FACE THE NATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 30, 1986
• Content Type: TRANS

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November 30, 1986 11:30 p.m.
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MS. LESLEY STAHL: The plot thickens. Now there are
reports that White House officials involved in the arms
to Iran/cash to the Contras scandals may have shredded
evidence.
The New York Times said that former National Security
Adviser John Poindexter and his key aides destroyed
stacks of sensitive documents. The news led to
intensified calls for a special prosecutor.
SENATOR JOHN KERRY (D.Mass.): Attorney General Meese
and others who are part of the formulation of this
policy, part of the overall politics of the White
House, cannot be the ones to clear the air.
ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWIN MEESE: The people who were
involved in the situations didn't tell anybody,
including the President.
MS. STAHL: But the finger of suspicion pointed higher
up the chain of conmmand.
REPRESENTATIVE LES ASPIN (D.Wisc.): The two most
likely people are Don Regan and William Casey. That's
where the investigation is going.
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MS. STAHL: As the President vacationed in Calfifornia,
his chief of staff denied that he knew.
DONALD REGAN: It's ridiculous, I was not briefed
thoroughly on all of this.
MS. STAHL: Various reports have implicated the CIA and
challenged the President's version of what took place.
THE PRESIDENT: Everything that we sold them could be
put in one cargo plane and there would be plenty of
room left over.
MS. STAHL: To complicate things, the President on
Friday ordered this B-52 modified to carry cruise
missiles into active service, thus violating the limits
of the SALT-II Treaty.
REPRESENTATIVE NORMAN DICKS (D.-Wash.): I can tell you
that when Congress comes back into session, we are
going to take measures and steps to try to bring the
United States back Into compliance with SALT-II.
MS. STAHL: Will Congress take over the running of
foreign policy? We'll ask the new Senate Majority
Leader, Robert Byrd, and the current Republican
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Dave
Durenberger. And we'll hear how secret CIA operations
work with CIA Director James Schlesinger.
REPORTER: Did you make a mistake In sending arms to
Tehran, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: No. And I'm not taking anymore
questions.
MS. STAHL: Rubbing salt in the Iran wound, an issue
facing the nation.
r~ With us now, Senator Dave Durenberger, Republican
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Conmmittee, and
Senator Robert Byrd, the incoming Democratic Majority
Leader.
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Senator Durenberger, your committee starts an
investigation into this whole arms scandal -- start
your investigation tomorrow. How concerned are you
about these reports that Colonel North and John
Poindexter were shredding documents over the weekend?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: Well, concerned enough so that we
got letters to the President immediately on hearing of
that, asking the President to ensure that everyone in
his Administration and all of the records in control
of his Administration be preserved for future
investigations either by our committee or any other.
MS. STAHL: At this point do you know If any evidence
was destroyed.
SENATOR DURENBERGER: The only thing we know precisely
Is the reports that we got from the media. But it
concerns us enough so that we have taken what might be
considered an unusual measure of even considering
having to subpoena the records, if need be, to get them
into safekeeping. We haven't yet made that decision,
but we may have to if it appears that sufficient
numbers have disappeared in some way.
MS. STAHL: Let me ask you about who you are going to
call to testify behind closed doors before the
Intelligence Commmittee. A lot of people -- Les Aspin,
the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee says
that the finger is now pointing up the chain of
command. Will you call Don Regan? Will you call
William Casey?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: Well, we'll make that decision
the week of December 15th. This is the first time that
the Intelligence Committees have done this.
We are going to spend two weeks laying out the facts
with people like the former National Security Council
advisers, and a variety of other people. Then we'll
make the decision to go to the cabinet level or the
Director of Central Intelligence, under oath, to
determine their accountability.
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MS. STAHL: Let me ask Senator Byrd about a report in
the Los Angeles Times today that the Attorney General
has decided to name a special prosecutor in the case.
The Justice Department is saying a final decision on
that hasn't been made.
But do you think that the justice Department, under
Attorney General Meese, can conduct an independent and
speedy investigation?
SENATOR BYRD: I think that Mr. Meese has moved rather
quickly, and he's to be complimented.
But I think the perception and possibly the fact of
personal interest and a political conflict of interest
is there.
I believe that the President should immediately take
action himself to instruct the Attorney General to go
Into the division of the court and apply for an
independent counsel.
The President is in trouble, the presidency itself is
being weakened; this thing is not going to go away by
itself, and the quicker the President can take action
himself and appear to be in control, the better off he
will be and we will all be.
MS. STAHL: Senator, I know that you have spoken to the
Attorney General. What did you two talk about?
SENATOR BYRD: We talked about getting on with the
investigation with alacrity and thoroughness.
MS. STAHL: Were you concerned that it wasn't moving
fast enough?
SENATOR BYRD: Well, I simply wanted to urge that every
expeditious action be taken.
But I think now this thing has grown so massively and
the perception is growing that with the Attorney
General having been the person who advised the
President as to the legality of the action, his
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closeness to the President, and all of these things--
and his being a member of the National Security
Council.
It seems to me that it's very, very important for the
President himself to take control, be perceived as
having taken control. And put this in the hands of an
independent counsel, and pledge to the support of the
Administration to open the way and to cooperate with
that independent counsel.
Because only in that way will we be sure that the
investigation was conducted independently by someone
who has no personal interest and no political ax to
grind.
MS. STAHL: Senator Durenberger, I have read some
quotes of yours that suggest you are not totally
certain that the Administration has been telling you
the trut, and I speak most specifically about the CIA
Director, William Casey.
Did he lie to you?
SENATOR DURENBER4GER: No, I don't think he's lied to
us. But I think Bill Casey is famous for instructing
his subordinates and his colleagues to tell us every-
thing that they think we should know.
And I don't think the American public is going to
settle for that; we've never been willing to settle for
that.
The problem for all of us here is not getting the
Congress deeply involved In the conduct of policy. We
have only one President, and we need Presidents to
provide leadership and policy.
It's when an Administration converts, for example, the
Central Intelligence Agency or the NSC into a political
action committee, to use a word I think I've heard Jim
Schlesinger use In the past. In other words, to do
political operations which in some cases are In
contravention of policy -- that we become concerned
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that neither the President nor we are getting all the
facts from intelligence advisers.
MS. STAHL: But, you know, that you are having these
investigations, that you are subpoening people, that
you are going to put them under oath, does suggest that
you don't believe what they've been saying so far.
SENATOR DURENBERGER: WelI, it suggests that the only
way you are going to prove to anybody that all the
facts are out is to put everyone under oath.
MS. STAHL: Do you believe that Don Regan didn't know?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: I believe that everybody knew
more than they are letting on, and the question is how
much and what they did with the information when they
had it.
MS. STAHL: Does that include the President?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: I don't know at this stage.
I've always tended to doubt how much the President knew
at least of the detail; and I always give the President
the benefit of the doubt.
MS. STAHL: Senator Byrd, when the Democrats do take
over in the Senate, what will you propose they do about
this, if anything at all?
SENATOR BYRD: Senator Dole and I have discussed the
establishment of a special committee, something like
the Watergate Committee. That committee cannot be
established until the Congress convenes again, because
only the Congress can give such a committee the
subpoena powers that It would need. And Senator Dole
and I are going to continue these discussions.
committee which makes the thrust of this matter so as
to save the time of Adminisration witnesses and other
witnesses, so as to save the time of Senators, be-
cause we do have other problems, pressing problems we
need to give our attention to.
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MS. STAHL: Well, you're suggesting that there be
televised hearings in which Administration officials,
Don Regan, William Casey, come before the public,
something that could go on for months and months and
months. Is that what you are --
SENATOR BYRD: I'm not suggesting that there be
televised hearings. The committee itself would have to
make that determination.
What I am suggesting, that although Senator Duren-
berger is taking steps now, and rightly so, to lay the
groundwork and get all the information that he can to
expedite this matter, which is in the interest of all
of us.
I think there is a need for a committee which will
handle this so that we don't have committees and
subcommittees tripping over one another, taking the
time of the Administration, creating repetition and
duplication in the testimony of the witnesses.
MS. STAHL: Senator Durenberger, were laws broken?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: In moving the sting operation,
moving money from the Ayatollah to the Contras, I'm
sure in there you are going to find violations of the
law.
But the more serious issues are getting around--
trying to get the President to get around issuing
findings, to get the President to get around involving
the Congress. Those are of more concern to the
American public.
MS. STAHL: Will someone go to jail?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: I have no idea whether anybody
will go to jail.. That isn't our business in the
Intelligence Committee, to put people in jail.
MVIS. STAHL: Let me ask you something that seems to be
cropping up more and more, and that's the question of
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Vice President Bush and how much he may have known. He
was the head of the terrorism task force, he was
involved with the Contras.
Are you considering calling him?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: George Bush -- we are not
considering calling him in the Intelligence Committee.
But George Bush has a deep concern for Nicaragua in the
future, and George also should have some concern about
the appropriate involvement of the Congress. And I
think he may have swallowed that concern when it would
have served his President.
MS. STAHL: If your worst concerns end up being true,
that the CIA was involved, that the NSC broke the law,
and all of these things that you are worried about turn
out to be true, Senator Byrd, what can Congress do?
What do you think Congress will end up -- what kind of
restrictions, limitations? How will it end?
SENATOR BYRD: I don't think that we should speculate
on that at this point.
I think the important thing at this point is to get an
independent counsel going immediately. And that the
President order that this be done. And let that
independent counsel have the complete support of the
Administration in following the thread wherever it may
lead.
'vIS. STAHL: Okay.
Let me ask Senator Durenberger one fast last question.
The President has now ordered that the United States
violate the SALT Treaty. What do you think Congress is
going to do about that, and why did he do that now, of
all times?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: Well, the Congress has tried
already to put this all in perspective, and it's not
working well.
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I think the President is operating here much as he has
operated in some of these other areas: too much
politics and not enough of a course to get us to a new
and verifiable arms agreement.
MS. STAHL: Senator, Byrd, on SALT?
SENATOR BYRD: On SALT, I'm sorry that we are breaking
through the ceiling.
I would urge that the President still take action,
compensatory action, to keep this country within the
ceiling.
MS. STAHL: Only urging?
SENATOR BYRD: I urge that. And, of course, Congress
could take specific action to drydock and dismantle an
aging Poseidon submarine. I would not support blanket
action, which could be construed as approving a treaty
by a majority vote when under the Consti- tution such
has to be done by two-thirds vote.
MS. STAHL: Thank you very much, Senator Byrd, Senator
Durenberger.
We will be back with more in a moment.
(Announcements)
MS. STAHL: Joining us now, jar ,ne_s Schlesinger, former
CIA Director and former Secretary of Defense.
Doctor Schlesinger, is there any question in your mind
that the CIA knew about this operation, and
specifically, the Director, William Casey, knew about
the operation?
DR. JA ES SCHLESINGER: I think it is highly probable
that parts of the CIA knew about It. Whether the
Director himself was informed remains to be seen, as a
result of these investigations.
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MS. STAHL: Well, now, you were the Director of the
CIA. How do these things take place without the
Dirctor knowing, particularly when it involves skirting
the law in this fashion?
DR. SACHLESINGER: Well, I think that this could have
been approved at the Deputy Director level.
But one must understand that the principal activities
were carried on by the NSC, The CIA's role is probably
tangential, but it certainly was an informed role.
There was the Swiss bank account that was estab-
lished. There was a finding that was issued by the
President in January that probably came out of the CIA,
which established the CIA as the executive agent for
the receipt of this money; and then the money came
over. I would think that somebody within the Agency
would examine and see whether or not that money had
been divided, whether it was full market value.
MS. STAHL: You know, there have been books written
about the CIA that talk about how they set up
operations and build in deniability all along the way.
You are always hearing about former CIA agents running
this and that.
And the question is, are there such things as former
CIA agents?
Can you tel l us, are you able to tell us, how these
operations are set up with the deniability built in so
that when they are found out, everybody can say I never
knew anything?
DR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I think that there are many
former CIA agents. Most of the people who have retired
from the CIA are not working for the CIA and they are
not working in any particular ventures.
MS. STAHL: Are you sure?
DR. SCHLESINGER: One can never be positive in the case
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of any particulr individual. But the bulk of the
people have retired.
M.S. STAHL: But what about 1 w you are always hearing
that former CIA agents did this or were involved in
that -- set up the bank account -- my real question
isn't about that. My real question is how do they set
up these things?
DR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I think that there is a special
circumstance that is a result of the Boland amendment.
And it's plain that in Central America that we have a
number of CIA type organizations that are being run by
former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.
There is not only deniability but technical separation
from the Agency.
One would be surprised if everyone in the Agency was
not knowledgeable about the developments in Central
America.
But that is a reflection of the Boland amendment.
MS. STAHL: What about anything particularly different
about this Administration that would have led to this.
And I would like to argue that maybe there isn't.
There have been secret operations under almost all our
recent Presidents, and in fact, operations run out of
the NSC. Is this a great departure?
DR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I don't think it's almost all
Presidents. I don't think of Jimmy Carter as getting
involved in these kinds of activities, for better or
worse.
It's clear that this Administration has the view of
Rambo as something more than an implausible adventure.
It is a profound political document. And, as a result,
one has these kinds of activities being carried on
because the Administration refused to be thwarted by
Congress, particularly in Central America.
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MS. STAHL: When you were CIA director, you launched an
In-house investigation that became known as "the family
jewels." And after that the CIA went through a very
wrenching period of house-cleaning, and sort of going
through and cleaning up after a period of misdeeds and
abuses. Everybody said William Casey had restored
morale.
What do you think is going to happen now to the CIA?
Will It go through a demoralizing period?
DR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I thhnk that Bill Casey indeed
has restored morale at the Agency.
However, one of the aspects of that restoration of
morale is a feeling at the Agency that one can
stonewall the Congress. And that one can get away with
denying the Congress various little bits of information
that it was agreed in 1980 that the Congress should
have.
And that kind of thing, I think, is going to lead to a
severe rebuke for the Agency, even if it doesn't bring
us back to the problems of the 1970s.
MS. STAHL: Do you think there should be laws now, and
restrictions on the NSC, as there were on the CIA, or a
cleaning up process similar to what happened to the
CIA?
DR. SCHLESINGER: I think there has to be an informing
of the Congress of the activities that are under way.
The NSC has been used as a vehicle to get around the
need to inform the Congress, because NSC staff members
have been protected by Executive Privilege.
One of the consequences, by the way, of Colonel North's
being suddenly detached from the White House staff is
that he is now fair game for the Congress, and he will
be up there under subpoena, without Executive
Privilege. And since he was the central feature of
operations in Central America, it means that he will be
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asked many questions about the funding and the
activities in Central America.
MS. STAHL: Very quickly.
Are you saying that members of the NSC staff should not
be protected by Executive Privilege?
DR. SCHLESINGER: I think that the Executive Privi-
lege is based upon the premise that one is not
conducting major operations within the Whte House; and
these operations should be kept away from the President
of the United States. That is why we've tried to
protect the Chief Executive.
MS. STAHL: Doctor Schlesinger, thank you very much.
We will be back in a minute.
(Announcements)
MS. STAHL: Joining us now, CBS news correespondent
David Martin, who has been covering this story over at
the Pentagon.
David, what are the big unanswered questions that these
committees have left to answer for us?
MR. DAVID MARTIN: Well, to me the salient question
here is who, among the people that knew about this
secret airlift to the Contras that was being flown out
of Iliopongo Air Base in Sel Salvador -- who in the
intelligence community knew that was going on. And
clearly a lot of people did, because there were active
duty CIA officers, active duty military officers at
that base doing other things with the Salvadoran armed
forces, reporting on the existence and the progress of
this airlift back to the Pentagon and to CIA
headquarters.
Now, who among those people that were reading those
reports knew where the money to pay for this multi-
million dollar airlift was coming from?
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This is an intelligence community which has boasted
that when a toilet flushes in Managua, they hear It.
All of their assets are focused on Central America and
Nicaragua In particular.
And I find it personally very difficult to believe that
when you have all your assets focused on this one
intelligence problem you are not going to know where
millions of dollars to pay for a secret airlift are
coming from.
MS. STAHL: If not billions.
We have had a flood of news reports that contradict
almost every facet of the story that the President and
Attorney General told at the two news confer- ences.
One, David, is coming out of the London press, that
there were 20 planeloads of American military equipment
that went into Tehran. Have you heard any such thing?
MR. MARTIN: Well, you have a difficulty separating
official US shipments from Israeli shipments that were
condoned or winked at by the United States.
And finally black market shipments that were strictly
the work of independent arms dealers. Because there is
a lot of American military equipment that's out there
on the black market, particularly aiTmunitions; which is
the kind of equipment that the Iranian military needs
for this trench warfare that they were fighting.
So I'm not sure that when we read these reports of 20
planeloads, billions of dollars worth of arms, whether
we are talking about the specific US operation, or what
we are talking about.
MS. STAHL: Another aspect of all this is the American
hostage, William Bjjckley, who apparently now we know
wwas killed by the terrorists. He was the CIA station
chief in Beirut.
And there is another report in a London newspaper today
that the United States, the Reagan Administ- ration,
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applied intense pressure on the Kuwaitis to release
their prisoners in the Kuwait jail -- in other words,
accede to the terrorists' demands in order to get
Buckley out of prison.
Have you heard any such thing in your reporting?
MR. MARTIN: Not specifically on the issue of
pressuring the Kuwaitis to release those prisoners.
But it's clear that Buckley, who was the one US
government employee that was being held hostage, was a
motivating factor in this whole effort to get hos-
tages out.
But I do not think that you can say he was the reason
we started selling arms to Iran, because the presi-.
dential finding was made in January, 1986, and by
January of 1986 1 think most people in the United
States government had given Bill Buckley up for dead.
MS. STAHL: So it all started before -- well -- but we
were sanctioning or condoning Israel before then.
I`.iR. MARTIN: Well, and we were also interested in these
other hostages.
MS. STAHL: Okay, David. Thank you very much.
We will end our broadcast with a cartoon by Jack Ohman
of the Detroit Free Press. His cartoon is about two
failed attempts to free American hostages.
I'm Lesley Stahl. Have a good week.
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