WHO KILLED THE CIA? CONFESSIONS OF STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN

ARTICLE
Edward Jay Epstein
ADMIRAL Stansfield Turner commanded
a destroyer, a guided-missile cruiser,
a carrier task force, a fleet, and the prestigious
Naval War College before he was shunted away to
a NATO post in Italy in 1975. When he was
abruptly summoned back to Washington in Feb-
ruary 1977 by his former classmate at Annapolis,
President Jimmy Carter, he expected to be ap-
pointed to a high naval position or to the joint
Chiefs of Staff. Instead, the new President asked
him to be Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
Although Turner had had little previous ex-
perience in intelligence, he viewed it simply as a
problem of assessing data, or, as he described it to
his son, nothing more than "bean counting." Ac-
cepting the position of "chief bean counter," he
assumed that he could bring the CIA, and Amer-
ican intelligence, to the same standard of opera-
tional efficiency he had brought the ships under
his command. The four-year effort to achieve this
goal is the subject of his book, Secrecy and De-
mocracy: The CIA in Transition.'
He quickly found, however, that the CIA was a
far more complex and elusive entity than he had
expected. To begin with, the acting CIA Director,
Henry Knoche, rather than behaving like a ship's
"executive officer," surprised Turner by refusing
his "captain's" first order: a request that Knoche
accompany him to meetings with congressional
leaders. As far as Turner was concerned, this was
insubordination (and Knoche's days were num-
bered). When he met with other senior executives
of the CIA at a series of dinners, he found "a dis-
turbing lack of specificity and clarity" in their
answers. On the other hand, he found the written
CIA reports presented to him "too long and de-
tailed to be useful." He notes that "my first en-
counters with the CIA did not convey either the
feeling of a warm welcome or a sense of great
EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, whose books include Legend: The
Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald and Inquest: The War-
ren Commission and the Establishment of Truth, is cur-
rently completing a book on international deception. His
articles in COMMENTARY include "Disinformation: Or, Why
the CIA Cannot Verify an Arms-Control Agreement" (July
1982) and "The War Within the CIA" (August 1978).
pproved For Rett A@ /x /14 : CIA-RDP91-00901
October 1985
Who Killed the CIA?
The Confessions of Stansfield
competence"-an asses
ment of many of these senior officers.
Turner was further frustrated by the system of
secrecy that kept vital intelligence hermetically
contained in bureaucratic "compartments" within
the CIA. Not only did he view such secrecy
as irrational, he began to suspect that it
cloaked a wide range of unethical activities. He
became especially concerned with abuses in the
espionage division, which he discovered was
heavily overstaffed wi,th case officers-some of
whom, on the pretext of seeing agents abroad,
were disbursing large sums in "expenses" to them-
selves, keeping mistresses, and doing business with
international arms dealers. Aside from such petty
corruption, Turner feared that these compartmen-
talized espionage operations could enmesh the en-
tire CIA in a devastating scandal. The potential
for such a "disgrace," as he puts it, was made
manifest to him by a single traumatic case that oc-
curred in the 1960's-one which he harks back to
throughout his book, and which he uses to justify
eliminating the essential core of the CIA's espio-
nage service.
The villain of this case, as Turner describes it,
is James Jesus Angleton, who was chief of the
CIA's counterintelligence staff from 1954 to 1974;
the victim was Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who
began collaborating with the CIA in 1962 and
then defected to the United States in 1964, and
who claimed to have read all the KGB files on Lee
Harvey Oswald. The crime was the imprisonment
of Nosenko, which, according to Turner, was "a
travesty of the rights of the individual under the
law." It all began in 1964, after Nosenko arrived
in the United States. Turner states that Angleton
"decided that Nosenko was a double agent, and
set out to force him to confess. . . . When he
would not give in to normal interrogation, Angle-
ton's team set out to break the man psycholog-
ically. A small prison was built, expressly for him."
Nosenko was kept in this prison for three-and-
one-half years, although he never admitted to be-
ing a double agent. He was then released and sub-
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APPEAR E D
.t!.'au
~il~ 1?~riv~_
T he CIA disclaims any responsibility for
Edwin Wilson. and Frank Terpil, the
two ex-agents who are now busily training
and arming Libyan terrorists. But the truth
is the CIA and the Justice Department have
long had the legal means to put these shady .
dealers out-of business.
Wilson, indicted in 1980 and'81 for sell-
ing explosives and murderous skills to the
Kaddafi regime, joined the CIA in the. ear-
ly '50s, at a time when all agency employ-
ees and alumni were solemnly sworn never
to assert any proprietary "claim" to what
they learned on the job and never "to di-
vulge, publish or reveal by any other means
... classified information, intelligence or
knowledge" without. official approval. The
same basic covenant was in effect when
Terpil signed on in the early '60s.
Two years ago, in a piling against me, the
Supreme Court upheld the legality of these
contracts. Though my case- involved the
unauthorized publication of a book about
CIA. activities, the contracts themselves
make no distinction between disclosure in
print and revelation by "sales pitch." Nor
are their strictures limited to secrets or even
knowledge gained during employment. Ac-
cording to a 1977 CIA regulation "subjects
deemed to be of official Agency interest
[and hence subject to pre-release approval]
include, but are not limited to, current and
former Agency activities, foreign intelli-
gence and foreign political, economic, sci-
entific, technical, military, sociological and
geographical matters, intludipg foreign as-
pects of international terrorist activity. . A later CIA directive generously exempts
"topics that are totally unrelated to intelli-
gence matters, such as the manuscript of a
cookbook, [or] a treatise on gardening," but
warns of "gray areas" and urges signatories
to err on the side of caution by letting the
CIA pre-screen all utterances that might be
of official concern.
Changed Rules: Since I had sidestepped
CIA scrutiny altogether, the Supreme
Court decided I had broken my contract.
For the same reason it found me guilty of
having violated an "implicit obligation of
trust." Normally this commercial-law con-
cept is invoked only against people who sell
NEw3wgEK
25 JANUARY 1982
a "breach of trust"-forfeiture of all prof-
its-and was ordered to submit to CIA
censorship in the future, even though the
government had never once accused me of
publishing anything confidential.
Terpil and Wilson clearly have done no
less than I. If my book was a violation of
implied and explicit covenants, so is their
unfettered assistance to the Libyans.
The two also are guilty of one other of-
fense that figured in the government's case
against me. To substantiate its claim that
my book had damaged the nation's security,
the Justice Department argued that any
such unauthorized release of intelligence-
related material can undermine confidence
in the CIA's security procedures and can
Why hasn't the
agency used its
legal powers to
stop former agents
who work for Kaddafi?
thus frighten off "sources" who might oth-
erwise be cooperative. The Supreme Court
agreed, declaring that the "appearance of
confidentiality" is often as essential to our
security as confidentiality itself.
By nuzzling up to Kaddafi, Wilson and
Terpil have most certainly imperiled the
"appearance of confidentiality" and have
discomfited intelligence sources. Why,
then, weren't they sued long ago for breach
of contract and trust? Part of the answer
undoubtedly lies in the influence and inter-
ests of the CIA's "old boy" network. Not
surprisingly, Wilson and Terpil aren't its
only charter members who are out peddling
"Company" know-how to unauthorized
consumers. Former CIA topsiders Richard
Helms, Henry Knoche, Vernon Walters
and Theodore Shackley are all involved in
business consultancies that cash in on what
they learned while on the agency's payroll.
Onetime CIA security chief Robert Gam-
bino has retired to train private security
they were once assigned..All of these agents-
turned-entrepreneurs are guilty of my
"transgression"-trading on knowledge
that the government claims isn't ours to
exploit. But because, as a group, they com-
mand more political clout than I, they've
escaped prosecution.
Moreover, because'of the muzziness of
the employment contracts, they have been
'able to argue that they face no constraints .
on their business activities. Helms has
commented that it would be "against the
American tradition" for the government to
attempt to impose such strictures.
Precedent: In fairness to -him and his
fellow scofflaws, the employment contracts
are not models of clarity. They have been
recast at least six times since the CIA's
founding and have never been consistently
enforced. So it's un ders ta.n dable that a signa-
tory might misconstrue his "obligation!
Then too, there is the legitimate question:
should Pentagon and State Department of-
ficials be permitted to transfer their profes-
sional expertise to the private sector while
CIA veterans are forbidden to do so?
That last issue (like so many others) was,
in fact, resolved by the Supreme Court's
ruling against me. Under the principles the
Court embraced, anybody who assumes a
position of trust in the government thereby
exposes himself to permanent official curbs
on his speech and conduct, regardless of
whether he signs a contract to this effect.
What remains to be seen is whether the
Justice Department will. now use the power
it won in my case to punish and deter the
likes of Wilson and Terpil. If it does, it will
admittedly set a precedent for similar suits
.against Helms, Knoche, Henry Kissinger
and other powerful form:erbureaucrats who
are engaged in more benign business ven-
tures arising from their government service.
But if it doesn't-out of deference to Helms
and Co.-it will make a mockery of the
arguments marshaled against me and, more
important, forfeit a chance to deliver a so-
bering object lesson to those Federal retir-
ees who would betray their public trust by .
marketing their professional skills to terror-
ists and disreputable foreign governments.
their employers' trade secrets to competi- guards, and scores of former field opera-- Snepp, a former CIA analyst, lost a suit to
tors. But in my case the Gib c>Relliaeh2fiO&2ld4l :c!ool& lag Ot90I ROiJ G@0 Gfb nt for publishing an
I was slapped with the standard penalty for pursue business interests in countries where unauthorized book on the fall of Saigon.
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JiR a I CLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
28 September 1981
Headlines are focused on mavericks
who train terrorists, spy for hostile
powers, leak vital secrets. But the vast_
majority of former agents exploit their.
unique expertise for different purposes.
When an American spy ends his cloak-and-dagger work
r for Uncle Sam, his life in the shadows may not be over.
A few maverick ex-agents have continued to lead the
covert life even after "coming in from the -cold." Often
operating outside the law, these onetime spies cash in on
clandestine skills honed-and secrets learned-as govern-
ment agents. Sometimes earning millions of dollars, they
move in a mysterious, violent world -of guns, explosives,
criminals and foreign agents. - -
Two former operatives of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy are accused of masterminding a terrorist training school
for Libya's 1,luamrnar Qadhafi and supplying him with ex-
plosives and technical expertise..A third has been convicted
of selling secrets to Russia-the only known case of a double
agent in the agency's 34--year history. Some former CIA
contract agents, free-lance operators who undertake specif-
ic contracts from the agency, have been arrested on drug-
smuggling charges. -
While only a relative few become outlaws, these none-
theless have caused headaches for the vast majority of ex-
spies who go into legitimate work. As a result, sentiment is
building for tighter restraints on all former agents.
Experts agree that those who resort to questionable.activ
ides are rare among the thousands of CIA operatives who
quit the agency during the 1970s because of purges, scan-
dals and disillusionment, Yet the pressures that can create a
rogue are felt by all. Foremost is the difficulty of making a
new life after a career spent spying, often in exotic places
and sometimes amid great danger. Some say it is an addic-
tive combination. -
There are other problems. Many potential employers are
sensitive to public hostility toward the espionage trade and
worry about any CIA ties that may remain. Many agents,
especially those who have spent a long time spying, lack
readily marketable job skills in the business 'world. And
some spies simply find themselves suited for no other work.
For them, covert activity has become not just a job, but a
way of life. -
For a at what spies do after leaving the government,
U.S.Alews & World Report has focused on a score of ex-
agents who have entered private life iii recent years. While
-most are respected businessmen, others operate on the
wrong side of the law. Both are examined in this report.
early 1970
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Wilson
been heaN
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could be
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long prison tern f
cover agent pQk*
Terpil, after his
world's biggest g
the conflict in L
Palestine Liberati
In 1976, he an
of other former a
Middle East. Corp
operation.
Prosecutors say
to open a terrori
terrorists were set
craft powerful bo
alarm clock to a t
The two recrui
structors, includi
tions experts and
cret Navy facility
of weaponry are
ployes, later fire
them obtain weal
them in other wa
At one point,
Global TerrorisrrA* Jt 'd Rel$ase 2005/12/140: CI DF -00
A f farmer a ents ave turned to se mg cover s i s t
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e
the highest bidders. Prime examples are Francis E. Terpil Ex-CIA agents Edwln Wilson. left, and FrancfsTerpil are accused
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ARTICLE API'ZA1.RED
ON PAGE, ___ .4 1
By Patrick E. Tyler and Al Kamen
Wavhingtnn Po Stal Wrib3ts
The CIA's discovery that agency employes
helped fulfill a terrorism training contract with
Libya touched off a major internal houseclean-
ing that led to then loss by firing, transfer, at
trition or forced retirement of 820 agents in the
agency's elite clandestine service.
The controversial 1977 housecleaning, only a
fraction of which was directly related to the
Libyan operation, was initiated by then-CIA'
director Adm. Stansfield Turner.
It represented the major thrust of the Carter
administration's attempt to get control of the
agency's covert operations branch and force its
agents to adhere to rigid guidelines governing
their activities. The controls were mandated in
the wake a host of revelations of CIA abuses
during the 1960s and early 1970s.
The internal shakeup was triggered when
Turner learned from a press- inquiry that two
active-duty CIA agents appeared to be involved
in the Libyan activities of ex-CIA agents EEdwin .
P. Wilson and 'Francis E. Terpil. Turner fired
the two active duty agents.
In unrelated cases, a third and a fourth agent
were dismissed, one of them for using a private
operative overseas without informing his CIA
superiors. Then Turner, already predisposed to
further reductions in covert staffing levels,
swollen from the Vietnam-war era, launched a
massive overhaul of the operations directorate.
A team of systems analysts was imposed
upon the highly autonomous clandestine branch
and, by the time Turner was finished, 17 covert
agents had been fired, 157 were asked to retire-
involuntarily, 50 were transferred out of the-
clandestine service to other CIA divisions and
nearly 600 other clandestine jobs were elimi-
nated by attrition.
At the time, CIA officials insisted' that the
exodus from the clandestine service was a rou-
tine reduction in force. But this -account, pro-
vided by senior intelligence officials, for the_
THE WASHINGTON POST
16 September 1981
first time shows a broader pure
and illustrates the significance th
.was attached to 'the Wilson-Te
case during Turner's four-year to
ure.- Turner's actions were attack
by veteran intelligence officials as
needless --decimation of covert in
ligence-gathering capabilities.
During his first month in office
the spring of 1977, Turner was n
-informed, of the investigations t
had been initiated nine months e
her bye his predecessor, George B
In,September, 1976,. one of W
son's partners and one of his e
ployes told the.agency that Wils
was exporting terrorist tr ' ? ....: .
materials to Libya's radical dictat
Col. Muammar Qaddafi.
. Turner discovered that his pre(
cessor?had investigated the charge
-but had. decided not to fire the two
active-duty agents. Instead, Bush
officially reprimanded and teas
signed-one of them as punishment -
for having assisted Wilson in design-
ing and building prototype delay-
action timers for mass production,
according to senior intelligence of- .
ficials. familiar with the investigation.
The second officer's disciplinary
action as well as investigations into
the activities of several other active-
duty -agents were pending when
Turner took office. .
Bushwas traveling in Mexico yes-
terday-and could not be reached.
These,- discoveries - in- - Turner's
opening, weeks as CIA director "led
to a' major change"" in his approach
to the clandestine service, according
to one knowledgeable official.
In _ his first contact with the agen-
cy's internal investigative files
Turner ;saw "four people out of con-
trol,"-the official said, and many oth-
ers who were "still playing cowboy.."
Turnoris said to have believed that
the -agency's covert 'operations
branch.had yet to respond to a new
era oftighter control.
to tine rinat analysis, the agency-1
lid not respond fully to the Wilson
case until Turner's attention Si 'as
focused by a Washington Post inqui-
ry in April, 1977, according to intel-
ligence officials. Before that time,
the agency had "fussed around" with
several disciplinary investigations of
its own agents,, according to one
knowledgeable source. A single letter
of reprimand and reassignment bad
been ordered before Bush left office
in January, 1977.
Wilson and Terpil were indicted
in April, 1980, by a federal grand
jury here for allegedly supplying ex-
plosives, delayed-action timers and
terrorist training and for plotting the
assassination of a prominent exile
critic of Qaddafi's regime. Other in-1
dictments are expected.
And other federal regulatory agen-
cies are examining ' their rules and
federal laws to curb what federal
officials see as an epidemic of illegal
arms and technology exports to hos-
tile nations. ' _ -
The CIA's investigation into Wil-
son's dealings with - Libya = began.
Labor Day weekend in 1976, when
one of Wilson's partners, Kevin, P.J
cQN I VUfD
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23 February 1981
Colorado corporations .are becoming increasingly worried-.
about security, according to a formertop CIA official, E.. Henry
plans to protect their.exeeutives, buiIdings-and trade secrets. H`'e
will, direct :a new Rocky'Mountai4 division-.of Guardsmark Inc.
the nation's sixth' largqt contractor of security services.
Knoche said during aninterview Past week. "It's something that
companies used to only worryabo atbudget time, but that is no
The growth of anergy firms n Colorado and. Wyoming pro-
?; Knoche was apppoointed depot director ,of the CIA in 1976 and
erv
s
ed,under.CIA Directors'George Bushand Stansfield. Turner:
In. that,,ipacity he was, in clime of, the agency's day=today
and joined Boeing Aerospace Co. i
last month, Knoche was assigned to Denver. The firm lias had a'
Denver :office, but it is now expanding its' operations into a'
division with a complete range ofsecurity;-crime;prevention:and
operating mining and drilling operations in remote areas,-Knoche
said,-while high technology comp ames located along the Front
Range are concerned about industrial espionage and the safety of
their executives,'
The bon's share of. our wor involves providing. guards,"
Knoche said. The, use of security guards is up 75 percent national
ly since 1970, he'said, and mor Ethan $12 billion is now spent,'
."In the old days, anysecurity outfit'that could hire awarm
body would strap a ;gun on him. and send him out, as a' guard,"
"Private security guards have no powers to arrest or detain
persons, but usually just their presence is enough to deter crime:'
he"said " =~ .- - ~
r investigations
Guardsniark is frequently called in to perfom
when a 'company is suffering from internal- theft; accordingto
Approximately $5D billion is-stolen internally each year, he
said, and no one knows how much crime is involved in computer
theft.
Consultants are called in to assist rn complicated computer
Sometimes a company just 'wants' its security system as-`
sensed, Knoche said, to see how difficult it' is for outsiders to get
overseas,'have become increasingly vulnerable to kidnapping or'
violence on the part of terrorists, executives are taught defensive
driving techniques and ways to reduce their public exposure.
of Chinese political affairs. He'.was stationed in' Washington
throughout his career, which -later. included management of the
:agency's finances...`'
Knoche said his most difficult intelligence assignment was in
1975 as. liaison with., congressional committees investigating al-
leged intelligence agency abuses
He believes that, as-a 'result of the investigations, the, CIA
-"hemorrhaged its secrets a little too widely- In intelligence work
you; must have secret sources and methods of investigation, once
these are revealed you're wiped out;' he said.
long:..In`ou p o l i t i c T emof checks."and;balancess,'we can't
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Former ?CIA Depu#y4Direc#or E tenry Knoche: :' The
counfr , as :become more security conscious
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oir 3
N .HIS STATE OF THE UNION AD-
dress, President Carter called for
the end of unwarranted restric-
tions. on American intelligence
agencies. "An effective intelli-
gence capability," he said, "is vital
to our nation's security." Although
the remark drew an ovation, there have
been no dramatic initiatives from the
Carter administration to revitalize what
is generally considered to be a demoral-
ized and often dangerously ineffective
American intelligence community. Yet
the president's words demonstrate that
the mood of the administration-and
with it, by all indications, that of the
country-has changed dramatically from
the time when the Central Intelligence
Agency was considered to be a "rogue
elephant" dangerously out of control.
What is required to realize the presi-
dent's goals? According to those who
have spent their lives in and around
the intelligence business, the primary
requirement is a change in, the domes-
tic attitude toward the CIA. Such per-
sons-including former directors and
top officials of the agency-say the CIA
must be freed from some of the more
exaggerated forms of congressional
scrutiny, such as the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment, which gives more than
200 senators and staff members ac-
cess to agency data. They also urge
that those members of government and
the media who have harassed the
intelligence community for the past half
decade must now recognize that a vi-
able intelligence agency is urgently
needed. And, they say, the agency and
the. intelligence community as a whole
badly need the finest possible leader-
ship, both from the White House and
from the office of the director of central
intelligence (DCI). That post is cur-
rently occupied by Admiral Stansfield
Turner, and in the view of an impres-
sive number of intelligence experts,
Admiral Turner is not able to lead the
CIA back to respectability.
ITHIN MONTHS OF HIS.
1977 appointment - as
DCI, Stansfield Turner
had acquired the nick-.
name "Captain Queeg"
in CIA headquarters
in Langley, Virginia.
One morning in January 1979, he
came to work to find the bulletin boards
and mailboxes full of a forged edition of
his own "Notes From the Director."
Dated January 15, it has become an
underground classic in the intelligence
community: -
I was in my office fairly exhausted last
evening after stopping work at 10 P.Ai. As
is my wont Pfter a h4b,t 4 ML
The Washington Quarterly.
StanslieldTurner;critics say, has
luUtb=d the CIA.
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lil.= ,U'ri:- THE WASHINGTON POST
t3 pAG _ - 1 March 1980
"Byi3iIl Peterson
-,No one is?'sure.who tacked up thee'-,
red, white and; blue "George Bush for
President" poster. beside the entrance
to the CIA'-headquarters ' in' Langley,;
\ a:, recently - , : ~:
--Workmen quickly `tole it ? down on.;::
the mistaken assumption that the pia ,?
ter was on CIS..' property. `!'We're studrt,=
iously. staying- `neutral An presiders
tibl politics," said press spokesman;'
Dale Peterson.
But- the poster -was an important:"
symbolic gestiu?e,- a-., commeutary;'on ' "
the-1980 -presidential race"-and" `the;
changing attitudes about - the;CI&''.
Simply-, put*, no, presidential cam-
paign --in .- recent:, memory-perhaps
support~-
ever has -attracted as.?much-
from the: ntefligence:commtinity a
the campaign of former CLAjdirecto?;
Bush ... ,
One top foreign policy' and-defense
adviser is Rag Cline,:a.former deputy,;
director ofthe CIA and director of Irt
telligence and research. at,the; State r
Department- Another, defense: adviser,,,c
is Lt. Gen. Sam V. -Wilson; - a former:
director of the Defense Intelligence.
Agency. ~?; ,.,
-Lt:-'Gen." Harold A:' Aaron, a fore iCr '
deputy : director of DIA, js on. Bush's?-
national?steering committee, B;enry,
Knoche;.Bush;s right-hand man-at the-el.
CIA and:latet`-acting director of the'!
agency, is quietly campaigning for
Bush in the West. And Robert Gam-
bino recently left.. his job-as CIA?direc
for of, security to work full-time for
Bushy:-
At Ieast 20, othei`.'formet' intelli-
gence officers-are working in various'
volunteer, capacities with. the .'Bush
campaign. Bruce Rounds, . director. cf-
operations for Bush 'hi New. f#amp-..
shire, is a former CIA officer. -So is
Tennessee finance '" chairmaif . Jon
Thomas., Virginia coordinator = Jack'
Coakley is a past executive director of
the -Association of Former- ?- Intelli-
gence: Officers, And at least' three.re
tired CIA officers work on Bush's 5
search staff:- ,.
'It's sure as hell not,'a CIA' coup 'or ,
anything like that,'.r says Coakley for.:
thet eis:.'a trery High level of; support
for -George -Bush among. current ,and
farmer. CIA:employes.'. .
.A few years ago when'the CIA was
under-.;almost daily. attack for its
. abuses.,and? :excesses, no _ candidate
would have dared accept such sup-
port. But today Bush openly welcomes
it, and at almost every stop he re-
loudest applause. when_ be
calls fora stronger CIA. _
Bush's -political advisers: originally
were wary.of their.-candidate's CIA
ties. In 'a world where secret police
forces ? routinely overthrow govern-
ments, they obviously didn't want him
to-- become labeled -the : CIA candi-
date."
Some of the ex-employes themselves
worried' about a backlash. "I could see
the-headlines:.. Bush Sprinkles. Cam-
paign With Former Spooks,". says= one
cued-that the public mood on the CIA .~
was shifting. Foreign policy adviser
Cline; now= director of the Center for,
Strategic and" International Studies
at Gedrgetown 'University; had been
delivering pro=CIA lectures on college
campuses and elsewhere since .1973
when he left the government in- dis-
gust "over" what they :were ;doing to
the intelligence agencies."
`For-years, he -was heckled at almost
every. stop. "I don't get any. heckling
now. In. fact,' I'm quite popular," -he
says. '.'I found there was a tremendous.
constituency. for the CIA in'the sticks
when :everyone" in Washington was
still urinating all over it:'
Bush bought Cline's argument- "He
-felt he did .a good job at the -CIA, and
the. support of.retired officers was a
reflection of that," says 'press secre `
tary Peter. Teeley. 'Quite; frankly;
..CIA veteran. "I've been beating this
bush since 1974 and it's just dawning
on people that we need stronger Intel-
ligence gathering.'-:-
"It's panned out almost too good to
be true," he adds:. "The country is
waking up just in time for George's,
candidacy.'
There certainly 'isn't anything im-
proper about the iinvolvement of for-
mer intelligence officers in a political
'campaign: All of those working for
Bush appear to be retired or ex-intelli-
I
gence officers. And the "old boy" in- telligence network doesn't. dominate
the Bush campaign any mere than
other networks of former associates
.Bush developed in his days at Yale
University, the Republican National
Committee, of which _ he was chair-
man, the State Department, (Bush was
U.ti. ambassador "and envoy to China), f
Congress or in the oil busipess.
But there were. some rumblings of
uneasiness in the intelligence net-
work. 'When the Association of For-:
mer Intelligence Officers held its an-
niual banquet last October, former ex-
ecutive director Coakley counted 180'.
of the -24b persons -present wearing;
George Bush buttons. And he recalls;
David Phillips,, , the association)
founder, declaring:-:`.'Ladies' and gent-i
lemen, we have- a problem and that!
problem- is George Bush-"
- . ?
Coakley. and other. former intelli-I
gence; officers - see the support for
Bush as a? perfectly natural phenome-
non. "This is the first time any signifi-
cant number of ? us. have ever gotten
involved in a presidential race. I don't!
think it's because lie's one of.us.:After:
all, he was.only, at the.CIAon-e year."
' -`But he was there-,'when..everytbing
1was going downhillPeople there Per-,
-ceived_ him as someone-who did, a very-
-good job , .under difficult - circum-
stances," he -continues. ;"Maybe-more
:.important, he's.the only candidate any
of.us can remember:who-has made the -
agency an`issue..lie's: the guy' who'
~ralsed:the intelligence community to a-
`.:national_campaignassuez,
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Ll TICY:g bPY . l1CD
W1 FAG~:
But Critics Despair
That Soy Agent
Can't Do Good job.
Second of two articles
lay Henry S. Bradsher
Wash ingtodStar Staff Writer
Looking casual in a navy blue'
cardigan but speaking intensely,
Stansfield Turner gazed out the glass.
wall of his office, atop the CIA head
quarters at Langley, over the bare
dusky woods toward the distant
lights of Washington and exuded
confidence about his organization.
"I'm just very optimistic these
days," Turner said. "I've been very
impressed by the quality of our
human intelligence activities," the
CIA director said. And U.S. technical
intelligence is superlative, he added.
In other government offices in the
city, most of them looking across
concrete courtyards at other offices
instead of having spacious views, in
the private. offices of people who
have left the government, in small
restaurants, in telephone' calls from
coast Ito coast, others talk about the.
CIA, too.
Some, like-former-CIA Director'
William E. Colby and former Deputy
Director Enno Henry Knoche, talk
for quotation about things like re-
strictions on the agency. But most
prefer to discuss the agency's prob-
lems from the protection of
anonymity.
Turner understandably is'angered
by this, especially on.the most emo-
tional aspect of his three-year tenure
at Langley, the forced retirement of
people from the clandestine serv-
ices. He argues that he rejuvenated
an aging agency.
"The- next time someone tells
you," he said, "that Turner Is'the
stupid bastard who cut the size of.
the agency out here, look at the
color of his hair.... This is a young,
man's game, and we are better equip-
ped today than we were three years
ago" for,clandestine operation,,.
THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
5 February 1980 1
The CIA is composed of three main
branches. The clandestine or opera-
tions branch handles spying and
covert operations, like, intervening
secretly in other countries'. affairs
or organizing guerrilla movements.
Another branch supervises techni-
cal intelligence, including recon-
naissance satellite photography and
communications intercepts. An. ana-
lytical branch pulls information
together for government policymak-
ers.
The controversy that has marked
Turner's almost three years at the
agency focuses on the operations
branch. There is also widespread but
less publicized distress around
Washington about analysis.
In both cases, Turner inherited
problems. His critics say.he exacer-
bated them; his supporters contend
that he has done much to clear them,
up: .
Once Was Twice as Large
"secret army" in Laos, added to
worldwide spying, pushed the num-!
ber of agency operatives to 8,500 in
the late 1960s - roughly double its
present size. As the Nixon adminis-
tration began to reduce U.S. commit-
ments in Indochina,'personnel had
to be reduced by attrition, transfers
and other means.
During his brief tenure as CIA
director, James R. Schlesinger
speeded up a cutback. Colby, his 1
successor, continued the program,
and so did George Bush during his
year as director. Most sources agree
that they were handled sensibly.
Then President Carter took
-Turner from his navy admiral's com-
mand and sent him to, Langley. He
arrived with what the old CIA hands
considered to be a skeptical, even
hostile,'attitude.
This set a chilly tone to his take=
over, despite his own explanations
that he simply wanted to.bring bet-
ter management to a sometimes un-
coordinated operation. His suspi-
cions of the need for drastic changes
were quickly reinforced by the
resignation of John Stockwell, a 40-
.year-old agent in the unsuccessful
.CIA effort in Angola.:.. , , ... ..
sent out the' first 212 pink slips on-
Oct. 31,1977. .
Although smaller than previous';
cuts, this one was handled differ-
ently and hit harder at lifetime
professionals in the spying and para-
military trades.
Says Cuts Helped Agency
"The cuts in personnel that every-
one still complains to me about have
strengthened t:he agency's covert ac-
tioncapabilities,"Turnersaid.
"You don't run a good, strong
paramilitary or covert action pro-:;
gram with a bunch of 55-year-olds;"
he said. "What I've done is cut out
high-grade superstructure ....a.nd
doubled the input into the clandes-
tine services . . . so that we have a
group of young tigers, and there's
enough accumulated experience
and expertise around to- guide
f
them."
This is strongly challenged by peo-
ple in a position to know. t
"Whatever Turner says, they can't
put on a show," says a Pentagon offi-
'j
cial who is very familiar with the
CIA's present operational capabil-
"We know that over in Ihis
ities.
building.".:. Other sources spell this out in;
more detail. One saysthe CIA's corps,
of paramilitary specialists who could
{
help organize, for instance, a more,
effective Afghan resistance to Soviet
control has declined from about 200 I
to-80, and many of the 80 lack the;
broad experience needed for effec-l
tiveness.
But Colby comments that, tf the
people in an operational area feel
CIA help is vital, they will find ways-
to-speed it up. ?
The'.worst: part of Turner's.
-changes, numerous present,and re-
tired officials say, is what they did to
CIA morale.. While he recognizes,
o ale suffered, but contends it
-
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that It is at best bumping along slide-_
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In the ensuing bureaucratic battle,
which included a high-level meeting
at, CIA' headquarters, Bush refused to
be' stampeded by' the'` alarmists who
turned out to,-be'wrong. -Althougli'he
was CIA'directoi-he'alsogave face to
some junior State 'Department partici-
pants- whom =he remembered .from
past diplomatic'duty . He Invited them
into his office to see his Chinese rugs,
leaving ?.more senior `? advisers from
other agencies wondering what was:,
going on.' .. ..
"He's riot tie kind of. person who
goes out looking for issues," added an-
other CIA veteran who. knew Bush
while he was at the agency; "but he
really did a, tremendous job stabiliz-
ing the situation, improving morale
and getting people working again."
"He's..not an. intellectual." this
source said. -"He lives day to day and
he doesn't-brood over anything. He
doesn't agonize. But he's very compe-
titive, He's ferocious, on the tennis
court. He's got to win." -
Bush's decision to resign when Pres- '
ident Carter was inaugurated troubled
'Knoche a - bit.. because that carried
- with it a suggestion that-the job had
been polit1cize4: But.the: deputy DCI
was still impressed enough with his
boss ,to award Bush the. CIA's Intel.li- ;
gence Medal of Merit for his burst of
activity following (arter's election.'
'In a single day,- Bush met with Pres-
ident- Ford alone in the. Oval office,
thed' sat down with Vice President
-gockefeller.:?.'conferred with..,the, head
of -'thee; Office of_ Management- and i
Budget,.about &-.-money crunch,. and
then flew down ,to. Plains,. Ga., with
Knoche to.brief'C6rter and.V.ice Pres-
identelectbTonclale: foP`six lydurs -on
the- CIA's, secrets,--sources. and meth-
ods. On the., flight back; Bush drafted
a memo for Secretary of State Henry
A.-Kissinger, :who. was to, e Carter
the next. clay, land dropped ''se it off at
I{issInger's house at I- a_m. Knoche,
as the man.iri charge of the:CIA's day-,
to-day operations, tcibk ft;uppa hint-
self to give 'Bush *his medal at the
daily, top-level staff meeting in Lang-
ley a.fewhours later. --
nese- on - their side of -the Taiwan
straits' But the: State.Dep'artrnent. dis- I
puted that interpretatibitf6 el,, ull,
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Bush stayed in Peking a little more
than a year, when Ford asked him to
return to Washington, to take over the)
Central' Intelligence Agency: It was a
controversial choice in the Senate be-
cause of Bush's : past Identification
with partisan "politics....Eventually
Ford had to promise not?'to consider
Bush as a running .mate. in:._1976 to
convince- the' Senate to c.ouf .ri b m. -
There was some puzzlerpent over
why Bush would want to take-.over-the
a
troubled agency... Its misdeeds. and
shortcomings were still. tumbling. into
the- headlines as the'result, -6f -House
and' Senate "investigatioiii: ;The .direc-
torship of the CIA hardy=: looked' like
a political 'asset; Nand..Bush.. acknowl-
edged that he hoped'td'return to poli-
tics one, day.
Nevertheless, he said, :?he regarded
the work as "desperately .important to
the survival of this country-.and-to the
survival of freedom around -the world.
' And-`second,'T lie .told-'the: --Senate
Armed Services Committee,,"old-fash= -
ioned as it may. seem,.td some; it as my
duty to serve my country"'
Bush pledged to keep, politics' out of
Intelligence, and :many praised him
for succeeding. "I was, very-concerned
about his appointment,'.' recalled Sens
Mathias, who was. a? member, of the In
telligence committee:'`But:.it. worked
out fine." William Miller, the-commit -1
tee's staff director; said Bush ".worked
very hard, asked. for 'hetp. and advice
.and before long-he:had:everyone's re-
spect."; ~?>z ~~., r
He=also-reassured, thezjveteraii Cr'4"'
employes who ,were-. feeling distinctly:
unloved-at the time Bush;*carne- to the,'
.agency."Instead of--coming in-hostile
and- suspicious-as, [Adm.'- Stansfieldi...
Turner did -[aftei- :Bush]',- he' took -a
-look-around the'agency;'talked- to-'peo-- .
pie and decided he liked it It'was ter-
ribly,. to+:have as -boss, who
felt like that;' recalls E. -Henry
Knoche, who` served as' deputy' direc-
tor. under Bush:, . - '.+ -.
Bush built a reputat[on'ainbn inteI-
'=ligeni+e officersuasg -mari,~vho could
listen and change his- intrid: -In_-'the '
?summerbf ?1976;'sou-eces seYj'hIarums
were'sounde&So4eeWNkt?sdrne'COn3Id-
eyed- provocative -'activity' by the Chi-
 Approved For ReleasVflbbY1:9g4V
29 November N"FW-1dAo1ROO0600
a SC
BY MARY'B
g(!nce?A,gency(IA) i
not at all; ille th
volves informed
aments on, military. eco
Wnornics geography,,;
political, technology,
cording eta ;: forrpei apabrlitres and nten ,
drrectorxnow jhvrng,' Lion Y. of ,:_ foreign.
j
n the 25 y~ rs nfarmedg iudgm ents can be collcted for the.
have been in the CIA; Ikkare given to. the resi judgments; a number
have never had a single dent and his advisers, of ways: " nformation
opportunity that James,} for determining f ireign, can be colt eted openly
''
'
Bond ;:has,
; quipped and defenses policy for +
*
.by. newsp. per,, teIe=
hers of the University
'
4
Rotas t:CIub: ;
Knoche,,, wha r~oine
he 'CIA in .`T953 and
specialized in interna=
tional affairs, was. CIA'
1977 to March 9, 197T.,; -
ver y . _Scholar ly`
oe; the
. nation,;:
said
Objectivity
portant, noted .
/e,.c "aie::the, k'ing's
. ''em as you see 'em .;
witnout regard: rlo rignt
Republican, ngrth `or
south ?''"'
countries a#d.?you can.
governmerilTis ;thinking
. -about" J
r attention to-themedia.
Informat on': can also''
.-be collected h ysatellites,
photography, and espio-
. nage "'What are the.
--decisions that are being
'made behixrd`:closed'
doors? h??
Knoch acknowledged';
that faire
question o sk. how do
you cpn&C j such any
agency ? .
;CongrYe s: _ n
lrnes~have t en issued,'
he .'s.d ` ani
'!No gov-
ernment
should be"le
t
for, anylei
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At TICLE A?PEn2 ED
ON P ^ GE__ ? ___
THE CIA:
Suicide or Murder?
just as he-was about to board his boat
for a day's sail on Chesapeake Bay a
fortnight ago, CIA consultant john A...
Paisley accidentally dropped his brief-
case into the water. He quickly fished it
out. "It's a project I've been working on
.for six months," - he explained to his
friend Mike Yohn. "I've got to get the
damn thing done." Paisley shoved off
from shore and shortly before nightfall
he radioed Yohn: "I'm just about to come
back. _. Leave the lights.on for me." He
never made it. The Coast Guard found
the boat aground the next morning. Pais-
ley was missing and his papers were
scattered about- Last week, a pleasure
boat came across Paisley's bloated
body-with 38 pounds of divers weights
around his torso and a fatal gunshot
wound in his head. _
Was it suicide or murder? Because
Paisley was an expert on the Soviet mili-
tary budget and had access to top-secret
material, there were early fears that he
might have been killed by the KGB, Mos-
cow's spy service. And some even enter-
tained the notion that he mighthave been
a double-agent forthe Russians. "If a guy
kills himself and there's no apparent rea-
son, you have to ask yourself, 'Has he
been up to some dirty work? " said one
NEWSWEEK
16 October 1978
veteran spook. But the KGB is not known
ever to have killed aCIA staff official, and
authorities speculate that Paisley prob-
ably killed himself for personal reasons.
The evidence seems to support them.
Friends say Paisley, 55, was depressed
two years ago when he broke up with
his wife and, more recently, when his
mother became ill. His girlfriend, Betty
Myers, who is a psychiatric social work-
er, is not convinced that Paisley commit-
ted suicide, but concedes that "there
were some painful things in John's life."
Myers had recently taken a job in Cum-
berland, Md., about two hours from
Washington, and. Paisley was bothered
about the separation. "I knew from little
things that he minded," she says.
There were other upheavals as well.
Paisley had retired early from the intel-
ligence agency in 1974 because, as one
colleague says? "he wanted to get away
from it all for awhile." But retirement
didn't work out quite the way Paisley
thought it would-even with his con-
sulting work for The Company. "just
living the life of the beachcomber and
mariner was kind of disappointing to .
him," says Hank Knoche, Paisley's for-
mer CIA boss. -
Speed Limit: Early this year, Paisley's
family urged him to begin group therapy,
and he later resumed full-time work with
an accounting firm-because, Myers
says, he needed the money. "He was
falling behind a little bit," she says. "He
needed a steadier income until the kids
were well through school." When he
turned 55 last summer, he told a friend
that he was going to stay "within the
speed limit." The friend thought at the
time that Paisley meant he would slow
down his pace of work, but in retrospect
another friend thinks Paisley meant that
be did not intend to live past 55.
Still, there are some unanswered ques-
tions. The small 9-mm handgun that
Paisley kept aboard his boat is missing. If
Al"
Paisley on his boat: 'Leave the lights on'
he shot himself, of course, it might have-
fallen overboard with his body. But the
Maryland police say that the bullet re.
covered from Paisley's head is "slightly
heavier than would normally come from
that type of gun.`" it tests show that the
-
bullet could not have come from Pais-
ley's gun, authorities might have to focus
on the possibility of murder. And if -
any classified documents are missing, --
Paisley's death becomes more suspect.
But the CIA says that it can account for
all the classified documents available to
Paisley.
To Betty Myers, the whole thing re-
mains a painful enigma. And though sui-
cide seems the most likely answer, it
seems probable that no one will ever
know for sure just what happened in fAT
last hours of John Paisley's life.
-OENNti9 A W N LUM5'Me DAV O MARTIN in W i'MgIc, _"
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 Approved For Release 20q 2/ -l-0099
6 August 1978
starts anew
0
.by. CAROL NANNINGA.
Times staff reporter
Can a man who has spent. 24
years "with=: the Central Intelli-
:genre-Agency, find happiness and
satisfaction as a business execu-
Live?
That is what L.-Henry Knoche,
former- deputy director of the
C.I.A., has come to Seattle to find
out. Last.,month Knoche/ began a'
-:new administrative career with
the Boeing Aerospace Co.
He left .the C.I.A. a little more
than a year ago because, he says,
-he "did'-riot see eye-to-eye"with
-..
Adm. Stanfield Turner who -be-
came C.I.A director its March,
1977. "We . had a' different ap-
proach;,? Knoche said. "'that out--.
fit - deserves.- two . leaders ..:: who
were comps-tible and did seeeye-
_to-eye.
"I left the C.I.A. with a great
deal of agony. To leaver, It at a
time when -,it was having some
difficulties was not an easy thing
to do. I had the feeling at the time
it was almost like deserting."
Knoche said investigations . of
the agency, including of its role in
plots to kill-Cuban President Fidel
Castro and to overthrow Chile's
government, did not seem. to dam
agge- the` morale.- of C.A" em-
ployes:- But the: arrival of Admiral -
Turner did:~ti
Turner, who-came into the- or--
ganization -from.- the outside,:.
seemed to- be asking himself how
he could make sure he had the
agency, under control, Knoche
said.... _ Y -
w
"What Turner~ didn't "kno Is:
that is not a' question. you have-to'
- worry about'. with the
Knoche said. "People are instinc-?
tively loyal upward'to the boss.
C.LA. employes ertdured? all the
public scrutiny only to find them-
selves "confronted with this feel-
ing of hostility and criticism `rom?
within,."] nocheexplained..
Criticism -from -within. is a:very -
.delicate matter, Knoche believes.
He- citese the case of, _ Frank
Snepp, a former. C.I.A. agent
whose earnings from. a:book-about- the, agency have been- impounded-
by"_the federal governnt P r4
Knoche- said the damage hone
by such a book is unmeasurable.
"It's like asking yourself;;`.'How-
many sources, would have worked
with the C.I.A. if all this-- hadn't
happened?' , : k _x:;
"As- a member of the C.I. If
you were able. - to - run across. a,
Russian who was willing to impart
highly- critical-- information. ` about A
secret matters inside' the Soviet::
Union; do you think he would join
us for one minute if he thought his
name was going to-be in The New.:
York Times or in a book by a.
C.I.A.. employe the next days
"Of course he wouldn't." /': . , ;
The secrecy agreement C.I.A,
employes sign as a promise to
protect forever their sources holds
the system together, Knoche said.
So the C.I.A., needs to protect the
confidentiality of sources as much-
as the media, he said. ? .
Knoche wishes -"whistle: blow-
ers" like Snepp- would. "operate-
within the system to get changes
made. While I wouldn't : rule out
the right of anybody to take a
,case to the media, I would think
that person should have first ex-
hausted the system and taken pain
not to divulge sources,. or ,.meth.-..
ods, he said.. ?
"The C.I.A. has nevet bensored=
a point of .view: Any, merican has
the right.to reach conclusions;
about foreign policy. "-'
And. the public could _ make
some. of-those decisions. better if it
knew something about the -C.I.A: s
budget,,:, Knoche believes.: "Some"":
approximation of ? the overall fig-:
ure should- berg- largely: known.
think thee figure is small- enough
that it . is a. bargain, - and most
Americans would see. it, that way.'?
But, he warns, a detailed public
accounting has its. dangers.
"`Foreign intelligence, services
would-begin analyzing the budget
and,-make rather informed ju g
ments as to where the level of
effort is. They they would begin to....,
plan counter, moves' .;, ;