former Special Assistant to Presi-
dent Eisenhower and onetime president of North
Carolina University; Dr. William 0. Baker of Bell
Telephone Laboratories; Dr. Edwin Land, head of the
Polaroid Corporation.; an.d Mr. Augustus Long, formerly
the top executive of the Texas Company.
These gentlemen also constitute sub-committees
to carry on. continuing investigations of our opera-
tions, and our successes and failures in obtaining
intelligence.
So we are under effective control by the Executive
Branch--of which we are a part--and whatever you may
have read to the contrary, we are also under the con-
tin.uing scrutiny of the Legislative Branch.
Ever since CIA was first established, the
Director of Central Intelligence has been authorized
and in fact instructed by the President to make
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complete disclosure of CIA activities to special
subcommittees in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
Congress, after all, brought us into being by
legislative act, and has created very select subcom-
mittees of the Armed Services Committees of the House
and Senate to hear these reports. Incidentally,
Senator Symington. is a member of the Senate group.
Also, as you may have surmised from my reference
to the Bureau of the Budget, our operations sometimes
require some money. Our headquarters are in Langley
Virginia, not at Fort Knox, and our appropriations
have to come from Congress, like those of all govern-
ment agencies.
We are not going to hand out free information
to the opposition, so our funds are lumped in--we
hope inconspicuously--with appropriations for other
agencies, They are discussed in full, however, with
special subcommittes of Senate and House Appropriations.
These gentlemen are also authorized complete access
to all of our operations. After they have scrutinized
and approved our requirements, they then see to it
that my salary is n.ot inadvertently eliminated by
somebody who may believe he is only reducing the Federal
Government's consumption. Of paper clips or carpeting.
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Some of the confusion, over CIA's relations with
Congress arises from the fact that these special
subcommittees, and only these--about 25 legislators
in. all--have been cleared by the President to inq'1:ire
in detail into all of our activities and operations.
We will, of course, brief any congressional
committee having a jurisdictional interest on our
substantive intelligence from all over the world. In.
1965, for in.stan.ce, there were about 20 such committee
hearings--an.d some of them ran as long as three full
days. We also brief individual congressmen frequently
at their request.
But discussion. Of CIA activities, methods, and
sources is another matter. It involves the lives of
people who work with us, an.d the efficacy of our
methods. National Security Council directives specify
that these matters will be discussed only with the
special subcommittees designated for these purposes.
This is not arbitrary or bureaucratic; it is simply
recognition. that the risk of inadvertent disclosure
rises with the number of people who have access to
sensitive information. Of this type.
Where disclosure is authorized, it is complete.
In. 1965, for instance, in addition. to those 20 hearings
or substantive in.telligen.ce, the Director or his senior
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aides met a total of 34 times with the special sub-
committees to keep them informed on the operations
of Central Intelligence.
So much, then., for the charge that CIA is under
no controls and that nobody in Washington is told
what CIA is doing.
As for the charge that CIA makes policy, let
me say flatly that intelligence is an. instrument of
policy, not a source. We serve the people who
actually make the decisions. Our role is to supply
the information, the evaluation., and the estimates
they need to reach an informed decision..
Intelligence, you know, is really an everyday
business, not confined 'to governments. When Mother
listens to the weather forecast and then. makes Junior
wear his rubbers or galoshes to school, she is using
an intelligence estimate to arrive at a policy de-
cision..
The Cardinals and Charlie Win.n.er may think that
they are going over the scouting reports in. prepara-
tion for next Sun.day's game at Dallas. In. our
language, they are examining current intelligence
on the capabilities and intentions of the enemy, in
order to formulate contingency plans for the outbreak
of hostilities.
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Now, the weather bureau will talk in terms of
the likelihood--the probability--of rain or snows,It
leaves the decision on rubbers or galoshes up to
Mother.
Similarly, that scouting report will deal with
possible weaknesses or vulnerabilities of the Dallas
Cowboys, and warn. about the nature of their principal
threats. The decision. on how the Cardinals are going
to cash in. on the information is left up to the coach.
It is the same in government, and intelligence.
It is fashionable, when we speak of our national
strategy, to refer to "options," or "alternatives."
This is the "in" way of saying that you should never
paint yourself into a corner. It means that whenever
the President is called upon to make a policy decision,
he must always have two or more realistic choices.
The role of intelligence is to provide the Presi-
dent and his advisers with factual, and above all
objective,. information. This is the information which
in the first place determines whether the options are,
in fact, realistic, and then enables the policymaker
to compare his options and make an informed choice.
If the organization which gathers the information
becomes an advocate of one particular option, one pro-
posed course of action, then the intelligence which
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it provides is necessarily suspect. It is no longer
acceptable per se as objective. Whether or not the
depth of partisan advocacy consciously or unconsciously
builds a self-serving bias into the intelligence re-
porting, the decision makers must take this possibility
into account.
That is the reason, why CIA is not engaged in
policy formulation., would not want to be, and would
not be allowed to be.
Information--the collection., analysis, and evalua-
tion of information., as accurate and as comprehensive
and above all as objective as possible--is our business.
If we become advocates of policy, we lose our
credibility, which is our most useful asset in serving
the government.
If the policy makers permit us to take part in
policy formulation, they must start by discounting
the objectivity of the intelligence we furnish them.
Any advocate of an. alternative course of action, can,
provide information. to support his proposals, but at
this point the information. becomes an. argument, not
an. objective appreciation of the facts and the prob-
able consequences.
By the National Security Act of 1947, the Director
of Central Intelligence is the principal intelligence
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adviser of the President. He reports to the National
Security Council, which in effect means that he re-
ports to the Presiden.t. He is not beholden to any
other department of the Government. Even in the
National Security Council, he is an adviser, not a
member.
In. the minds of the Congress, this was the only
sensible way to establish the CIA and the position of
Director, because it is the only way to give the
President, who must make the ultimate decisions, an
adviser and a source of information completely
divorced from the competing and sometimes parochial
views of the advocates of alternate choices.
This principle does not require the checks and
balances that I have listed which monitor the covert
operations of the CIA, because it is a principle
which has been welcomed and implemented by every
man. who has held the office of Director of Central
Intelligence.
This has been. attested to in public by every
President, and by officers at the cabinet level who
would be the first to complain. if it were not so.
There is one concept which operates as a control
mechanism in. this respect, and that is the concept of
the intelligence community.
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You may never have read of the intelligence
community--it doesn't fit into a headline as easily
as CIA, and it doesn't have the same juicy appeal to
the information media. If there were no intelligence
community, however, the CIA might never have been.
created to coordinate its work.
Obviously, the function. of intelligence in, the
United States Government did not begin with the Office
of Strategic Services in. World War II. Intelligence
is one of the oldest professions, dating back at least
to Noah and the airborne reconnaissance mission. he
launched from the Ark. In our own country, George
Washington. found spies to be not only necessary but
exceptionally useful during the Revolutionary War.
Down through the years, there have been. in.telli-
gen.ce components in the Navy, the Army, the Department
of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation., even,
in. such comparatively prosaic offices as the Department
of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce.
These intelligence agencies, however, existed
primarily to serve the needs of their particular de-
partments. As a result, there has been a natural
ten.den.cy for their interests and their competencies
to be somewhat parochial.. Some departmental in.telli-
gen.ce was originated by diplomats or economists who
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might be unfamiliar with weapons. Other departmental
intelligence may have come from military attaches who
were more conversant with the order of battle or the
various types of fighter aircraft than they were with
political or economic developments. But this speciali-
zation was not the main weakness.
The sign.ifican.t failing of such an apparatus lay
in the possibility that on.e of the intelligence com-
ponen.ts might --by unilateral decision--consider a
given piece of information too marginal, too unimportant,
to be passed along to the decision makers, or even
laterally to the other intelligence components.
One of the lessons we learned from Pearl Harbor
was that information must not only be exchanged and
coordinated among all of these disparate intelligence
elements, but that there must be a clear responsibility
for bringing that intelligence to the attention of all
of the men. in. our government who need to know it.
As a result, the men who make the decisions for
our national government today want what we call
national in.telligen.ce. This is the agreed synthesis
of all the intelligence available to the government
from all possible sources, analyzed against all of
expertise and all of the background information we
can. bring to bear.
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The National Security Act of 1947, which created
the Central In.telligen.ce Agency, did not put the State
Department, or the armed services, or the commercial
and agricultural attaches, out of the in.telligen.ce
business. Instead, it rounded up all of the intelli-
gence assets available to the govern.men.t, and estab-
lished the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate
the work of this intelligence community.
Mr. Helms has the title of Director of Central
In.telligen.ce, not only Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. He is the principal intelligence officer
of the Government, and when. he reports to the President,
or the National Security Council, he is delivering the
intelligence developed by all of the assets of the CIA,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, Navy, Army and Air
Force intelligence, and the intelligence compon.en.ts
of the Department of State, the FBI, and the Atomic
Energy Commission.
This is what we mean by the intelligence com-
munity. When. finished national intelligence goes for-
ward, it is the agreed and considered evaluation. by
all of these componen.ts?--or at least if there has been.
disagreement, the dissenting views are set forth in.
footnotes for the guidance of the policymaker.
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I should add that except for the representa-
tives of CIA, the members of this community come
from departments and agencies which have a legiti-
mate role in. policy formulation. When. they act as
the intelligence community, however, they are under
strict injunction. to come up with an. objective and
impartial appreciation of the intelligence picture,
the interpretation of its significance, and the
estimate of possible future developments.
The intelligence community includes enough of
these non-CIA elements so that,:'. in any policy dispute,
it is virtually certain to have representatives from
agencies on opposite sides of the fence, and this in
turn provides the safety mechanism that I mentioned.
With the opposing sides represented, it is incon-
ceivable that there would n.ot be a vociferous and
audible complaint if the finished national in.telli-
gence were not completely objective with regard to
the impending policy decision..
Finally, if I may, I would like to devote a
few moments to the men. who make up the Central In-
telligence Agency.
The fact of the matter is that James Bond and
his colleagues of the spy movies and spy novels
never worked there.
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A commentary in. the London. Economist last
month, discussing the British intelligence service,
made my point pretty well with this summary:
"Modern intelligence has to do with the painstaking
collection and analysis of fact, the exercise of
judgment, and clear and quick presentation. It is
not simply what serious journalists would always
produce if they had time; it is something more
rigorous, continuous, and above all operational--
that is to say, related to something that somebody
wants to do or may be forced to do."
Our appetite for information. is catholic and
enormous. Our basic background information on.for-
eign countries, compiled in what we call the National
Intelligence Surveys, already adds up to more than
10 times the size of the Encyclopedia Britann.ica.
Much of this is hardly secret, covering such
prosaic matters as economic statistics, legal codes,
sociological conditions, and transport facilities.
The information has to be on. hand against the con-
tingency that Country X, seemingly remote and of
little current concern to our national security, may
some day erupt onto our list of critical situations.
Against that day, we must have not only the informa-
tion, but the experienced and knowledgeable experts
to interpret and apply it.
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Take French Somaliland. After the recent riots
there, President De Gaulle announced that French
Somaliland should have the right to decide between.
remain.in.g under French rule, or becoming independent.
Is this of n.o concern to us? Ethiopia and the Republic
of Somalia have each announced that if France sets its
Somalis free, either Ethiopia will seize the area to
keep it out of Somali hands, or vice versa. Now,
the United States has a very close relationship with
Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union. trains, equips, and
advises the Somali armed forces. This raises the
posssibility of a direct confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union at some time in.
the future, so it behooves us to know the depth and
capacity of the Djibouti harbor, the terrain in the
hinterland, the efficacy of the railroads, and the
composition. of the population, today.
The result is that the CIA employee is a much
more academic man than the public realizes. We may
have a few men. with the debonair aplomb of Napoleon.
Solo, but we have more than 800 senior professionals
with 20 years or more of intelligence background.
Three quarters of our officers speak at least one
foreign. language. About 15 percent have graduate
degrees. Six out of every 10 of the analysts who have
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direct responsibility at headquarters for analysis
of a foreign area had lived, worked, or traveled
abroad even. before they came to CIA.
When you combine all of the years required for
graduate study, foreign. experience, and then. add 10
to 15 years of intelligence work, it adds up to an
impressive depth of knowledge, competence, and ex-
pertise at the service of our government.
We could easily and adequately staff the faculty
of a university with our experts, and in a way, we do.
Many of those who leave us join university faculties,
and others take leaves of absence to teach, and renew
their contacts with the academic world.
I have discussed with you how the Central Intel-
ligence Agency serves the govern.men.t, how it is con-
trolled, and briefly, what man.n.er of man. works there,
and I have left to the end on.e final question--Why?
For the answer, let me call in a couple of outside
witnesses:
Last winter, Secretary of State Rusk told a press
conference, "I would emphasize to you that CIA is not
engaged in activities not known. to the senior policy
officers of the Government. But you should also
bear in. mind that beneath the level of public dis-
cussion., there is a tough struggle going on in. the
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back alleys all over the world. It is a tough one,
it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is
not a field which can. be left entirely to the other
side. And so, once in. a while, some disagreeable
things happen., an.d I can. tell you that there is a
good deal of gallantry and a high degree of competence
in. those who have to help us deal with that part of the
struggle for freedom."
In. April, 1965, President Johnson. Put it this way:
"We have committed our lives, our property, our re-
sources and our sacred honor to the freedom and peace
of other men., indeed, to the freedom and peace of all
mankind. We would dishonor that commitment, we would
disgrace all the sacrifices Americans have made, if
we were not every hour of every day vigilant against
every threat to peace and freedom. That is why we
have the Central Intelligence Agency."
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