CUBA AND CONSEQUENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150016-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: November 28, 1983
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2006/Q'tA45W:Ec144-RDP91-00901 R000501 50016-3
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
28 November 1983
Cuba and Consequences
Richard Helms, 70, was the CIA's deputy directorfor operations
under Kennedy and its director under Lyndon Johnson and Rich-
ard Nixon. He is now a consultant in Washington.
I do recall. I was sitting at
lunch at the agency with John
McCone, who was then direc-
tor, and two or three other sen-
ior officers of CIA, when sud-
denly Mr. McCone's aide came
through the door and said that
the president had been. shot.
And I realized very quickly
that my responsibility was to
get the lines out as rapidly as
possible to see if there was any-
thing else going on anyplace
else in the world. Could this be
part of a conspiracy? A con-
certed attack on the United
States or its leadership? It be-
came manifest within 24 or 48
hours that this was not the case,
but in the early hours, one had
no way of knowing.
The assassination catapult-
ed him immediately into a kind
of pantheon because of the way
be died. I found both John
Kennedy and Bob Kennedy
men.of integrity, strongly pa-
triotic, tough-minded in the
programs in Congress were in
terrible trouble. He was one of
those who inevitably got us
deeper into the war in Vietnam;
those who attempt to say that
President Kennedy would nev-
er have gotten us into Vietnam
the way President Johnson did
have a very hard time, I think,
supporting their claim. Pure
presumption on their part.
Pure assumption.
There are those who for
some reason write that Presi-
dent Kennedy really didn't
mind very much about the Cu-
ban thing. Hell, he minded a
great deal. He was wild with
Castro, and the whole govern-
ment was pushed hard to see if
there wasn't some way to un-
seat him. The fact that the
agency was not able to get the
results was something that did
not please him, and it didn't'
please his brother, either."
I'm also not quite sure why
these advisers to President
area of foreign policy, prepared Kennedy are preening them-
to stand up.to their responsibil- selves over the remarkable job
ities. But a lot of the sheen
that's implied in the word
"Camelot" has come off the
administration since. By the
time he was assassinated, his
they did handling the missile
crisis. I lived through that peri-
od here, and it was tense, God
knows. But there had to be
in the minds of that so-called
HELMS: 'NOT A GOLDEN MOMENT FOR FOREIGN POLICY'
ExCom, or Executive Commit-
tee, the knowledge that the
United States' nuclear weap-
ons far exceeded the strength of
the Soviet Union, and that
there was very little the Soviet
Union could do to force itself
through the quarantine.
Jack McCloy, who was then
advising President Kennedy on
disarmament, tells about sit-
ting on a fence at his house up
in Connecticut with Kuzne-
tsov, the deputy foreign minis-
ter, arranging the withdrawal
of the IL-28 bombers that were
still there after the missiles had
been removed. And Kuznetsov
turns to him and says, "All
right, Mr. McCloy, we will get
the IL-28s out as we have taken
the missiles out. But I want
to tell you something, Mr.
McCloy. The Soviet Union is
not going to find itself in a posi-
tion like this ever again."
And it was at that point, as
you look back, that the Rus-
sians started their big surge in
strategic weapons. Various
members of the Kennedy ad-
ministration who stayed over
into the Johnson administra-
tion never believed that the So-
viets would go for a force that
was larger than the U.S. had.
And yet that's exactly what
they've done. I'm not laying
this at anybody's door. The
events of life led there. But
these fellows are patting them-
selves on the back for their
statesmanlike handling of this
situation, and I think if you
look at it with a cold eye, you
can say that this probably
wasn't a golden moment 'for
American foreign policy.
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Lark for Art's Sake
By Sarah Booth Conroy
The urge to rub eyes and look
cautiously over your shoulder was
universal last night at a Phillips Col-
lection benefit. Guests came into
Gartinckel's on F Street-and felt as
though they had fallen down "Alice
in Wonderland's" rabbit hole.
Not all the thoughts were happy.
Richard Helms. 'the former __CIA
head, talked a bit about the bombing
of the Capitol. "You know our Con-
gress has not been concerned about
terrorism -on the theory that ter-
rorism is what happens elsewhere.
But this bombing roulcl be more
than an isolated act. A man named
Brian Jenkins defined it best. He
said, `Terrorism is violence aimed at
the people watching.' The bomb in
the Capitol fits that description."
J x ?1ED
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4 November 1983
Top Suspect in Beirut Blast
But Finding a Culprit
Leaves Open Question:
Should U.S. Retaliate?
By DAVID IGNATIUS
And GmAI.D F. SEIB
Staff fteponers of TIE WAU. STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON - Pictures of Hussein
Moussavi show a small, neatly dressed
man with a dark beard that seems to over-
whelm his face. He is a school teacher by
profession and a man with a family prob-
lem. Friends say that be was driven ? from.
his village in eastern Lebanon nearly a
decade ago after he killed one of his cous-
ins in a quarrel.
Mr. Moussavi is emerging as the.prime
`-suspect in an unusual intelligence dragnet.
U.S. officials say
they are nearing a
firm judgment that
he and his extremist
Shiite Moslem sup-
porters planned the
bomb attacks
against U.S. and
French soldiers in
Beirut last month-
probably with help
from Iran and
Syria.
A Reagan admin-
istration official
summarizes- the
vesti tion of the ::'?`' :;:.?. ,.>
T
The Baalbek option has problems. A
commando attack would require moving
into territory controlled by Syrian troops.
An air strike would risk hurting bystanders
in a crowded urban area, one U.S. official
notes. Moreover, an air strike could be
dangerous for the U.S., since attacking
planes would probably be vulnerable to
Syria's extensive air-defense system,
which is partly manned by Soviet troops.
Finally, it isn't even certain that those re-
sponsible for last month's terrorist attacks
have remained In the Baalbek area.
The Reagan administration also is con-
sidering diplomatic reprisals. For exam-
ple, the U.S. may urge Lebanon to .close
the Iranian Embassy. in Beirut, which
American officials believe was a meeting
place for the terrorists. The U.S. might
consider sanctions against Syria as well.
But even these relatively mild diplomatic
measures are blocked now by the Leba-
nese "national reconciliation" discussions
in Geneva, Switzerland. The U.S. doesn't
want to disrupt those talks, which offer the
best 'hope for stabilizing Lebanon and get-
ting American troops out.
An alternative to retaliation is negotia-
tion of a security agreement with Syria
that would protect American troops in Leb-
anon. The U.S. adopted this approach with
the Palestine Liberation Organization in
the 1970s, and it helped stop attacks
against Americans in Beirut. The U.S. and
Syria talked last week in Damascus about
security problems, but there isn't any sign
that Syria is ready to offer any solid coop-
eration.
Hussein Moussavi Syria's role in the Lebanon crisis is cru-
bombings this way:
"There are intelligence estimates that
identify Moussavi and his group as being
associated with the attacks, with Iranian
support and Syrian acquiescgnce."
If the U.S. reaches a firm conclusion
that Mr. Moussavi and his supporters are
the culprits, it will face an agonizing deci-
sion about whether to retaliate. President
Reagan warned in a televised speech last
week: "Those who directed this atrocity
must be dealt justice, and they will be."
The Reagan administration this week
remains committed to retaliation. _ Btyt
some policy makers question such tactics,
suggesting that they could open the U.S.
Marines to further terrorist acts and also
complicate . a solution to the Lebanon
crisis.
The simplest retaliatory operation
would be an attack against the headquar-
ters of Mr. Moussavi's "Islamic Amal"
faction in Baalbek, in the Syrian-controlled
Bekaa Valley. Some U.S. officials favor a
commando raid against the headquarters,
while others argue for an air. strike. Offi-
age--or forestall-terrorist raids. U.S. and
Lebanese officials argue, for example, that
it would have been difficult for Mr. Mous-
savi's Shiite group to gather and transport
the explosives that killed at least 234
American and 56 French troops without the
connivance of the Syrian armed forces and
intelligence network in Lebanon.
"It's naive to imagine that anything
happens (in Syrian-controlled parts of Leb-
anon) without the Syrians," explains a
Lebanese source. Adds .Richard Helms a
one-time ambassador to Iran and Central
Intelligence Agency director. "You don't
get trucks and 2,000 pounds of dynamite
from the local drugstore." .
Syria, Iran and Mr..Moussavi have all
denied responsibility for the bombings. But
all three have gloated about the carnage.
Gathering Clues
In its investigation, the U.S. is drawing
on a range of sources. The U.S. has covert
contacts in some Lebanese factions; these
are supplemented by the much broader
France, Britain, Israel, Jordan and Saudi
Arabia. In addition to these human
sources, the U.S. has various forms of
technical surveillance. The array of infor-
mation is being analyzed now in a final
"all sources" intelligence effort.
The case against Mr. Moussavi and his
pro-Iranian supporters isn't yet conclusive,
partly, because of the difficulty in gather-
ing reliable information in Lebanon. U.S.
officials cite three sorts of evidence:
-Analysis of the method of operation.
The fact that the attacks were suicide mis-
sions suggests that the drivers of the
bomb-laden trucks were extremist Shiite
Moslems, who believe that by dying in a
holy cause they will gain a place in
heaven. The fact that French troops were
hit-at a time when Iran is furious at
France for selling sophisticated jets to
.Iraq-suggests that the attackers were
pro-Iranian. Thus, suspicion immediately
falls on Mr. Moussavi, the most extreme
pro-Iranian Shiite leader in Lebanon.
-Surveillance. At about 6:32 on the
morning of the attacks, roughly 10 minutes
after the bombs exploded, a group of men
was seen leaving the Iranian embassy in
Beirut and driving off at high speed. Their
flight indicates that the Iranian embassy
may have known about- or helped coordi-
nate the bombings. U.S. officials also sus-
pect that the Iranian embassy may have
been a contact point for Mr. Moussavi's
followers in Beirut.
-Agents' reports. In recent weeks_L_S.
intelligence had picked up rumors that
there would be a "spectacular attack" by
pro-Iranian Shiites against "the godless
Americans and French." Last week, as the
U.S. and its friends pumped for informa-
tion, intelligence contacts in Lebanon re-
peatedly named Mr. Moussavi as the man
behind the attacks. "People who are
sources of various intelligence services are
saying that Moussavi did it," says one offi-
cial.
cials suggest that the U.S. could hit the liv- network of the Lebanese Deuxieme Bu-
ing quarters of Mr. Moussavi's group, in reau, the intelli .nce unit of the Lebanese
addition to their commandAp bved For Ri A fik acmi lamst ~-00901 R000500150016-3
reports from riendly countries, such as