NUKEFREEZE-COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500070013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 19, 1983
• Content Type: PREL

UNITID PRESS INTERNATIONAL 'o
Approved For Release 2MUOM jge@IA-RDP91-00901 R00
STATINTL'
Nukefreeze-Colby
Because the United States has nuclear superior over the Soviet Union,
President Reagan should call for an immedate nuclear freeze, former CIA
Director William Colby said Tuesday.
In an article for the opinion page of The Washington Post in which he said
President Reagan is trying to appease both the Soviets with arms talks and
nuclear freeze proponents with a softer position, Colby said a freeze would
benefit the United States by halting the certain buildup of Soviet weaponry and
benefit the Soviet Union by halting American buildups now planned.
In criticizing Reagan, Colby, who ran the CIA from 1973 to 1976 under
Presidents Nixon and Ford, said, ''Appeasement doesn't work. I am sure the
president would agree with that statement, but in fact, he is engaged in a
program of appeasement. "
Cataloging the administration's history of arms moves he said amounted to
appeasement by Reagan, said each argument against a freeze collapses under
careful scrutiny.
A freeze, he said, would halt both the MX missile and Soviet testing of two
new missile types. It would stop work on cruise missile armadas on both sides,
halt work on a new Soviet bomber and an 'the B-1 on the U.S. side. And it would
"bar work on the D-5 submarine missile by the United States, but not bar
replacement of Polaris submarines with Trident units. The Soviets are behind the
United States in submarine technology, he said, but they can be expected to
catch up.
Appeasement, said Colby, ''is not the answer. It does not satisfy the nuclear
priesthood, which thinks only of building new and more complex weapons systems.
It does not satisfy the Soviets, as every indication of yielding is taken as a
weakening of will to achieve a mutual solution to the arms race,'' said Colby.
''Only a bold, firm call for a mutual stop in the arms race could cut through
the present tangled political and diplomatic negotiations and produce a result
worthy of an American president, '' he said.
Colby said the Soviets are not superior to the United States ''in any
meaningful way today.
''If they were, we would see them using that superiority, rather than
indicating concern over the technological superiority of the United States and
its ability to leap ahead in technology in the coming years at a pace beyond
that possible in-the Soviet Union. The present American retaliation potential is
absolute, and with a modicum of maintenance, its components will not vanish
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 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500070013-5
from old age."
Colby said the Soviets are restricting their global moves to ' 'the safer
techniques of proxy war, subversion and attempts to encourage weakness of
American will and separation from European opinion. This is not the bluster of
someone convinced that he has the power to dominate. It is the wiliness of
someone operating from a position of weakness, trying to slow the opponent down
without confrontation.''
He said U.S. intelligence systems can verify Soviet violations of a freeze
and those serious enough to affect the United States would be spotted. He said
disputes about verification can be hanled with third-party investigations or
other methods.
"The Soviets have shown themselves in recent treaties to be willing to yield
some of their long-held phobias against exposure of their affairs, provided that
the result is specifically in their interest'' he said.
A freeze, wrote Colby, " would certainly be of advantage to the Soviet Union,
halting the major American nuclear buildup now planned. As with any successful
treaty, however, the question is whether it would be in the equal interest of
the United States, halting a certain further Soviet buildup of nuclear weaponry,
which, of course, it would.
"We can better protect the United States by convincing the Soviet Union not
to develop new weapons systems than by developing the defensive systems to shoot
them down if they are used against us.
"Thus appeasement is not the answer," he said.
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 UNITED PRESS n
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STATINTL
'Meeting of minds' on nuclear Freeze vote
C~P PATR I C I A KOZA
WASHINGTON
Sponsors of a nuclear freeze resolution reached a ''gentlemen's agreement''
.with Republican opponents Tuesday to call a vote in the House after two more
days of debate, a congressional source said.
Because of the agreement, Rep. Clement Zablocki, D-Wis., head of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and chief sponsor of the resolution, abandoned a plan
to ask Rules Committee Chairman Claude Pepper, D-Fla., to limit debate.
The source said the House will devote all of Wednesday and Thursday to debate
and then vote on the resolution, strongly opposed by President Reagan, that
calls for a ''mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear
weapons."
''There has been what you'd call gentlemen's agreement to finish by late
afternoon Thursday," the source said. ''There was sort of a mutual meeting of
the minds ... that it was time to move on to a final vote.''
In debate on the resolution March 16 and April 13, the House acted on only
four of 39 amendments. An aide to Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., another sponsor,
said since last week at least 15 more amendments have been added.
The sponsors, confident the Democratic-controlled House will approve the
resolution by a wide margin, had been tolerant of Republican efforts to stretch
out debate. The Rules Committee set no limit on the number of amendments that
could be offered on the floor.
But, the aide said, ''We'd like to get a vote on this thing this week. We've
always felt if administration wants to get pounded like this every week, it's
fine with us. We've got everything ready if they want to go after us again.''
Former CIA Director William Colby took issue Tuesday with Reagan's
contention that a freeze would lock in a Soviet advantage. He said Soviet
nuclear forces are not superior to the U.S. forces " in any meaningful way
today'' and both nations would benefit from an immediate nuclear freeze.
In an article on The Washington Post's opinion page, Colby said Reagan is
trying to appease the Soviets with arms talks and nuclear freeze proponents with
a softer position.
''Appeasement is not the answer," he said. " It does not satisfy the nuclear
priesthood, whic-h thinks only of building new and more complex weapons systems.
It does not satisfy the Soviets, as every Indication of yielding is taken as a
weakening of will to achieve a mutual solution to the arms race."
''Only a bold, firm call for a mutual stop in the arms race could cut through
the present tangled political and diplomatic negotiations and produce a result
worthy of an American president," Colby wrote.
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 ART K `PIRPpF or.Release 2001/0# pr . ~-'W&0901 R
ON PAGE -?~/ STATINT
William E. Colby
Reagan Should Turn From
'Appeasement' to a Freeze
ably closer. Both sides will be convinced that the other will
To use language meaningful to those of President
Reagan' have the potential for a single devastating blow, re-
work. generation (and my own), appeasement doesn't soon n it keep itself on hair-trigger alert for an
work. I am sure the president would agree with that quiring that equally devastating response: The decision time in such
statement, but in fact, he is engaged in a program of ap- circumstances will be reduced so that automatic, not
peasement. NATO's first resolute decision to deploy 108 human, decisions will have to be programmed, offering the
Pershing II missiles and 464 cruise missiles to meet the sickening prospect of mutual destruction through machine
Soviet SS2O buildup has been followed by the presi- error.
dent's proposal of a zero option on both sides, rejected 2) A freeze would bar the develop-
by the Soviets, and then a suggestion for an interim solu meet of cruise missile armadas on
tion, also rejected by the Soviets. . both sides. While. the United States is
The president's proposal to supplant the SALT II treaty technologically ahead with this new,
by the START proposal to reduce strategic launchers to device to date, it is predictable that the
850 on each side and warheads to.5,000, no more than half Soviets will develop their own capabil-
of which would be land-based, has been rejected by the ity within the next decade. They did
Soviets. The U.S.S.R. made a minimal move in our direc just that with respect to the MIRV,
tion by suggesting an 1,800-launcher limit. The administra- after it was left out of SALT I in 1972
tion now considers means by which it could move off its because the United States had no in=
original proposal toward the Soviet position. centive to bar itself from something
Another appeasement being attempted is of the anti-nu- the Soviets did not then have. At the
clear and nuclear freeze movements in the West. The polit- end of this decade, we can confidently
ical force of these movements led the administration to expect a national debate over the need
soften its previous positions, in hopes of diluting the impa- for a comprehensive air defense system to protect the
tience of millions of Europeans and Americans over their United States from a Soviet cruise missile armada. This
governments' inability to reduce the nuclear terror to whole development would be eliminated by a freeze today.
which they are exposed. Minor variations of the degree of 3) A freeze would bar the further development and de-
terror certainly are not going to appease these movements, ployment of the Blackjack bomber on the Soviet side and
particularly when these gestures are matched by plans to of the B1 on the American side. This would have to be
bring in new weapons systems like the MX, the D5, the clarified in the discussions leading to the freeze agreement,
BI, and a whole new dimension of space warfare. but it seems clear that the strategic arms negotiating his-
The real requirement is for a bold move to halt the arms tory considers intercontinental aircraft to be launchers
race, as a clear indication of resolution to reduce the nu- rather than platforms. Again, this would prevent the
clear terror to which all our populations are subjected. This buildup of a large Soviet intercontinental nuclear air force
is the basis for the call for a mutual and verifiable freeze on requiring the kind of air defense system the Soviets are
the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weap- now hoping can hold off at least some of our B52s.
ons and their delivery systems. A recitation of whet this 4) The freeze would bar the development of the D5
freeze'will produce in benefits to the safety of the United
States is a compelling argument for Reagan to leapfrog the missile by the United States, with its improvements in ac.
obstructionists who urge him to oppose it and instead take curacy leading to the danger of first strike from the sea.
leadership of it. Similarly, it would bar a more accurate Soviet submarine-
A simple projection of current weapons plans that would launched missile. It would not bar the replacement of
consid ered red Tridents because the negotiating
be obviated by a freeze demonstrates its value to the safety P history has submarine
of our country history submarines as platforms rather.
1) A freeze on new types of land-based missiles permit- than as launchers. The Soviets are currrently considerably
ted under SALT II would halt the present Soviet testing of behind the United States in submarine technology, but
two new types, It would also halt the MX. The prime again it can be confidently expected that they will improve
characteristic of these new weapons is an increase in ac- over the next decades through a combination of espionage,
curacy and consequent targeting of the land-based missile allocation of resources and talent, and plain competitive
systems of the other"side. While the so-called "first-strike" determination. A freeze on launchers would limit the appli-.
scenario is discussed as a theoretical possibility today, the cation of those improvements in the nuclear dimension.
advent of these new weapons systems, Will bring it remark- Each of the arguments against the freeze collapses
under careful examination:
CJQQN2XvvW,
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 4171.
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1) The Soviets are certainly not "superior" to the
United States in any meaningful way today. If they were,
we would see them using that superiority, rather than in-
dicating concern over the technological superiority of the
United States and its ability to leap ahead in technology
in the coming years at a pace beyond that possible for
the Soviet Union. The present American retaliation
potential is absolute, and with a modicum of mainte-
nance, its components will not vanish from old age.
The Soviets restrict their adventurism these days to
the safer techniques of proxy war, subversion and at-
tempts to encourage weakness of American will and
separation from European opinion. This is not the blus-
ter of someone convinced that he has the power. to domi-
nate. It is the wiliness of someone operating from a posi-
tion of weakness, trying to slow the opponent down
without direct confrontation.
2) Could we verify whether the Soviets would abide
by such an agreement? The administration's own re-
ports show that we are doing exactly that in our atten-
tion to potential violations of SALT fI and the steady
buildup of Soviet power. The fact is that our intelligence
system will cover the Soviet Union's nuclear weaponry
whether there is a freeze between us or not; a freeze
treaty would merely make it easier to do so because of
the numerous elements included in recent treaties to fa-
cilitate the process. Even in areas of ambiguity, of which
there will certainly be some, such as the current indica-
tions of Soviet violation of the chemical and biological
treaty, it is plain that our intelligence systems have
picked up these activities. They have not occurred with.
out being exposed to outside scrutiny.
The fact that the Soviets might violate a treaty is not
the determinant. No one should,"trust" them not to do
so. The real point is whether we would catch them at it
and be able to act upon that information. The evidence
today indicates that this is clearly the case. Any violation
that would be extensive enough to have an impact on the
strategic balance would certainly be noticed by us.
The real question is what we propose to do about a
violation rather than whether we would know of it. In
this respect, there are .improvements that can be made in
procedures, such as third-party investigations and deci-
sions, interim sanctions and greater visibility upon chal-
lenge. The Soviets have shown themselves in recent
treaties to be willing to yield some of their long-held
phobias against exposure of their affairs, provided that
the result is specifically in their interest.
3) A freeze would certainly be of advantage to the
Soviet Union, halting the major American nuclear
buildup now planned. As with any successful treaty,
however, the question is whether it would be in the equal
interest of the United States, halting a certain further
Soviet buildup of nuclear weaponry, which, of course, it
would. We can protect the United States better by con-
vincing the Soviet Union not to develop new weapons
systems than by developing the defensive systems to
shoot them down if they are used against us.
Thus appeasement is not the answer. It does not sat-
isfy the nuclear priesthood, which thinks only of build-
ing new and more complex weapons systems. It does not
satisfy the Soviets, as every indication of yielding is
taken as a weakening of will to achieve a mutual solution
to the arms race. It does- not satisfy the opponents of nu-
clear warfare among the broad populations of Europe
and the United States, who believe their leadership has
failed to protect them against potential annihilation as a
result of the inexorable march of technology.
Only a bold, firm call for a mutual stop in the arms
race could cut through the present tangled political and
diplomatic negotiations and produce a result worthy of
an American president.
The writer, former director of the CIA, is a
Washington lawyer.
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 Approveg poi Rel
Now Formal
11 APPTL 1983
STATINTL
01/~7~T.IA-P~~-901 RO
Richard Allen's Ties to Japan
By Michael Isikoff
? i'nngtim W,~t S:aff Writer
In the course of little more than a
year. Richard V. Allen has gone from
,President Reagan's national security
adviser to foreign agent.
Allen was ousted from office' last
year after disclosures that he accept.
ed $1,000 from a Japanese magazine
and three Seiko watches from a ?Jap-
attese businesstmal.
Allen's ties to the Japanese are
now more formal and far more lu-
crative. According to government.
records, Allen recently signed a
$300,000-a-year contract to serve as
chief' lobbyist for a consortium of
Japanese companies, including Mit-
subishi and the Bank of Tokyo,
which are seeking 'U.S. government
approval for a new sea-level -canal
through the Isthmus of Panama.
In that capacity. Allen has tapped
his administration connections.
When a group of his :Japanese clients
arrived in town last winter. Allen ar-
ranged meetings for them with
Treasury Secretary Donald T.
Regan. Assistant Secretary of State
Thomas O. Enders and other high-
level government officials.
The meetings raised questions at
the State Department, where some
officials wonder about the propriety
of a former government official who
once had access to classified infor-
mation being on a foreign payroll.
Allen's reaction is that "this is not
a matter that vitally affects the na-
tional security. I'm very much aware
of seemliness and propriety."
Allen's judgment is shared by doz-
ens of former government officials.
including ex-senators, Cabinet sec-
rteetaries and agency directors who are
selling their expertise to foreign goy-
erntnents and corporations.
?Just.ice Department officials say
that the foreign "revolving door" is
moving so briskly they can no longer
police it.
.Just last month. for example. for-
mer senator Charter Goodell (R-
v.Y.) registered as a lobbyist. for a
French aerospace firm.
Stuart Spencer. a longtime polit-
ical consultant to Reagan, registered
to handle public relations for the
government of South Africa.
'Other recent filings at Justice
show:
? Former defense secretary Clark
Clifford's law firm received ;10+5.000
last, year from the Australian Meat
and Live Stock Corp. to lobby Con-
gress on farm import legislation and
832,400 from Atlantic Container
Lines Ltd. to lobby the Defense De-
partment to buy the British firm's
container ships.
? The consulting firm of William
Colby, former director of the CIA,
received about 8180.000 last year for
political and economic analysis pro-
vided to the Government of Singa-
pore Investment Corp.
? The law firm of former trans.
portation secretary Brock Adams re-
ceived about $483.000 last year to
lobby on behalf (it' a variety of for-
eign transportation clients. including
the China Ocean Shipping Co.. the
.Japanese Fisheries Association. the
Japan Deep Sea Trawlers Associa-
tion and the Hokuten (Japan)
Trawlers Association.
To monitor such activities, the
Justice Department has a 17-person
unit whole job it is to insure com-
pliance with the Foreign Agents Reg-
istration Act. That, law was passed in
1t1.38 because of' concern about Nazi
propagandists and other subversives.
Critics say' the law is weak and en-
lorcement~ is sporadic. There hasn't
been a criminal prosecution under it
since 1963. "The act has never been
given very much attention by the
.Justice Department," says .Joel
Linker, the former registration chief