SOVIETS EMBARK ON NEW PATH OF ANTI-AMERICAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600210056-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: April 14, 1981
• Content Type: NSPR

?Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-009 1R000600210056-1
NORWICH BULLETIN (CT)
14 April 1981
Sovieis em rk in 12
anti-America
By WILLIAM PARHAM
-? Bulletin Staff Writer
. The Bulletin has learned that a new Soviet covert action ca
on a series of forgeries of U.S. official documents sugges
Europeans that they are facing a new holocaust because of
with the U.S. -
A Reagan Administration source familiar with such campan
Bulletin, "There is no doubt that if U.S.-Soviet Relations deteriox at.c
- there will be more anti-U.S. propaganda and covert action of this type."
The Soviet Union already spends several billion dollars a year in anti-
U.S. covert action and propaganda ? the world's largest such effort. And
this does not include Soviet-controlled propaganda and covert action efforts
.on the part of Cuba, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslavakia, Hungary and
other Soviet bloc intelligence services.
Last year? Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Director for Operations
John McMahon testified before Congress in closed committee session that the
:Soviets were spending from $3 billion to $4 billion a. year on anti-U.S. covert
. ,
action and propaganda.
"The Soviets have established, a worldwide network of agents, organiza-
tions, and technical facilities" to implement these programs, McMahon told
the House Intelligence Committee.
' ? "That network is second W none In comparison to the major world
, powers in its size and effectiveness."
According to McMahon and other sources, such covert "active mea-
sures", as distinguished from the normal intelligence collection and
counterintelligence functions of the KGB, have included:
?Written and oral "disinformation". In May 1978, Soviet Ambassador to
Zambia Solodovnikov warned Zambian President Kaunda falsely that Soviet
Intelligence had learned _British and American intelligence services were
plotting to overthrow him. Kaunda was advised against making a trip to
Britain and the U.S., since his departure was to precipitate the coup.
Soloclovnikov said falsely that the U.S. and Britain had used a similar
plan to overthrow Nkrurnah of Ghana. ,
? Forgeries and false rumors. A bogus U.S; Army field manual was
_ _
cited by the Soviets as proof that the CIA was secretly Manipulating the
terrorist Red Brigades who murdered Italian leader Aldo Moro.
This happened after it was reported that the Red Brigades had received
training in Czechoslovakia and had ties with the Soviet Union.
"Whenever the KGB is caught red-handed in an outrageous action that
threatens the Soviet Union with serious embarrassment," wrote Reader's
Digest Senior Editor John Barron in his book KGB: the Secret Work of Soviet
Secret Agents, "it hurriedly commences disinformation operations to divert
, world attention from the event. Frequently the KGB simply accuses others of
doing precisely what it has been shown to have done."
The forged field manual used in the Moro case also was used by the
Soviets to try to prove that U.S. military and intelligence liaisons abroad are
used as cover to penetrate and manipulate friendly foreign governments.
? "Gray" or unattributed propoganda. Men the Soviets want to 'create
an aura of authenticity around an otherwise implausible position, they use a
system of press placements through non-Soviet journalists recruited to make
sure Soviet articles surface in the local foreign press. , .
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1071117CLE APP
ON PAGE
SOVIET AID DISPUTED
IN TERRORISR STUDY
A Draft CIA: Report, Novi Being
Revievi' ed, Finds listifficien
Evidenbe'of Direct Role"-
-
' By?JUDITH MILLER. ,
Special to The New York Tleses
WASHINGTON, March 28?A draft re-
port produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency has concluded that there is insuf-
ficient evidence to substantiate Adminis-
tration charges that the Soviet Union is
directly helping to foment international
terrorism,. Congressional and Adminis-
tration sources said today.
William J.. Casey; Director of Central
Intelligence; has asked his analysis, the
sources said, to review their conclusions;
given the substantial opposition to the re-
port from other agencies. . ?
The draft estimate, produced by the
C.I.A.'s National Foreign Assessments
Center, has stirred debate within Admin-
istration foreign policy circles, as foreign
affairs spokesmen have publicly accused
the Soviet Union of training, equipping,
and financing :-,international terrorist
gxouPs. ' -
The review'; of the draft. estimate has
once again raised questions about the
relationship between intelligence offi-
cials and policy makers, with some C.I.A.
officials concerned that the agency is
coming under pressure tor tailor its analy-
sis to fit the policy views of the Adminis-
tration. e .
- Charges In Last Administration,y ? ,
Similar rbarges were made during, the
Carter Administration and resulted in
frequently bitter exchanges between
policy makers and intelligence officials:,
Bruce C. Clark, who heads the agency's
assessments, or analysis unit, is retiring
from the C.I.A..in April, in what officials
said was a personal decision unrelated to
the dispute over the intelligence estimate
on terrorism. ....."4:i , ?
NEW YORK TIMES
29 MARCH 1981
One official said that a successor hac
not been named, but another indicate(
that Mr. Clark's successor would be th(
current director of the agency's opera
tionsunit, John McMahon.
The special national intelligence esti
mate on terrorism was begun soon atm
the Administration took office,- official
said. Secretary of State. Alexander
Haig Jr. said on Jan. 28 in his first new:
conference that the Soviet Union, as par
of a "conscious policy," undertook th
"training, funding and equipping" of ir
temational terrorists. ?
The Administration has subsegnentt
said that combatting international tei
rorisrn is one of its key, foreign policy at
2.` A
'Ample Evidence' on Soviet Role
- In addition, Richard V. Allen, Pres
dent Reagan's national security advise
said in an interview with ABC News thi
week that "ample evidence': had been ac
cumulated to demonstrate the Sovie
?.Union's involvement in international ter
rorism. Mr. Allen also said that the Soviet
Union was "probably".'supporting the
Palestine Liberation Organization, which
he said must be identified as a terrorist
organization, through . financial assist-
ance and through support of its "main
aims." ? I: -;
Finally; Mr: -Allen concluded that Is-
raeli air raids into southern Lebanon
should be generally recognized as a "hot
pursuit of a sort and therefore, justified."
- Officials said that the draft estimate
contained some factual evidence to sup-
port charges that the Soviet Union was di-
rectly '., aiding and abetting terrorist
groups, but that in. many instances the
evidence of such involvement was either
murky orhonexistent.
The estimate, which was circulated for
comment to the State Department, Na-
tional Security Council, Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, and the National Security
Agency, stirred angry debate and re-
? ',??:
000600210056-1
commented.!' '\\.. ?-?
_Other Administration and Congres-
sional officials, however, voiced concern
that the agency was'-once again being
asked to tailor its views to fit the public
pronouncements lot senior Administra-
tion officials. L ?
"There would not have been a review if
the estimate's conclusions had totally
supported the Administration's
charges," the official said. ? ?
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Approved For Releas021:05FRITC911A-EMEIC010033 R0006
January 1981
0210056-1
WAS SCENE.. .from the AlAA Washington Of ft
? CIA Deputy Director John McMahon, in testimony before
a House Intelligence Subcommittee, estimated that the
Soviet Union had spent $200 million on propaganda and
covert campaigns against NATO deployment of enhanced-
radiation (neutron-bomb) weapons and the modernization of
theater nuclear weapons.
Enhanced radiation weapons (ERVV) increase radiation
while greatly reducing blast (tenfold) and heat damage to
surrounding areas. Made for use in short-range, tactical
nuclear weapons such as the Lance missile and 8-in.
howitzer, they would probably be used against large con-
centrations of Warsaw Pact tanks, a major threat to NATO.
The campaign against the neutron bomb began in the
summer of 1977 and was manifested in a series of coor-
dinated diplomatic moves, overt propaganda, and covert
political action, said McMahon. It began in the Soviet and
East European press and spread to communist international
front groups all over the world. "The purpose of this front-
group activity was to maintain the campaign's momentum
and to draw noncommunists into the campaign, particularly
In Western Europe. What had begun as a Soviet effort now
appeared to many as a general public reaction to the alleged
horrors of the neutron bomb," said McMahon.
By far the most important comments, said McMahon,
appeared in the noncommunist press in the political center
or on the left. "A segment of this press could be counted on
to react almost automatically once the neutron bomb re-
ceived attention in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Others in this group could be expected to react negatively for
.various reasons: anti-Americanism, doubts on NATO's viabil-
ity, hope for maintaining goad relations with the Soviet
Union, or an honest distaste for the development of new.
Veapons of mass destruction. For the Soviets the real
propaganda success lay in the broad, adverse editorial treat-
ment given the bomb by this second journalistic sector."
A second front was formed using direct contacts between
politicians and organizations on both sides of the iron
curtain. "In late January 1978," McMahon continued, "every
Western government announced that it had received a letter
from Brezhnev warning that the production and deployment
of the neutron bomb constituted a serious threat to
detente....Western parliamentarians received similar letters
from members of the Supreme Soviet, and Soviet trade-union
officials sent letters to Western union organizations and
their leaders." It was clear, the CIA official said, that the So-
viets were focusing their attack on our NATO allies, who had
to decide whether to accept deployment of the weapons on
their soil.
Still other approaches were made at UN disarmament
meetings, Soviet front organizations, and European Com-
munist Party-sponsored meetings, said McMahon. One such
meeting, the "International Forum Against the Neutron
Bomb," organized by the Dutch Communist Party, drew
40,000 people from all over Europe.
Approved For Release 2005/11/28
While it is difficult to assess the full impact of the anti-
neutron-bomb campaign, the Carter Administration in April
of 1978 deferred production of the enhanced-radiation ele-
ment of the warheads indefinitely while proceeding with
modifications to the warheads themselves to make them
compatible with ER components. In commenting on the re-
sults of the Soviet bloc campaign, the CIA testimony quoted
the chief of the International Department of the Hungarian
Communist Party, Janos Berecz, as saying, "The political
campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most sig-
nificant and most successful since World War 11." McMahon
also noted that "the Soviet Ambassador to the Hague
(Netherlands) at that time was subsequently decorated by
the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in
recognition of the success of the Dutch Communist Party,
under his direction, in organizing the high point of the anti-
neutron bomb campaign."
With the neutron bomb temporarily defused, testified
McMahon, the Soviet Bloc turned its efforts against the U.S.-
initiated move to modernize the theater nuclear forces (TNF)
by deploying the highly accurate ground-launched cruise
missile (GLCM) and the Pershing II missile. Scheduled for de-1
ployment In late 1983, they will, for the first time, place tar-
gets on Soviet soil within range of NATO ground-based mis-
siles. The purpose of the modernization is to minimize the
risk that the Soviets might believe they could use their long-
range weapons to make or threaten limited strikes against
Western Europe without NATO being able to respond in kind.
The Soviet Bloc campaign Used tactics similar to those in
the neutron-weapon effort, McMahon said, including con-
tacts with legislators, mass meetings, and a worldwide press
and poster campaign. The posters, he testified, "adorned
every block and wall in Western Europe." Some of the argu-
ments used against modernization of the TNF were that the
transfer of cruise-missile technology was prohibited under
SALT 11 and that the TNF would undermine future arms-con-
trol negotiations.
Despite the Soviet Bloc efforts, NATO approved TNF mod-
ernization in December 1979, although the Netherlands and
Belgium deferred a decision on whether to allow basing
these weapons on their soil. The British government strongly
supported TNF, but the leaders of its Labor Party have
strongly opposed basing cruise missiles on English soil.
Another witness at the hearing described the types of
contacts possessed by Soviet Bloc intelligence and their ef-
fectiveness in carrying out such campaigns. He was Ladislav
Bittman, former deputy chief of the Disinformation Depart-
ment of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service. Batman I
defected to the West after the Soviet invasion of his country
in 1968. He gave an inside view of Soviet Bloc intelligence ac-
tivities a decade earlier. His Disinformation Department had;
close contacts with West European media. It put out false I
stories for Western consumption, including forged docu-
ments. Forgeries of documents attributed to President Car- 1
ter and Vice President Mondale were material at the
hearings. Bittmann's department also operated "agents-of-
influence," high-level westerners who held key positions In
foreign governments or media who would aid them in their
mission. Bittman said he personally controlled several mem-
bers of the West German parliament and a director of a na-
tional television network in a western European country. He
also mentioned that the Czechs had several agents among
imktifiglitinteitikbelogimiMxipithe mid-Sixties.
In offering advice on flow to counteract Soviet propaganda
and covert action, Bittman focused on the American phe- 1
Approved For RWINItectIOINIPPV280:f GIA4140PaigelikUltkROLI0400 10056-1
"This situation creates, of course, a great advantage for So-
viet Bloc intelligence. Their officers sent to the United States
are always surprised by what they call the political naivete
and credulity of many Americans, politicians, and jour-
nalists. From the press or accidental contacts they are able
to get information for which they would have to pay a high
price In any West European country."
Bittman gave as an example the investigation of the CIA
several years ago by the Congress and the press. "Sensitive
information about CIA operations around the world, for
which the KGB used to pay hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars," he said, "was suddenly available In the press. The sec-
retary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington clipped the infor-
mation from the New York Times or the Washington Post."
He added, "If somebody had at this moment the magic key
that would open the Soviet Bloc Intelligence safes and
looked into the files of secret agents operating in Western
countries, he would be surprised....A relatively high percent-
age of secret agents are journalists. A journalist operating in
Great Britain, West Germany, or the United States is a great ?
asset to communist intelligence. He can be Investigative and
professionally curious. This is particularly true in the United
States, with its tradition of an aggressive, adversary press."
Bittman also noted that "there are important newspapers
around the world penetrated by communist intelligence ser-
vices. There are one or two journalists working for a particu-
lar paper who are agents and who receive from time to time
InstruCtions to publish this story or that story once or twice a
'year....There are newspapers In the West which are owned by
Communist intelligence services. The Czechoslovak service,
for example, owns several newspapers in the Western Bloc.
There are publishing houses owned by the cpmmunist intelli-
gence services."
Bittman concluded, "I am not trying to start a new witch
hunt against journalists. I am trying only to explain that
journalists are one of the major targets, and journalists play '
a very important role for Communist Bloc intelligence. That
is why they are a highly sought commodity." [Ed.?Like, one ;
would suppose, any well placed military, government, or
company employee. Spies will be spies.]
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kil7 'ARTICLE APPIURED
ON PAGE /
WILMINGTON SUNDAY NEWS JOURNAL
13 APRIL 1980
.watoFtwoarh?s
ghi 1980, Th?er4estl-iourn.al C?
By JOE TRENTO
buting nearly 7 pounds of pure her-
oirLeThe outcome of the trial forced
:din to:modify his threa t. Now, he
:
Wants to "See
RICHARD that'll:Ls. friends.
.r.:and SANDZA--e-
- coria 11,1.:?4 ; neither :deported to ,Iran, nor sen.::
- ;: Stall . .adenti ;
e fenced to jail. One friend is the son
BETHE'SDA,.;:Md,-;?-;- -...?BIoomig of the founder Of Savak, the Iranian.
:-dale's is a strange place to meet a secret Police; the other is an Iranian
t!:forrner CIt operative who is threat--.. restaurant owner7..,?,-eir ,
tening his . ex-employers -with the since the - poielication c_ of_ his
_release of 7,500 agents' names and threats, the media, ,to,o, has begun
other state secrets ii they don't do stalking --.--I)eneselya..-?,.? Novi : `.`60
what he wants them to do. . minotesi ).mieeewalizee, CBs, Fred
Nevertheless a't precisely 11 'arm' Graham, the: Washington Post and
.,-?;one day. this month, asmal! bearded . the Assmated Press call him. Den-
.,.
arrived at the fourth floor of eselyads stiinned by it all. -
ethe White -Flint Mall, store,-ernerg- ? He cloe not seem to c6 .mPrehend.
ing..through . the. stemware' depart- that his schenie to "get even" with.
.:ment carrying a plastic briefcase. the U.S. governrnent has- attracted
. . .? ,
worldnidde attention and made him
a'Public- figure. He feels-himself a
martyr' for an :Unknown cause. The
officials he has , indeed
,harassed, for years call him men-
.understand.. He doesn't say so ? but... '.tally unbalanced and a menace. Yet
the faceless:justice..pursuing him they have done PotP.18 to. put him-
soundi like something Out of Frani. belund bars.? ? ? ? .
..--,Kafka's novel "The - :He tarrie4 down 1."60 Minutes"!..:,
Deneselya carries much of his life because he believes ? the CIA- has
":?".: around.. in . his eybrielcase, ??? docn?:, bought them off with. stories, most
rnenting the reasons for his: bi tter---; recently Dan .. Rather's- expedition-
n-ess,. . his 'rage and his ...altrio* " into Afghanistan. He says he talks to
religions . belief . that . the CIA ? h.aS; the AP and the Sunday News Jour-
ruined his. life. The feds follow hint. nalitbatts:e he believes the..CIA-.-
pverywheee, he says 'fears- both news organizations. He
Recent events. have triade him-? a 'offers no ? explanation' for his feel-;-,
wanted man Two weeks ago, in an in
interview' With this newspaper;hd. ? ? ? , ."":',;---???4- ? made public public hiS priirate threats- ? De)ieselya, despite. the magnitude.
-those who run. and have run the MC, -.'of'his threat, is not bombastic. He is
Leavemeandmfriendsal?neorL ..-.a.?-..rinan with- a mission, a man- who
Will release thenames of 7,500 CIA- eVen with an agency he
operatives," he has told the CIA and. -sh was out to ruin his life. ?'?????-e'
other federal agencies. -?
?.... The -publicity-, that followed .1ha:t-..
disclosure!forced. him to seek* the
anonymitY of a meeting place ?irra.
.-suburban ?..Washington , shopping
mall /
The` friends he sought to. protect
are-two Iranians:who. on, April" 3
were convicted of.Selling andclistri?;'
41. ?
Donald Eugene Deneselya;-'40,
'and his. family have been haunted_
rand hunted by FBI and CIA agents
for 16 years, for reasons the former,
agency operative says he has yet to
Stranger than all of his problems
iitils.unwillinpesS to tell his per-
sonal Story. "I don't want my wife
and two children brought into-this:.
This is between me and the CIA-," he:
"
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After
Sunday
;weed
spareri
\vay he
reveali
a4tient,54
born to
in ? thei:
recruit.
uments
from tt
1.0.
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to be a
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how it.
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. spies o
STAT
report',
lie was: picked: to .be-the ...lhand4.-',1
:ho1der.7 f6r.."Lad1e," the code narne'd
of an important RI:issian .defector,:i
AnatohGolitsrt
He was t6woi?. fOr;threeniOntlis
With Golitsin, who had broughtsev-:::.,
? eral? important Of inf ormation
,to tbe somegnarters
sine : ?irith :revealing to-.
Counterintelligence.chief'. Jam es.
??? Ari etod..jhat British a gent e e
PhilbywasaiongtimSOvietspy.1n
-19&3 Philby;def ected..to? the Soviet4.,
:Union from Britain. - ? `-'?
Golitsin "is ---alsb---::-credited
'detailing-pllni fora Soviet assassi-1
?-:?riatiote of Richard Nixon if he:had -
:been elected pre9ident oven Ken-:
;nedy 1950-
Not only was Deneselya privy :to
:highly secret- briefing papers; he
also had to listen patient17.,to GolW
t:sin'S". complaints- about now
'difference he found-. betwe-en-? then
?!:.CI.A.Where he bad sought refugeand
thei:KGB -h-e- had .f.left -.Russia Jo.'"4
'esca
November:- 1952, -:DeneseiYI
Golitsin was fed up with the:;
? 's Soviet-Russia division andit'd
him He took Matters into hisl
own'. handie:At...;a--_,?lun-Cheon at thd4
pcy.,, he: toldE-Alleri-,Diilles;?7.theri:i
0.,?dtno
UMWS
director,
,
.COWPINTTED.
ZRTICT,I? AP3-7_u3
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,b 1.1
ON PACE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
'
6 APRIL 1980
337 'Irma Szuic
Room S-407 on the Senate side of the
Capitol has more than its share of pro-
tective electronic devices inside and
armed guards outside. It is designed to
keep its secrets.
On Wednesday, Jan. 9, during the
Congressional Christmas recess, a
small group of Senators was summoned
back to Washington to meet in S-407, the
most "secure" room in all of Congress,
with high officials of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency_ The agenda: a presenta-
tion by the C.I.A. of its plans for covert,
paramilitary operations in Afghani-
stan.
The Senators included Birch Bayh of
Indiana, chairman of the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence; Barry Goldwa-
ter of Arizona, vice chairman, and Jo-
seph R. Biclen Jr. of Delaware ? plus
the committee staff director, William
G. Miller, and the minority staff direc-
tor, Earl D. Eisenhower. The C.I.A.
was represented by the Deputy Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, Frank C.
Carlucci, accompanied by John
McMahon, Deputy Director for Opera-
tions, the top man in clandestine opera-
tions. ?
What Mr. Carlucci spelled out at the
session was a new covert aid program
for the anti-Soviet Moslem guerrillas of
Afghanistan. Since last November, as
the Senators knew, the C.I.A. had been
secretly prov5ding the rebels with lim-
ited assistance ? field hospitals and
communications equipment. But after
the Soviet invasion of Dec. 27, the Car-
ter Administration had decided to esca-
late that aid program dramatically.
The C.I.A. proposed to provide the Af-
ghan rebels with Soviet-made AK-47 as-
sault rifles from American stocks,
TOW antitank weapons and SAM-7 sur-
face-to-air missiles e and launchers.
(The SAM's were for use against an an-
ticipated spring offensive when the
- weather would permit the Russians
greater use of planes and helicopters;
the offensive has since begun.)
The Senators listened. They offered
no major objections. The next day, Mr.
Carlucci advised the White House of the
results of the session, and President
Carter signed a Presidential Decision
(known as a P.D.) setting the program
in motion. ? -
STAT
Approved For#R
For all the secrecy and the high-
stakes international gamble involved,
that progression from Room S-407 to
the signing of the P.D. was fairly rou-
tine. It was a standard example of Con-
? gressional oversight of American intel-
ligence work as it has developed in the
? last five years ? a balancing of the
C.I.A .'s national-security require-
ments and the Congress's desire to
? keep a hand in foreign-policy decisions
and safeguard Americans' individual
rights. According to sources in both
camps, the agency has been informing
the appropriate Congressional commit-
tees of its clans. and the committees
have, apparently with few exceptions,
gone along. "
Today, however, that relationship is
undergoing dramatic change. The
C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies
are openly and successfully seeking
greater independence of Congressional
oversight and of a variety of other re-
straints, as well. According to its crit-
ics, the "unleashing" of the C.I.A. is
well underway.
FAI A bill that would deprive the Con-
gressional intelligence committees of
the right to review all C.I.A. covert
operations has been approved by the
House Foreign Affairs Committee. It is
likely that some such legislation will be
passed by Congress this year.,
Si A measure, once encouraged by the
Carter Administration, which would for
the first time have defined the powers
of the intelligence agencies, is given I it-
tle chance in Congress this year.
CI A bill to amend the Freedom of In-
formation Act to protect the agency's
secrets is expected to pass the Senate.
P
BIgreme rEIZTIErft218hadittfkr5IVV03
up ourt ruling. ?
doing the shouting. In the wake of the
Vietnam War, Congress took a long,
hard look at the freewheeling ways of
the C.I.A. The first concrete result was
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the
Foreign Aid Authorization Act of 1974.
According to this measure, no funds
could be spent on a covert intelligence
? operation unless it was reported in a
"timely fashion" to the appropriate
committees in Congress. Public reports
of secret, widespread and illegal C.I.A.
moves against political dissenters in
the United States (code-named Opera-
tion CHAOS) led to the hasty creation of
the Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations With Respect to In-
teitigen-Ce ?Activities, with Senator
Frank Church of Idaho as chairman.
Along the way, the committee
learned in detail of C.I.A. plans to as-
sassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro and the
Congo's Patrice Lumumba, and of the
agency's crucial role in establishing a
climate in which Chile's President Sal-
vador Allende Gossens, a democrati-
cally elected Marxist, could in 1973 be ?
overthrown by the Chilean military.
The committee also discovered that the
agency had been conducting mind-con-
trol experiments, feeding LSD and
other drugs to unwitting subjects; co-
vertly passing money to foreign politi-
cal parties to affect the outcome of elec-
tions, and recruiting American journal-
ists, clergymen. and academics for.se-
00060920,0136g*ncework.
Congress demanded a curtailment of
the C.I.A.'s ability in effect to make-
IR . P?
/0
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ARTICLE .A AU.113.? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
03 FAGIS 3 March 1980
While Russia's diplomats talked peace
and reconciliation, her secret agents were.
busy concocting bogus documents
to blacken America's image. A new CIA
report spells out what happened.
Now coming to light is the most complete disclosure yet
of how the Soviet Union?even when d?nte was in full
flower?systematically staged "dirty tricks" to discredit the
U.S. among its allies and other nations;
Details of the secret campaign were made public on Feb-
ruary 19 by the House Intelligence Committee. The panel
released a report by the Central Intelligence Agency that
was sent to. lawmakers as congressional debate heated up
over proposals to give the CIA a freer hand to conduct co-
vert operations of its own.
The study portrays a clandestine anti-U.S. propaganda
drive that started after World War II and reached a Peak in
intensity and sophistication during 1978 and 1979, t14 peri-
od in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union were wrapping
up a new strategic-arms-limitation treaty.
Among other things, Moscow is accused of using forged
documents in various attempts to link the U.S. with terror-
ism around the world, including the 1978 assassination of
former Italian Premier Aldo Moro.
U.S. bureaucratese duplicated. The CIA says the Soviets
have made near-flawless forgeries of everything from se-
cret U.S. Army field manuals to classified State Department
communiqu? Not only have they obtained the proper
inks, paper, printing presses and letterheads, but Soviet ex-
perts have become masters at duplicating the writing style
of American bureaucrats. ?
In the 105-page report, complete with voluminous docu-
mentation, the CIA says the Soviets called a halt to their
dirty tricks for four years in the mid-1970s for reasons that
remain unclear. But by 1978, the Kremlin had streamlined
its foreign-propaganda apparatus into an International In-
formation Department, bankrolled it heavily and, as a mark
of its new importance, installed as its bosS a longtime crony
of President Leonid Brezhnev's. ,
- The agency reports directly' to the Politburo and works
hand in glove with the KGB, the Soviet spy agency, as it
carries out covert "disinformation" operations that rely
heavily on forgery. The CIA believes that; as many as 50
KGB technicians are detailed to a forgery Squad. ;
According to the CIA's reckoning, the Soviets in 1979
poured at least 200 million dollars into a variety of special
campaigns?using both propaganda and covert opera-
tions?to isolate the ,U.S. from its friends. "Moscow does not
see any basic -incompatibility between its official policy of
expanding bilateral relations with Washington and practic-
ing dirty tricks," John McMahon, the CIA's deputy director
of operations, testified before the panel. "The iSoviet
Union' S willingness to conduct its foreign policy irii accor-
, Appcoved For. Release 2005/1.i/28 :;CIA
Soviets manufactured a series of authentic.looking State De- ?
partment memos criticizing Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and
..aqpIrtz,c,tine? fi-not fin.II Q uuresilr4 onnn hirrv
dance with the
served by both si
tente has
Among rei
Doctoring a Fi?
One of the slic
manual that has
poses. Bearing ti
moreland, the n
on how. the Amn
Communist fore
The manual si
meddle in the i
even use leftist (
into adopting In
book appears to
es?authentic in
jargon and swec
to the regulatior
The bogus. ma
but the Soviets
Aldo Moro kidnappmy;
Communist with ties to Soviet and
agencies?published in two Madrid newspapers an article
citing the manual as evidence of U.S. involvement with. the
Italian Red Brigades, the terrorist killers of the Christian
Democratic leader.
, Excerpts from the forged: manual and the article were
widely reprinted in Europe,. especially in Italy, "Within
days of the Moro kidnapping, the Soviet -propaganda appa-
ratus had begun a campaign of suggestion and innuendo to
falsely link the U.S. to this murder," says the CIA study.
"But. Moscow had enjoyed little success without proof to
Cuban
intelligence
21? ?' "'?
01:)RATIOINIS-tO-MORANDLIM
THE D%PARTI?IF.!:: 01STACE.,
TROIA: Er:P.:M.:SY RO
7:J9JECT: P0L:71C0L DE77L0?:1Efl-5 ESI:P7
-C-7935-11 .77
Olth. reference to my previous- reports anCI the nee dui,d?line
ditr,utacrl in:,1Jachinitan,,f hare pai'_ clove ettent inn to liatitica./..
tlevelapnentc hare vith apeciX7C'en-phati.r on Ilt.hrthe talat
ic tackling the irohlent:pnx-.:,: tr'Lth-r. Janjury tiaturhanree?:
An Li pa-sau, it .hernr.-c. clear that too :major factors, -
ha.?127!.. trifgar the Jarronryriottl,- far the firct ?
a. Jane.,
Preciitont Safat co-, Lp the
mariner,: thc ,Cc-cinet tar,:e or
Pr'eai den: StolatPt' ettee'pP7n to'hlare iha .cu.nonniZA, and;
ha-cher-Sol lo:arra fa, tr ev,r,t- rc,i.niceranlg rn,7 uns -
pnorly CV,N ec pra.,,,t,rit's ?eat.
?
:shi4:14;:onc=not
ilfr..rences
Larnrration.and of vel fare open'.
ihresh;.. policy ani: in hart
as,ters.
January, there. hav.
re of fre:sifent End.,
1.,a ?till in crisis.: A
,1tensive ernnamic uptu
.corruptter.?Unrortunk?..
\41:.
.';.ivmet by
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600
ART I CU.'
Oil PACT'
THE WASHINGTON POST
1 March 1980
Diplomat-sin
Ousted i6i Spy ing
-
By Charles t. Babcock
Washington POst Staff Writer
The FBI's retiring counterintelli-
gence chief said yesterday that five
communist-bloc diplomats were qui-
etly forced to leave the United States
in the past year after they were
caught spying.
William Cregar, head' of the bu-
reau's intelligence division, said that
such expulsions usually are not publi-
cized because the communist nations
' would feel compelled to retaliate.
Cregar's remarks capped a recent
series of exposures by American and
allied intelligence officers of Soviet-
bloc spy networks in New Zealand,
Canada, Spain and Japan.
It has been suggested that the
stream of disclosures is part of a U.S.
.policy decision to change the usual
rules of international spying and re-
taliate against the Soviet Union for its
invasion of Afghanistan.
,Spokesmen for the State Depart-
ment and Central Intelligence Agency
refused to comment on the, matter
yesterday. A White House official said
he was unaware of any policy change.
But it seems clear that at least some
of the disclosures were orchestrated.
Last month, for instance, John Mc-
Mahon, the CIA's deputy director for
? operations, told a House Intelligence
subcommittee in closed session about
Soviet forgeries of U.S. government
documents. Last week, the testimony
was suddenly made public, exposing
to publi&view more than 100 pages of
examples of alleged Soviet-bloc propa-
ganda.
, The release was to "dramatize" re-
cent increases in such forgeries, a sub-
committee spokesman said.
The Chicago Tribune reported on
Monday that theeCIA-"has disclosed
the names of many Soviet-bloc agents
of? influence..to allied intelligence in
recent weeks., ?
In his testimony; McMahon noted
, that a forged U.S. Army field manual,
?purporting to show plans for Anieriee
? an interference in allies' domestic afe
fairs?showed up in Spain ins 1977 in
the hands of a Cuban intelligence offi-
cer. The Tribune story--, said the CIA
..:gave the names. 9f those involved in
the- fabrication :tn.' Spanish
.gence. "vs
APPeallfeekfoliltrkiMbleteitv2i)&51401
:nage-network occurred ineJanuary.
New Zealand, where Soviet. Ambassa-
dor Vsevolod Softy:14y ewaxpelled
STAT
after he was accused of funneling money to a
socialist political party.
In retaliation, the Soviets expelled the New
Zealand- ambassador from Moscow a month before
the end of his scheduled tour of duty.
In Canada in January, two Soviet embassy of-
ficials were expelled after being charged with, pay-
ing money to an American undercover agent.
In Japan, the army's chief of staff resigned after
a Soviet-run spy network was closed down by police.
Intelligence officials refused to say yesterday
whether these events were connected.
There has long been a dispute within the in-
telligence community about how to treat foreign
diplomats caught as spies. The traditional theory
is the one the FBI's Cregar noted yesterday: expel
. the person quietly so the other country doesn't
feel compelled to respond in kind.
There's another ,argument against even quietly
expelling the discovered spy, intelligence officials
note. At least you know who he is and can monitor
his activities. If he's kicked out, he'll be replaced
by someone your, counterintelligence will. have to
find all over again, they said.
Last fall, in the wake of the controversy over
the Soviet brigade, of troops in Cuba, coluninist
Jack Anderson reported that national security af-
fairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was quarreling
with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance about tak-
ing a hard line in generating anti-Soviet propa-
ganda around the world.
In a press conference at the time, .Vance took
pains to say there was no dispute between State
and Brzezinski. He didn't deny the anti-Soviet cam-
paign was being considered, however.
The last publicized expulsion of a Soviet diplo-
mat from the United States occurred in 19713. Vla-
dimir P. Zinyakin, an official at the Soviet mission
to the United Nations, was forced to leave for his
role in a spy case. ?
The case involved two Soviet- employes who
didn't have diplomatic immunity and were pros-
ecuted for buying U.S. defense secrets; from a
Navy officer cooperating with the FBI.....
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell decided to
press the-case to show the United States wouldn't
tolerate spying by non-diplomats at all. .
The FBI's Cregar said yesterday that he feels
the FBI has made excellent progress in its silent
counterintelligence battle with communist-bloc
spies. - --
"We know more about theite methods of opera-
tion.' We have a better appreciation of who their
intelligence officers are and of the equipment and
techniques they use against us," he said.
STAT
8 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600210056-1
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00060
? T r.L L'./1:7? ED
STAT
THE BALTIMORE SUN
26 February 1980
Washington (KNT1?The Central Intel-
ligence Agency anti - allied intelligence
agencies have declared open season on
there' KGB counOrpartS, exposing Soviet
intelligence operations throughout the
world,. -
. . . . .
In the weeks following the Soviet in-Vae
siert- of Afghanistan, . there have been
major exposures of Soviet spy networks in
New Zealand, Spain, Canada and Japan:
Agents have been exposed. 'and, in- some
cases, etepelled. ; .
Intelligence veterans note- that this
filmy of "rollbacks" is in marked. contrast
to the days of detente when the tight little
world of spy versus spy simmered clan--
tie
? In adcitiont the CIA has given reporters
and friendly intelligence . agencies hun-
dreds of pages of previously secret docu-
ments about the KGB's activities. They
detail recent plots to discredit United
States peace moves in the Mideast and to
derail nuclear arms policy talks between
the U.S. and Western European allies. "
. _
"There. are always a lot of spy cases on
the back burner," said a former U.S. coun-
terespionage official, who kept tabs on the
KGB- during the Cold War.' "Sometime?
word comes down to bring them in. It's
like deciding when to play your trump in a,
card game." .- ;tenet::: e ? et. tt
Perhaps most damaging to- the KGB
iivas a hearing on Capitol Hill earlier this'
month. For the first time in the CIA!s
tory. testimony by the-agency's chief spy-e
master, the director of covert operations,
was banded to reporters. Until then, John.
l'ilcMahon's identity as deputy director for
operations was itself a se.cret;:,-,'?
McMahon's testimonY:disciosed
mass of sensitive data. It included copies
of what Mr. McMahon called KGB for-
geries of American diplomatic documents,
,which were part of an apparent scheme to,
.undermine relations between the U.S. and
Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat.
Mr. McMahon told the House Oversight
;Subcommittee on Intelligence that the
KGB forged a letter over the fabricated
signature of Hermann F. Eilts, ambassa-
. ? ,
dor .to Egypt, statin,g.' that the U.S. Was
planning to dump Mr..Satiat.,. -
".We must repudiate him [Mr. Sadat;
and get rid of him without hesitation,"
said the falsified letter, which was ad-
dressed to Adm.- Stansfield Turner, direc-
tor of central intelligence., Mr. ? McMahon
'said the letter was planted in a Syrian -
newspaper October 1, and was the KGB's
third forgery involving Mr. Eilts's
ture." ; e'
In his testimony, Mr. McMahon said,
"The KGB exercises day-to-day operation
responsibility for forgery efforts, but its
annual and fie-to-seven-year work plans
are approved by the highest levels of the
Soviet political authority." '
In all, Mr. McMahon gave the subcom-
mittee 18 documents he called KGB for-
geries. They show the Soviet spy agency
writing nonexistent press Conferences for
President Carter in which he made insult-
ing remarks about Greece, an Army field
rnanual urging subversion of host coun-
tries and many falsified- diplomatic
Mr. McMahon also disclosed a CIA esti-
mate of how much the KGB spends a yeari
?"our rough estimate of3 billion a year;
is probably a conservative figure." ' I
: The CIA estimated that the KGB spentl
.$200 million last year for support to guer-,
rilla groups,4100 million on clandestine
radio stations and another ;200 million for
"special campaigns"--including an effort
to stop American plans to build the neu-
,tron bomb and place. nuclear missiles in
'EuroPe? '
.spokesman for the House subcOrn-
rnittee said:, Mr. ? McMahon's t testimony;
tdeliverade ml secret session February 6,
t was released last week to "dramaftze"?re-
cent increases in Soviet forgery schemes.
Mr. McMahon said the KGB had been
r using forgeries since the 1950s. ? 'iltet
et'tThe new bogus documents ineltide,
high-quality, technically sophisticated fal-
sifications of a caliber which the Soviet
and bine intelligence services were evi-
dently incapable of producing in the 19503
land even the 1960s," Mr. McMahon said.
"Furthermore in two cases Soviet
foi?gers directly attributed false and mis-
leading statements to the president and I
vice president of the United States, some-
thing they have refrained from "doing in
the past." .
. .
t_tt A liouse'SOUrce:Said; the had
provided allied intelligence agencies with i
additional details: ? ' ?
`.For example, he said, the CIA gave to
Spanish intelligence the names of a tr.em--
beren,of the Spanish _Communist Party
- and'a Cuban emigrant allegedly involved
in faking a U.S. Army traiaing. manual.
Names of sabres of other such "agents of
influence" were disclosed to _intelligence
agencies around the globe in recent weeks,
the sources said.
; ? , e:tt. 'teat
-The clandestine game of tag Ilea been
played out from the South Pacific tocana-
?
In New Zealand the government 'ex:.
Felled Soviet Ambassador VseVolnd Sofia-
ski in mid-January for supplying cash to a
Socialist political party. The .case had
beeta_developed several years ago, intelli-
gence sources said, but only closed inI
January.
In Spain, last week. the manager orate
Soviet airline Aeroilot, Oleg Shuranov,
was expelled after he was caught carrying
"documents related to Spanish security.7
Government sources said Spanish intelli-
gence had been suspicious of him for
.'? In Ottawa, Canadian authorities ex-
pelled two Soviet embassy officials and d
chauffeur. January 21. All were charged
'with paying money to an American under-
cover agent to buy 'U.S. secrets. The Cana-
din.s knew about the case for 16 months
hut made the arrests in the wake of the.
-Afghanistaminvasion.. ?
In 'Japan,- the nation's army Chief of
:-staff -resigned 'January 28 after police
t
:there. closed down a Soviet-operated spy
network which. had been discovered in
.1976: The case, a sensation in Japan's
was the first espionage scandal
-since the army was formed in 1954 after
. being outlawed following World War
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600210056-1
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0
1-Lin:'/CLE
ON: PAC;IL 6.?
Canada to Japart\
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
24 February 1980
0600210056-1
STAT
By James Coates
and John Maclean
Chic eeo TrIbene F'ress Service
WASHINGTON ? The Central Intelli-
gence Agency and allied intelligence
agencies have declared open' season on
their KGB counterparts, exposing Soviet
intelligence operations throughout the
world. ? ? ?. -
..In the weeks following the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, there have been
major exposures of Soviet spy networks
in New Zealand, Spain, Canada, and Ja-
pan. Agents have been ,exposed and, in
some cases, expelled. ?
Intelligence veterans note that, this
flurry of "rollbacks" is in marked con-
trast to the days' of detente when the
tight little world of spy versus spy aim-
mered clandestinely. ?
In addition, the CIA has given report-
ers and friendly intelligence- agencies
hundreds of pages of previously secret
documents about the KGB's activities.
te- They detail recent plots to discredit U.S.
peace moves in the' Mideast and to
derail nuclear arms policy talks be-
tween the U.S. and Western European
allies. ? ?
"There are always a lot of spy cases
on the back burner," said a former U.S;
counterespionage official, who kept tabs
on' the KGB during the Cold War.
"Sometimes word comes down to bring
them in. Its like deciding when to play
your trurnp in a card game."
In Moscow, Tass news agency an
flounced- Friday that Afghanistan's se'-?
cret police had arrested an? American,'.
Robert Lee, in Kabul. Tam said Lee
was ,"known for his links with the.Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.".
PERHAPS 'MOST - damaging.--to 'the
KGB- was a:bearing on Capitol Hill ear-
'her this month. For the first time lathe
CIA's history, testimony, by, the ageney's.
.chief spymaster, the director of covert
operations', cvds handed to reporters.7,Una
tit then, 1.Itihn McMahon's identity' as
deputy director for operations was itself
"a secret. .7. : ? .
McMahon's testimony disclosed a
'mass of sensitive data. It included co-
les of ,what. 'McMahon called KGB for-
geries of American diplomatic docu
ments, which were part 'of an apparent ?
.scheme to undermine relations between
k.
the U.S. and:Egyptian President' Anwar
,
Sadat. ? a ? --- ?,
McMahon told .the HriegypiQm/4
Subcommittee on .Intelligence that .:the
.KGB forged a letter.. over the fabricatedt
signature of Herman Eilts, ambassador
- "We must repudiate him I.Sadatl and
get rid of him without hesitation," said
the falsified letter, which was addressed .j
to CIA Director Stansfield- Turner. ,
McMahon said, the letter was planted in
a Syrian 'newspaper Oct. 1 last year,
and, the KGB's third- forgery involving
Eilts' "signature."
IN BIS testimony, McMahon said,
? "The KGB - exercises clay-to-day opera-
tion responsibility for forgery efforts,
but its annual and 5-to-7-yehr work plans
are approved by the highest levels of
, the Soviet political authority.".
In,
. .
.:.. In all, McMahon gave the subc'omniit-
'1 tee 15 doeuments he called KGB forger-
ies. They show the Soviet spy agency
'Writing nonexistent press conferences
for President Carter in which Carter
made insulting remarks about Greece,
an Army field manual urging 'subversion
of host countries, and: many falsified
diplomatic cables. ,
Mc:Mahon also disclosed a CIA estimate
,.of how much the KGB spends a year :-L-:
"our rough estimate of $3- billion a year
is probably -a conservative figure."
' The CIA estimated the KGB spent $200'
million last year for support to guerrilla
grOups,- $100. million on Clandestine radio
stations, and another $200 million for
`'special campaigns" -- including an ef-
fort to stop American plans to 'build the
neutron bomb and place nuclear -inis
silesin Ettrope. - .? ? .. ..':- ..,. .
i ?
- A: SPOKESMAN for the House 'sub-
committee said ?McMahon's testimony,
. delivered in secret' session Feb. 6, was
?released last week, to "dramatize" .re-
c en t increases- hi" Soviet .forgery
"'schemes. McMahon said ".the KGB: had
been using forgeries since: the 19505:.
-: ""The . new - bogus documents include'
high quality, technically sciphistiCated
falsifications of a caliber which the Sovi-
et' and bloc' intelligence: services wer
evidently incapable of producing, in the
,1950s and even .the 1960s," ,McMahon
I "Furthermore, -in two 'cases. Soviet
forgers directly attributed false and, mis
deading.s,tatements to the President and
'Vice' Piesident of the 'United States,
isornething they.have refrained from do-
r ROWEaltti2CMH'i128:.; CIA4fari1-
0
-. A HotiSe. source said the CIA has pro-
? I
vicled allied intelligence agencies with
additional details. ?
For example, he said, the CIA gave to
Spanish' intelligence the names of a
. member of the Spanish -Communist Par-
ty member and a Cuban emigrant alleg-
edly involved in faking a (IS. Army
training manual. Names of scores 'of
other such "agents of influence" were
disclosed to intelligence agencies -around
the globe in recent weeks, the sources,.
said. -
THE CLANDESTINE game of. tag has
been played out from .the South Pacific
to Canada.
In New Zealand; the governinent ex-
pelled Soviet Ambassador Vsevolocl So-
finski in mid-January for supplying cash
to a Socialist political party. The ease
had been developed several years -ago,
intelligence sources said, but only closed
in January. . - ??
In Spain; laSt-week, the maimger -of
the Soviet airline Aeroflot, Oleg gbura,
nov, was expelled after he :was caught
carrying "documents related to Spanish
security." Government sources said
'Spanish intelligence had been suspicious
of him for Months. . ? ? .
In Ottawa, Canadian' authorities ex-
pelled two ,Soviet embassy officials and
-a chauffeur Jan,'21... All were charged
with paying. money to an American un-
dercover agent to buy' U.S. secrets. The-
Candians knew.. about .the case for' 16
months but made the arrests :in . the.
wake of the Afghanistan invasion.
In Japan, the nation's .army chief Of:
,staff resigned Jan. 28 'after police there
, closed down a Soviet-operated spy net.-;
;work"which had been discovered in 1976,,
the case a sensation in Japan's media'
was the first espionage scandal since'
:the army was formed in 1554 after being
-outlawed following World War If.
-AT THE White House an official fa-.
:miller with U.S. Intelligence _activities
denied ,that Washington engineered these.
'various crackdowns :against ?the KGB.
'However, he added, "without . anybody
:orchestrating anything, you cannot rule
out the idea there has been a" changein
'how many .countrids:.perceire.the,world
'today-and hOw, theSt.perceiVe the.. Soviet
9010:110e60021'60584'-7'i::- -
'It is well-known-I the?Soviets dolabuse.
diplomatic immunity' and do Lisa it to.?
,c.arry on clandestine activities.l'i --.?
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901
THE NEWS WORLD
17 January 1980
).11 T1 CLZ
ON PAG.14 /-
? ??
1/q. ? ,
? ; ; ?
,
STAT
Nvw,
.; ?
;
1 ; t
't'dr
". By Ted Agres7-
NEWS WORtD WAsmiNGTON 9uREAt.) ? i
.:-,i?Copyriglit .1986 The Nes4;y
.WASHINGTQN:?Presi-.
dent Cadet" ignored evidence;
obtained ,the. CIA that the'
'Soviet Union. had, been. subs;,
tantially involved:: in the
.tal