LET'S KEEP COOL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 4, 1983
• Content Type: NSPR

Tle52 APPEARED WASHINGTON POST
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James H. Schlesinger
Let's Keep Cool
:reasons. Such an . incentive system le.aves:little!-
room forflexibiliy. .: ? .
In the 21/2 hours that the Soviets tracked the.
jetliner, ample time was provided for ground con-
-trol to refer the mattecto higher echelons. The
decision was certainly referred backto Far East- -
ern .Command and probably to :Mosenw.:Liven
the time available, the . decision. Was ;Probably
made by senior military officers 01 the PYO. One
can assume, though one cannot be certain, that
the issue was .not referred to the .political level.
Within the Soviet system, more trouble -wnuld be !
caused for the military commanders if the airliner
were .not shot down, than if it were. .
Thus, given the nature of the Soviet system?
its sensitivities, its rigidities and its pattern of re-
wards and punishments -the outcome is scarcely
surprising. It was not "calculated -murder," but
rather the natural outcome of the creaky Soviet
system. Only. those who disregard .:Soviet tough- :
ness, and have been prepared to accept a vision of
the Soviet system as a mild, inoffensive, peace-
loving state, can have been truly surprised.
The Soviet response to the international outcry
Ens been somewhat: bizarre. After initial- silence
and then fumbling,the Soviets have finally settled
on the simple canard that the jetliner flight was?.
however implausibly?an intelligence operation.
Allegedly a camera with all its equipments was in-
gtalled in the aircraft, presumably unnOticeil by
bah passengers and ground service . crews in
New York and Anchorage, despite .the. dis, -
placement of baggaste and Wel oh along over-
seas flight. The plane, however, fie' aboVe
cloud cover:-Moreover, even the lits-siansimuSt
acknowledgethe difficulty in taking goodpic-,
tures in the virtually total dark- -
?ess of 3 a.m. There is simply no r
reason (even at high noon) to -do
inefficiently, and at great risk, What. is
:performed efficiently and simply by --space :
satellites. Finally, few nations -thetaphOriollsi.use
women and children to clear. land*ritalOwsdivert;
fire in !either -battlefield or intelligenceOperations .
the netion4that'.269.7.innocent 'people rmght be
risked for.suChapurPose is foreignitothe .Westero'.:
mind, if nottn:theSoViet ?
As acoverstory; this 'Sovieticanard is is fees'
bleat it mendacious. '
Yet,l)e3iiind expressions of:outrage the , basic'
question Tow is 7-what should the-internas
tional response'? - '?
The Soviet Union may be a bully brutal
and insensitive .sbut it is a -Tut:Icor-armed
bully. 'Moreover, it has the capacity to cause a
great deal of trouble -in Berlin,in the ? Peasian-
Gulf -and in Lebanon; for :starters; While we
should seek on 'appropriate expression lir regret
and compensation, Mir resi)onsennist be miens-
ured -and our limited means 'recognized. The..
, episode should not be. allowed permanently to -
darken the international climate.' -
In the halcyim 'days of -,detente, this tragic
episode .would have been handled quite 'differ- ?
ently and more quietly -a talk between the Secs'
Prior to the sinking of-the laisitania in -1915, ,
the Imperial German 'government placed-news-
paper advertisements 'warning ?prospective pas-
sengers that Britain and Germany were at war
and that the Lusitania was-thus subject to sill).
marine attack. Warnings issued, the .German
goverment felt it had 'done ? its' duty. it .waS
wholly unprepared for -the -vehement 'foreign...
reaction to the Lositania's :sinking. The -event -
was -regrettable perhaps;but.surely there would .
be universal understanding-of actions taken for
- reasons of state
- Prior to the shootdownalif the Korean jetlin, .
er, the Soviet- -Uniori-4had-,!tegularly -published ?
-warnings,- placed on maps;that aircraft intruds'.-;
.ing. into 'Soviet airSpacewere 'subject 'teitheing-:.
7-shottlowa Warningsissued, it, like the German;
'government in 191.5,-has been 'wholly ?,unpre-
:pa:major the worldwide-reaction of outrage.it
-could not conceive:how' offensive to Western
-and other 'opinion is the needless destruction of'
civilians. After all, warnings had ? been issued, a
civilian airliner had been fired upon and forced
. down . in 1978, and 4herewere good :and'stitfi-
.
cient reasons of state: .7.-- ss.
? Too_imuch ?attention,4seems.to me, -hasjieen-,
devoted to the question; why did this shootdown
occur? Given the Soviet cast ofinind -and :Soviet;
-operational procedures-, the outcome was .highly
probable,. if not 'foreordained,' Orice se_?'..deep;,a ',-
penetration occurred inso sensitive an area. ?
. First of all, the Soviet regimeistough,lif not.
bloody-minded, about such matters. The Soviets.
are hypersensitive, ifnot paranoid, about security..
? Sakhalin, for example, has only 10 percent of the
--Military assets located in the Hampton Roads
:area, yet the United States would surely not shoot
7d6wn a civilian airliner that had strayed over the
region. The Soviets, ,by contrast, are to deter-
mined to prevent intrusion of their airspace that
they are willing to defy international opinion and
the Community of .nations.- - .
-:::.Second, the Soviets have an exceptionally rigid
?conunand-control system. This is reflected, for ex-
ample. in Soviet inaliilitypromptly to turn off the
. politically costly :submarine operations , against
Sweden, once they had been blown. When a Ko-
. rem jetliner in'1978,penetrated so deeply into the
even more Sensitive area of the Kola Peninsula be-
fore being attacked and - forced down, ? one, can
- 'readily imagine the consternation at the headquar-
ters of the Air Defense Forces' (PV0) =in the
? Soviet Union an independent service. Reprimands
Were issued; court-martial proceedings wereinstk,
toted. New rules 'of' engagement were established,
and warnings unquestionably issued that such an .?
'occurrence must not be allowed to occur-again.
In the Soviet Union penalties rarely will be on-
posed for following the book. By contrast; severe
penalties will almost certainly be imposed for vio-
lating standing orders?even for humanitarian
STAT
"The episode should not
allowed perinanently.to
darken the international
,?-
retary of state and the Soviet :ambassador, a
government confirmation of press 'reports after
a day or two. The Soviets may well be aston-
ished at the drastically altered American style
ofhehavior?with the secretaryii state himself !
spearheading the attack. . -
White Rouse aides are whispering-that the
episode -confirms 'everything:that Ronald Rea-
gan has 'ever Said about. the ,ItirsSiiins; is our
policy now PriMarily to be moved by notions re-.:
.garding the '"empire of cv117...iir 'the !"1.'welve
Commandments according to Nikolai Unitr.?
If so, it would. amity additiOnal trouble down.
the line .-twith Our allies :and -'with
which 'remains quite restless the ads
MiniStration'S ripproatiatrinqiiiritiOL.
:What the Soviets haiii,'elnife*OffenSive to..,
the entire Conimunity of TatiOn'S,'Other nations
'must consequently remainlallYinValved. This
legitimate issue shoUld,00t'be,turned into a
simple Soviet U S ainfrentiitiOn. :All actions
need to be coordinated coreftiliY,Italay be pos-
sible to 'persuade most :,nntinns ,to Withhold :.
landing rights from Aeroflot ontil the Soviets
'...taiknOwledge the ciiipabilitY,4.?their action. A .
more general cessation of *inde,if :it .should 'be
considered, must be teinnor* and have a clear
terniimition point: 'Above all, sanctions should ..
not be permitted to becortiea.SOurce of Western...
'disunity tas so draMatierilly.,occurred in the
pipeline dispute. -
While others Will urge that the 'United States..
do something, we shouhl recognize the stringent
'limits on -prospective sanctions'and the need to
maintain Alliance cohesion With the recently
expanded sale of oral?. Which is unlikely to be:
.interrupted, our eildibilityin persuading others
to take costly measures':will, be, limitedtsand.n
potential source of disputes.
ln 1915 President WilsOn's protests over the
? sinking the Lusitania were ignored. The United
States and Germany ultimately drifted into
:war. war is no longer n sanction to be
seri-
ously considered against a -'nuclear-armed
perpower. It is precisely-what We must avoid..
I he quest for nniwailent coexistence imposes
severe and clear restraints.- =
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14 June 198S,
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Ex-C.IA,Head Now Works f
a Nuclear Freeze
By PHIL GALLEY
Special co Tbe New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 13 ? Eight
years ago, while this city was under-
going its post-Watergate cleansing,
William E. Colby did something un-
usual for a director of Central Intelli-
gence.
He disclosed the agency's "family
jewels," as its dark secrets and illegal
activities were called by insiders, be-
fore a Senate committee. At the same
time he turned over to the Justice Dee
pertinent the findings of an internal
Inquiry that led to the prosecution of
Richard Helms, one of his predeces-
sors, for lying to Congress about
C.I.A. activities in Chile.
The agency's old guard reacted with
harsh accusations and innuendoes.
Some, including James J. Angleton,
who had been ousted as head of coun-
terintelligence by Mr. Colby, sug-
gested at the time that he might be a
Soviet mole; others accused Mr.
Colby of paralyzing the agency's abil-
ity to conduct covert operations by
kneeling before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence as if it
were, in the words of one former
C.I.A. director, "a mourner's bench."
President Ford asked for Mr. Colby's
resignation in late 1975.
These days Mr. Colby, who prac-
tices international law here, is again
playing a surprising role for a former
director of Central Intelligence. He
has joined the public debate on nu-
clear arms control on the side of the
Catholic bishops and the nuclear
freeze movement, and this has
brought a new round of criticism of
Mr. Colby by some of his old C.I.A.
colleagues who never forgave him for
opening the agency's black bag to the
world.
Known as a 'Soldier-Priest'
"My position is a little incongruous
for a former C.I.A. man, and I under-
stand that," he said; adding that, con-
trary to what some are saying, neither
religion nor guilt brought him to his
present view.
Still, friends and critics alike, in-
cluding two former directors of Cen-
tral Intelligence, suggest privately
that Mr. Colby, known around the
_ C.I.A. as the "soldier-priest," may be
motivated in part by his deep commit-
ment to his Roman Catholic faith and
a sense of guilt from some of the most
painful periods of his life.
After he was appointed C.I.A. Di-
rector in 1D73, antiwar groups tacked
up posters in Washington labeling Mr.
Colby a "murderer" and war criminal
for his role in directing Operation
Phoenix, an effort to identify and re-
cruit or imprison leaders of the Viet-
cong an South Vietnam. Some 20,000
Vietcong "suspects"'were killed dur-
ing the ?operation. Mr. Colby told ,a
House committee that there had been
some "excesses" despite his rules
_against illegal killings, but he insisted
. that the program had, on the whole,
been suc,cessful. ?
Still, Mr: Colby was-shaken by sug-
gestions that he had condoned politi-
cal assassinations. "How does it feel
to be married to a war criminal?" be
asked his wife when the posters went
up.
RiS public tribulations were
matched by his personal grief. In 1971
? his eldest daughter died in Washing-
ton after a long illness, and friends say
Mr. Colby, who was stationed in Viet-
nam during the years her health was
deteriorating, felt a sense of guilt for
not having spent more time with her.
Practical and Moral Aspects
Mr. Colby, whose poker player's
face rarely betrays his emotions or
private thoughts, nodded slightly as a
reporter repeated this speculation
about why he went from the cold to the
fleece.
"If I were taking the other side, no-
body would bat an eyebrow about it,"
he said. "I felt this way long before
the bishops' letter came out and, in
fact, I helped to some degree in ex-
plaining the issue to Catholic groups. I
figure the priests can take care of the
moral aspects and I'll talk about the
practical aspects."
Mr. Colby, who is waging his per-
sonal freeze campaign on the speak-
ing circuit and in newspaper columns,
; contends that his ?antinuclear activi-
I ties are "a logical extention of what I
?
? was doing in the intelligence busi-
. mess." ? ?
He goes on: "At the C.I.A. it be-
came obvious to me that the real func-
tion of intelligence is not to win battles
but to help with the peace, to avoid the
kind of destabilizing surprises that
can occur. It is clear to me that the
arms race has us on the verge of -an-
other one of these terrible destabiliz-
ing steps that is moving us toward a
hair-trigger world with all this talk of
launch under attack. My God, we're
talking about the fate of the world."
?? If Mr. Colby's former colleagues in
the intelligence community are per-
plexed by the latest public role of this
man who (-ells himself "an 'unrecon?
-
structed cold warrior," so are some
liberals who .have welcomed him into
the ranks of the nuclear freeze move-
ment despite his support for the Rea-
gan Administration's policies in El
Salvador and his unwavering defense
of American involvement in Vietnam.
James R. Schlesinger, a former
C.I.A. director, said that the freeze
movement, "if anything but a political
gesture, could be detrimental to the
overall military balance," He said he
did not doubt his former colleague's
sincerity, but, like some other mem-
bers of the national security corn-
mtmity, said he felt that Mr. Colby's
words were taking a turn toward stri-
dency.
Mr. Schlesinger, Secretary of De-
fense in the Nixon and Ford Atiminis.
trations, said he read with dismay Mr.
Colby's recent remarks to an antinu-?
clear group at Georgetown Universi-
ty. Mr. Colby told that audience: "I
think it's time for people to take this
matter away from the priesthood that
has gotten us into this mess and to
simply insist that we stop building -
these things."
In an -interview, Mr. Schlesinger
said: "I get restless, and I suspect
others do too, over firebrand com-
ments about a supposed nuclear
priesthood. Bill knows ? better than
that. Discussions regarding nuclear-
strategy have been 'mite coma more .
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.6;
Front Burner
Central America Issue
Heats Up a.s President
Follows His Instincts
His Conservative Stand Risks
Collision With Congress
And Latin Allies of U.S.
Setback on El Salvador, Aid
By GEFLA.LD F. SEIB
stAff Reporter of TiE WALL STREET JouRNAL.
WASHINGTON?During the 1980 presi-
dential carnpaien, an interviewer asked
Ronald Reagan what foreign-policy issues
he would put at the top of his priority list.
"I think the whole problem of Central
. and South America and the Caribbean has
been neglected too long," he replied
promptly.
That response. little noticed at the time,
seems prophetic now. It goes a long way in
explaining why the president has pushed
Central America to the top of his
foreign-policy agenda?even though: by do-
.ing so, he risks a huge collision with Con-
gress and friendly Latin American govern-
ments and may be creating a hot. issue for
the 1984 presidential contest. .
In part, Central America has vaulted to
the top of the administration agenda be:
cause of a genuine deterioration in the posi-
tion of 12.S.-backed forces in El Salvador.
But just as important, a new chemistry of?
personalities and politics in Washington has
suddenly brought out the president's natural
inclination to 'dramatize the threat of Soviet-
inspired insurrection in Central America.
"You have a convergence of elements
here,- says United Nations , ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick, who has helped push
Central America into the public eye,
Shifting Winds
For two years, the diversion of-pressing
domestic issues such as taxes, !combined
with his advisers' squeamishness about par-
allels with Vietnam, muted the: president's
alarm about Central Arnericii.. But now
many of the restraints are goiie. Aides who
favored a moderate approach have been
chastened, and national-security adviser
William Clark has stepped in-to-urge on the
president. At precisely the Same time?,' Con-
gress is forcing the president's hand by
challenging the whole thrust of his policy in
Central America. ?- ?
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
27 April 1983
The result is that tonight President Rea-
gan makes one of the most unusual and dra-
matic moves of his administration. He has
called a joint session of Congress, to be na-
tionally televised ,at 8 p.m. EDT, to press
skeptical lawmaters to approve more mili-
tary aid for .tra: government of El Salva-
dor.
It will be `die first time a president has
addressed Congress on a foreign-policy issue
since President Carter appeared in early
1979 to plug the new SALT. II arms-control
treaty, congressional ? historips say. Mr.
Reagan it going to the trouble mostly to win
congressional approval of $I10--smillion in
quick new military aid for El Salvtvior he
proposed last month.
Legislative Setback ?
But the speech also will carry an implicit
warning: Congress risks taking the blame
for the fall of El Salvador to the Commu-
nists if it ignores such a dramatic plea for
help from the president.
Underscoring the problems the president
faces in Congress, a House Appropriations
subcommittee yesterday cut Pt) million
from the administration's request to funnel
$60 million in military aid to El Salvador
from funds earmarked for other countries. A
separate request for $50 million in new aid
for El Salvador earlier was cut out entirely
by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
' The administration hopes the president's
speech can persuade Congress to replace
some of the deleted funds, but resistance
from Democrats is ,high. To save even half
of the requested $60 million yesterday, the
administration had to make a large conces-
sion to lawmakers. It agreed under pressure
to appoint a special Central American envoy
to help El Salvador arrange talks with leftist
rebel groups in an effort to lure them into
national elections later this year. Salva-
doran leaders are uneasy at the prospect of
interference from a high-level . U.S. envoy
but were forced to accept one.
Case of Nicaragua
Nor were the president's problems on the
eve of his speech limited to the House. The
Senate met in a special closed session yes-
terday to discuss charges the administration
is violating a congressional mandate by co-
vertly aiding armed groups trying to over-
throw the leftist government of Nicaragua.
Even some administration officials think
Mr. Reagan, in taking his case directly to
Congress tonight, is being melodramatic and
may undercut his support in Congress. They
fear that his move could .reinforce impres-
sions that he is an alarmist on Central
America.
"I tend
says one State Department official. "There
are those who think you have to get this out,
of the public eye, not into IL" Officials say
preparations far the speech have been
marred by bickering between hard-liners at
the White House, who want to play up the
Soviet and Cuban role in fomenting unrest,
and State Department aides, who fear Con-
gress will recoil at anything resembling
"Red scare" tactics.
Regardless of their views, though, admin-
istration aides agree that the high profile of
Central America is here to stay in the Rea-
gan administration. "It comes from Ronald
Reagan's heart, really," says one official.
He asserts that there now is a "fair amount
of agreement" within the administration 1
that Mexico is the ultimate target of .Soviet-
inspired unrest in Latin America. ?.
The president's position is bolstered by
the fact that even some former skeptics now
share his pessimism on El Salvador. "Our
_ _
impression is that the situation is deteriorat-
ing very rapidly," says a European diplo-
mat from a country that has often ques-
tioned Reagan Latin American policies.
?rime is running out, and the U.S. has to be
very quick."
This diplomat is particularly worried that
if Western Europe deals the Soviet Union a
setback by deploying new U.S. nuclear mis-
siles late this year, the Russians will begin
casting about for a quick victory -elsewhere.
They may mount a drive to help guerrillas
topple the government in El Salvador or sta-
tion new weapons in leftist-ruled Nicaragua;
he fears.
Moreover, top administration officials
have begun to worry that failure to win con-
gressional backing -for aid to Central Amer-
ica is hurting U.S. credibility on other for-
eign-policy issues. For example, Middle
Eastern leaders won't take American peace
efforts seriously if the Reagan administra-
tion appears incapable of following through
on initiatives in its own backyard, presiden-
tial aides fear.
Many Doubters
Yet all this dire talk falls on" many deaf
ears in Congress, as various committees
slice or delay the administration's urgent re-
quests for more aid for El Salvador. "I don't
think the people think El Salvador is all that ?
important," says Senate Democratic Leader
Robert Byrd. Like many of his colleagues,
he contends the administration is "going
down the wrong track" by relying too much
on military aid and too little on encouraging
peace negotiations -between El Salvador's
factions.
The administration has itself to blame for
much of the congressional skepticism. The
White House has undermined its own credi-
bility by swinging sharply from a calm de- . STAT
meanor to an alarmist attitude about Cen-
tral America, officials acknowledge.
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Reagan Again Asks for MX-Missile Funds
From Congress, and Road Remains Rug1i
By WALTER S. MOSSBERG
SI g.f.f Reporter Of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON?For the third time in 18
months, President Reagan asked Congress
for money to field a fleet of 100-ton MX mis-
siles. But it won't be easy to rescue the lat-
est plan from the rejection that greeted its
predecessors. _-
As expected, Mr. Reagan embraced the
recommendations of a high-powered com-
mission he appointed to study the basing of
the 10-warhead nuclear weapon. -
That panel, which included several for-
mer defense secretaries, urged that 100 of
the 'missiles be stuffed into existing silos in
Wyoming, even though the silos are vulnera-
ble to a Soviet sneak attack. For the long
run, the commission urged development of a
small, one-warhead missile that would be
easy to hide and thus tough for the Soviets'
to attack.
The cornmission'a report was worked out
in close cooperation with the administration,
and its adoption by Mr. Reagan was never
in doubt. The recommendation is an effort to
satisfy congressional hard-liners who favor
the MX. while attracting some MX oppo-
nents with the pledge to eventually deploy,
in the early 1990s, the smaller, less-vulnera-
ble missile.
Part of Lobbying Plan
Mr. Reagan's formal proposal yesterday
was part of a thick lobbying and public-rela-
tions plan to try to sell the MX during the
45-day period Congress has set aside to con-
sider it.
Speaking before assembled members of
Congress and national-security figures, the
president said deployment of the NO? is the
only way to assure Soviet agreement on a
new arms-control pact. "We can no longer
afford to delay," Mr. Reagan declared.
"Now is the time to act."
Shortly after, House Majority Leader Jim ;
Wright (D., Texas) appeared on the White!
House driveway to endorse the plan and pre-
dict its passage.
But Mr. Wright warned that House Dem-
ocrats won't formally grant Mr. Reagan's
request for broad bipartisan support of the
MX plan, and some influential Democratic
members are already lining up against it.
Chief among these opponents may be
Rep. .Joseph Addabbo (D., N.Y.), who has
great influence over military ? spending
through his chairmanship of the Defense Ap-
propriations Subcommittee. It was Mr. Ad-
dabbo who led the successful efforts to kill
production funds in December, and he con-
tinues to oppose the missile. There haven't
been any MX missiles built yet.
Common Cause, the self-styled citizens
lobby, issued a call yesterday for the contin-
ued rejection of MX production funds, call-
ing the missile "fundamentally flawed" and
"highly destabilizing."
The House has more Democrats and lib-
erals than it did in December, and it already
has slashed deeply 'into the Pentagon's bud-
get request for fiscal 1984. In addition, it is
widely expected that the House will soon ap-
prove a nuclear-freeze resolution Mr. Rea-
gan opposes.
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
and other top administration aides, who are
scheduled to begin 11a testimony today, are
likely to face a barrage of hostile questions
about contradictions between the latest MX
plan and its predecessors. '
The most important of these is the admis-
sion, this time, that there isn't any feasible
basing scheme that could make land-based
missiles safe from a Soviet first strike?at
least duringithis decade. The administration
has tried to sell a number of basing plans it
claimed could do just that.
Further, the new proposal argues that
this missile vulnerability isn't very worri-
some because U.S. bombers and submarines
can compensate for it. Mr. Reagan ran for
election in 1980 partly on a pledge to close a
"window of vulnerability" in missiles for
which he blamed the Democrats.
Use-It-or-Lose-It Weapon
Critics already are charging that placing
MX in "soft" silos will turn it into a use-it-
or-lose-it weapon, likely to be fired in a pre-
emptive strike or in response to ambiguous
radar readings from Soviet territory..
To counter these charges, which It failed
to deflect before, the administration hopes
to rely on some of the prestigious national-
security figures who served on the commis-
sion and who are closing ranks behind its
plan in an effort to obtain MX deploy-
ment.
Particularly important is Harold Brown,
the most recent defense secretary in a Dem-
ocratic administration and an expert on nu-
clear weapons. Another important figure is
James Schlesinger, who serveo in three ad-
muustranons, Republican ana Democratic,
as chief of the C'entral Intellizence Agency,
secretary of defense and secretary of en-
men have publicly attacked features
of the Reagan defense program. But both
were present at the White House yesterday
for the kickoff of the latest MX sales effort, .
and both are expected to work hard on liber-
als and moderates to win backing for the
planned deployment.
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THE NATION
26 MARCH 1983
THE COMPANY (3: THE COPS
THE C.I.A.'S
SECRET TIES TO
LOCAL POLICE
PHILIP H. MELANSON
Two years ago, President Reagan signed Execu-
tive Order 12333, "unleashing" the Central In-
telligence Agency to conduct domestic intelli-
-gence operations. Civil libertarians have rightly
criticized the order for creating the danger of a
police state in which the C.I.A.., acting on its -
own or through local police forces, will seek to
suppress dissent.
What has not been fully reported is the extent
to which the agency has in the past worked with
police departments in American cities. If the
past is prologue, the President's order not only
gives a cachet of legitimacy to such cooperation;
it also will encourage its expansion.
Executive Order 12.333 authorizes the C.I.A..
to conduct "administrative and technical sup-
port activities within and outside the United
States.. . ." (Emphasis added.) This is coupled
with a sweeping authorization for all intelligence
agencies to "wont-rate with appropriate law en-
forcement agencies for the purpose of protecting
the employees, information, property and facili-
ties of any agency within the intelligence com-
munity." Moreover, intelligence agencies can,
under certain circumstances, "participate in law
enforcement activities to investigate or prevent
clandestine intelligence activities by foreign
powers, or international terrorist or narcotics
activities."
Prior to this order, it was widely believed that
the C.I.A.'s charter, which states that the agency
shall exercise no "police, subpoena, or law en-
forcement powers or internal security func-
tions," barred it from involvement in do-
mestic security matters. When Congress approved
Approved For Release 2006/02/07
thTaiarter in 1947, i
operate exclusively a
1970s, the C.I.A. s
departments, providi
equipment and expl
return, municipal p
their intelligence um
information on grou
terested, provided C
use as "cover" and,
agency wanted thro
1972, when the press and several members of Congress got
wind of these activities, the agency denied and downplayed
them, while continuing to emgage in them until the mid-1970s.
The agency also cooperated with local police officers in offi-
cial and unofficial ways.
Although domestic spying by the C.I.A. was reported in
the press in the 1970s, given the tight security at the agency's
Lasigicy, virginia headquarters, all the facts may never be
known. However,) have obtained under the Freedom of in.
Act a declassified 362-page file that provides
numerous examples of C.I.A. involvement with police. The
file, titled "Domestic Police Training" (hereinafter referred
to as the D.P.T. file), reveals the Lip of what must be COD-
sidereci a very large iceberg.*
According to the file, the agency cultivated friendships
with poll= officers mainly by entertaining them at its head-
quarters and occasionally by giving them gifts and money.
When a Fairfax County, Virginia, police chief took a vaca-
tion in Puerto Rico, he was furnished with a car by the
San Juan field office. Nor did the agency forget the cop on
the beat. According to the file, one police officer was given a
week's vacation at a C.I.A. safe house in Miami; the agency
picked up an 5800 car-rental tab for another officer.
Police chiefs and commissioners were frequently given
red-carpet treatment at Langley.. Invitees to a 1967 get-
together were sent identical letters of warm greeting by
Howard Osborn, director of the C.I.A.. 's Office of Security:
Mr. Helms has a keen, personal interest in our meeting and
has directed that such Agency facilities as you may require be '
put at your disposal. He will host a dinner in your honor on
6 October ai the Headquarters Building.
The schedules for the visiting police dignitaries stressed
play over work. There were lots of coffee breaks, "get.
acquainted sessions," "free time" periods and long cocktail
hours?more than enough to take the pain out of the totirs
and lectures, which usually ran from ten to forty-five
minutes. "Recreation periods" took up as much as four
hours of the nine-hour workday. Travel arrangements were
made by the agency, and limousines and spacious suites at
tigwaaeg/TPL-Ragt$19P993P16414)the guests.
000600290013-0
./
ARV CLT..
071 PA=
NEW YORK TIMES
d For Release 200VOWOZHQ1103DP91-00901R0
600290013-0
Schlesm&s ;W8IV Oil
Special tone New 'York Times
? _
WASHINGTON,' March 18 ? How
advantageous is the oil price decline?
James R. Schlesinger, the nation's:-
first Secretary of Energy, believes it
is likely to inhibit the domestic indus-
try's-ability to keep replacing the oil ?
that is now being consumed:Nore-
over, he says, it may further dampen
efforts to develop alternative fuels. -
Mr. Schlesinger, a former top budg-
et, defense and intelligence official as
? well as Energy Secretary, is now a
senior adviser to Lehman Brothers -
Kuhn Loeb Inc. and Georgetown Uni-
versity's Center-for Strategic and In-
temational Studies. The following are
excerpts from -a,- conversation -With
him this week about the new pricing ',-
and production agreement by the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting'
Countries and other energy matters.
? Q. What does the OPEC price
cut to $29 a barrel mean?'
A. There is a chance the agreement
will hold, but the probabilities are that
.there will be further downward pres-
sure on prices in the spring. If prices .
break, they could go down to the $22-:
A. Some of the power we presumed
they had was illusion on our part. It
was a rationalization for what were
major trends in the oil market rein-
forcedby two notable supply interrup-
tions. For the most part, OPEC '
merely followed the market -
. Q. Most people Dow seem to ?
think that lower prices, while
causing some problems, add up to -
a substantial plus. Do you agree?
, A. I think it is ? if we have eco- :, in8 something like Mil employment
, nomic recovery. We ought not to thine and continued economic- growth, an
"of the recession as a cure for our 1 assumption that apparently has been
energy problems Indeed, oil supply . .unWarranted? . ., - -
= prospects are grimmer , than five : ' Q. Is the Administration filling
years ago.. ;-?,(4.,,,, ,,, ..,,, ,
the- strategic oil reserve fast
enough?
to.$23-a-barrel range.
Q. Did OPEC bluff us into think-
ing it was more powerful than it
really was?
A.. The fundamental point is that
?-what is useful for us in the energy
market short term is likely to be
costly to us in the long term. The con-
verse is also true. There is no doubt
that, if we could have a permanent re-
duction or one that would last for five
or six years, that would be beneficial.
However, if prices are merely to dip
for a short time, then pop back up, the
result vrill be a decline in efforts to de-
velop alternative supplies and in drill-
ing activity in the United States and
other high-cost areas.. ?
Q. 'You didn't mention banking.
A. I should have. This brings great
-pressure to bear on those banks that
have extended substantial credits to
oil-producing countries such as Mexi-
co.
Q. I gather you think the decline -
Fill he temporary. ?
Approve For Fie
Q. How do you quantify the rein-
tive effects of recession and in-
' . creased energy efficiency?
A. At least half of the decline in oil
demand is attributable to the decline
in international economic activity. We
, should see a recovery of oil demand on
the order of 4 million barrels a day.
,?That, with an end to destocking, would
' 'increase- demand from the OPEC
countries. from todars 14 million bar-
rels a day back up to 23 or 24 million
and this would put us back into the-
same position we were in the the late
1970's and early 1980's.
, Q. Is this the time to Impose a
gasoline tax or import fee?
A. I have always been in favor of a
substantial increase in gasoline taxes.-
A. The Natural Gas Policy Act of ?
This is an especially-good time. The
. .
F miport fee is a less certain item; it 1978 was intended to ? provide some -
r might lead to a restoration of the enti- subsidization of those who would go
k dements program. Nonetheless, given out and find new reserves. The Ad-
the circumstances, we ought to pro- ministration's bill would end that; all
vide some degree of protection for do- gas prices would be the same. Old gas
mestic oil production ? we have the prices would come up to something
lowest reserve-to-production ratio - like the equilibrium level. If one be--
amongst major countries? and such lieves the Administration, the new gas
a fee would benecessary. , ?
'
No. I believe in a maximum fill
ra-teAnd right now there isn't a better-
argument for that than, if oil prices
are temporarily dipping, we can fill at
lower cost_ ?
-
? Q What should be done about
- ?
synthetic fuel projects?
? 'A.: The most important are those-
that provide fuel liquids. We ought to
have the technologies in hand to
produce them synthetically. At the.
present rate of progress, it appears
those technologies will ambitiously be
developed arotmdi.the :year 2000 in-
stead of the year 1990. That's regretta-
ble. - ?
Q. What do you thinit of the Ad.
,
ministration's natural gas bill?
Q. Should we sell Alaskan oil to
prices would fall. That means that the
incentive to go out and find new re-
serves would be substantially cur-
Japan? tailed. ', 4 .' ? A), .. -Z' .
? - ? , ''' ' -? ...i.e -, e. t- ?
.. .
- ? We should certainly _con.sider itillie_ r.Q. Didn't the Government trt the -
---Carairei-kiniiiiiiiation made several'sk 1970's mislead people by saying
' attempts to remove the restraint on ? that we were running out of natu-
; the export of oil. But we must reaps- "-- taigas? . -; ,
nize that the acceptability of that idea A. I think there Was some exaggera-
has declined because major invest- tion and I think that there 'was undue
meats have been made by the compa- - concern, probably, expressed on the
?,,
riles in shipping oil to the amtinental gm by members of Congress.. But I
.. United States. And, of course, one will think our estimates of gas production
f,.. have the continued opposition of. the were very accurate.
maritime unions. -, - , , .. ,, , ,
.1'
- Q. What about the budget ef- , Robert D. Hershey j
..., lents of the price decline? ... .......5..-:. :..)......? 2.-- ,:...;..,-..4.4...;.-. ..-4..........
t, A. It certainly has an adverse ef-
fect. It will increase the deficits. The
? Government is now a partner of the oil
industry to a degree it has not been in
! the past.
Q. How well have our bite)).
? gence agencies done in energy
A. I think they were functional with
, regard to prospective oil supply. They
were less accurate with regard to pro-
jecting demand The Central Inteili-.
gence Agency's estimate_was assum._
ease 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0
STAT
Approved For Release 200 21 R000600290013-0
.4.2 7 1 az1.2:1----L:,:aro 25 JA'IJARY 1983
Ga. PAGE 17
Any Decline Soon in Oil Prices
May Be Small, Analysts Say
By H. ERICH HEINEMANN
The breakdown of the OPEC meet-
ing in Geneva yesterday has set the
stage for a slight decline in oil prices
and a further cutback in production by
Saudi Arabia and its allies on the Ara-
bian Peninsula, energy economists
said yesterday.
But a sharp drop in the price of oil
from the current world average of
- about $33 for a 42-gallon barrel ap.
? peered unlikely ? at least for the
present, the economists said. The cur-
rent price among members of the Or-
- gantration of Petroleum Exporting
Countries is based on $34 for Saudi
Light crpde,,,
Total oil production by Saudi Arabia
" and its neighttors has _declined
about 8.5 million barrels a day, from
average of 13.7 million in' 198D, as'
they have tried to maintain their price
structure despite the abundance of oil
' in world markets. That has prompted
'..ot..ber OPEC- producers "to- discount
prices in order to sell their oil.
If Saudi Arabia makes an attempt to
maintain prices ? and is successful ?
then the decline may be modest. But
even a small decline could prove a
mixed blessing.
A Double Effect
On the plus side, lower prices may
increase business activity and lower
Inflation, among other benefits. The
negatives focus on the possibility of
loan defaults by nations such as Mexi-
co, which depends on oil revenues to
meet debt payments, and reduced de-
mand for industrial products by the 13
OPEC nations.
According to Herbert W. Krupp,
? senior energy economist for the Bank-
ers Trust Company in New York,
there are these three major options
available to the nations of the Arabian
?Peninsula ? Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates and Qatar:
cAn official price cut of a dollar or
: two plus stated ceilings on their out.
put "Such price realignment would
be combined with a threat of further
price reductions," Mr. Krupp said,
. linking "the carrot of protected export
volumes for non-Gulf producers with
the stick of threatened production in-
creases and further price cuts."
IIA significant reduction An prices
and increases in production. The hope,
he said, would be to "coerce" other
producers into relinquishing a share
of the market in a .new agreement on
output and prices. "This threat has
not worked before," Mr. Krupp noted.
IlPrice discounts, special credit
terms or barter arrangements with
major customers as disguised price
reductions. "However," Mr. Krupp
said, "if the Gulf producers erode con-
fidence in their official prices, then
widespread discounting could ulti-
mately be far more serious."
Saudi Arabia Again the Key
than interview, Mr.Krupp said that
whatever happened, "Bankers Trust
-believes that OPECIfill bCSuccessful
in avoiding a significant price break
through 1983 anctbermd:12.=
A senior energy economist for the
Federal Government., Who asked not
to be identified, agreed with Mr.
Krupp's analysis that Saudi Arabia
audits allies still held the key.
He added, however: "I happen to
think the present price structure is not
in the Saudis' long-term interest, and
that a lower price is in their interest.
If they hold oil prices over $30 a bar-
rel, that would result in a relatively
low share of the world oil market, and
?over time ? lower revenues."
According to data compiled by Wil-
liam L. Rand& international energy
analyst for the First Boston Corpora-
tion, from the Central Intelligence
Agency. OPEC's share of world oil
production has droyoed from about 50
percent in 1979 to less than_35 percent_
in the second Quarter of19F2.
Spokeimen for the Exxon Corpora-
tion and Texaco Inc., two of the four
partners in the Arabian American Oil
Company, which produces and buys
most of Saudi Arabia's oil, had no
comment on yesterday's develop-
ments in Geneva. "This is too sensi-
tive," an Exxon official said. .
But a senior economic adviser to an-
other of the nation's largest oil compa-
nies, who agreed to be interviewed if
STAT
he were not identified, argued that it
made sense for Saudi Arabia to try to '
maintain oil prices at current levels.
"If we get an economic recovery
this year, as I expect," he said, "then
this oil surplus won't look anywhere
near so bad six months from now. My
advice would be to try to hold the line,
and hope for a pick-up in demand." .
Richard O'Brien, chief economist of .
the American Express International
Bank in London, told a news briefing
In New York yesterday that the fears
of major international financial dis-
ruption from loan defaults set off by
lower oil prices had been "overdone.!'.
Economic growth in the main indus-
trial nations would accelerate sub- .
stantially as a result of a sharp drop in
oilprices to, say, $25 a barrel, without
any adverse impact on inflation, he -
added. ?
Donald Htrasthe1m, who is- In -
charge of short-term projections at
Wharton Econometric Forecasting
Associates, strongly supported Mr.........
O'Brien'i view. "A lower oil price has
to be a plus," he said. ,
Effects on Rankin System
Nonetheless, serious concerns re-
main that a sharp price drop would in-
deed pose severe problems.
According to James Schlesinger.
former Secretary of both DeempAnd,
Energy as well as Director of Central
jntellieence. "the oddity is. that,
largely because of the run-up in oil
prices, we have an international
financial system and an international
economy tfiat are in a parlous state."
"There are a whole set of things that
would be benefited, and a whole set of
things that would be harmed," he con-
tinued. "What I fear at the moment as
I look at Mexico, as I look at Canada,
which is in a 'delicate' condition, that
the more sensitive relations may be
the ones that would be harmed. Ad-
mittedly, this would be a great boon
for the Germans and Japanese, which
are purely oil importing nations, but
they are not in as sensitive a shape."
Mr. Schlesinger concluded: "Vola-
tility in oil prices may be worse in its
impact than high prices, particularly
In its impact on the .bnernational
financial system."
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00
ARTICLE APPEAR= THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGE 2 PA R AIDE 5. DECEMBER 1982
0600290013-0
WALTER SCOTT'S
Personality Parade
QWhatever happened to James Schlesinger, who
was head of the CM, Secretary ofDefense and held
. other high positions in government? He seems. to.
have disappeared .?Maurice Rosen. Albany, N.Y. A
A James Schlesinger, "other high posi-.
tions" included chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission and Secretary of Energy?now works
for the investment banking corporation of Lehman
Brothers Kuhn Loeb. The father of four sons and '
four daughters, Republican Schlesinger has decid-
ed that he can no longer afford the luxury of full-
time government service.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0
STAT.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00060
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PACE.
THE WASHINGTON POST
1 May 1982 ?
eitense C ,iefs Urge
rms reaty
eview.0
? By Michael Getler re,
Washington Pnit Staff Writer
, Two formersec' retaries Of defense
yesterday urged? cOngress and the
Reagan administratiOn to take an-
other look at reviving the never-ra!;
*;tified SALT' H Strategic arms lim-
itation treaty with Moscow, and ex.,
'pressed doubts. about President Rea-
'gan's claim that the-Soviets had "a
'definite margin of superiority" over
country. e ?:-
? James R. Schlesinger, who served -
'under Presidents Nixon and Ford,'
! and Harold Brown, who was: under
President Carter, advanced these
5 views during the second in a series of
.4kSenate Foreign Relations Committee,
hearings aimed at producing a res-
t: ohition on nuclear arms control pole
,
icy that can command strong nation-
support. . ? ,
Sen. Claiborne Pell
? marked wryly that. he was glad to
? have tivii witnesses : "who presided
e over that decade of-neglect" on mile
: itary spending that. the current
;de-
fense secretary, Caspar W. Weinber:
ger, says .is the cause of :so much
-.trouble. .??
**. Under questioning by Chairman!'
Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-M.),
singer said "we. have lost valuable
-
time and, more importantly, the po-e
litical initiative" both in Europe and
-
I among the U.S: population by taking
so long in the Reagan administration
to get started : on new arms talks,
: which are now called Strategic. Arms
'1?Reduction -TalkOr START--
.
-:Schlesingei agreed that there Was,
some validity to administration ;de-L;:
sires to build up. US nuclear forces',
flea:
. But he said those goals Were over
:7. taken by events and that this coun-
try "is losing: more both Striae-
gicallYand politically by the fail-
;"-ure : to ? negotiate than it would by
- going to the negotiating table:with a
?
somewhat .weaker .1.13"p rev?
Percy has also bee pushing the
White House hard for a U.S.-Soviet
rnaatinci
Schlesinger agreed that a meeting
.would .be '-'desirable," adding that
:this administration came to office-
:believing that most Americans and
'allies were -not skifficiently aware of
the Soviet menace and thus - feared.
that ; any palsy-walsy"
would detract ,from their ability to
mobilize public opinion
Although Congressional aides say
? chances are strongly against any re-:
Cvival of the ? never-ratified 1979
SALT H.; a growing number of law. ,
*makers are pushing for it. ^
One is Sen. John Glenn:a:Ohio),
who argued yesterday- that SALT II,
which- is 'still officially in the Senate
-although dormant politically, is a .
"do-able", first step which would- re-
quire cuts of some 250 missiles in
the Soviet arsenal and then lead to
the next round of START talks.
Schlesineer said he .!eoped the ad- l
ministration "would review that pos-
sibility of reviving SALT II." Brown,
, testifying later, "strongly urged this
committee to consider again the vir-
.tues of the treaty" which he helped
design. '
".The Reagan administration vehe-
mently opposes the Carter-era trea-
.
ty; claiming that it puts no real lim
:.:jtations .on the arms race and con
:firms Soviet* superiority in certain
- eweapons.
Under- questiOnire:b; 'Percy
:.:Brown said; "I would have to re-
espectfullY disagree" With the assess
-
merit' of Reagan and Weinberger
:about Soviet superiority in overall
;,nuclear forces. ? ?-re e-e? ;
Both 'Brown and Schlesinger
agreed that, ;Moscow's ;Iland-based
missiles were now a threat to knock
.out U.S.- land-based missiles and
ethat ,the Soviets do have some ad-
-...vantages.',
But bah' ; did the
chairman . of ? the Joint ...Chiefs, of
.Staff, Gen. David Jones, t day be-
Releaa?2tomers a 66 ae.rWs
in rl
Marines, and agreed . the \United
, States still- has a arcing: ability to
290013-0
'fj. -"The Soviets do not hae,`k ii.,,
1
,j-kidginent,- anything , like- stra,tegic
superiority in the sense of 'a militari-
, ly or politically useable advantage in
istrategic nuclear forces," :Brown said:
, furthermore, perceptions of. the
;strategic balance. are crucially impor-
&tent because they "affect* the polit-
3cal will and morale-of government
- and publics. Thus, it is important for
!..
:informed individuals:: particularly
etheeee with government resPonsibile.
' ity, th make eVery effort to express
4 - - .
:their, judgment' of that balance in
:terms . that - are accnrateneither
'alaririist nor conaplacetit," he said: ' .-?
!.: - Schlesinger did: not, *directly? re-
'spond to the 'president's- 'claim; but
:said the United States has signifi-
' cant nuclear strengths that Moscow
"may or may not have. I would pre-
fer not to buy a pig in a poke," he
-said when asked if he ould: switch
forces with Moscow. , ,,..
- Schlesinger said the ? S?et space
,
'program turned: cut to, be a fraud
'and stressed that there '.re .".many
unknowns about Soviet weapons,- --e.e.
-.. Schlesineer;--e- former CfA direc-
tor, stressed there
vvns a aut missi e ac ura an
STAT
'technical failure on both sidese"Giv-
.
en the spotty Soviet history, ink.deale
'ing with modern. technologies,' One
ould hypothesize that thiseriinse be
1:a constant Worryzof the Soviet lead=
ers.
e- "We ourselves know. a great deal
more' ''abOut---,:helicopteroperations
'and maintenance-than we do about'
factual: operations-.Yet:, if we
recall the abortive rescue operation
In Iran in 1980, :even wee with a far.
:more .impressive history of _technical
'success, should bear in .mind this
:salient element," he said. .
1R000600290013-0
x ? u i?? lax ArA9 p rove d
PAC3E 100
? 0-7.? {-7,7*;
?eir;Pri
For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290
PLAYBOY
MAY 1982
????? *i.`" eif;
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STAT
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Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON _
Perlis and Promise
TIME
11 January 1982
IN a 7 hen the White House speechmiters crafted Ronald Rea-
gan's Christmas message, they tried desperately to get
away from Charles Dickens' hoary label for any era:' "It was
the best of times; it was the worst of times" But they failed,
drawn again to that time-worn language to describe the mad-
dening contradictions of the world today. And indeed, Dick-
ens' words may be especially apt for 1982, a year with no poetry
in its sound, no numerical magic. It is a year that a number of
scholars and, statesmen are already predicting will be momen-
tous for the industrial democracies of the West, a time Combin-
ing peril and opportunity.
The perils are obvious. The free world's alliances are weak-
ened and some-of its economies faltering the adversaries are
more threatening and the have-nots more demanding Military
power and its illicit offspring, terrorism, threaten to break all
restraints. Firm decisions elude American strategists on nucle-
ar security. Recession continues and worries deepen over the
impact of budget and tax cuts. Decline in the auto, steel and
building industries spills over to small business, fanning and
credit institutions. The accumulated stress spells fear:
Zbigiiew BiLeilaski, National Security Adviser to Jimmy
Carter, pulled his trench coat around him in Washington the
other morning and said, "The foreign Policy crisis that I pre-
dicted for late winteris starting to develop by early winter." He
cited four areas?Poland, the Middle- East, Central America
and China?that have reached critical mese against a dispirit-
ing background of European neutralism, Third World alien-
ation, frustrations about nuclear arms and indecision within
the President's council about what we should do.
Brzethiski's counterpart from the Nixon-Ford years, Hen-
ry Kissinger, sees the next months as one of the most critical
junctures in postwar American history, ranking with the 1956
Suez and. Hungarian crises and the building of the Berlin Wall
in 1961. "It is almost exactly a generation since the great cre-
ative acts of the immediate postwar years were put in place,"
says Kissinger, referring to such landmarks as the Marshall
Plan and the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, The key tests
today, in Kissinger's view, are for the nation to deepen values
and transcend materialism at home, and to meld firmness and
conciliation abroad in wise portions. Fa:ling that, he says, "we
can become irrelevant in just a few months' time." -
Public television's Scholar-Author Ben Wattenberg, a se-
nior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, declares: "Po-
land is one of those great events that happen once in a genera-
tion to unmask the ? truth." Like former CIA Director and
STAT
600290013-0
Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms, Wattenberg sees much of
the world struggle transformed into a propaganda war of un-
precedented scope, in which perceptions of strength and weak-
ness?conveyed in words and spirit?are critical elements.
Both Helms and Wattenberg would have the President muster
academics, peace marchers, public relations experts, labor
groups, corporations and churches in a worldwide educational
effort to show, that the Communist system is a brutal failure.
"Turn the bully pulpit into a bully spotlight," says Watten-
berg, who, with Kissinger, believes that the U.S. is at the end of
an era. "I've thought about it a great deal," Wattenberg Says.
"Perhaps a new era is defined best when people begin to agee ?
coNl'it?
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I OLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C._ 1
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 November 1981
STAT
to PWheS tire utton?
g
In actual war games, the liberals and
the women are the deadliest of the species
By Benjamin F. Sehennner
?(1 URKHA SOLDIERS don't sheathe their
124-swords until they've drawn blood, tradi-
tion has it.. The legend, is not exactly correct,
but it illustrates that. warriors. understand
how fatal combat is ? and why they don't
.brandish weapons lightly.,
A similar psyche has. Icept .mankind from
crossing the unthinkable threshold of nuclear
war. There are certainly. enough weapons.to
start one: The Soviet-Union and United
States today have about 28,000 nuclear war-
heads to throw at each other. They add up to
? about 20,000 times the destructive power of
all the air-dropped mtinitions:used in World
War H and more than all.the munitions fired
. since the invention of gunpowder.
?- Who would start that kind of a war? It
might be a Russian -- but who in America
? would start such a war? 0
Fortunately, no one knows. Hopefully, we
will never find out., "--
Yet -a survey. of participants in America's
recent war games reveals that in such mock
conflicts, it is almost always a civilian partici-
pant, ? not a military adviser. or decision
maker, who decides to "go nuke"- first. Fur-
thermore, in those few war games where
women played significant roles, it was a wom-
an, not a man, who decided to push the but-
ton.' Finally, it is the liberal "dove," not the
conservative, who is most likely to get so out-
raged that he decides to use the "ultimate
weapon." ? -
The significance of this goes beyond con-
'founding the image of generals as Strangelo-
vian warmongers. '
Presidents, after all, seem to have grown
closer to their wives in recent times not just
relying on them privately for advice, but ac-
knowledging it Publicly. By some accounts,
Nancy Reagan was the most influential per-
son in Ronald Reagan's election campaign.
Many people felt that Rosalyim Carter was 1
the most influential adviser by far in the I
White House from 1977 to early 1931, , ,
And, of course, women are assuming in-?
creasingly important policy posts. in govern-
ment. We now have a woman justice of the
Supreme Court; a woman, Jessica Tuchrnan
Mathews, was Carter's National Security
Council staff expert on conventional arms
transfers and human rights; Harold Brown
-,named a woman as the Defense Department's
general counsel and another ,as under secre-
tary of the Air Force. We now have 20 women
in Congress; some may rise in seniority to be
in the line of succession for our chief execu-
tive. On eight occasions since Franklin D.
Roosevelt became president, a-Woman has
held one of the 14 Cabinet posts which fall in
the line of presidential succession. ,T
To find out how the "nuclear option" has
figured in U.S. war games, we put the clues
-
tion to some 25 senior national security offi-
cials, analysts and advisers from the current
and past administrations. We asked them to:
put aside the issue of civilian control over the
, military and, instead, simply to recall from
nuclear war games in which they have
"played" whether it was a military person or
a civilian who finally decided or recommend-
ed, "It's time to go nuclear." ? ... ?
In his years at CIA, then as Lyndon Johnson's deputyf
national security-adviser, in ambassadorial posts, as a sen-!
_ibr analyst at Rand, as special adviser on NATO affairs to
the secretary of defense and most recently as under secre-
tary of defense for policy, Robert W. Kamer has played in
about a dozen war games which crossed the nuclear;
threshold. He said, "It's been my experience that, almost
invariably, it's the civilians Who are the most bloody-
minded of all and the military who are the most prudent. I,
And the most bloody-minded of them all," Korner adds,
"have been the State Department types.". ?
Asked if his experiences would suggest that the- civiliarzi
-opted,to."go nuke" more often than the military, James !
Schlesinger agreed: I think there is some inclination. in,'
that direction.,,The military does tend to be-more cau-
tious.." Once a Rand analyst whose-work focused on:
strategic issues?Schlesinger has served as-chairman of the
old Atomic- Energy Commission, associate !director of
? management and budget for national security Prog,rams,'
? CIA directorrsecretary of defense and. secretary of energy. ;
? :et)
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Benjamin Schemmer is editor of the
independent nulgazine Armed Forces
,-Ir17ervin1 h.^ rrs ? t ? i
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
Risk Analysis
Bi Business
y
For x-Mdes
. By CLYDE H. FA RNSWORTIrl
SpecialtoTheNorsYoricTlates
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27?At the end? :
of a long shadowy corridor in a nondei
script office building three blocks
, from the White House, the sigi. by the
locked door reads International Busi-;
ness Government Counsellors Inc..".; -
?
Afterpressing a buzzer, the visitor is
swiftly led into a room filled with
books, a large map of the world and se-
cure filing cabinets. The air is heavy
with the aromatic smoke of pipe tobac-
CD.
E. Colby, .a former director,
' of the Central Intelligence Agency, ap-
praises a visitor from behind steel-
? , rimmed glasses and then ever so cir-
cumspectly describes his new job for
private industry as an "investment.
risk assessor-
It's a "natural followeup" to his ex- ?
prience in intelligence, he says, and
then briefly sizes up conditions in
Egypt, Saudi', Arabia, Mexico and-
Prance as he used to do for his former
client in the Ovaloffice.
Thoughts on Saudi Royalty
One of his conclusions: Expect a
devaluation of Mexico's currency be-
fore next year's general electioris. An-
other: The Saudi royal house has far
deeper political roots in that country
than the Shah had in Iran and is there-
fore not ripefor a coup.
Mr. Colby is a leading practitioner
of a biligeoning industry in Washing-
ton, the selling of expertise tb the pri--
. vete sector by former Government of-
ficials. It's known as the "revolving
door" in the trade, and has existed for
decadeseee ?
NEW YORK TIMES
28 OCTOBER 1981 '
Lawyers in regulatory agencies take
jobs with the companies they once
regulated. Former trade officials ad-
vise private clients on United States
trade policy. Former Cabinet officers,
with f kesh knowledge of the inner
workings of Government, provide new
Inpit to their old law-firnis or to the t
boards of private compardes. I
But now, after the collapse
of the
Shah in Iran and the clobbering that
1
many companies toolrdik. failing to
foresee the revolution, a growing num-
ber of former officials.' particularly
those with experience in intelligence
or the foreign service., are becoming
investment risk assessors formultina-
tional companies.
A One-Man Consulting Concern ?
-
Richard Helms, another former top
'C.I.A. ',official, who was once the?
American envoy tolran, now rens a.
- one-man consulting operation, which-
he calls Safeer, after the Persian word
for ambassador. Among his Clients is
the Bechtel Corporation, the interna-
tional., construction enterprise that
thrives on contracts with various Mid-
dle Eastern.countri es. . ? :
' Jarties. R. Schlesinger Jr.- who had.
been Defense and Energy Secretary as
well as director of the C.I.A., now ad-
vises Letunan Brothers, 'Kuhn Loeb.
One of his current tasks is the exami-
nation of investment possibilities in
China fora host of Lehman clients.
? Not all have come in out of the cold..
James A. Johnson, who was execu-
tive assistant to Vice President Mon-
'dale, and two other Carter Adminis-
tration appointees, Richard C. Hal-
',make, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia, and Decker Anstrorn,
who hada high position in the Office of
Management and Budget, have'
formed a 'consulting operation, that
they call Public Strategies. ?
The assessment of a country. s politi-
cal stability is only one element of
what has become a highly sophisti-
cated and specialized business of in-
vestment analysis. ? ? .
? 4 - eee"
e ew o ax ides -
The analysts also look at a country's
regulatory process and tax policies to
see whether they will be excessively
burdensome for the companies consid-
ering doing business there. -
While there has beei a proliferation
orindepehdent risk-analysis consult-
ancies, they are now due for "some
kind of shakeout," said Gordon Ray-
field, who is president imf the Associa-
? tion of Political Risk Analysts, which
has 300 members. Multinational com-
panies are starting to build irehouse-
? departments of full-time investment
analysts. Gulf, E=on, Mobil, General-
Motors, and Chemical Bank and Chase ,
Manhattan are among those that haves.?
moved in this direction. The Chase"
uses the services of former Secretary'
of State Henry A. ssinger on its risk
committee for foreign loans.
Risk analysis is even being taught at-
some milversities. Georgetown lir& ?
*versity's School of Foreign Service is
among these. And the professor,
Thomas Reckford, not surprisingly is
a form eraperative for the C.I.A. .
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ARTICLE APPEARED THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGE 9 September 1981
James R. Schlesinger.
Reagan's Budgetary Dunkirk
The last rites have now been pronounced
over the great rearmament boomlet of 1981. Its
demise had been expected by the diagnosticians
for some time. Like Halley's comet, it visited us
and then departed quickly, trailing only a long
(though quite insubstantial) tail deserving fur-
ther observation.
For the past six months the defense debate has
focused on the wrong issue: could the "immense"
funds ostensibly being made available to the De-
partment of Defense be usefully spent in signifi-
cantly enhancing the security of our international
position. With the Soviet Union outspending the
? United States by some 50 percent on defense gen-
erally and by a disturbing 85 percent in the criti-
cal area of military investment (procurement),
with conventional capabilities in Europe porous
and relatively weak and theater nuclear forces
now overshadowed by those of the Soviet Union,
with deterrence flimsy (at best) in the region of
'the Persian Gulf despite the West's enhanced in-
terests and responsibilities, with the naval bal-
ance deteriorating in the Far East, and with trou-
ble even in the Caribbean (and an evanescent
threat "to go to the source")?not to mention
concern about the strategic balance, Minuteman
vulnerability and aging B52s?that should have
been an issue in principle easy to resolve. Yet, all
along the real question should have been?given
the administration's fiscal proposals?how to
maintain adequate deterrence- with growing re-
sponsibilities in the Indian Ocean and with re-
sources dramatically less than those invested by
the Soviet Union.
Seven months have been wasted on an irrele- '
vent debate. We shall now have to make do
with a smaller growth in defense resources than
that projected by the Carter administration?
previously denounced as hopelessly inadequate.
So much for "making America strong again,"
"closing the window of vulnerability" and the
vaunted "superiority" so casually endorsed in
the Republican platform.
The unavoidable outcome, given its fiscal
goals, seems genuinely to have suprised the
Reagan administration. Disregarding the nor-
, mal laws of arithmetic, and bemused by its own
distortions of,supply-side economics (alterna-
tively known as "voodoo economics," snake oil
or the ,Tooth Fairy), it lulled its pro-defense
supporters (and itself) with farfetched projec-.
tions supposedly demonstrating that the pro-
posed rearmament effort could be achieved in
the face of a massive shrinkage of the tax base.
According to the initial mythology, dramati-
cally lower interest rates and cutting the "balance 1
of government" almost in half (everything beyond 1
interest payments, defense and the "social safety
net") would permit the achievement of a bal-
anced budget by 1984. But interest rates have
risen rather than fallen, and only so much blood-
can be squeezed from the "balance of govern-
ment" turnip, so the cuts unavoidably must now
come from the fenced "social safety net" or from
defense4 More significantly, the recent tax legisla-
tion?which seems likely to go down in history as
the single most irresponsible fiscal action of mod- ,
ern times?reduced the tax base to 19 percent of
the GNP by 1984 (with expenditures running
some 22 percent of the GNP), a revenue reduc- ?
tion of $150 billion or roughly 17 percent. As an
offset, some $35 billion in non-defense expend-
iture reductions have now been achieved?less
tlian one-third of those projected for 1984, less
than one-fourth of the revenue loss., - -
" The budget director, occupationally debarred
- from an abiding faith in the Tooth Fairy, has now
read- the grim arithmetic?the equivalent of a
Budgetary Dunkirk. The fiscal consequences may
be briefly, if sadly, stated. Unless the tax reduce
tions are reversed?which seems unlikely?on the
basis of present legislation and projected defense
spending, the nation faces growing budget deficits
of $65 billion in 1982, $90 billion in 1983 and $120
billion in 1984. Non-defense reductions will be in-
creasingly hard to achieve. Thus, only the total
jettisoning of the administration's goal of a bal-
anced budget will permit even a modified defense
buildup to survive.
Nor should one believe that with the half-an-
nounced cuts for defense of $20430 billion we
have reached the end of likely defense reduc-
tions. The best current estimate for FY 82 out- ,
lays is $715-$720 billion ($20425 billion over
ceiling). The ceiling for FY 83 in the revised
Reagan budget is $732 billion?a total in-
crease over 1982 of $12-$17 billion. Limiting
spending to this ostensible ceiling, given
probable inflation rates, would imply a re-
duction of real federal expenditures by 6-7
percent. Not very likely. Far more probably
1983 expenditures will run roughly to $775
billion?a sum $45 billion over the presump-
tive ceiling. Substantially to reduce the out?
-
year deficits, given the growing difficulty in
CON
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achieving non-defense cuts, would probably
require that some three out of four dollars in
reductions come from defense.
One can always spend less?by doing- less.
Gone now are the fancies of nine additional
tactical air wings, of three additional Army
divisions. Gone, too, in all probability, is the
600-ship Navy?unless, like Jefferson, we
provide mostly frigates or gunboats. Em-
barking on major new systems like MX or
B1 or new acquisitions like carrier task
forces will ultimately lead to an ill-balanced
force by leaving insufficient funds for opera-
tions, readiness and sustainability.
The planned buildup for NATO will have
to be reduced--especially so in light of Id-
dian Ocean requirements. What an ideal
moment, given the anti-nuclear tide running
in Europe, to increase the degree of depend-
ence on nuclear weapons and diminish con-
ventional capabilities. 7'
The international ramifications are dis-
quieting?to say the least. The already. ap-
prehensive Europeans will conclude that,
while the United States is prepared to dis-
turb the international scene by threatening
to launch an arms race, it is now seen to be
unwilling to provide ,the resources either to
run.the race or to provide additional
tary muscle. The Soviets will not be loathe..
' to exploit those European apprehensions.
Moreover, the Soviets will conclude that, de-
spite American bluster, they have little to
fear in terms of additional forces to narrow
the growing disparity in military capabil-
ities. As for the Japanese (and others), this
notable example implies that we might as
well abandon the effort to persuade them
significantly to increase defense spending.
In creating and maintaining forces, wish-
ful thinking is no substitute for an adequate
tax base. In this ill-fated venture the cycle
from bold words to budget cuts has been the
shortest on record?a kind of instantaneous
New Look. The historic failure lies in so
casually dissipating the carefully forged na-
tional consensus supporting higher defense
spending?while leaving in the public mind
the illusion that a sizable new defense effort
has actually been.launched.
The writer was acting budget director, di-
, rector of Central Intelligence and secretary
of defense in the Nixon administration. '
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..tRTIC LE APPEARF,D THE WASHINGTON POST
PAGZ, 2 August 1981
David Wise.
?
1 .
Control
Outsiders or the
William J. Casey has survived as CIA director, at
least for the moment, but the wrong conclusions will
probably be drawn from the Senate, investigation of
. his activities and the pratfall from power of his spy-
master, Max Hugel. .
The moral of the story, some will assurrie, is' that the
CIA should be left to the professionals. That, of -
course, is precisely what the .powerful 'network of Old
Boys, both inside and. outside the CIA, would like the
public to think. The intelligence professionals, the ca-
reer spies, prefer to regard "the agency" as their pri-
vate preserve. Outsiders are poachers. "
While the controversy may have appeared on the
surface to be a struggle between the Senate intelli-
gence committee and Casey, the real struggle was
over who will control the CIA. Arrayed on one side
were Casey and the president, who gingerly pup-
ported his CIA director. On the other side were the
Old Boys, the present and former CIA professionals,
and their allies on Capitol Hill. . .
It was an old battle played out again with a new:
cast of characters. Back in 1965, President Lyndon
Johnson appointed Mm. William F. Reborn Jr., the
? man responsible for the development of the Polaris
missile, as CIA chief. The Old Boys were annoyed.
? Within weeks, stories found their way into print re-
? porting that at CIA meetings Reborn was ei muddle of
confusion, "so unlettered in international politics," as:
'Newsweek put it, "that he could- not pronounce or
?
even remember the names of some foreign capitals
and chiefs of state." Six montlei latereRaborn was out
as CIA director. With the admiral piped ashore, John-
? son named a professional, Richard Helms, to the peat.
- Besides Reborn and Casey, at least two other out-
siders who served as CIA directors..were targeted by
the professionals. President Nixon named James A.
Schlesinger to the job in 1973. Schlesinger fired a ?
number of Old Boys, 'arousing much ire within.- the
agency. Under Jimmy Carter; Adm. Stansfield 'Turner
managed to survive as CIA chief, but many old agency .
hands refer to him mockingly as "the Admiral."
The current flap had its unobtrusive beginnings late
in March when Casey quietly moved John McMahen
out as deputy director for operations (the CIA's covert .
side) to head intelligence and analysis. Then, on'May
11, Casey tapped Hugel, who had worked with him in
. the Reagan campaign, to be the DDO.
Only four days later, on May 15, Cord Meyer, the
covert-operator-turned-columnist, surfaced Hugel's
name, revealing the appointment of "a rank 'ama-
teur" to head the agency's cloak-and-dagger direc-'
. torateeThe drama had-beguile': ]..:
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Id Bo s.
? Two brothers, forrher business- associates of the
Brooklyn-born Hugel, went to The Washington Post.
On July 14, within hours of the newspaper's publica-
? tion of charges of improper or illegal business activities
by Hugel, he had resigned. There were those who
ary,ued, albeit not seriously, that the disclosures only
proved Hugel's superior qualifications for the job. Ac-
cording to the Hugel tapes and other revelations in
The Post, the spymaster had threatened to kill a law-
yer who got in his way, warned his business associate
that he would hang him by the testicles and admitted
(in his. unpublished autobiography) that he was a liar,
infoimer and a bunko artist_ To top it all, he beat the
CIA lie detector. What finer background could any-
one have to head the CIA's dirty tricks division?
? But Hugel went quickly down the tube. Perhaps;
one anonymous White House official speculated,
with some help from 'eformer intelligence officials."
Whether anyone, inside or outside the CIA greased
the ways for Hugel's fall, remains, like So much
about the agency, clouded in mists. But it is very
clear that Casey's appointment of Hugel, a one-time
sewing machine manufacturer, rankled the CIA pro-
fessionals like nothing in recent memory.
From the tree-shaded lanes of Langley to the Fed-
eral-style homes of Georgetown, the sputtering could
be heard wherever old spooks gathered. It was as
though a busboy had suddenly been made a Mem-
ber of the Club. Unheard oft
On the very day that Hugel resigned, stories mys-
teriously surfaced noting that a federal judge?two
months earlier On May 19?had ruled that Casey
and-others had "omitted and misrepresented facts','
to investors in Multiponics, Inc., a company that
owned farm acreage' in the South. In succeeding
days, Casey's image came to resemble nothing so
much as a series of ducks in a carnival shooting gal- .
lery. One duck carried a sign reading "Multiponics."
Others read "Vesco," "ITT," or had similar labels of
cases in which the crA director's narrie had figured.
in the past No sooner would one duck be slotdown
than another would pop up. ? -
Casey had concealed a $10,000 gift, said one
story. Casey had links to a New Jersey garbage
man who might have links to the Mafia, said an-
other. Soon Barry Goldwater and other influential
Republicans were calling for Casey's resignation.
In the midst of it all, Samuel and Thomas McNeil
Hugel's accusers, vanished. ?
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ON PAGE 12 JUNE 2981
James R. Schlesinger!
'The U.S. Will
That the Mideast provides- combustible matter
for international conflagration akin to the Bal-
kans prior to World Wart: has now become.,:al-
most a cliche. Two distinctive elements make it
impossible to treat conditions in the Mideast with
'.he indifference normall*accorded to ...Cliches.
First, unlike the situatiorrin the Balkani4n the
pre-World War I period' (Which prospectively in-
volved only the prestigenCthe contending great:
powers),. the viteLinterestkii,of the WeSt--indeed;-;
the entire free World---arOvholly engaged in coni
tinuine,iecesseto the energy resources . of. the
Persian Gulf: 8on& the existence and prospecae,
ow
STAT
e torce
etee,%ere?
strengthening of Europe's" desire to Strike out on
its own; arid the premature forcing of the United
States to a decision pointe-in effect, the unmask-
ing-!`-cit American diplomacy. Moreover, like the
simultaneous crises in Hungary and at Suez in
19564 :this episode may.dilute the attention fu-
cusedouEastern Europe-and provide the Soviets
with cover for whatever miSchief they may 3, _ern-
I.;?tark On in Poland. -To all this, appears sub-
Wilily indifferent. ? eie,',AelkLi ??es ?rn-ie",;1_ _
This catalytic event has 'also underscoredAbe-
s'ilIstantial void in'Ameiican foreign polic.7 eThii!
creased doubts about the effectiveness of the
American role in the region.
With regard to these -regional tensions, the
United States might have preferred to temporize.
It can do so no longer. The raid makes these ten.1
sionsl central?and underscores U.S. inability to
fulfill' its expected role of ensuring Israeli re- -
,straint. The United States will now be forced to,
,k choose. On the one hand, we may, tacitly condone
the rairlly_mehetaining_arms shipments to Israel.,
To condone the attack?including Israel's use '
of American-suPplied weapons in a manner dubi-
ous 'under American law?requires in logic a far
tmay turn out to be beneficial since the situation-J
tive further spiread: of nuclear weapons, whicht eie:presninably curabletNonetheless aside iron higher priority for 'anti-proliferation polies than
might be employed in a .Mideast conflagration, Latin America, the Reagan administration in fivet the administration has exhibited to date. Sen.e
geometrically add to the inherent danger of this.,iconths has done remarkablY little in establishing: '''Alan Cranston and others may quite consistently::
tinderbox.:,t . ;f,,thii specifics of goals arid, instruments, which are in view of their -long-term stress on preventing
The raid on the Osinik..research reaciZi:neareilf(e7substance of foreigf4olicy. Elsewhere the the :spread . of nuclear weapons, find the Israeli
Baghdad significantly T complicates the politics- of specifics are unformed or; at best, tenuous. Oppo- strike justifiable. So could the Carter administra-
the Mideast and reduces diplomatic 'maneuver if Rion to Soviet aetivisire or international terror- tion, with its well-advertiSed, if ineffective, poll-
room, especially for -American diplomacy: Aside. rim May be welcomed,'" but that represents a cies to prevent proliferation. But, to date, the
frora the enhancement of Menachem Begins elec; mood or an inclination' rather than concrete Reagan administration has been indifferent or
ioral prospects?a purely domestic matter?the PplicA (better revealed by expanding grain sales). fatalistic about the spread of . nuclear weapons,:
principal beneficiaries of this development are the . Anti:commtinist rhetoric is no substitute for well perhaps most dramatically so in terms of its
Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the Khomeini. defined policy Least of all, whatever its value as evolving support and military assistance for Paid
-
regime in !ran, which may draw satisfaction from copy for the Washington fun-and-games depart- sten. Hiving immediately condemned the attack,
the humiliation of Saddam Hussein. Even the ad?e'. mentAeee the recent phenomenon of let's-all- the administration will find it doubly hard subse-
vertised goal Sharply to circumscribe the spread of pummel-the-secretary-of-state-to-teach-generals.? quently to condone it on the bails of non-prolifer-
nuclear capabilities is; for reasons I'll get to in a ' requisite humility constitute foreign policy? The ation objectives to which it so far has been rather
moment, essentially transiterY and probably pal- attack at Baghdad thus forces the administration, indifferent If the arms flow to Israel continues, in
try. On balance, the decision to strike has Probably inclined to breeze along onan image of doniestic the face of the proprieties of American law, the
augmented the forces undermining Israel's inter- good will and international toughness, to focus on distrust of American motives and of its intended
national position. Begin has not merely demon the specifics of foreign policy, notably in the Mid- role as honest broker in resolving Arab-Israeli dif-
strated his disdain for his neighbors with whom Is east, and on nuclear proliferation.- - 'fereiaces will be significantly heightened. ? -
rael must ultimately coexist and for international- TO this point, the administration's approach in Since Israel's own power is quite limited; its
unilateral effort to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons in the region will prove, at best, tran-
sient. An issue on. which the superpowers agree,
though even they are limited in. their ability to
grapple with the Problem, is Certainly beyond Is 1
rads very limited abilities. Israel's action may, by
dramatizing the isstie,' strengthen Arab determi-
nation to acquirenuclear. weapons. Perhaps more
opinion of manifinde-eeo. ? theitimnificliate concerns and embrace our own significant; it Should be recalled" that the initial
The additional costs associated with the raid; ;k.For ,:liothilsrael and its. Aral . neighbors, worry move toward ,"the - Islamic 'bomb" and the so-
regrettably, may be quickly listed: the aborting of eabet4 the other's intentions and actions consti-': ; kiting of support for that venture was by Pakie
the peace process (or what was left of it); addi: tuteita clear and present danger, which they will - stan's Mi Bhutto in the middle 1970s. And,
tional reentry points for the Soviet. Union into .scarcly forget simply to accommodate our con- spite Begin's provocative rhetoric, Pakistan lies
the region; the weakening of Arab moderates and 'cern 'regarding the longer-term though lower- - beyond the reach of Israeli War planes and is,
?
the coalescence of the Arab world on more radical -probability -threat to the region 'posed by the ? moreover, under American protection.
lines; the reinforcement of European distrust of -Soviet Union. Any hope that regional attention To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in
America's policies and role in the Mideast, and a could be focused northward, .in the absence of a the region, Israel's own power is far too limited.
simultaneous and effective grappling with the in The best that might be hoped for from Israel's
The writer who was secretary defense? dur, Jernal tensions of the region, must now be abane, badly-thought-threugh though brilliantly exe-
,
:cloned. The raid; in short, means the end for that cuted strike is that it could once again focus in-
mg the IV/it:least airlift in 4.973, also serval as dt.2 ?
particular drift in American policy preferences, ternational attention on the problem of prolifera-
rector of the Central Intelligence Agency and
. for it has 'shaipened the apprehension's about the tion. Yet, it will do so in a badly deteriorated in
chairman of the Atomic Energy COM'azission.- 'unresolved internal conflicts . while raising in ternational climate...
Together the Mideast and Poland pose' tiro pro-
,
spective crises for the United States in the next few
, weeks?with the secretary Ofstate abroad in China.'
It should provide dseridui test of the adininistral
- ? ? ?.?
; Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901ROW0IIIIHRM1AWYgeT,ntiPachulerY
opinion in general; he has placed his treaty part--the - Mideast has been to focus on the Soviet
ner, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, in a most threat and to seek a "strategic consensus"
awkward position and has apparently been indif-1 presumably ending in cooperative action of the
ferent to the substantial embarrassment of Lsraeli ?states of;the region in' improving the- military -
protector, the United State& Asa small state (un- deterrentlo' Soviet intervention. While such an
like, say;, the Soviet Union), Israel's ultimate sur-' outcome Wpuld be highly satisfying to many of us,
vival cannot rest on a-flagrant disregard for what it is the height of American ethnocentrism to as
-
Thomas Jefferson called a decent respect for the ?*'surntilliat ;the states of the region will abandon?
STAT
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AP,PP
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owe rips
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ReporkdRsui
WASHINGTON STAR
19 APRIL 1981
Detente-Fueled
Seen Aiding:Moscow::
By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer ?
The Soviet Union plans to i ncreaSe-
its spending on military equipment,,
which is already higher than U
weapons expenditures, by about 10,
percent a year during the 1980s.? ac!.=
cording to a leading American spe-
cialist on Soviet military budgets:. e
s The specialist. William T. Lee, also-
calculates that -increased-foreign-
trade has 'enabled the Soviet Union
to devote-more of its domestic pro-,
duction.to armairTeriand seeS'this'
as an example o(detente's helping.
shift the military balance in the Se-
viets favor. e. &be. ; -
As a privetefconsultaiii working
"ii contracts from the Pentagon and
other sources, Lee has been present:,
ing his findings to congressionaV
committees and other panels around
Washington in conflict with CIA spe-
cialists, among whom he once.
worked. He has contended foryears'.
that the CIA ,underestimates SoVie
military spending.
The CIA admitted lir 1976 that its
estimates of themilitary burden on;
the Soviet economy, and. tlierefOeei.
the priority that Kremlin leaders
gave to armed strength; were.-
low. It doubled its estimate of the
share of Soviet gross national prod-
uct going into the armed forces and
related military spending: The new
range- was 11 toil3 percentaeeeet:::
Since that admission, wbich, ad.:
justed CIA figures to close to-what'
Lee was alreadycalculating. Lee his'
won an increased following anfongl
US. and Western European students'
of the subject.-ScantY estimates pub:-
lished by China support Lee,:
With its overall economic-growth'
slowing down while military spend-
ing continues to speed Up. the Soviet'
Union is now spending 12', to 14 per..
cent of GNP for military purPoses;
the CIA says. It estimates a ruble figi
? tire of 61 to 72 billion in- 1980'
. Lee and another-leading critiC"cif
-the CIA estimates,. Prof.- Steven S.
Rosefielde of the University of North:
-
Carolina, say the ampsyniatiortet
again fallen behinilltie Lee
calculates:that the figure Was 18 tier-,
cent in 1980, and liosefielde's -Cii-
tiques of CIA estimating ? methods,
support this. - ? ? '
Lee says the percentageWill rise'
to above 20 on the basis of the pat-
'tern of allocations in the-1981-85 Sci-:
viet economic-plan; ?-?
Foamer Defense Secretary:James'
R Schlesinger. who Was critical of-
the CIA estimates when beheaded
the agency in 1973, said the other day
that he believed "the Soviets are
de-
voting 17 or18 percent of their na-;
tional effort to military efforts. The'.
CIA numbers may be misleading,
with the agency trapped in method-.
ology that underestimates the mag.-7
-nitude of the military effort, hesaid4
The: Reagan- administration's'
proposals would increase-US: de-
fense. spending' for. the 1982 fiscal'
year to slightly. over 6 pe' cent of
GNP. Announced plans would raise
that_to a little over 7 percent by
Both the CIA: end its critics con..:
tend that an understanding of the,
.share of Soviet GNP going into its-
- military effort is important. Western
intelligence'ingencies have what.
,they believe. to be a pretty good
count of Soviet missiles, tanks and
submarines, regardless of their cost
But knowing the economic burdetv,
tells Western leaders much about
Kremlin thinking. ? :-
In the new Soviet economic plan,.
both investment in future growth-
and consumer goods output will in-
crease at -a slower rate than in,the
past. Rut military spending will con-
tinue to speed up'at the expense of
other sectorSof an inCreasinglyslug-'.
gish eCononay." This shows= a Soviet:
devotion to"armed power as more im-
portant :than future' prosperity Or:
present?Iiving standards. - ,"! e
This fits the picture of Kremlin
thinking described in articles by Na-i
tional Security Council specialists'
on the Soviet Union. eaa
Army Brig. 'Gen; William Odoin,'
who worked on the Carter adminis-. 4
R000600290013-0
N.410
? trz
th
, de
-et)
NS
pe
th,
an
str
me'as central to Soviet Communism
as the pursuit of profit is to societies
with market-oriented economies?
Lee contends that during the 1970s
the Soviet. Union increased its sales
to market economies of natural gas
? and other raw materials in order to?
--import- more advanced- -industrial- -
equipment than it could produce it-
self. Not only did it get better equip-
'rnent-this way but it also freed-some
' of its own industrial capacity to con-
- centrate on weapons. .
Thus, according to Lee's calcula-
tions from Soviet data, the era of
-detente made it possible for the
-Kremlin to order more and better.
'.weapons .rather than diverting- the
economy from armaments to, more
peaceful purposes - as has. been
Nidely_..believed in the West, *eve%
- daily by Europeans who have been
eager for Soviet trade.- ? -
Lee draws his conclusions primar-
ily from Soviet data, adjusting them
to include -in military spending
many things hidden elsewhere in
- the Soviet budget than under pub-
.:- ; lished defense accounts. He says the
Soviet Union is now making a mili-
tary effortof between 108 and 126 bil-
lion rubles a year, rather than the
62 to 7Lbillion estimated by the CIA.
Under Lee's questioning in con-
gressional hearing whose tran-
scripts were published late last year,
' the CIA conceded that 'its rubles
were artificial values rather than -
the real rubles that would show up
In the secret Soviet accounts. The ,
;US. government therefore lacks any
'official estimate of actual Soviet '
spending, Lee argues in his often
scathing denunciations of the ex-
-pensive CIA effort to find Soviet mili-
tary figures. ? '
' In a confrontation last Wednesday
!..`between a CIA official, James Stei-
ner, and Lee. Steiner disclosed that.
the agency knew actual ruble prices
-of only 135 things that the Soviet ?
? military buys. Other prices are cora-
' ..puted .by various mean; including
; estimating dollar, costs and then
using.ratios. to convert to_rubles......
CONTIlltin
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