SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND DISINFORMATION: OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN

ARTICLE APPEAREDt pproved For Rdle4e2.0,0S142/'V4 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R0006002000
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PARAMETERS - JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY WAR COL
SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
AND DISINFORMATION:
by
OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT DENNIS KUX
Lately there has been increased public
attention regarding Soviet "disin-
formation" and "active measures,"
attempts by Moscow to influence political
attitudes and public opinion in non-
communist countries through deceptive and
often covert means.
Yet serious analysis has been limited.
There has been a great deal of focus on
Moscow's espionage endeavors, but this
other facet of the Kremlin's intelligence
operations has received far less scrutiny,
either by the press or academics.
The terminology pertaining to the
subject is unfamiliar and loosely defined,
even among specialists. In fact, the terms
"active measures" and "disinformation" are
both imported directly from the Soviet in-
telligence lexicon. "Disinformation," the
more frequently used and better-known term,
is the English transliteration of the Russian
"dezinformatsiya" or misinforming through
the dissemination of information that is
totally or partially false. The phrase "active
measures" is the English translation of
"aktivnyye meropriyatiya," the name of the
Soviet KGB unit charged with implementing
these activities.
In Soviet intelligence doctrine, the
concept of "active measures" covers a wide
span of practices including disinformation
operations, political influence efforts, and
the activities of Soviet front groups and
foreign communist parties. All active
measures have the common goal of enhancing
Soviet influence, usually by tarnishing the
image of opponents. They generally involve
elements of deception and often employ
clandestine means to mask Moscow's hand in
the operation.
Overall, where active measures fit in the
Soviet framework may be better understood
by considering the whole spectrum of Soviet
foreign policy endeavors through the optic of
"white," "gray," and "black" operations.
Normal diplomatic, trade, aid, and in-
formational efforts can be considered
"white" or overt activities. "Gray" ac tv tires
are those involving communist fronts,
foreign communist parties, "clandestine"
radio stations, or well-known media outlets
for disinformation. While not officially
acknowledged to be Soviet sponsored, semi-
overt "gray" activities are widely known as
under Soviet direction and control. In
contrast, "black" activities involve genuinely
clandestine operations: the use of agents of
influence, spreading false rumors, duping
politicians and journalists, and disseminating
forgeries and fake documents. Active
measures fall under either the "gray" or the
"black" rubric, although the line between the
semi-overt and the clandestine is often
blurred.
Finding an appropriate English phrase to
describe active measures is difficult. Former
Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagle-
burger has written: "No phrase in English
conveys precisely the meaning of active
measures. Perhaps World War II
psychological warfare operations provide the
closest parallel."'
The So% lets first used active measures as
a policy tool in the 1920s when :Moscow
sought to discredit emigre groups in Western
Europe, particularly rt France, by spreading
disinformation and by luring emigre activists
back to Russia through various subterfuges.
Even before the 1917 Revolution, the Tsarist
secret police emplo%ed similar deceptive
techniques, using foreign agents not only to
collect intelligence but also to sow dissent
among emigre groups and, by covert sub-
sidies to selected journals, to attempt to
create a better foreign press for Imperial
Russia.
In the 1950s the Soviet Union in-
stitutionalized these practices, establishing an
intelligence unit that specialized in disin-
formation; this was Department D within the
First Chief Directorate of the Soviet in-
telligence organization. In the 1960s, the term
Continued
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WASHINGTON TIMES
25 December 1985
~E TIE BELTWAY
Polygraph 'em
Journalists are often the equals
of Doubting Thomas in the face of
"official statements." The latest
cynical aside following a line de-
livered by an official spokesman
is: "Give him a polygraph!"
The use of polygraphs, de-
nounced by Secretary of State
George Shultz, also has become an
issue for various activists to ride
piggyback. Free the Eagle has
joined the Federation for Amer-
ican Afghan Action, for example,
in calling for "a public lie-detector
test for CIA Deputy Director John
McMahon" on the matter of covert
Afghan aid. According to John
Houston of Free the Eagle, a
"polygraph test for McMahon is
necessary to determine if the di-
sastrous covert aid is deliberate
policy or sheer incompetence."
Mr. McMahon, often mentioned
as a successor to William Casey as
director of the CIA, has been a
target of the two groups for some
time. The current polygraph flap
offers them yet another opportu-
nity to bring their charges to the
fore.
- John Elvin
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ON PAGE 12 December 1985
Panel vote
.expected
today on
Sporkin
judgeship
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES.
The Senate Judiciary Committee
investigation into charges that CIA
General Counsel Stanley Sporkin
shielded a senior CIA official from a
Justice Department espionage pros-
ecution is expected to end today with
a committee vote oq Mr. Sporkin's:--
nomination to a federal judgeship.
The controversial nomination has
been held up for 18 months. during
an investigation of allegations of im-
proprieties relating, to Mr. Sporkn's
role in a CIA investigation of a leak.
The only open hearing an the
nomination revealed `Tuesday that
Mr. Sporkin was involved in a dis-
pute between the CIA and the FBI,
and that both agencies had delayed
giving details of the investigation to
committee investigators.
Sen. Jeremiah Denton,. Alabama
Republican, told the hearing that he
had become Mr. Sporkin's primary
antagonist in the affair because of
"missives" from FBI officials who
sought to challenge Mr. Sporkin's
nomination. Mr. Denton heads a Ju-
diciary subcommittee on security
and terrorism that oversees FBI ac-
tivities.
Mr. Denton said in an interview
'Ittesday the investigation into the
nomination has produced numerous
"sworn contradictory statements,'
that may involve perjury.
According to congressional
sources close to the investigation,
FBI officials oppose the nomination
because, they say, Mr. Sporkin
blocked a Justice Department espi-
onage investigation of a senior CIA
intelligence officer that began in
July 1982 and ended with the res-
ignation of Charles E. Waterman, a
CIA national intelligence officer for
Middle East affairs.
The congressional sources, who
requested anonymity, provided the
following account of the dispute be-
tween the FBI and CIA, which has
been verified independently by
other sources close to the investiga.
tion:
The investigation began when the
National Security Agency obtained
electronic intercepts that indicated
data from an internal CIA publica-
tion relating to Middle East sources
had been passed to a Washington re-
search center and published in the
center's monthly newsletter.
The Justice Department then or-
dered an FBI investigation into the
leak and traced its source to Mr. Wa-
terman, the CIA's top Middle East
affairs intelligence analyst.
In the spring of 1984, this account
goes, Mr. Waterman's attorney, Sey-
mour Glanzer, called the FBI's Wash-
ington field office and told FBI
agents that Mr. Sporkin had ar-
ranged for him to provide pro bono
legal counsel for Mr. Waterman. Mr.
Glanzer told the FBI agents that the
leak of classified information had
been authorized by. CIA officials.
Therefore, Mr, Waterman had vio-?
lated no laws regarding the disclo-
sure of classified information.
Mr. Glanzer has said he did not
provide free legal services to Mr.
Waterman, but would not say how
much Mr. Waterman paid him for his
services.
The FBI reply to Mr. Glanzer was
that the investigation could be con-
cluded if he could produce an affida-
vit from the CIA saying the leak had
been authorized.
Deputy CIA Director John
McMahon refused to authorize an
official CIA statement on the disclo-
sure of the secret data.
Mr. Glanzer then called the FBI
and arranged a meeting, which was
attended by Mr. Sporkin, Mr. Water-
man and CIA Deputy Director for
Intelligence Robert Gates.
The meeting was called to dispel
the allegation that Mr. Waterman
had disclosed information without
authorization, without an affidavit
from the CIA.
Instead, the meeting prompted a
letter from William French Smith,
then the U.S. attorney general, to
CIA Director William Casey, warn-
ing that the Justice Department
might prosecute Mr. Waterman on
espionage charges unless the CIA
took action.
CIA spokesman George Lauder
said no letter had been sent on the
subject of Justice Department pros-
ecution of Mr. Waterman, but he
would not say whether the Justice
Department sought to prosecute a
senior CIA official.
Mr. Waterman left the agency in
late 1984 and now works as a foreign
policy consultant.
Mr. Sporkin, who has previously
said he was carrying out his respon-
sibility as CIA general counsel in no-
tifying Mr. Waterman to obtain legal
counsel, could not be reached for
comment.
The FBI also opposes the Sporkin
nomination because they believe Mr.
Sporkin woad favor the CIA as the
presiding judge of the Foreign Int$ JL
ligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
court, congressional sources say.
With his CIA experience, I:.
Sporkin as a judge would be a prime
candidate to head the seven-judge
panel when the term of the presidillt;
judge ends in 1989, the sources said.
The FISA court was establisht:,1
by the 1978 act to authorize wiretaps
and other electronic surveillance
techniques by the FBI and the Na'
tional Security Agency. Judges as e
appointed to a single seven-yc,.r
term by Chief Justice Warr~n
Burger.
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Washington Pondel ui iieiuco:
A Troubled Spy or an Actor?
ing consequences for the C.I.A., whose
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Sgcw a Tss New York rams operational procedures are under acru-
WASHINGTON, Nov. 9 - Vitaly S. tiny in Congress and within the Admin-
Yurchenllso's voice was breaking and istration. Until now, the criticism of
he appeared to be brushing tears from William J. Casey, the Director of Cen-
his eyes this week as he described for tral Intelligence, has focused on covert
reporters what he said were his experi- operations such as the mining of the Co-
ences during three months in the hands rinto harbor in Nicaragua.
of the Central Intelligence Agency. For the first time, it is Mr. Casey's
"When I was sleeping, they prohib performance as this country's chief spy
ited me even to close the door,, I he said. master that is being called into ques-
"Door should be closed, and next room tion by members of Congress and the
was sitting such fat quiet, stupid - ex-i Administration. Administration offi-
cnrse me - unemotional person who is (dais and members of Congress are
following the order. Only following the troubled by the Yurchenko case and by
order." the agency's handling of Edward Lee
Mr. Yurchenko's rambling perform- Howard, a former C.I.A. officer who
ance at the news conference this week Mr. Yurchekno said had helped Soviet
may have been the finale in a elaborate intdllligence identify a valuable Amer-
play staged from the start by Soviet in. ican agent who was a weapons re-
telligence. Or it was a remarkable pub. searcher in Moscow.
lic display of the inner turmoil of a mid- Members of Congress want to know
dle-aged man, a spy spurned by his why Mr. Howard was forced to resign
lover and torn by guilt over betraying while he still knew sensitive informa-
his homeland. tion. And some are asking why Mr.
No one in Washington is sure which Yurchenko was allowed to dine with
explanation is the truth, and members only one companion last Saturday at a
of Congress and knowledgeable Admin- restaurant just a short distance from
istuation officials are divided over how the Soviet embassy compound on Tun-
to interpret the evidence. law Road.
U.S. Denies Mistreatment 'Some Tough Questions'
The State Department has called Mr. "All this has cost the agency," said
Yurchenko's charges against the C.I.A. one senior Administration official.
"completely false," and members of "And they're going have to answer
Congress including Senator Dave some tough questions."
Durenberger, chairman of the Senate "Either a mistake was made in get-
Select Committee on Intelligence, have ting into this situation or a colossal
denied the C.I.A. mistreated him. mistake was made in not spotting a
C.I.A. officials now have begun to double agent," said Senator Patrick
view everything they were told by Mr. LAY, the Vermont Democrat who is
Yurchenko. The agency hhooppeses its ef- Vice Chairman of the Select Commit-
forts to verify leads he prrndded will es- tee on Intelligence.
tablish that he was a legitimate defec- On Friday, in an unusual public
tor who changed his mind. Agency offi-
cials believe the evidence available so
far supports this view.
But the doubts within the Adminis-
tration reach as high as President Rea-
gan, who last week said that Mr. Yur-
chenko's revelations were of little
value. The entire affair, Mr. Reagan marriage and said he was a "general should not underestimate the emo-
suggested, may have been part of designate" of the K.G.B., responsible . tional content of state security offi-
Soviet ploy to disrupt the summit for a variety of spying rations in cars." He said a Soviet in gene
scheduled fair later this month. North America and !officer he had once worked
wiwith As senior intelligence officers, mem- fected because an East German
The case7s'teTy toiiu -e fFIi leach. bers and Congress and exrerts in the woman who was his lover had told au-
0(jnaed
field begin to assess central issue of
Mr. Yurchenko's bona fides, several
themes have begun to emerge.
A Classic Pattern
Those who support the theory that;
Mr. Yurchenko chan his mind
under the stress of de say his
case appears to have followed a classic
pattern.
Current and former intelligence offi-
cers said that virtually all the defectors
to the United States - from senior in-
telligence operatives to merchant sea-
men - have suffered severe emotional
strain that prompts them to seriously
consider returning to their homeland.
,,we get an awful lot of defectors,"
said one official, "and some of them go
back." Only last year, Oleg Bitov, a
Soviet journalist who defected in 1993,
returned to the Soviet Union and at-
tacked the Western nations in which he
had lived. Mr. Yurchenko cryptically !
referred to that case at his press con-:
ference, saying, "I read on the newspa-
pers about Bitov. I don't know," but
adding: "But I can understand him ex-
act S me former officials familiar with
I the C.I.A.'s handling of defectors say i
the Yurchenko case is part of pattern of
insensitivity that has surfaced In other
instances.
Donald Jameson, a retired C.I.A. of-
ficial who dealt with defectors and has
remained close to many of them since
his retirement in 1973, said: "This has
long been one of the least adequate ele-
ments of the agency. The willingness
and the ability to do the right thing has
been lacking."
'The Emotional Content'
statement, the agency appeared to be i Many have questioned whether a
trying to blunt some of the criticism senior K.G.B. official such as Mr. Yur
and to show the Russians that Mr. Yur.: chenko would be willing to return to his
chenko had given away extensive in. homeland after detection, knowing that
agency's three-page biography of Mr. , and a lifetime of disgrace.
Yurchenko?mentioned the strains in his Mr. Jameson responded, "One
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thorities about his Swiss bank ac-
counts.
Nonetheless, this spy went back into
East Germany to rescue the woman
who had turned him in. "He walked
into a trap, and I think he knew it, but
he couldn't help himself," Mr. Jame-
son said.
Mr. Jameson, who has remained
close to defectors since his retirement,
asserts that the agency has often not
paid enough attention to their precari-
ous psychological state. "I cannot
think of a defector-who has not, how-
ever briefly, come to the conclusion
that the only thing to do was go back
and make restitution."
Lave Affair Cited
Mr. Yurchenko, according to Amer-
ican officials, had hoped to continue his
longtime love affair with the wife of a
Soviet diplomat who lives in Canada. In
September, American authorities
drove him to Ottawa where, by their
normal signals, a face-to-face meeting
was arranged, according to officials In
W on and Canada. The woman
spurn him, officials say, and Mr.
I Yurchenko appeared to grow de.
pressed and less cooperative after that
trip.
When an intelligence officer defects,
the C.I.A. assembles a team of officials
to conduct interviews and analyze the
information gleaned. One senior intelli-
gence officer noted that defectors usu-
ally arrive prepared to tell a set story.
After this initial phase, the inter-
viewers begin to investigate more
deeply, asking the defector to reveal
things he would prefer to keep secret. It
is at this point, the official said, that the
homesickness, guilt, and emotional.
stress often reach their peak.
Ladislav Bittman, a Czech intelli-
gence officer who defected in 1988, re-
calls that his experiences with the
C.I.A. were mixed: Some officials
were sensitive but others did not seem
attuned to the cultural shock suffered
by an Eastern European plunged into
American society.
Of his debriefing, he said: "Basically)
it was done on a professional level ands
not much attention is paid to psy-
chological stress of the individual. This
is an extremely important issue bcause
the defector is going through the most
dramatic trauma of his life. He has
given up his home, his values, his coun-
try. He is like a defenseless child
to find a new life."
The most important piece of evi-
dence that argues against Mr. Yur-
chenko being a genuine defector would
be what some officials say is the "am-
biguous" importance of the informa-
tion he has provided.
Senator William S. Cohen, a Maine
Republican who was one of several
senators who doubted Mr. Yurchenko's
bona fides, notes that much of the infor-
mation that has been publicly revealed
was historical in nature. Mr. Howard,
the former C.I.A. officer, was a "spent
agent" in the parlance of the intelli-
gence trade, and Mr. Yurchenko's help
in identifying him has largely served to
cause in the C.I.A. Additional-
ly, he i #ald to have explained the ;
death of Nicholas Shadrin, an Amer-,
ican double agent who disappeared in
Vienna in 1975.
'Historical' Information
A White House official said it was the
"historical" nature of these revela-
tions that had led him to downplay Mr.
Yurchenko's value.
The C.I.A. contends that the remain-
ing information, which has not been
leaked to the public, will establish his
bona fides. But Administration offi-
cials outside the C.I.A. who have re-
viewed the whole body of statements
taken from Mr. Yurchenko are said to
remain undecided about whether he
was a genuine defector.
One official questioned Whether the
Russians would risk a live press confer-
ence with a man supposedly cracking
from emotional stress 'without some
very good reason to believe he would
follow the prepared propaganda line.
Senator Malcolm Wallop, a Wyoming
Republican who doubted Mr. Yur-
chenko from the first, said the C.I.A.'s
Deputy Director, John McMahon, told
him several weeks ago: "I'd stake my
career an Yurchenko's bona fides."
But a White House offi0al re-
marked: "The jury is still "
I,
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 J
ARTICLE AMUM 1 r WASHINGTON POST
M4 PACE, 3 November 1985
-
CIA Anti-Qaddafi Plan Backed
Reagan Authorizes Covert Operation to Undermine Libyan Regime
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By Bob Woodward
Washington Poet Starr Writer
President Reagan has authorized
a Central Intelligence Agency co-
vert operation designed to under-
mine the Libyan regime headed by
Col. Muammar Qaddafi, according
to informed government sources.
The plan, which involves CIA as-
sistance to another country or
countries in North Africa and the
Middle East that oppose Qaddafi,
has run into initial resistance from
the House and Senate Select Com-
mittees on Intelligence, which over-
see the CIA. The chairman and vicei
chairman of the Senate panel re-
cently wrote Reagan to outline op-
position to the covert operation.
However, a narrow majority of
the members of both panels so far
supports the covert action, admin-
istration sources said. Secretary of
State George P. Shultz appeared
before the House committee as re-
cently as last week to support the
plan.
The operation, authorized in a
formal presidential "finding" signed
this fall, is at first designed to dis-
rupt, preempt and frustrate Qad-
dafi's subversive and terrorist
plans, the sources said. Secondly,
they said, it might lure him into
some foreign adventure or terrorist
exploit that would give a growing
number of Qaddafi opponents in the
Libyan military a chance to seize
power; or such a foreign adventure
might give one of Qaddafi's neigh-
bors, such as Algeria or Egypt, a
justification for responding to Qad-
dafi militarily.
After 41/2 years of ineffective eco-
nomic sanctions and perhaps some
minor financial support or encour-
agement to Libyan dissidents in ex-
ile, the administration has decided
that Qaddafi is such an international
menace to U.S. interests that co-
vert action should be undertaken,
argued that the new covert plan is That 1984 assessment, part of
designed to stop terrorism, not to the analysis that led to the decision
support the assassination of Qad- to launch a covert` action now, also
dafi. concluded that disaffected ele-
ments in the [Libyan] military could
A at-
signed by Reagan expressly forbids spurred to assras with h the
the CIA or any other U.S. govern- tempts or to cooperate with the
ment agency from direct or indirect exiles against Qaddafi."
In light of the executive order
involvement in any assassination banning U.S. involvement in assas-
plan. sination, several sources voiced
This is the issue that most con- surprise that the word was used in
cerned the chairman and vice chair- this; -vulnerability assessment that
man of the Senate Select Intelli- was prepared under the direction of
gence Committee, Sens. David F. the national intelligence officer
Durenberger (R-Minn.) and Patrick (NIO) for the Near East and South
J. Leahy (D-Vt.) respectively, who Asia, the top analyst in the U.S.
conveyed their opposition to the intelligence community for that re-
plan against Qaddafi in a letter to gion.
the White House, sources said. In The vulnerabilities of the Qaddafi
the letter they asked Reagan how government could only be ex-
the plan would avoid the prohibition ploited, according to the assess-
against assassination attempts or ment, "through a broad program in
plans. cooperation with key countries
The White House responded, combining political, economic and
sources said, by insisting that there paramilitary action." It also said
was no plan to assassinate Qaddafi that "the exile groups, if supported
and by asking the two senators to to a substantial degree, could soon
delete the word.assassination from begin an intermittent campaign of
their letter. The senators declined sabotage and violence which could
to do so, sources said. prompt further challenges to Qad-
Administration sources said dafi's authority."
there is no doubt that Reagan, The assessment said Libyan ex-
Shultz and Casey would like to see iles who oppose Qaddafi have re-
Qaddafi toppled, and believe that a ceived support from Egypt, Iraq,
support operation costing several Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and
million dollars through a third coun- Tunisia.
try is the type of antiterrorist op- The State Department intelli-
eration that can safely and legally gence branch disagreed with the
be undertaken. vulnerability assessment and said in
According to intelligence reports, a footnote that it "rests too heavily
Qaddafi gives support to some 30 on fragmentary, unsubstantiated
insurgent, radical or terrorist reporting and fails to give sufficient
groups worldwide, ranging from weight tot Qaddafi's enduring pop-
current hot spots such as Nicaragua ularity ......
and the Philippines to groups in Since 1981, the first year of the
Lebanon, Pakistan, Europe, South Reagan presidency when' Qaddafi
America, the Caribbean and Africa, allegedly dispatched "hit teams" to
that, reports allege, are pursuing assassinate the president. or other
goals contrary to U.S. interests. top U.S. officials, Qaddafi has been
A top secret, 29-page "Vulner- a thorn in the administration's side.
ability Assessment" done by the The president has authority to
CIA and other U.S. intelligence begin covert operations that he
agencies and dated June 18, 1984, deems necessary for the national
concluded that "no course of action securi ty Under the law the con-
officials said. short of stimulating Qaddafi's fall ressional oversight committees
Shultz and q4 ~i IN lea 2@~S/ '/4 if6 4tPWE~P~9 ff0901 RO QQ0~?Q{ @Mfully and in a
A J. Casey, according to sources, have ing change in Libyan policies."
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timely fashion. If Congress objects
to the operation, the only recourse
is to cut off the funds, as was done.
with the CIA covert operation
against Nicaragua.
An alternative to an actual at-
tempt to overthrow Qaddafi, ac-
cording to sources and documents,
might be some paramilitary support
to Egypt or Algeria, the chief coun-
tries that might be able to bring
pressure on Qaddafi, though both
have had serious reservations about
cooperating with the United States
in the past when covert anti-Qaddafi
proposals have been discussed.
Last year, according to sources, a
covert plan against Qaddafi was
blocked by CIA Deputy Director
John N. McMahon on grounds that
the exiles were "Boy Scouts" and
too weak to have even' half a chance
at success.
Casey supported that decision
not to move ahead with a covert
operation because no U.S. ally
would support it. Last year Qaddafi
was gaining some respectability in
Europe, expanding intelligence ties
with Greece and enhancing military
relations with Italy and Turkey,
according to intelligence sources.
The sources were unable to ex-
plain exactly why the administration
has chosen this time to launch the
covert operation. But they pointed
to a Special National Intelligence
Estimate entitled, "Libya's Qaddafi:
the Challenge to the United States
and Western Interests," completed
earlier this year, that said Qaddafi
"provides money, weapons, a base
of operations, travel assistance or
training to some 30 insurgent, rad-
ical or terrorist groups."
The report said reliable intelli-
gence showed Qaddafi stirring up
trouble worldwide by continuing
.subversion in Chad, Sudan and Tu-
nisia; pursuing common goals with
what the estimate called the "rad-
ical states" of Iran, Syria, Ethiopia
and Nicaragua, and through con-
tinuing support to groups in the
Philippines, New Caledonia, Pak-
istan and Zaire.
A map in the intelligence esti-
mate showed Qaddafi supporting
insurgents or terrorist groups in
countries such as Guatemala, El
Salvador, Chile, Colombia, the Do-
minican Republic, Lebanon and
Iraq.
In addition the map showed Qad-
dafi providing financial support to
the political opposition or to leftist
politicians in Costa Rica, St. Lucia,
and Dominica.
The estimate said there were
50,000 Soviet and Eastern Euro-
pean technicians or advisers in Lib-
ya. Such special or regular intelli-
gence estimates are issued by
Casey with input from the other
U.S. intelligence agencies.
Calling Qaddafi "a judicious po-
litical calculator" and pointedly say-
ing that he was not living up to his
madman image, the intelligence
estimate said that Qaddafi would
continue to be a threat to U.S. and
Western interests.
Early this year some Libyan mil-
itary officers launched two unsuc-
cessful assassination attempts
against Qaddafi, who responded by
executing as many as 75 officers
accused of participating in them.
U.S. intelligence agencies re-
ceive almost a steady stream of re-
ports-many considered reliable-
that Qaddafi is expanding his ter-
rorist capabilities and planning var-
ious actions against U.S. installa-
tions or individuals.
Earlier this year one report said
Qaddafi had formed two new special
operations units to conduct com-
mando and terrorist operations,
including one naval unit headed by a
senior aide.
Within the last two weeks there
have been intelligence reports that
Qaddafi was targeting the U.S. Em-
bassy in Tunis and the U.S. ambas-
sador to Tunisia, according to gov-
ernment sources.
Staff researcher Barbara Fein man
contributed to this report.
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RET
N,~; WASHINGTON TIMES
1 November 1985
Afghan rebels backers
blame CIA, official
for
restricting covert aid
~
By BjII Gertz J
THE VYFSRIRUT(J?I'TIMES
Representatives of three Afghan
resistance support groups yesterday
called for the ouster of Deputy CIA
Director .iohn McMahon who, ,tey
charged, has impeded the covert aid
program to Afghan guerrilla
fighters.
"We need to start hitting this ad-
ministration where it hurts, by nam-
ing names and helping to create a
justifiable outrage among the
American people that there is a
genocide going on [in Afghanistan],"
said Neal Blair, president of the con-
servative lobbying group Free the
Eagle.
The remarks were made at a
downtown press conference, where
Mr. Blair said U.S. aid was not
reaching Afghan freedom fighters
and he was not satisfied with the
response from many government
agencies.
The group's 265,000 members are
pressing the CIA's inspector general
to investigate "the botched oper-
ations under McMahon's supervi-
sion;' he said.
"We've undertaken the effort to
have our members write directly to
Donald Regan, White House chief of
staff, urging him to call John
McMahon to account for his per-
formance, Mr. Blair said.
"And unless or until McMahon is
able to do so, we are urging his im-
mediate dismissal from his position
at the CIA," he said.
A CIA spokesman called the al-
legations against Mr. McMahon "asi-
nine" but would not comment fur-
ther.
Nabi Salehi, a college professor
who represents one of the Afghan
mujahideen guerrilla groups, said
"time is running out,, for Afghan
fighters opposing Soviet forces in
Afghanistan.
Since the Soviet invasion in De-
cember 1979, more than 1 million
Afghans have died in the fighting, he
said.
"The war in Afghanistan is no
longer a battle of one armed force
against another," Mn Salehi said. "It
is the systematic technological de-
struction of an entire population by
the army of a superpower."
He called. on the United States to
provide advanced anti-aircraft mis-
siles and ammunition.
Congressional sources said yes-
terday Mr. McMahon has opposed.
supplying the Afghan guerrillas
with the advanced weapons needed
to knock down Soviet helicopter gun-
ships. He fears the U.S. weapons
would fall into Soviet hands and that
the Soviets would then develop coun-
termeasures against the arms, the
sources said.
Andrew L. Eiva, a former U.S. spe-
cial forces soldier and director of a
group called the Federation of
American Afghan Action, said Mr.
McMahon was singled out for doing
the most "in blocking effective aide
to the Afghans and misleading Con-
gress about it."
He provided reporters with a fi-
nancial analysis of CIA covert arms
deliveries to Afghan guerrillas,
which shows that last year less than
one-third of $122 million in weapons
appropriated by Congress had
reached the Afghan resistance. The
loss was attributed to "skimming"
by Pakistani-based Afghan rebels.
The conclusion reached by the
three groups resulted from an inves-
tigation that included information
supplied by Congress and the rebel
forces.
Mn Eiva also distributed a "report
card" grading CIA Afghan oper-
ations that he said were limited by
an effort to provide only the Afghan
guerrillas with "enough to survive,"
but not enough to win any major bat-
tles.
Mr. Eiva estimates that since 1981
the Reagan administration has
appropriated a total of $342 million
in covert assistance to Afghanistan.
But since the aid was covert, U.S.
officials insisted on supplying out-
dated and militarily ineffective
weapons that could not be traced to
U.S. sources.
He called for ending covert assis-
tance and providing more modern
weapons, particularly advanced
shoulder-held Stinger and Redeye
surface-to-air missiles.
Mr. McMahon served as "point
man" for CIA efforts to curb legisla-
tion that would facilitate the flow of
advance weapons and briefed at
least three members of Congress in
an effort defend the CIA's efforts in
Afghanistan, Mr. Eiva said.
Indiana Republican Representa-
tive Dan Burton, a supporter of con-
gressional aid to the Afghan guerril-
las, said in an interview that he has
pressured the CIA to "get through to
those mujahideen people everything
that Congress sent."
"People are dying over there;' Mr.
Burton said. "They are fighting for
freedom and, by gosh, we as a Con-
gress have made a commitment to
help them, and we ought to do it.,,
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1
CIA spy
gave clues
of intent
to ends
By Bill Gertz
TH w*->a+QTON nos
The CIA mishandled both the hir-
ing and firing of Edward L. Howard,
a former employee suspected of sell-
ing the Soviet Union top secret infor-
mation. on CIA operations in
Moscow, an intelligence official says.
Fugitive and former CIA oper.
ative Howard had trained for a MOs-
cow assignmentand learned some of
the agency's most sensitive secrets
before he was fired in June 1983
after failing two lie detector tests,
the official said.
The intelligence official, who
spoke on the condition he not be
identified, called the affair "a secu-
rity scandal of major proportions."
He said the CIA had failed to take
steps to put Howard under surveil-
lance even after he told two CIA offi-
cers in Austria he had considered
getting even for his dismissal by
revealing details of the CIA's Mos.
cow operations.
During a L984 trip to Austria,
Howard gave the Soviet intelligence
service, the KGB, information that
led to the arrest of a CIA agent in the
Soviet avionics industry, according
to federal officials.
Howard met "two current
employed of the CIA" four days later
and told them he had considered
spying for the Soviets in Vgtshingoon,
according to court documents,
Howard's meeting th thOMCW said
.CIA offi-
cers was not reported laths FBI, but
CIA officials contend -appropriate
action was taken" Under federal pri.
vacy laws, the CIA cannot monitor
Americans who express "fantasies"
about spying, a CIA official said,
"We were obviously. very can.
cerned about him the Official, said. the Hem was nnot
neglected nor ignored," Published
WASHINGTON TIMES
21 October 1985
reports have said the CIA hired a
psychiatrist for Howard after he left
the agency to work as a financial
analyst in New Mexico.
Howard has since fled the United
States and is believed to be in Mos-
cow
Howard's treachery was dis-
closed by Soviet defector Vitaly
Yurchenko, a senior KGB offices
Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence spokesman Dave Holiday
said the committee is investigating
both the CIA's hiring of Howard and
charges that the FBI was not alerted
to Howard% statement that be had
United espionage against the
States.
Under CIA guidelines, all con-
tacts with Americans suspected of
espionage must be reported to the
FBI. The FBI maintains a liaison
office at the CIA's headquarters in
Langley, Va., to handle such cases.
Mr. Holiday said that during ini-
tial committee briefings on the How-
ard case, no mention was made of
the CIA's contact with Howard in
Austria.
Regarding the CIA's hiring of
Howard, "one of the questions that
we have wanted to know all along is
what was the result of the first [poly-
graph test], W. Holiday said in an
interview, "If he had problems on
the second one, did he develop them
in that 21/2-year period or was it
detected in the beginning;" he asked?
A CIA official said Howard would
not have been hired by the agency if
he had failed polygraph testing.
But another administration offi-
cial said Howard failed one of two
polygraph tests when he was hired
by the CIA in January 1981.
Although he passed a loyalty test, a
test about his personal lifestyle indi-
cated illegal drug use- He was told to
"clean up his act" and began training
within the CIA's clandestine oper-.
ations division, the official said. Two
and a half years later, Howard again
failed a lie detector test, which
showed continued drug use and also
theft of agency funds, the official
said.
Rather than transfer Howard out
of clandestine services, the agency
summarily dismissed him, he said.
The CIA's handling of the Howard
case has focused attention on
Deputy CIA Director John N.
McMahon, the agency's executive
director at the time Howard was
hired in January 1983.
According to an intelligence offi-
cial, Mr. McMahon vetoed an over-
seas counterspy program, which
might have
and before he tagents
contacted the KGB in
Austria.
The Program also might have
detected
'Y John Walker, who allegedly met
frequently with KGB officials in
Vienna, and CIA clerk Sharon might have prevented
Scranage from
Passing secrets to a Ghanaian intel-
ligence agent, the official said.
Scranage pleaded guilty last month,
and Mr. Wklker is awaiting trial is
Baltimore.
In 1978 Mr. McMahon was pro-
-
fmieoltd ed Tbry nfeor rmto er dCeIpA utdyredrcecr tSor afnosr
operations - the section that han-
dles clandestine operations -
although records show his exper-
ience was limited to technical and
electronic intelligence collection.
Conservative critics have charged
that Mr. McMahon's control over
CIA policies eclipses that of CIA
Director William Casey.
CIA spokesman say what oleLauder Mr.
would
r
McMahon played in bringing How-
ard into the agency. But he said
"John McMahon had absolutely
nothing to do with Howard's depar-
ture from the agency."
After Howard's disappearance
last month in New Mexico, the CIA's
chief of security, William Kotopish,.
was transferred from his post, an
administration official said. He
described the new CIA security
chief as a "manager" with no secu-
rity background who had been rec
ommended by Mr. McMahon. He
declined to reveal his name.
Mr. Lauder confirmed that a new
security chief has been appointed
but said the selection had been made
by Mr. Casey.
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 -IV
ARTICLE APP proved For Release 2005/1 JA8V%7ctommffld500901 R000600200001-2
IN PA
stunned U.S. spy network as Yank traitor betrays our man in Moscow
SOVIETS EXECUTE
By NILES LATHEM
Bureau Chief
WASHINGTON - The
CIA's most prized "mole"
in the Soviet Union was
arrested and executed
last summer, The Post
learned last night.
He was captured
through information
provided to the KGB by
fugitive CIA turncoat
Edward Howard.
Top U.S. intelligence of-
ficials confirmed last
night that the American
agent, A.G. Tolkachev,
was arrested and exe-
cuted last July after
being betrayed by How-
ard - his former "con-
trol," or supervising case
officer, in Moscow.
Tolkachev was an
electronics wizard who
worked at a top-secret
military aviation com-
pound in Moscow.
According to an ac-
count in yesterday's Wall
Street Journal, Tolka-
chev for several years
had provided the CIA
with details of the latest
Soviet advances in radar
and "stealth technology"
- the most sensitive in-
formation in military
aviation.
He also is believed to
have given the U.S. its
first tipoff about Soviet
plans for the large
phased-array radar
system under construc-
tion in Krasnoyarsk -
the center of the Sovi-
et's own Star Wars nu-
clear defense system.
Last night, the CIA
would give no official
comment on the latest
revelation to rock the in-
telligence underworld.
But administration
and congressional
sources confirmed to
The Post that the CIA
had lost one of its most
treasured "human as-
sets" behind the Iron
Curtain as a result of
Howard's double-deal-
ing with Moscow.
Tolkachev's arrest for
espionage was an-
nounced by the Soviet
news agency Tass in
July.
Howard, a former CIA
agent with a history of
emotional problems. es-
caped an FBI dragnet in
New Mexico on Sept. 23
after his dealings with
Moscow were exposed by
KGB defector Vitaiy
Yurchenko - the No. 5
man in the KGB.
He had been working
as an economic analyst
for the New . Mexico
Legislature.
He is now believed to
be under safekeeping in
Howard, 33, joined the
CIA in January 1981
and was assigned as a
deep-cover case officer
to the U.S. Embassy i
Moscow.
His main assignment,
sources confirmed, was
to handle the information
being provided to the em-
bassy by Tolkachev
through a series of
"dead-drop" sites estab-
lished throughout Mos-
cow.
The CIA had estab-
lished through a series
of polygraph tests that
Howard had a history
of drug problems in-
cluding cocaine. In 1983,
Howard was eased out
of the CIA under orders
from CIA Deputy Direc-
tor John MacMahon.
It is believed that
Howard's bitterness at
being fired by the CIA is
what prompted him to
become a traitor.
The loss of one of the
CIA's most important
spies and the bungling
of Howard's case by the
CIA has angered key
members of congres-
sional committees.
The congressmen are
demanding that both
the FBI and the CIA im-
prove its counter-
intel-ligence-capabilities.
telligence abilities were
crippled in the '70s in
the wake of the domes-
tic spying scandals that
led to the firing of coun-
ter-intelligence chief
James Angleton.
Intelligence experts
say that the FBI has
never been given the
proper funding and re-
sources to keep up with
the steady increase of
Soviet espionage activi.
ties in the U.S.
Newly released photo shows F-15 jet
launching anti-satellite missile during se-
cret test. Technology is closely guarded
because of high-stakes espionage war.
The Soviet
space shuttle
- on which
U.S. intelli-
gence keeps
the Red cen-
terpiece in the
space-weap-
ons race.
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17 October 1985
A
ON PAGE
KGB Defector Confirms U.S. Intelligence Fiasco
By WILLIAM KUCEWICZ - "He saved us billions of dollars in develop- was Intelligence
In April 1982, Mr. McMahon
t 11
t
b
lli
month of issuing what can only be called a
press release. In a statement distributed
by the official TASS news agency, the So-
viet intelligence agency accused a Soviet
citizen of spying for the U.S. and also an-
nounced the expulsion of a U.S. Embassy
official.
The KGB named the suspected spy as
A.G. Tolkachev. He was Identified merely
as a staff member of a "Moscow research
institute." No other details about his back-
ground were provided. His arrest appar-
ently took place sometime in early June.
The announcement maintained that Mr.
Tolkachev had been caught passing infor-
mation to an American diplomat, Paul M.
Stombaugh, of the U.S. Embassy's political
section. Mr. Stombaugh was ordered to
leave the Soviet Union June 14. The KGB
statement gave no explanation for the
three-month delay in announcing Mr. Tol-
kachev's arrest and Mr. Stombaugh's ex-
pulsion.
Western news correspondents in Mos-
cow interpreted the belated announcement
as one-upmanship by Soviet authorities. A
week earlier, Britain had expelled 31 So-
viets for spying and the Soviet Union re-
sponded in kind by ousting an equal num-
ber of Britons in Moscow. This exchange
had been triggered by the defection of a
Soviet spy in London, who had apparently
worked as a double agent for the British
for years. The Tolkachev announcement
was seen as just another spy maneuver.
Valuable Human Asset
That wasn't the real story, however. Ac-
cording to high-level U.S. intelligence
sources, Mr. Tolkachev was one of the
Central Intelligence Agency's most valua-
ble human assets in the Soviet Union. And
his exposure and arrest stand as indict-
ments of gross mismanagement and inepti-
tude reaching to the highest levels of U.S.
counterintelligence operations.
Mr. Tolkachev was an electronics ex-
pert at a military aviation institute in Mos-
cow. Over several years, he had passed in-
valuable information to the U.S. about the
Soviet Union's latest research efforts in
new aircraft technology-especially avion-
ics, or electronic guidance and counter-
measures; advanced radar; and so-called
"stealth," or radar-avoidance, techniques.
Such research is at the cutting edge of mil-
itary aircraft breakthroughs, both for the
Soviets and the U.S. Mr. Tolkachev, one
source hinted, may have also tipped the
U.S. off to the large phased-array radar at
Krasnoyarsk-a treaty-violating facility In
the south-central part of the country aimed
at completing a nationwide anti-ballistic-
missile defense.
"He was one of our most lucrative
agents," said another well-placed source.
men cos
s
y te
ng the US. about the was named by President Reagan to re-
direction of Soviet aviation efforts. In that place Adm. Bobby R. Inman as deputy in-
way, American researchers could more telligence director.
precisely target their own work toward In spring 1983, Mr. Howard was told to
countering future Russian military resign or he'd be fired. Mr. McMahon took
threats. this step despite Mr. Howard's privileged
U.S. intelligence experts believe that knowledge of U.S. intelligence operations
Mr. Tolkachev is fated for execution, if he in Moscow, and what his continued drug
is not already dead. But how was he dis- use said about his emotional stability.
covered? And why did the KGB wait three (Later, In February 1984, Mr. Howard was
months before announcing his arrest? arrested for brandishing a pistol at three
Mr. Tolkachev wasn't merely caught in men in downtown Santa Fe, N.M.; in a
the act of passing secrets to the U.S. Em- plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to an as-
bassy's Mr. Stombaugh, as the KGB sault charge and was sentenced to proba-
claims. In fact, as U.S. Intelligence sources tion.) Instead of firing him, intelligence ex-
Edward Howard, an untried and untested trainee
suspected earlier of drug use, was, inexcusably, told about
critical U. S. human intelligence operations in Moscow.
tell it, he was betrayed by a former CIA
agent, Edward L. Howard. And the KGB's
peculiar September announcement was ap-
parently a ruse to try to put U.S. counter-
intelligence officers off the scent of this
turncoat.
Mr. Howard, who is now 33, joined the
CIA in January 1981. An initial polygraph
test indicated that he was an occasional
drug user. Agency officials told him to end
his drug-taking or face dismissal. He then
promised to give up drugs.
Shortly thereafter, he entered an inten-
sive, 2%-year training program to become
a "deep cover" case officer in the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow. One of his assign-
ments would be to "run" Mr. Tolkachev;
in other words, he was to.collect Mr. Tol-
kachev's materials at "dead drop" sites
in Moscow and to care for his needs. In the
course of his training, this untried and un-
tested trainee was, Inexcusably, told about
critical. U.S. human intelligence operations
in Moscow; he was even informed about
anti-Soviet operations in the U.S. Mr. How-
ard was also trained for several months by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in sur-
veillance techniques and evasion.
Before being dispatched to Moscow, Mr.
Howard was given another polygraph test,
which suggested that his drug use had con-
tinued and also indicated at least one in-
stance of petty theft outside the govern-
ment. According to sources who have long
been critical of shortcomings in U.S. coun-
parts suggest, a more sensible course
might have been to cancel Mr. Howard's
transfer to Moscow but retain him in a
nonsensitive area of the agency where his
actions could be closely monitored.
(Mr. McMahon didn't return a phone
call yesterday requesting comment.)
In September 1984, Mr. Howard told two
of his former colleagues at the CIA that
he was thinking of passing his informatidn
to the Soviets as an act of revenge, accord-
ing to documents filed in a Justice Depart-
ment criminal complaint against him.
These agents then told the proper CIA au-
thorities about Mr. Howard's threat. But
the agency's only response was to get a
psychiatrist for Mr. Howard in New Mex-
ico, where the CIA had helped him find a
job as an economic analyst with the state
government back in June 1983.
Meanwhile, a momentous event was oc-
curring a continent away that would
darken further the profile of Edward How-
ard. On July 28 of this year, in Rome, a
visiting Soviet official was taking a stroll
with some colleagues. He told them that he
would meet them back at the embassy af-
ter he toured the Vatican museum. His So-
viet compatriots never saw him again, and
a month later he was in the U.S. being de-
briefed by the CIA. The Soviet official is
Vitaly Yurchenko of the KGB. By many
accounts, he is one of the most important
The State Department officially an-
terintelligence capability, Deputy Director pounced Mr. Yurchenko's defection last
of Central Intelligence John N. McMahon pl( week. He was deputy chief of the North
at this point decided he wanted Mr. How- American department of the KGB's First
and (JUL of the agency. Mr. McMahon, a ca-
reer intelligence officer for more than 30
years, had been the CIA's executive di-
rector, responsible for the day-to-day man-
agement of the agency, when Mr. Howard
Chief Directorate, which is in charge of the
Soviet Union's world-wide spy operations.
He was "specifically responsible for the di-
rection of KGB Intelligence operations in
the U.S. and Canada," the State Depart-
Continued
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2
ment's announcement said. In addition, he
held a senior position in the KGB's coun-
terintelligence program, which aims to
root out any Russian moles working for the
U.S. or other foreign governments. Pre-
viously, Mr. Yurchenko served as a spy in
the Soviet Embassy in Washington from
1975 to 1980. As a result of these positions,
Mr. Yurchenko was able to gain a broad
understanding of the highly compartmen-
talized operations of the KGB.
Mr. Yurchenko gave his debriefers a
code name for a former CIA agent who
had supplied valuable information to the
KGB. While he did not have the real name
of the agent, Mr. Yurchenko did provide
enough information for U.S. authorities to
"sift through" the relevant data and fi-
nally pinpoint Mr. Howard as the sus-
pected spy, said law-enforcement sources,
who asked not to be identified. According
to other sources familar with the debrief-
ing, Mr. Yurchenko said that this former
CIA agent had provided the KGB with de-
tails about U.S. human intelligence activi-
ties in Moscow, including the identity of
A.G. Tolkachev. Mr. Howard's revelations,
therefore, prompted Mr. Tolkachev's ar-
rest and likely execution.
Major Foul-Up
FBI agents were instructed to interview
Mr. Howard but not to arrest him. Ex-
plained a law-enforcement source: "The
information provided by the defector,
standing alone, was not sufficient to estab-
lish probable cause." After he was quizzed,
FBI agents kept Mr. Howard under sur-
veillance. In a major foul-up, however, no
one ever told the FBI agents that Mr. How-
ard had been schooled by the bureau itself
in surveillance and evasion tactics.
On the moonless night of Sept. 21, Mr.
Howard escaped his FBI watchdogs. On
Sept. 23, the FBI issued a warrant for his
arrest, but it was too late. U.S. intelligence
finally succeeded in tracing Mr. Howard's
trail to Finland and then to Moscow, where
he is now presumably being debriefed on
all he knows about U.S. spying operations
in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.
"The United States has virtually zero
counterintelligence capability," Sen. Mal-
colm Wallop (R., Wyo.) said recently in
criticizing the CIA's and FBI's failures in
the Howard case. Some experts are pre-
dicting a major shakeup in intelligence
management due to the Howard-Tolka-
chev-Yurchenko affair. What will remain
after blame is assessed, of course, is that
the U.S. has lost one of its most valuable
human assets in the Soviet Union and his
alleged betrayer has fled safely to Mos-
cow.
Mr. Kucewicz is a member of the Jour-
nal's editorial board.
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2-
17 OCT 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Telecons with David Matthews, Sen. Dole's Office
1. Mr. Matthews called the office on 11 October and asked
to speak with someone about an article criticizing John McMahon
which had appeared in the August 1985 edition of "Free the
Eagle"(copy attached). The Public Affairs Office was contacted
but declined to return Mr. Matthews' call. PAO suggested that
OLL should field the call. I then called Mr. Matthews.
2. Mr. Matthews said that he wished to know what the
Agency's position on the article was. He said that Sen. Dole
had received constituent mail asking if the article was
accurate. He(Mr. Matthews) had been charged with responding to
the constituent mail. I told Mr. Matthews that I would check
with our public affairs people on the matter.
3. I spoke to George Lauder about Matthews' call. Mr.
Lauder std to tell Matthews that the article was
"irresponsible, outrageous, and ridiculous."
4. I attempted to reach Mr. Matthews on 11 and 16
October. He called me on 17 October, and I passed on Mr.
Lauder's words, telling Mr. Matthews that the Agency considered
the article to be beneath the dignity of further comment.
5. Mr. Matthews called back on 17 October seeking
additional information on Mr. McMahon. He asked if Mr. McMahon
conerned himself primarily with Afghanistan. I replied that
Mr. McMahon had many duties and concerns as the DDCI. I said
the DCI was the President's principal adviser on intelligence
matters. His deputy performs the duties assigned to him by the
DCI and acts for the DCI in the latter's absence. I said we
believe that Mr. McMahon is doing an excellent job as DDCI and
that he is indeed supporting the President's policies.
6. Mr. Matthews thanked me, and the call was concluded.
ze iaison Division, ULL
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?i iri:-~Y, STATE OF THE NATION
August 1985
i- pr+e+eidc'nt Aea
i tv ibt.t-
aui^ -yew ?
~_.Ta?is.~r merest; -my
friend, I th t these ir?aune simple
reason why our government does
nothing to stop the Soviet Union:
it's because certain public
o flcfials-ram4eiy John McMahon
-refuse to carry out American
policy.
In a minute. I'll be more spe-
cific.. But first, let me tell you of
the latest events in Afghanistan.
I'm sad to 'say that events
there have taken a turn for the
worse lately.
Last month,
leashed mas
stare air strike
the Af-
ghan people-
not just against
the fi eedom
fighters, but
against peace-
ful civilians as
well.
Why? Because Soviet dictator
Mikhail Gorbachev wants to wrap
up the conquest of Afghanistan.
He's anxious to consolidate his
is
Ironically. an overwhelming
majority of Americans would
gladly give the Afghan freedom
fighters the weapons they need to
protect themselves from this air-
born terror.
President Reagan has pledg-
ed to send effective weapons and
supplies to the Afghan freedom
fighters.
And last October, Congress
unanimously voted-for the first
time ever-to supply effective aid
to the freedom fighters.
Then Congress approved the
largest budget ever for a covert
paramilitary operation-$280
million.
Those votes came after Free
the Eagle asked many of you last
September to write and demand
effective aid for the Afghan
freedom fighters.
Those letters made a
difference!
Yet. despite the Reagan ad-
ministration's official policy, the
unanimous vote of Congress and
the overwhelming support of the
American people...
Neither our State Department
nor the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy will send workable weapons to
the Afghan freedom fighters!
As we've told you in State of
the Nation, the weapons the CIA
power over the Soviet empire. sends the freedom fighters-
And he-wants to prove to the mortars, rifles, mines, machine
world he Is decisive and ruthless. guns and hand-held missiles-are
Gorbachev wants a. quick vic- fold and defective.
tory. So he has stepped up his air- And 85 percent of the ammo
born genocide-pounding Afghan is of the type that won't pierce the
villages day after day, burning, armored gunships that at this
maiming and mutilating thou-
sands of terrified people.
His unchallenged air raids
even bomb hospitals, killing hun-
dreds of helpless patients.
very moment are burning, killing
and maiming the Afghan people.
It's no wonder Soviet air at-
tacks on Afghan villages are so
brazen-and deadly.
Day after day, they maim and
mutilate innocent Afghans-men,
women and children who have no
means to protect themselves.
We could cite many more
examples...
Examples of how the CIA has
failed to supply the Afghan
resistance with effective weapons
and supplies.. .
Examples of how the CIA has
failed to carry out the mandate for
Afghan aid from the Administra-
tion, from Congress and from the
American people.
Why does the CIA persist in
failing to supply the Afghan
freedom fighters with effective
weapons?
Who's behind this massive-
and deadly-blunder?
To find out, Free the Eagle
has done some detective work.
;i= With the help of some of our
sources, we tracked down and un-
covered the specific individual
responsible for this.
His name is John McMahon.
He's a deputy director of the
CIA-one of the top officials there.
And John McMahon has the task
of carrying out the administra-
tion's Afghan policy.
But for three years. McMahon
has pursued his own Afghan
policy!
McMahon runs a two-track
Afghan program: a program of
disinformation and a program of
interference.
In secret briefings to con-
gressmen. McMahon has painted
a misleading picture of CIA per-
formance in Afghanistan, calling
it "outstanding."
Now, perhaps John McMahon
thinks he's right. And perhaps he
thinks he's doing what's best for
America and for the Afghan
people.
But the fact is: he's wrong.
He's negligent or incompetent, or
both.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2
 John McMahoApprcategbFor Releaft2Q 6/1Wg4n-Gl l5P9t1460fi@d R0006VD2QQ11Q4PQ6rt to you in State
Yet only President Reagan -one on this page... of the Nation on how our cam-
aind his top advisors can force the Letters demanding that Mr. paign progresses.
State Department and the CIA to
obey his administration policy,
Congress and the American
people.
Thus, the fight for Afghani-
stan is really not in the Panjshir
Valley but rather right here in our
own country-behind the doors of
the White House.
Its time for the Reagan admin-
istration to hold John McMahon
accountable!
That's why I ask you to sign
the fetter on this page to White
House Chief of Staff Donald
Regan. and then return it to me.
It asks Regan to see that
Deputy Director John McMahon
gets fired-fired for letting down
both the Afghan and the Ameri-
can people!
With your help, we can and
will oust Mr. McMahon! After all.
he works for us!
Over the next three months.
wC plan to collect 50.000 letters to
:"McMahon be dismissed.
We will deliver these per-
sonally to Donald Regan's office.
So please sign the letter to
Donald Regan. Then mail it to
Free the Eagle in the postage paid
envelope enclosed in this issue of
State of the Nation.
At the same time, please help
us to raise the other 50,000 letters
by enclosing your contribution of
$25 or more to Free the Eagle.
The lives of too many inno-
cent people cannot wait any
longer.
For your contribution of $25
or more, we will send you Afghan
Update, the bulletin of FTE's
sister organization. American
Afghan Education Fund.
Many in Congress tell us
Afghan Update is the only source
that gives them the full story on
the war in Afghanistan and CIA
aid to the freedom fighters.
Send your gift of $25, $35 or
more in the enclosed postage paid
envelope.
Once more, let me thank you
for all you have done on behalf of
these innocent people. It has been
so heart-warming to see your ef-
forts have such an effect in the
last year.
So please rush your letter and
contribution to us today because:
John McMahon must go!
These people just cannot wait
any longer.
Sincerely,
Neal B. Blair
President
P.S. If you can get others to write
White House Chief of Staff Donald
Regan. please do so. But please
sign and return your letter to us
today so we can collect and
deliver as many letters as
possible.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2
McMahon Must Go!
Dear Neal.
You're right. John McMahon must go! C
I have signed the letter addressed to White House Chief of Staff
Donald Regan. asking him to see that McMahon gets dismissed.
I am also including an emergency gift to help you in this project:
$15 -~ $25 $35 $50 $100
$150 $250 E $500 $1.000 - $ Other
Name -
Address
City/State/Zip
Check enclosed Charge my ::: MasterCard = VISA
emu-- C=1=cJUUU^^^^^^^^^
Expires Signature
For my contribution of $25 or more. I understand I will receive Afghan
Update for six months.
Mr. Donald Regan
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington. D.C.
Dear Mr. Regan:
As an American citizen who supports the Afghan freedom fighters.
I ask that you see to it that John N. McMahon. a deputy director of the
CIA, gets dismissed.
Mr. McMahon has the task of carrying out the administration's
policy of aid to the Afghan freedom fighters.
But for three years, McMahon has pursued his own Afghan policy'
McMahon has been identified by congressional sources as failing
to carry out in an effective manner the mandate of the Reagan ad-
ministration. Congress and the American people for effective aid to the
Afghan freedom fighters.
Instead. McMahon has run a program of disinformation and in-
terference that prevents effective aid from reaching the Afghan freedom
fighters.
To cover up his negligence and incompetence. McMahon has been
spreading disinformation. In secret briefings to congressmen. he has
painted a misleading picture of CIA performance in Afghanistan, call-
ing it "outstanding."
Anyone with any sense of compassion for the Afghan people would
have to agree: Mr. McMahon is crippling the Afghan's struggle for
freedom.
As an American citizen, I will not tolerate negligence or in-
competence by those charged with guarding my own freedom or
anyone else's.
John McMahon must go!
The lives of many innocent people cannot wait any longer.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
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3
 STAT Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2
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 ARTICLE AP,
ON PAGE
Approved For Wp6412404S'lEIA-RDP91
15 August 1985
Commando Helped Bfli
Alleged Plot to Kill a President
By Charles R- Babcock
Walrin!ton ro,,t Staff write
On a steamy summer Florida
weekend, two former members of
an elite U.S. combat unit meet with
a foreign general and a Miami arms
dealer. The topic: a plot to assas-
sinate the president of a Central
American country.
The commandos later tell the
CIA and 09 about the scheme a
one agrees to work ercover o
e it. The investigation m-
chxles secret videotapes of tsus-
pects aboard a yacht and to dis-
cussions melt ionruIl on o-d~r
drug deal to finance the assassina-
tion.
If that sounds like an outline for a
new episode of "Miami Vice," it
isn't. It is a prosecutor's version of
how the U.S. government stopped
an alleged attempt last year to kill
the president of Honduras.
Arrests in the case made front
page news when announced last
November, but the role of the two
commandos in cracking the case
wasn't disclosed until later. Their
story will unfold in a Miami court-
room later this month when two of
the defendants, arms dealer Gerard
Latchinian and businessman Manuel
Binker, stand trial.
The soldiers are retired Army
colonel Charlie A. Beckwith, com-
mander of the ill-fated attempt to
rescue American hostages in Iran in
1980, and one of his Delta Force
comrades, retired major Charles D.
Odorizzi.
One of the prosecutors in the
case said Beckwith was "more John
Wayne than John Wayne" and Odo-
rizzi "deserves a medal" for his un-
dercover work. In fact, the U.S.
attorney in Miami gave Odorizzi an
"outstanding law enforcement of,
facer" medal last month.
The investigation resulted in the
U.S. indictment of several men, in-
cluding former Honduran army
chief of staff, Gen. Jose Bueso-
Rosa, now the military attache in
Chile, on charges of attempting to
finance a political murder with a
drug deal.
The State Department has said
the case "again demonstrates the
link between drug trafficking and
international terrorism."
Latchinian's attorney, Laurel
White Marc-Charles, contends in
court papers that her client thought
he was dealing with U.S. authorities
because of Beckwith and Odorizzi's
background in secret military op-
erations. Beckwith testified that the
claim was ludicrous. Marc-Charles
also claims that Odorizzi, in his un-
dercover role, entrapped the defen-
dants by suggesting the assassina-
tion could be financed by a drug
deal.
Beckwith declined in a telephone
interview to discuss his role in de-
tail and Odorizzi could not be
reached for comment. But the tran-
script and exhibits from a pre-trial
hearing in April contain details of
their involvement that seem more
suited to a screenplay than reality.
Beckwith, who is now in the pri-
vate security business in Texas,
testified that he accompanied Odo-
rizzi to the meeting in Miami in July
1984 because he was "trying to get
my oar down in Latin America to do
a few things" and thought the dis-
cussion would center on a training
mission in Honduras. Instead, . he
heard from the people he met that
"they wanted to take someone out.,,,
Beckwith said he wasn't certain;
at first what was meant so he and
Odorizzi called another meeting the'
next day. There they were told.
point-blank that the idea was to kill
Roberto Suazo Cordova, the pres-
ident of Honduras. Suazo has held
office since 1981, when he became
the first democratically elected
president in his country in more
than a decade.
Beckwith testified that when he
heard specifics of the alleged mur-
der plot, "I said 'That is a hell of a
job to have to do.' I said, 'I'd have to
chew on this.' And I' said it would
require a survey. Someone would
have to go down there and look it all
over. This is a big task to do. And
frankly, I was a looking for a real
nice soft way to get the hell out of
there."
He and Odorizzi met once more
with the alleged plotters and re-
ceived $3,000 for expenses, accord-
ing to the indictment. "I don't work
for nothing," Beckwith explained
last week.
On the way back to Texas, he
testified, "I remember that I said
what I have got to do is, I can't
mess around here and go to some
pissant about this. I have got to go
to someone high in the government
and inform them." Beckwith said he
didn't think assassinating the pres-
ident of Honduras was "a prudent
thing to do." And he said, "I didn't
think this would be good for Reagan
and this administration for that to
occur."
The next day he called John
McMahon, the deputy director of
the CIA, whom Beckwith knew
from his days with the Velta orce.
But McMahon was on vacation. A
week later he tried again, only to
told McMahon couldn't see him un-
til later in the week.
"I said ' is is a hell of a way to
run a railroad. I got something here
I think is kind of sensitive, and I
want to see him.' "The word came
back that McMahon was booked up
at the time. Beckwith and orizzi
flew to Washington anyway and on
the plane the former eta Force
commander wrote a cryptic letter
to ts deputy director.
"Eight days ago in Miami, my
partner and I were asked to devel-
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r, a
 Approved For ReleaRs 9 ( /aA: PA- fDP91-00901
4 August 1985
Congress, Agencies Clash
Over Counterintelligence..
Lawmakers Call Administration Efforts Weak
By Charles R Babcock
W j FM sue wrwr
In the spring of 1984, Sen. Mal.
Cohn Wallop (R-Wyo.) received a
certificate naming him an "honorary
counterintelligence specialist" in
the Central Intelligence Agency.
The award was said to be in recog-
nition of his efforts to establish a
semiautonomo s core of career
counterintelligence (CI) specialists
in the agency.
Wallop, then chairman of the
Senate Intelligence budget subcom.
mittee, was neither honored nor
amused.
"The CIA ridiculed the career
specialist by giving me the award,"
he said in an interview. "It was de-
signed in total cynicism, with little
boys laughing behind doors." .
So he wrote, and Congress ap-
proved, language in the classified
intelligence agencies' authorization
bill report for fiscal 1985 requiring
the CIA to reestablish Cl as a ca-
reer service. It still has not been
done, he and other intelligence
sources say.
Doing something about counter-
intelligence has been a hot topic
since accusations In May that al-
leged spy John A. Walker Jr. and
others for years had passed U.S.
Navy secrets to the Soviets. To
Wallop and other critics, the Rea-
gan administration's inaction on the
"CI specialist" mandate reflects a
broader lack of commitment to im-
proving the nation's ability to pro-
tect secrets from foreign agents.
"This country," Wallop said, "has
virtually zero counterintelligence
capability."
He argued that the CIA's coun-
terintelligence system is inadequate
because the officers now working 'in.
it will someday rotate out to work
for other officers whom they may
have investigated or whose oper-
ations they may have challenged.
The result, Wallop said, is a too ca-
sual effort, in which the tough ques-
tions are not asked about the cred-
ibility of agents, operations or even
technical systems.
Although few others are so crit-
ical, interviews with current and
former intelligence officials suggest
that the Reagan administration's
strong words about counterintelli-
gence have often been matched
only by half-steps.
President Reagan said in a radio
speech in June that "we've devel-
oped a list of things to be accom-
plished in the counterintelligence
and security areas." He has signed
two secret directives to study and
act on the counterintelligence prob-
lem, but little of substance has been
accomplished because of bureau-
cratic resistance, several sources
said. A separate directive to re-
vamp personnel security policies
has been languishing without action
for more than a year. .
Funding for more FBI counter-
intelligence agents-who are re-
sponsible for counterespionage op-
erations in the United States-has`
been added to recent budgets. but
only over the objections of admin-
istration budget officers. There are
now about 1,200 Cl agents in the
FBI, sources said. But they are still
outnumbered, and squads of inex-
perienced clerks have been used for
years to help keep track of potential
foreign agents in at least four major
cities.
Administration spokesmen de-
clined to speak on the record about
the counterintelligence issue. But
several members of Congress did.
Rep. Lee Hamilton -(D-Ind.), chair-
man of the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, said "some-
times it takes a strong blow across
the snout," such as the Walker case,
to get
gress to
iticians,
spondin
The b
intelligei
nation's
tions an(
etration.
counteri
of spy a
trying t
cruiting
in place.
The i
between the CIA, which keeps
track of foreign intelligence agents
overseas, and the FBI. which does
the same in the United States..
Hamilton and Sen. Patrick J.
Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the
Select Committee on Intelligence,
said long-term solutions are ? re-
quired, in addition to the increased
use of polygraphs and the imposing
the death penalty on military per-
sonnel for peacetime espionage, the
two measures passed by Congress
so far. . .
Hamilton said the least expensive
and most important step to protect
national secrets would be enforcing
the "need to know" policy. "A secu-
rity clearance shouldn't entitle any-
one to see- anything. Someone
should have-access only if he needs
it for his job.-
A theme in much of the criticism
is that counterintelligence is not
viewed as a path to career promo-
tion at the CIA or FBI, or the State
Department, where security has
long been a low priority.
Rep. Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.),
chairman of the House intelligence
oversight subcommittee that has
been holding closed hearings on
counterintelligence, said he feels
the biggest security problem is at
the State Department. He said CIA
Director William J. Casey had ac-
cepted a recommendation by an
internal CIA commission to give
more independence to. the Cl staff
there. "It's fine-tuning at CIA,"
McCurdy said. "It's trying to stop a
flood at State..
He cited recent reports of
bugged typewriters in the U.S. Em-
bassy in Moscow and the hiring of
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R00060020000i., 2
 "'"^"~ ^ S '~ Approved For Release 2 ?/12A4t {A '009
STATE OF THE NATION
*l+ent .
::~-:lltil'j~t?
. l tl ttuawtraie simple
reason why our government doers
nothing tq stop the Soviet Union:
It's _because certain public
o$lcisla. - Iy John McMahon
-refuse to carry out American
policy.
In a minute. I'll be more spe-
ciiic-.-But ftrst, let me tell you of
the latest events in Afghanistan.
I'm sad to 'say that events
there have taken a turn for the
worse lately.
Last month, the Soviets un-
leashed mas-
afawe- air strikes
agdt the Af-
ghan people-
not juste against
the
fighters, but
against peace-
ful civilians as
well.
August 1985
Ironically, an overwhelming
majority of Americans would
gladly give the Afghan freedom
fighters the weapons they need to
protect themselves from this air-
born terror.
. President Reagan has pledg-
ed to send effective weapons and
supplies to the Afghan freedom
fighters.
And last October, Congress
unanimously voted-for the first
time ever-to supply effective aid
to the freedom fighters.
Then Congress approved the
largest budget ever for a covert
paramilitary operation-$280
million.
Those votes came after Free
the Eagle asked many of you last
September to write and demand
effective aid for the Afghan
freedom fighters.
Those letters made a
difference!
Yet, despite the Reagan ad-
ministration's official policy, the
unanimous vote of Congress and
the overwhelming support of the
American people. . .
Neither our State Department
nor the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy will send workable weapons to
the Afghan freedom fighters!
As we've told you in State of
the Nation, the weapons the CIA
sends the freedom fighters-
mortars, rifles, mines, machine
guns and hand-held missiles-are
old and defective. _
And 85 percent of the ammo
is of the type that won't pierce the
armored gunships that at this
very moment are burning, killing
and maiming the Afghan people.
It's no wonder Soviet air at-
tacks on Afghan villages are so
brazen-and deadly.
---y --ca aily, axey maim and mutilate innocent Afghans-men,
women and children who have no
means to protect themselves.
We- could cite many more
examples...
Examples of how the CIA has
failed to supply the Afghan
resistance with effective weapons
and supplies...
Examples of how the CIA has
failed to carry out the mandate for
Afghan aid from the Administra-
tion, from Congress and from the
American people.
Why does the CIA persist in
failing to supply the Afghan
freedom fighters with effective
weapons?
Who's behind this massive-
and deadly-blunder?
To find out, Free the Eagle
has done some detective work.
With the help of some of our
sources, we tracked down and un-
covered the specific individual
responsible for this.
His name is John McMahon.
He's a deputy director of the
CIA-one of the top officials there.
And John McMahon has the task
of carrying out the administra-
tion's Afghan policy.
But for three years, McMahon
has pursued his own Afghan
policy!
McMahon runs a two-track
Afghan program: a program of
disinformation and a program of
interference.
In secret briefings to con-
gressmen, McMahon has painted
a misleading picture of CIA per-
formance in Afghanistan, calling
it "outstanding."
Now, perhaps John McMahon
thinks he's right. And perhaps he
thinks he's doing what's best for
America and for the Afghan
people.
But the fact is: he's wrong.
He's negligent or incompetent, or
both.
Why? Because Soviet dictator
Mikhail Gorbachev wants to wrap
up the conquest of Afghanistan.
He's anxious to consolidate his
power over the Soviet empire.
And he wants to prove to the
world he is decisive and ruthless.
Gorbachev wants a quick vic-
tory. So he has stepped up his air-
born genocide-pounding Afghan
villages day after day, burning.
maiming and mutilating thou-
sands of terrified people.
His unchallenged air raids
even bomb hospitals, killing hun-
dreds of helpless patients.
WNW
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 ease 2d?5/12/14 W2NI-1YG I UN1 -??Reg R0006002~
? 04101110
Good morning.... Now that
Undersecretary of Commerce for
internationa trade Lionel Omer
has announced his intention to
resin June 14 sources close to
the CIA sav Director aWilli m-
Casev favors Mr. 0 mer or t e
number two CIA post a by
John Mc a on. umors ave
been circulating in mte igence
circles for L 11C past few
months that epu irector
John c a onwi retire a t o
en of June for personal reasons.
CIA officials aismissed the
rumors and say McMahon has no
plans to retire. "It's been going
on for months;" one official said of
the rumors. "And he's still here:'
Mr. McMahon and Mr. Casey
reportedly have clashed over CIA
policy. According to Hoover
Institution analyst Arnold Beic-
hman, Mr. McMahon scuttled a
Casey plan to bring 65 Soviet
POWs from Afghanistan for a U.S.
press conference and blocked
three of Casey's top-level
CIA appointments.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CI Ih 'fPA9 1' 600600200001-2
May 1986
By Bill Gertz brought to trial as the result of information
THE WASHINGTON TIMES supplied by Mr. Yurchenko, who defected last
year but later redefected to the Soviet Union.
The espionage trial of former National Se- Mr. Yurchenko provided U.S. officials with a
curity Agency code specialist Ronald William tip that led to Mr. Pelton's arrest Nov 24 at the
Pelton is expected to open today in Baltimore Annapolis Hilton hotel.
federal court, a case surrounded by secrecy FBI Director William Webster has said in-
and controversy. formation from Mr. Yurchenko has resulted in
After 14 years as a cryptoanalyst specializ- a number of ongoing espionage probes. But
ing in electronic intelligence-collection pro- ,ounterintelli ence experts sa that, based on
grams against the Soviet Union, Mr. Pelton, t s career profile o r. urc en o e
45, left NSA in July 1979, three months after shou have supplied muc more etau m-
he filed for bankruptcy and six months before formation on Soviet spy networks, which
he met with KGB officials for the first time would have led to numerous arrests.
in Washington, court papers say. So far the only other person known to have
Mr. Pelton has pleaded not guilty to charges been named as a Soviet agent b Mr. Yur-
that he sold NSA secrets to the Soviets be cen o is ormer CIA on -ra iv Fdward i
tweet January 1980 and September 1985 for Howard, whoa slipped out the country more than $35,000. hours before FBI agents planned to arrest
U.S. District Judge Herbert F. Murry, who him.
will preside over today's trial, ruled Friday Mr. Yurchenko shocked the CIA when he
that Mr. Pelton's statements to FBI agents bolted a eor?etown restaurant
before his arrest and information obtained tad to the Soviet Union several weeks before
from telephone intercepts of the Soviet Em- Mr. Pelton's arrest.
bassy can be used as evidence in the case. The Pelton case also set off a storm of con-
Fred Warren Bennett, Mr. Pelton's court- troversy over the publication of classifed in-
appointed attorney, had argued that FBI formation. CIA Director William J. Casey re-
agents used "psychological coercion" to ob- centl threatens to ---prosecute The
tain statements from Mr. Pelton. Washington Post i it published NSA secrets
Mr Bennett also challenged use of a court- Mr re>