EXECUTIVE CHANGES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 29, 1985
• Content Type: NSPR

NEW YORK TIMES
For Release 20O1q?, , CIA) DP91-00901 R
EXECUTIVE CHANGES
? Mitre Corp., Bedford, Mass., a sys-
tem engineering organization, has
elected to its board James R. Schles-
inger, former Secretary of both the
Departments of Defense and Energy,
and Director of Central Intelligence.,
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f TV IE APP. REED
ON PAZ"--' 1--~ ~ NEW YORK TIMES February 1985
Schlesinger Says Distrust Hinders
Foreign Policy..;
By HEDRICK SMITH
special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 6 - Former
Secretary of Defense James R. Schles-
inger asserted today that President
.Reagan's main difficulty in winning
support for his Pentagon budget, Nica-
. ragua policy and missile defense pro-
posal was Congressional distrust of Ad-
ministration objectives and credibility.
"A national consensus cannot simply.
be wished into being," he told the. Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee. "It
can be restored .only gradually over
-time, if at all. It will come about only
through the development of mutual
trust, reasonable success and the sus-
tained credibility of the executive
branch."
In a review of American foreign poli-
cy, Mr. Schlesinger called President
Reagan's hope fora total strategic de-
fense to protect American cities an illu-
sory plan that would cost ,well over
half a trillion dollars and probably will
-exceed a trillion." Moreover, he said,
the "Star Wars" proposal shatters
political consensus by breaking withj nation's past strategic ~ doctrine.
Mr. Schlesinger, who has served in
both Republican and Democratic Ad
ministrations, asserted that "there is
no way" the Administration can sus-
tain its military buildup in the face of
enormous deficits without' a tax in-
crease. So long as there are sharp divi-
sions on the budget, he added, it is vir-
tually impossible to obtain a consensus
an foreign policy.
On Central America, he said the de=
bate . over whether to resume aid to
Nicaraguan rebels was less influenced.
now by policy considerations than by
the breakdown of trust between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment because, he said, the Admini_c-
tration had not openly spelled out clear
and consistent objectives. - `
"Nicaragua has moved beyond a
substantive issue to an issue of trust be-
tween the two branches," he said in re-
sponse to questioning by Senator Rich-
ard G. Lugar the committee chair-
man, who has organized hearings on
the broad scope of foreign policy.
-That issue of distrust has to be re-,
solved," Mr. Schlesinger added. "This
is an issue that transcends the over-
sight function of the intelligence com-
'' mrttees because they are not charged
with judging policy."
' The central theme of his broad-
gauged assessment of American power
and commitments abroad was that no
administration could sustain a policy
unless it maintained credibility with
Congress. He drew on his experience as
Secretary of Defense under Presidents
Nixon and Ford, Director of Central In-
telligence under President Nixon and
Energy Secretary. under President
Carter.
Under questioning by Senator Larry
Pressler, a South Dakota Republican,
Mr. Schlesinger quickly took issue with
President Reagan's hope that his "Star
Wars" proposal would.render nuclear
weapons obsolete.
"The notion of a defense that will
protect American cities is one that will
not be achieved, but it is that goal that
supplies the political magic, as it were,
in the President's vision," he said. But
'.he found a more limited ' defense,
shielding American land-based mis-
siles "well worth examining."
Mr. Schlesinger took sharp issue
with estimates that a limited defense
would cost only about $60 billion. That,
he said, was an unconvincing estimate
,and 'a cope-on price in gain support.
The actual costs, he said, would be
much higher but could not be known
i until more research was done.
In a broadly analytical opening state-
ment, Mr. Schlesinger asserted that
since the early postwar period Amer..
ican foreign policy had suffered from
two major problems: first, a decline in
American power without a matching.
decline in overseas commitments, and
second, a breakdown in the political
consensus behind foreign policy since
the Vietnam War, which brought in-
creasing Congressional assertiveness.
Despite Congressional. cries for
reducing American commitments
abroad, Mr. Schlesinger argued
against moves to "reduce or jettison"
such commitments, saying these might
embolden "predatory powers" to chal-
lenge American interests.
He sided with Secretary of State
George P. Shultz in this policy debate
with Secretary of Defense Secretary
Caspar W. Weinberger, who has
argued against American involvement.
in wars abroad without public approval
in advance.
"I cannot concur with the emerging'
belief that the United States must only
fight popular, winnable wars,., he said.
"The role of the United States in the
world is such that it must be prepared
for, be prepared to threaten and even
be prepared to fight those intermediate
conflicts thatiare likely to fare poorly
an television."
He said be' meant conflicts between
such "glorious little wars" as thequick
seizure of Grenada and a longer, full-
scale conventional war in Europe.
But under questioning by .Senator
Christopher J. Dddd, a Connecticut
Democrat, he warned repeatedly that
the Administration would have to make
greater efforts to restore its credibility
with Congress by setting out Its object
tives clearly. - _
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 r ase20U6/02/
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901 R0006
~ r
ASH I NGTSN POST
7 February 1985
Schlesinger Says Natian
`Has Lost Preeminence'
Associated Press "not a clearcut winner will not long
Former defense secretary James enjoy public enthusiasm," he said.
R. Schlesinger said yesterday the Besides painting a generally pes- I
United States "has lost its preem- simistic view of U.S. ability to pro-
inence" among the superpowers and ject diplomatic.and military power
will face a long period of risk and around the world, Schlesinger
likely inability to meet its commit- jumped into a running disagreement
ments around the world. between Defense Secretary Caspar
"While [the United States] re- W. Weinberger. and Secretary of
mains the leading nation on the in- State, George P. Shultz about the
ternational scene," he said, "its use of American military power
power, which earlier was scarcely . overseas,
disputable, is now very much dis- Weinberger has said there should
putable." be no U.S. military involvement
Testifying before the Senate For- without broad popular support, and
eign Relations Committee, Schle- Shultz has advocated preemptive
singer said there is .no longer a na-' attacks against would-be terrorists.
tional consensus on foreign policy, . Schlesinger. said both are wrong.
especially in providing military aid I. cannot concur with the emerg-
to allies in such countries as Nic- ing belief that the United States
aragua and Lebanon, must only fight popular, winnable
"The upshot is that our ommit- wars," he said, adding: "I for one do
ments will remain larce and that not believe that there is a political.
our military Dower will remain base in this country for American
more modest in relation to those preemption against terrorist
commitments than it has b n in groups."
the past," said Schlesinger who Nonetheless, he said the United
also has been energy secretary and States must be prepared to retal-
CIA director, iate selectively "in the face of re-
Schlesinger, who served in the peated provocations."
Nixon, Ford and Carter administra- Reagan's goal of creating a "Star
tions, was one of a series of former Wars" strategic defense system in
top officials called to testify before space that will forever neutralize
the committee, which is undertak- Soviet nuclear offensive weapons
ing a broad review of foreign policy will never happen, said Schlesinger.
under President Reagan. Estimating the cost of "Star
Ile said there is almost always Wars" at between $500 million and
public support for "glorious little $1 trillion, he said the Soviets
wars" like the U.S. invasion of Gre- would develop new, sophisticated
nada as long as they are quick and cruise missiles and submarine-
successful. based weapons that would offset the
Schlesinger noted the deaths of satellite system.
more than 300 Americans in Leb- Moreover, he said, creating a
anon and the subsequent withdraw- kind of "Astrodome" defense over
.al of Marines from that country and the United States would also create
said, "It is useful to have a Grenada serious divisions among European
to trump a loser like Beirut." " allies fearful that the United States
"But from the national'perspec- would defend only itself and not the
tive such easy victories resolve re- alliance against Soviet attack.
markably little," he said. "If a con- As a former Pentagon chief,
flict is sufficiently easy to be a `g]6. Schlesinger said he was sympathet-
-rious war,' it is certain to be mar- is to Weinberger's fear of deep bud-
ginal to our interests." get cuts. But with $200 billion def-
Meanwhile, conflicts such as icits forecast, he said, the admin-
those in Korea and South Vietnam istration cannot defend the size of
that require staying power and are its military buildup.
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 NEW YORK TIMES
-7 February 1985
Excerpts From Schlesinger's Senate
Spedal to The New York TI"
WASHINGTON, Feb. 6 - Follow-
ing are excerpts from the testimony
of former Secretary' of Defense
James R. Schlesinger before the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee to-
day on American commitments
abroad:
The United States has lost its pre-
eminence. While it remains the lead-
ing nation on the international scene,
its power, which earlier was scarcely
disputable, is now very much disputa-
ble. Simultaneously - and not simply
by coincidence - national unity has
been fractured - both in terms of the
national consensus and in terms of i
the agreement between the executive,!,
and the legislative branches.
In short, these changes imply that
the costs and risks of sustaining our
international position have risen. De-
spite the relative decline of American ?!
power, not only in relation to the
Soviet Union but even in relation to
some third world . countries, the de-
gree of American commitment
worldwide has generally not altered.
The unchanged state of U.S. com-
mitments accompanied by the rela-
' tive decline of American power and
the evaporation of national unity have .
led to two distinct gaps. These are the
commitments-power and the consen-
sus-policy gaps.
The Central Commitment
The central foreign policy commit-
ment of the United States since World
War II has been to sustain a free Eu-
rope - and It is to this commitment
that the overall cost and structure of
the American military establishment
has primarily been addressed.
From time to time attempts have
been made to curb our involvement In
other parts. of the world, which ap-/
pear less central. to American to
policy.
. For any great power - and }nost
notably the protecting superpower of
the West - to back away froth com-
mitments is more easily said than
done.
In practice, the loss in prestige may
actually reduce our power more than
the reduced _ claims on our military
resources enhances that power, In
that may lie the supreme irony, Clos-
ing the power-commitments gap may
not be possible through reduction of
commitments. The United States, as
a great power, has essentially taken
on the task of sustaining the interna-
tional order. And any abandonment of
major commitments is difficult to
reconcile with that imposing task.
The upshot is that our commit-
ments will remain large and that our
military pov/er will remain more
modest in relation to those commit-
ments than It has been in the past.
That implies a degree of risk that we
must acknowledge and accept. Try as
we will there is no acceptable way
that we can escape from either these
responsibilities or these risks.
Vietnam Brought Change
It is, of course, the recognition of
these costs and risks that has led to
the so called consensus-policy gap.
Fulfilling our commitments was rela-
tively simple in the past. When we
had the visible power simply to
smash our potential foes - as in the
50's and 60's - there was little diffi-
culty in sustaining domestic agree-
ment. Vietnam brought a sea change
in domestic attitudes. The human and
'financial costs of conflict were.
brought. home.to the American pub-
lic.
Since then there has been a notable
reluctance to see American forces be.
come engaged notably in third areas
of the world.
In such places as Lebanon or Cen-
tral America there is little question
regarding'the raw physical power of
the Jnfted States to Impose its will.
There is no power-commitment gap
/but rather a consensus-policy gap.
Other nations have come to doubt not
the abstract power: of the United
States to achieve its goals but rather
its staying power in sustaining them.
Consensus and Power
Thus, ultimately we are faced with
a paradox. In dealing with what is the
central strategic problem of the
United States, the formidable cape-
bilities of the Soviet Union in relation ?
to finite American power, there is at
base a domestic consensus -- with re-
spect to both protection of the North
American continent and our obliga-
tions in Europe. Yet paradoxically; it
is here in this arena in which the con-
sensus is not seriously challenged
that we may face a real gap between'
power and commitr}ients.
By contrast, in much of the third
world, in which our power is certainly
commensurate with our commit-
ments, there is simply no domestic
consensus regarding the prospective
use of force. Thus, overall, in all parts
of the world we are likely to have to
contend with at least one of the two
gaps. Such is the penalty for the loss
of-our postwar pre-eminence.
These perplexities lie behind the
disputes between the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense. In
effect, the Secretary of Defense has
insisted upon domestic consensus be-
.Testimony
fore U.S. forces become employed.
Given the circumstances, that is in-
deed a demanding requirement.
Were it to be rigorously implement-
ed, It would virtually assure other
count on not fat
powers that the70=.
ing American The Likeliest Challenges
Much as I personally sympathize
with the concerns of the Department
of Defense in the post-Vietnam era, I
cannot concur with the emerging be-
lief that the United States must only
fight popular, winnable wars.
The likeliest physical challeng_ es to
the United States come in the third
world -. not in. Europe or North
America. If the more predatory
states in the third world aregiven as-
surance that they can employ, di-
rectly or indirectly, physical force,
against American interests with im-
punity, they will feel far less restraint
in acting against our interests.
Americans historically have em-
braced crusades such as World
War II - as well as glorious little
wars. The difficulty is that the most
likely conflicts of the future fall be-
tween crusades and such brief en
counters as Grenada or Mayaguez.
Yet these in-between conflicts have
weak public support. Even the best of
times - with national unity and at the.
height of, our power - public enthu-
siasm for Koreq and Vietnam evapo-,
rated in just a year or two.
The problem is that virtually no op-
portunity exists for future crusades -
and those glorious wars'are likely to
occur infrequently. The role of the
United States in the world is such that
it must be prepared for, be prepared i
to threaten, and even be prepared to
fight those intermediate conflicts -
that are likely to fare poorly on televi-
No Way Out
Is there a path out of these perplex.;.
sties? I wish I could suggest one to
you. However, there is none. We shall
have to bear continuously a degree of
risk that is unwelcome.
In the aggregate, our international /
commitments exceed our capabilities.
to fulfill all of them simultaneously. -
Prudent planners will argue that we
are running a bluff. Worriers will
simply worry. But in fact it will rep
resent the conscious acceptance of.
risk - and - a conviction that not_
everything will ".go wrong simulta
. neously.
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I
S
Scenario
for a Bay
of
yen before he has had a
chance- to savor his massive
electoral victory, President
self on a collision course with the
Democratic majority in the House
I over the covert aid the United States
has been giving the Contras fighting
in Nicaragua.
In the Senate, the'new 'chairman
of the Intelligence Committee, Dave
Durenberger, R-Minn., is telling the.
administration that the only way to
save the arms aid to the guerrillas is
to go public.. `
To deepen Mr. Rea ann's"dilemma
them uenn voices of former CIA
directors Richard Helms and James ..
Sch esinrer are being raised to warn
that the heavy involvement of the,
`rintelligence agency in this contro-
versial and no-longer-secret ro`ect
is eroding the agency's support in
Congress over the long term......
Rolling with 'these punches, Mr.
Reagan has made it clear that he has
no intention of abandoning the Con-
tras by' permanently cutting their;
supply lines. But he has a reed that
all possible ways of assisting =e
guerrillas be explored to see if there"
are yractical options other than CIA
funding. Since the vote on whether
to renew the CIA arms aid cannot be
held until March, the administration
has a month to decide on its strateev
It is likely that few decisions in the
next four years will more profoundly
affect the American position in the
world and Mr. Reagan's place in the
history books than how he manages
this enormously difficult dilemma
involving the future of Central
America. In their initial review of
the available options, Reagan offi
ci s are finding no easy alternative
solutions, and the renewal of quasi-
secret CIA funding may turn out to
be the only realistic way of helping
the Contras.
WASH
NGTON TIME
1 February 1985
At first glance, Mn Durenberger's
proposal to make the arms assis-
tance available by open vote as part
of the foreign aid package has the
appeal of forthrightness and sim-
plicity. But under the law, the United
States can .only give such military
laid to duly recognized governments
or international entities and the
president. would have to report
openly to.-Congress within60days
and obtain the support of both
Houses.
-
' .In effect, ".going public'.' aa!ithmili-
Lary aid to the Contras would require
breaking relations with. the Nicara-
guan government and giving some
kind of formal recognition to the
main guerrilla group. A U.S. Con-.
gress that balks at quiet support to
-the Contras is not ready for a virtual
declaration of war against the San-
dinista regime that would eliminate
the remaining possibility of negoti-
ation, persuasion, and pressure. -; ,
Until the' conclusion is reached :!.
that there is no hope .of - getting-the
Sandinistas to agree to an open:soci--,,
ety and free elections,. a complete,
diplomatic break. is premature. At -
present, it would not.-have. the sup-
port of most Latin countries nor of
our European allies
--If publicly voted US arms ~ aid to,.
the Contras- is, a. mirage, :. there
remains the possibility that friendly
third countries might. be persuaded
to provide. the arms.the . US: Con-`
gress is reluctant to supply. In fact,
:one -or -two `. governments :'have
stepped in to assist the Contra s'since
the US. aid was suspended last May-.
But this assistance was-a stop-gap.,
measure designed to see the Contras
through to the promised renewal of
U.S. aid this year. If it becomes clear,
that the United States is perma-,
nently terminating its aid, there is
-little hope that others will help when
they see the United States is unwill-
ingto protect its own vital interests.
If it turns out that CIA funding,
with all its drawbacks; is the only
feasible way of supplying the Con-
tras Reagan officials believe that
the predictably disastrous copse-
.,.
uences of American withdrawal
can change enough votes to save e
aid. A decision to cut off the Contras
would amount to a con ressionall
man ated Bay of Pies and would i
send out the signal that the ilnite&
States has again proved to be an
unre table ally.
The Sandinistas would take the
U.S. pullout as a green light for a
major offensive with their helicopter
gunships to crush the Contras and to
impose a militarized state on the
-Cuban pattern. The democratic
opposition groups that still exist,
openly inside Nicaragua have con-
sistently warned. that the Contra
threat is .their--=only protection
against a Sandinista crackdown.
Released, from the necessity of
defending its own territory from the
-Contra attacks, the: large Sandinista
-army would be freed to step up the.
flow of arms and trained guerrillas '
into Et Salvador and Guatemala. A
very major increase. in the
American assistance programs to
Honduras and Costa Rica would be
necessary over many years to have a
chance of preventing their retreat
into a frightened neutrality.. Aid to
the Contras is cheap at the price,
when the cost of its .withdrawal, is
soberly calculated.
Finally, the Reagan _administra- -
;.lion can make a strong case that a
renewal of aid to the guerrillas at'
this critical moment could- have a
dramatic impact on the Nicaraguan
:civil war. Symbolizing American .
determination to stay-:.the course, ' i
this decision would present the San-,
dinistas a choice between the even-
ual risk of defeat_or.the holding of
the genuinely free 'elections they-
once promised.,; ? ..:.M,
Cord Meyer is a.nationally synth
:.sated columnist-,....,.,
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 Approved For Release 26MO1O7 CIA-DP91-00901R00
22 December 1984
Debate on Security: Educa
Special to The New York Tlmee
WASHINGTON, Dec. 21 -- The de-
bate on national security versus free-
dom of information, long a staple in
Washington, dominated discussion in
the capital this week. It was
prompted by The Washington Post's
publication of details of the secret
payload of the space shuttle mission
scheduled for next month, and the
condemnation of the newspaper's ar-
ticle by Secretary of Defense Caspar
W. Weinberger.
The New York Times sought. com-
ments on the controversy from sev-
eral Washingtonians prominent in the
fields of national security and the
press. Excerpts follow.
Stanfield M. Turner, Director of
Centr~Ia ate Bence er iaeat
Carter:
I think the press is being very hypo-
critcal. Most agreed with Weinberger
on the need for secrecy and then when
.-The Post published their story; which
things when they shouldn't have and
on occasion I'm sure the Government
has witheld information when it was-
n't entirely necessary.
I think that this Administration is
trying to get better discipline than
perhaps there was in the past.
?
was unconscionable, all the others James R. Schlesinger, former Sec-
used it as excuse to go ahead and retarv of Defense and Director of
print..One day the mission deser ves Central Intelligence:
secrecy and then the next they jump
on the bandwagon. Balancing the claims of press free-
I think the press ought to apply the dom and security must ultimately
following rule: Is what they are going rest on a rule of reason. This society,
to print really going to educate the quite rightly, is unprepared to sacri-
American people? The details of the five either. For this reason one grows
satellite The Washington Post printed uneasy in times that the press and
were not issues of particular impor- government are hurling absolutes at'
tance to the American public. one another. It is regrettable and
risky that the Government cannot.
maintain security for its essential
I. F. Stone, the journalist: though fragile intelligence activities.
One thing puzzles me. This is the But security has been breaking
first time in my 44 years in Washing- down for a generation. That break-
ton that I have ever heard of calling a down reflects a loss of national con-
press conference to announce that sensus policy. Not only is the press
t....., :.d.:I-.ie ,4 nrnt _1,, ;Inc the Cnn-
y"" WCr` 5' '5 ress been brought into such matters
cret. If you want to keep a hold on it g
and secret, why scurry arouitdtown (members and staff are not invari-
asking people please not to print it? alby reticent!). Above all, there has
That's the surest way of getting it in been a breakdown of discipline within
the executive branch.
print.
Now, the second thing that bothers To-preserve secrecy, especially in a
me is that this test on Jan. 23 is going democracy, security must be part of
to be a shuttle that is going to carry an accepted pattern of behavior, out-
some commercial testing and some side of government and inside. Re-
milititary testing. If you really want grettably, we no longer have such a?
to keep it secret, why not carry off pattern.-
military testing under the cover of a Restoring effective security ar-
commercial test? rangements, short of a sense of
Of course, I am not arguing-that _:. shared and immediate danger, can
there 'is never an occasion when a ; only come from within the executive
government has no right to withhold branch and by example. Unless the
information Every law, including.. nation's leaders demonstrate that
homocide, has its exceptions, but its they respect the security rules and
irrelevant to an incident in which the will not violate those rules to score
Pentagon flaunts a secret operation political points against rivals or
as if to deliberately invite maximum make their speeches more colorful,
visibility.,, ? those further down the hierarchy will
_ continue gushing (euphemistically
called "leaking"). Rather than being
William E. ColbT, former Director--- prepared to suspend curiosity in se-
Ete ence: Iected areas, the press will find it too
Government has a legitimate call
tempting to refrain from publishing
for secrecy for some. of its activities'
and there is a tension between that
and the desire of public and the press
..'especially to know everthing. I think.
STAT
the wealth of information all too read-
ily available. ;
able. Hitler said that the strength of
the totalitarian states is that they'
force' their enemies' to immitate
them. I have. an unhappy feeling that -':
-this Administration, however unin- _
hat' -
2eationally, is 'edging `.us. down that'-
America's free institutions and civil
America's
liberties, including. the. First Amend-
ment liberties. If we gradually become like the
Soviets - secretive, paranoid, politi-
cally neurotic - then world tensions
would ultimately become unbear-
on the needs of a free press and the
needs of national security.
At this point, I think that we have
gone too far in revealing information
-with an impact on national security.
The combination of leaks, a reporter
putting together bits and pieces of in-
formation, creates lots of problems
-between the Government and the
media.
I may be prejudiced, but I feet that
when in doubt, you should lean to-
ward the national security side.
Eric Sevareid, television cowmen=
tator:
A great illusion exits about national
security. Our true security lies in
peace itself. Our weaponry and sol-
diery provide the first line of defense
of our territory and our vital interests
abroad. But our first line of defense of
S I
Gen. David C. Jones, former Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Unfortunately, we have arrived at
a paint of great confrontation be-
tween the press and the Government
on national security issues and I hope
that we can come to an understanding
.
that this tension is healthy. It's part
of our constitutional. sysytem.
There is however, some inforrna-
Lion that should not be revealed. It re-
mains a judgment call that we wres-
tle with every day.
On occasion the press has revealed
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 ARTICLE A10
PEAR'
11\ U 9 pi.~~~~ A oved For Release 200
20 December 1984-
A Public Call for Secrecy
By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 - The Rea- specialists replied that from previously
gan Administration's effort to impose published technical literature and from
tight secrecy on the next mission of the, Cong ressional testimony, anyone else.
space --+1 fl
s u
b
th
ere ects
o
an urge to
protect national security interests and
what some intelligence
News specialists see as a broad-
Analysis er, long-term drive to curb
the flow of information on
could have ? foreseen that the United
Staates was preparing to launch new,
electronic intelligence satellites to
monitor Soviet radio traffic..
g
such issues to the press committees have made not the least se-
and. public. cret of the fact that we've provided
Former Government 'officials sup- funds for verification methods in
port the Administration's assertions, space," said Senator Daniel Patrick
that this country has a legitimate need Moynihan of New York, former vice
to keep Moscow in the dark about its
satellite technology. But they quickly
add that by making such a highly publi-
cized shift to secrecy in the civilian
space program, the Administration has
evoked a foreseeable reaction and may
have undermined its stated goal of
denying Moscow information about a
new generation of American intelli-
gence satellites.
The Administration has drawn atten-
tion to the shuttle flight for Jan. 23, they
say, thus alerting the Soviet Union to
its importance, and in effect inviting
closer scrutiny from the press and. pub-
lic.
Beyond that, the episode has touched
off a political controversy over how far
the Government needs to go in putting
pressure on the press to protect se-
ctuity information without crimping
policy debate on arms in space. This
echoes earlier controversies over the
Reagan Administration efforts to
tighten up on policies and practices It
inherited.
In early 1982, Caspar W. Weinberger,
the Secretary of Defense, subjected
more than a score of top Pentagon offi-
cials to polygraph, or lie-detector, tests
td try to trace the source of one dis-
patch about the country's future mili-
tary needs. After that, William P.
Clark, then national security adviser,
drafted a Presidential order requiring
high officials to accept lifetime censor
ship of their public writings and disclo-
sures, a move eventually blocked by
Congress.
In the satellite case, Secretary Wein-
berger asserted that a Washington Post
article today on the next shuttle mis-
sion represented the kind of disclosure
that "can only give aid and comfort to
the enemy." However. Congressional
.; s; .
ressional intelligence
"The Con
"If the objective was re-establishing
the capability of the Air Force in the
long run to have a classified satellite
launch, that's undertstandable. But if
the objective was to keep this particu-
lar mission classified, it was almost
inevitable that something would leak.
Breaking the routine of the shuttle
flights and the NASA tradition of 20
years was bound to call attention to this
mission."
Another intelligence specialist,
speaking on condition of not being iden-
tified, said that by holding a news con-
ference on Monday to announce the
new policy and then publicizing Mr.
Weinberger's efforts to prod the press
into cooperating, the Administration
had also put the Soviet Union on notice
that it had important missions coming
up.
Q Defending the legitimacy of tight se.
chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee. "The details are confiden-
tial and should be kept confidential.
But I saw nothing in that article that
you wouldn't just naturally know if you
knew anything at all about this sub-
ject."
But Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Ver-
mont, mont, the new committee vice chair-
man, called The Post's article "dam-
aging" to American interests and said
that if its details were accurate the in-
formation would definitely be of value
to the Soviet Union. Mr. Leahy said he
was most concerned about who in the
Administration gave away the infor-
mation in the first place and that he
would ask the Justice Department and
the Defense Department to determine
who was responsible.
Schlesinger Cites Precedent
What apparently produced a severe
jolt in political Washington, several
former high officials suggested, was
the Government's abrupt effort to im-
pose secrecy on the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration, founded
two decades ago as a civilian agency
dedicated to open, peaceful missions in
space.
James R. Schlesinger, a former De-
fense Secretary and Director of Central
Intelligence, said that the Air Force,
and Central Intelligence Agency had
managed to launch military and intelli- .
gence satellites through the years in
relative secrecy by establishing a pat-
tern of operation that won public and
press acceptance. But In this case, he
observed, the Administration dramati-
cally changed both the routine and the I
nature of the civilian space agency.
"If the Defense Department wanted
to keep this particular mission classi-
fied, it chose the worst possible ap-
proach," Mr. Schlesinger said. "By
throwing the spotlight on this mission,
it produced an enticement for people to
go after what the mission was about
and then to publish what they found
out.
curity on the military functions and de-
tailed operation of satellites, intelli-
gence specialists point to history. One
specialist said that the American KH-
11 photo reconnaissance satellite oper-
ated in the mid-1970's for a year with-
out Soviet detection until a Pentagon
clerk sold Soviet agents a manual.
Until that security breach, this spe-
cialist said, the Soviet Union was un-
able to develop countermeasures to
balk the intelligence-gathering ca-
pacity of the KH-11. He added that for
six months more, Moscow was un-
aware that the United States had a sec-
ond satellite like it in orbit, meaning
that for at least six months more, ibop-
erated without being disrupted.
But this same specialist saw little
justification in the Administration's
announced intention to keep the time of
launching secret for the Jan. 23 mis-
sion, because the preparations for such
space shuttle launches at Cape Canav-
eral are visible to anyone on the high-
ways and beaches in the region.
Defense Department officials today
indicated that the roger in the Penta-
gon toward The Wlshington Post was
more over its defiatce of Mr. Weinber-
ger's appeals not o publish informa.
tion on the missiorthan over any spe-
cific security breath.
"My impressionis that it has to do
more with procedures," said Fred C.
Ikle, Under Secreary of Defense for
policy. "The Secretary of Defense
talked to a number of the networks, not
to go with some sbries, and they com-
plied. Then The Washington Post has a
story. It undernutes a process .which
was accepted by elitors and publishe
that abstain from printing."
Speculation of Invoking Fight
Mr. Ikl@ has been one of the Adminis-
tration's most vgorous advocates of
tighter legal restrictions. At "a confer-
ence at PrincetorUniversity on Dec. 1,
he told reporters. Government officials
and academics that the Administration
was likely to sdek legislation to in.
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y LIED
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600290007-7
crease penalties! against officials who
disclosed security information to the
press.
"The laws are not adequate," he as-
serted. "We have decided to fight it on'
all fronts."
Some knowledgeable intelligence
specialists said that the Pentagon
might have anticipated and welcomed
a political clash with the press on the
shuttle issue, confident of public sup-
port because of President Reagan's
overwhelming re-election and polls in-
dicating public displeasure with the
press.
nal battles over the Pentagon budget,
Mr. Weinberger might have calculated
that a clash with some press institu-
tions might make him a rallying point
in the Administration and for the Presi-
dent personally. If controversy leads to
Congressional efforts to make the Air
Force less dependent on the space shut-
tle program for launching its satellites,
some -suggested this would strengthen
the Air Force hand in the battle for
coney and authority for its own satellite
launching program.
But a. more common reaction was
that Mr. Weinberger's vehemence re-
flected both the Administration's gen-
eral conviction that more controls are
needed and its reversal of the policy of
greater openness established under the
Carter Administration. Mr- Carter had
issued orders to try to reduce the
amount of secret material and to make
more of it public, but Mr. Reagan has
issued orders seeking to tighten con-
trols and insure that more, not less in-
formation, is kept secret.
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