KISSINGER BELIEVES SOVIETS BEHIND ATTEMPT ON POPE' LIFE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150027-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: December 31, 1982
• Content Type: PREL

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ASSOCIATED PRESS
31 December 1982
WASHINGTON
KISSINGER BELIEVES SOVIETS BEHIND ATTEMPT ON POPE' LIFE
Accounts that have emerged so far on the assassination attempt on the pope
lead "almost to no other conclusion" than that the Soviet secret service was
behind it, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said Friday.
"Here is a Turkish terrorist, who suddenly shows up in Bulgaria, which is not
the normal thing for a Turk to do, lives in the best hotel in Bulgaria, emerges
with $50,000 and a weapon, travels all over Europe. It cannot happen without the
Bulgarian secret police," Kissinger said in a Cable News Network interview.
The interview was taped Wednesday for broadcast Friday and Sunday.
"It's nonsense to say, as I read somewhere, that maybe something got away
from the higher levels. That does not happen in Bulgaria. Then it had to be the
Soviets. The Bulgarians have no interest in coming after the pope."
Kissinger continued, "... they must have concluded that they had to crush
Solidarity. At that time in 1981, they must have thought that the possibility
existed that the Red Army would have to go in.
"In that case if there were a Polish Pope who did what he was alleged to have
threatened, go to Poland and oppose them, that would be a formidable
psychological problem."
Kissinger said he had been told by Richard Helms, former head of the CIA,
that "it had all the earmarks to them,of a KGB operation."
"If you try to square the Known facts, it really leads almost to no other
conclusion."
Yrui Andropov, the new Soviet leader, was head of the KGB at the time.
Asked what the implications of that were, Kissinger said: "I take it we will
never know more than we know. We don't negotiate with the Soviets because we
like them. ... The Soviets will ruthlessly pursue their own interests. Our
problem is whether in a nuclear world the Soviets pursuing their own interest
and we pursuing our interest can ease the potential conflicts and reduce the
danger of confrontation."
On the two sets of negotiations now under way with the Soviets, the strategic
and the intermediate-range nuclear missile talks in Geneva, Switzerland,
Kissinger said, "the difference between the two sides is not so irreconcilable."
Kissinger was the primary negotiator of the SALT I treaty and the unratified
SALT II treaty limiting strategic nucler weapons.
Noting pressure for A nuclear freeze from some sectors of U.S. public
opinion, he said, "I do not think it is useful and I do not think it is
communist manipulated."
STAT
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 )Red For Release 20061 ?&IAS91-00901 R
27 DECKER 1982
WASHINGTON - On Nov. 9, the
day before l.eaaid Brezhnev died, Ital.
ian Interior Minister Virginio Rognoni
received a visit from the C.I.A.'s vice
chief of station in Rome and a staffer
from the U.S. ' Senate Intelligence
Committee. The Americans wanted to
know about the Bulgarian connection
to the shooting of the Pope.
Mr. Rognoak explained that All
Agca, the Turkish gunman, had been
informed a few months before that
Italy could not afford the cost of keep-
ing him in solitary confinement much.` .
longer. To Mr. Agca, that meant he
would be transferred to an ordinary
prison and would promptly be mur-
dered. That induced him to talk about
the Bulgarian Government officials
who hired him to kill the Pope.
"what proof do you have?" asked
the C.I.A. man.
The man in charge of Italy's inter-
nal security laid out the facts: that the.,
gunman was a cold-blooded killer for
hire, and not a fanatic or ideologue;
that be was able to pass into Bulgaria
easily on an Indian passpart-and take
up residence in a first-class hotel,
which requires secret service knowl-
edge; that he entered penniless and
came out with $50,000 trom what is
hardly a land of opportunity; that be
was able to describe accurately the
living quarters of the Bulgarian of5-
caals who pvere his controls and con-
tacts; and that a flurry of electronic
commumicatioa came out of the Bul-
garian Embassy lust before the. at-
tack on the Pope, similar to the ac-
tivity that took place before an Ameri-
c an general was abducted.
The C.I.A. man waved that all
aside. "You have no proof," be said,
and did .his best to convey to the Ital-
ian Government a high degree of skep-
ticism from the American Govern-
ment.
"what proof do you want?" asked
Mr. Rognoai. The circumstantial evi-
dence already presented, along with
some more that the gunman -was ea- .
petted to reveal. was the best that
ESSAY
`You Have
No
Proof
By William Sa ire
could be garnered on a covert-
opera-tion. Nobody would came forward
with a fingerprint of Yuri Andropov on
the gun, but it was certain that no such
mission could be undertaken without
the permission of the, K.G.B., then
headed by Mr. Andr opov.
According to one report of the meet.
ing, the C.I.A. representative c ontin-
ued to anew with distaste the condu-
sions being reached by the Italian in-
vestigators. Meanwhile, in other capi-
tals - and in Washington - middle-
level C.I.A. men with journalistic con-
tacts have been pooh-poohing the
story. In Rome, U.S. foreign service
officers have been telling Italian dip-
lomats that the investigation is an in-
temational embarrassment
Thus, the Italian Government farad
itself pursuing a case that caused it to
strain relations with a Communist
neighbor and profoundly offend the
new Soviet leadeer without the moral
support of the government of the
United States. The lackadaisical atti-
tude of most of the US. press on this
subject throughout the early winter -
especially after the man who had to
have at least guilty knowledge of the
plot was elevated to the top post in the
Kremlin - was seen by Italians as
further evidence that the U.S. wanted
the investigation shut down.
Why do we require tongs to touch
this story? why are we setting our-STAT
selves standards of proof that the
Soviet bloc will make impossible to
meet? .
One reason is humanly institution-
al: most spooks, after the C_I.A.'s flat
rock: was flipped over in the post-
Watergate era, don't want anybody to
think that assassination is part of any
nation's "dirty tricks," and so they
come to the defense of the K.G.B. in
grand le Cam fashion, hinting that
the evidence is part of an anti-Andro-
pov plot. (An exception is former Di.
rector of Central Intelligence Richard
Helms, who was pointing a finger at
this "classic intelligence operation"
from the start)
Another reason has to do with the
workings of the American press:
where does a story of such magnitude
come off being broken in the Readers'
Digest, and developed in detail by
NBC, a mere television Detwork?
Such a story needs establishes le-
gitimacy; only a major newspaper
can properly provide that.
Then there is the bogglemeat fat.
tar: the story. of the spymaster who
gave the order to kill the Pope and
thereby saved Poland from Solidarity
and rose to the top in the Kremlin -
that's a large lump of information to
digest. Evil so audacious is mbehev-
able.
The central reason for the shameful
reluctance to urge the lt:alians on is
political: we have to deal with this
an Andropov, say our doves, and If
the chain of circumstance is drawn
too tight we might not be able to trust
the Soviets an arms control.
That fear of not being able to bring
back detente motivates mast of those
who wish this awful trail of circum-
stance would vanish. We know
enough; they do not want to know any
more.
That is wiry, after facts are pre-
seated which compel common sense
to lay the crime at the Kremlin door,
we will bear the faceless. officials
complain, "you have no proof."
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 1IC:: 1- ._:;k ed For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-0090
0.ll P`.C --' THE CHEISTIAR SCIENCE MONITOR
22 DECD ..,ER 1082
Readers write
Response from Mr. Helms
Since the Monitor has a reputation with me
for accuracy in reporting, I would like to
bring to your attention the item that appears
on page two of the Nov. 24 edition in which you
report that I "lied about the (Chilean) plot in
Senate hearings."
The fact is that I was -never charged with
lying. I pleaded nolo contendere to not having
testified "fully and completely" before a Sen-
ate committee in 1973. My testimony took
place at a time when ongoing secret oper-
ations would have been exposed by a "full and
complete" statement on my part.
Richard Helms
[Ed. note: The statement that Mr. Helms
lied about a plot to assassinate President
Allende ,of Chile was cited in a brief wire ser-
vice report and attributed to an Atlantic
Monthly article drawn from Seymour Hersh's
book. "The Price of Power: Kissinger in Nix?
on's White House." In fairness it should have
been stated that the a ticle does not explicitly
use the word "lie," but leaves such an im-
plication.]
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000
Ota^Fx
WASHINGTON POST
13 DECEMBER 1982
Sir,rou
It ded Chaptc' o
d
BEM M
ar
} urrey er
Washington Post Staff Writer
A heavily shrouded chapter of
Cold War history has been reopened
with new insights and controversy
arising from recently declassified
testimony of CIA chief Allen W.
Dulles on spy plane operations
against the Soviet Union in the
1950s and early 1960s.
Members of the U.S. intelligence
community from the Dulles era were
dismayed a week ago by news ac-
counts about an allegedly undis-
olosed "CIA spy plane" shot down
over the Soviet Union before the
sensational U2 overflight of Francis
Gary Powers May 1, 1960.
? Dulles' testimony was given be-
hind closed. doors to the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee May 31,
1960, during the international up-
zoar about the U2 high-altitude re-
Connaissance jet plane and the col-
aapse of the Paris summit conference
in. mid-May that year when Soviet
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev
vented his outrage over the flight by
the captured American pilot.
News reports last week based on
Dulles' testimony said he disclosed
that the United States lost "eight or
nine" Central Intelligence Agency
operatives on an earlier "spy plane"
farted down in the Soviet Union.
'.State Department officials, after
eainsulting with the CIA, told ques-
tioners that the reports were incor-
rect and that Dulles evidently was
referring., to the widely publicized
loss of a U.S. Air Force plane and
crew over the Turkish Soviet border
iri 1958
`.Many colleagues of Dulles simi
lakly said he only was citing a known
incident in 1958-a second one in
which a plane was forced down
across that frontier.
There were two problems with the
However, from information now
available, it appears that in the tense.
U2 inquiry, Dulles , deliberately
scrambled his testimony to shield
the identity of the then-supersecret
National Security Agency, or unwit-
tingly mixed up the two incidents.
Possibly he did both.
As one associate recalled, a Dulles
technique in maintaining an aura of
certainty in his testimony was to
"give quick answers to deflect ques-
admi
anyth
missi(
virtue
inadv
inc.cid(
Be
etrati
flying
U.S.
BLII\
tions and never appear hesitant or in sions, known as "ferrets", operated
doubt." around the vast periphery of the So-
One encounter involved an Air viet Union to pick up emissions of
Force C118 on a CIA courier mission radar, ground communications and
with nine men aboard-three for- microwave signals.
mally assigned to the CIA-and Sometimes-accidentally or de-
forced down about 100 miles inside liberately-they penetrated Soviet
Soviet Armenia in June, 1958. Five territory during what were called
of the nine Air Force officers aboard risky "fox and hounds" forays to se:
descended by parachute, and four off Soviet air defense radar and in
landed with the aircraft. All were these instances American aircraft
released after 10 days of questioning. often were fired upon.
In September, 1958, a second, Allen Dulles, in his 1960 testimo-
deadlier incident occurred in the ny, evidently overlapped both inci-
same. region. An Air Force C130 with dents. He said, "You may recall
17 military personnel aboard, on as- there have been several instances of
signment to the National Security planes that have strayed over Soviet
Agency, and packed with electronic territory which have been shot down.
eavesdropping gear for gathering in- You recall the two incidents in Ar-
telligence, was shot down and menia and the Caucasus a few years
crashed in Armenia. ago, and there have been instances
Six bodies were returned by the off the tip of Japan and some near
Soviet Union, but 11 were never re-
Alaska."
covered. In 1962, after stormy dis- He went on to say, "In one case
pute at the highest levels of the U.S. we are still endeavoring to get `back,
and Soviet governments, the 11 you know-they haven't told us
missing were officially "presumed , what happened to, I think, eight or
dead," although efforts to recover nine of the crew of one of the planes
the bodies were still being made in that ramp down in the area of Cau-
casus."
That episode is recounted in a "This was a. civilian plane," Dulles"
revealing.. book on "they NSA;--"The said. "It was manned by employ of
Puzzle Palace" by James Bamford. it the Central Intelligence Agency, not
--reprints- an'-extraordinary-transcript by military personnel. They were in
of monitored conversations by Soviet civilian clothes. It was an entirely
fighter pilots during the attack on' civilian intelligence operation, and I
the C130. The transcript made pub- was prepared to take the responsi-
lie in 1959 by Secretary of State bi]ity and document that responsi-
Bxplanations, however. The two John Foster Dulles, Allen's brother, bilit ." -
groups were talking alAptpdtf ehFor Rdreme' O b'k1?12t: G1 eRE)R91-00901 R000900150027-1
episodes, and neither fully meshed Kremlin to account for the missing
crew members. c~.c ,~
With Dulles' testimony. No one will-
 STAT
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FeiCr,' l
ON
ATLANTIC MONTHLY MAGAZINE
December 1982
THE PRICE OF - Po
Kissinger, Nixon, and Chi
BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH
YEOMAN CHARLES E. RADFORD DID NOT WANT TO BE
reassigned to Washington, but it was the fall of
1970 and he was in the Navy and his country was
at war. Radford, twenty-seven years old, had been hand-
picked by Rear Admiral Rembrandt C. Robinson to serve
as his confidential aide and secretary on the National Secu-
rity Council staff in the White House. The bright and am-
bitious Radford was an obvious choice for the sensitive job:
he was married and had young children; he was a devout
Mormon who did not drink and would never consider using
drugs; and he was fierce in his determination to earn a
commission and become a Navy officer. Radford reported
for duty on September 18, replacing a civilian secretary
who was being transferred. There was obvious tension in
the office, and Admiral Robinson, in one of their first
meetings, demonstrated why, Radford recalls: "He made it
clear that my loyalty was to him, and that he expected my
loyalty, and that I wasn't to speak outside of the office
about what I Oid in the office."
Admiral Robinson was the liaison officer between the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council,
and his office was a sensitive one: the White House's most
highly classified documents, including intelligence materi-
als, routinely flowed through it. By mid-1970, Henry A.
Kissinger, President Richard Nixon's national security a-
viser, had developed complete confidence in Robinso 's
discretion and loyalty.
It was not surprising, therefore, that Robinson was
deeply involved in the secret Kissinger and Nixon oper-
ations against Salvador Allende Gossens, of Chile, who
had astounded the Central Intelligence Agency and the
White House by winning the September 4 popular election
for the Chilean presidency, although Allende received only
36.6 percent of the vote in a three-way race. Radford, who
arrived at his new post a few weeks after the Chilean elec-
tion, vividly recalls the sense of crisis: "This wz .n't sup-
posed to happen. It was a real blow. All of a sudden, the
pudding blew up on the stove." Admiral Robinson and his
superiors were "wringing their hands" over Chile, Radford
says, "almost as if they [the Chileans] were errant chil-
dren." Over the next few weeks, Radford says, he saw
This is the secandA(*vp lfr }ea 2OO6/U*/4 T}GaIA-R .9 @GO t 5OOd$QUZptions papers, as the bu-
Price of Power: Kissinger in Nixon's White House, which will be pub- reaucracy sought to prevent Allende from assuming office.
lished next spring by Summit Books. . Among the options was a proposal to assassinate Allende.