WILSON'S CASE COULD DEFINE THE POWER OF SPIES ON TRAIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150030-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: August 29, 1982
• Content Type: NSPR

- -STAT_._..
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ARTICLE APFEAP.ED
ON PAGE
NEW YORK TIMES
29 AUGUST 1982
Wilson's Case
Could Define
The Power of
Spies on Trial
By PHILIP TAUBMAN
WASHINGTON-If the case of Edwin P. Wilson, the
former American intelligence agent accused of illegally
aiding Libyan terrorists, goes to trial later this year, the
issue of classified information is certain to play a pivotal
role in the proceedings. In pretrial hearings and motions,
Mr. Wilson's attorney, Herald Price Fabringer of New
York, has threatened to Introduce as evidence national se-
curity secrets which he says will "shake the C.I.A. to its
foundations." The Justice Department is expected to
present its initial response early In September in papers
due to be filed in Federal court here.
Not long ago, such threats would have posed serious,
even insurmountable, problems for prosecutors handling
a criminal case involving sensitive national security in-
formation. The prospect that classified information would
be revealed in the course of a public trial often outweighed
law enforcement interests, hampering and in some cases
actually blocking prosecution.
The defense tactic, called graymail because of its
similarity to blackmail, was the bane of the Justice De-
partment. Former Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, in
"Taking Care of the Law," a recently published book
about his service in the Carter Administration, describes
the problem of graymail as "appalling."
Theoretically, that should no longer be the case. In.
1980, Congress enacted the Classified Information Proces.
dures Act. The legislation established special guidelines
for dealing with sensitive information in criminal cases,
including closed pretrial hearings to determine.whether
such evidence would be relevant and admissible. In addi-
tion, if a judge rules that the material should be admitted,
the law gives the Government the right to appeal before
deciding whether to modify or drop prosecution.
The Wilson case promises to be the first major test of
the new law. Before leaving Government employment in
1976, Mr. Wilson had worked as an American intelligence
agent for 22 years. Mr. Wilson specialized in creating and
operating fictitious companies used by intelligence agen-
t 1 der none and disguise covert operations. He
nun
In 1976, according to the Justice Department, Mr.
Wilson and a another former C.I.A. employee, Francis E.
Terpil, reached an agreement with Col. Muammar el-
Qaddafi, the leader of Libya, to sell their expertise in in-
telligence and military matters to help train terrorists.
The two former agents were first indicted by a Federal
grand jury in 1980 on charges of illegally shipping explo-
sives to Libya and conspiracy to commit murder. Mr. Wil-
son was apprehended two months ago. Mr. Terpil remains
a fugitive, reportedly living in Beirut.
Mr. Wilson's lawyers say they will contend that the
C.I.A. sanctioned and supported Mr. Wilson's operations
in Libya. The intelligence agency has repeatedly denied
any official involvement in the scheme, but Wilson associ-
ates have claimed that several senior agency officials
were aware of the Libyan venture when it began and
asked participants to collect information about Libya and
its sponsor, the Soviet Union.
Mr. Fahringer has said his claient has evidence of just
such complicity. If so, it is likely to Include classified
documents and information about the operations of the
C.I.A. Even if Mr. Wilson lacks such hard evidence about
an agency role in Libya, he may possess -other sensitive
information acquired during his career. Even a partial
reconstruction of his Government service, for example,
would likely involve sensitive subjects such as the meth-
ods used to operate intelligence-gathering networks.
The identities of current and former covert agents
could also be relevant to his case. Few issues concern the
C.I.A. more, and President Reagan recently signed legis-
lation that makes the naming of agents a crime.
It was such concerns that scuttled criminal cases be-
fore enactment of the graymail law. Mr. Bell, in his book,
cites one: "We had to drop the prosecution of two interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph Corporation executives
for testifying falsely about helping the C.I.A. in Chile be-
cause a judge balked at accepting a proposed Govern-
ment protective order on national security material."
Perhaps the best known case involved Richard
Helms, the former Director of Central. Intelligence who.
faced potential charges of perjury for misleading a Sen-
ate committee about his agency's covert involvement in
Chile In the early 1970's, when the C.I.A. tried to block the
election of Salvador Allende. Though Mr. Bell denies in
his book that graymail was a factor, the Carter Adminis-
tration agreed to let Mr. Helats plead no contest to misde
meanor charges.
Earlier this year, the Justice Department delayed
prosecution of a former Mexican Government official sus-
pected of involvement in a car theft ring in California be-
cause the C.I.A. said the man had been an important intel-
ligence source. Though the suspect was eventually indict-
ed, the United States Attorney in San Diego, William H.
Kennedy, was dismissed by President Reagan when he
complained in public about the delay. I -
The Wilson case, C.I.A. officials say confidently,
should not produce such problems.-An internal investiga-
tion of his activities has convinced them be has no star
tling secret information that would compromise or em-
barrass the agency. Federal prosecutors and investiga-
tors still examining his ties to former senior agency offi-
y
cres o
was involved in the U-2 spy plane project and the Bay of-- cials say they are not so sure.
Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. F
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ARTICLE APP
011 PAGE_ E
NEW YORK TIMES
8 AUGUST 1982
STUDY Oj;I n~O((~p1(ylj~ry conclusions fiat aiythe
OF !1 HES 1 A\1 G.I.A. analysis was that while many an-
TESTS
tiwar leaders bad close Communist as-
tCo"they do not appear to be STAT
under under Communist direction. "
"In any case," the analysis said,,
"their purposes insofar as the war in
Vietnam is concerned coincide with the
Communists'."
Johnson Got C.I.A. Findings on Noting contacts between antiwar
leaders and the North Vietnamese Gov_
Antiwar Movement-in 1967 ernment in Hanoi, the report,,said that
"Moscow exploits and may. ;eed in-
fluence" peace groups through its front
TOLEDO, Ohio, Aug.:7 (AP) -The organizations but that indications "of
Central Intelligence Agency told Pres-' covert
these U.S. overt connections between
dent
dent Johnson in 1967 that there was no .S. activists and foreign govern-
menizareumitea.
or foreign-in.: The analysts concluded, tspired link to the protests against the i "On the
Vietnam War but he refused to believe
It, a historian says.
A 23-page unsigned C.I.A. report, re-
cently declassified from "toptisecret -
sensitive" status, was -obtained from
the Johnson Presidential library in Aus-
tin, Tex., by Charles DeBenedetti of the
University of Toledo.
The November 1 by Richard Helms, then
Director of Central Intelligence,
stemmed in part from a march on the
Pentagon a month earlier, the historian
said.
About 100,000 protesters took part in
the demonstration to oppose United
States involvement in Vietnam.
Mr. DeBenedetti, who specializes in
the histor! of the antiwar movement,
said the report was mentioned by Con-
gressional committees investigating in-
telligence-gathering practices but yam
never made public before he obtained it,
last September.
He said in a paper that the Intelli
-
gence agency's information to Johnson
was colored by "the agency's bureau-
cratic interest in aiding the Administra-
tion in its aim of discrediting the anti-'
war opposition."
significant evidence that would prove
Communist control or direction of the
U.S. peace movement or its leaders."
The importance of the analysis, Mr.
DeBenedetti said, is that Johnson ''ig-
nored it because it did not suit his politi-
cal purpose, which was to establish for-
eign control of the antiwar movement."
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AR !' I CLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
-
'r'i.1' I'?
7-14 9r`2
EXCHANGE.
CBS Vietnam and the btu
New York City
In her article ["The Vietnam Numbers
Game," The Nation, June 26] attacking the
TV Guide story "Anatomy of a Smear" 1
wrote with Sally Bedell, Frances FitzGerald
dismisses as "trivial" the journalistic lapses
we uncovered in CBS's "The Uncounted Ene-
my: A Vietnam Deception." Ironically, while
trying to defend the show, FitzGerald herself
succumbs to one of its many distortions.
In her examination of "the story contained
in the broadcast," FitzGerald says that Gen.
William Westmoreland's chief of intelligence
Gen. Joseph McChristian, was succeeded
in mid-1967 by Lieut. Col. Daniel Graham
(whom the docur entary accused of engi-
neering a cover-up io assist the alleged West-
moreland-led "conspiracy"). McChristian's
successor was not Graham but Gen. Phillip
Davidson. During th period covered by the
program, Davidson was the highest-ranking
military intelligence officer in Vietnam, and
therefore a key witness who might have be-en
able to challenge CBS's assertions. However,
the CBS show did not even includeAn inter-
view with Davidson. His name was uttered
only once (by Westmoreland) in the entire
ninety-minute documentary.
By excluding Davidson and his second-in-
command, Col, Charles Morris (whom CBS
producer George Crile inexplicably inter-
viewed only after the show had been com=
pleted, a few weeks before the program
aired), the documentary misled even Viet-
nam War expert FitzGerald.about Graham's
role within the M .ACV intelligence structure.
The truth is, not a single intelligence officer ?
interviewed on camera in the CBS show was
in Daniel Graham's chain of commas L -
"Trivial" indeed! ? Don Aower
Staff Writer, TV Guide
Washington, D. C.
... In the June 26 Nation there appeared
an article by Frances FitzGerald defending
CBS's documentary "The Uncounted
Enemy: A Vietnam Deception" and blast-
ing Gen. William Westmoreland and TV
Guide's early June article "Anatomy of a
Smear." Given the timing of her piece, Fitz-
Gerald must have responded very quickly to
TV Guide. Given its substance, she must not
have been objective enough even to read the
TV Guide article.
FitzGerald's article is so ful! o
it. Let us begin with one point sh
any cub reporter could have detei
untrue. She identifies me as "head of military
intelligence in Vietnam in 1967" and states
that I was successor to Gen. Joseph McChris-
tian in Vietnam as chief of intelligence.
Baloney: I was a lieutenant colonel, and
lieutenant colonels do not replace generals.
McChristian's successor was the able and
blunt Gen. Phillip Davidson, who was never
even interviewed by CBS in its so-called
documentary, although no such "con-
spiracy" as it inveighed against could have
occurred without Davidson playing the key
role. He is not mentioned in FitzGerald's
sadly defective piece-a fact which suggests
that, she didn't even read' TV Guide's case
against CBS, Mike Wallace, George Crile
and company. Had she done so, she would
have known that it was Davidson, not 1, who
succeeded McChristian. TV Guide devoted.
several paragraphs to this matter.
There are other. gross r rrors. FitzGerald
states that the main forces of the 'Vietcong
(VC) were "guerrillas." "Nonsense. They
were regular units. If FitzGerald finds Com-
munist generals more reliable than American
generals, she will find that North Vietnamese
generals make the same. point in their
memoirs.
She states that the Central Intelligence
Agency had "tits own totals" of VC strength.
Nonsense. There is ample documentary evi-
dence that the C.I.A. agreed with military in-
telligence on strength figures throughout the
war. True, one. analyst at the C.LA.--the
one CBS paid to put -its documentary
together and who was rehearsed carefully for.
his part in the show-had different figures.
This man, Sam Adams, though 12,000 miles
away from Vietnam at the time, concluded
that there were 600,000 enemy soldiers, not
the 285,000 estimated by everyone else-
-including the C.I.A. This fact was brought
out by George Carver, who was in charge of
C.I.A. estimates on Vietnam and who is
another man never interviewed for the CBS
documentary.
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