A U.S. INTELLIGENCE VACUUM?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500240013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 8, 1983
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001
ARTICLB A?PE
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he terrorist bombing of the
U.S. Marine headquarters
in Beirut and the unexpect-
edly large Cuban presence
that American forces found in Gre-
nada have raised major questions
about the performance of.our intel-
ligence agencies.
The intelligence questions,
according to Reagan administra-
tion officials and members of Con-'
. gress, revolve around two
immediate concerns: whether bet-
ter intelligence information might
have helped prevent the attack on
the Marines in Beirut on Oct. 23
and whether the American troops
that invaded Grenada two days
later were sufficiently informed
about the strength of Cuban forces
on the island.
The officials said thatfundamen-
tal questions also had been raised
about the mission and methods of
the nation's intelligence agencies,
including the issue of whether U.S.
spying had become too dependent
on sophisticated electronic surveil.
lance equipment instead of human
agents.
Military officers who com-
manded the invasion of Grenada
complain about an intelligence
vacuum that they say left assault
forces unprepared for the stiff
resistance they encountered from
Cuban troops.
In Lebanon, U.S. officials report
that intelligence tended to lack the
specific information that would
enable the authorities to block
assassination plots or other terror-
ist activities. Three days before a
terrorist drove the truck filled with
tons of explosives into the Marine
headquarters in Beirut, killing 240
American servicemen, the Central
Intelligence Agency reported that
a pro-Iranian Moslem splinter
group appeared to be planning an
attack against the Marines. The
report was widely distributed
among senior government officials,
including Marine leaders.
Defenders of the CIA cite the
report as evidence that the agency
provided at least some warning
.before the .bombing, even if it did
not give the time, target or type of
attack. Gen. Paul X. Kelley, the
Marine commandant, disputed that
WASHINGTON TIMES
8 December 1983
I ALLAN BROW' _
E
suggestion, telling members of the
House Armed Services Committee'
that no one had given the Marines
the kind of detailed intelligence
they needed to prevent a suicide
bombing attack. "I'm not talking
about those broad, vague, general
statements that they hide behind,"
Gen. Kelley said, in an apparent
reference to the Oct. 20 intelligence
report. "I'm talking about
specificity, about a truck:'
Gen. Kelley, of course, protests a
bit too much. "Did he want the
license plate number as well?" one
intelligence official asked. Rather
than denying any responsibility for
lax security, Gen. Kelley would
have done well to remain silent
until a thorough investigation had
been conducted. If the security was
indeed thorough, why was it that a
host of new security precautions
were implemented the day after the
bombing?
With regard to Grenada, Defense
Department officials said they
were surprised by both the number
of Cuban" combat forces and the
extent of Soviet and Cuban influ-
ence on the island. Intelligence
officials acknowledged that
detailed information on both sub-
jects was unavailable, but said that
planning for the invasion had
,moved so rapidly that there was
little time to prepare the tactical
intelligence normally required for
a military assault. They also said
that the military services, not the
CIA, were responsible for the col-
lection of tactical intelligence.
Administration officials say the
CIA had little information about
political developments in Grenada.
As.a result, they said, Washington
was caught by, surprise when
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop
was ousted in the October coup
In both Grenada and Lebanon,
intelligence officials said,theinfor-
mation that was lacking was of the
kind best obtained by human
agents rather than satellites, recon-
naisance aircraft or other elec-
tronic equipment. It was, we must
remember, during the Carter
administration - and the CIA
LD
directorship of Stanstield 'Itirner,
that many of our most experienced
agents were released from service.
"Humana gents," the Carter admin-
istration told us, were no longer
necessary in the new technological
age. Now we, can see how wrong
that assessment was.
In Grenada, the CIA had no per-
manent presence and the State
Department maintained no perma-
nent diplomatic presence. As a
result, the United States had few
reliable sources of information. .
The U.S. intelligence capabilit3f
matically. In 1981, an analysis o
the -CIA concluded that, "Th
American intelligence community
has routinely failed to predict
major political and military devel
opments before such development
become irreversible and before
they become blatantly obvious,
even to the general public:'
What the report called "massi
and virtually inexplicable intelli
gence failures that occurred du
%r
ing the last 15 years" includ
failure to predict the massi
Soviet buildup of nuclear missile
failure to predict the majo
sistent gross misstatement o
Soviet global objectives; general
failure to explain the characters
.systems and vessels, for exampl
the new Russian guided-missil
cruisers; and the entire situation i
Iran.
gence, critics charge, is the lack Of
cess for quality review. Former
Director Daniel Graham has pr
posed that analysis and estimat s
should be carried out by competin
intelligence bureaucracies wit
each having equal access to the
president and the chief intelligen e
officer of the United States, w o
would-no longer be the director f
the CIA.
CONXVVVM
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ARTI CITE AP
OZ PAGE
THE ADMIRAL'S
BRIEF GUIDE TO
AMERICAN SPYING
Bobby Inman likes to
put things in perspec-
tive, and offers a
standard 20-minute
review of the history
of American intelligence-
gathering that goes some-
thing like this:
For the first 100 years of its
existence, the United States
created intelligence organiza-
tions during wartime and
abolished them when the
wars were over. The first per-
manent peacetime intelli-
genee unit, was cleated in
1882. when the Secretary of
the Navy chartered what be-
came the Office of Naval In-'
telligenee. and a naval officer
went to England ... to
count British ships'
The Defense Department,
not to be outdone, sent men
to Berlin, Vienna and Peters-
burg, and the race was on.
World War 1 gave impetus to
the notion.-of gathering of
technical intelligence, and by
the time we entered World
War II we had what Inman
calls an austere intelligence
gathering capability.
That ability soon became
lush. with the OSS, clandes-
tine human collection and
covert action. "After the war,
the leadership sat down to
talk about what to do. They
decided that we should never
again be so dumb about the
outside world." They already
had Navy, Army ? and State
Department intelligence; the
CIA was to run the clandes-
tine operations but. in a
break with the British sys-
tem., also had a major analyti-
cal division.
WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
4 December 1983
The Korean war demon-
strated a need for better in-
formation flow among de-
partments, so the director of
Central Intelligence was
given a leadership role, "to
produce a flow to the CIA,
and a reverse flow." -
President Truman, want-
ing a separate agency for
technical intelligence, char-
tered the secret National Se-
curity Agency in 1952. Task-
ing came from the director of
Central Intelligence, but it
was administered by the De-
fense Department. Collectors
in the field were military; the
internal staff was civilian.
NSA's main purpose was to
function in wartime, but
things being what they are in
Washington, it was soon
functioning full time.
The CIA built its ency-
clopedic intelligence base and
launched its covert activities.
But in 1959 none of the intel-
ligence agencies could agree,
for instance, on bow many'
missiles the. Soviets had.
Eventually, President Ken-
nedy discovered there was in-
deed a missile gap-we had
more than the Russians.
Kennedy's Secretary of
Defense, Robert McNamara,
deciding that he wanted con-
trol of analysis, commis-
sioned the Defense .Intelli-
gence Agency. Overt opera-
tions went to the State De-
partment, covert stayed with
the CIA. -
The war in Vietnam took a
lot of people away from ac-
tivities elsewhere in the
world; then, because of the
balance of payments prob-
lem, American presence
abroad was reduced. That,
says Inman, was "the single
most 'damaging decision to
the country's human intelli-
gence system."
The country's technical
capability was increased, with
Approved For Releas
declined. Simply put, there
were not enough people to
sort through the material col-
lected. One result: the Yom
Kippur war in 1973 went un-
predicted. Revelations of CIA
misconduct and acrimonious
congressional hearings dam-
aged the reputation of intelli-
gence gatherers of all sorts,
abroad and at home.
"By 1980, there were four
prospective foreign agents in
America for every agent here
to cover them," Inman says.
The ideal ratio is two FBI
agents for every suspected
spy. "The total intelligence
community had been reduced
40 percent since the plateau
was reached in the early
'GOs
The. Reagan administra-
tion has reversed the trend,
Inman says. O
_ dames Conaway
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Back in 1975, when
Bobby Ray Inman
was director of Naval
Intelligence, he was
invited by some Sen-
ate staffers to come up to
Capitol Hill and discuss the
Soviet threat. The invitation
proved to be more compli-
cated than it appeared, as in-
vitations to spies often do
. but let Inman tell the
story himself:
"After the , meeting, a
staffer asked me to lunch. We
went to a little restaurant on
,the back side of the Hill, and
two characters slid into the
seats next to us. They started
talking to me, suggesting that
if' their companies got some
contracts, they could be of
great help to the Navy. I was
'WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
4 December 1983
BY JAMES COMAWAY
Elk
James Conaway is a staff
writer for The Washington
Post Magazine.
budgetary requirements, but , worked his way up through
the meeting with Wilson con- Naval Intelligence to become
vnced him that the decision a four-star admiral, was
was sound "Later"-and named deputy director of the
Inman smiles the Defense Intelligence Agency
gap- in 1976 and then became the
toothed smile so familiar to youngest director ever of the
congressional committees and secretive, monolithic Na-
intelligence operatives- {tonal Security Agency.
"Wilson blamed me for a lot He tried to retire in 1981,
of his troubles."
Inman was Wilson's an- with 30 years of military ser-
tithesis,.principled to a fault, vice, but President Reagan
and so physically unassuming personally asked him to take
that as a child he was often the number-two job under
beaten up in east Texas CIA director William Casey.
schools (until he helped two Inman agreed, but left the
brawny classmates with their CIA a year later, to critical
homework and learned the acclaim from congressmen
d value of bodyguards). and soldiers alike, some of
just be
in
in
to
t i
g
n
g
ge
ncense
when one of them said, -`By Today Wilson is in prison whom feared that American
the way, I work for you."' and Inman is drinking Cab- intelligence was losing one of
Inman .vas flabbergasted. fornia riesling in the first- { its most valuable assets.
The man -was - Edmund Wil- class cabin of a Boeing 727 Inman resisted interview-
son, a hulldng former CIA streaking between Washing- a~ while about government, but
agent who belonged to the se- ton and Austin. "The thought
crossed my mind," he sa s gence-gathering for the sim-
zation Naval Intelligence Tas organe gazing at his wan reflection in pie reason that "it's an im-
157, whose as k Force the blackened window of the portent subject." His views
57, whoose members rs gathered aircraft, "that Wilson might on the men and the machines
intelligence about harbors in the business are instruc-
around the world. While i try to do me harm."
working for Task Force 157, tive. Former CIA director
Wilson had managed to be-' nman is a civilian now, William Colby says Inman
come a rich man, owning a the director of a consor. "had all the jobs and never
Virginia horse farm, among tium of electronics and let the bureaucracy get in his
o on computer companies way ... He respected the
other thin
s
He would
g
.
g
to procure illegal explosives known as MCC that is congressional prerogative, but
for Libyan terrorists and at- I racing the Japanese toward was also concerned with
tempt to have some people the next generation of super- keeping the necessary se-
other story. tired last year as. deputy di-
"I went back to the office" 1 rector or the central Intelli-
"He's a consummate pro-
fessional and a highly moral
Inman 'says, "and asked, gence Agency, he probably individual," says George
I had more varied experience Carver, who was deputy of
`Who is this guy?' That da
or
y
,
g
c
decided to terminate Wilson's in analytical intelligence than national intelligence in the sity of Texas ring around
contract" Inman had already anyone. Though not a Naval CIA in the mid-1970s, now a finger while deflating
decided to do away with Task ~II Academy graduate, Inman ; senior fellow at the George- .notions about spies and
Force 157, toAp~DtU .fsdr Release 2001/03/07: CIA ft 0JbTR }0r' 00 A1 U?
International Studies.
"Bobby Inman has alwa ?s _
been an extremely articulate
and able advocate of the true
net interests of whate er
agency he represented."
That is a fair description of
a good spy.
"Articles saying that I'
master spy are pure garbag
Inman says. "I've never a
clandestine operation. ut
I've been an avid user of what
they produce."
Disputes over covert act on
were cited as the rea~ on
Inman left the CIA, however,
differences between him d
Casey reportedly arose fr m
personality conflicts, rater
than philosophy, and he
natural differences between
generations. Casey was drj
ping spies into Nazi Germ
when Inman was a Texas
whiz kid.
Computers are as es-
sential to the govern-
ment Inman worked
for as they are funda-
mental to his new I en-
deavor, in a world where ri-
vate enterprise and govrn-
ment service often ove lap.
His competitors might well
be uneasy, given the admi-
ral's vita.
Inman insists he is no
? longer in the business:
not using any clandestine or
technical sources to deter-
mine what the Japanese are
doing. I do know that wher-
ever I go to speak, there are
substantial Japanese in '', at-
tendance."
He looks like the class vale-
a Uni er-
ian
twistin
di
t
his
me
ch-
 p or Release 200 F1fi9ot
er~.~ ecem er'
E
4'
A b091-00901 RO
Talking Shop* With
Admiral Bobby Inman -
Admiral Bobby Inman spent more
than 22 years organizing inter-
national high-tech espionage net-
works for the U.S. Navy, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the CIA, and
the National Security"Agency, where
he served as director from 1977 to
1981. Now Inman has turned from
the classified to the proprietary,
spearheading an unprecedented com-
puters and semiconductor-research
venture pooling the talents and mon-
ey of 12 major U.S. corporate in-
vestors, the resources of the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin, and some of
the best scientific minds in the
nation. The result is MCC-
Microelectronics and Computer
Technology Corporation-of which
Inman, 53, is president and chief ex-
ecutive officer. Formed less than two
years ago, the company is the brain-
child of William C. Norris, chair-
man of Control Data Corporation,
who saw the necessity of formulating
a uniquely American response to
Japanese high iechnologv initiatives,
especially those government-
sponsored.
"Norris began worrying about it
about eight years ago when he saw
the Japanese putting up money and
bringing together research talent
from competing companies," Bobby
Inman explains. "We didn't have
anything like that ... and it was a
great idea."
Unlike the cooperative fifth gener-
ation and artificial intelligence
projects conducted by Japan's Min-
istry of International Trade and In-
dustry and the Institute for New
Generation Computer Technology,
however, MCC is totally a private
sector initiative; bankers, .industri-.
alists, academics, and political
figures have joined together to raise
private' donations in addition to
monies put .up by the participating
shareholders. These include some of
the leading U.S. competitors in semi-
conductors and computers: Control
Data Corp., Motorola Inc., Honey-
well Inc., NCR, National Semicon-
ductor Inc., RCA Corp., Sperry
Corp., United Technologies Corp.,
Harris Corp., Digital Equipment
Corp., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
and Allied Corp. These companies
will also contribute research and ad-
ministrative talent to the venture.
MCC's plan is to develop propri-
etary designs in software, computer-
aided design and manufacturing,
packaging of integrated circuits, and
advanced computer design, all of
which can be adapted for profitable
commercial product lines by the
sponsoring companies. Many
projects should come to fruition in
six to 10 years, at which time the
sponsors will get a license and a
three year jump on the marketplace.
Admitting that he is terribly ex-
cited about the prospects for MCC,
Admiral Inman, one of the world's
foremost intelligence experts, is also
cognizant of the risks involved. Last
year he gained national promi-
nence-and drew the ire of critics-
by advocating before a congressional
committee that certain advanced
electronics research data might be
subject to some form of government
review. While Inman still maintains
his suggestions were blown way out
of proportion by the media, he also
remains firm in his belief that strate-
gic information--and proprietary
technologies-must be protected.
Technological spying is on the
increase all over the globe, he ac-
knowledges. Japanese espionage, as
revealed in the well-publicized IBM-
Hitachi case, in which FBI men in
the Silicon Valley rounded up more
than a dozen businessmen workin7
on behalf of both Hitachi and Mit-
subishi Electric Companies to buy
stolen secrets from IBM, may be part
of an "iceberg, " Inman suggests. De-
STATINTL
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spite these problems, he argues that
international alliances of the most
sensitive nature must be formed and
held together even as economic com-
pcrition grows more heated. Inman,
ever-surprising, looks' highly favor-
ably on the Japanese and the press
sores they've exerted on the Ameri-
can technological mind-set. Out of
challenge, he argues, comes growth,
and only with growth and the reas-
sertion of America's technological
leadership in the world can political
stability be attained. The impli-
cations of this position are vast, and
as worldly as the Admiral himself.
In his interview with Personal Com-
puting's Arielle Emmett, he revealed
himself to be a highly confident man
with a flair for talk and the long
view; for historicizing optimistically,
even about the Soviets; for arching
his brow when his picture was taken
and for smiling when words would
not take him any further. A former
deputy director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, Inman was guarded
on particulars of national security,
and of his own intelligence experi-
ence, although in a second interview,
he was more open about matters of
security. But his demeanor went
against everything one classically
thinks of as "spy." Instead, Inman
traverses the world of science, of ed-
ucation, of politics and of shared
hope for a world he believes will reap
real benefits from advanced com-
puting Technologies. Below, some ex-
cerpts from two long and challenging
interviews.
Admiral Inman, the current per-
ception is that the United States is
losing ground in the internationd
competition for supremacy in higi
technology industries. Why have we
fallen behind?
Inman: In the immediate post-war
years, a lot went into fueling the great
economic boom. Education was the
hero. And that happened in two ways:
a very large upswing in under-
graduate education as a result of the
G.I. bill, and graduate education
which in very large measure came.
from grants from the Defense De.
'partment, unrestricted, no strings at.
tached. But in the early .1960s, we
began examining defense with a new
set of tools. One of the early param-
eters was cost-effectiveness, and a
decision was made which said that it
wasn't cost-effective to give grants
unless they were directly tied to
weapons systems or likely weapons
systems. The impact of cutbacks be-
gan to show up by 1968 when there
I know that over the last 10 or 12
years, we've moved towards sharing
technology more with our allies. And
that's largely been a defense-oriented
thrust. There is also a role here that
the multinational companies play in
spreading technology. When you
nand back to look, IBM has major
investments in Japan, it's interesting
that they are the'target of the Hitachi
efforts in this country. Yet, they've
got shared research efforts with the
Japanese and they've got major hold-
ings in Japan. Texas Instruments,
Which is not one of my shareholders,
has a number of collaborative ar-
rangements with the Japanese. So
was a drop in the number of graduate
students in sciences and math. The
total student population in graduate
schools in the U.S. did not drop be-
cause a lot of foreign students began
to come in and take up' the open
spaces, and we trained a lot 'of fine
scientists and sent them back to Ja-
pan and other countries along the
way. So now_ we need to review the
business of grants for graduate study,
but that's going to take years. The
key question is: How do you keep up
with the external competition given a
shortage of overall talent to take ad-
vantage of opportunities?
What kind of insights into foreign
competition did you get during your
years in security work?
Inman: I spent the bulk of my time
looking at our principle adversaries-
the Soviets-and a reasonable
amount looking at the North Kore-
ans, the Vietnamese, the evolving
relationships with the Chinese, a lot
less about Eastern Europe, and very
little about the rest of the world. I've
a lot of friendships in our allied
countries. I've had the privilege of liv-
ing in Japan several times, being on
ships based out there, and I have lots
of friends in the Japanese Navy. But
I frankly know very little more than
most of you who have been reading
avidly what the Japanese-are doing. I
have an enormous admiration for
what they have accomplished. -
Are the Japanese conducting a form
of technological espionage in this
country and are we simultaneously
doing that with them? They are-
technically at least-our allies.
Inman: I'm reasonably comfortable
with an answer that we are not con-
ducting industrial espionage in Ja-
pan, or in Western Europe for that
t matter.
How about them?
Inman: Well-yeah-the Hitachi
case, I don't know how big that ice-
berg is.
again-don't get me into too de
trouble-I have somewhat a differe
view from some of my shareholde
about the Japanese. I think the Ja
efficient job of using trained power
take basic research to technolo
which is'commercialized. They ha
had government funding and autho
ity to do it. I am not recommends
that we follow that model. 1 mu
prefer a private enterprise-fueled o
to do it if we can. We've got to see
p
t
we can. The Japanese got past t
cultural problem, they brought co
petitors together to do research, So;
don't look at the Japanese as the en -
my, and I. take a view that co =
petition is healthy. Now I do thi
that means that Japanese markets
have to be opened up. .
One person I spoke with who is doi
systems for the U.S. military sa
that in the marketing of defen
systems-rapid nuclear respon
systems, for instance-the Japane
don't distinguish between allies a
adversaries.
Inman: Potential adversaries?
Right. They really will sell to a
body, this computer expert asses
to me. Is that your perception, at
Inman: My perception has been t
they were insensitive to potent
military applications. And that's
partly why the Japanese military
hasn't been that good a market. So
they've been out hawking the com-
mercial market. We've left them ne
percent of the GNP going into th
own military investment and we
not been a market for buying In
the Japanese..
y-
ed
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But other countries have, I under-
stand.
Inman: They've gone to where there
was a market. And perhaps one in-
sensitive to military applications. But
in the relatively few cases I'm aware
of where we've raised that question..
the Japanese response has been forth-
coming. So there is an education fac-
tor here.
In other words, you're saying that you
can-with the right kind of cooper-
ative relations with the Japanese,
foster a better understanding of what
is sensitive and what is not? And
whom to sell to?
Inman: I think when you focus on the
question of adversarial access, you've
really got to do it in a pro-common
environment, you really can't do it in
a U.S.-only climate. And when the
Japanese stand back and look at the
adversarial side, they'll find what
they usually sell is one or two or three
of a kind and then they [the buyers]
go build their own. When they stand
back and look at it, that's not a big
commercial market.
What about the Russians and the
Chinese? I have read that they have
stepped up their espionage, particu-
larly in high technology areas, and as
a result, a number of Soviet emis-
saries have been thrown out of various
.countries. But in this country, are we
aware enough, as a nation, of secu-
rity, even as it affects our particular
audience-business people with
computers in their offices?
Inman: We are probably the most
open society in the world, And I think
that is basically good. You know one
of the earlier acts children learn is
using the telephone. And we never
give it up the whole rest of our lives.
And I found that whether people
were in commercial enterprise -and
living in foreign countries or whether
they were diplomats or military
officers, if they suddenly wanted to
talk about something, they just
grabbed the nearest phone and
started talking to their American
counterparts without any thought
About who all else might be enjoying
that conversation. And the same
thing is true with the bulk of our com-
rhercial dealers. ? __
When there is a prospect of loss of
proprietary data that might make a
profit, all of a sudden, some of
the very best security exists in this
country .. .
You know I'm a year out of date on
following most of these problems. But
certainly earlier in my goverment en-
virons, and in dealing with security
regularly, I've found that IBM was
no slouch in industrial security.
When companies believe there is a
genuine prospect that they will lose
business ... they get very protective
of it. There's a new complication,
though, on the U.S. scene, at least
certainly in the information handling
industry. And that's the rapid move
of venture capital to support new en-
trepreneurs with a new idea going
out. Universities have a steady drain
of talent going off from their faculties
to start companies and in many cases
become very wealthy and productive
entrepreneurs. A lot of companies
have had people break off. When we
were doing site selection for MCC, I
found that my shareholding corn-
panics were not at all enthused about
the company going to Silicon Valley
in California -because of a very high
turnover rate of technical personnel.
You move them out there and very
soon thereafter they find a venture
capitalist. I've noticed with interest
this past year IBM's efforts to hold
former employees accountable to
statements they had signed for pro-
tection of proprietary data.
Oh really?
Inman: Yes! They have taken some
very aggressive moves, some lawsuits
against people who have moved out
and taken ideas with them.
1)o you think that's a valid way of
trying to exert control?
Inman: Well, we're clearly headed
down that road. All MCC employees
will sign a proprietary agreement. All
intellectual property, all patents will
belong to MCC, and they arc not-to
'share them without approval.
Did you see the copyrighted story in
The New York Times that appeared
(September 25, 1983, Sunda,,
"Security of Computers )forric.v
Military Experts" by li'illiarn .1.
Broad) discussing computer security
and the penetration teanrs?
Inman: No I did note I
There was material here, and ... / r
me read it to you ... ghoul alrerirj.,
(computer) programs. (here the ir~-
terviewer read a few short excer7t v
front the article citing a case ra
which scientists at Bell Lahorcrtoric..
during the 1970s had put a secrrritt
bypassing procedure into a conrputcl,?
program. With such a program, tl c
computer would " . . . skip normal
security procedures and immediate/ '
give access to key' secrets," Thy
Times reported. Although Bell Lahol,-
ratory officials asserted such a prol-
grant never ran outside the lah'.s fitl,-
cllities, Defense Department expertlc
claimed that such a program in foe
was "installed at different sires
around the country, including tlyd
National Security Agency', .vhi"ill
specializes in electronic' cspionag '
and runs the Pentagon contputcct;
security cent(Ir, " according to the err
title. Admiral Inman was head of the
National Security Agency bc'twecti
1977 and 1987.)
Inman: The security center is actuall\l
the Department of Defcn.,c (c,mput-I
er Security hcadclu;trtcr, phv,icaII\'
located at NSA ... It's been crcatcd
over the last two years as a dcdicatcd
effort by DOD to look at theIproblcnt.l
The article cites an anot{{vnuns De-.
fense Department source who con-I
tends the program was used Jo v
roughly two years before so>reoncl
discovered it. He said NSA contput-i
ers weren't rulnerahlc' unless the Be/II
program were connected to outaidei
telephone lines. Are they?
Inman: To the best of my knowledge,
the answer is no.
But the National Security Agency
did use the Bell program'
Inman: I don't even know if they used
the Bell system, but what I do know.is
that those are all classified computer
systems. They're not the unclassified
ones like .you'd set up in Bell Labs
. where you want to communicate.
I don't know what they may have
changed in the last couple years, but
my firm recollection is that there
were no computer systems (at
NSA) which could be accessed by
telephone. .
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But are you saying there were pro-
grams at the National Security
Agency computers that used a Bell
system?
Inman: I don't know. I don't re-
member any that did.
Let's go on. This is where we talk
about penetration teams. The article
cites Proceedings of the United
States Naval Institute. According to
the Proceedings, as cited in the
Times report, "There are means at
hand for saboteurs to penetrate this
country's military computer
systems."
Inman: That's flatly false. I don't be-
lieve it's true at all. From a lot of
years of looking at them, I think the
vast bulk of suggestions about poten-
tial penetration are great flights of
imagination which have no basis in
fact. I don't think it's a valid threat
at all
Can 1 ask you one other question?
Experts cited in the Times claimed
-the government had engaged scient-
ists to try to break into computers.
Despite their efforts and the rede
signing of security systems in recent
years, NSA hasn't certified that any
of its computer systems are invulner-
able from internal attack. My ques-
tion is .. ,
Inman: The question cited was inter-
nal attack . , . The other question is
telephone access or external
attack ... And internal attack means
if you've got someone who actual-
ly has physical access to the
facilities and the rest of it. You
know there is a vulnerability.
Did you have any involvement in
these penetration teams?
Inman: No, and I have great skep-
ticism of the story, but I can't rule out
that some of it is true because in the
early 70s I was off doing totally dif-
ferent things. I had NSA from July
1977 to March 1981. That's when we
began some of our concentrated ef-
forts on computer security. But it was
not touched off by any of these teams
at all: It was getting at a multilevel
security problem.
A point that ought to be made is
the, vast majority of,the networking of
military computers where you are
dealing with operational information,
they're classified. They're en-
ciphered communications streams al-
ready so the amateur in fact can't
penetrate them. They could jam
them, that could keep them from
working, but they could not access
the data base. So you have two differ-
ent kinds of networks. You've got re-
search networks that are unclassified
that are easy to penetrate, and you've
got the classified where encipher-
ment devices, at great expense, cover
the linkages, and those are not acces-
sible to the "WarGames" kind of
guys who dial up.
When you say you were working on
multilevel security, do you mean
internal security?
Inman: I mean different levels of clas-
sification within the same computer.
Were you.more concerned about
internal or external attack?
Inman: Internal.
Did you have computers that net-
worked out to others?
Inman: Yes. Lots, all with fully en-
ciphered communications and ( l
was) completely comfortable about
their absolute security.
Have the Soviets penetrated a super-
computer in England? Do you know
anything about that?
Inman: No. Again, that's unclassified
research. Again, there is an informa-
tion exchange group that was set up
in Vienna; Kosygin's son-in-law was
one of the principle officials. And it
worked as a gateway. You could dial
into that organization and through it
access any number of unclassified re-
search activities in Western Europe
The gate the other way did not
access any Soviet computers
... Again (there's the) need to sep-
arate unclassified research where you
deliberately want widespread ex-
change among scientists .. as op-
posed to government networks that
are classified where you have already
enciphered devices controlling all the
external linkages. There the vulnera-
bility is not the external access, is
the internal access.
Given the fact that that's true, is
there any way, that highly sensitive
information-whether it's corporate
information or government infornw-
tion-can ever be totally Insured
again$t attack?
Inman: It can be with enciphered de-
vices, but most of those arc very ex-
pensive. and many corporations have
elected not to provide this protection
of proprietary data. Ws'; big capcnsy
in the absence of hard evidence that
anyone is listening ... Its in cco~i
nornic question. As a reference paint:,
you could go to a first-rate studyv done'
at Carnegie-Mellon University about',
three years ago by the College of"
Engineering and the College ofd,
Public Policy, in which they went out'
and interviewed a large number of",
business executives. The answer back
was, there were very few companies
that didn't spend the money ..here
they were very concerned about pro-
prietary data of value to their com-1
petitors, but the overwhelming ma-!
jority, in the absence of certainty that
insulation (of what) they were tran
smitting wasn't going to help the',
competitor, weren't willing to pay the-I
cost.
The multilevel security is an en-
tirely different argument. That is, we
buy computers that have enormous
capacity. Can you store in those com-
puters various levels of information:
unclassified, confidential, secret, top
secret, and limit access only to people
who are authorized to access that
(level) of data? That is a very tough
problem. But if you want to get max-
imum use of the computers, instead
of having to buy different ones for
different purposes, it's one that would
be economically very desirable to
solve.
Does NSA have a satisfactory system
of multilevel security?
Inman: They're still compartmenting
it off.
Do you think multilevel security will
be possible in the future?
Inman: I think it will be.
But it isn't at the moment?
Inmon: No.
Which computer systems are secure
in your eyes?
Inman: Most of the ones in use. In the
government at this point I'd be very
comfortable or their complete secur-
ity from unauthorized access to the
classified facility.
Internal attack is still a problem?
Inman: Internal attack will always be
a problem.
"What direction will corporations and
governments take in the future to-
niake sure their, computers are safe?
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Inman: There are always a lot of
things major corporations like banks
are doing. Limiting physical access,
plastic cards required for access. All
kinds of checks.You have a whole
variety of things in place now, and I
suspect there will be more over time
depending on the challenge. On the
urger question, is there going to be a
market for transmission protection of
proprietary data? That depends on
whether the corporations ultimately
conclude they are being pursued by
competitors.
What has been the Japanese reaction
to your announcements? Are they fo!-
lowing this?
Inman: I'm told that they're following
this very closely, and there's a lot of
talk about it. But I haven't any direct
contact, so I can't give you a first-
hand reaction.
I have great admiration for Dr.
William O. Baker, the former head of
Bell Labs. In an interview, he pro-
posed a sort of Japanese-U.S. collab-
oration on this project. My response
is: I don't rule out ultimate collab-
orative efforts but I think they'll have
to be tri-lateral: Western Europe and
Japan as well as the U.S. I don't
think we can join up with Japan to
take on Western Europe any more
than we could join with Western
Europe to take on Japan. We've got
to find a way, ultimately, to keep all
those relationships open . . . I believe
it's achievable provided you've got
the technology they want.
They have the technology we want
now? Japan?
Inman: The Japanese certainly now
have ceramic production techniques
I guess the answer to your ques-
tion when you stand up and think
about it is that the Japanese have
been faster to go to the marketplace
with new technology.
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