ABC NIGHTLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 20, 1984
• Content Type: TRANS

ABC NIGHTLINE
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KOPPEL: Good evening. I'm Ted Koppel, and this is Nib st~e5 nimseii
as the ultimate Arab leader. He has supported international terrorism. He's
underwritten political assassination. And he's engaged in a frantic effort to
buy his own nuclear bomb. Libya's Moammar Khadafy, how much longer will the
rest of the world put up with him?
DUNSMORE: However complex Khadafy's personality, analysts are unanimous that
he
is driven by a single-minded ambition. He wants the mantle of former Egyptian
President Nasser. He wants to reunite and lead the Arab world. It has been
his
greatest frustration that he comes from a tiny country of some
and therefore has no legitimate 3 million people
power base. ROBERT KUPPERMAN (Center for
Strategic and International Studies): He's.a one-man source of tyranny, with a
comparatively small following that is willing to violate all of the
international norms of decency and who somehow has maintained a high degree of
personal charisma and zealousness upon the part of his followers.
DUNSMORE: Most of his escapades, however egregious, can be seen as attempts to
make himself important. He has dispatched hit squads to assassinate President
Reagan and former Secretary of State Haig. He has mined the Suez Canal. He
has
made war on the Sudan. And he has eliminated untold numbers of his opponents
within and outside of Libya. The latest incident in Egypt would be, for him,
only a minor setback. If you take a map of the world-and then paint red e
country where Khadafy has supported terrorist groups, tried to overthrow there
government, sent in hit squads to assassinate political leaders or tried to
form
a political union, the map will be redder than during the heyday of the British
empire. There are rather more important reasons for the British to dislike.
Khadafy. In April, a man inside the Libyan People's Bureau here in London
fired
on a crowd-of demonstrators, killing a policewoman. After the shooting and
siege here at the People's Bureau, many Britons were asking the old questions,
'Why do we put up with Khadafy? Why not cut off all ties and isolate him?' And
back came the same old answer, 'Well, Khadafy may be bad politics, but he.is
good business.' There's no question that Khadafy's oil money has created a
tolerance for his behavior, which would otherwise not-exist. Britain broke
relations but continues to trade with Libya. France stood up to Khadafy in the
civil war in Chad, but President Mitterrand's critics say he was out-maneuvered
by Khadafy into a premature withdrawal from Chad because the French want to
resume arms sales to Libya. Even the United States, despite all the public
hand-wringing, still does business with Libya. One thousand Americans continue
to work there, and U.S. oil companies continue to make millions. Ironically,
parts of the Arab world believe Khadafy survives because he is a creature of
the
CIA. In this view, said to be held by senior Saudi Arabian officials, Khadafy
is useful because he could give the U.S. access to his Soviet weaponry, and he
is a divisive force in the Arab world. Actually, the greatest concern for
Washington is the possibility that Khadafy might get his hands on nuclear
Continued
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 STAT
By M. A. FARBER
STAT
N A. Adams, was contained in an in-
al Central Intelligence Agency
yesterday in the libel case brought
agaitst CBS by General Westmore-
land, who is expected to take the stand
today'
In the memo, Mr. Adams accused
General Westmoreland's command of
"hale-truths, distortions and some-
times outright falsehoods" regarding
the size and nature of enemy forces in
South Vietnam in 1967. It was, basical-
ly, these same charges that were lev-
elec; on the 1982 "CBS Reports" docu-
menea,ry, "The Uncounted Enemy: A
Vietnam Deception."
N.r.,.Adams is also a defendant in
General Westmoreland's $120 million
libel suit, which stems from the broad-
-ca.,t and is being tried in Federal Court
in Manhattan.
; Memo Introduced In Court
rhb memo - dated Jan. 31, 1968, the
thy after the start of the Tet offensive
was written to George A. Carver Jr.,
then chief of Vietnamese affairs for the
C.I.A., and Mr. Adams's immediate su-
perior. It was introduced by David
Boies,the lawyer for CBS, during his
cross-examination of Mr. Carver.
In September 1967, Mr. Carver led a
delegation of intelligence officials to a
conference with military leaders in
Saigon, - where an agreement was
struck on size of the North Vietnamese
and Vietcong forces in South Vietnam
to be included in a report- for President
Johnson. Initially, the C.I.A. argued for
significantly higher estimates of
enemy strength than did General West-
moreland's command.
In the memo of Jan. 31, 1968, Mr.
Adams notified Mr. Carver that he was
leaving his staff to take a job with the
agency's office of economic research,
where he said he could pursue his inter-
est in Vietcong organization and man-
power.
But the "fundamental" reason for
his departure, Mr. Adams said, related
to what he called a compromise on
enemy strength that been forged in Sai-
gon the previous September.
een years before he became a
paid 'consultant to CBS-TV on its 1982
documentary on Vietnam, a C.I.A. ana-
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ON PAGE 15 November 1984
~ '68 Memo by C.I.A. Aide Read
at CBS Libel Trial I'
lyst told his superiors that Gen. Wil.
liamC. Westmoreland's command had
engaged in a "monument of deceit" re-
garding estimates of enemy strength in
Criticized C.I.A." Besides serving as a consultant for
Mr. Adams said the C.I.A., and the documentary, Mr. Adams also ap- .
particularly Mr. Carver's staff, had peared on the 90-minute broadcast.
made a "mistake" in agreeing to lower Like Mr. Adams, CBS contended in the
figures on the estimate of enemy documentary that, by mng the
strength in South Vietnam and had size of the enemy in Mn, 1967General
thereby "basically misinformed poll- Westmoreland's command had left the
cymakers of the strength of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
enemy." American troops Tut prfeparedd if Jame
magnitude of the
T
C T A Mr AAams said in the
e
clently diligent in bringing to the atten-
tion of the intelligence community the
numerical and organizational strength
of our adversaries in Vietnam."
Mr. Adams said in the memo that he
realized the "pressures" on the C.I.A.
- originating, he said, from General
Westmoreland's command - "have
been enormous.
"We have occasionally protested,"
he said, "but neither loud enough, nor
long enough."
Analyst Present at Meeting
On direct examination at the trial,
Mr. Carver testified that Mr. Adams
was present in Saigon when the the
the military and had not dissented these figures were settled on, C.I.A. of-
from it. Mr. Carver said, however, that 'I ficials - including Mr. Carver - were
Mr. Adams had expressed his feelings uncertain of their validity.
about the final enemy troop estimates I In a Nov. 3, 1967, memo to Richard
before writing the memo. He described
Mr. Adams, 51 years old, as someone
1 who is "often in error, seldom in
doubt."
Yesterday, Mr. Carver told Mr.
Boles that he respected Mr. Adams's
ability and had recommended him for
the "promotion" to the office of eco-
nomic research. But he said he had
reservations about Mr. Adams's judg.'
ment and about his readiness to accept
the fact that, in government, "you have
many arguments" and while "you win
some, you lose some."
The CBS documentarydocused on the
events surrounding the preparation in
1967 of a revised order of battle and of a
new intelligence estimate on enemy
strength in Vietnam for President
New Order of Battle
The accord reached in Saigon in Sep-
tember 1967 listed a total enemy mili- ,
tary force of 223,000 to 248,000, plus a
separate category for 80,000 to 90,000
political cadre. The figure of 248,000
represented a decline of 51,000 from the .
existing order of battle, which, unlike
the new listing, included the political
cadre . The existing order of battle also
included 70,000 Vietcong self-defense
forces, which were now dropped from
the listing in favor of a "verbal descrip-
tion" of them. C.I.A. and military esti-
mates of the self-defense forces in 1967
put their number at about 120,000.
Helms, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, Mr. Carver wrote that "evi-
dence has come to light which suggests
the VC may be further blurring the dis-
tinction" between armed guerrillas
and the self-defense forces.
Mr. Carver told Mr. Helms that "we
will need to do a lot more concentrated
research in this area" if the kind of
agreement made in Saigon was not to
prove "more misleading than helpful."
Johnson. An order of battle is the offi-
cial military listing of enemy forces.
STAT
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"-?EARED
ei ;_ WASHINGTON TIMES
14 November 1984
CIA ex-official's testimony,
deposition differ
NEW YORK (AP) - A former
CIA official who testified that com-
munist militia forces were not mili-
tarily important in the Vietnam
War seemed to express a different
view a year ago in a deposition
brought out in court yesterday.
George A. Carver, the agency's
top specialist on Vietnamese
affairs from 1966 to 1973, was on
the American public that the war
was being won.
A key issue in the trial is whether
Gen. Westmoreland's staff improp-
erly insisted on excluding "self--
defense" and "secret self-defense"
units from estimates of enemy,
strength, known as "order of bat-
tle" reports.
Mr. Carver testified that the self-
defense forces were made up of old
men and boys as young as 10, and
that they should not have been
counted among the guerrillas who.
the witness stand for a fourth day in
the $120 million libel suit filed
against CBS by retired Gen. Wil-
liam C. Westmoreland, former com-
mander of U.S. forces in Southeast
Asia.
Gen. Westmoreland, 70, claims
he was defamed by the 1982
broadcast, "The Uncounted
Enemy: A Vietnam Deception,"
which accused his command of sys-
tematically understating enemy
strength in the months before the
communists' 1968 Tet Offensive.
The intent, CBS said, was to con-
vince officials in Washington and
confronted U.S. troops.
But in his deposition, which
came out during cross-examination
by CBS attorney David Boies, Mr.
Carver had said the so-called
"irregular" forces were an insuffi-
ciently appreciated factor.
Mr. Carver said in the deposition
that he believed as early as 1967
that intelligence experts "ought to
- take a look ... at all the components
of organized or quasi-organized
man- or womanpower to which the
communists had some degree of
access and assess their total contri-
bution."
Mr. Boies also produced a memo
written by Mr. Carver in 1967 to CIA
Director Richard Helms:
We on the American side ...
have always drawn a sharper dis-
tinction between the guerrillas and
the other paramilitary elements
than is drawn by the communists.
Evidence has recently come to light
which suggests the [communists]
may be further blurring this dis-
tinction to the point where our
rather arbitrary U.S. breakout may
be more misleading than helpful."
Mr. Carver testified yesterday
that U.S. intelligence analysts,
experienced in the methods of reg-
ular armies fighting conventional
conflicts such as those in Europe,
had difficulty adapting their meth-
ods to the conditions in Vietnam.
"Order of battle in the classic
Western European military, sense
was essentially irrelevant," he said.
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J~REi'3 "'w`ARED BOSTON GLOBE
4. + 4 i ...
By Mark McCain indicators ... all point to inescap-
14 November 1984
Former: CI.A " deputy. disputes
statement ~ in CBS docurnentar
tral Intelligence Agency headquar-
ters of the "inescapable conclu-
sion" that Gen. William C. West-
moreland had put an arbitrary
ceiling on the estimate of enemy
troops.
Now, in a Manhattan court-
room, lawyers for CBS, Inc. are
trying to rekindle the accusatory
spark of such words. But Carver
prefers to shrug them off as "pur-
ple prose" uttered in the heat of
the moment.
Like a dozen other witnesses so
far, Carver has rallied behind
Westmoreland in his $120 million
libel suit against CBS. But some of
Carver's past remarks are work-
ing against the 70-year-old gener-
al, who claims the network libeled
him' by charging he.,deliberately
downplayed enemy troop strength
to make the war appear winnable.
A central charge by CBS - in a
1982 broadcast now the focus of
the legal attack - is that West-
moreland ordered his-officers to
keep a ceiling of 300,000 on en-
emy troop estimates prior to the
NEW YORK - Seventeen years
ago, In Saigon, George A. Carver
Jr, fired off a cable alerting Cen-
The year was 1967, and for
many months, the CIA had been
arguing for an estimate of about
--500.000 enemy _ troops.- But the
military assistance command in
Vietnam (MACV) considered a fig-
ure about half that size to be cor-
rect.
In September. Carver led a CIA.,
delegation to Saigon to settle the
,simmering debate, which had de-
STAT layed a new estimate of enemy
strength intended for President
Lyndon B. Johnson. Two days
after his arrival in Saigon, Carver
abled CIA director Richard
[:[Helms-
"So far, our mission frustrat-
able conclusion that Westmore- sat down privately with West-
land ... has given instructions moreland. Within hours after that
tantamount to direct order that meeting an agreement was
[enemy] strength total will not ex- reached. Carver then cabled
ceed 300,000 ceiling. Rationale Helms: "Circle now squared, chief-
seems to be that any higher figure ly as a result of Westmoreland ses-
would not be sufficiently optimis- sion... We now have. agreed set,
tic and would generate unaccepta- of figures Westmoreland en-
ble level of criticism from the' dors?S."
press." The CBS broadcdst, ";The Un-
Under questioning by West= counted Enemy: A Vietnam De-
moreland's lawyer, Dan M. Burt, ception," said those figures repre-
Carver said the cable reflected an- sented a- virtual surrender by the
ger he felt towards the MACV ne- CIA to Westmoreland. It quoted
gotiators "because they weren't Carver's deputy, George Allen. as
doing things my way. saying: "It was strictly a political
"They were so obtuse and diffi- judgment, a political decision, to
cult to deal with," he said, "that I drop CIA's opposition and' to go
drew the inference they were oper-~ along with,the modified set of fig-
ating under some order." ures." -: I.
Carver, under . cross-examina- The agreement called for a
tion by Burt, conceded one of the range of: "at least" 223,000 to
largest disputes ,centered on a.; 248,000 enemy and 75,000 to
category known as" the self-de- 85,000 political cadres, Self-de-
fense militia. MACV wanted these fense forces were dropped from
troops deleted from all future esti- the tally. They continued to be in-
mates, arguing that they had little eluded, however, in the body
offensive military ability and were counts..
too elusive to count. But they The CIA had gone into the Sal-
planted mines and booby traps `gon conference favoring a range of
which killed American soldiersl 311,000 to 371,000 regular troops
the CIA argued, and were an in- and 120.000 self-defense troops.
trinsic part of the communist CBS lawyer David Boles
guerrilla war. quizzed Carver about why the CIA
Two days later, on Sept. 12, agreed to an estimate "so similar"
1967, Carver cabled Helms to say to the "take-it-or-leave-it, offer"
negotiations were "at an im- from MACV.
passe." Westmoreland's deputy "I heard arguments,, analysis
for pacification, Robert Komer, and evidence that I hadn't heard
had "launched into an hour-plus before," 'said the 54-year-old Carv-
monologue," Carver explained, er, who was scheduled to begin his
"reviewing his and Westmore- . fifth day of testimony today in
land's problems with the press.. i Federal Court.
and the paramount importance of Sitting halfway across the
saying nothing that would detract .courtroom from Carver was, one of
from the image of progress." his .former CIA analysts, Samuel
. According to the cable, MACV EA. Adams, who has been arguing
made a"final offer,' not subject to the numbers-deception theory for
discussion" with a range of a decade.
219,000 to 249,000 enemy troops Most recently Adams served as
and a separate listing of 75,000 to a. paid consultant for the CBS
85,000 for political cadre8`-'the broadcast. He is now a defendant
Viet Cong's "shadow". govern-'j in the libel suit, as are CBS -pro-
t ' ' ' : ducer Gero a Crile and reporter
g
STAT
ingly unproductive since MACV men.
stonewalling, obviously under or ..The next day Carver; who was Mike Wallace. ~? t:, u:oi -
ceptabie level of
ern: t :. fr. ti .
press."
Westmoreland is stung CBS ' cr a
1982 docurnet:tat- The L r.cot of
Enemy: A Vzezram Decet:ic,r,, thst
said the general imposed an artific.j!
ceiling of 300.000 or. encrn,, stren;'h
estimates to give the impression the
war was winnable.
He contends CBS libelously ac-
cused him of deceiving President
Lyndon B. Johnson about the prog.
ress of the war.
Carver's five internal CIA cables
and a memo show that a marked
change took place during the Sep-
tember 1967 conference, in which
Westmoreland's officers oppoWd the
CIA's plan to number civilian "self-
defense" troops in an official nation-
al intelligence report.
The day after complaining of
"stonewalling," he said the talks had
been "full of action and behind the
scenes scurrying" in Westmoreland's
command, but so far "little move-
ment."
The following day, Carver met
with Westmoreland and had .dinner
with Robert Komer, a representative
of the President with the rank of
ambassador. .
He was then able to report in a
cable to Helms, "Circle now squared,
chiefly as result of Westmoreland
session (and perhaps Komer din-
ner). We now have agreed to a set of
figures Westmoreland endorses. Mis-
sion seems on verge of successful
conclusion."
The CBS documentary contended
that the CIA gave in to Westmore-
land's demand not to count civilian
encrt troops.
The general's attorneys have por-
trayed him as a man who willingly
accepted a CIA offer to mention the
civ,iiar. forces in the narrative of an
ref,.. b'~' r:c'
Ca- e u ruts tc E:.
. ...
bcc , n ~cl.ed ever troop
'1h morn.. p mo
~a;sc _ ~l cat
,i
and his staff for "invaluable contr;-
bt.;i~n~
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 ASSOCIAT
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INTERNAL CIA CABLES AT CBS TRIAL
NEW YORK
Internal cables detailing a rift between the CIA and the military show the
top CIA official in Vietnam complained that enemy troop counts were purposely
underestimated but then apparently struck an agreement with Gen. William C.
Westmoreland.
A series of internal cables and a memo were introduced as evidence Friday in
Westmoreland's $1220 million libel suit against CBS over its January 1982
documentary, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception."
George A. Carver Jr., the top CIA official in Vietnam, sent the cables to
CIA Director Richard Helms during a heated conference in Saigon over the
politically sensitive intelligence reports.
At the start of the conference, Carver complained Westmoreland's staff was
"stonewalling" and "obviously under orders."
He wrote that the "juggling of figures" by the staff and "tacit or oblique
lunchtime and corridor admissions" by his officers "all point to the inescapable
conclusion that Gen. Westmoreland ... has given instruction to direct order"
that the estimate of Viet Cong strength would not exceed a "ceiling" of 300,000.
He said the "rationale" appeared to be that an increased estimate of enemy
strength would lead to an "unacceptable level of criticism from the press."
The CBS documentary said the general imposed an artificial ceiling of 300,000
on enemy strength estimates to give the impression the war was winnable.
Westmoreland, commander of U.S. troops in Vietnam, contends CBS libelously
accused him of deceiving president Lyndon B. Johnson about progress of the war.
Carver's five internal CIA cables and a memo show a change took place
during the September 1967 conference, in which Westmoreland's officers opposed
the IA's plan to include civilian "self-defense" troops in an official
national intelligence report.
The day after complaining of "stonewalling," Carver said the talks had been
"full of action and behind the scenes scurrying" in Westmoreland's command,
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but so far showed "little movement."
The next day, Carver met with Westmoreland and had dinner with Robert Komer,
a representative of the president with the rank of ambassador.
Then he was able to report in a cable to Helms, "Circle now squared, chiefly
as result of Westmoreland session (and perhaps Kamer dinner). We now have agreed
to a set of figures Westmoreland endorses. Mission seems on verge of successful
conclusion."
The CBS documentary contends the CIA gave in to Westmoreland's demands not
to count civilian troops.
Lawyers for Westmoreland have portrayed him as willingly. accepting a CIA
offer to mention the civilian forces in the narrative of an intelligence report,
but not to count them.
Westmoreland lawyer Dan M. Burt also introduced as evidence a memo Carver
wrote to Ellsworth A. Bunker, U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, saying an
agreement had been reached over troop estimates. The memo praised Westmoreland
and his staff for "invaluable contributions."
Burt said the memo, which was sent on to Johnson, showed there was no attempt
to deceive the president.
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QNpA6 _ WASHINGTON POST
/,3 - - 10 November 1984
Troop-Count Dispute
? ? in ?
Am ifted Trial
i
E
D
A Vi
By Eleanor Randolph
Washington Post Staff Writer
NEW YORK, Nov. 9-The for-
mer head of Vietnam intelligence
for the Central Intelligence Agency
testified today that he wrote a cable
in September 1967 accusing retired
Army general William C. West-
moreland's command of "stonewall-
ing, obviously under orders" against
CIA efforts to increase estimates of
enemy troop strength.
But George A. Carver Jr. also
said that, when he met with West-
moreland two days later, the gen-
eral "immediately, firmly and em-
phatically" denied imposing any ceil-
ing on his officers negotiating dif-
ferences between the CIA and the
military over an official such esti-
mate,
Carver was then the CIA's spe-
cial assistant to `the director for
Vietnamese affairs. He was testi-
fying for a third consecutive day in
Westmoreland's $120 million libel
action against CBS, Inc., and three
co-defendants.
At issue is whether a CBS doc-
umentary was correct two years
ago in accusing Westmoreland of
ordering an arbitrary ceiling of
300,000 on numbers of enemy
troops and of coopting officers un-
der him at M".tarv Assistance Con.-
r ,arc `;:?tr t (MACV) and other
intelligence officers, including those
at the Ci A, to stay within that
an; t whi; h had been cited by the
media.
The CBS broadcast said that, be-
cause of a conspiracy to underrate
the enemy in the autumn of 1967,
the media, the public and even
Westmoreland's superiors, includ-
ing President Lyndon B. Johnson,
were surprised by the massive com-
munist attacks that began through-
on,' nar-
ecept
nemy:
etnam
rator/reporter Mike Wallace said
that, after a bitter intelligence de-
bate on troop estimates, '"Gen.
Westmoreland ... won the intel-
ligence war,
"And so, instead of being told of
an enemy army of more than a half
a million, the president, the Con-
gress and the American public were
told there were only 248,000 Viet
Cong left, that the enemy was run-
ning out of men," Wallace reported.
In cables, parts of which were
read to the jury by Westmoreland's
attorney, Dan M. Burt, Carver de-
scribed how he engaged in "heated,
testy and at times adversarial" ar-
guments with then-Army brigadier
general Phillip Davidson. West-
moreland's second-in-command at
MACV and chief of intelligence.
Carver said these occurred at a
meeting in Saigon in September
1967 to hash out a CIA-Army dis-
pute about enemy strength.
But, after four days of the nego-
iations, Carver said, in a cable to
IA Director Richard Helms: "I
ave made a major concession in
of quantifying the irregulars. It
seemed to me this was MACV's
major sticking point."
Thus, an earlier CIA estimate of
120,000 so-called irregular troop-
including including the "home militia" of wo-
men. old met: arid te,1n-ao,,--,
n,,
c.:
Ctr
in a w ate;: summa o er;er.t.
strerg'h.
In caJi?' to Hc'::;"
er saiv. Thr otfaia] t.atron:rl Intc
ligence l s.in,at hammered out
that week wc,uld not include a tuta!
of Vie: Conk' military and political
troops "since we believe such an
aggregate total is inherently mean-
ingless and misleading."
Carver's cables, some of which
were re
o u and
-highly descriptive of the confron-
tation in the summer and fall of
1967 among intelligence officials
from all branches of government.
In the series of cables, most la-
beled "Eyes Only" for Helms, Carv-
er charted the compromise, always
suggesting that he would try to see
Wesmtoreland to attempt to "loosen
this straitjacket" imposed by MACV
on the negotiations.
In a cable dated Sept. 13, 1967,
after Carver met with Westmore-
land, he told Helms: "Circle now
squared ... we now have agreed
set of figures Westmoreland en-
dorses."
Those aggregates, minus the ir-
regulars, were increased from an
earlier MACV figure of 298,000 at
the beginning of the session to a
range of 299,000 to 334,000 as the
compromise.
In the cables, Carver accuses
Davidson of interrupting him "fre-
quently and sometimes tendentious-
ly" during sessions.
Carver seems to relish "discom-
fiture of our [MACV] hosts" when
the CIA's case seems bolstered and
describes "tacit or oblique lunch-
time and corridor admissions by
MACV officers, including David-
son-all point[ing] to inescapable
conclusion that Gen, Westmoreland
. has given instruction tanta-
mount to direct order that [Viet
Cong] strength total will not exceed
300,000 ceiling."
Asked today about such lan-
guage, Carver said: "I had had two
extremely frustrating days, very
difficult discussions where i fe't the
peop't whon, I v: - ra "ir~z
uru - ')nae~:_ s1r c tr,c, o:rrt r.ot
dung thing- my war
'I tti d. tired, I wa
lapsed into sl.?gntiy p, . pr c-e
trying to convey a mc.ud and in;-
pre;s;on, having no thcugnt 1 Mould
he discussing this in detail 17 nears
later in a lawsuit," Carver added.
Carver, whose role was consid-
ered crucial in any compromise on
enemy troop figures, is expected to
face cross-examination by CBS at-
torney David Boies Tuesda-y.
Westmoreland is expected to tes-
tify next week.
Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500150003-7
out South Vietnam on the Tet hol-
iday Jan. 31, 1968.
In the program, "The Uncounted
 ARTICLE APPEARLD
ON PAGE,___,~ . _
Ex-C.I.A. Aide Cites Westmoreland's
Help on Troop Figures
William C. Westmoreland had imposed analysts. Among Mr. Carver's aides
a ceiling of 300,000 on reports of the size Oki was Samuel A. Adams, who, 14 years
of enemy forces in South Vietnam, per- later would become a consultant for
The-former chief of Vietnamese af- headquarters in Langley, Va., had met
fairs ' for the Central Intelligence with Maj. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson Jr.,
Agency testified yesterday that he be- General Westmoreland's chief of intel-
lieved' fora few days in 1967 that Gen. ligence, and the general's intelligence
lion-libel suit against CBS, the general
was instrumental in helping to quickly
arrange an accord on enemy strength
figures between his own intelligence
officers and the C.I.A. after months of
dispute in which the C.I.A. had favored
reporting higher troop figures than
General Westmoreland's command.
The 1982 CBS Reports documentary
that prompted the suit - "The Un-
counted Enemy: A Vietnam Decep-
tion" - said that officers at "the high-
est levels" of military intelligence had
conspired to minimize enemy strength
by setting an "arbitrary ceiling" of
300,000 for Communist forces.
To achieve that end, the broadcast
said, General Westmoreland adopted
the "tactic" of deleting the Vietcong's
self-defense units from the official list-
ing of enemy strength known as the or-
der of battle.
Mr. Carver's purpose in visiting Sal-
.nn in September 1967 was to reach an
,but the witness, George A. Carver
Jr.. said in Federal Court in Manhattan
that when he confronted General West-
moreland with his concern at a private
meeting in Saigon on Sept. 13, 1967, the
general "immediately. firmly and em-
phatically denied that he had given any
such order."
Moreover, Mr. Carver told the jury
in General Westmoreland's $120 mil-
CBS on its Vietnam documentary.
But General Westmoreland, on Sept.
10, 1967, was on leave in Manila.
Frustration Is Noted
"So far, our mission frustratingly un-
productive since MACV stonewalling,
obviously under orders," Mr. Carver
wrote Mr. Helms, using the initials for
General Westmoreland's command.
"Unless or until I can persuade West-
moreland to amend those orders, Seri-
ous discussion of evidence or substan-
tive issues will be imp.=able."
Mr. Carver said the "root problems,
as we all recognize, lie more in political
public relations realm than in substan-
tive difference" and added that the dis-
cussions "all point to the inescapable
conclusion that General Westmoreland
(with Komer's encouragement) has
given instruction tantamount to direct
order that VC strength total will not ex-
ceed 300,000 ceiling."
The parenthetical reference was to
Estimates of Strength Differ
When Mr. Carver arrived in Saigon.
C.I.A. officials leaned to from 3l enemy
strength figure ranging
371,000, excluding an estimated 120,000
part-time forces in the self-defense
orals. The order of battle total at the
time was 298,000. General Westmore-
land's fig-
ure command proposed a
ure of 213,000 - excluding a newly esti-
mated figure of 85,000 for political
cadre that was counted in the C.I.A.
total and that had been carried in the
existing order of battle at a figure of
40,000.
Military intelligence officials also
differed with the C.I.A. over the self-
defense forces, which were listed in the
existing order of battle at about 70,000.
Senior C.I.A. officials said they agreed
with General Westmoreland's com-
mand that the self-defense forces had
little offensive military ability. But the
C.I A. wanted these units counted - if
Robert W. Komer, General Westmore-
land's chief civilian deputy, who was
away at that time in Bangkok.
Mr. Carver told Mr. Helms that Gen-
eral Westmoreland's "rationale seems
to be that any higher figure would not
be sufficiently optimistic and would
generate unacceptable level of criti-
cism from the press."
Yesterday. Mr Carver said that in
hi-, d st.es hF ' tL ._ pt
Pr. ` - - t: n
Pf -'_ "er s J t'~ an d.r
Salo. that 1 mad=- inference the,
were under order,
V I /1 I "b'
urete, which would be incorporated in a
special estimate of enemy strength for
President Johnson. In a cablegram to
a officials on Aug. 30, Central 1967, l In-
ard Helms, then Director O of Centraal In
telligence, Rich-
telligence, described the issue as
"charged with political and public rela-
tions overtones.'
Yesterday, Mr. Carver cited that
cablegram and others that he himself
had sent to Mr. Helms from Saigon
early in September 1967. Mr. Car'er's
frustration before he talked to Genethe
Westmoreland was captured
beginning of the first cablegram he ad-
dressed to Mr. Helms - on Sept. 10,
two days after his arrival in Saigon.
only in a "nonmilitary" appendix to the
order of battle - and General West-
moreland's officers insisted they not be
counted in the future.
General Davidson, Mr. Carver said
yesterday, took a "take it or leave it"
approach to the dispute. And. on Sept-
12 , he and Mr. Adams and other C.I.A.
representativesin Saigon, he said, took
another look at the C.I A. figures. They
now arrived at a total enemy strength
of 229.000 to 259,000, with a sepa
listing of 80,000 to 90,000 for political
cadre and no formal counting of the
self-defense forces.
Within hours of his meeting with
General Westmoreland the next morn-
ing. Mr. Carver testified, an agree-
ment was reached on an enemy
sire:,-h range of 224.000 to 249.001. plus
ate listing of 7a.0~ to t* 'or
cadre. Th se'f-d" s Ose f
w , not be courted in t;t 01kA Jr
bat '4 but they ,would be des flbec
verb.".y' and, in the es:.' nr - to
President Johnson.. note would be lak'_
thev they had once beer. as h.g a
"Circle now squared;" M:. Carver
cabled Mr. Helms. "chiefly as a result
of Westmoreland session, "
Mr. Carver's testimony will continue
on Tuesday.
Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500150003-7