TARGET QADDAFI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500230008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 22, 1987
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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p r Rele a /g4/12j ~qtA-RDP91-00901
TARGET
STATINTL
QADDAFI
By Seymour M. Hersh
EIGHTEEN AMERICAN WARPLANES SET
out from Lakenheath Air Base in England
last April 14 to begin a 14-hour, 5,400-mile
round-trip flight to Tripoli, Libya. It is now
clear that nine of those Air Force F-11 I's had an
unprecedented peacetime mission. Their tar-
gets: Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi and his family.
The mission, aut ortze by the White
House, was to be the culmination of a five-year clandestine
effort by the Reagan Administration to eliminate Qaddafi,
who had been described a few days earlier by the President
as the "mad dog of the Middle East."
Since early 1981, the Central Intelligence Agency had been
encouraging and abetting Libyan exile groups and foreign
governments, especially those of Egypt and France, in their
it
bi-
efforts to stage a coup d'etat - and kill, if necessary -
zarre Libyan strongman. But Qaddafi, with his repeated
threats to President Reagan and support of international ter-
rorism, survived every confrontation and in the spring of
1986 continued to be solidly in control of Libya's 3 million citi-
zens. Now the supersonic Air Force F-111's were ordered to
accomplish what the C.I.A. could not. goal of
That the assassination of Qaddafi was the primary g
the Libyan bombing is a conclusion reached after three
months of interviews with more than 70 current and former
officials in the White House, the State Department, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and
the Pentagon. These sources, a number of whom were closely
involved in the planning of the Tripoli raid, agreed to talk only
if their names were not used. Many of them, however, cor-
roborated key information. The interviews depict a White
cision-making process that by early last year was
d
e
House
relying on internal manipulation and deceit to shield true
policy from the professionals in the State Department and
the Pentagon.
The interviews also led to these findings:
^ The attempt last April on Qaddafi's life was plotted by a'
small group of military and civilian officials in the National
Security Council. These officials, aware of the political risks,
operated with enormous care. A back channel was set up to
limit information to a few inside the Government; similar
steps had been taken the year before to shield the equally
sensitive secret talks and arms dealings with Iran.
^ Much of the secret planning for the Iran and Libyan
operations took place simultaneously, so that the Administra-
tion was pursuing the elimination of one Middle East source
of terrorism while it was trading arms with another. The two
missions involved the same people, including John M. Poindex-
ter, then the national security adviser, and Oliver L. North, the
N.S.C.'s deputy director for political-military affairs.
Seymour M. Hersh is working on a book on the Reagan Ad-
ministration's foreign policy for Random House.
^ There was widespread concern and anger inside the Na-
tional Security Agency over the Administration's handling of
the Libyan messages intercepted immediately after the
April 5 terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque. The
White House's reliance on these messages as "irrefutable" evi-
dence that Libya was behind that bombing was immediately
challenged by some allies, most notably West Germany. Some
N.S.A. experts now express similar doubts because 'he normal
intelligence channels for translating and interpreting such mes-
sages were purposely bypassed. As of this month, the N.S.A.'s
North African specialists had still not been shown these inter-
cepts.
^ William J. Cat-then Director of Central Intelligence,
personally served as the intelligence officer for a secret task ill
force on Libya set up in mid-1981, and he provided intelli-
gence that could not be confirmed by his subordinates. Some
task force members suspected that much of Casey's informa-
tion, linking Qaddafi to alleged "hit teams" that were said to
be targeting President Reagan and other senior White House
aides, was fabricated by him.
President Reagan's direct involvement in the intrigue
against Qaddafi - as in the Iran-contra crisis - is difficult to
assess. The President is known to have relied heavily on
Casey's intelligence and was a strong supporter of covert ac-
tion against QaddafI. But Mr. Reagan initially resisted when
the National Security Council staff began urging the bombing
of Libya in early 1986. Some former N.S.C. staff members ac-
knowledge that they and their colleagues used stratagems to
win the President over to their planning.
THE PLANNERS FOR THE LIBYAN RAID AVOIDED
the more formal White House Situation Room, where such
meetings might be noticed by other staffers, and met instead
in the office of former Navy Capt. Rodney B. McDaniel, the
N.S.C.'s executive secretary. The small ad hoc group, for-
mally known as the Crisis Pre-planning Group, included
Army Lieut. Gen. John H. Moellering of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for
political affairs, and Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for international security affairs. Most of the
planning documents and option papers on the bombing were
assigned to a small subcommittee headed by North; this com-
mittee included Howard J. Teicher, the N.S.C.'s Near East
specialist, and Capt. James R. Stark of the Navy, who was as-
signed to the N.S.C.'s office of political-military affairs.
For North, a Marine lieutenant colonel who had emerged
by early 1985 as the ranking National Security Council opera-
tive on terrorism, the Libyan raid was a chance to begin a
new phase in the American counterterrorism struggle - the
direct use of military force. He had served as a member of
Vice President Bush's Task Force on Combating Terrorism,
whose report - made public last February - presciently
summarized the pros and cons of the mission:
"Use of our well-trained and capable military forces offers
an excellent chance of success if a military option can be im-
plemented. Successful employment, however, depends on
timely and refined intelligence and prompt positioning of
forces. Counterterrorism missions are high-risk/high-gain
operations which can have a severe negative impact on U.S.
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Force officer says "The fact
Teicher had been deeply involved in the Administration's se- cret arms dealings with Iran for nearly a year; they also
knew that funds from those dealings were being funneled
from a Swiss bank account controlled by North to the Admin-
istration-backed contras fighting against the Sandinista Gov-
ernment in Nicaragua.
North has told associates that only he and a few colleagues
worked on the targeting of Qaddafi and that they left no writ-
ten record. "'There was no executive order to kill and no ad-
ministrative directive to go after Qaddafi,' " one former
N.S.C. official quotes North as saying. "They've covered their
tracks beautifully."
EVEN THE OFFICIAL BOMBING ORDERS
supplied by the White House to the Pentagon
did not cite as targets the tent where Qaddafi
worked or his family home. Instead, North
has told colleagues, the stated targets were
the command-and-control center and admin-
istrative buildings of El-Azziziya Barracks in
Tripoli, none of which were struck by bombs,
as well as the military side of the Tripoli airport and a com-
mando training site in the nearby port city of Sidi Bilal, which
were hit by the other nine F-I I1's. Also mistakenly hit by one
F-111 assigned to attack the barracks was a heavily popu-
lated residential area of Tripoli near the French Embassy.
The shielded orders explain a series of strong denials after
the bombing, especially by State Department officials, when
it became clear that Qaddafi's personal quarters had been a
primary target. That, too, was part of the White House or-
chestration, officials acknowledge.
One well-informed Air Force intelligence officer says,
"There's no question they were looking for Qaddafi. It was
briefed that way. They were going to kill him." An Air Force
pilot involved in highly classified special operations acknowl-
edges that "the assassination was the big thing."
Senior Air Force officers confidently predicted prior to the
raid that the nine aircraft assigned to the special mission had
a 95 percent "P.K." - probable kill. Each of the nine F-11 i's
carried four 2,000-pound bombs. The young pilots and weap-
ons-systems officers, who sit side-by-side in the cockpit, were
provided with reconnaissance photographs separately de-
picting, according to one Air Force intelligence officer,
"where Qaddafi was and where his family was."
The mission was the first combat assignment for most of
the fliers. Qaddafi's home and his camouflaged Bedouin tent,
where he often worked throughout the night, were inside the
grounds of El-Azziziya. The notion of targeting Qaddafi's
family, according to an involved N.S.C. aide, originated with
several senior C.I.A. officers, who claimed that in Bedouin
culture Qaddafi would be diminished as a leader if he could
not protect his home. One aide recalls a C.I.A. briefing in
which it was argued that "if you really get at Qaddafi's house
- and by extension, his family - you've destroyed an impor-
tant connection for the people in terms of loyalty."
In charge of the mission was Col. Sam W. Westbrook 3d, a
Rhodes scholar and 1963 Air
Force Academy graduate
who was subsequently
promoted to brigadier general
and reassigned in September
to the prestigious post of Com-
mandant of Cadets at the
Academy. A special biography
made available to recruiting
officers for the Academy in-
cludes a typewritten adden-
dum stating that Westbrook
led the Libya raid and caution-
ing that he "is not cleared to
has told associates, pin-
pointed Qaddafi's exact loca-
tion during the long night of
April 14, as the Air Force
jets, bucking strong head-
winds, flew around France,
Portugal and Spain to the
Mediterranean. The last fix
on Qaddafi's location came at
11:15 P.M., Libyan time, two
hours and 45 minutes before
the first bombs fell. He was
still at work in his tent.
In the hours following the
raid, Qaddafi's status was not
known, but inside the White
House there was excitement,
one N.S.C. staff aide recalls,
upon initial reports that he
had not been heard from.
Teicher reacted to the belief
that Qaddafi had been killed
by excitedly telling col-
leagues: "I'll buy everybody
lunch, and not at the Ex-
change," an inexpensive Fri-
day night staff hangout.
Shortly afterward, a C.I.A.
operative in Tripoli informed
the agency that the Libyan
leader had survived but was
said to be shaken by the
bombing and the injuries to
his family. All eight of Qadda- The C.I.A. knew of the plot
fi's children, as well as his in advance, the official says
l
wife, Safiya, were hospita
- but was unable to learn fo
ized, suffering from shock several days that the office
and various injuries. His 15- I
month-old adopted daughter,
Hana, died several hours
after the raid.
Poststrike infrared intelli-
gence photographs showed
that the bombs, guided by the
F-1I1's sophisticated on-
board laser system, left a line
of craters that went past both
Qaddafi's two-story stucco
house and his tent. Newsmen
reported that the bombs had
damaged his tent and the por-
ticoed family home.
The Air Force viewed Qad-
dafi's survival as a fluke. Two
senior officers separately
compare his escape with Hit-
ler's in the assassination at-
tempt led by Count Claus von
Stauffenberg in 1944, and a
four-star general, after de-
scribing in an interview the
tight bomb pattern near Qad-
dafi's tent, says resignedly,
"He must have been in the
head."
Another well-informed Air
is, they got into the exact tarp
get areas they had planned. It
was an ironic set of circum4
stances that prevented Qad4
dafi from being killed. It was
just an accident, a bad day.'!
The officer is referring to the
fact that the laser-guidance
systems on four of the nine
F-111's attacking Qaddafi's
quarters malfunctioned prior
to the attack The pilots had
to abort the mission before
reaching the target, thus
eliminating at least 16 more
bombs that could have been
dropped. The high-technology
system that was to insure
Qaddafi's death may have
spared his life.
The C.I.A. already knew
how difficult a target Qaddaf
could be. In late 1981, accord
ing to a senior Governmen
official, after Libyan force
returned from Chad, Qaddaf#
promoted the commander of
his successful invasion to
general and invited him to hi
desert headquarters. On th
jeep ride, the new genera
pulled out a revolver an
fired point-blank at Qaddafi.
had missed and been shot to
death by the Colonel's set
curity guard, believed to
an East German. After th
attempt, Qaddafi was no
seen publicly for 40 days.
A FTER THE RAID Ol
Tripoli, any sugges,
tion that the Unitedl
States had specifically tarp
geted Qaddafi and his family
was brushed aside by senior
Administration officials, who
emphasized that the Govern
ment had no specific know
edge of Qaddafi's wher(
abouts that night.
Secretary of State Georg
P. Shultz told newsmen, "We
are not trying to go after Qa
daft as such, although
think he is a ruler that is be
ter out of his country." One
the Air Force's goals, he sai
guard around Qaddafi.
At a closed budget hearirl
before the House Appropri
tions defense subcommitt,
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circumstances." c?dl,y
 six days Q, gWoarao~eIeasfhItQ4&Ze%GfAel r P
retary of Defense Caspar
W. Weinberger was ques-
tioned about the Air Force
targeting by Democratic
Representative Norman D.
Dicks of Washington. "Mr.
Secretary, you are a lawyer,"
Dicks said, according to a
subsequently released manu-
script. "Can you characterize
this in any other way than an
attempt to eliminate a for-
eign leader?"
"Oh, yes, Mr. Dicks, we
sure can," Weinberger re-
sponded. "His living quarters
is a loose term. This is a com-
mand-and-control building.
His living quarters vary from
night to night. He never
spends two nights in the same
place. His actual living quar-
ters are a big Bedouin sort of
tent. We are not targeting
him individually."
When questioned for this
article, Adm. William J.
Crowe Jr., chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, said
through a spokesman that
there had been what he
termed "some loose talk"
during planning sessions
about "getting" Qaddafi, but,
he went on, such targeting
was "never part of the plan."
The spokesman added,
"There was a lot of bantering
at these meetings," but
Crowe and his aides "did not
take the bravado seriously."
A Congressional aide who
participated in classified
briefings on the raid says he
understood all along that the
denials of Administration of-
ficials of any assassination
plans were pro forma. "I
was acute disappointment in
the White House and Penta-
gon, military officials say, be-
cause five of the nine F-111's
had failed to engage their tar-
get - besides the four mal-
functioning guidance sys-
tems, human error aboard
another F-111 resulted in the
bombing of the residential
area, killing more than 100
people.
There was criticism from
abroad, but the attack was
strongly supported by the
American public and Con-
gress. A New York Times/
CBS poll, taken the day after
the raid, showed that 77 per-
cent of those queried ap-
proved, although many
voiced fear that it would lead
to further terrorism.
One reason for the wide-
spread support was a collec-
tive sense of revenge: the
White House had repeatedly
said prior to the attack that it
had intercepted a series of
communications, said to be
"irrefutable" and a "smoking
gun," which seemed to di-
rectly link Libya to the April
5 bombing of the La Belle dis-
cotheque in West Berlin, in
which an American service-
man was killed and at least 50
others injured. There were
also nearly 200 civilian casu-
alties, including one death.
found myself feeling some-
what ambivalent," he re-
called, because of the Air
Force's target - "you know,
'Scum of the earth.' "
A senior American foreign
service officer on assignment
in the Middle East at the time
of the raid recalls having few
i illusions: "As abhorrent as
we find that kind of mission,
the Arabs don't. The first
word I got was, 'You screwed
it up again.' We missed."
Only one F-111 was re-
ported missing during the at-
tack and the overall opera-
tion was subsequently de-
scribed by Weinberger as a
complete success..
ANY IN THE IN-
telligence com-
munity believe that
the Reagan Administration's
obsession with Libya began
shortly after the President's
inauguration in 1981, and re-
mained a constant preoccu-
pation.
Director of Central Intelli-
gence Casey and Secretary of
State Alexander M. Haig Jr.
took office prepared to move
against Qaddafi, who had
been utilizing a number of
former C.I.A. operatives,
most notably Edwin '_Wil-
son and Frank E. Teroil. to
help set up terrorist training
camps.
There were other reasons
for American concern. Qad-
dafi was relentlessly anti-Is-
rael, supported the most ex-
treme factions in Syria and
opposed the more moderate
regimes of Jordan's King
Hussein and Egypt's Anwar
el-Sadat. There also were re-
ports early in 1981 that Libya
'I QWWQQQ5Q82A0eA6'-r3
often-stated ambition to set
up a new federation of Arab
and Moslem states in North
Africa alarmed policy
makers, especially after his
successful invasion early in
the year of Chad. One of the
areas seized by Libyan forces
was believed to be rich in ura-
nium.
Qaddafi was further
viewed as having close ties to
the Soviet Union, a point re-
peatedly driven home in a 15-
minute color movie that was
prepared by the C.I.A. in 1981
for the President and key
White House officials. It was
clear early in the Adminis-
tration, one former White
House aide recalls, that the
best way to get the Presi-
dent's attention was through
visual means. The movie,
which substituted for a writ-
ten psychological profile of
Qaddafi, the aide says, was
meant "to show the nature of
the beast. If you saw it, there's little
doubt that he had to go."
Libya became a dominant topic of
the Administration's secret delibera-
tions on C.I.A. covert action. At senior
staff meetings, one participant later
recalled, Haig repeatedly referred to
Qaddafi as a "cancer to be cut out."
In mid-1981, Haig put William P.
Clark, the Deputy Secretary of State,
in charge of a secret task force to look
into the Qaddafi issue. The initial goal
of the small group, which included a
representative from the Department
of Energy, was to evaluate economic
sanctions, such as an embargo on
Libyan oil purchases. Libya was then
supplying about 10 percent of total
American imports of crude oil, and
an estimated 2,000 American citizens
lived in Libya. Such planning was
hampered by the fact that Libyan
crude oil was of high quality and
much in demand. Clark, whose confir-
mation hearings had been marked by
controversy over his lack of knowl-
edge about foreign affairs, turned to
Robert C. (Bud) McFarlane, then the
State Department counselor, for help.
One immediate step, taken early in
1981, was to encourage Egypt and
other moderate Arab states to con-
tinue their longstanding plotting
against Qaddafi. In May, the State
Department ordered the closing of
the Libyan diplomatic mission in
Washington and gave Libyan diplo-
mats five days to leave the country.
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There were reports in American
newspapers, leaked by Government
officials, suggesting that Libyan op-
position to Qaddafi was growing and
citing the defection of Mohammed
Magaryef, a former Libyan Auditor
General living in exile in London who
would become the focal point of
American, French and Egyptian ef-
forts over the next four years to over-
throw Qaddafi.
In August 1981, President Reagan
approved a series of naval war
games inside the so-called "line of
death" - the 120-mile limit claimed
by Libya in the Gulf of Sidra. As ex-
pected, the Libyan Air Force rose to
the bait and Navy jets shot down two
SU-22 warplanes about 60 miles off i
the Libyan coast.
Libya accused the United States of
"international terrorism." According
to an account later provided to the
columnist Jack Anderson, an enraged
Qaddafi, in a telephone call to Ethio-
pian leader Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile
Mariam after the planes were shot
down, threatened to assassinate
President Reagan.
One former Cabinet-level official,
who served in a national security
position in 1981, recalls that there
was no question that the "only thing
to do with Qaddafi was kill him. He
belonged dead." However, White
House and C.I.A. planning throughout
much of 1981 was hampered, the for-
mer official says, by President Car-
ter's 1978 executive order against as-
sassinations. "The thought was to get
a third party," the former official
said - such as Egypt's President
Sadat, who some in the White House
believed was within a few days of
moving against Qaddafi when he was
assassinated on Oct. 6, 1981.On Oct. 7,
Magaryef and other exiles formed a
National Front for the Salvation of
Libya, based in London, "to rid Libya
and the world of the scourge of Qad-
dafi's regime."
In the weeks following Sadat's
death, newspapers and television re-
ported a barrage of Qaddafi death
threats to Reagan and senior Admin-
istration officials. Secret Service pro-
tection was ordered for the Presi-
dent's three top aides, Edwin Meese
3d, James A. Baker 3d and Michael K.
Deaver, and security for senior Cabi-
net members, including Haig and
Weinberger, was increased. Haig, at
a news conference, told newsmen:
"We do have repeated reports coming
to us from reliable sources that Mr.
Qaddafi has been funding, sponsor-
ing, training, harboring terrorist
groups, who conduct activities
against the lives of American diplo-
mats."
There were further reports that
five Libyan-trained terrorists had ar-
rived in the United States to assassi-
nate the President and some of his
aides. Mr. Reagan publicly endorsed
those reports. "We have the evidence
and he knows it," he told newsmen,
referring to Qaddafi.
ACCORDING TO KEY
sources, there was little doubt
inside Clark's task force
about who was responsible for the
spate of anti-Qaddafi leaks - the
C.I.A., with the support of the Presi-
dent, Haig and Clark. "This item
stuck in my craw," one involved offi-
cial recalls. "We came out with this
big terrorist threat to the U.S. Gov-
ernment. The whole thing was a com-
plete fabrication."
Casey began traveling regularly to
the State Department to attend policy
meetings of the Clark group. He was
accompanied at first by his deputy,
Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman, a long-
time intelligence officer who had
served as director of the National Se-
curity Agency in the Carter Adminis-
tration.
According to one participant, Casey
claimed to have reports and inter-
cepts directly linking Qaddafi to ter-
rorist activities. "I listened to Casey's
pitch and it was going for broke," the
participant recalls. "'We're going to
take care of Qaddafi.' Everyone was
very careful - no one uttered the
word assassination - but the mes-
sage was clear: 'This matter has to be
resolved.' "
If Casey's intelligence was correct,
the participant recalls, it threatened
the day-to-day ability of American of-
ficials to travel internationally.
Inman attended only one meeting, at
which he said little.
The participant, experienced in in-
telligence matters, was struck by In-
man's sudden disappearance and the
lack of specificity in Casey's presen-
tations. Privately, Inman confirmed
to a task force member that there
was no further specific intelligence
on the Libyan "death threats." A trip
to N.S.A. headquarters was arranged
for the member; there was nothing in
the raw intercepts other than "broad
mouthings" by Qaddafi, the
official recalls.
During this time, the Amer-
ican intelligence community
consistently reported that
Iran and its religious leader-
ship were far more involved
than Libya in international
terrorism. Qaddafi was
known to have brutally mur-
dered former Libyan offi-
cials, but he was not known to
have acted on his many
threats against Western
political leaders. An intelli-
gence official who has had di-
rect access to communica-
tions intelligence reports
says, "The stuff I saw did not
make a substantial case that
we had a threat. There was
nothing to cause us to react
as we have, saying Qaddafi is
public enemy No. 1." -
Inman soon resigned from
the C.I.A. and Casey contin-
ued to handle the intelligence
briefings to Clark on Libyan
terrorism. Some task force
members were convinced
that Clark's aides, including
McFarlane and Michael A.
Ledeen,_then a State Depart-
mentsconsultant, were leak-
ing Casey's reports. One task
force official eventually con-
cluded that Casey was in ef-
fect running an operation in-
side the American Govern-
ment: "He was feeding the
disinformation into the (intel-
ligence( system so it would
be seen as separate, inde-
pendent reports" and taken
seriously by other Govern-
ment agencies.
There were reprisals
planned if Qaddafi did strike.
By the early 1980's, the Navy
had completed elaborate con-
tingency plans for the mining
of Libyan harbors, and sub-
marines bearing the mines
were dispatched to the Medi-
terranean during training ex-
ercises. In late 1981, a White
House official was sent to
Lajes Air Base in the Azores,
one N.S.C. aide recalls, to in-
sure that it was secure in
case an air raid against
Libya was ordered. "When
Haig was talking about the
hit team," the aide recalled,
"we were ready to bomb."
None of Qaddafi's alleged
threats materialized.
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Continued
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500230008-3
I N JANUARY 1982,
Clark succeeded Richard
V. Allen as national se-
curity adviser and quickly
named McFarlane as a depu-
ty. McFarlane brought in
Donald R. Fortier from the
State Department's policy
planning staff. The two had
worked together on defense
issues as Congressional aides
in the last days of the Carter
Administration.
Later, Howard Teicher, an-
other McFarlane protege
from the State Department,
joined the staff. North, who
had come to the White House
on a temporary basis in the
summer of 1981, was kept on.
He would establish a close
working relationship with
McFarlane. "He accompa-
nied McFarlane to meetings
with the President and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
that other N.S.C. staffers
would not participate in," one
of North's former colleagues
recalls.
After a year and a half,
Clark, who had a poor rela-
tionship with Nancy Reagan
and the men who ran the
White House staff, resigned.
The President picked McFar-
lane as his successor, and
McFarlane named Fortier
and Vice Adm. John Poindex-
ter as deputy assistants.
Fortier was given the author-
ity to delve into any N.S.C. ac-
tivity, including covert ac-
tion.
A critical step occurred in
early 1984 when, after a
series of political defeats on
the contra-aid issue in Con-
gress, President Reagan au-
thorized McFarlane, one aide
recalls, to get the contras
funded "in any way you can."
North subsequently wrote an
internal memorandum out-
lining the shape of much of
the future N.S.C. activities,
calling for White House-led
fund-raising efforts in the pri-
vate community and among
foreign governments. Mean-
while, Fortier, relying on raw
intelligence, was beginning to
argue that the Administra-
tion could make some policy
moves toward Iran. The
N.S.C. staff began to go
operational.
UAMMAR EL-QAD-
dafi again became
an obsession in
Washington after the June
1985 hijacking of an Athens-
to-Rome Trans World Air-
lines flight by a group of
Lebanese Shiite Moslems.
One Navy diver on board was
killed and 39 other Amer-
icans were held hostage for
17 days. There was no evi-
dence linking the hijacking to
Libya, but within the Reagan
Administration feelings ran
high that action must be
taken, and striking against
Iran and Syria wouldn't do.
By July, the N.S.C. was se-
cretly involved in conversa-
tions with Israeli officials
over the possibility of trading
American arms to Iran for
hostages. And any attempt to
target Syria would be
strongly resisted by the Pen-
tagon. Syria's superb antiair-
craft defenses had shot down
an American Navy fighter
plane in 1983 and one naviga-
tor, Lieut. Robert 0. Good-
man Jr., had been captured.
He was later released to the
Rev. Jesse Jackson, one of
the President's most severe
critics.
The target was obvious. In
July, McFarlane opened a
high-level foreign policy
meeting with the President
by declaring that diplomatic
and economic pressure had
failed to curb Qaddafi's sup-
port for terrorism and much
stronger measures had to be
taken.
During the late summer
and early, fall, there was
a series of White House
meetings on Libya, under the
supervision of Poindexter
and Fortier. The two even
made a secret visit to Egypt
to coordinate possible joint
military operations against
fi
dd
a
Qa
. I
By October, the President
had formally authorized yet
another C.I.A. covert opera-
tion to oust Qaddafi. But, ac I~
cording to a report in The
Washington Post, the Admin-
istration was forced to have
Secretary of State Shultz ap-
pear in secret before the
House Select Committee on
Intelligence in order to pre-
vent a rare committee veto of
the action. Committee mem-
bers were said to have been
1984 C.I.A. assessment con-
cluding that it would be possi-
ble to call on "disaffected ele-
ments" in the Libyan mili-
tary who could be "spurred to
assassination attempts or to
cooperate with the exiles
against Qaddafi."
United States officials
knew of at least two major
French operations to assassi-
nate or overthrow Qaddafi in
1984, both directed by the Di-
rection de la Security Exter-
ieure, the French counter-
part of the C.I.A. According to
a participant, officials at the
National Security Agency
monitored cable traffic from
C.I.A. headquarters to its sta-
tion in Paris authorizing the
sharing of highly sensitive in-
telligence, including satellite
photographs and communi-
cations intercepts, in support
of the operations. Teams of
Libyan exiles were armed
with Israeli and other third-
party weaponry, brought to
the Sudan for combat train-
ing and infiltrated through
Tunisia into Libya.
Neither plot succeeded, al-
though one, in May 1984, re-
sulted in a pitched battle with
Qaddafi loyalists near El-Az-
ziziya Barracks. Libya later
reported that 15 members
of the exile group had
been slain. Qaddafi emerged
unscathed.
THE SECRET WHITE
House planning escalated
dramatically after terrorist
bombings in airports in
Vienna and Rome on Dec. 27,
1985, killed 20 people, five of
them Americans.
Within days, the N.S.C.'s
Crisis Pre-planning Group
authorized contingency mili-
tary planning that included
possible B-52 bomber strikes
on Libya from the United
States, as well as F-111 at-
tacks from England. Predict-
ably, Qaddafi responded to
published reports of Amer-
ican plans by warning that
his nation would "harass
American citizens in their
own streets" if the bombers
came.
Approved For Release d over a toe-secret)
~~b3/04/02 : IA-RDP91-009018000500230008-3
 Newsmen were told that
the C.I.A. had foutAltw
Libyan connection to the air-
port attacks, although the Is-
raelis publicly blamed them
on a Palestinian terrorist fac-
tion led by Abu Nidal. A State
Department special report,
made public early in 1986,
was unable to cite any direct
connection between Libya
and the airport incident. The
sole link was that three of the
passports used by the terror-
ists in Vienna had been
traced to Libya. One had been
lost in Libya by a Tunisian la-
borer eight years earlier and
two had been seized by
Libyan officials from Tuni-
sians as they were expelled in
mid-1985.
One involved White House
aide believes that the basic
I decision to use military force
was made at a high-level Na-
tional Security Planning
Group meeting on Jan. 6,
1986, in the emotional after-
math of the airport bomb-
ings. All of the key Adminis-
tration officials attended, in-
cluding the President, Shultz,
Weinberger, Casey and Poin-
dexter.
Reviewing his notes of the
For Releain {oloftanl't~W1001
resist a military response pending a
"smoking gun" - some evidence link-
ing Qaddafi to the airport bombings.
Another of Mr. Reagan's concerns
was that an attack on Libya must ap-
pear to be a just response. The Joint
Chiefs were known to be reluctant to
use force as a response to terrorism,
and had been resisting White House
staff entreaties to move a third air-
craft carrier into the Mediterranean
to buttress the two already on patrol.
The Joint Chiefs had claimed that at
least three carriers and their strike
force would be needed if Libya re-
sponded to a bombing with its 500 1
fighter aircraft. Adding a third car-
rier to the task force, the Joint Chiefs
explained, would disrupt the schedule
of leaves for seamen and pilots. One
White House aide recalls a tense
meeting in which Richard Armitage
of the Defense Department declared,
"Cancel the leaves," only to have the
Joint Chiefs insist that three carriers
could not be on station until March.
Jan. 6 meeting, a White
House aide recalls that a
decision was made to pro-
voke Qaddafi by again send-
ing the Navy and its war-
planes on patrol in the Gulf of
Sidra. Any Libyan response
would be seized upon to jus-
tify bombing.
According to this N.S.C.
aide, there was talk, inspired
by a memorandum written by North,
Teicher and Stark, of using one of the
Navy's most accurate weapons, the
Tomahawk missile, to attack targets
in Libya. Libyan air defenses, the
White House had been told, were ex-
cellent and would probably shoot
down some American aircraft. The
Tomahawk, a submarine-launched
cruise missile with a range of 500
miles, is accurate at that distance to
within one hundred feet of a target.
The next day, Jan. 7, the President,
declaring that there was "irrefuta-
ble" evidence of Qaddafi's role in the
airport attacks, announced economic
sanctions against Libya, including a
ban on direct import and export
trade. The idea, advocated by Forti-
er, was "to get economic sanctions
out of the way so the next time they
could do more," one involved White
House aide recalls. President Rea-
gan, the aide adds, may not have been
fully aware that he was being boxed
in by an N.S.C. staff that wanted ac-
S PEAKING AT THE NA-
tional Defense University at
Fort McNair in Washington on
Jan. 15, George Shultz argued that the
United States had a legal right to use
military force against states that
support terrorism. Under interna-
tional law, he claimed, "a nation at-
tacked by terrorists is permitted to
use force to prevent or pre-empt fu-
ture attacks, to seize terrorists or to
rescue its citizens, when no other
means is available."
Shultz's statement was part of a
carefully constructed scenario. In
subsequent weeks, one White House
official recalls, State Department
lawyers began to prepare an exten-
sive legal paper arguing, in part, that
"in the context of military action
what normally would be considered
murder is not."
Two days after Shultz's speech, the
President signed a secret executive
order calling for contacts with Iran
and waiving regulations blocking
arms shipments there. Casey was in-
structed not to inform Congress, as
the law provided, because of "se-
curity risks." The White House was
careening down two dangerous paths.
E ARLY IN 1986, INTELLI-
gence sources said, the Na-
tional Reconnaissance Office,
the secret group responsible for the
procurement and deployment of
America's intelligence and spy satel-
lites, was ordered to move a signals
intelligence satellite (SIGINT) from
its orbit over Poland to North Africa,
where it could carefully monitor
Libyan communications.
Libyan diplomatic and intelligence
ReiacaQ2 a routine target
of the N.S.A., whose field stations ring
the globe; but beefed-up coverage
was deemed necessary. Interception
stations in England, Italy and Cyprus,
among others, were ordered to moni-
tor and record all communications
out of Libya. In the N.S.A. this is
known as "cast-iron" coverage. A
high-priority special category
(SPECAT) clearance was set up for
the traffic, denying most N.S.A. inter-
ception stations access to the Libyan
intelligence. A special procedure for
immediately funneling the intercepts
to the White House was established.
A third American aircraft carrier
arrived in the Mediterranean in mid-
March, and the three carriers and
their 30-ship escort were sent on an
"exercise" into the Gulf of Sidra. It
was the largest penetration by the
American fleet into the Libyan-
claimed waters.
One involved N.S.C. aide acknowl-
edges that Poindexter, who had suc-
ceeded McFarlane as national se-
curity adviser, and Fortier had deter-
mined that the Navy should respond
to any loss of American life in the ex-
ercise by bombing five targets in
Libya. As the Navy task force sailed
toward Libya, the aide remembers,
he overheard Fortier and General
Moellering, the Joint Chiefs' delegate
to the Crisis Pre-planning Group, dis-
agree on tactics during a meeting in
the N.S.C. crisis center. Fortier, the
aide says, asked the general to outline
the Navy's rules of engagement in
case Libya responded. "Proportional-
ity," the general said.
"They should be disproportionate,"
the aide heard Fortier sharply re-
spond.
On March 25 and 26, the Sixth Fleet
attacked four Libyan ships, destroy-
ing two of them. Navy aircraft also
conducted two raids against a radar
site on the Libyan coast. There were
no American casualties and no
Libyan counterattack. The White
House, pressing the advan-
tage, warned Qaddafi that
any Libyan forces venturing
more than 12 miles from
shore - the international
limit recognized by the
United States - were subject
to attack.
Qaddafi's failure to rise to
the bait frustrated the N.S.C.
staff. One senior State De-
partment official acknowl-
edges, "Everybody wanted to
beat the hell out of Libya." In-
stead, the fleet was with-
drawn after three days in the
Gulf of Sidra, two days
earlier than planned.
tion. "We were m4 t 'etve&Frro f (Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500230008-3
the President," the aide says.
 Thcpp6Rspd citidglee po'ie0iYS~vitaGerte~yesPcqiQ09~}~ iOM90$nIny of
N.S.C. aides remained: how to
convince the reluctant Presi-
dent that bombing was essen-
tial. In late March, the N.S.A.
intercepted a message from
Tripoli to Libyan agents in
East Berlin, Paris, Belgrade,
within hours. One State De-
partment intelligence officer
recalls, upon seeing the inter-
cepts, "It was too good. I
knew it would leak."
On April 7, Richard R. Burt,
the Ambassador to West Ger-
Geneva, Rome and Madrid many, publicly linked the
ordering them "to prepare to Libyans to the La Belle
carry out the plan." Shortly bombing. Interviewed on the
before 8 P.M. on April 4., "Today" show, Burt said,
Washington time (April 5 in "There is very, very clear
Germany), the La Belle disco i I evidence that there is Libyan
in West Berlin was blown up. involvement."
Fourteen hours later, the Yet police officials in West
men in the White House had Berlin repeatedly told news-
their "smoking gun." men that they knew of no evi-
B Y 10 A.M. ON SATUR-
day, April 5, the N.S.A.
had intercepted, decod-
ed, translated from Arabic
and forwarded to the White
House a cable from the
Libyan People's Bureau in
East Berlin to Tripoli stating,
in essence, according to
N.S.C. and State Department
officials, that "We have
something planned that will
make you happy." A few
hours later, a second mes-
sage from East Berlin to
Tripoli came across the top-
secret computer terminals in
the N.S.C. providing the exact
time of the La Belle bombing
and reporting that "an event
occurred. You will be pleased
with the result."
The messages were rushed
to the California White
House, where the President
was spending Easter. The
decision to bomb was made
that afternoon, one former
White House official recalls:
"The same people who
wanted to have a show of
dence linking Libya to the dis-
cotheque bombing. One week
after the attack, Manfred
Ganschow, chief of the anti-
terrorist police in Berlin, was
quoted as having "rejected
the assumption that suspi-
cion is concentrated on
Libyan culprits."
Christian Lochte, president
of the Hamburg office of the
Protection of the Constitu-
tion, a domestic intelligence
unit, told a television inter-
viewer five days after the
bombing, "It is a fact that we
do not have any hard evi-
dence, let alone proof, to show
the blame might unequivo-
cally be placed on Libya.
True, I cannot rule out that
Libya, in some way, is re-
sponsible for the attack. But I
must say that such hasty
blame, regarding the two
dreadful attacks at the end of
the year on the Vienna and
Rome airports, for which
Libya had immediately been
made responsible, did not
prove to be correct."
A senior official in Bonn, in-
force in late March could now I terviewed last month for this
do it in the context of terror- article, said that the West
ism." The President would no German Government contin-
longer be, as one aide put it, ued to be "very critical and
"the inhibitor." skeptical" of the American
By Monday, Teicher had intelligence linking Libya to
prepared a discussion paper the La Belle bombing. The
for a talk at a high-level United States, he said, which
meeting on the proposed has extremely close intelli-
bombing; one key element, a gence ties with West Germa-
i firsthand source recalls, was ny, had made a tape of its in-
a proposal that the intercepts tercepts available to German
should be declassified and intelligence, with no change
made public in a Presidential in Bonn's attitude.
speech. The idea, the White Some White House officials
House official adds, was to
again "make an end run on
the President" and prevent
any second thoughts.
had immediate doubts that
the case against Libya was
clear-cut. The messages had
been delivered by the N.S.A.
to the White House, as direct-
ed, without any analysis.
them specifically linking
Qaddafi to the La Belle bomb-
ing. What is more, the disco-
theque was known as a hang-
out for black soldiers, and the
Libyans had never been
known to target blacks or
other minorities.
The normal procedure for
SPECAT intelligence traffic
from Libya is that it be pro-
cessed and evaluated by the
G-6 group at N.S.A. headquar-
ters at Fort Meade, Md., be-
fore being relayed elsewhere.
But the La Belle traffic was
never forwarded to G-6. As of
this month, the April 4 and 5
Libyan intercepts had not
been seen by any of the G-6
experts on North Africa and
the Middle East.
"The G-6 section branch
and division chiefs didn't
know why it was taken from
them," says an N.S.A official.
"They were bureaucratically
cut out and so they screamed
and yelled."
Another experienced N.S.A.
analyst notes: "There is no
doubt that if you send raw
data to the White House, that
constitutes misuse because
there's nobody there who's
capable of interpreting it."
N.S.A. officials had no choice
if the White House asked for
the intercepts, he says, but
adds, "You screw it up every
time when you do it - and
especially when the raw traf-
fic is translated into English
from a language such as Ara-
bic, that's not commonly
known."
Yet another analyst points
out that Qaddafi was known
to have used personal
couriers in the past - and not
radio or telephone communi-
cation - in his many assas-
sinations and assassination
attempts.
A senior State Department
official who was involved in
the White House delibera-
tions on the Libyan bombing
insists that he and his col-
leagues were satisfied with
the handling of the intercepts.
"There was nothing to sug-
gest that it was not handled in
good faith," he says. "The in-
tercepts did not say La Belle
disco was bombed. They
never identified the site. But
there was a history that the
Libyans were going to mount
an operation in Europe."
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 T HERRp{~+-,4sv F _Rel as%cQft 4k02in Q1M DP91-00'9?1>~@AO Q0&Q~)0?$it
mosphere of cynicism given to colleagues, North, the Joint Chiefs Chairman,
and disarray within just prior to the bombing, North told colleagues. At the
the National Security Council made a series of suggestions close of the meeting, with the
as it prepared to bomb Libya at a high-level meeting at- President out of hearing,
while supplying arms to Iran. tended by the President, North related, Crowe walked
Poindexter was being hailed Poindexter, Crowe and Gen. up to him, and nose to nose
in Newsweek as "a cool war- Charles A. Gabriel, the Air warned: "Young man, you'd
I rior" who "steadies the Force Chief of Staff. With the better watch your step."
N.S.C." But privately, some approval of Casey, North had Through an aide, Crowe
I security council officials say, already interceded with the denies the encounter, saying
he was feeling overwhelmed, Israelis to increase the intel- that he "did not recall any
and would soon be telling ligence available before the discussion on substantive
close associates that he mission. Now he argued for matters that he ever had"
wanted a transfer to the Na- using a covert Navy SEAL with North. "Nor does he re-
tional Security Agency. By team, which would surface on I call any meetings with North
April, some N.S.C. insiders, the beach near Qaddafi's tent except as a back-bench note
and reportedly the President, and residence and set up a taker" at White House meet-
knew that William Casey had laser beam that could guide ings, the aide said. Further-
started undergoing radiation the American bombs directly more, Crowe was quoted by
treatment for prostate can- to the main targets. The at- an aide as saying, "He doesn't
cer; his illness was not made tacking planes could then recall North having any input
public until December. Don- launch their bombs offshore at all in the April raid."
ald Fortier also was ex- - out of range of Libyan an-
tremely ill. He would die of tiaircraft missiles - and be T N A NATIONALLY
liver cancer in August. just as effective. The SEAL televised speech on April
In the weeks preceding team, apparently at North's 14, President Reagan said
April 14, Oliver North has direction, had already been the intelligence linking Libya
told associates, he became deployed to the Middle East. to the La Belle bombing "is
extremely active in the But, North told colleagues, direct, it is precise, it is ir-
Libyan planning. The Joint Crowe said no - that no one refutable. We have solid evi-
Chiefs had decided on a two- wanted to put Americans at dence about other attacks
pronged aerial attack, involv- risk. Qaddafi has planned." He Be-
ing Navy units in the Mediter- North reportedly then scribed the Tripoli raid as a
ranean and the F-111's from raised the issue of using the "series of strikes against the
England. But none of the mili- Air Force's most-advanced headquarters, terrorist fa-
tary planners wanted to see fighter-bomber, the superse- cilities and military assets
American airmen shot down cret Stealth, said to be capa- that support Muammar Qad-
and paraded around Libya; ble of avoiding enemy radar. dafi's subversive activities."
and there was concern that The aircraft would be perfect The President added: "We
the Navy's A-6 bombers to attack Qaddafi's personal Americans are slow to anger.
would be vulnerable to an- quarters and tent; it could be We always seek peaceful ave-
tiaircraft fire. The F-11 is not ferried to the huge American nues before resorting to the
only flew much faster - they naval base at Rota, Spain, use of force, and we did. We
would hit the target going 9 and attack from there. Admi- tried quiet diplomacy, public
miles a minute - but also ral Crowe again said no, ex- condemnation, economic
had far superior electronic plaining that the Stealth tech- sanctions and demonstra-
defense mechanisms to ward nology was too valuable to I tions of military force - and
off enemy missiles. risk. none succeeded."
The round-trip from Eng- North told colleagues that According to one involved
land to Libya, over France, he persisted in seeking alter- N.S.C. official, there was
1 would be about seven hours, natives, raising the possibil- other language prepared for
well within the F-11 is limits. ity of attacking the Qaddafi the President - a few para-
Admiral Crowe and the Joint quarters with a convention- graphs bracketed into the
Chiefs agreed that the F-111's ally armed Tomahawk cruise text in case the White House
would play the lead role in the missile fired from a subma- could confirm that Qaddafi
attack, buttressed by 12 Navy rine. Admiral Crowe, the re- had been killed. The message
A-6's, which were assigned to port goes, responded that would echo an analysis pre-
bomb an airfield and military there were too few conven- pared by Abraham D. Sofaer,
barracks 400 miles east of tionally armed Tomahawks the State Department legal
Tripoli. in the arsenal. North has adviser, claiming that the
But North has told col- claimed that he then raised I United States had the legal
leagues that he had doubts the possibility of supplement- right "to strike back to pre-
about the Air Force's mis- ing the bombing by mining vent future attacks." The kill-
sion, and they were height- and quarantining the har- ing of Qaddafi, under that
ened when the French bars, saying he wanted "a far doctrine, was not retaliation
refused to permit the F-111 more sophisticated scenario nor was it in any way a crime.
overflight. The Air Force was to cover up the fact that the But Qaddafi was not killed,
now confronted with a diffi- target was going to be an as- and a White House official re-
cult assignment against the sassination." counts an elaborate briefing
strong headwinds of the Bay a day or so after the raid at
of Biscay. which the Air Force's failure
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ConhfU88
 wash
N'av
obvt6"i S. ft
were at ease, confident," the
aide recalls. "All had worked
perfectly." The Navy's two
main targets had been accu-
rately attacked, with no loss.
"The poor Air Force guy," re-
calls the aide. "He was defen-
sive and polite. Talked about
how the White House kept on
changing signals."
The intelligence satellite
that had been moved from
Poland was ordered to re-
main over Libya, in the hope
tember, there was a
200y3,'~;5-X06601 R000500230008-3
ficials to Iran, and continued
arms trading. Within a month
that the bombing would rally
those military men opposed
to Qaddafi and spark a revolt.
"They honestly thought Qad-
dafi would fall or be over-
thrown," one National Se-
curity Agency official says,
referring to the N.S.C, "and
so they kept the bird up
there."
There was no coup d'etat -
and there was one intelli-
i gence satellite missing over
Eastern Europe in late April,
when an explosion rocked one
of the reactors at the Soviet
nuclear power plant in Cher-
nobyl, in the Ukraine. After
another bureaucratic battle
inside the intelligence com-
munity, one N.S.A. official re-
calls, the satellite was re-
turned to its normal orbit
above Poland, as the United
States tried to unravel the ex-
tent of damage to the nuclear
power plant and the scope of
the fallout threat to Western
Europe.
The White House's two-
track policy toward Libya
and Iran continued. In May,
McFarlane, accompanied by
North and Teicher, among
others, traveled to Teheran
bearing arms. A few weeks
later, Poindexter routinely
approved a proposal,
strongly supported by Casey
and Shultz, calling for an-
other disinformation opera-
tion against Libya in the
hopes of provoking Qaddafi.
The C.I.A. triggered the re-
newed planning, one insider
recalls, by reporting once
again that "Qaddafi was on
the ropes."
the policy - and the National
Security Council - began to
come apart. By early Novem-
ber, the Iran scandal was on
the front pages. Its major
casualty was the credibility
of a popular President.
In the wake of that scandal,
Oliver North would emerge
in the public's perception as a
unique and extraordinary
player inside the National Se-
curity Council, a hard-charg-
ing risk-taker who was differ-
ent from his colleagues. It is
now apparent that North was
but one of many at work in
the White House who believed
in force, stealth and opera-
tions behind the back of the
citizenry and the Congress.
He was not an aberration, but
part of a White House team
whose full scope of opera-
tions has yet to be unraveled.
North, along with Poindex-
ter, Teicher and others, have
left the Government. The
much-reviled Colonel Qad
dafi remains in power. ^
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 ARTICLEAP+ ABED
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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
STATINTL
ON PAGE I I A 17 February 1987
An addiction to covert operations despite
their limited value
4 PARIS-As the direction of the CIA passes from
William Case ,enthusiastic patron of the "operations"
e o t e intelligence agency, to Robert M. QatcL a
career intelligence analyst, a good"8e"ar t en
approvingly about Casey's rebuilding of the agency's
covert action capability. No one seems to be asking
what covert action is worth, or whether it recently has
done the United States any good.
"Covert," of course, has in CIA matters acquired a
rather peculiar definition, that of an officially
proclaimed program, debated in Congress, and
followed in close detail by the press. The government
itself is responsible for this, since officials deliberately
make known their "covert" programs to promote their
policy in Congress and collect support from the public.,
Possibly the United States runs truly covert "covert"
programs, in addition to the ones we know so much
about. One is inclined to doubt it, though-Americans
never having been particularly talented in this matter,
as well as being devoted to publicizing what we are up
to. Support for anticommunist, or ostensibly
anticommunist, guerrilla movements in Afghanistan,
Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua certainly is the main
element in current U.S. covert operations.
Serious questions should be asked. First is a political
question: Have these movements a serious chance of
succeeding? The answer in every case except the
Afghan is no. The contras will return to Managua only
if the United States Army takes them there. The
guerrillas the U.S. supports in Angola and Cambodia
are tribal, regional or factional, not national. The
Afghan resistance is a national movement of resistance
to a foreign occupation and has imposed severe costs
upon the Soviet Union, with the result that Moscow
now wants out of Afghanistan. But like the United
States in Vietnam 20 years ago, the Soviet Union
wants it both ways-to leave Afghanistan and also to
keep a communist government there.
Second is a moral question. If a guerrilla movement
isn't going to win, is support for it justified? The
guerrillas themselves may say they will fight on, no
matter what their prospects are. They are to be
honored if they take that stand. For the United States
to give support to guerrillas without serious prospect
of success implies a cynical decision to let them die for
American interests, while Washington reserves the right
to abandon them when that seems expedient.
Let us not forget that the United States has again
and again supported guerrilla movements and then
dropped them, often after having encouraged them to
commit themselves to combat and risks of a scale they
,/William Pfaff
might not otherwise have dared. The list of victims is a
sobering one, including Ukrainians, Albanians, Chinese
Nationalists, Tibetans, Kurds, Meos and Montagnard
tribesmen in Vietnam. There is not much doubt that
the contras sooner or later will join that list.
.. Adm. Bobby lnm who directed the National
S or our years and then became
deputy director of the CIA, recently told a University
of California at Berkeley seminar that he is skeptical of
the usefulness of covert action. "I'm not persuaded
that efforts to change governments have over the long
haul been either very successful or very effective. It's
hard to get along with unfriendly governments; it's
even harder to try and prop up people to govern that
you helped put in place that don't have the capacity to
govern." He added that he is persuaded that, in the
CIA, "covert action has tended to draw support away
from what I consider a much more vital function:
understanding what goes on in the outside world."
Two factors are responsible for the American
government's addiction to covert enterprises despite
their demonstrated limits. The first is that covert
action provides something to do. It does little to
answer the real problem, but it answers the problem of
seeming to do something about the real problem. It .
provides a useful illusion.
The second reason we like covert action is that it is
exciting and seems romantic. "The trade of the spy is
a very fine one," wrote Honore de Balzac. "Is it not in
fact enjoying the excitements of a thief, while still
retaining the character of an honest citizen? ... The
only excitement which can compare with it is that of
the life of a gambler."
Like the gambler, the covert operator, of course,
loses more often than he wins. For him, as an
individual, the game may nonetheless justify the odds.
For a government, dealing in national interests both
grave and enduring, the gambler's choices are surely
false choices.
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 ARTICLE APP@,i vedForlelease 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500230008-3
ON PAGE ,4.A US\ TODAY
1? February 1987
CIA choice
has tough
tasks ahead
By Sam Meddis
USA TODAY
The Senate could confirm
ri Robert-,Cates-today as youn-
'gi~ver CIA director.
But, at 43, the 21-year CIA
veteran faces two larger tests:
^ First, defending the CIA's
role in the Iran-contra scandal
at confirmation hearings - to-
day on CNN at 10 a.m. EST.
^ And, over the next two
years, establishing his indepen-
dence from the Reagan admin-
istration so he can retain the
post under a new president. UPI
"I flatly predict - I have no GATES: Married father of two
question in my mind - he called a very private person
should be confirmed," said
Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt. "oil drilling equipment"
Chas a reputation for Some senators may try to ex-
hard work, a flair for analysis tract a pledge that Gates will
and a scholar's savvy about the tell the panel of all future se-
Soviet Union. He joined the cret CIA operations or resign.
CIA in 1966, remaining in the Ex-CIA Deputy Director
analysis unit - never in clan-, Bobb Inma Gates has a
ante of staying on af-
destine activities. He become s Fong c
deputy director in April. ter Reagan: "His reputation
But the Senate Intelligence (as) a non-partisan, competent
Committee hearings will raise professional is already there."
sticky questions about Gates'-fJ Says ex-CIA Director Stans-
role in the Iran affair. field Turner: "It's a good move
"I expect some fairly tough to start with a new generation."
questions on ... what he knew./ vv Roy, Godson, a Georgetown
and when he knew it," says Jim University government profes-
Dykstra, a committee staffer. sor, says Gates will have to
If Gates knew anything, the fend off congressional efforts
questions are likely to turn to at new restrictions on the CIA
why he didn't tell Congress. while improving counter-intel-
While committee Chairman ligence in the wake of embar-
Sen. David Boren, D-Okla., says rassing big spy cases.
the hearing won't become a "It would be hard enough to
full-blown arms scandal probe, do either one of those," Godson
Gates is certain to be asked said. "And he's got to do both."
about reports of a cover-up. Contributing: William Ringle
News reports claim a cover- -
up story was drafted for ex-CIA
director William Casey - now
recovering from brain surgery
- to be presented before the
Senate, saying the CIA believed
missile shipments to Iran were
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 WASHINGTON TIMES
3February 1987
610,
STATINTL
Reagan names Gates
'to succeed Case
Little `cloak-and-dagger'
on deputy chief ~e resume
N 71MES
Robert Michael Gates, President
Reagan's nominee for CIA director,
has a reputation as an intelligence
bureaucrat with a wealth of knowl-
edge about analysis but scant exper-
ience with clandestine operations -
often considered the heart and soul
of the spy business.
A career CIA analyst who special-
izes in Soviet affairs, Mr. Gates, 43,
became acting director last month
when William Casey underwent
brain surgery to remove a cancerous
tumor. Mr. Casey resigned yesterday.
The announcement of Mr. Gates'
nomination drew praise from most
intelligence experts, with the excep-
tion of some critics who felt he might
derail Mr. Casey's large-scale covert
action programs in support of anti-
communist resistance movements.
4 David Atlee Ph fillips a former CIA
clandTestine services officer, praised
the Casey era for what he called "the
revival" of both the agency's morale
and the funds alloted for covert op-
erations.
But Mr. Phillips said he believed
Mr. Gates, who would be the first
CIA analyst to become the agency's
director, would not provide the same
level of support for covert action.
"Since his background is devoid
of all covert action experience, we
will assume there will be very little
of that in the last two years of the
Reagan administration," Mr. Phillips
said yesterday.
Born in Wichita, Kan., Mr. Gates
attended the College of William and
Mary and Indiana University. He
earned a doctorate from George-
town University. He joined the CIA
in 1966 and then spent three years in
the Air Force before becoming a CIA
analyst.
In 1971 he joined the U.S. SALT
negotiating team as an intelligence
adviser, and in 1973 became the
s ass>stant national intelligence
officer for strategic programs.
He was detailed by the agency to
the National Security Council dur-
ing the Nixon and Ford administra-
tions and later became an executive
assistant to Carter administration
National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski,
Mr. Brzezinski, now with the Cen-
ter for Strategic and International
Studies, described Mr. Gates as "a
shrewd, experienced professional"
who advocated close cooperation be-
tween the White House and CIA.
"One of the things he always
stressed to me was that the CIA and
National Security Council should be
natural allies." Mr. Brzezinski said.
"I think that analysis will serve him
well as DCI."
Former Carter era CIA Director
,y Adm. Stansfield Thrner, who chose
1VIrr. ates as a policy adviser, said
the director-designate would have a
hard time repairing the agency's
poor relations with congressional
oversight committees following the
Iran arms deal controversy.
"I think the president was right to
put someone in there who is fully
familiar with what went on," Adm.
'lltrner said. "He's imaginative and
he helped me originate many of the
innovative things I tried to do for the
CIA."
Adm. Thrner has been criticized
by some former CIA officials for
summarily dismissing hundreds of
the agency's most experienced clan-
destine services operators.
Mr. Gates was chosen by Mr.
Casey to be an executive assistant in
1981, but later returned to his post as
the top intelligence analyst on the
Soviet Union.
He became CIA deputy director
for intelligence in 1982 and assumed
the No. 2 post at the agency last sum-
mer.
During confirmation hearings,
Mr. Gates supported the administra-
tion's large-scale paramilitary pro-
grams but noted the agency was re-
sponsible only for implementing
such programs.
"It [covert action] is a decision
made by the National Security Coun-
cil, and CIA is an instrument by
which it is implemented," Mr. Gates
told the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee. "And I believe that when that
decision is made, the CIA has an ob-
ligation to implement it as effec-
tively and as efficiently as possible."
Intelligence sources said sugges-
tions for covert action programs
often began with plans developed by
the CIA's operations directorate.
One intelligence source, who de-
clined to be identified, said the nomi-
nation of Mr. Gates was a sign that
agency enthusiasm for covert action
has ended.
"The agency will be very, very
hesitant to engage in anything with
a flap potential unless they have
someone like Casey willing to take
the heat," the source said. "He was
willing to give things a whirl, but I
don't think anybody sees Gates that
way.
"If I were a covert action oper-
ative," the source continued, "I
would think about early retirement,
or not working very hard until some-
one is in there who will support the
programs."
Another source said the nomina-
tion did not have the support of clan-
destine services branch officials, al-
though a CIA official said Mr. Gates
had the backing of CIA Deputy Di-
rector for Operations Clair
George.
ormer CIA Deputy Director
Bobby Rav Inma disagreed and
sai Mr. Gates was "absolutely the
best appointment the president
could make."
"He is the first director of central
intelligence from the analytical
side," Mr. Inman said. "But I'm com-
fortable he will call on the depth of
competence from inside DDO [oper-
ations directorate] to operate it and
operate it efficiently."
Senate Intelligence Committee
member Sen. Chic Hecht, Nevada
Republican, said tie oo d not ex-
pect Mr. Reagan to have nominated
Mr. Gates without Mr. Casey's full
support.
"Bob Gates has big shoes to fill,"
said Mr. Hecht, who praised Mr.
Casey for "rebuilding" the CIA. "He
has got a top staff of people at the
CIA that he can rely on."
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 ppr~
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20- Year Career Man
Cautious Gates
Called Contrast
to Casey Style
3 February 1987
B MICHAE,~. WIt
Times-Staff Writer
WASHINGTON-To succeed his
close friend William J. Casey in the
nation's top intelligence post, Pres-
ident Reagan on Monday nominat-
ed a man who is Casey's top deputy
and in many ways his opposite.
The contrast between Casey and
Robert M. Gates likely will please
many critics-of the CIA and the rest
of the intelligence bureaucracy,
now under fire for missteps in both
the Iran arms affair and the quasi-
private support network for rebels
in Nicaragua.
But whether the cautious,
even-tempered Gates will have the
same sway over the intelligence
community as the irascible, adven-
turous Casey is an open question.
Gates is a 20-year veteran of the
CIA and the National Security
Council and the holder of a doctor-
ate in Soviet history. He is a
cautious sort who reportedly
frowns on "black" operations such
as the Iran arms affair, favoring the
sort of dispassionate analysis on
which he has built his own career.
Friends and observers say that he
has a quick wit and acceptable
political skills.
At 43, Gates is the youngest man
ever proposed to become director
of central intelligent. a job that
includes not only management of
the CIA but also coordination of the
entire U.S. intelligence community,
from the Pentagon to the National
Security Agency.
He appears little like the 73-
year-old Casey, the oldest director
of central Intelligence in the post's
30-year history. Casey is a former
World War II intelligence officer, a
Reagan political guru, an anti-So-
viet hardliner and cantankerous
defender of the kinds of risky
intelligence missions-such as the
Iran arms sales-that had fallen
into disfavor in the 1970s.
A Senate Intelligence Committee
report last week suggested that the
CIA under Casey became more
deeply involved in the Iran and
contra scandals than has been
admitted. Although Gates served as
deputy director for intelligence
during the period, he so far has not
been tainted by the affairs.
'Careful Analyst'
''He's a very competent,
straightforward person. a person of
integrity. He's a careful analyst.
He's fair-minded," said Michael
Oksenberg, a University o hi-
an professor and former co- work-
er at t e National Security Council.
"He represents to me the best of
the profession, and it's a demanding
profession."
"I think he's clean," one former
top CIA official said Monday. "I
think he'll be questioned closely"
during confirmation hearings by
wary senators, "but many of them
will be relieved to have somebody
who's clearly not political."
For someone reportedly so apo-
litical, Gates' ascent through the
espionage bureaucracy has been
unusually rapid.
Casey already had been retired
from the CIA's predecessor, the
wartime Office of Strategic Servic-
es, for 20 years when Gates joined
the CIA in 1966 a an intelligence
analyst. In 1974, the year he ac-
quired his doctorate from George-
town University in Washington,
Gates moved from the CIA to the
National Security Council, where
he remained through the Gerald R.
Ford and Jimmy Carter adminis-
trations.
By the time he left the NSC in
1979, he was executive assistant to
then-National Security Adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski, controlling
the paper flow within the White
House national security bureaucra-
cy and acting as an informal advis-
er on Soviet affairs.
Back in the CIA under Reagan.
he served first as the agency's top
Soviet analyst and then, in 1982. as
deputy director for i.itelliger,ce. a
year rater he added the post of
director of the National Intelli-
gence Council, the body that over-
sees the assembly of intelligence
"estimates" of worldwide political
and military situations.
It is in the world of number-
crunching and thoughtful forecast-
ing-and not dark-alley spying
missions-that Gates has excelled.
"Gates has demonstrated repeat-
edly a very tough mind and he sees
the role of intelligence agencies as
making judgments, not lust writing
United Prey (nternauenai
Robert M. Gates
history," said Bobby Ray Inman, a
former deputy
gene under Casey. "When you do
that, you're never 100% right. But
your value is greater."
The covert operations that Casey
so admired "will be a new business
to him," Inman said of Gates.
Other associates say that Gates
brings the professionalism add
breadth of view to the job thd!'
Casey, the World War II "cowboy,"
visibly lacked. But the dispassiont,
ate Gates lacks the White House
clout and, perhaps, the internak
loyalty that made Casey a powerfuk
and often popular CIA director.
"He's quick to form ludgmentS
and not easy to turn around. Some-
times he forms judgments by the
quickness of arrogance rather than
analysis," one critical observer
said. "He is a crackerjack analyst
who's rough on people. His man-
agement style is to deal with
substance and he doesn't give
enough time to trying to win the
allegiance of those who have to
carry out his instructions "
Several former associates said,
that Gates may be hindered in thk
job by his relative youth. He i4i fully
three decades younger than Rea-
gan, and years the junior of other
intelligence heavyweights such as
National Security Adviser Frank C.
Carlucci The odds that he will be
replaced by the next President.. in
about two years. also limit his
power to change the intelligence
community's course, they said..
Cc,v %A., )f.y
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 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500230008-3
But he has other assets to draw
on, mciuding close ties to Car!ucc:
and .o National Secur;t?: A;cncy
D:rector