NEW NATIONAL SECURITY GROUP FORMED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500240026-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: January 26, 1983
• Content Type: TRANS

Approved For Release 2921/ag ;1-Rlf17?21-??9 -
26 JANUARY 1983
New NATIONAL Security Group Formed
Washington
STATI NTL
Several former national security officials announced the formation Wednesday
of another group aimed at developing national strategy.
.tae.
AsAgroup held its first meeting, three officials from the Reagan
administration attended because "they want to hear from us about our plans,"
said former Sen. Richard Stone, R-Fla.
Besides Stone, leaders of the new group include former CIA deputy directors
Adm. Bobby Inman and Ray ClineL; Rep. Mickey Edwards, R-Okla.; and Gen. Lyman L.
Lemnitzer and Adm. Thomas Moorer, both retired chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
At a news conference, both Stone and Cline .7 said they had no specific
recommendations for a long-range strategy. Both cited as examples of strategies
the former U.S. policies of containment, the 19405 goal of limiting Soviet
expansionism, and detente, the decade-old attempt to improve relations with the
Soviet Union.
"The problem is that too much of our thinking has been short-range," Stone
said. His group's "wealth of experience" could be put to use by policy makers to
come up with long-term goals, he said.
"We're trying to grasp what was good about containment and modernize it to
the present day," said Cline!..
A statement by the group said "few Americans recognize that the United States
is the primary target of a hostile Soviet global strategy designed to decrease
U.S. power and influence relative to the power and influence of the Soviet
Union."
The goal of the private, non-profit group is to "provide specific details
concerning all of the global economic, military, technological and political
trends that are running against the United States and concerning which effective
national action is urgently needed," the statement said.
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' Appring Wiatinse 2001/03/07YEQAPRF'91-00901R00
OE PAGE Ar-/a 24 JP.ZIJARY 1983
WASHENGTON TALK
Briefing
New Post for Inman
Aim. Bobby R. Inman, who re-
signed as Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence last June,
has accepted an offer to become presi-
dent and chief executive officer of a
new corporation that will conduct re-
search and development in the elec-
tronics field, on a pooled basis, for a
dozen major computer producers.
The concern, to be called the Mi-
croelectronics and Computer Tech-
nology Corporation, represents an ef-
fort by industry to combine forces to
keep the United States in the forefront
of computer and semiconductor tech-
nology. Among the sponsoring corpo-
rations are the United Technologies
Corporation, Sperry Univac, Radio
Corporation of America and Control
_Data Corporation.
Admiral Inman those the research
? corporation, in part, because it will do
no business with the Federal Govern-
ment, eliminating any possibility that
he could later be seen as profiting
from his Government service. .
The Department of Justice has re-
portedly assured the corporations in-
volved that the new venture will not
violate antitrust barriers against
cooperation by competitors.
-- ?
Phil Galley
Warren Weaver Jr.
. . -
STATINTL
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RADTOr Re
REPORTSM
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM The Bob Grant Show
DATE
SUBJECT
STATI NTL
STM1ON WMCA Radio
January 20, 1983 4:10 P.M. Ow New York, N.Y.
Interview with Admiral Bobby Inman
BOB GRANT: If I were to tell you the name -- if I were
to say the name Bobby Ray Inman, you'd probably think of a
quarterback for the Alabama Crimson Tide, maybe, or the Georgia
Bulldogs. It sounds like one of those Southeast Conference
quarterbacks. They always have those names, you know, two names.
Why have one when two will do? '
But actually, Bobby Ray Inman is an admiral. Yeah,
that's right. He became an admiral in the United States Navy.
But even more incredible, Bobby Ray Inman was a CIA Deputy
Director. I say was because he resigned last April. And there
were bits and pieces of controversy over why he resigned. But
the fact of the matter is, in spite of the Abbie Hoffmans and the
Jerry Rubins and the Tom Haydens and the people like that, the
Jane Fondas and the people like that, in spite of that, a
sovereign nation has not only the right, but the duty to maintain
a counterintelligence unit. In short, in order to survive, a
nation must have a spy system. Call it espionage, call it
counterespionage, call it any name you want, it is an honorable,
necessary endeavor.
Had we not had it, we would not have beaten the Japanese
and the Germans in World War II almost simultaneously in a
relatively few short years. Had we not had it, General MacArthur
would not have been able to make that brilliant landing at
Inchon, which was never followed up the way it should have been.
Had we not had it, the United States of America would not be even
the vestigally free country it is today.
So make no mistake. After all, the brainwashing of the
'60s and '70s, the lunacy of self-hatred, incredible mass
psychosis of beating one's breast and saying, "My country is
oFFicjkovitvgarnyiReleatliti7oail5f?dX-116-016t8oioickaVo5SooAao OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
Material supplied by Radio TV Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited
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2
terrible. It's awful." It's incredible. That's what it is.
It's absolutely.
And anyway, we need a spy system. But is ours really
operating the way it should? Whet commends William Casey to be
the head of the CIA, anyway?
We'll talk about that to Admiral Inman.
GRANT: Admiral Bobby Inman, are you there, sir?
ADMIRAL BOBBY INMAN: I am here.
GRANT: I have so many questions that I would like to
ask you. I probably -- I probably don't know where to begin,
except I want to know, first of all, why you took the job you
quit last April in the first place; if you were going to quit it,
why you took it in the first place. That being what amounted to
the number two man in the CIA, sir.
ADMIRAL INMAN: I took it only because of the direct
personal request from the President and Mr. Casey that I at least
take the job to help them get started. I had decided by 1980 I
should retire, since I sat on a small pyramid of naval
intelligence officers; and as long as I stayed on active duty, I
blocked the opportunity for bright youngsters to come along and
get their own chance to star.
Notwithstanding my desire to retire, Mr. Casey and the
President both asked that if I was not willing to do the whole
term, I at least help them get started. That's what I committed
to do. But we also understood from the outset that it was going
to be for less than two years.
So all of the stories later that made it appear as
though I was walking off in anger could not have been further
from the truth.
In my confirmation hearings, there was a little salting
away that it was going to be a short tour. Only one journalist
ever followed that up.
GRANT: Well, of course, journalists, being journalists,
they like to make the most out of everything that happens. And
indeed, there were all kinds of rumors. One that surfaced in the
New York area a great deal was that you felt you were a
professional and your boss was an amateur, and you found it
difficult to take orders from an amateur.
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ADMIRAL INMAN: [Unintelligible] not accurate. I had
not illusions several years earlier about the prospect of a
professional moving to head the intelligence services. We had a
chance to get a charter in the late '70s. For a variety of
reasons, it was not enacted. In the absence of that, now and for
the foreseeable future, Presidents are going to choose as their
Director of Central Intelligence someone they're personally
knowledgeable of and comfortable with.
I think all the professionals understand that and are
prepared to work with them and support them as long as they
consider them competent.
In Bill Casey's own direct instance, we would never have
gotten this Administration to sign up for a long-range rebuilding
had he not been able to go directly to the President to get past
all the blocking bureaucracy and get his approval. So if the
professionals needed any demonstration of why it's advantageous
to have someone as the DCI who has the President's direct ear,
that specific approval for the rebuilding program brought it
home.
GRANT: Admiral Inman, you say, then, that Bill Casey's
doing a good job?
ADMIRAL INMAN: Anybody can be criticized for various
areas of their job. Bill has -- does not have a long patience
for dealing with the press, for dealing with any of the areas of
the office that would probably give him a better image. But for
the crux of the matter, where it really matters about how he's
doing his job, I believe he will get very good marks from
history, in looking back. I think he'll get those good marks
from the job he did for rebuilding, but probably more importantly
for revitalizing the way the country goes about developing its
national estimates of events abroad. They drifted over a period
of years into being encyclopedic historical kinds of studies, in
large measure. Bill had no patience with that. He brought up a
whole new approach, a fast-track approach to dealing with
problems that are going to be relevant in the near term for
policy decisions. And I think that will, on the long term, end
up getting him strong plus marks for his tour as DCI.
GRANT: Admiral Inman, would you say that the CIA is in
now, after a period in the '70s of almost being loathed by some
Americans, being distrusted by some Americans, being feared by
some Americans -- as a matter of fact, there are some Americans,
to this day, that equate it -- at best, equate it with the KGB.
I just don't understand it, but I'm sure you know what I'm
talking about.
ADMIRAL INMAN: I do indeed.
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I think we are on the road back. In retrospect, looking
back over the 30 years from in World War II to '75, the overall
performance of the CIA has to come down as being very strong,
contributing to the country's security. But along the way there
were some missteps. There will always be great debate about
covert action, changing other governments, reporting guerrilla
movements, whether that's in the country's interest or not.
Setting that aside and dealing with its primary mission,
the [unintelligible] foreign intelligence, a first-rate job in a
great many areas.
But some of the abuses that surfaced in the '70s, and
particularly the use of CIA and the other organizations to try to
track whether or not there was foreign funds flowing to anti-war
elements in the U.S., subjected not only CIA, but the FBI and the
Defense organizations to a great deal of discredit.
GRANT: Yes.
ADMIRAL INMAN: As people began to suspect the only
thing they did was spy on U.S. citizens. And that's been the
hardest thing to shake in getting on with rebuilding the
country's intelligence capabilities to be all that we need.
GRANT: Well, the pendulum, thankfully, has seemed to
have swung back in a more rational territory, wouldn't you say?
ADMIRAL INMAN: Yes, sir. I believe it has.
GRANT: Let's turn to some more contemporary matters.
For example, if I were to ask you, just off hand, who's the
world's most dangerous leader, who would you say?
ADMIRAL INMAN: I'd be hard put to give you one. I'd
give you two. Qaddafi of Libya and Kim Il Sung of North Korea.
GRANT: All right.
ADMIRAL INMAN: I think they are the two who are the
most erratic and where one has to always at the prospect that
they would stage an incident that could spread into a substantial
conflict.
GRANT: All right. I just asked -- in case you just
joined us or the noise on the line interfered with your hearing,
Admiral Inman answered Qaddafi of Libya and North Korea's Kim Il
Sung, and citing one of the major reasons for saying this the
fact that they are both erractic, unpredictable.
And I think a lot of Americans wold agree with you.
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5
Although not too many years ago, when I would talk about Qaddafi,
people didn't know what I was talking about.
We have the Administration responding to what Gromyko
said in West Germany the other day, in which he said that if we
did not -- that we had better not deploy any Pershing
medium-range missiles in NATO countries, because if we did, they
would drop the arms talks in Switzerland. What do you think we
ought to do about that?
ADMIRAL INMAN: Well, first, I believe it's a bluff.
It's a hard line. They clearly want to do anything to block the
deployment of Pershing and the ground-launched cruise missiles to
Europe because they see them as very sharply again redressing the
balance, which went out of balance with their deploying their
SS-20s. And there'll be a major campaign in the months ahead to
try to portray the U.S. as the major threat to world peace and
to portray themselves in Western Europe as the peaceful
[unintelligible], and to really drive a wedge between the U.S.
and our European allies.
GRANT: Well, I'm going to interrupt you for just a
moment because, parenthetically, with what you have just said,
Admiral Inman, I was reading some of the portions of some of the
speeches of some putative presidential candidates who were in
Sacramento, California-- Alan Cranston, Walter Mondale, to name
two; Gary Hart, to name a third. All three would make it sound
-- did make it sound, indeed, that Washington was really the
cause of the problems on the arms control talks, not Moscow.
As an American, how does this make you feel?
ADMIRAL INMAN: I worry about the signals that are sent
to our friends abroad. And there are so many instances over the
last decade where we say so many different things publicly, and
it's also rapidly picked up and covered in the news media, that I
worry that foreign countries are confused about what our will
really is, what our policies really are.
GRANT: Ah-ha.
ADMIRAL INMAN: I'm persuaded that, ultimately, you've
got to compromise to get agreements, and that we will have to
compromise from some of the positions we started. But you don't
start caving in to compromise before you've got some counter-
offers and you see a prospect of a bargain which will at least be
equitable for you.
So, I don't believe we'll ultimately get arms control
agreements unless we are prepared to make some compromises. But
you've got to have a good hard line going in, or you're not going
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to get agreement which reasonably protects your interests.
GRANT: So, then, you see nothing wrong with the
President's seeming hard line going in.
ADMIRAL INMAN: I think that's -- I think he's a good
negotiator. From time to time, I see the signs long before his
entry into politics, back to his Screen Actor Guild days. I
remember with great clarity an instance when I was still serving
in the Administration and there was an intense debate about what
the positions ought to be. And the President sort of stopped the
heated debate to say, "Why would I want to send negotiators
without something to negotiate?"
So I think, indeed, he's properly taking a hard line.
But I also believe, at the right time, he'll make smart
compromises to get an agreement that serves this country's
long-term security interest.
GRANT: One final question. I appreciate your time,
Admiral Inman. One final question.
People have asked me, and I pass it on to you because
only individuals such as yourself are in a position to really
assess the answer. The question is: Why should we spend the
money to deploy these mis -- to build these missiles, to ship
them, to deploy them, to maintain them? What difference does it
make if we don't have any and the Soviets do? They'll never use
them anyway. If they did, the whole world would be destroyed.
So what difference does it make if they have the missiles or the
missile edge and we don't?
Your answer, sir.
ADMIRAL INMAN: The heart of the matter is the
perception of our allies and friends about their own security.
Do they believe they will be defended by standing up, by
continuing free enterprise systems; or do they believe that we
lack the capacity to defend them, lack the [technical
difficulties] them, and that they therefore should reach
accommodations with the Soviets?
GRANT: Very good.
Thank you very much, Admiral Inman.
ADMIRAL INMAN: A great pleasure to talk to you.
GRANT: That's Admiral Bobby Ray Inman. He was the
number two man of the CIA. He's only 51 years of age. You may
have thought he was older because of some of the things that he
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7
said.
He feels the CIA is being rebuilt, has been rebuilt a
great deal since William Casey took over as head of the
organization, and is very approving of the President's posture.
He says the President is a good negotiator. He also says that we
must be careful that we don't send signals to our allies and to
other people in the world, send the wrong signals, make them
think that we don't have the will to do what must be done to
stand up to the Soviet Union.
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NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
January 1983
intentions. integyity
and caMR:or Release 2001/03/07 Magri einclata43.4
Government, according to Administration budget
officials.
STATINTL
By Philip Taubman
illiam J. Casey, the Director
of Central Intelligence, sat at
the end of the mahogany con-
ference table in his office.
Outside, the late afternoon
sun played across the trees
that ring the Central Intelli-
gence Agency's headquarters
in northern Virginia, filling the windows with a
fresco of autumn colors. A short stack of docu-
ments, some stamped SECRET, rested at Mr.
Casey's left elbow, and a yellow legal pad on which
he had penciled several notes was positioned to his
right.
"The reason I am here is because I have a lot of
relevant experience and a good track record," Mr.
Casey said, alluding to comments that he was un-
qualified for the job and had been appointed only
because he was Ronald Reagan's campaign man-
ager. Mr. Casey, an imperious and proud man, had
been fuming over the criticism for months, accord-
ing to his friends, and now, in his first comprehen-
sive interview since taking office, he wanted to set
the record straight.
He flipped through the papers and extracted a
yellowing clipping from The New York Times that
extolled his record as chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973. Next,
he provided several pages copied from a book about
Allied intelligence operations during World War II;
he had underlined a glowing assessment of his con-
tribution to the Office of Strategic Services. The
final clipping was a story that appeared in The
Washington Star in the summer of 1980. describing
Mr. Casey's role as Reagan campaign director.
The headline: "Casey, the Take-Charge Boss."
It was an oddly defensive performance for a man
who, according to classified budget figures pro-
vided by Government officials, is overseeing the
biggest peacetime buildup in the American intelli-
gence community since the early 1950's. Because
Intelligence expenditures are secret, it is not widely
known that at a moment when the Reagan Admin-
istration is forcing most Government agencies to
retrench, the C.I.A. and its fellow intelligence or-
ganizations are enjoying boom times. Even the
military services, which have been favored with
substantial budget increases, lag well behind in
terms of percentage growth, although military-run
Intelligence agencies are growing almost as
quickly as the C.I.A. Spending figures for intelli-
gence agencies, including the C.I.A., are hidden
within the Defense Department's budget. With a
budget increase for the 1963 fiscal year of 25 per-
cent, not allowing for inflation, compared with 18
P.1", 1+-7-r-.. -
8TATINTL
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P:Ti6n ATPZARM WASHINGTCN PCST
ON
?
Arms Talks
Chief Assails
GOP Critics.
By Patrick E. Tyler -
Wastgarton Pat Blatt Writer
U.S. arms control director
Eugene V. Rostow yesterday
accused some Republic=
conservatives in the Senate
.of attempting to take over
nuclear arms control policy
by challenging key presiden-
tial appointments and. en-
dangering the Reagan ad-
ministration's credibility, in
negotiations with the Soviet
Union. '
Following a White House.:
decision Monday against re-
nominatirg Robert T. Grey
Jr. as deputy director of the ?
Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency (ACDA), Roe-
tow said "the next few ap-
pointments' in the vacancy-
riddled agency will demon-
strate whether "we retain
control in the agency and
have personnel in the agency
representing a continuing
point of view."
In coming weeks, as the
wireinietration prepares for
the resumption of nuclear
arms reduction talks in Ge-
neva, Rostow said, the agen-
cy will not be hampered by
unfilled positions. For now,
he said, he is optimistic that
the Senate conservatives who
have blocked Rostow's
choices to ACDA positions
"are not having any effect on
the formation of policy" and
that "policy is being made in
accordance with the presie
dent's ideas." ?
Rostow said that he did
not wish to state his accusa-
tion toward the Senate con-
?
5 January 1983
,servatives in'naked"
terms, but
;added that a minority of Senate Re- 1
:Publicans led by Sen. Jesse Helms
successfully scuttled .,
tc'neippointrelenteitrid .cpne .othee ?
li'iajeteetippointoserit lastear;* are.
? seeking ei level of influence in arms
, control policy not warranted by their
numbers.
Heesaid the threat of such dispro-
rik.r,tienatt imileetteet could promote a
"fear response" ? .from the Soviet
Union "over the credibility of Amer-
' lean guarantees or lead to extreme
nationalism" e to counter a greater
? perceived threat from the United
States..
"ThieSoviets can tie% to exploit the
3, doubts, and they get Very anxious at
'Ithe ? thought that ? atiSr? extrimiat
American group might take charge
of American nuclear policy," Rostow
said.
He said that the difficulty of his
job has been to chart a course be-
tween "people who want an agree-
ment with the Russians at any price
. . . and people opposed to having
any agreement at all."
? Rest nee called the loss of Grey "a
sad COminent on the political pro-
cess,itAtii sources on Capitol Hill
and in the administration said yes-
terday that the battle over Reagan 1
administretion foreign policy ap-
pointments is likely to continue:
While some sources had suggested
that abandonment of the Grey nom-
ination -in the face of strong oppo-
sition Train. Helms would ease oppo-
sition 0...other key appointments
held1;ortage during much of 1982,
aides teeseVeral conservative senators
involved in the fight indicated oth-
erwise.
? Thiflind administration officials
said it ntidappears certain there will
be a major confrontation in the Sen-
ate later this month over the expect-
ed renomination of Richard Burt as
assistant secretary of state for Eu-
ropean affeirs.
Burt is seen by several conserva-
tives as. a potential -moderating- in-
Efluerice ones.: hard ,tht.
Le Soviet linionin iirnisliegotiations. e.
Yesterday, an aide ti, Helms said
he wasn't aware of any deals relating
to the White House's decision to
abandon Grey. ' ?
? 'There have been any number of
so-called deals zumounced unite!.
terially. ," he said. Tut there
never were any such deals, they just
said, 'Here's the deal.'" -
doubt very seriously whether
Grey bought thein much," said an
aide ? to Senate'. Majority Leader
Howard H. Baker Jr. - (R-Tenn.).
711e community npposing Grey and
the community opposing Burt are
not entirely the same."
Saying the current intention is to
force the fight over the Burt nom-
ination as soon as the Senate recon-
venes, the aide added:
"At some point we've got to move
on. The president and the secretary
of state seem committed to the nom-
ination, and we're going to do our
best to get him through."
An aide to Sere Malcolm Wallop
(R-Wyo.) said yesterday that admin-
istration officials are "whistling in
the dark" if they think opposition to
Burt has abated. They have broad-
ened the challenge to Burt to include
"security" grounds stemming from:
an article he wrote in 1979 as a re-
porter for The New York Times.
That article revealed the existence
of a US. spy satellite. code-named
Chalet that could be reprogrammed
to monitor communications signals
emanating from Soviet missile tests.
As a follow-up to a classified letter
protesting the Burt appointment
sent to Secretary of State George P.
Shultz last summer by Sen. _Barry
Goldwater (R-Ariz.), Republicans on
Cf),WXINUED
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ARTI CLE APPEARED
Vri PAGE /
Rebuilding U.S. Intelligence
LOS ANGELES TIMES
3 JANUARY 1983
Casey Shapes Up CIA
Survives as Top Spy
By OBERT C. TOTH, Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON?Last summer,
several months before Leonid I.
Brezhnev died, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency produced a study of
Kremlin leadership politics almost.
40 pages long. It predicted that a
cluster of Soviet officials would
succeed Brezhnev.. not ? a strong
individual leader.
.A.fter reviewing the top-secret
report before it was forwarded to
the White House, Central Intelli-
gence Director William .1 Casey
concluded that President Reagan
-would never wade through it $41.1. So,
in a brief covering letter couched in
race-track parlance, he boldly pre-
dicted which Kremlin contenders
would win, place and show.
Kirilenko peaked too soon. Casey
9
?Casey s midterm report card
shows that:
?The country has experiencd no
known "intelligence failures" or
"intelligence abuses" during his two
Years.
?intelligence budgets, up 20%,
have grown even faster than.
Pentagon budget, - -
?Output of analytic studies his
jumped a remarkable fivefold over
the last years of-the Jimmy-Carter
Administration.
?Covert activities have dropped
somewhat in number, but individual
operations have grown in size.
?And "intelligence guidelines,"
which are the do's and don'ts of the
=Immunity, have been shortened
drastically.
told Reagan, and Chernenko faded / Casey's former. deputy, retired
irrthe stretch. Andropov is in the Adrat Bobby IL Inman, believes
lead, perhaps challenged by Usti- Casey will be rated "very high" as a
nov, with Gorbachev the dark horse director of intelligence for "totally
and a future corner. overhauling the process of making
national intelligence esti-
mates?sharply increasing their
number, making them shorter and
more focused on problems that
policy-makers grapple with?plus
winning the President's support for
rebuilding the intelligence commu-
nity."
'Substantially Better'
"Under Bill, things are substan-
tially better than the public image
suggests," Inman said in an :inter-
view. ?
Casey?a scrappy, sometimes ar- .Ray S. Cline, a former senior CIA
rogant, bulky 69-year-old who re- official has praised Casey for seek-
ing to balance, with equally high
priority, the need to provide accu-
rate, in-depth analysis with the ?
need to make it timely and useful in
helping to answer the hard policy
questions of government
STATI NTL
On tire Money
As it turned out, Casey was right
on the money: _it was Yuri V.
Andropov, not a committee, that
succeeded Brez,hnev as general sec-
retary of the Soviet Communist
Party. But the episode is less impor-
tant as a measure of Casey the
Kremlinologist than as a measure of
Casey the CIA director and of the
methods Casey has developed to run
the multibillion-dollar-a-year U.S.
intelligence community.
tains a trace of his native New York
accent?has surprised admirers and
critics alike by surviving as the
nation's top spy through the first
two years of Reagan's tenure. Even
more, he has managed to set and
es, believe y has "moved
the CIA backward" in restricting
the release of information and in
resurrecting its covert action capa-
bilities. And some conservatives,'
who asked not to be identified.,
complain that Casey has not shaken
up the intelligence community as
the Republican Party platform of
1980 promised a Reagan Adminis-
tration would do.
Be that as it may, Casey?a
veteran of American intelligence
operations during World War II, a
multimillionaire with an entrepre-
neurial bent and a former senior
federal official in financial and eco- '
nomic areas?has no intention of
leaving the job.
"I'm enjoying it," he said in an
interview, "and we're making prog-
ress. I intend to stick with it."
' Twelve months ago, it was .far
from obvious that Casey was either
enjoying the job or was going to
keep it long.
At that point, he was reeling from
his early and almost disastrous
decision to hire a fellow Reagan
campaign worker, Max Hugel, as
chief of the CIA's clandestine
operations?a "very conspicuous
mistake on my part," Casey later
called it. Hugel quit after private
financial irregularities were alleged
in the press, but three senior Re-
publican senators called for Casey's
resignation.
The Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee re-examined Casey's financial
background, too. It grudgingly con-
.C,Q.NTINZMa
maintain a careful but significant On the other hand, .critics
pace for rebuilding the nation's v such as Morton Halperin, director of
intelligence capabilities. the Center for National Security STATINTL
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STATI NTL
Int= APTiEZD
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THE NATION
1 JANUARY 1983
Ileagzufs 'Secret'
War on Nicaragua
STEPHEN SCHLESINGER
espite the President's denials?and despite even
the new Congressional order against just such an
effort?the Reagan Administration is launched
on a course to undermine and ultimately over-
throw the Sandinist regime in Nicaragua. This "worst-kept
secret war," as The New York Times calls it, has been front-
page news for months, and it is now well established that the
Central Intelligence Agency is using former Somoza National
Guardsmen to initiate a covert war against Nicaragua. from
neighboring Honduras, a longtime and pliable ally of the
United States. But no press accounts have fully gauged the
breadth of the American conspiracy against Nicaragua.
Since Reagan took office, the United States has relied on
intimidation and destabilization to disrupt, isolate and
replace the Sandinist regime. The Administration has pre-
sumed that in dealing with Nicaragua, intimidation atid
destabilization are as legitimate as diplomacy, though such
tactics are forbidden by the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance and by the charters of the Organiza-
tion of American States and the United Nations. So far,
however, to the chagrin of Reagan strategists, the two
methods have not worked, and that increases the chances of
an outright war between Nicaragua and the United States.
The American tactics of intimidation started after the Ad-
ministration realized it could not coerce the Sandinists by
diplomacy to reduce their troop strength, refrain from buy-
ing MIGs from the Soviet Union, end arms deliveries to
Salvadoran guerrillas and dissolve their governing direc-
torate. On April 1, 1981, the United States cut off all
economic aid to Nicaragua and then increased its pressure
on international lending institutions to deny the Sandinists
loans and advised American companies to get out of Nica-
ragua. Periodically thereafter, Secretary of State Haig, in
Congressional testimony and political speeches, emphasized
the dangers posed by the Nicaraguan ievolution and hinted
at countermeasures Washington might take.
At a November 1981 House hearing, for. example, Haig
assailed the "totalitarian character of the Sandinista
regime" and said he would not rule out any options, in-
cluding a military blockade, to end Nicaragua's "subver-
sion" of El Salvador. Haig's remarks took on an even more
ominous coloration with the revelations in The Washington
Stephen SchlAIRACTIYogariMioriVigneFruit, a 9istory
of the 1954 C.I.A.-backed coup in Guatemala, published
STATI NTL
Post and The New York Times in February and March 1982
that the White House had approved a ten-point C.I.A. co-
vert operation against Nicaragua.
Then on March 9, 1982, Deputy Director of Central Intel
ligence Adm. Bobby Inman released thirty-six aerial phot
graphs of Nicaraguan military bases taken by U.S. sp
planes. The pictures, Inman claimed, documented a large-
scale military buildup in Nicaragua, including the construc-
tion of thirty-six new installations, the presence of Russian
helicopters and tanks and the lengthening of landing strips
at three airports to accommodate jets. (Incidentally, the
Nicaraguan "air force" consists of three propeller-driven
Cessna 180s, two T-33s and three T-28s. The country has no
navy. Its only protection is its army, consisting of 25,000
poorly trained soldiers,. 25,000 reservists; 70,030 militia
volunteers, twenty-five Soviet tanks that don't operate well
in jungles and assorted defensive missiles.)
The White House put steel into its threats with gra
military support for Honduras, a public foe of the Sandinis
regime. To signal Nicaragua that it possessed the means
eventually to make good on them, the Administration has
turned Honduras into its most powerful base in Central
America outside of its military depot in Panama.
The effort began shortly after Reagan'S inauguration.
The United States increased its embassy staff in the capital,
Tegucigalpa, to about 115, making it one of the largest in
Latin America. Reagan's new Ambassador, John D. Negro-
-ponte, according to Newsweek (November 8, 1982), was
charged specifically with directing the campaign against
Nicaragua. Washington also sent 100 Pentagon "advisers,"
44:
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Approved For Release 201,91/91/1(RDCRRH91-009011
January 1983
Orlando Was
A Great Success!
More than 1,300 TROA
members and guests
visited TROA's
World in Orlan-
do during the
Association's
1982 Nation-
al Conven-
tion held at
the Sheraton-Twin Towers, Nov. 18-20.
For the first time, golf and tennis
tourneys were conducted on the open-
ing day. More than a hundred officers
and their spouses played golf on the
beautiful Magnolia course at Disney
World. A lesser number of tennis play-
ers used courts at the Orlando Naval
Training Center.
Those who attended the opening din-
ner were treated to the mellow music of
the Vaughn Monroe Orchestra. Speak-
ers at the various functions were excep-
tional. Heywood Hale Broun, sports es-
sayist for CBS, was hilarious at the
breakfast honoring chapter and coun-
cil presidents. A consummate actor
and storyteller on stage, he had many
laughing so hard they cried.
Our "keynote" speaker, Adm Bobby
R. Inman, USN-Ret., just retired from
his position as Deputy Director, CIA,
gave a more somber presentation but
one which clearly outlined the nature
of the threat our country faces.
STATI NTL
intelligence
and National Defense
By Adm Bobby R. Inman, USN-Ret.
I t is a great pleasure for me to come
today to spend some time with so
many people?husbands and wives?
who have served their country. It is
coming into fashion again, but there
has been a long period in between.
You know, we are all shaped by the
people we have been privileged to work
with and for along the years. At the risk
of embarrassing one of your number,
one of my earliest bosses is present. I
worked for her in Paris 29 years ago.
Would Maj Elizabeth Ryland please
stand up?
Unhappily, my speech will be some-
what somber. After talking to people in
all walks of life, I sense that the support
which looked promising a couple of
years ago for rebuilding our defense
capabilities after a very long down-
slide is beginning to erode. We are in
for some very tough times in the months
and years ahead in trying to make sure
that the rebuilding is sustained.
I have been trying to speak out on the
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topic aAppRmcci-fdaraggWiA*9 20PgliPPIRTneP IMPI?A'ke9APP 1 R9P0PaQ?49,9Z6,71 a rm non tv
lems that I think this country is going
to face in a way that I hope the public
can understand and will in turn sup-
port. And in saying to those who are so
eager to cut the defense budget that
indeed economic realities may force us
to stretch out the rebuilding but the
talking about cutting ought to be taken
out of the vocabulary. We spent 14
years cutting and in that process we
ignored the kind of challenges that this
country may have to deal with in the
next 15 to 20 years.
THE SOVIET UNION
I will spend some time with you look-
ing at the Soviets from my long per-
spective of trying to understand them,
understand where they have been and
where they may go.
In the 1943 to 1944 time frame, in
beginning to plan how they would deal
with the immediate post-war years, we
are told that Stalin in concert with his
closest advisors mapped out a defense
strategy of absolute dominion over the
bordering countries where they hoped
to install rifling communist parties,
and a defense force very large in num-
bers. The urge was to build numbers
that would compare with what the UK
and the U.S. had. It didn't matter that
they might be capable of being used for
only a short period of time. It was the
intimidation that large-size forces
would bring . And, in their own internal
thinking, they usually talked in terms
of using that force no more than 200
miles away from the dominion they
had created.
When Stalin died there were two
years of uncertainty and then as
Khrushchev gathered the reins, he took
them on a nine-year roller coaster that
ultimately led to his removal from of-
fice. But, in those years, they began to
evolve their thinking about the use of
military power. They began pretty ear-
ly on in his time talking about a defen-
sive line 600 miles out instead of 200.
They began building strategic forces
and their thrust to directly threaten
the U.S. that. led to the Cuban adven-
ture contributed to Khrushchev's ous-
ter. But by the end of his time, they
were talking about a 1,500-mile perim-
eter and thinking about the need to for-
ward position forces beyond those in
Eastern Europe.
When Brezhnev and company took
over, it was just at a time frame when
the planning was underway for the
next fiApprolied For Releate
that five-year plan a healthy additional
structure. I am still persuaded that the
leadership was primarily driven not by
any strategy about how they would use
it, but to reward the military for the
strong support which enabled them to
remove Khrushchev peacefully and
without any ripples.
Five years later when they started to
put together the next five-year plan
they looked at the achievements?not
only the enormous investments in
building new shipyards, tank factories,
aircraft factories, but the beginning of
a flow out of new hardware that had
multiple shot capability, not single
shot, and the ability to deploy for sub-
stantially greater distance and stay for
much longer periods of time?they
made two decisions because they saw
for the very first time that they had
begun to narrow the gap between the
military capabilities of the U.S. and its
allies and those of the Soviet Union.
Admiral Inman is a former Deputy Director
for the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first decision was to increase
that level of investment and they have
left it there steadily ever since. The sec-
ond was to begin further evolution in
their thinking about how they might
use military force. They spent some
time talking about war-winning and
strategic war. They ultimately recog-
nized the propaganda disadvantages
from that and are rewriting the public
record.
/ For rue, 1975 is the watershed year.
We had a major debate in the U.S. intel-
ligence community over how the Sovi-
ets would react to the collapse of the
government in South Vietnam. The
majority view was that the Soviets
20011/03407te.fekatoRDP914090
other than that it would have no signifi-
view that the Soviets would not have
failed to observe that a't least along the
eastern seaboard of the U S., the prin-
cipal public debate was not whether
you could rescue Saigon, but what
would be the impact on detente if you
tried. You can't document a decision in
that time frame to chanze their ap-
proach for using force, but you can doc-
ument that beginning thai spring and
summer they stopped in their own mil-
itary exercises talking about a 1,500
mile defensive line. They talked about
using force in the interest of the state to
counter, within the extent of their ca-
pabilities, opposing forces.
More importantly, in November'
1975, in a two-week time frame, they
moved 15,000 Cuban troops and mas-
sive quantities of equipment by air and
by sea into Angola, something they had
to have planned over a number of
months. We fumbled around for a re-
sponse, the public was greatly afraid it
was about to be another Vietnam com-
mitment, and we got an overreaction,
the Clark Amendment, which forbad
the use even of covert action to raise
the cost of that adventure in Angola.
Two years later we saw a repetition in
Ethiopia. In I97S it was Aden, the Viet-
namese into Cambodia and Laos. Of
course in 1979 a differeni decision t6
use their own forces in Afghanistan.
But
But the harbinger of that was visible
nine months earlier. April of 1979 the
Soviets staged the largest movement of
forces they had ever accomplished in a
short period of time in a major exercis
out into Mongolia. It would have been
larger still but they had a disaster on
the first day, an air drop lost a number
of people and therefore it was some
what curtailed. But, it was in man*
ways a dress rehearsal for the speed
with which they moved force into Af-
ghanistan on Christmas Day of 1979.
MOBILE POWER
As one looks at the years out ahead
one would have to conclude that the
Soviets are going to have a mobility o
movement of forces that no Russian
ruler has ever had available to hirn ir
the past. The critical question is going
to be what is the attitude about the use
of that new mobility of power. I don
think they will lessen their interest i
the 'central front of Europe, and I clO
not expect them on their own token
without some kind of agreement, to do
any significant reduction in their in
1 R000500240026 Q2ms but I alsO
thilik those are the least likely applicai
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tions of power that this country may
have to deal with.
If one stands back and looks at the
use of this burgeoning capability, you
have to conclude that the old Bolshe-
viks, who have been in power, have ex-
ercised those growing capabilities
with great caution. They have used
them only where they had a high de-
gree of confidence that there was not
likely to be a direct confrontation with
the U.S. We are not into the period of
transition. It has gone smoothly to put
Mr. Yuri Andropov in the General Sec-
retary position. He is not a healthy
man so his period of governing could
turn out to be a fairly, short one. But,
even if his health holds, he is likely to
spend much of his time evolving power
to the next generation of Soviet lead-
ers. We know far too little about them.
They will not, it is certain just by age,
have the same searing memories of the
Germans on the banks of the Volga and
around Leningrad that has been the
governing life experience of those who
are now at the top. We may be lucky.
Having grown up in that bureaucracy,
having so much at stake in sustaining
it, they may be cautious about the ap-
plication of power abroad, but there is
at least as much chance that they will
be more arrogant, more inclined to use
that force where they see opportunities
in the interest of the Soviet state.
1 believe ultimately they will make
their judgments on two primary fac-
tors. The first one, hopefully, we can
work on in the near term. That is the
state of U.S. military capabilities. If we
do get caught by economic reality and
have to stretch out, there does need to
be a debate about priorities. We do
need to ensure that we are going to be
in a position to deter conventional con-
flict. But, over the long term-, how those
new leaders elect to use their power is .
probably going to ride more on a judg
ment of our will than on our military '?
capabilities. And, to deal with that
problem, to persuade them that Ole
should pay attention to the leaciershi
there should be a vocal outpouring o
support that they can understand. On ,
has to worry if they draw their impres'
sions only from nightly news coverag
focusing on the size of the latest dem
onstration against building this coun
try the kind of military capabilities
that may make the difference in all o
our security in the years out ahead.
I wish you great success in the
months and years ahead in helping sus-
tain a defense buildup thal is both ra-
tional and certainly urgently needed.
The much harder task for us is to work
to ensure that the will is there and visi-
ble to the outside, but if we have to, we
will in fact protect our vital interests. '
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STATINTL
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? Approved For Releit61M1336)411(1-15Pgf-baT9TOWIGFOtdblia26-2
TANUABY 1983
VIEW FROM THE TOP
Adm. Bobby Inman:
intelligence Should be the
Front Line of Defense"
Two intelligence chiefs discuss the state of affairs of U.S.
inteiligence and its international implications in a rare and
candid interview. Adm. Bobby Inman, former deputy
director, CIA, and Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, former director,
DIA, address this nation's intelligence preparedness and
the opposition at home and abroad.
by Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, USAF (Ret.),
ME/C Military Affairs Editor
ME/C: Your concerns for the flow of high technology from
the West to the Soviet Union have been reported widely by
the press. You have been criticized for proposing some
industrial and academic discipline here in the United
States. Would you state your concern and give us some
suggestions to halt this hemorrhaging of one of our
principal strengths vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.?
Inman: For a decade we took as a given that trade with the
Soviet Union and the East European allies was going to be
good ? good for us. We hoped that encouraging the East
European countries to pull away from the Soviets might
make the Soviets easier to deal with on political matters.
Ten years later, one has to stop and wonder if that's been
fully realized, but that's a totally different topic. In that
climate of the emphasis on trade, however, little
examination was focused on technological loss ? how the
Soviets used the open access that was provided by the
desire for trade to search for material that would help
accelerate their own defense build-up.
A few thoughtful members of Congress began to worry
about this problem two years ago. Senator Nunn began
structuring hearings before the 1980 election. They did not
come off until later; but he asked shortly after the current
Congress was formed, that Senator Goldwater formally
request intelligence to provide a community-wide
assessment of the technology-loss problem to the Soviets.
A great deal of effort was dedicated to the problem. The
right people from a number of agencies worked hard at it
for six months. They scrounged through all thefilesfor.any
shred of information which might relate, and put It together.
The results were startling. The conclusions were highly
classified, in the aggregate, but a great many detailed
examples documented, to the reasonable satisfaction of
anyone examining them, that the Soviets were running a
very sophisticated operation, vacuum-cleaning the United
States. The Soviets were looking for what was going on in
the way of new research, new development, new weapons
systems, and even such things as productivity improve-
ments and now to make composite materials. When they
found what WilS going on, the Soviets, using a very careful,
weil-considered method, went out to acquire that which
they wanted. The first approacn was to buy legally, and
work, they would then try an illegal purchase. And if that
failed, they would turn to espionage, directly targettng,..,
(because of the openness) the exact people that in ight tiv'e
them that which would be of greatest value. ?
That study was finished at the end of October 1981.
During the weeks that followed, I watched officiz7ds of the
government begin to contemplate the magnituce of the
loss and what actions they might take to regulate or
legislate the control of loss. Over these many years of
government service, I came to view with substantial
skepticism those government efforts to regulate without ?
some consultation with those who are to be regulated. So in
this instance, I decided to try to stir my colleagues in the
outside world into addressing the problem themselves.
That moved at a little faster pace than I had planned. I went
to a symposium for the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, and I listened to some academics
from the floor assert that no useful research had ever come
from classified research, and that never, under any
circumstances, could any kind of restraint on the
publication of results from research ever be acceptable.
Given my knowledge of the loss and the steps being
contemplated, I used some rather colorful language to
convey my view that they weren't living in the real world ?
that if they were to avoid the potential for regulation that
was not carefully thought out, the academicians had better
give some thought to the problem themselves. It has been
my experience, from the parallel of the narrow example in
the field of cryptology, that when a broad cross-section of
people finally gets involved in addressing the problem and
accepts as a given that there is a national security concern,
they come up with some very good ideas, such as those
which the government is now trying. The plans are not to
the total satisfaction of all those in the government, but
from my sense, it's a substantial help in dealing with the
problem in that area.
I also gave those views to some senior officials in
organizations like the National Academy of Science and
the National Academy of Engineering. I was very pleased
when they elected to jointly sponsor a study effort by ai
panel headed by Dr. Dale Carson and funded by the
National Science Foundation. They had a narrow charter:
to look only at the university-sponsored research. And as I
inoicated in public testimony a year ago, that's only a small
part of the problem. But it is a part, I think, that .s going to
v,,hen couldn't _pLa it los ally, they try to get a grow. To successfully cut off the loss across the defense
third p,:ApprQyeigrthOECKeEeasEy2001/03-a7dT'CIA]4;/DP91t4.o0.9olmYiytostto'4d6/6-y turn to the
uri sitil?epprOMegirEdardR009.?99119031SEtchs,-.Ripp91-00901R000500240026-2
c.;: Despite the world's nearly unanimous cry for the
before the problem grows. They've made some interesting
recommendations. I think there will be some who object,
hoth from the university side, that it goes too tar, and from
the government side, that it doesn't go far enough. It's
probay a g000 measure for us that they found a pretty
good place to begin. A major snortfall is that some
Lnoughtful effort on the industrial research side is needed.
Better guidelines are necessary in that area.
While all this is being highlighted, I'd like to discuss
another one of trio casualties of the long period of drawing
down the national security establishment: When we were
lookinn for t' iings we could do without, when we were
looking for ways to cut back expenses, we lost a lot of the
good dialogue between the research organizations in
defer7>e and the universities, and other organizations. One
of the things I found when I first began probing this
problem was that there were no areas where dialogue went
on regularly. There were no places where scientists could
tarn for quick advice on whether something might have
some military application. I think the degree to which
defense is now addressing those problems ? which is
going on at a pretty good pace ? offers some substantial
promise in helping deal with the problem.
ME/C: NBC News recently presented some rather startling
facts on the ease with which the attempted assassin of the
Pope moved through Eastern and Western Europe, with
help from a terrorist apparatus which both NBC and others
view as nearly impossible without the knowledge and
probable support of the Soviet security organs, the KGB
and the GRU. Borders in Eastern Europe and even in
Western Europe are much more difficult to breach than
those of the United States. What should the U.S. reaction be
if the rate of externally supported terrorism and urban
insurgency increases within the United States?
Inman: We have potentially a very large problem. In some
ways, if we are very alert to the problem early, we are
perhaps a little better off than some of the Western
European countries because so much of the traffic comes
by air, rather than simply crossing borders. But as a first-
order priority we need to address, with Mexico and with
Canada, the kind of working relationships that offer the
prospect that those large border areas will not be used for
overland transit. The government has to address this as a
cooperative measure, pulling together the resources of the
companies that fly in, the various routes that are provided,
and ties with Customs and Immigration looking for terrorist
infrastructures.
Terrorism is a very tough target to penetrate, to follow.
Various technical means can be of enormous assistance
with many other intelligence problems. But this is one
where I think human penetration is probably going to be the
key to understanding the various structures that would be
set up to support terrorism. The degree to which the FBI,
who has prime responsibility in this country, is able to
establish a network to watch for any sign of a support
structure will be very important. The magnitude of effort
that follows is apparent to all of us, from the example of the
Weathermen, and by the clear evidence now apparent from
the Brink's case in New York, where an infrastructure
stayed in place and successfully hid those people for a
decade. Americans are already the prime targets for
terrorist activity abroad, in numbers of individuals: It's going
to require substantial additional resources for the agencies
that are responsible for tracking it, if we're going to in fact be
alert before we have to deal with terrorism heie. But we do
have some geographic advantages if we follow it up
Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan, there is no sign that the
U.S.S.R. has any such plans. Their vaunted military
establishment has p,.oved very- ineffective aeainst the
Afghan loyalists. What do you see as the reason for Soviet
military failure there?
Inman: Entirely aside from questions of experience,
training, and equipment, I would say they have not been
able to establish a viable government in Afghanistan that
can keep the loyalties of even their own military establish-
ment. The Soviets have not elected to put massive force in
the country, to take over the battle totally. They've tried to
have it both ways ? of keeping the facade of a friendly
communist government ruling Afghanistan that they're
assisting, and a native army leading the fight. But they're
just not competent to do the job.
I had thought at an earlier time, after the '80 Olympics had
passed, that the Soviets might make the investment,
doubling the troop strength in Afghanistan and trying to
completely crush the rebellion with their own forces. They
did not do so. Poland may well have been a facto,: because
of its unwillingness to commit the very substantial
additional forces while worrying about what its needs
might be in Eastern Europe. But as time goes on and the
Soviets still haven't addressed the problem, I've come to the
conclusion that they've decided they're prepared to accept
a level of loss and a level of activity. The current' cautibu-S--':
leadership is not willing to make the level of commitment of
its own forces that might be successful in totally crushing
the rebellion. As you and I think back over the Soviet
activities we watched over the years, in Poland and in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, we realize their standard
approach has been to move in so massively that they could
quickly overwhelm the opposition. In Afghanistan, the
Soviets moved in a large force, but not a massive force ?
the kind that could have sealed off the very long borders ?
and then moved with complete ruthlessness to destroy the
roots of rebellion. I think they're finding that short of that
commitment, and in the absence of any kind of a viable
government in Afghanistan that they can rely on. this is a
war without end.
ME/C: Speaking of Soviet military failure: Israel seems
regularly able to defeat surrogate-owned Soviet military
equipment in the field. Can NATO expect to do as well
against Warsaw Pact forces and their equipment?
Inman: If one could keep the war purely conventional,
ultimately the NATO forces would have the prospect of
achieving comparable results if they brought comparable
dedication. But I believe the real difference is that while
there is clearly a margin of superiority in the weapons that
the Israelis have, the real difference is the training and the
dedication of the Israeli military, and the tactics that they
bring to the problem. There are a number of the East
European forces, and certainly the Soviets themselves (who
would be engaged in any conflict on that front) which are
substantially better trained and are going- to be better at
using the equipment than the surrogates that we've seen
elsewhere. Western Europe has not always provided the
degree of attention, the motivation of its own forces, and
the training and the tactics which would makethe difference.
There are clearly some lessons to be learned from the Israeli
model, that training, tactics, doctrine, discipline, and dedica-
tion can indeed make the difference ? particularly if you got.
a little technological edge in the equipment.
ME/C: The United States seems dedicated to a strong
defense, especially if we look back at the consistency in
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that direction by the last and current Administrations. Has
the percentage of the budget for U.S. intelligence been
raised as consistently as the Defense Budget during the
past six years and at the same rate of increase? Should it be?
Inman: The rise in the intelliyance budget was slower in
the beginning. The fact that the intelligence budget was
classified made it difficult to gain public support for growth.
The argument has gone back and forth for years, still
coming down that there is potentially greater hazard for
help to foreign espionage activities by the disclosures of
full detail. But the fact is, the size of manpower in the U.S.
intelligence community was first diverted to the Southeast
Asian war, and then drawn down, over a period of almost 14
years, to a level some 40 percent below the 1964 total. The
spending power was steadily reduced, even as we were
making major purchases of technology that absorbed a
tremendous amount of money that was available to do
things like monitor treaties ? expenditures that generally
turned out to be for the country's best interest. But there
would certainly have been a much greater interest if that
had been an added expenditure instead of a reduction in
manpower or a focus on many countries of the world where
we simply gave up the bulk of our efforts. It really was not
until the shock of Iran, Nicaragua, Afghanistan that full
attention began to be applied to the rebuilding of the
intelligence community.
I came to view with considerable skepticism
government attempts to regulate without some
consultation with those to be regulated.
We are currently enjoying support for rebuilding at a rate
slightly ahead of the defense budget. I believe that is
exactly as it should be. Intelligence should certainly be the
front line of defense. There should be no apologies for it. I
believe that the rate should be determined by the ability to
absorb, not by any predetermined percentage of
expenditure along the way. The rebuilding is going to be a
lot slower than I would like to see it, because of problems of
finding quality people with the kind of skills that you can
put to work. The impact of years of neglect of language
training in the universities and area studies, simply says
that when you can find bright people, you still have to invest
a couple of years in giving them the skills they ought to have
already before they can begin to be productive in helping to
solve the problems.
ME/C: Are you satisfied that the U.S. intelligence leaders
will be able to construct a sufficiently effective intelligence
establishment over the next few years to allow U.S.
Interests in the turbulent underindustrialized world as well
as in Western Europe to be properly supported ?given the
slowness with which the rebuilding is going to occur?
Inman: In the decade that preceded, where we had the
general attitude: "What can you do without?" we essentially
gave up any in-depth knowledge of the bulk of the turbulent
outside world. Because there was not a communist
government in power that posed a threat to our interests,
the resources were not provided to follow In any depth.
That problem was recognized as early as 1979, and
Congress began to add some additional people. There was
strong support from the other sectors inside the Executive
branch, as well as from the select committees in Congress.
The highest priority for investments in the last two years
has been to try to build the effort against the Third World
area, but that still neglects focus on our allies. We clearly
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have to understand better what goes on inside those
countries and what motivates them, as we move into a time
of intense economic stress and competition, we're going to
be able to hold together our political and military alliances.
I believe the quality of people that we need is available.
While going out on campuses, I find a great deal of
enthusiasm from the young generation for some kind of
public service. They're not eager to be dratted, but I believe
one can make a successful case to appeal to very bright
youngsters to commit themselves to a career in the
intelligence field, provided the resources are going to be
there to support them. It's going to take a long time.
ME/C: Which of the major nations of the world has the
largest foreign intelligence apparatus? The best?
Inman: The largest in manpower is very easy to identify ?
it's the Soviet Union. The People's Republic of China
probably isn't far behind in manpower. In total numbers
deployed around the world, I would be very comfortable in
my judgment that the Soviets, again, have by far the most
numbers applied. We equally have a very substantial lead in
applied technology such as computers, a whole range of
collection systems, technical skills of the people, ability to
analyze the material that's available, and thoughtful ways of
examining analytical problems. If one were to look purely
man for man, I would be inclined to speculate the Israelis
may well have the best single knowledge of a specifibereiCi.
because they believe their survival depends on it. Many of
our allies have good services. The British have always had
the skill for this business, and they have endeavored to
keep a world view and interest even when they have
suffered from their substantial draw down in resources.
There isn't any doubt in my mind that the United States
could easily have, by a substantial margin, the best
Intelligence service. But we have cut short that opportunity
by the sharp reduction in manpower and by the failure to
maintain an encyclopedic knowledge of the outside world.
In the period immediately after World War II, those who
had to make decisions with little hard knowledge on such
adverse topics as economic worries, availability of raw
materials, plans for amphibious landings or bombing raids,
methods of conducting civilian government, and various
areas that had been occupied, came away pursuaded that
the country must have encyclopedic knowledge of every
country in the world. That general attitude was sustained
through the '50s but was one of the casualties of the
Vietnam period when we diverted people away from
keeping an encyclopedic data base to do the detailed work
In support of the Vietnam commitment. The sad fact was
that, when the war began to draw down, those people were
not returned to encyclopedic efforts and the gap which
already existed widened. So we now have a long rebuilding
period to develop the kind of encyclopedic data base that
enables bright people to recognize problems and to quickly
advise decision makers of the problems facing us. The
decision makers can then come up with options to deal with
the problems.
ME/C: What does the United States have to do to assure
the best foreign intelligence capability possible and
practicable in the way of resources that aren't talked about
in the normal sense: that is, resources and investment of the
country in the educational processes and so forth?
Inman: We first need a commitment to have an excellent
intelligence capability on the entire world. We have to
support that by investment both in people and in resources,
In human collection, and in various kinds of technical
collection. We need analysts who have been given the
urn
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opportunity to understand the countries they are
observing, and can understand events they are watching
through the eyes and the minds of the country being
watched, not of how they might react to problems as U.S.
citizens, We in this country need now to increase educa-
tional standards and to increase the requirements at the
high school level of language training. We need to increase
the math and science requirements and the literacy
requirements, stressing the ability to write well and in a
concise manner. In the universities we have to find the
programs that encourage area studies and language
studies and encourage people to remain and teach as well
as to go off into industry and government. That will be a
long-range rebuilding program. We have to come to
recognize that as a basic element of national security.
Rather than a "federal welfare for education fund," Its
recognizing that ultimately the quality of the intelligence
and organization rests on its people. If we don't have a
strong academic foundation, we are not going to have the
quality of intelligence the country must have.
ME/C: In a more near-term and practical sense, would you
advocate the, government to remove the center of the
intelligence establishment from the very expensive
Washington, DC, area or in some other way make it affordable
for young, bright, technologically trained individuals to come
to work in intelligence for the federal government?
Inman: As the rebuilding process goes on and additional
people are added, the locations should be decentralized. In
a great many cases, particularly with modern communi-
cations and the ability to take advantage of satellite
communications, computer-to-computer communica-
tions, close dialogue between users and producers, and
collectors and analyzers can be sustained without all of
them being physically collocated in the expensive and,
vulnerable Washington area. Our country's basic security
resides to some degree on the tact that any potential enemy'
recognizes the survivability of its adversary's principal
assets, and that certainly includes the eyes and ears of the
intelligence community. A good effort has gone into
planning and thinking about the kinds of problems the
country will have to face in the next decade, and the
planning, collection, and analytical resources we need to
deal with it. We have not yet done enough in thinking about
how we can hold the people that we go out to acquire. So
there are still lots of challenges for those who are now
managing our Intelligence.
ME/C: The United States seems regularly to get itself
involved in areas. of the world where ft has little, if any,
Intelligence capability ? it has to start from scratch during
crises.. Quite often it seems U.S. public opinion is then
quickly formed through or by an uninformed press, and
sways in whatever direction external propagandists with
interests inimical to our own want to take it. We in the
Intelligence community seem regularly to take "hits" for so-
called "failures."
Inman: Yes, I concur that It is a problem. I think that we
should not be in the business of writing journalists' stories,
and we have to be very careful that the degree of contact
I between the working analysts and the media doesn't add 10
this torrent of leaks which already causes us so many
problems in protecting our intelligence sources and
methods. But there is a useful role that can be played in
helping provide encyclopedic background, to put events in'
context. We need to do that in a more thoughtful manner than
we are doing at this time,' somewhere between trying too
eagerly to get leaders' pictures on magazine covers, on one
side, and assuming an ostrich position tif having no contact.
ME/C: Few leaders in the U.S. intelligence community
have been able to instill confidence in ow intelligence
establishment among Americans as you have. Why did we
have to lose you just as you became such an effective
leader? Would you consider coming back to government as
the Director of Central Intelligence? Do you plan to
eventually return to government in another capacity ? say,
Senator or Congressman?
Inman: Let me start at the upper side. I have not considered
running for public office. I greatly admire one of the young
Senators whom I've known for a long time. I remember
some early discussions when he was going to run for public
office, of his sense that he needed to go back and build an
independent economic base first. That probably shaped
my attitude toward a political career. I do not plan to come
back to the federal government. I enormously enjoyed my
30 years of service but Itelieve, from both my obligations to
my family and to myself and from the need for fresh
challenges, that I can deal with a lot of these issues while
pursuing another career better than I could by shuttling in
and out. The basic factor that many people do not
understand about military intelligence specialists is that
the field is relatively small and the career opportunities for
upwards promotions are very small. If one is fortunate
enough to get selected early, as I was, the opportunities are
then blocked for a great many other people to be promoted
up the line. So my basic decision in MO to retire via,sbased-77
on the fact that I had already performed six years-of flag'
rank service at that point, and that my own sense that
additional billets were not going to be allocated to the
Intelligence specialty. The longer I stayed in place, the
more I was depriving very bright able people of their
chance to deal with these same challenges. I was
persuaded to stay an additional two years, but even a total
of eight years of service as a flag officer was three more
than has normally been the case for the flag intelligence
officers in my service. Over the long term. I believe that we
ought to put a high premium on the professionalism of the
intelligence services, and that one could make a case for a
long-term assignment of a professional as Director of
Central Intelligence. That was not something I could
campaign for when I was serving, because it would have
appeared to be self-serving ? something I was seeking
for myself.
Having turned the page on that chapter, it is something I
will come back to work on in the years ahead. But I'm not
going to launch off in the next year or two on a campaign to
reorganize the intelligence community, because I'm afraid
that that would distract from the first priority, which is
rebuilding. Once we have the rebuilding well under way, in
perhaps three or four years, we an come back to say, is
the current structure of the community organized the
optimum way? I'm persuaded at this time that it is effectively
managed and that it is probably working better right now than
It has over any time in the years that I have observed It. So the
way It's organized, the way one selects the leaders, is not such
a pressing problem that it needs to go to the top of the agenda.
Rebuilding is the number one priority.
ME/C: I believe the Senate and the House Select
Committees on Intelligence have been bastions of security
the past few years, as isaw them operate from my vantage
point at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Do you agree?
And do you believe the intelligence community can
continue to count on their very strong support, their great
display of responsibility, and their ability to guard the
nation's most sensitive intelligence secrets?
Inman: The country owes a great debt of gratitude to
Senator David Inouye of Hawaii for his very insightful and
thoughtful efforts in setting up the first permanent Select
Committee, where he shrewdly recognized that one
OWLINLED*
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needed both the carrot and the stick for effective oversight.
The stick was putting together authorization along with
oversight. If you wanted your budgets, you needed to be
forthcoming with the committees in order to get their
support. And the carrot was establishing security that was
above reproach. Therefore, people would be encouraged
to come and tell their problems, yet be confident that they
would not be leaked, distorted, or used out of nontext, that
might in any way damage sources or methods. He got very
strong support in that from his vice chairman Sen. Barry
Goldwater over the next several years. And when
Congressman Boland came to chair the House Select
Committee, he elected to follow essentially the same
pattern with an even smaller staff. I would put the security
record for the two Select Committees for the first several
years of their existence up for comparison against any
other part of the government apparatus. They were not
flawless, but their record was substantially better than that
of the Executive branch.
A concern to me has been some fraying around the edge.
In 1980, some of the staff from the Senate Select Committee
got very involved in partisan politics and began writing
./ articles and features for the papers. If one believes what
one hears from friends In the journalistic services the
Senate Select Committee became a frequent source of
leaks to news media for stories that would slant
occasionally on things they were opposed to. That problem
has not been entirely solved. That remains a subject of
some worry that the original, absolute dedication and
sense of discipline installed by Senator Inouye and
Senator Goldwater has not been sustained. This dedication
perhaps may not be supported by all the senators who in
some cases may shield some of their staff designees who
otherwise should have departed on the basis that they were
not maintaining the high standards of security previougy
established. On the House Select Committee side, you
know that I have publicly criticized the Committee for
releasing reports on oversights along party lines. But
generally speaking, I would still say that the Committee has
done a very tine job. As I said In my letter to Congressman
Boland, I believe the leadership he and Congressman
Robinson provided is of a quality that has been rarely
matched. The great dedication that they and their
colleagues on the Budet Subcommittee have brought to the
problem has had a very major impact on improving U.S.
intelligence capabilities. All citizens are in debt to them. But
I believe it is so critically important to establish the fact of
nonpartisan intelligence to make absolutely certain that the
intelligence community in all matters must be nonpartisan
from the top of its leadership to the lowest collector or
analyst. The select committees must lead the way again
here. As when they make decisions along party lines, they
run a high risk of drawing a partisan reaction from the
administration in power, whichever party is there. I don't
expect them to always approve of what the intelligence
community does. I think criticism can be very healthy; I
believe if they really work at it they can find ways to express
criticism ? perhaps without all the detail they would like to
provide, again in a way that makes It very clear they are not
engaging in the criticism for partisan policy. I see a little
straying away from the sterling record they had the first '
years, the situation is clearly recoverable.
ME/C: John Barron, with Reader's Digest, has charted a
remarkably strong Soviet organization in support of the
current world nuclear freeze movement, both in terms of
organization and active KGB involvement. He shows ective
'KGB involvement even here in Washington, DC, before
House of Representative hearings and throughout a variety
of organizations around the world involving thousands of
very well-meaning people. Is enough being done to
describe how and why the U.S.S.R. is so active in this area?
If not, why not?
Inman: Throughout my long career, I have been involved in
both human and technical collection and have served on
the analytical side, but I've had almost no experience in the
counterintelligence side. I really have almost no first-hand
knowledge of the extent of the espionage activity or the co-
vert action that they call "active measures" that the Soviets
have undertaken in this country. I have a sense that they
have done a lot but I suspect you could find a much better
expert to discuss It. I have looked at it overseas and I do
have some sense of the increasing sophistication with
which they approach the problem, for instance, in Western
Europe. In the old days they picked sort of a brute force
approach. It was very apparent early that they were driving
the action and that thoughtful people would back off. In the
nuclear disarmament concerns that popped up,in.Westwa,
Europe, my sense is that the Soviets have been rnt.ieh fru:ire--
skillful this time. They have let the leadership in fact draw
from basic pacifist leanings, but they have been very swift
and skillful to provide the logistic support to turn what
might otherwise be a fairly small group into an enormous
media event. That, more than anything else, demonstrates
the increasing speed and sophistication of Soviet "active
measures" activities. PA VC
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STATINTL
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ART' CrIE APPEARED
ON PAGE 468
FOREIGN POLICY
WINTER 1982-83
DATELINE AUSTRALIA:
AMERICA'S FOREIGN
WATERGATE?
b.Y imf-'s A . 'Valhan
GAT7
VW' no lost Australia.' - may soon be a signif-
icant debate in American politics. All over the
democratic world opposition parties are gain-
ing power. Should this happen in Australia,
the alliance with America might be called into
question and Washington could lose intelli-
gence facilities indispensable for any future
arms control regime.
Today. from press and Parliament, Australia
is awash with accusations about illegitimate
American intelligence activity. Much attention
and anger is focused on the Central Intelligence
Agency. There is an almost hysterical set of
indictments leveled against U.S. intelligence.
The CIA is charged with becoming involved
in Australian politics and foreign relations.
even manipulating the Australian banking sys-
tem and. most istonishinglY, organizing a nar-
cotics trade from Australian soil.
Intelligent American observers' initial dis-
belief needs reassessi,ng. For in Australia a
plausible case is being developed that CIA of-
ficials may have also done in Australia what
they managed to achieve in Iran. Guatemala.
and Chile: destroy an elected government?in
the case of Australia. the Labor party govern-
ment from 1972 to 1975.
The fall of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam
and the appointment of current Prime Minister
Malcolm Fraser met with profound relief
among C.S. officials. Whitlam, perhaps the
best orator in contemporary Australian his-
tory, aroused deep hostility within the U.S.
intelligence community. Jr viewed his party
and politics as, at best, benighted accomplices
to Soviet undertakings. The CIA feared that
secrets shared with Australia were being
routinely compromised, that CIA activities and
agents in Australia would soon be revealed,
irreplaceable elec
Australia. vital f
activities, could b
During the Whi
United States wer
trust. The CIA wa
as an associate, a
would be involve
nations. Relations
a more conserVati
tralian capital, Ca
tigation into the
based. American-
chant Bank has
the controversies
tralian suspicion
preposterous in 1
river of evidence.
warrant to 2 water
noids have enemi
Geography and geology have conspired in
directing Australia's destiny. Australia has
bountiful mineral endowments and a small
population-to-area ratio with a total population
of 15 million. It is one of the most strategically
valuable pieces of real estate on the planet Aus-
tralia sits at the southeast corner of the Indian
Ocean about 2,400 miles southeast of Indo-
nesia. Sixty-nine per cent of Japan's oil require-
ments. 70-80 per cent of Western Europe's, and
15 per cent of America's passes through the
area between Australia and southern Africa.
B-52s flying from Guam to Diego Garcia
refuel in northern Australia at a base in Dar-
win. Australia hosts 10 American military in-
stallations. Because of their unique location.
most cannot be replicated at any cost. The new
U.S. Defense Guidance characterizes Australia
as a critical area.
Australia has traditionally been friendly to-
ward the United States. Tens of thousands of
U.S. sailors each year are delighted to find that
the computerized date-a-sailor services offered
at every Australian port are overburdened with
amicable Australian applicants. But things are
changing. No longer do prime ministers claim,
as John Gorton did in 1969, "Wherever the
United States is resisting aggression . . . we
will go a-waltzing Matilda with you.- Evidence
of a new atmosphere was the roasting Vice
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