ABC THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500060005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 28, 1984
• Content Type: TRANS

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ABC THIS WEEK WITH DAVID B RINKLEY,
28 October 1984
NICARAGUA/CIA>BRINKLEY: It may seem that none of the i,c~ers in
>MANUAL>Central America on either side, any side, need any
instruction on how to commit murder. They have, after
all, been committing murder in more or less wholesale
numbers for years. Nevertheless, the law says that the
CIA or any other agency of the U.S. government may not
commit, encourage or support assassination for any reason,
even among fighters who, whatever we do or say, are going
to assassinate their enemies anyway. Before we question
today's guests about this, here's some background on a
messy, ugly scene from John Martin. John?
MARTIN: This is the cover of the psychological warfare
training manual, David. When it surfaced here in
Washington 13 days ago, it raised the possibility that the
CIA had been training rebels to assassinate Sandinista
officials in Nicaragua. If so, it would violate the
president's own executive order, but it would reopen some
of the deepest wounds suffered by American intelligence
agencies nearly 10 years ago. At the Nicaraguan embassy
here in Washington this past week, the Sandinista
government announced a formal protest. The ranking
diplomat, Manuel Cordero accused the United States of
complicity in some 1,200 kidnappings and 854
assassinations in Nicaragua in the last three years.
MARTIN: What evidence do you have that they were killed
by Contras or by the CIA or by anybody outside their own
circle? MANUEL CORDERO (Nicaraguan minister-counselor):
Because of witnesses that have testified because of the
situation and the report by the army when these things
have taken place, people have witnessed that, and the
Contras themselves have announced that through the radio
station.
MARTIN: The Sandinistas say they took these pictures of
children shot to death in March in an area called Rio San
Juan and of farm families murdered in May in a cooperative
called *Palo de Archo. But there are no death
certificates and no witnesses available to ABC News. Some
civilians die in combat. That is how the embassy said
these Sandinista youths were killed 18 months ago.
STAT
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Scholars and journalists studying Nicaragua say they are 2 .
skeptical of the assassination figures. The State
Department called them ridiculous. Even so, the Contras
claim responsibility for some assassinations. A Jesuit
economist says he knew this couple, government officials,
who were kidnapped and killed by a Contra, who later
confessed. REV. XABIER GOROSTIAGA (former government
planner): And he says, 'Yes, I killed them, I killed them
because they were Sandinistas, because they were
irreductable (sic) persons. I was trained by the CIA.'
And he gives us the name of the CIA trainer.
MARTIN: A former CIA analyst says he visited Nicaragua
last month and examined records that he said documented
about 65 murders of Sandinista election officials, one, a
peasant on a local voting board. DAVID MacMICHAEL (former
CIA analyst): The door of his house was broken down, a
group of Contras came in, dragged him outside in front of
his eight-month pregnant wife, six children, castrated
him, cut off his ears and then shot him to death.
MARTIN: American CIA officials declined requests for
interviews. But Edgar *Chormoro of the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force said the American who helped him draft
the training manual emphasized the need to control the
minds of potential supporters. The document does not use
the word 'assassination,' but calls for kidnappings in
efforts to neutralize Sandinista officials.
SEN. MALCOLM WALLOP (R-Wyo., Senate Intelligence
Committee): What neutralize means to me is basically to
reduce the effectiveness of it. There's all kinds of ways
of eliminating effectiveness without eliminating life.
MARTIN: This week, the Senate Intelligence Committee got
a closed briefing from CIA officials, who could not say
who ordered or reviewed the training manual.
NICARAGUA/CIA>BRINKLEY: Adm. Turner, Mr. Colby, thanks very much
>MANUAL 2>coming in. Here with us are George Will of ABC News, and
Sam Donaldson, ABC News White House correspondent. As you
both know, as we all know in the middle 70's the CIA got
into all sorts of difficulties. It was called a rogue
elephant and this sort of thing, and, as a result, it was,
if not almost destroyed, it certainly was diminished and
damaged. Is that about to happen again? We seem to have
one CIA difficulty now after another. Admiral?
ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER (former CIA director): I think
it's almost inevitable it will happen if they don't call
off this covert activity in Nicaragua because what's
happening is they've been asked to do some things almost
impossible to do by this technique. Therefore, the CIA
people on the spot are frustrated, and they keep reaching
for some new technique or device to get their job done
well. What's happened? It's increasingly questionable
types of activities they've turned to. The mining of the
harbors: the public rejected that; they stopped. Now a
manual that advocates assassination; that's against the
president's own executive order; they have to stop that.
If they keep going, they're going to stretch and stretch.
BRINKLEY: Does it advocate it or simply say how to do it,
if you have decided on your own to do it?
~`WILLAIM E. COLBY (former CIA director): Neither. In
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fact, what it says, uses, is a single word 'neutralize,'
which has all sorts of connotations to Americans, but in
the context of the particular manual does not refer to
assassination, and it does not mean assassination.
SAM DONALDSON: What would you think neutralize might
mean? COLBY: Neutralize is a general word which means
take the person out of action. In Vietnam, it was used to
either capturing them, getting them to accept an amnesty
or in a fight having them killed.
SAM DONALDSON: Why not use those words then? Why not
say... COLBY: They did in Vietnam, but in this context,
this was a direction as to how you handle a town after a
guerrilla group has taken it over. And one of the items
says you have to neutralize the other leadership for the
time being. It doesn't say to kill them. TURNER: I'd
like to quote from the manual right here. Section 5, this
is the heading for the section, 'Selective Use of Violence
for Propagandistic Effects.' First sentence: 'It is
possible to neutralize carefully selected, planned
targets, such as judges.' I don't believe there's any way
you can neutralize with violence without risking murder.
GEORGE WILL: But, Admiral, isn't there a kind of
artificial clarity here to the distinctions we're trying
to draw? That is, we're against, everyone says and the
law says, at least an executive order says, we're against
assassinations, yet the Contras are described frequently,
and I suppose accurately, as freedom fighters resisting a
tyranny. Freedom fighters resisting a tyranny are apt to
kill the tyrant and the tyrant's agents. Now, where does
this become a legitimate fight for freedom and where does
it become an illegitimate use of assassination and is it
possible to draw that line? TURNER: Yes, I think it's
quite possible. We have warfare in which you kill
combatants, and we have assassination in which you kill
civilians and officials and others. And this clearly, in
inciting violence against these people, talks about judges
and other such officials.
WILL: But that is exactly the kind of line that guerrilla
warfare blurs. Are you saying that guerrilla warfare is
going to be exercised by our adversaries in the world, but
we will not engage in or support guerrilla warfare?
TURNER: I think it is very clear from the people of the
United States and from the Congress of the United States
since 1976, when the revelations were brought out that
David referred to earlier, that this country has a level
of ethical procedure that it won't stoop below. We don't
want to go to all the procedures that the communists use.
COLBY: I'm the first guy who wrote a directive against
assassination. It was later picked up by the presidential
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directives. So, I'm against it, that's clear, but if
you'll look at this pamphlet in total context, what it's
doing is instructing a guerrilla movement that the
important aspect of the guerrilla movement is to capture
the loyalty of the population. And it specifically says
that one of the things that you say when you're talking to
the population is that you will not mistreat the enemies
of the people, the Sandinistas. That you will, even
though they may have committed crimes, you will not
mistreat them. Now, it's trying to give a guidance as to
how a guerrilla movement should conduct itself so that it
keeps its main focus where it should be, on the political
aspect, and the violence has a secondary part. In a war
you're going to have violence, but it's secondary to the
political objective.
WILL: Before you wrote the memo forbidding
assassinations, you ran the Phoenix program in Vietnam.
COLBY: Right.
WILL: During which they neutralized, according to our own
figures, by 1969, 19,000 Viet Cong agents, including
killing 6,000 of them. COLBY: No, the figures are wrong.
We captured 28,000. Seventeen thousand took amnesty,
which was offered to them, and 20,000 were killed, mostly
in military action.
DONALDSON: I want to know how the CIA agency works when
it comes to the distribution and the printing of such a
handbook as the one that we've been talking about.
Someone had to pay for it--I guess that was agency funds--
and someone had to authorize it. Just where, is the
question. From your experience, where would this be
authorized? Would it go to the director? COLBY: It
might or might not. If it was clearly identified as an
assassination program, it would have gone to the director.
Since it was not, since the context of the brochure was
clearly a general directive on how to politicize a
guerrilla movement, then it might not have gone to him.
And the single word 'neutralize' in that sense and the
violence could have slipped by. The agency now says it
wishes it hadn't happened, but the military wishes they
hadn't spent $15,000 for a coffeemaker, too. It's the
supervisory work of the Congress that will keep the agency
in line.
DONALDSON: Well, it did go to Langley. It did go to CIA
headquarters. It went to some level beyond their first
suggestion, it was a mere contract employee somewhere.
Admiral, where do you think it went? TURNER: I don't
think it went very high because, Sam, this is one
paragraph in a 42-page document. I doubt that it would
have gone all the way up to the director himself. But the
real question is, what instructions did the director and
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the White douse give Lo Lne Lia ror Lnis wnoie operation-.
And I would suggest to you that it's probably against the
law.
DONALDSON: If I may, you know that officially, on the
record, the administration has to deny that there is any
such operation because you mentioned the law, the Boland
Amendment, clearly it is against the law. TURNER: Well,
it's a question of whether this manual advocates the
overthrow of the government.
DONALDSON: I'm talking about the secret war to topple the
Sandinistas. COLBY: I think the manual preceded the
Congressional action that cut off the aid, so in that
sense...
WILL: Let me come back a minute to this distinction. I
gather we are aiding the freedom fighters in Afghanistan.
It would be shocking if the freedom fighters in
Afghanistan were not trying to kill Afghanis who are
collaborating with the Russian occupiers or Russian-
occupying officials. Isn't that assassination, and should
we be horrified? COLBY: I happen to support the idea of
helping brave men fight for their country, and if that
means guerrillas fighting an occupier or a hostile force,
then I think we are proper... (everybody starts talking at
once)
DONALDSON: ...brave men fighting for their country if
they're on our side. You don't see the Nicaraguans and
Sandinistas fighting for their country. COLBY: Whichever
side, there are brave men on the other side fighting. A
fight is usually brave men on both sides fighting.
DONALDSON: Then why do we call one freedom fighters and
the other guerrillas?
WILL: Because one side's fighting for freedom.
BRINKLEY: I want to raise an ethical point. Admiral
Turner was saying a minute ago that we have a level of
ethics and decency below which we will not fall. OK,
fine. We give weapons to fighters, guerrillas, Contras,
whatever you care to call them, whose cause we sympathize
with, in the full knowledge they're going to be used for
killing. They have no other purpose. No one complains
about that as an ethical matter, but then we write a
little book telling them how to use these weapons and how
to kill a few people and win their war, and suddenly
that's a terrible scandal. Can you explain that to me?
TURNER: Sure. The reason this particular covert activity
in Nicaragua is in such deep trouble was predicted by the
Church committee report in 1976. It said this kind of
covert activity has never in the past been successful,
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This nation today is not agreed on what we should do about
Nicaragua. It is agreed, George, on what we should do
about Afghanistan, and therein lies the difference. That
we are willing as a nation to support this kind of
unethical activity in an Afghanistan because we know where
the country should go there. We don't know where we want
to go in Nicaragua, and we don't support it.
BRINKLEY: Is it ethical, therefore, to give them guns?
TURNER: In Afghanistan?
BRINKLEY: No, in Nicaragua. TURNER: Yes, I believe it's
ethical to give them guns, but I think it's against the
law of this country to be supporting the overthrow of the
government of Nicaragua, and that's the way I read this
manual. And if you don't read the manual that way and are
more generous towards it, you have to at least admit that
people to whom we are giving it are certainly going to use
it to overthrow the government in Nicaragua, and that's at
least against the spirit of what the Congress has said it
wants the CIA to do. COLBY: If we give them guns, it
seems to me that it's quite logical to give them direction
as to how to conduct a guerrilla war most effectively, and
that means putting the major focus on the political
aspect. I happen to be very ambivalent about the aid to
the Contra program because I think that the main focus of
our effort in Central America should be to build the
strength in El Salvador, Honduras and the democratization
process in Guatamala, and that the Contra action probably
debilitates our overall support of that particular program
and that strategy. But, nonetheless, it has been approved
in the past. The House of Representatives has now
objected to it. Pur aid to the Contras has stopped until,
unless the House removes that authorization next spring.
BRINKLEY: Well, thank you very much. Thank you Admiral
Turner, Mr. Colby. Thank you for coming. We enjoyed
hearing your views.
AB07>NICARAGUA/CIA>BRINKLEY: We're back, and Sam is trying to get a question
>MANUAL 3>in. Sam?
DONALDSON: Sen. Goldwater, should we have assassination
as part of a CIA plan under any circumstances? GOLDWATER:
No, I don't believe so. That's specifically prop- i e ,
uh, not just by laws that have been passed recently but
old laws that prohibit the CIA or any other member of our
intelligence family from attempting assassination.
DONALDSON: Would you agree then that the CIA ought not to
persuade others to engage in assassination? GOLDWATER:
I, I don't believe that under the operation of the United
States or any part of the operation of the United States
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that we snoula, under law, advocate anybody attempting
assassination. That's up to the individuals who are
trying to fight their way to freedom. If they want to
assassinate, that's their business.
DONALDSON: Then why not use a word other than neutralize?
Why not say capture if that's what you mean? Why use a
word that's open to the ambiguities of that word to an
interpretation that's contrary to what you just expressed?
GOLDWATER: Well, I didn't write the book. If I wrote the
book I might have used some other word. Neutralize is a
very, very broad word. I've checked with all of my
Spanish-speaking friends out here. I speak Spanish
myself, and it has no different meaning in Spanish than it
has in English. Uh, if it was going to raise all that
kind of fuss, use another word.
DONALDSON: Sen. Moynihan, when they wrote the word,
neutralize, whether it was copies or whether it was
original, do you think the author meant to imply that
perhaps assassination was all right, or do you think the
author meant to say that the United States forbids it?
MOYNIHAN: Look, a little common sense here, the Army
lesson plans that use the word removed, it speaks of
having the populists gather and take part in the act. Now
look, there's a rule that organizations in conflict become
like one another, but I don't want us to become like the
communists in what they will do. There are things
Americans won't do, and I can't think that this has helped
us one bit in advancing democratic principles in Central
America. And Barry, I don't think you think so either.
And in either event it is specifically prohibited by
presidential executive order.
BRINKLEY: Well on this point, whoever was going on about
this Socratic dialectic view, we might have expected to be
able to choose his words carefully, wouldn't we?
MOYNIHAN: They chose the words carefully, they meant,
they were talking about a practice technique, specific,
formal technique of the Chinese Communists, when they were
taking over China. Every time they came to a village they
identified somebody as a landowner, an oppressor. They
got everybody together in the town, village, and they
formally shot him. That's what they're talking about.
DONALDSON: Sen. Moynihan, if I may change the subject
slightly, President Reagan this past week endorsed the
idea that Americans could go down and join in the Contras
and fight with them, endorsed it to the extent of saying
that he would not interfere with it, and as a matter of
fact he thought there was a long tradition in this country
of doing that type of thing. Do you agree? MOYNIHAN:
Well, they better not bring arms with them, or they're in
violation of American law. But if they do, I hope they
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know what is awaiting them because it's a very casual
thing to tell Americans to go down into those jungles.
They are full of snakes and AK-47s.
WILL: Sen. Moynihan, I want to come to a minute ago. You
said there's some things American's won't do. Now this
country two generations ago dropped an atomic weapon on
civilian populations, created a firestorm deliberately,
using incendiary bombs in Dresden and Hamburg. Now,
having killed in the interest of getting rid of a tyranny
and establishing democracy in Germany, which we did by
doing this sort of thing. (sic) Now, why is it, I don't
understand, why is it that it is suddenly us becoming like
the other side, when we do kill our Sandinista officials
one at a time instead of in job lots of 80,000 as we did
killing innocent civilians during the second world war.
MOYNIHAN: George, we are describing here a technique of
communist terror. It's called explicit and implicit
terror, and no thanks. I think we can do our work in the
open and be Americans and be democrats and don't have to
apologize. Do you think w? have helped democracy,
whatever chance it has, of coming back to Nicaragua? I
don't.
BRINKLEY: Let me ask a question on a slightly different
but nevertheless related subject. Secretary of State
Shultz this past week made a speech discussing the,
discussing American retaliation against terrorists, those
who blow up our embassies and so on. And he said the
American people must understand there will be, when we do
.this, some loss of life among our servicemen and of
innocent people. And he has, more or less I think,
depending on what's happened in the last 10 minutes, been
disowned by the Reagan administration, yes on one day and
no on the next. I don't know where they stand. What do
you think about the Shultz's speech? Sen. Goldwater, what
do you think? GOLDWATER: Well, I think Secretary of
State Shultz was absolutely right. If you're going to
stamp our terrorism around this world and in this country,
and we're only beginning to see it, we have to stamp out
the people who practice this. Now, this is nothing new in
this world. *Klauswitz wrote about terrorism and war a
long, long time ago. We never dreamed we'd see terrorism
in peace, but we're seeing it. And the only thing they
understand is what they're practicing. If they want to
stamp us out, we'd better stamp them out first. And if we
lose somebody here and there, that's a lot better than
losing tens of thousands of people.
BRINKLEY: Sen. Moynihan? MOYNIHAN: George Shultz is a
deeply responsible man and not a casual one to call for
killing even innocent persons. But you know if you're
going to kill them, you'd better know who them is, and
it's a very hard thing to do. And I would trust George
1kjJ,, rid
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Shultz to make the judgment. I wouldn't trust the people
who put this manual out about Nicaragua to make that
judgment.
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WASHINGTON TIMES
11 October 1984
NDERCOVER ... Wrap
the wok, with the utmost
discretion, for former
CIA chief Bill Colby. (Bill,
recall, Tbld Almost All in "Honor-
able Men" and "My Life at the
,,IA,' his two bang-up books.) Last
'week, 64-year-old Bill polished
bff a low-key Virginia divorce
from his wife of 39 years, Barbara.
'This week, he quietly hitched to
fair, fortyish Sally Shelton, Jimmy
'Carter's Ambassador to Barba-
dos. She's now a Veep at Banker's
Trust in the Big Ap; he's a bigwig
with a hotshot international lob-
bying biz right here. But both are
bobbing 'round the Islands on a
honeymoon cruise 'til things settle
down. Ear, of course, is thrilled
but astonished. As usual.
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RADIO N REPORTS, .N
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone],
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
STAT
This Week with David Brinkley STAl1ON WJLA =TV
ABC Network
DATE October 28, 1.984 1:30 P.M. CITY Washington, D.('.
DAVID BRINKLEY: Over the years, Central and South
America have received from the United States loans from banks,
loans from the U.S. Government, cash grants, Peace Corpsmen,
various experts offering advice, cash payments for such commodi-
ties as lumber, shoes, steel, bananas, coffee, cocaine, plus,
once in a while, visits by the United States Marines, and now
military advisers in Central America and a sort of tutorial
explaining how to fight a civil war and how to neutralize leaders
on the other side.
Well, what is going on? Is the CIA again out of
control, as it once was said to be? Are our elected leaders
aware of what it is doing?
We'll ask today's guests: Senator Barry Goldwater of
Arizona, Chairman; and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New
York, Vice Chairman of the Senate Committee on Intelligence.
Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. William E. Colby, also former Director of
the Central Inteliligence Agency. Some background from our man
John Martin. And our discussion here with George Will, Sam
Donaldson, and Hodding Carter.
BRINKLEY: It may seem that none of the fighters in
Central America on either side, any side, need any instruction in
how to commit murder.. They have, after all, been committing
murder in more or less wholesale numbers for years. Neverthe-
less, the law says that the CIA or any other agency of the U.S.
Government may not commit, encourage, or support assassination
for any reason, even among fighters who, whatever we do or say,
OFFICES IN: WAS-11~' _ -
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By Eleanor Randolph
wuhington Post Staff Writer
WASHINGTON POST
7 October 1984
est nioreland Li bel Case"
Seen as Groundbreaker
Starched and confident as he
stood in a Pentagon briefing room
17 years ago, , Gen. William C.
Westmoreland showed no visible
reservations when he said that
peace in South Vietnam "lies within
our grasp."
"The enemy's hopes are bank-
rupt," the commander of U.S.
forces in Vietnam assured report-
ers and their audience of. Ameri-
cans, many troubled and divided by
this distant war.
Fifteen years later, in a 90=
minute television documentary
called "The Uncounted Enemy: a
Vietnam Deception," CBS charged
that Westmoreland and other high
government officials were conspir-
ing at the time to keep the enemy's
actual strength a secret not only
from the press and public, but also
from the president.
It could be argued, CBS said, that
such rosy predictions about the war
left Westmoreland's commander in
chief, President Lyndon B. Johnson,
unprepared for the Tet offensive in
January 1968 when the enemy
waged a massive guerrilla attack in
spite of Westmoreland's rosy pre-
dictions that their numbers were
waning. Such a tactical blunder,
according to CBS, helped lose the
larger war for public support.
Now CBS and Westmoreland will
defend their versions of this pivotal
time in the Vietnam war. in a trial
.expected to become one of the most
important and perhaps bitter court-
room dramas of this decade.
It is a battle for reputations, in
one sense, as Westmoreland's at-
torneys accuse the network of bad
journalism and CBS lawyers charge
that Westmoreland hid the truth
about the unpopular war.
But the trial of Westmoreland's
$120 million libel suit against CBS,
scheduled to start Tuesday in U.S.
District Court in New York, is more
than the latest skirmish between
titans from the media and the mil-
itary. Some of those observing say
the trial could be the first major and
official inquiry into this crucial pe-
riod of the war.
Years and miles from the conflict,
scholars for the military and the
press also hope for new answers, or
at least new perspectives, about
whether the war was lost on the
battlefield; in the 'war rooms or dur-
ing the nightly news.
And, as the inner workings of a
major network are revealed, some
other issues also could emerge that
have become emotional in a society
increasingly critical of its press es-
tablishment.
For example, can a public official
sue successfully over press criti-
cism of his job? Can a journalist
.'.have preconceived beliefs about a
tory?,There also is the even larger
question of whether the press has
become as arrogant now as some in
government and the military
seemed to be 20 years ago.
-. "Among the questions in dispute
will be whether the high U.S. mil-_
itary command in Vietnam engaged
in willful distortion of intelligence
data to substantiate optimistic re-
ports of the progress on the war
and whether one of the nation's
most important distributors of news
and commentary engaged in willful
or reckless slander," wrote U.S.
District Judge Pierre N. Leval, who
will try the case.
As Leval explained last month
when he reluctantly turned down a
request that the trial be televised,
the drama to be played out in his
courtroom is destined to be "a rare
debate and inquiry on issues of i
highest national importance."
It also could be a rare opportu-''
nity for some of the most reluctant
managers of the Vietnam war to go
on the record in their testimony
about one of the war's most crucial
periods: the months before the Tet
offensive.
The case will feature some of the
big names from the Vietnam era,
including television
stars. Also im o journalism
could be
of the usually anony
mous m some
ilitary
and intelligence people who ar
e ex-
pected to tell how they did their
wartime jobs.
The lineup of witnesses available
for Westmoreland reads like a
"Who's Who" of the Johnson admin-
'istration, including former secre-
tary of defense Robert S. McNa-
:nara, former secretary of state
Dean Rusk, former -IA directors
William E. Colby and Richard
Helms, Gen. Phillip B. Davidson,
Gen, Joseph A. McChristian and
President Johnson's special assis-
tants onnational security affairs,
McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Ros-
tow.
By contrast, CBS has as potential
witnesses a number. of intelligence
analysts who worked for the Army
and the CIA in Vietnam and Wash-
ington as opposed to the policy.
makers who are potential witnesses
for the other legal team.
As David Halberstam, author of
"The Best, and the Brightest" and
one 'of CBS' potential witnesses,
said: "What you have here is most
of the people who were the sources
for those of us covering Vietnam.
They are the ones testifying for
CBS-the people who actually did
what the brass told them."
As the trial nears, it becomes
apparent that Westmoreland will
try to concentrate on the issue of
whether he misled President John-.
son, instead of whether he distorted
facts to the press, the public and
Congress. It also has become clear
that. the big names have become
more important in this trial.
David Boies, the lead attorney for
CBS, said at a news conference Fri-
day that the policy-makers from the
.era will be asked- "whether they
were part of the deception or part
of the deceived."
In many 'ways, the event that
spawned this legal drama was an
internal conflict between two arms
tin nu
STAT
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7NEW YORK TIMES
/q .:I 1 October 1984
AD AT HO WE I Anthony Lewis
Out to Lunch
BOSTON
resident Reagan's attempt to
blame anyone and everyone
1 but himself for the security
failure at the American Embassy in
Beirut has discomfited even some of
his admirers. But they have not al-
lowed themselves to see the real point
of the contemptible episode. That is
that Ronald Reagan feels no responsi-
bility - not for the Embassy and not
for anything done by the United
States Government.
Just try to puzzle out his suggestion
last week that weakening of U.S. in-
telligence before he took office led to
the terrorist success in Beirut. The
relevant part of his answer"to a col-
lege student's question about the
bombing was:
"Where we're feeling the effects to-
day of the near destruction of our in-
telligence capability in recent years
- before we came here - the effort
that somehow to say, well, spying is
somehow dishonest and let's get rid of
our intelligence agents, and we did
that to a large extent."
The first thing to be said about that
comment is that it was factually un-
true. Past and present C.I.A. officials
rushed to deny that the agency had
been brought "near destruction" by
Mr. Reagan's predecessor.
When former President Carter took
offense at what he called Mr. Reagan's
"false" and "insulting" claim, Mr.
Reagan telephoned to explain that he
had not meant to criticize Mr. Carter.
He said he really meant to blame the
Senate committee under the late Frank
Church. But the Church committee in-
vestigated C.I.A. excesses such as
plots to assassinate foreign leaders; it
did not aim to cut intelligence-gather-
ing activities.
The second thing to be said is that
the President's comment was irrele-
vant. For the immediate failure in
Beirut was a physical one: The fail-
ure to install gates and other security
devices that the experts had said
were needed. William Colby, former
Director of Central Intelligence, put
it: "The problem was not a failure of
intelligence but a problem of putting
in proper security."
The President's comment was,
then, a melange of untruths and ir-
relevancies. But I am convinced that
Mr. Reagan fully believed what he
said. That is why the episode is so re-
vealing.
The point is that Mr. Reagan sees
the world through a screen of ideol-
ogy. The beliefs that make it up are
fixed;' no reality can dislodge them.
Thus be believes that the United
States "unilaterally disarmed" in the
years before he took office, and no
facts about the upgrading of our nu-
clear arsenal can change his mind.
One of the items in the Reagan ideo-
logical canon is that critics destroyed
U.S. intelligence capabilities in the
1970's. And that was what came to
mind when the President felt himself
challenged on the Beirut failure. It
was an ideological reflex.
The grip of ideology on his mind
gives Ronald Reagan an extraordi-
nary political advantage. He can
blame whatever goes wrong on things
beyond his control, and he can do so
with perfect sincerity. Failure
abroad must be a product of past
weakness, of insufficient anti-Com-
munist zeal. Trouble at home must be
the result of Big Government, and we
all know he is against that. He is
never an incumbent.
In short, ideology enables Mr. Rea-
gan to escape responsibility. And it is
all genuine, in the skin-deep sense. He
is not a person who is aware of a mis-
take and skillfully covers it up. He I
does not feel any responsibility, and
hence he feels no guilt at failure.
George Will, the conservative com-
mentator, wrote a thoughtful column
criticizing the vapid excuses offered
by the President and others for the
Beirut bombing. But his conclusion
missed the point. Mr. Reagan, he
said, needed to make subordinates
fear penalty when there was failure.
But a President who feels no responsi-
bility himself - who sees failure in
ideological terms - cannot provide
such leadership.
The most amazing thing about Ron-
ald Reagan as a politician is his suc-
cess in convincing the electorate that
he is a "strong leader." His postures
may look strong, to others as to him.
But in the concrete terms that really
measure political leadership, he is
just not there. He is the most passive,
the remotest President since Calvin
Coolidge.
Alexander Haig called this White
House "a ghost ship." We have a Gov-
!rnment in which the President does-
not decide the most urgent issues of
policy: arms control, the priorities of
negotiation with the Soviet Union,
Middle East policy. We have an unac-
countable President. That is the larg-
er, and the chilling, reality behind
Mr. Reagan's conduct in the Beirut
episode. ^
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MONDALE CHARGES
REAGAN IS EVADING
B6Rh1E IN B0MBING
Carter and Former Leaders of
C,I.A. Assail President as
Wrong on intelligence
S,pectuJ to The New York Tunes
WASHINGTON, Sept. 27-Walter F.
Mondale accused President Reagan
to- day of an "inexcusable" attempt to
shift the blame for last week's bombing
of the American Embassy in Beirut.
Earlier, the White House sought to
NUN YORK. TIMES
28 Septe;aber 1984
Rebuttal on intelligence Cuts Then he
He added that the President had not "the real pro
meant. that this trend had led speciti- feeling the of
cally to the bombing, although Mr. I struction of o
Reagan's comments had come in an- in recent yea. the effort th
swer to a specific question about that spying is so
incident. Two Americans and an un- get rid of o
known number of Lebanese died. we did that
More broadly, several former senior Seeking
intelligence officials said the cutback "Your bi
in overseas intelligence agents began we're trying,
in 1967, long before the Carter Adminis- to where you
under Presidents aonnson, Piixun, runt ? Campaigning in Saginaw, Mich.,
and Carter, and by 1978, the Carter Vice President Bush, who was a Direc-
White House had reversed the trend tor of Central Intelligence in 1976, said
and was pushing for increases in intelli- today that it would be wrong to inter-
gence funds. ? pret Mr. Reagan's comments as laying ``
Moreover, several officials said, the blame for the Beirut bombing on'
there had been no intelligence failure the Carter Administration.
before the Beirut bombing because "But I &.) believe there were cuts
warnings from terrorist groups about made in the intelligence business that
such an attack had been made public. were inappropriate," Mr. Bush went
Former President Jimmy Carter, on. -Laying off a lot of people and thus
saying he had previously restrained curtailing a lot of our sources on intelli-
himself in the face of "a stream of false I gence was not good for the overall intel-
" b President Reagan, ligence community, and I think that's
assertions' by ..,t-r tho Praciriant'c trying to say."
soften M;.r. Reagan's implication that, issued an unusually strong statement.
the fault lay with the "near destruction It charged that Mr. Reagan's "claim
of our intelligence capability" before yesterday that his predecessors are re-
his Administration took office. sponsible for the repeated terrorist
At a news conference after his meet- bombings of Americans is personally
ing in New York City with Andrei A. insulting and too gross in its implica-
Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, tions to ignore."
Mr. Mondale asserted that Mr. Reagan "He only has to question his-own Ad-
should quit trying to pass on the blame ministration officials to determine that I
for the incident. his statement was also completely
"The latest statement by the Presi- false," Mr. Carter added. "This series
dent is inexcusable," Mr. Mondale of tragedies in the Middle East has
been brought about by the President's
said. "He should stand up and say he is own deeply flawed policy and inade-
responsible. By saying the C.I.A. is quate security precautions in the face
weak, he encourages terrorists and our of proven danger.
enemies around the world to believe - "His frivolous reference to tardy
that we don't have an effective intel- kitchen repairs is indicative of his re-
lignce capacity, when we do." fusal to face the reality of his own re-
It was one of Mr. Mondale's most sponsibility," Mr. Carter went on, al-
blistering criticisms of the President. luding to Mr. Reagan's likening of con-
structing security barriers to getting a
Reagan Charges Distortion kitchen remodeled on schedule. "Mr.
In Washington, Mr, Reagan com- , Reagan should apologize for these mis-
plained to reporters about "the way leading statements," Mr. Carter as-
you distorted my remarks about the serted.
C.I.A." Mondale Sees a Divisive Move
The White House spokesman, Larry Mr. Mondale said it was wrong for
Speakes, said the President was refer- Mr. Reagan to suggest any division be-
ring to "reports in the media putting tween the two major political parties
the blame entirely on the Garter Ad- on the need for a strong Central Intelli-
ministrativn." Several reporters said gence Agency and to imply that he had
inherited a weakened intelligence net-
they had based their articles Wednes- work.
day on guidance from Reagan White Mr. Reagan's comment came in re-
House officials. sponse to a student's question about the
But today Mr. Speakes said the Beirut bombing at a campaign stop at
President had been talking about "a Bowling Green State University in Ohio
decade-long trend and a climate in Con- Wednesday. As he had said previously,
gress" in which "human intelligence Mr. Reagan observed that no security
had been weakened considerably." "can make you 100 percent safe" and
"an embassy is not a bunker."
Former intelligence directors as well
as Democratic politicians took issue
with Mr. Bush's implication that this
began with the Carter Administration.
William E. Colby, who served in a Re-
publican Administration as Director of
Central Intelligence from September
1974 to January 1976, also called Mr-
Reagan "mistaken on two counts."
"The first is that we began to reduce
the size of the agency in 1967," Mr.
Colby said. There was a gradual de-
cline in numbers because there was a
decline in covert action, in operations
that try to influence other countries
and a shift to intelligence collection and
analysis, he said. '
"The second is that the problem in
Beirut was not a failure of intelligence
but a problem of putting in proper se-
curity, Mr. Colby added. Mr. Speakes
said that was the burden of a report
given the President today by Robert
Oakley, the State Department's top
specialist on terrorism.
Other senior former intelligence offi-
cials said Richard Helms and James R.
Schlesinger, the Directors of Central
Intelligence under Presidents Johnson
and Nixon, had eliminated 1,000 to 1,500
overseas agents under a deliberate
plan to scale down the agency as Amer-
ican involvement in Vietnam and
Southeast Asia was phased out.
Senate investigations of the agency
in the mid-1970's led to disclosures of
assassination plots, drug experimenta-
tion with unwitting human subjects,
surveillance of Americans and a string
of other abuses that hastened the agen-
cy's shift away from agents to increas-
ingly sophisticated satellite, electronic
and photographic intelligence-
gather-continued
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