KGB STATUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500060003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 25, 1985
• Content Type: TRANS

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RADIO TV REPORTS, IN~
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4QAP~
NBC Nightly News STATION WRC-TV
NBC Network
September 25, 1985 7:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
TOM BROKAW: Intelligence sources in Washington now have
confirmed reports that a very high KGB official defected to the
West in Rome this summer. Vitaly Sherchenko (?) is said to have
had detailed knowledge of Soviet operations in the United States,
Western Europe, and Latin America.
And as John Dancy reports, this is only one of several
major KGB setbacks recently.
JOHN DANCY: The explusion of 31 Soviets for spying has
devastated the KGB's operations in Britain. American
intelligence sources confirm that the Soviet KGB chief in
England, Oleg Gordievsky, has already revealed the names of more
than 100 Britons working for the Soviets.
GEORGE CARVER: Gordievsky was a gold mine, a platinum
mine and a diamond mine all rolled into one. He knows everything
that there is to know about Soviet intelligence activities in his
country of assignment; in this case, the United Kingdom.
DANCY: The man on the left, Stanislav Levchenko, is a
former KGB agent, who declines to be photographed because of
death threats against: him.
What effect must this have on the KGB's operations in
STANISLAV LEVCHENKO: The Soviets, of course, lost all
of their agent network in Great Britain, which will take them at
least five years to rebuild. They're trying to assess the damage
which was done to the KGB operations, not only in England, but in
Europe.
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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ARTICLE APPEARED.
ON PAGE Q- -A
Suit takes
aim at U.S.
weapon test
By FRANK JACKMAN
News Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON-Four
Democratic congressmen
and the Union of Concerned
Scientists filed suit In U.S.
District Court yesterday to
block the upcoming Air
Force test of an antisatellite,
or ASAT, weapon against a
target in space.
The ASAT weapon, which
will be carried aloft by an
F-15 jet fighter, is scheduled
to track down and destroy an
old, drifting U.S. scientific
satellite over the Pacific, re-
portedly on Friday.
The group of scientists
were joined by Reps. George
Brown (D-Calif.), Matthew
McHugh (D-N.Y.), Joe Moak-
ley (D-Mass.) and John
Seiberling (D-Ohio) in seek-
ing a delaying injunction.
They argued that such a test
at this time would be illegal
because the Reagan adminis-
tration is not "endeavoring in
good faith to negotiate with
the Soviet Union a mutual
and verifiable agreement" to
limit such weapons as re-
quired by current law.
In his certification to Con.
gress last month, President
Reagan said that the U.S. was
trying "in good faith" to
negotiate an agreement with
Moscow and that pending
such an agreement, testing
was needed "to avert clear
and irrevocable harm to the
national security."
"The USSR has the
world's only operational
ASAT system with an effec-
tive capability to seek and
destroy critical U.S. space
systems in near-Earth orbit,"
Reagan said. He said tests
were needed to "restore the
necessary Military balance in
this area."
But in an affidavit accom-
panying Yesterday's lawsuit,
former CIA Director William
o y c that even wi
o test, the U.S.
ASAT system "is alrea far
more advanced than be
em." He said that
of the 20 Sov tests to date,
half have failed.
Brown, a leading critic of
the controversial $4 billion
U.S. antisatellite program,
said the ASAT test was really
a preliminary test of the
President's proposed Star
Wars space defense system.
'Transparent'
"The miniature homing
device that is a key compo-
nent' of the ASAT weapon
"actually is ... an essential
element of one tier of a
space-based ballistic missile
program," Brown said. He
charged that Reagan's cer-
tification was "a transparent
effort to circumvent the
law."
White House spokesman
Larry Speakes denied the
charge.
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.....;_ ... ...t
ARTICLE APP
RE hat
!M PAG
ever the reasons for paring
, if staff, analysts assert that co m_
The J parries are their shortsighted by
/y tdmIping back k their analytical cape~-
Ris Business
biltiee.? "There is a secular trend of
ice*,"
the globalization of goods and serv-
Mr. Nye-side tnfo eaviron-
ent, it is self-defeating for a com-
papy to pull in its horns and concern
Small Firms
Face Squeeze
By KENNETHcN. GILPIN
it elf solely with. the domestic mar-
"'We sat down a few weeks ago and ? ket..You need someone in the corpo-
edunted up the number of contacts we ration with a sense of world events so
had that could get us to heads of state yoq won't get blindsided. Companies
.around the world, and the number that don't see. this are in for some
came to about 35," Mr. Colby said in shocks and loss. of market share.
an.interview. Political risk analysis is a field that
Although the private consulting has come of age only in the last deg-
firms charge more than individual, ado, as foreign affairs have rocked
sources say that Mr. Kissinger's ? other foregin affair
South Africa's problems may be an annual fee of about $250,000. Mr.
creating difficulties for a host of corn.. -singer's firm declined to comment
parries doing business with that coun?? `0~'its fee structure, but Arco and the
try. But for one business, political 1uor Corporation have said in the
risk assessment, it could prove some., 'past that they are clients. Mr. Colby 's
thing of a boon, serving as a reminder ? has much lower up-trout fees,
of the relevance of political inteffi. the industry sources said.
genre, particularly t mpanies op- '-Corporate risk analysts typically
erating abroad. earn $60,000 to $75,000 a year, acwrd-
The profession could use some bol-? ing to a survey by the Association of
stering. The South African problems Political Risk Analysts last year.
come at a time when companies such Some firms headed by well-known
as Atlantic Richfield and Gulf 011 individuals have managed to make
have been phasing out their political money, but the brunt of the downturn
risk departments, or decreasing their in the business is being borne by
importance. small consulting firms. Last year,
'136 percent of those responding to a
Nye, director of international evalua-
tion, said his unit was being dis-
banded as part of a restructuring.
From now on, someone with a part-
time job will be looking at interna-
tional affairs," said Mr. Nye, who
founded the department 11 years ago,
after receiving his doctorate in politi-
cal science at Washington University
in St. Louis. He will begin evaluating
foreign . government credits for
Moody's Investors Service in New
t onth
m
k
Y
-survey compiled by the Association of
Pblitical- Risk Analysts, a profes-
sional group, classified themselves as
consultants offering political risk
services, about half as many as the
'previous year.
? ? ?sAnyone can put out their shingle,"
said. William P. Kelly, deputy direc-
tor of international governmental af-
fairs at the Ford Motor Company.
"And a lot of the consulantancies
ere one-man operations."
R$asons for Shake-Out
x
or ne
Foreign affairs experts point to the
The reduction in in-house staff at Po
corporations, however, has aided a Secession of the early 1980's, corpo-
number of small consulting firms rdte retrenchment and dissatisfac-
headed by such foreign policy super tion with the kind of analysis that
stars as Henry A. Kissinger, former > nagement was getting to explain'
Secretary of State, and W i . Why the political risk business is
goWg through something of a shake-
_ "to
Colbv Director of Cent
oence from 1973 to 1876. These firms out. The strong dollar has also cut
offer the government experience of into overseas earnings at many com-
their key people as well as often panes and lessened their emphasis
providing contacts with government .oa.,foreign operations, they say.
officials here and abroad. "After the fall of the Shah of Iran in
Mr. Colby left another Washington -199, everybody said let's do some-
about political risk," said Gor-
consultitig firm, International Busi? Rayneld, a political risk analyst
Hess Government Counselors, to start ? in;ihe international economics group
his own firm, Colby, Bailey, Werner at the General Motors Corporation.
&, Associates, early this year, and `But the recession here caused com-
formed anetwork of outside consult- panies to cut staff in manufacturing
ants, including William B. Dale, a for- ln?ustries, in the oil industry and in
nier deputy managing director of the the banking industry. And some of the
International Monetary Fund. Access ;IR people to go were political risk
to a wide range of powerful people is y-ts,
'flit' important selling point.
rt who could
.inending problems and ideally
save a company money - was an at-
tractive one to many concerns.
Businesses turned to 'academia and
government to recruit experts who
could sift through complex economic
,and political data about Iran br Mex-
iccL or other potential trouble spots
.Around the world, and weigh their Im-
plications for their companies.
Gulf Oil-Angola Case Cited
political judgment can pay off is the
.decision taken in the mid-1970's by
Gulf Oil to remain in Angola in spite
of a widening revolution. In that
situation, sources said that the feeling
among Gulf's management was to
pull out of the country. The compa-
ny's international affairs group
argued against such a step, and Gulf
stayed. Cuban troops are guarding its
oil rigs, but Gulf is still there, making
money.
But if the idea of political risk as-
sessment seemed compelling, the
profession has encountered some
rough going. There is little question
that predicting riots and coups and
other generally unpredictable events
is a tough occupation. But that is the
kind of service that political risk ana-
lysts purport to offer.
The South African financial crisis,
which some analysts confess they did
not see coming, offers some insights
into the difficulties of analyzing polit-
ical risks. In that case, the growing
political unrest led to a loss of confi-
dence among some of the country's
creditors. The decision by the Chase
Manhattan Bank in July not to roll
over some debt reverberated through
the financial markets, leading even-
tually to a financial crisis for the
countrythat took some by surprise.
"I felt that things would get bad
quickly and saw that there had been
some capital flight," Mr. Rayfield of
G.M. said. "But I had no idea that
things would unravel so fast, and I
didn't make the short-term call. I talk
to a lot of people at other companies
on the phone, and no one was making
that prediction."
Continued
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Even when political analysts can
foresee troubles ahead in a particular
country, moreover, a company may
still encounter problems. For one
thing, the analysts may not succeed
in convincing management that their-
outlook is right. Perhaps more diffi-
cult is the case when analysts and
management agree, but there is no
easy way to react.
William Looney, an associate edi-
tor at Business International, a
weekly newsletter that tracks the im-
pact of international events on multi-
national companiess, said that a re-
cent survey of companies with invest-
ments in South Africa, for example,
showed that foreign companies felt
there was little, if anything, that
could have been done,
"A number of the savvier compa-
nies, like Ford, have slowly been
reducing their exposure there for
sometime," Mr. Looney said. Earlier
this year, Ford, which has been in the
country for more than 60 years,
merged part of its holdings with a
division of the Anglo American Cor-
poration.
"We made our decision based on
our long-term reading of the situation
down there," Mr. Kelly of Ford said.
Now that the risks in South Africa
have become more apparent, many. J
companies feel locked in. "A year
ago, we weren't sure when the pro-
cess of real polarization would turn
into street violence and cause disrup-
tions in the economy and the country
in general," Mr. Rayfield said. "Now
we know, but aside from lowering our
long-term market forecasts, all we
can really do is wait it out. Doing
something drastic, like pulling out or
selling out, will be much more diffi-
cult now."
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STAT
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ARTICLE APPEARED 6 September 1985
ON PAGE '/d
High-Stakes Lobbying' on Behalf of her a ions
Grows in Washington Around Aid, Trade Issues
By MONICA LANGLEY
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STRIET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON - Even though House
and Senate conferees were deliberating on
a foreign-aid authorization bill in a session
closed to lobbyists, Denis Neill and Leslie
Janka were lobbying hard for their clients.
Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.
Outside the conference room, Mr. Neill,
formerly with the Agency for International
Development, was meeting with law-
makers and their staff as they emerged,
suggesting changes in the bill to help his
foreign clients. At the other end of Penn-
sylvania Avenue, Mr. Janka, a former
Reagan administration official, shuttled
between the State and Defense depart-
ments, urging officials there to weigh in on
the congressional debate.
By the time the conferees wrapped up
the $12.8 billion foreign-aid bill at 1:30
a.m., just a week before Congress began
its summer recess, Messrs. Neill and
Janka were delighted that the legislators
had watered down a provision to prohibit
arms sales to Jordan until it negotiates a
peace treaty with Israel. They also were
pleased that the conferees didn't reduce
aid to Morocco because of its ties to Libya,
but did provide for $2.6 billion of funds to
Egypt next year.
Lobbying for Countries Grows
Such high-stakes and finely orches-
trated lobbying on behalf of countries is
growing on a wide range of issues includ.
ing economic aid, military assistance and
international trade. Nations that used to
rely on their ambassadors making the
rounds on the dinner circuit increasingly
are rushing to sign up this town's top lob-
byists, including many former high-rank-
ing government officials, and paying re-
tainers of as much as $600,000 a year.
Yet some worry that the growing ranks
of lobbyists representing foreign govern-
ments are harmful. "By hiring the elite
lobbyists, foreign governments can manip-
ulate the administration and Congress to
act against our own national interests,"
charges Joel Lisker, former chief of the
Justice Department's foreign-agents unit.
"If not against our national security," he
says, "against our economic health, with
era[ to investigate some lobbyists' actions
on behalf of foreign interests.
Lobbying and law firms predictably are
taking advantage of this swelling eager-
ness by foreign governments and corpora-
tions to retain Washington representation.
Gray & Co., for example, a big lobbying
and public-relations firm here, set up a
separate lobbying unit catering to foreign-
government clients.
About 850 lobbying firms are registered
now with the Justice Department, repre-
senting "thousands" of individual lobby.
ists, according to Mr. Lisker. This number
has risen steadily in the past four years, he
adds. And more often, high-ranking offi-
cials are leaving government and lobbying
for foreign interests.
William Colb came out of the Central
Intelli ence A enc an start re resent-
1g Sineanore at an an raz ea-
gan campaign operatives Charles Black,
Paul Manafort and Roger Stone have
signed up Saudi Arabia, Peru, Portugal,
the Bahamas, St. Lucia and the Dominican
Republic. Stanton Anderson was a deputy
assistant secretary of state until he left to
start his own firm, now representing Japa-
nese and Brazilian interests. Richard
Stone, former U.S. senator from Florida,
now lobbies for Taiwan. And William Ful-
bright, former chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, has advised
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emir-
ates.
And the pay is typically higher from
these foreign governments than from do-
mestic clients, lobbyists acknowledge.
Neill & Co. receives $360,000 from Egypt,
$300,000 from Morocco and $260,000 from
Jordan as annual retainers. South Africa
pays $500,000 a.year to John P. Sears, for-
mer Reagan campaign director, and $300,-
000 to the law firm headed by former Sen.
George Smathers. Gray & Co. just renego-
tiated its contract with Turkey, doubling
the fee it receives, to $600,000 a year.
"Foreign countries tend to pay bigger
fees to lobbyists, because they are more
susceptible to big names and past titles,"
says Thomas Quinn, a Washington lobby-
ist.
Congress Bewilders Them
often frustrating to them because one con-
gressman can stop everything," says Jo-
seph Blatchford, former director of the
Peace Corps and Commerce Department
official, now with the O'Connor & Hannon
law firm here.
As foreign-country business heats up,
lobbying firms are establishing areas of
the world in which they claim to be expert.
Neill & Co., for instance, is establishing it-
self as expert in the Middle East. Edward
van Kloberg of Van Kloberg & Associates
says his firm "specializes in developing
countries and Eastern European coun-
tries." His group represents Romania,
Iraq and Cameroon.
Yet, some lobbyists refuse to represent
countries they fear would hurt their credi-
bility. "We have turned down Libya sev-
eral times," says Niels Holch, a Gray &
Co. vice president. "And we also refused
to represent the Nicaraguan freedom
fighters." Gray & Co. does represent South
Korea, the Cayman Islands, Haiti, Mo-
rocco, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
A group of 14 congressmen recently
called on Attorney General Edwin Meese
to investigate the foreign-agent disclosures
made by the Washington law firm repre-
senting Nicaragua. In a letter, the law-
makers asserted that the firm, Reichler &
Appelbaum, "may have falsified their re-
cent activities report" by failing to dis-
close that they "initiated, facilitated and
assisted in the production and dissemina-
tion" of two reports alleging human-rights
violations by Nicaragua's anti-government
resistance forces.
Paul Reichler says his firm isn't re-
quired to report that it initiated and helped
carry out the reports; disclosure is re-
quired only if he disseminated the reports,
and he didn't, he says. The letter to the at-
torney general "is obviously a political
statement for 14 apologists for the Con-
tras," he asserts.
While representing foreign governments
is generally very profitable, there can be
surprises, as Mr. Blatchford, the former
Commerce Department official, found.
Hired by then-President Nimeiri of the Su-
dan, he lost the lobbying contract abruptly
when a military coup occurred early this
summer. "My clients don't drop me; they
get overthrown," quips Mr. Blatchford.
"The next foreign country that retains me,
I'm going to ask for the fee upfront."
the current trade imbalance as the best ex- Lobbyists say foreign governments gen-
ample." erally hire them for help before Congress,
With the rapid rise in the numbers of because they find it bewildering to accom-
foreign-nation lobbyists, some members of modate so many members with so varied
Congress want greater disclosure to the interests to protect. "Foreign countries
government on their activities. Other law- think they can handle the State Depart-
makers have asked the U.S. attorney gen- ment, but Congress, on the other hand, is
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?1 PAGE I September 1985
DRAGONS
HAVE ~0 BE
IMI JD
William Colby, the Colorless CIA Director, Was Tired of
Battling James v Angleton, the Agency's Mysterious Counterspy.
Does a Bureaucrat Get Rid of a Legend?
One weekend this May, strug-
gling to maintain some poise
but betraying the discomfi-
ture of an assistant headmas-
ter whose chair had been
slipped out from under him
one time too many, the vice chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, Senator Patrick Leahy, whistled
in the media to announce his intention to
launch an immediate inquiry. Despite
the law's requirement and the Reagan
administration's statements that at least
the chairmen and vice chairmen of both
the Senate and House intelligence com-
mittees must be adequately informed of
all covert activities, the Vermont Demo-
crat was clearly worked up at the extent
to which "things have fallen between the
cracks. "
The detonation the previous week of a
car bomb in Beirut that killed more than
80 people was the direct consequence,
according to the Washington Post, of a
late-1984 administration directive to the
Burton Hersh has been working on a book about
the CIA for two years. He has written for The
Washingtonian about diplomat-lawyer Sol Linow-
itz and Senator Edward Kennedy; his previous
books include The Mellon Family and The Educa-
tion of Edward Kennedy.
By Burton Hersh
Central Intelligence Agency to put to-
gether native teams for "pre-emptive
strikes" against suspected local terror-
ists. Of this initiative-promptly denied
by the administration itself-virtually
nothing had reached the ears of Leahy
and his fellow Democrats because none
of them had enough of an inkling of the
administration's covert intentions to
frame the right questions during intelli-
gence-committee hearings. As for that
car bombing? Under attack from report-
ers, the magisterial Leahy had pressed
for answers and "found out about it on
my own. " To preclude subsequent bush-
whacking, Leahy announced, "We're
going to review six or seven operations.
I do not want my side to get caught on a
Nicaraguan-mining type problem. "
It's been a decade since cataclysm came
close to obliterating the Central Intelli-
gence Agency; Senator Leahy's public
desperation was itself a measure of how
far Agency leadership had vitiated the
oversight-and-disclosure process and re-
turned the clandestine establishment to
business as usual.
Ten years ago, responding to the pub-
lic's outrage at reports of broad-scale
domestic mail-opening programs, drug
travesties, and decades of bungled assas-
sination plots, the post-Watergate Con-
gress set up its first sweeping investiga-
tion of the CIA since authorizing the
Agency in 1947. Down bureaucratic rat
holes, like so many fire-hose nozzles,
the Pike and Church Committees sec-
onded by the Rockefeller Commission
let loose a torrent of investigators and
depositions and conscience-stricken case
officers and subpoenas and discovery
documents and unfriendly witnesses un-
til month by month the deepest cata-
combs of the intelligence community
were swamped to the rafters. Out into
the publicity of the hour there streamed
an incredible proliferation of espionage
mavens and subversion impresarios,
species rarely identified before, many
bobtailed and indignant at such a historic
interruption.
Least unhappy-looking, friends of the
intelligence community kept noticing,
was the Agency's tidy little director. It
was William Colby, after all, whose
slips to newsmen had all but sounded
the alarms; now he seemed blithe
enough, and forthcoming at all times
before the swarming investigative
bodies. "Bill, do you really have to
present all this material to us?" a heavv-
Cnntlnued
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ARTICLE APPEARS
ON PAGE
BALTIMORE SUN
11 August 1985
Number of Soviets in U.S.
called threat to security
By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington bureau of The Sun
WASHINGTON - Operating
from an imposing embassy on 16th
Street here that predates the Com-
munist revolution. Soviet spies gath-
er Information almost openly In the
halls of the federal government and
more circumspectly on suburban
back roads.
Across the continent, in an afflu-
ent San Francisco neighborhood
called Cow Hollow. a seven story
brick building houses the Soviet con-
sulate. The American counterintelli-
gence community regards It as the
West Coast headquarters for the re-
lentless Soviet pursuit of U.S. high
technology, military and otherwise.
. These are the most prominent
outposts of the hundreds of Soviet
and other Eastern bloc agents be-
lieved to be operating In the United
States. They have become increas-
ingly controversial since the charges
that the alleged Walker "spy ring"
sold Navy secrets to Moscow for
nearly two decades and the first-
time ever conviction of an FBI agent
for passing bureau information to
the Soviet Union.
The Soviets' American outposts
are a source of frustration to coun-
terintelligence experts and govern-
ment officials who believe Washing-
ton Is needlessly giving Soviet
espionage a helping hand by permit-
ting too many official Russians in
the United States.
A recent report by the Senate In-
telligence Committee put it this way:
The danger to U.S. national se-
curity entailed by larger-than-neces-
sary numbers of Soviet diplomatic
and consular officials in the U.S. and
Soviet personnel at our embassy and
consulates in the Soviet Union re-
quires immediate action."
The mention of Soviet personnel
in U.S. facilities was a reference to
the fact that while the Soviet Union
provides all Its own personnel in this
country, from janitors to ambassa-
dors, the United States hires Rus-
sians for many jobs at U.S. facilities
in the Soviet Union.
The report went on to say that
while administration officials say
they are committed to fbdng the
problem, little effort has actually
been seen.
In fact. President Reagan used
his Saturday radio broadcast on
June 29 to say the United States
should 'reduce the size of the hostile
intelligence threat we're up against
In this country." In the same broad-
cast, the president said that "we
need a balance between the size of
the Soviet diplomatic presence in the
United States and the U.S. presence
in the Soviet Union...."
At the State Department, howev-
er. an official involved with the issue
says there's no plan to reduce the
Am of the Soviet contingent in this
country. As far as the balance dis-
cussed by the president goes. con-
sideration is b being workers U.S fadlg
ties with Americans when we can
afford It and it will contribute to em-
bassy security."
? This has been the department's
longstanding approach to the ques-
tion.
The Soviet Union has about 320
persons officially associated with its
embassy here and consulate in San
Francisco, about evenly divided be-
tween diplomats and support per-
spnnel such as chauffeurs and jani-
tors. The U.S. counterintelligence
community estimates that perhaps
aP much as 40 percent of the total is
composed of professional spies.
" The United States has 185 Amer-
icans off cially working at its embas-
sy and consulate in the Soviet
Union. nearly all diplomats. Moscow
has not put a limit on the number of
Americans It will allow, but the
Cited States capped the Soviet
presence here at 320 in 1980 as a
response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
These figures do not count the
number of Soviets assigned to the
United Nations in New York or such
c an- numbers as trade delega-
tMns the like that allegedly have
been used as covers for spies.
In total, according to the FBI,
there are approximately 4.300 offi-
cials f!om the Soviet Union, Soviet
bloc countries. Cuba and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China in the United
States. It Is estimated that 30 to 40
percent of them are intelligence pro-
fessionals.
.
The arrest on spy charges of for-
mar
Navy warrant officer John A.
Walker Jr., two relatives and a for-
mer Navy colleague sent shock
waves through both the military and
the counterintelligence communi-
ties. Mr. Walker was arrested May
21 in Montgomery County after the
FBI said he left a plastic bag with
classified documents for a Russian
contact. That contact was apparent-
ly a Soviet diplomat seen in the area
of the drop, the FBI says.
John Walker's brother, Arthur,
was convicted Friday of seven char-
ges involving espionage.
The Walker case reinforces our
longstanding concern about the ex-
tent and scope of Soviet espionage
activities in this country." said Sen.
Patrick J. Leahy. D-Vt.. vice chair-
man of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee.
Mr. Leahy and Sen. William S.
Cohen, R-Maine, have written an
amendment to the State Department
authorization bill to limit the num-
ber of Soviet diplomats and embassy
personnel in this country to the
number of Americans in similar po-
sitions in the Soviet Union. ,
In introducing the measure to the
Senate, Mr. Leahy said It would
speed the reduction of the approxi-
mately 200 Russians employed by
the U.S. embassy in Moscow and
consulate in Leningrad.
It would, as well. he said. require
"action to be taken to draw down the
numbers of Soviet diplomatic and
consular representatives in the Unit-
ed States."
The State Department opposed
the amendment. saying the limits on
its flexibility in carrying out its own
staffing process "could be harmful to
U.S. interests."
Last week. the amendment sur-
vived in the final version of the State
Department authorization bill. The
administration has six months to
come up with a plan for evening out
the numbers.
it doesn't mean you're going to
stop spying here," Senator Leahy
told a TV interviewer. "There's no
way you could pass a law to outlaw
the Soviets spying here, but you
could certainly cut down the number
of those who have diplomatic immu-
nity and give the FBI a fighting
chance. Right now, they don't have
that."
Accordinil to William Colby, for-
mer director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, "A ood way to han-
dle the Soviets is strict reCIDrOCIty. In
other words, if we have 10 people.
Continued
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ON PAGE - C _
WASHINGTON TIMES
5 August 1985
Monday's People
Spoken word, and then some
William Colby
Words, words, words.
Speaking is the agenda
and the main order of
business at the 154th
annual convention of the
International Platform
Association today through
Friday at the Mayflower
Hotel. Former CIA direc-
tor William Colby, former
ambassador to France
Evan Galbraith and
magician-illusionist Harry
Blackstone Jr. are among
first-day speakers.
By the time the IPA con-
vention winds up, among
those joining them at the
microphone will be Joan
Mondale, wife of the former vice president, Walter
Mondale; Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kan.; Rep. Claude Pep-
per, D-Fla.; J. Peter Grace, former CIA director Stan-4
field 1Lrner Malcolm S. Forbes Jr., Jeane Dixon,
David Hartman, Dick Cavett, Douglas Fairbanks Jr.
and singer-songwriter lbddy Pendergrass.
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ARTr WASHINGTON POST
,~A(1.~C;L7t 4 August 1985
ff7iatDo You Do
-N-MeiiYou. Get
B Y I ~4 A N'
B R 1` rT n v
William Colby, CIA director 1973.
1976. In 1975. President Gerald Ford
fired William Colby as chief of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. Colby stepped
down in 1976.
When Colby took over the CIA. he
acted against such practices as open-
ing citizens' mail. The agency had been
looking at U.S. citizens' mail to the
Soviet Union lince 1952. when. Colby
says. "we were worried about atomic
spies." He explains: "1 told Congress_
in a secret report ... what had gone on... I
was trying to show that the CIA was not
(hiding) under every bed in the country
But my secret report leaked... The
Nei' York Times published an article
that launched a full Congressional in-
vestigation. I was fired. Afterward. I
wrote Honorable Men, in which I show
the CIA is basically a good outfit. I'm
writing a book about Vietnam. where I
worked for the agency for years." He
also runs an international investment
consulting firm.
"Sure." Colby says. "it's a shock to
be tired, but it's the end of a job. not the
end of your life."
William Colby. Fired as
director of the CIA.
ire d~
STAT
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i
DN PAGE_ July, August,
Intelligence for
Business Leadership
By William E. Colby, General Partner,
Colby, Bailey, Werner and Associates
The intelligence process is traditionally con-
sidered to be a system of collection of information,
especially in the more exotic form of es ip onage.
Since espionage is by definition illegal, one won-
dgrs how intelligence can then be reconciled with
business. In fact, intelligence has grown far
bond its earlier identification with espionage.
Today, masses of information flow to intel-
ligence centers and are exchanged among them.
The triumphs of modern communication and
other forms of high technology have now created
the information age with its ability to report
instantaneously the most obscure details concern-
ing most of the world.
Technology has also produced new techniques
for assembling and accessing information, from
electronic communication to satellite photog-
raphy to computer data banks. In government
intelligence circles some of the techniques re-
main secret, but at the same time much of the
substantive information acquired is released to
provide the information necessary to public
debate. An example of this is current Soviet
nuclear weaponry, weapons the Soviets consider
secret but which we learn about through secret
means and about which our Department of
Defense reports to the public on a regular basis.
The intelligence process also comprises a third
stet), which is probably least well-developed in
government, but which is easily achieved in the
private sector. This is the application of infor-
mation collection and analysis to the particular
problem faced by the decision maker. In business,
if the analysis is not relevant to the decision
maker, he will not purchase the service. T the
incentive for private enterprise is to focus intel-
ligence support on the business leader's ques-
tions. These may include specific bureaucratic,
regulatory or cultural problems a business may
face, as well as broader political or economic
trends. The business leader is also as much inter-
ested in opportunity as danger, so the business
intelligence process must identify the positive
as well as negative implications.
The usual business situation requiring an intel-
hhence assessment is an investment or acquisition
abroad, reflecting a company's desire to expand
September 1985
or diversify its operations into a new and promis-
ing market. But before acting on the basis of a
market survey alone, the prudent executive should
insist on a look ahead at the political and
economic environment of the market nation.
The result may be more subtle than a simple
go-no-go decision, as the investment may be
structured to limit the investor's exposure. Or
the assessment may reassure that an apparent
threat, such as the election of a Socialist govern-
ment, will not in fact result in nationalization.
Thus the business leader has access to a vast col-
lection of facts about the modern world, assisted
by remarkable advances in communications,
information storage, and energetic reporting ser-
vices. As many business leaders can attest, how-
ever, the results can be less than satisfactory as the
flood of data can be difficult to order and absorb.
A new industry of intelligence analysis for
business purposes now exists in the United States.
In all cases the process is essentially judgmental,
depending upon a broad background of exper-
ience not only with the area and subject but with
the techniques of analysis. The process also
includes the second opinion familiar to the med-
ical profession, an independent assessment, ac-
quired from a separate source, to check the
reliability of the first judgment. When uncertain-
ties exist they must be identified, even high-
lighted in alternate projections of contradictory
scenarios, to warn the business leader of the
degree of risk he is assuming by relying on one
or another judgment about a future development.
For the business leader the important thing
is to recognize the need for the full intelligence
process as he faces a decision. He must not be
satisfied with a simple assurance from his regional
manager that there is a bright and happy future
in a given country and that all of his friends in
the Western-oriented business class feel that
things are in good shape despite some problems
in the countryside.
Either as a function of the business operation
itself or through outside consultants the decision
maker must insist upon a meticulous examin-
ation through the full intelligence process, i.e.,
collection of the information analysis of the
implications, and application to the particular
decision. In this way the business leader can take
advantage of the enormous growth of the intel-
ligence process in America in these last few
decades. He can at least identify the degree of
risk he faces even when he is not truly certain
C" Wed
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of a result, so that he
can measure the gain
he must anticipate as
justification for assum-
ing the risk involved.
In this way he can not
only demonstrate due
diligence in his
responsibilities, but
true wisdom in his
decisions. ?
Jt.
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ON FAGE~._...-~
TIME
8 July 1985
The Problems with Retaliation
Fear ex-CIA chiefs weigh the options for countering terrorism
he TWA hijacking have fed
he desire to find some way to
o to terrorists what they are
oing to American citizens.
threaten and perhaps take the lives of hi-
jackers? Might swift retribution deter ter-
rorists, or at least punish them? What
about covert counterterror, the capacity to
identify and eliminate terrorists, pre-emp-
Navy strike team trains In California
" If there are casual ties, so be i t. "
tively or in retaliation? TIME Washington
Bureau Chief Strobe Talbott put these
questions to four former directors of the
Central Intelligence Agency. All agreed
that the U.S. should move vigorously and
effectively to oppose terrorism but not
adopt assassination as an instrument of
policy.
Each of the former CIA chiefs has had
other experiences that bear on the current
challenge. Richard Helms (Director of
Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973)
spent many years in the CIA's clandestine
services and was Ambassador to Iran from
1973 to 1976, so he knows about Shiite
fundamentalism firsthand. James Schle-
singer (DCI from January through June
1973) was Secretary of Defense from 1973
to 1975. William Colby (DCI, 1973 to 1976)
ran the highly controversial Phoenix
counterinsurgency program in Viet Nam
from 1968 to 1971. And at the request
of Annapolis Classmate Jimmy Carter,
Stansfield Turner (DCI, 1977 to 1981) came
to the CIA from a career in the Navy. Their
interviews with Talbott follow.
RICHARD HELMS
It is very important to keep these inci-
dents in perspective and not get so incred-
ibly worked up over them. Terrorism, of
course, is a serious challenge, and we must
do our best to deal with it. But to declare a
"war on terrorism" is just to hype the
problem, not solve it. The quiet, steady
approach is better than bombast.
As for assassination, it's just not on.
The people of the U.S. won't stand for it.
In fact, there are problems with all levels
of violent action. Let's say the Delta Force
puts on masks and goes in and blows up
an installation around Beirut. We've vio-
lated the sovereignty of Lebanon and
killed a lot of people in cold blood. Are
they terrorists? You'll have a lot of argu-
ment about that, just on our side alone.
What if you send in a coup-de-main
group of civilians [a hit team]? If it comes
out that they were Americans-and it
takes no time at all for that kind of thing
to unravel in public-you're facing all
sorts of allegations.
If, instead, the blow-and-burn stuff is
done by surrogates whom you've trained
in the black arts and given a suitable cov-
er, there is a whole other set of problems.
If you've recruited them from dissidents
who have an ideological motivation, they
may be very hard to control. You may
think you've called the operation off and
wake up one morning and find out they've
gone and done it anyway.
Let's say we have reason to believe that
Khomeini or Gaddafi is behind some ter-
rorist act, so you decide to strike by attack-
ing the Iranian oil fields or a Libyan air force
base. In the latter case, you've now got all
the Arabs against you. Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and the moderates will feel immense pres-
sure to line up with their Arab brethren.
We've got to get used to the disagreeable fact
that there really is no quick fix for terrorism.
What we do need is improved intelligence
work against terrorist groups. Penetration
can help derail the nasty stuff. When I was
in the agency, the CIA penetrated the P L.O.,
and we helped head off several terrorist acts,
including an assassination attempt against
Golda Meir.
We also need improved cooperation
among free-world intelligence services. As
long as we have a leaky Congress and a
leaky oversight process, friendly services
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 ARTI CLE
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WASHINGTON POST
24 June 1985
Controversy at Cosmos
Oath Opposing Women Members Required
By Sandra G. Boodman
Washington Post Staff Writer
The officers of Washington's
posh Cosmos Club thought they had
finally found a way to defuse the
embarrassing controversy over ad-
mission policies that has simmered
for more than a dozen years. Their
solution: to require prospective
members to sign an oath stating
they will not seek to change the
bylaws that exclude women.
Rather than squelching a debate
its officers characterize as "un-
seemly," however, the policy seems
likely to revive the furor over let-
ting women join the elite social club
that was founded 107 years ago for
"men of accomplishment." Amon _
its 3100 members are supreme
Court Justice Harr A. Blackmun
an William Colby, former direc-
tor of---the Central me igence
Aency_.
TheCosmos Club is not tax ex-
empt. and thus is under no legal
obligation to admit women. Last
year the club, located in an ornate
Embassy Row mansion valued at
$5.1 million at 2121 Massachusetts
Ave. NW, paid nearly $104,000 in
real estate taxes, city records show.
Within days after the policy was
announced earlier this month by the
club's board of management in its
eagerness to "restore a tranquil and
sociable atmosphere," the Commit-
tee of Concerned Members of the
Cosmos Club, a group favoring the
admission of women, hinted it might
challenge the policy in court. A law-
suit, Samuel P. Hayes, leader of the
Committee of Concerned Members,
warned in a recent letter to the
board, "could hardly take place
without undesirable publicity."
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ASSOCIATED PRESS
9 June 1985
WHAT ARE AMERICA'S MOST COVETED SECRETS
By HENRY GOTTLIB
WASHINGTON
An American Army officer once joked that a way to stymie Soviet spies woulo
be to feed them all 19.6 million classified U.S. documents, requiring them to
spend years sifting the entire pile _ much of it useless.
While no one in the Pentagon has taken the sL!ggestion seriously, many
intelligence experts agree that the key to espionage is quality, not quantity;
that some top-secret leaKage harms U. S. security but much of does no damage at
all
What intrigues some analysts about the alleged spying by former Navy
communications specialist John Walker Jr. and a band of associates is that the
secrets Walker could have passed to the Soviets appear to range from very
valuable to highly "perishable" information that wasn't very important.
On the issue of intelligence in general, "there's no laundry list of what's
the most important, but it is possible to distinguish between what is highly
valuable and what is marginally dangerous if lost," said James J. Townsend, a
Soviet affairs expert at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and ntP nnfiLnal
Studies.
Highest in value, according to Townsend, would be information that would
reveal to the Soviets U.S. sources of information on what the Soviet military
machine is doing.
For example, the most damaging loss to U.S. intelligence would be exposure of
a y'well-laced U.S. spies, in the Kremlin ..or the revelation of U.S. techni ues
of direct intelligence gathering on Soviet opera ions.
"The highest priority of any intelligence operation is to find out where the
;.F,aks are," Townsend said.
It is for this reason that when spies are discovered, an effort is often made
to turn them into double agents or dupe them into passing useless or inaccurate
information to their masters.
There are also electronic means of monitoring a potential enemy, and the
seriousness of the Walker case stems from his possible access to codes, jamming
techniques and other surveillance measures that might have helped the Soviets
know how America tracks their ships, Navy officials have said.
beyond the category of spy vs. spy and the question of how the United States
gathers intelligence electronically, the most vital secrets are those that could
inform an enemy o a U.S. mill arv vulnerability. Former CIA Director William
E. Colby, in a telephone interview, referred to such information as "chinks in
the armor}ter a any country woo be desperate to hide.
Pentagon and Capitol Hill sources revealed on Thursday that the CIA is
studying whether the Soviet Union can detect and track America's nuclear
missile-firing submarines.
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P~4% NEW YORK TIMES
6 June 1985
Money Said to Have Replaced
Ideology as Main Spy Motive
By IRVIN MOLOTSKY
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 5 - "Money is
the dominant reason" Americans now
choose to spy for the Soviet Union, ac-
cording to Stansfield Turner, a former
Director of Central Intelligence.
,Admiral Turner, who served in the
callgl: Adminitratsut: and o er or-
1her officials concerned with n-aTional
ecurity agreed in separate interviews
today that ideology was no e
-
-
es
P167
'n reason Americans commir
a e as r was to S 19JQ s.
They suggested it was muc more
difficult to capture a spy acting for
financial gain than those who do it for
reasons of ideology. The current spy
case involving three members of the
Walker family was broken only after
the former wife of one took her story to
the authorities.
Ideology in Rosenberg. Case
Perhaps the most famous case in-
volving ideology in the United States
was the one that led to the execution of
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, a case
that still stirs sharp argument over
their guilt today, 32 years after their
execution. They were the only Amer-
icans ever `executed in the United
States after a civilian trial for espio-
nage, having been convicted of trans-
mitting nuclear weapons secrets to the
Soviet Union.
Another was the perjury conviction
of Alger Hiss, a former State Depart-
The arcane language of espionage:
Washington Talk, page B14.
merit official imprisoned when he
denied charges brought against him by
I Whittaker Chambers. Mr. Hiss has
I long denied guilt.
William E. Colbcr. who headed the
Central intelligence rtkencv from
' o 1 9 7 6 , , said a is. c
Philbv- uraess- ac - Uwe
Arl Britain in vvoo ved-acZ.iv!. a -
.curred "when a ovl u
sented antifascism aria t e .were R -W
off with the Hitler-Stalin nonaggression
pact and later with the information
provided by Nikita Khrushchev when
he denounced the horrors of Stalin's re-
gime, Mr. Colby said.
More Potential Recruits
The current investigation, involving
John A. Walker and others, presents
pieblems typical of those that the
United States must deal with these
days, the intelligence experts said.
"John Walker is a money case," Ad-
miral Turner said.
Gene R. LaRocque, a retired admiral
who is director of the Center for De-
fense Information, a group often criti-
cal of the Reagan Administration, said
the development of spying-for-money
was dangerous because the field of
potential recruits is so much larger.
"The ideologues are few in number,"
he said. "The people who want a little
more cash are legion."
Griffin B. Bell, the Attorney General
in the Carter Administration, said
changing values were also having an
effect in a number of recent spy cases.
"With the breakdown in values,
partly because of Vietnam and partly
Watergate, and a looseness in general
discipline, both social and organiza-
tional, secrets are held in much more
contempt," Mr. Bell said. "The `me'
generation and `I'll make it onmy own'
have lea to recent circumstances that
have beer. financially based."
Asked to review the spy cases he
knew about as the nation's chief prose-
cutor, Mr. Bell said, "I don't know of
any ideological recruits."
Few Leads With Money Cases
A knowledgeable intelligence source,
who would not rmit use o his name,
.had this appraisa :
"In counterespionage, if you can
identity 'geological groups, that's won-.
derful. B ut when it's pure cash for sale,
you :lull : have any leads. It makes
searching for the agents much more
opt ncult, if not impossible."
Morton Halperin, a Pentagon and
National Security Council official from
1966 to 1969, agreed that ideology was
no longer the main motive for espio-
nage and said this undercut the notion
that the Government should investi-
gate the ideological past of Americans.
"The people convicted in the past
seemed to have acted out of political
reasons," Mr. Halperin said. Now, he
said, it would seem to matter less that
a person was once a member of the
Communist or Socialist Party, or the
Anericar'.r for Democratic Action.
Presceution Policy Change
Mr. Halperin is now director of the
Center for National Security Affairs,
which deals with security and civil
liberties matters and has been critical
of Reagan Administration policies.
Another change noted by Mr. Halp-
erin was that the Government was now
prosecuting people who spy for money.
"In the cast," he said, "the Govern-
ment would make them double agents
or feed tnem false information. That
would cast doubt on the information
they had sent previously. Also, if you
prosecute, you blow your double
agent."
Mr. Halperin noted that it was Mr.
Bell who, as Attorney General, had
changed that policy.
Mr. Bell said he had decided to prose-
cute such cases because "I always
thought we were going to have to have
more sentences to do something about
it."
"We do need to have more trials,
more examples, more long prison
terms," he said, "if we are going to
bring it under control."
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AUME
09 PW
WASHINGTON TIMES
4 June 1985
Vernon
;Walters
Debunking the image
of mysterious lone wolf
By Deborah Papier
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
he lone wolf. Furtive, mysterious; A 'creature.
of the shadows, moving stealthily through
those nether regions of the diplomatic world
where the light of publicity never shines. %
f This was the reputation Vernon Walters developed
some would say cultivated - in four decades of
service to the United States as a military intelligence
officer, deputy director of the CIA and special State
Department envoy.
But Vernon ]Dick) Walters, who two weeks ago
became Jeane Kirkpatrick's replacement as ambassa-
dor to the United Nations, doesn't have much patience
these days with that cloak-and-dagger image.
"It's bunk," he says. "The lone wolf creeping around;
that's an overdone legend. I've been highly visible for
a long time. I could show you a box as large as this
coffee table filled with cassettes of public speeches I
have made in various parts of the United States.
"I have not been publicity-seeking;' he continues. "I
don't seek the limelight, because I find I can work more
effectively if I don't. But I don't shun it either. This idea
of my fleeing and hiding ... as I said at the press
conference the day I was nominated, I have never trav-
eled under a false name, I have never used a passport
that was not made out in my name; and unlike many of
the people in this room I could say that I'd never reg-
istered in a hotel under any name but my own"
The point that Mr. Walters wishes to make is that he
is not some mole suddenly forced, at the age of 68, to
adjust to a life above ground.. He does not see his new
-post as representing a radical change in direction for
him, but rather as a natural culmination of a long
career in foreign affairs that involved him in most of
the important events of our time, from the implementa-
tion of the Marshall Plan in Europe after World War 11
and the founding of the Organization of American
States, to the Paris peace talks with the North Vietnam-
ese and the normalization of relations with the People's
Republic of China.
"The reason why I do not feel awestruck by this jo "
says Mr. Walters, "is that everything I've been doing for
many years has been in direct preparation for it. Fur
44 years I've been serving the United States all over the
world. I've translated for six presidents. 1 would ven-
ture to say I've probably been involved in world affairs
longer than any of my predecessors in this job"
"I think Walters comes to the job running full-speed,"
says former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, for
whom Mr. Walters worked as a special envoy. "He'll
have no learning process. He's fully abreast of all the
international issues, has been involved in the evolution
of those issues. He will garner a level of respect that
may be unprecedented in the history of that post. I
would anticipate he will be the most effective U.N.
'ambassador we've had in recent years"
Former President Richard Nixon goes even further.
saying that Mr. Walters is a "world-class strategic
'thinker," and that this skill, 'com-
bined with his linguistic talents (he
speaks eight languages), makes him
"the best-qualified American
ambassador to the United Nations
since the organization was founded"
Despite Mr. Walters'
qualifications for the post, the
course from his nomination to his
confirmation was not a smooth one.
He was nominated by President
Reagan in early February. Six weeks
later, it was reported that he was pre-
pared to turn down the assignment
unless he could be guaranteed the
same access to National Security
Council meetings that Jeane Kirk-
patrick had, access that Secretary of
State George Shultz evidently
wished to deny him.
"It was not a matter of personal
pique," says Mr. Walters. "I felt that
if the position were diminished my
voice would be muted; and it was not
in the interest of the United States to
have a U.N. delegate with a muted
voice. I also thought that coming on
the withdrawal from UNESCO, it
could be interpreted as the United
States' giving up on the United
Nations, turning its back on it."
It is still not clear exactly how
-much access to the National Secu-
rity Council Mr. Walters will have,
but he professes himself content
with the disposition of that particu-
lar issue.
"I've been told that the terms of
reference of my job are exactly the
same as Ithose ofI my predecessor,
which is perfectly satisfactory to
me. A great many newspapers indi-
cated that I had accepted a down-
graded job, a lessened job, and that's
just not true.
Lu Lris>~t
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Alin CLB Ap W-11R
Of PAGE__7j2A.-
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
20 May 1985
"Information Boutiques"-
Intelligence a Price
Former government agents,
academics are striking gold by
selling guidance about foreign
developments to business.
NEW YORK
A few years ago, an ex-CIA agent
walked into the headquarters of Secu-
rity Pacific Bank in Los Angeles and
said his new company could provide
useful information. He knew, for exam-
ple, that Spanish officials were lying
about their country's inflation rate. "I
was amazed," recalls Richard Kjeldsen,
the bank's international economist. "I
thought he would be talking about peo-
ple running around with Molotov cock-
tails-not economic affairs."
Now, such visits are commonplace as
former State Department officials, aca-
demics and espionage agents, plus
business executives with international
connections, sell their expensive in-
ances of international affairs to corpo-
rate chieftains. His firm cloaks itself in
mystery-the door to its Manhattan of-
fices says merely "Suite 1100."
In Washington, a multitude of one-
time Central Intelligence Agency direc-
tors and operatives have formed similar
companies. Former CIA Director Wil-
liam Colby spends part of his time work-
ing for International Business-Govern-
merit Counsellors, Inc. Richard Helms,
another ex-director, advises clients such
as the Bechtel Group on Mideast securi-
ty matters. Andrew Falkiewicz, once
assistant director of the CIA under
George Bush, runs a company called
Dunedin Corporation with five former
CIA analysts.
Algxander Haig, former Secretary of
State, likewise trades his knowledge of
foreign leaders for a fee, as do many
lesser ex-State Department officials.
Cox, Lloyd Associates, a New York
research house, estimates that busi-
nesses in 1984 spent 3 billion dollars on
news and information-a figure that
increases about 10 percent each year.
Though the bulk of that money goes
for conventional news and financial-in-
formation services, Connie Cox, presi-
dent, notes that scores of "information
boutiques" with revenues of less than 2
million dollars now offer what could be
described as private intelligence. Ob-
serves Cox: "It's enough to keep a
number of people living comfortably."
What information is worth that kind
of money? A Long Beach, Calif., orga-
.nization called Business Environment
Risk Information predicted in Decem-
ber of 1980 that President Anwar Sa-
dat of Egypt would be assassinated
within a year or two. Ten months later,
the prediction came true.
BERI also forecast an Iraqi invasion of
Iran nine months before it occurred.
Yet it said India's Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi stood only a 10 percent chance
of assassination-adding that if she
were killed, a military takeover would
ensue. Gandhi was later murdered, and
there was no military coup. BERI
charges $144 a year for a newsletter and
$400 per country for specific reports.
Humble pie. Dunedin Corporation
correctly forecast the results of local
West German elections that led to the
victory of Chancellor Helmut Kohl in
sights into the' twists and turns of for-
eign economic and political events:
For companies needing guidance
about foreign lands, there is no lack of
sources-
^ A dozen large corporations- pay
$2,000 a month for Oxford Analytica,
an Oxford, England, service that issues
electronically a daily news analysis.
a InterMatrix Group of Westport,
Conn., 'charges $400,000 a year for a
data-base service giving in-depth assess-
ments of specific issues and countries.
^ For something over $100,000 a
year, Henry Kissinger will explain nu-
1982. Bank clients of Dunedin were
interested in local elections because of
business dealings at those levels. But
Dunedin did not expect Mikhail Gor-
bachev to take over the Kremlin lead-
ership. "Despite the fact that we spend
a lot of time dealing with the U.S.S.R., I
am humble in our ability to predict
things that come out of the Politburo,"
says Falkiewicz, who served in the For-
eign Service in Moscow.
Kissinger gave Merck & Company
advice that France under Francois Mit-
terrand would be tough on foreign
businesses. At that time, the Rahway,
N.J., drug firm was considering a sub-
stantial investment there. Despite Kis-
singer's warning, says William Van
Buren, vice president and secretary
of Merck, "we decided it warranted
additional private investment."
Sometimes, these information ser-
vices wield too broad a brush for their
clients. James Bisch, a senior vice
president of Chase Manhattan Bank,
says he would like Oxford Analytica
to focus more on the business ramifi-
cations of its reports. But, in general,
"we're quite satisfied," he adds.
Though former CIA and State De-
partment people abound in these or-
ganizations, they disclaim use of
clandestine methods to gather infor-
mation, or reliance upon contacts at,
Langley or Foggy Bottom. "If
asked," says Thomas Bolle of Dun- ..
edin, "we tell clients we are not a
conduit for confidential informa-
tion." He says that Dunedin relies on
the experience of senior associates
who have spent a lot of time in their
specific areas of responsibility."
Kissinger obtains insights from his
continual global travels and friend-
ships with influential figures. Others
such as InterMatrix have local con-
tacts they query for analyses.
Timing a key. Corporations pay well
for information though it may be avail-
able for 50 cents-the cost of a business
newspaper. Timing is one reason. Many
services claim to have contacts inside
governments. They say they can alert
clients to events before they become
public. "Since day one," says Walter
Wriston, former Citicorp chairman,
"people have wanted to know some-
thing first, whether it's a crop failure in
Argentina or the amount of money the
Treasury is going to raise." Citicorp is
often solicited by private intelligence
experts but relies on its own staff abroad.
Yet many businesses do need guid-
ance on unfamiliar topics or nations.
Daniel Sharp, director of international
relations at Xerox, says the appeal of
information-consulting services is that
they help his company follow the busi-
ness environment abroad. A good set-
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aR1i - ap~EQ ED
WtSSHINGTON TIMES
13 May 19 85
I U
Events of note
Here is a selection of the
many Washington events which
may be making news in the week
=~?1
ahead:
? Wednesday: The Andrei Sakha-
rovlnstitute and The Jefferson
Educational, Foundation will
honor Mr. Skaharov with a con-.
ference, dinner and concert
(Capitol Hill).
Former CIA director William
Colby wili deliver a lecture at the
National ~.rchives on "The-Con-
stitution and the CIA."
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STAT
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~~0SS ^S_f C;' . 6. t'YLY~r
WASHINGTON TIMES
6 May 1985
SOCIETY / Betty Beale
Former CIA director Bill Colbv
and is bride of five months, for-
mer ambassador to Barbados Sally
Shelton, being toasted by Esther
and Jack Coopersmith. Said Bill,
recently divorced from wife Bar-
bara, he met Sally two years ago
and tumbled. She's v.p. of Banker's
Trust for Latin American business.
He's now business consultant. They
have an apartment in New York and
house here.
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Women Speak out in a Nuclear world
The Majority That's
No Longer Sileh
By BEVERLY BEYETTE, Times Staff Writer
"We sit here," the speaker said,
" 30 menu 15; r o m some mis-
% m the miq e o ioeria-tar-
ted on os An e es. m sur
t was not a frame rom "Dr.
Strap clove Part I. t was the
first Los An eles omens on er-
ence on National ecurity, n t e
s ea er, i tam . 0 y, or
of the entra me i ence Qency
from 1 to . was aooressin
tree question: an ust e
,ussians .
boosting Participation
were men and that only one person,
a questioner in the audience, men-
tioned that none of the U.S. negoti-
ators at the table in Geneva are
women.)
When the last speech had been
presented, Lynn Greenberg of the
Thursday Night Group, a Santa
Monica-based nuclear education
most
rees
f
,
e
organization, told con
of them women, "This is your
chance to stop listening to experts
and to become one yourself." Her
appeal for ideas for constructive
. . ranging
informed public debate, public par-
ticipation in policy-making, creates
more coherence. it tends to blunt
the extremes."
Warnke emphasized that he was
not suggesting that the public take
part in the day-to-day, nuts-and-
bolts decisions, explaining, "1 don't
think (for example) that most
Americans really feel that they
have the information to determine
whether or not we ought to stay in
UNESCO. I think most Americans
couldn't tell UNESCO from
UNICEF or Uniroyal or Unisex"
Issues of Survival
-Inc -wiu'.-'......
e issues Warnke
urday at UCLA was a 12-hour, $40 from a women,
said, h course in Soviet-American to talk with Russian women, to that should engage public attention
crash
relations, arms control strategies, formation of study groups
e and theeau sse of U.S.
the pros and cons of "Star Wars," sian history, culture and politics. ' are Chary forcissues of u
tion of milit the economics of defense and the I Scared. . . or believed', strategic arms policy. These are
[y the issues that
specter of nuclear proliferation. I
The stated objective of the spore- But, bombarded of ieen? omen, wiitth peace, with survival. have to do
song Committee for National Se- information, many what Ruth- W arnke added: "The sorry histo-
curity, a Washington-based pri- seemed to be thinking
vote nonpartisan, nonprofit group, Mead of Brentwood, a
Ann book ry of the NIX (missile) certainly " expert was "to educate a broad spectrum 1 keeper company, for a lateretelevis ss pdrodudon't rely 1 on the confidence judgment of
on what: those who from time to time are in
issues women and to about encourage national them security to
issues know who to believe
participate knowledgeably~in ... I subject. .1 don't know whether thTposi,s ors' e(Strategic De-
decision-making be more scared or, more re- fense Initiative) debate did not
decision-making p ,r lfeved." have., as had been promised by
of
Dan Caldwell of
CNS director Anne Cahn is on "' A prevailing theme was the.
record as favoring 'a mutual Mora . importance of citizen participation
pepperdfne University, the p:vro-
..Corium on the further testing indecision-making. It is vital, said technicpunchftheitlm,butitwas
am, that the collective wisdom be ts.
nuclear weapons" and it appeared
that many at this regional forum, "the rudder" of U.S. policy. not Thomas without its its mo mo amenistant direr-
had its peak attendance Cahn poured a single pebble from tor for multilateral affairs in the
which
250 50 at Friday's opening ning session, , a tennis ball can into a saucepan,
nth with a freeze Arms Control and Disarmament
were in symp y explaining that the ping represent- Agency and, as he pointed out, the
philosophy. ed the total megatonnage of all ? only political-level representative
Why a women's conference on bombs dropped during World War of .the Reagan Administration;
national security? One reason, II. Then, pouring a canful of peb- among the speakers, called the,
Cahn said, is that it is an area.of bles into the pan with a great "Star Wars,, controversy "a mix-
? ? ? +
policy-Making from which women , clatter, she said that is what is lure of good physics and ill will
have traditionally been excluded. available today. of extraordinary proportions,"
Another is the special viewpoine Said Cahn: "We, you and I, have In the long run, litzold said, "I
that women bring to debate on the r. to ask what is it all about? What is think the presidents strategic De-
issue-for example, re-examining:- it all for? We have tolerated and ?' .fense Initiative is going to seem
national security in the c octal of- endured. Now we need to confront conservativei the most proper
how arms buildup affects social and and to change." _ -- t sense," in that it conserv es deter-
It was a somewhat fragrnenteo -.
forum, offering a glut, or what one
speaker referred to as a "cumula-
tive overlap," of statistics on guns
and butter, megatonnage potential
of state.of-the-art nuclear war-
the Gorbachev mind-set and
ds
h
,
ea
prospects for the 'arms control ?
negotiations under way in Geneva
(It is significant, perhaps, that-
the principal conference speakers
. 4,.CJ...,......-... -. - - - ana
.man of the Committee for National rence as a basis for security
Security, former director of the' emphasizes increased reliance on
Arms. Control and Disarmament - defense and decreased reliance on
Agency and in 1977x'-78 chief U.S. nuclear offense.
negotiator at the SALT arms con- At the very least, he added, the
'trol talks, said: proposal provided the impetus for
"I don't believe that (citizen the Soviets to return to negotia-
input) is either a sign of weakness lions, on real reductions in both
nor is it necessarily a formula ! strategic- and intermediate-range
for anarchy. I think instead that,
STAT
STAT7
n
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 ART I CLE
GCE PAGE
China-S. Korea Trade Is Booming
Ships of Ex-Enemies Carry $800 Million in Goods Yearly
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WASHINGTON POST
Er1Rr.D< ')Q n-._., 1u4c
By John Burgess
Washington Post Foreign Service
ization programs. Television sets,
radios and textiles are common
items.
The trade began in secrecy in the
1970s, often using Hong Kong mid-
dlemen and faked documents. To-
day, wraps are slowly coming off,
and ships sometimes sail directly
between the two countries, which
are only about 200 miles apart. t
Commerce has grown to the
point that cargo routed through
Hong Kong alone in the first 11
months of 1984 was, worth at least
$300 million and estimates of the
total for 1984 run as high as $800
million.
Trade has smoothed the way for
government-to-government con-
tacts. In the view of many analysts,
the Peking-Seoul thaw has helped
raise chances for serious dialogue
between the intensely hostile gov-
ernments of North and South Ko-
rea, although few expect dramatic
breakthroughs.
If China is beginning to treat
South Korea as a legitimate neigh-
.. bor, the reasoning goes, it is prob-
ably counseling its ally North Korea
to do the same. South and North
next month are to resume talks on
family reunions and economic co-
operation.
The officials who run South Ko-..
rea's export-fueled economy still
routinely refuse to discuss the
trade. Nonetheless, a Korean ver-
sion of China fever is taking hold in
Seoul: Traders are studying Man-
darin. Former CIA director William
Colby was in the city earlier this
year to address a seminar on Chi-
na's economy.
"The Koreans believe that China
is the only large market left for the
future," said one Seoul analyst who
follows the trade closely..1
v-TOKYO-Although officially still
at war, South Korea and China are
now engaged in trade estimated at
up to $800 million annually. The
exchanges are increasingly open
and they now extend beyond com-
merce to official contacts.'
:.,'China and South Korea fought
each other during the 1950-53 Ko-
rean war and have never officially
made peace. But ships bearing the
red star of the Chinese merchant
marine can sometimes be seen at
South Korean docks these days,
unloading oil, coal and yarn for tex-
tile factories.
Across the Yellow Sea, South Ko-
rean vessels are frequent callers in
ports on the China coast, bringing
consumer goods that China is pro-
viding its people,as part of modern-
c * * EXCzRPT.3MJ
Special correspondent Dinah Lee
contributed to this article from
Hong Kong.
STAT
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WASHINGTON TIMES
16 April 1985
Q: What's everyone else gossip-
ing about?
A: Al Neuharth of Gannett -
which already has USA Tbday, for
heaven's sake - rumored rarin' to
launch a Washington DC rag...
CBSer Bill Paley and journaliste
extraordinaire Lally Weymouth -
she's Kay Graham's daughter - as
an Item... Rose Marie Bogley's
"Before" party. It was flung last
weekend at her newly-
acquired, 706-acre Bolling Brooke
estate in Virginia Hunt Country.
(Remember, darlings? It belonged
to Edwin Wilson the ex er
ho's now in the pokey.) Washing-
ton city-mice dragged on jeans and
boots to trundle out there and
munch chicken, admire the old
slave school - soon to be a pool-
house - and eyeball the knockout
part-pre-Revolutionary, part-pre-
Civil War mansion stripped-down to
its plaster... The Little Dinner that
Madisonmeister Marshall Coyne's
tossing for Jeane Kirkpatrick on
Thursday... The bubbly and
chocolate binge Esther Cooper-
smith's flinging to celebrate the
hitching of ex-CIAer Bill Colby and
Sa11y Shelton... The Prez bowling
out to help his barber, Milton Pitts,
celebrate 20 years snipping at the
Sheraton-Carlton yesterday... And
Nancy Reagan's Hair Man Robin
Weir jumping into the fray, to pick
out the Tbp Ten Best-Groomed Men
In Washington. The envelope,
please: President Ronald W. Rea-
gan; Father Gilbert Hartke of
Catholic U; Sen. Bob Dole of Kan-
sas; Sen. Jay Rockefeller of West
Virginia; Pat Buchanan, Assistant
to the Prez; Prince Bandar, Ambas-
sador from Saudi Arabia; George
Will, columnist; KenCenner Peter
Sellars; the lone baldie, Willard
Scott the Weather Man (but.Robin
doesn't say if he means with or
sans the rug); and Jim Rosebush,
Nancy Reagan's Chief of Staff.
Madame Earie is proud of them.
I And proud of Robin. And proud of
his flack, Mary-Jo Campbell, who
probably dreamed it up. And proud
of herself, for not being too proud
to use it. Another day's Gossip
Quota filled! Tons more tomorrow.
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 Approved For Release 2008/04/28: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500060003-7
IN S, 5l~EFK
15 April 11)SS
The Legacy of Vietnam
55 Days
-.of Sha
After 58,000 men had died, after billions of dollars
had been squandered, America's crusade in Vietnam
dwindled down to the rooftop rescue of a few Marines
with a mob of abandoned allies howling at their heels.
t was just after 6 o'clock on the
morning of April 30, 1975, and
only 11 Marines were left on the
roof of the U.S. Embassy in Sai-
gon. The door to the rooftop heli-
pad was locked and barricaded,
but on the other side Vietnamese
pounded away at it, springing the hinges
and cracking open the door. Clouds of tear
gas billowed from the top of the six-floor
embassy, and gunfire rattled randomly in
the streets below. They are not coming back
for us, thought Sgt. Steve Schuller. We
really are stuck here. The man in charge,
Maj. James Kean, never doubted that a
helicopter would come back for his desper-
ate dozen. But the Marines on the roof had
no radio, and for nearly two hours there
was no sign of another chopper.
roof was six inches off its
hinges. Kean ordered his
men to throw tear-gas
STAT
L
You have my
assurance that we will
respond with full force
should the settiemenl
be violated by North
Vietnam.
Richard Nixo:
in a letter to President Thiez
January 197.
grenades into the stair-' nngsliorttnene icop-
well. The ploy bought ter evacuation-and
precious time, but the thus for leaving un-
copter's whirling blades areas o1 ietnamese friends in the dust.
sucked up the gas, mo- And Martin joins Henry Kissinger and
mentarily blinding the others from the Ford administration who
Marines and their rescu- blame Congress for a fatal cutoff of U.S.
ers. Kean and his men military aidbefore thefinal offensive. Rich-
scrambled aboard, and and Nixon is another forceful spokesman
N the CH-46 lifted off. for the blame-Congress school. "When we
First there was a diz- signed the Paris peace agreements in 1973,
zying plunge; then the we had won the war," Nixon maintains in a
m' tude and fluttered off to- tolosethepeace."
-15 ward the U.S. fleet wait- There is plenty ofblameto go around. In.
s Sea. Aboard the helicop- President Nguyen Van Tnieu wattled, his
ter, the Marines found a opposition plotted another coup and key
E PRC-25 radio. Its buzzer generals fled from the battlefield ahead of
T TNOPPOSED: ENEMY TANK ATTACKS THE PALACE went off, and a laconic their troops. It is odd that few of the W ash-
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yearsv ofv hitter divisiveness at home,
America's crusade in Vietnam dwindled
down to the rooftop rescue of a few Ma-
rines, with a mob of abandoned allies howl-
ing at their heels.
Americans of the age will never forget
the televised pictures of their countrymen
dodging potshots from abandoned allies as
they scrambled out of Vietnam. The
French had left Saigon in 1954 after a
flag-lowering ceremony on a parade
ground; in 1975 the Americans sneaked
outside after dark to lower the embassy
flag for the last time. How could the enor-
mous U.S. enterprise in Vietnam simply
collapse like a house of cards? Why
couldn't Washington at leasi negotiate a
dignified withdrawal? Such questions are
still alive in the minds of survivors. Merritt
Stark, for years a public-health adviser in
Kean remembers telling his men to lie Vietnam, lost his 26-year-old daughter,
down so that they wouldn't be seen from Laurie, in the crash of a planeload of or-
below. Schuller recalls that he set up phans in the final days. He is still searching
a machine-gun emplacement facing the for "a number of answers" about Vietnam.
door. "We knew eventually they were go-
ing to break it down," he says now. "So we
half-assed a gallant last stand." Someone
passed around a bottle of Johnny Walker
"If we got the answers," he says, this
would be a lot more commemorative to
[those] who died than putting up some
statue or memorial in Washington."
Black. Just before 8 a.m., they watched as! The art of deflectine blame reached new
riot police escorted the country's latest and' heiehts after inefall of _
last president, Duong Van (Big) Minh, Saigon. In ar; early ~-
down Thong Nhut Street to the Presiden- book. rant: Sne . a
tial Palace. Then the Marines spotted their ormer CIA anaivstin
helicopter, a CH-46. They signaled to Vietna blamed his
it with smoke grenades-"everything we station chief and his
had," says Schuller, "green, yellow, red." ambassador for neg-
The pilot made a couple of passes, dodging 1ecting to organize an
small-arms fire from the ground, and final-; orderly U. S. with-
ly settled onto the pad. { drawai wniie there
By now the door to the was still, time. The
ambassador. Graham
Martin, stili biames
Washington for cut-
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EARED
15 April 1985
STAT
Senators collaborate on spy thriller
WASHINGTON (AP) - A U.S.
senator travels to Miami and Am-
sterdam am on secret missions e-
sign to unrave connections be-
7ween the assassination of John P'.
Kennedy, organized crime and a
renegade terrorist squad inside th
walls of the Kremlin.
He investigates the mysterious
death of an aging Mafia chieftain
and later meets with an interna-
tionally known assassin.
Truth or fiction?
The answer begins at 3 a.m. on
a pre-dawn morning in July, 1980,
when real-life Senators Gary Hart
and' William Cohen found them-
selves drinking coffee in the Senate
Dining Room, bored and exhausted
during an all-night filibuster on an
issue both have forgotten.
Mr.' Cohen: "I said to Gary, 'If
you were nova senator right now,
what"-' would ,you rather be
dotng?' -
Mr.- Hart-I'd rather be in Ire-
"'land writing a novel."
Mr.-Cohen: "You can't go to ire-
land, so why don't we write a
And the publisher, William Mor-
row and Company, remained inter-
ested.
Not until late last year was the
final twist of plot complete, and it
turns out that there is as much
truth as fiction in the book.
In the summer of 1975, Mr. Hart
was pursuing links between the
Mafia. Fidel Castro's Cuba, and the
assasssination of President John
F. Kennedy.
Returning through Amsterdam
from a trip to Moscow. Mr. Hart se-
cretly arranged with then-CIA Di-
rector William Colby to meet with a
hired assassin code-named,
QJWIN, to develop leads on the
Kennedy killing.
Mr. Hart's description of the at-
tempted meeting closely parallels
the same episode in "The Double
Man," except in the fictional ver-
sion the meetingactually takes
place.
"He [QJWIN] was living in Eu-
rope at the time,'' Mr. Hart said.
"Colby sent over a high level oper-
ative who made contact with'_htm,.;.:?
was no apparent motive for his
death beyond his testimony before
the Senate committee.
"1 went to Miami." recalled Mr.
Hart. "It was when Roselli was
killed. I talked to the Miami Police
Department."
Mr. Hart tried to keep the trip
quiet and recalls that he probably
traveled under a pseudonym. "I
was there less than an hour when I
got a call from a reporter asking
why I was there," he said with a
laugh.
In the book, the hero also goes to
Miami w ere e uncovers evidence
that the Soviet spy agency, the
KGB, is competing with the Mafia
by selling narcotics in the Unitect
fates to raise money for terrorist
acts.
Mr. Hart also tried unsuccess-
fully to arrange a trip to Havana for
a secret meeting with Cuban Presi-
dent Fidel Castro. After several
meetings with the Cuban delegate
to the United Nations, the effort
collapsed because the State De-
partment declined to cooperate.
Neither author has illusions
--- - --about the
And so "The Double Man" was he was living in Europe." serious literary merit of
born on the back of a large U.S... k` Unfortunately, professional their book. Nor Nor are there here plans for
"'Senate manila envelope. ' a movie or television production.
Over the next hour, Mr. Hart, a assassin got cold feet.' "It's just a hell of a good story,"
Democrat from Colorado, and Mr. "There were a whole series of says Mr. Hart. "We were conduct-
I mysterious events, and he bolted," in an ex eriment to see whether
Coheir; a Republican from Maine, said Mr. Hart. "I showed up at the g p
crafted a spellbinding story send- bar where we were supposed to [ two elected officials could c when nei
ing the hero, Thomas Chandler, rate on a work of fiction when neit
:' throwgli a byzantine maze of suPer-. morninmortg. be. And d between he bad leandft.1" in the they one of them had ever done it
power politics and murderous in- before."
In the end, Mr. Hart said, the as-
tdlli operations. - And when Mr. Cohen is asked if
gence sassin found out that Mr. Hart was
'Mr. Hart and Mr. Cohen, who there is a moral to the novel, he re
have both been members o the involved in investigations of the
calls that the book opens with a
CIA and decided to flee Amsterdam bomb attack by the KGB on an
Senate intelligence Committee, fin- an hour before the scheduled clan-
ished the story, outline all the way destine meeting With the senator. American secretary of state's Jim-
ousine on a tree-line picturesque
to a surprise ending that catches en, there was r. Hart's solo
the reader off guard, and opens the 1 route through Washington c ed
trip to Miami in 1973 to investigate _
question of whether to expect a se- the deaths of Mafia figures Creek Parkway. The secre-
guel. They say not, gures Johnny: Oy-s wife is killed instead.
During the four following [Roselli and Sam Giancana. Mr the moral, Mr. Cohen says
g years Roselli a testified before the spe with a chuckle, is, "Stay off Rock
that July meeting In the Senate cial Senate committee to invests Creek Parkway."
Dining Room, the project intermit- . ! sate CIA abuses in the ]960s,
j the panel. Like a Mafioso figure in
interruptions; each ran for re-elec- suddenly and his body was found
tion and Mr. Hart sought the presi- stuffed into a 55-gallon oil drum
dency. found floating off-Florida.
Mr. Hart and Mr. Cohen, who The deaths of Mr. Roselli and
has published one book of poetry-. Mr. Giancana were mysterious.
and has another in the works. say said Mr. Hart, because at the time
that when they had the time to Mr. Roselli had retired and there
work on the book, the writing went
smoothly- with with no significant con-
flicts.
STAT
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 STAT
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NETWORK FEVER ...
Gary Hart almost hit
ABC's little whoop-de-do
here, celebrating Ted
Koppel's five years manning
"Nightline." But his office buzzed
first. What about the Star Quotient?
they asked. Would Joan Collins or
Linda Evans be there? Well, no,
said the ABCers. So Gary didn't go.
But it all got quite peppy anyway.
Barbara Walters flew in specially,
with chum Roy Cohn. The South
African Ambassador and ABCer
Ken Walker - who'd been to South
Africa with Ted - grinned at each
other. Assorted twinklies from the
Soviet Embassy swapped vibes
with the two newlywed ex-CiAers,
Bill Colbv and Stansfield Turner.
Mr. Demo, Bob Strauss, howdied
with Republican honcho Frank Fah-
i renkopf. Roone Arledge, the ABC
news Prez, and honoree Ted Koppel
languished in the receiving line for
two whole hours, as acolytes
tripped up bearing their drinks.
"Room Service' "'cried David Brin-
kley when turn as cupbearer
came. (Or was it "Roone Service"?
Everyone laughed and laughed,
anyway.) "They put me next to the
door in case I say something
embarrassing - so I can be yanked
back through it," said Ted. But of
course, he didn't. He said super
things. To Nouveau Republican
Jeane Kirkpatrick: "Did they
immerse you in Chablis for the.
Conversion?" Tb someone else: "It's
inevitable that anyone who
squeezes bathroom tissue on televi-
sion is going to become a celeb-
rity!" As A-Listers like Cap
Weinberger and John Block and
Sam Pierce and Maggie Heckler
trundled in, Roone waved his unlit
Castro Cuba cigar. ("Peter Ueber-
roth got it for me while he was try-
ing to squeeze Cuba into the
Olympics;' he explained.) Pollster
Pat Caddell, his piebald beard all
wild and whiskery, bobbed by to
pay homage to the Tubers, then
darted off to another party to cheer
Fritz Mondale back aboard his law
firm. Marvin Stone, ex-editor of US
News and World Report, and
Shelby Coffey, the new one, beamed
at each other with wary bonhomie,
like wolves who've just sorted out
which one runs the pack. Arthur
Miller, the legal eagle for Good
Morning America, grumbled that
Gossip Norma Nathan had spilled
the beans on his wife suing him for
divorce before he'd even gotten
the papers. (That, Arthur, is what
gossips are.for.) And stock gadfly
Evelyn Y. Davis, who owns bits of
ABC, went round flashing her very
fine face-lift, and darkly warning
that ABC Veeps will bite the dust
by the dozen now that Capital's
bought them. "How do you shut this
goddam party off?" Ted finally
enquired. No good, Ted. It's still
humming on, somewhere in Wash-
ington. Stick with Ear.
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 NE YORK DAILY NEWS
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loak and dagger frays are
here to stay
By JOSEPH VOLZ
Washington (News Bu-
reau)-The killing of Maj. j
Arthur Nicholson by a Soviet
sentry while Nicholson was
photographing tanks in East
Germany last week raises a
question: Is it worth risking
humans to gather intelli-
gence in an age when sophis-
ticated space satellites can
count the shingles on a
Kremlin roof?
Is the human spy becom-
ing obsolete?
Ralph McGehee who
s en nt 25 years as a field
officer with the Central In.
telligence Agency, answers
ye "I don't think you can get
anything more in the way of
technical intelligence from
military people than you can
from various satellite pro-
the ability to take pictures of
anything inside a building-
as Nicholson apparently was
doing immediately before he
was killed.
THE SOVIETS also have
become adept at putting
together a schedule of when
the satellites will fly over so
they know when to wheel
supersecret equipment into
sheds.
The United States con-I
tinues to use highflying spy
planes such as the SR-71
Blackbird, but they -have
many of the same limitations
as satellites.
A high-ranking Pentagon
Barmyantsev was trying to
retrieve what he thought
were stolen American sec-
rets from a Maryland tree
trunk when the FBI caught
him.
Yet, the cost of the U.S.
military attaches working for
the Defense Intelligence
Agency is a drop in the buck-
et compared to what the Pen-
tagon spends for its huge
National Security Agency
operation, with headquarters
at Fort Meade, Md., 20 miles
north of Washington. The
NSA uses at least 100,000
servicemen worldwide to
STAT
for intelligence analysts.
They often complain that
NSA supplies so much undi
gested material portant items can that
get lost in
the deluge.
There have been major
foulups. One official recalled
that during the Vietnam War
NSA picked up a conversa-
tion from North Vietnamese
troops who knew a team
from the south was going to
infiltrate. But by the time
analysts back in Washington
got to look at the material,
the team had already been
man listening posts on the
infiltrated-and killed
.
ground as well as on planes
It Is almost impossible for
and ships to tune in radio
anyone to conduct
on-the-
transmissions and phone
ground intelligence
gather.
calls.
ing in the Soviet
Union,
official says of the on-the- THE ANNUAL cost for
ground spy: "There is no this intelligence gathering by
substitute for this kind of NSA is a staggering $10 Dl--
intelligence. You don't get as lion, compared with about
good information from space $1.5 billion for the next
as from being at the scene." largest snoop shop. the CIA.
grams.. i tnmK miuiary La- Other officials say the ! The NSA overheard radio
telligence just justifies its ' military man on the scene transmissions of Egyptian
budget and manpower by -not only can snap closeups field commanders before the
claiming human intelligence of new equipment but, if 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict
is important" lucky enough to get close to, and knew that the war was
BUT PENTAGON and say, a new tank, can also coming.
State Department officials scratch it and take a sample NSA has also been able to
say that on-the-ground in. of the paint---or even of the intercept virtually any mi-
telligence is indispensable. metal. Studying new alloys crowave message around the
Former CIA Director Wfl- used in tanks is necessary to world. Overseas messages
liam v says that intelli- develop anti-tank warheads bounced off a communica-
" i tions satellite can be picked
ence agencies absolutely for missiles and shoulder.
need borne anti-tank weapons.
He told the Daily News up and sorted out by NSA. If
NOT ALL of the intelli- analysts want every satellite
last week, "We can get a gence gathered by human message mentioning,
llit b t operatives comes during Jones, an NSA computer
l f t
e
a
great de rom sa es u clandestine missions, howev- can do it.
there are subtleties of readi- er. One official noted last
ness and discipline that can week that some of the best To try to do the same Job
only be observed by humans. intelligence . the . United just a decade ago, the NSA
Human intelligence is part of had to send FBI and defense
States receives comes from intelligence agents to the
the total."....... military attaches aggressive-
, .
Satellites;: despite- their Washington
~ ly probing ~g iron Curtain downtown
corn-
L ability to; take pictures and counterparts at cocktail par- offices of municatons international companies to
infrared readings, have ties. pick up the carbons of every
limits. The spy satellites are The Soviets, too, place m
t verseas
o
.
n
essage se
only over a target 15 minutes great importance on the use
on each orbit. They cannot
military attaches.
of their
take pictures from 100 miles
up if the site is covered by
clouds and they do not have
.
For example, Soviet Lt. Gen.
Yevgeny Barmyantsev was
booted out of the United
States. in 1983 for spying.
.given the closed nature of its
society. Americans don't go
wandering . unobserved
around the country and de-
fense attaches have been ex-
pelled after being caught .
peering over fences with
their cameras. As a result,
satellites end up doing much
of that job.
IN FACT, Defense Intel-
ligency Agency estimates on
just how much the Soviets
are spending on defense are
based not so much on work
by military attaches as on
satellite photos, remarkably
accurate, of how many new
tanks, planes and ships the
Soviets have produced..
Despite their limits-
though human snoopers
such as military officers
doing so-called legal esnio-na a and A officers hand-.
ling networks of agents will
remain on the U.S. vayroll
for some time to come.
One reason is obvious:
The Soviet Union shows no
inclination to retire its own
spies..
THE VERY ability of NSA G ~~ A d
to sweep up so many mes-
to Fort Meade is a nightmare IF
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WASHINGTON TIMES
21 March 1985
THE RISING SAP... Jingle
those bells, again. Admiral
Stansfeld Turner, Jimmy
Carter's ClAmeister, has
quietly shed Patricia, his mate of
30 years. This weekend -
smack after her divorce from Sgt.
John Gilbert, USAF, sailed through
- Stansfeld up and married Ellie
Karin Gilbert, his secretary. Ear, of
course, always cheers for Amour.
But it worries, too. Didn't Big Bill
Colby, that other ex-Superspook,
shuck a spouse exactly that
way last year, before his happy
hitching with Sally Shelton? Is
there some Funny Substance in the
Langley waterworks? Watch out,
Bill Casey. Everyone else, just
watch.
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 March 1985
INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS
USIs
beefing up
its covert
activities
There is something abou
does not fit our image of
This attitude was expres
tary of State Henry Stim
down an operation that d
grams on the theory th
read each other's mail."
But the fact is the US
the not-quite-gentleman)
vening in other nations'
following World War II,
der the table to Christi
and moderate worker groups throughout West-
ern Europe to help keep the region from turning
to communism. Paramilitary teams of partisans
were dropped behind the Iron Curtain.
In the '50s, US envoy Kermit Roosevelt and
a suitcase of money helped topple Iranian
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, restor-
ing the more pro-Western Shah Muhammad
Reza Pahlavi to his throne. A somewhat
gaudier campaign in 1954, including covert ra-
By Peter Grier
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
waahktpton
N the late 1940s, the US Central Intelligence
I Agency (CIA) provided funding for guerrilla
fighters in China, Albania, and the Ukraine
section of the Soviet Union. These operations -
among the first covert actions by the agency -
were but minor annoyances to their communist
targets.
Forty years and much experience later, and
half a world away, the Upited States is involved
in "covert" operation, this one highly contro-
versial. The country in question is Nicaragua;
the US allies are an estimated 7,000 to 12,000
contras fighting their country's ruling
Sandinista regime.
As covert actions go, this is a modest affair.
But intelligence experts say that since there is
no national consensus on overall US policy in
Central America, aid to the contras has raised
old questions about when and where secret ac-
tion is justified.
It has also focused attention on the capabili-
ties of US intelligence agencies, which are re-
building after the budget. and staff cuts of the
mid-1970s. Covert action, after all, represents
only a small fraction of what US intelligence
does. Today, there is much debate among ex-
perts about the quality of the major portion of
US intelligence work - research and analysis.
"There have been some successes, and some
significant improvement in the quality of US in-
telligence," says a former military intelligence
officer. But this source adds that there is still a
tendency for reports to be too bland.
The US has long been ambivalent about the
means required to produce good intelligence.
i property).
Then came the Bay of Pigs. The US-backed
partisan invasion of Fidel Castro's Cuba in
1961 was a military and propaganda flop.
By the mid 1970s, these and other operations
had come back to haunt the CIA. A pair of con-
gressional committees, angered by what they
perceived as CIA abuse of power, proposed a
number of reforms, most aimed at tightening
control over the agency.
These committees considered a blanket ban
on covert action. They backed off, however,
after deciding the US did need-a foreign policy
tool in between meye speech and sending in the
Marines. "We decided there were circumstances
where you wanted to do it," says an academic
source who was a staffer on one of the panels.
But the CIA, branded a "rogue elephant" by-
the public investigations, was not eager to rush
back into undercover actions. When President
Carter took office in 1977, he inherited "zero"
covert actions, according to his director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner.
President Carter and Admiral Turner eased
the CIA back into secret operations. This pro-
cess has continued under the Reagan adminis-
tration and its agency director, William Casey.
By most accounts, Mr. Casey is a director pre-
occupied with covert action. Under his direction
the CIA proposed (but did not get) such an ac-
tion against the small South American country
of Suriname, intelligence sources say.
The largest "covert" operation currently be-
ing run by the US ("It is a little bizarre to be
debating covert action in public," says former
CIA director William Colby)-,.ins probably its
dio broadcasts and US-supplied warplanes, de-
posed Guatemalan head of state Jacobo Arbenz
Guzman (who had expropriated US corporate
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ON PAGE 7
1 n1LLW .LVHLA LNQUIXER
9 March 1995
U.S. negotiators leave for
Geneva amid hope,, caution
By James McCartney
At"dw wamnston Errata
WASHINGTON - President Reagan
dispatched his new team of arms
control negotiators to Geneva yester-
day, declaring that the United States
has "set out on a new path toward
agreements" to "radically reduce the
size and destructive power of exist-
ing nuclear missiles.", , .
But the President conceded in a
statement at the White, House that
"we should have no illusions that
this will be, easy" and that "we know
our differences with the Soviet
Union are great."
A new round of arms control talks
with the Soviet Union is scheduled to
open Tuesday in Geneva, 15 months
after the Soviets walked out of an
earlier series of negotiations.
Reagan pleaded for "patience,
strength and unity" as necessities for
success, adding: "Like Americans ev-
erywhere, I want these negotiations
to succeed. ... I pray that the Soviet
leadership is prepared to makt the
same commitment"
Since January, when the two,coun-
tries agreed to resume talk, Reagan
has reorganized his negotiating
team. He named Max M. Kampelman,
a conservative Democrat, as top ne-
gotiator, with former Sen. John G.
Tower (R., Texas) and veteran for-
eign service officer Maynard M. Glit-
man the two main negotiating subor-
dinates.
Reagan said goodbye to them and a
large group of advisers and members
of Congress: who are accompanying
them, with a formal statement for
television cameras.
"Since the dawn of the nuclear era,
all God's children have lived with
the fear of nuclear war and the dan-
ger of nuclear devastation," he said.
"Our moral imperative is to work
with all our power for that day when
the children of the world can grow
up without the fear of nuclear war."
He said that above all, the United
States seeks agreement "as soon as
possible on real and verifiable reduc-
tions in American and Soviet offen-
sive nuclear arms."
The United States, he added, is
ready "to negotiate fair and equita.
ble agreements reducing the dangers
of nuclear war and enhancing strate-
gic stability."
The Geneva talks will include a
new category of negotiation on de?
fense and space weapons that will
deal with the President.s proposal to
develop a space-based missile de-
fense system, the Strategic Defense
Initiative, nicknamed "Star Wars."
The meetings will also deal with
long-range strategic arms and inter-
mediate-range nuclear weaponry.
The negotiators left Washington
late yesterday and were expected tot
arrive in Geneva this morning..
White House national security a&
viser Robert C. McFarlane, who at-
tended Reagan's meeting w" the
negotiators, said the President told'-
them that the strategic balance bed
tween the two countries had gotten
"out of kilter" in recent years as a
result of Soviet weapons programs.
He also told them that the Soviets
had established "a poor record of
compliance" on earlier arms control
agreements but that the United
States should be flexible and willin
to "meet the Soviet Union halfway
in. the talks, McFarlane said..
Over on Capitol Hill, the adminis.
tration pressed its case for funds for
the MX missile program by linking
the issue to the Geneva talks, amid
some signs its effort would succeed
The State Department's top arms
control adviser, Paul H. Nitze,
warned a Senate panel that the
United States would be vulnerable at
Geneva without that approval
Nitze told the Senate Appropria-
tions subcommittee on that
it is essential that "we caMplMe the
Soviets that, as a and alli-
ance, we"-stand uni
"Congressional for the. MX
will send just s h..e to
Moscow," he added. it will send a
strong signal of national resolve and
will greatly strengthen our hand in
Geneva."
Opponents continued to reject the
administration's effort to. link the
MX vote with the edema con.
trop talks. . .
Former CIA Directott William
emigm of-the arm control
talks.
And-Senate Minority Leader Rob-
ert C. Byrd (D., W.Va.) dismissed the
argument that rejecting the MX
would send a sign of weakness to the
Soviets me the same kind of "hot
rhetoric" used when U.S. troops were
in. Lebanon.
It appeared, however, that Rea-
gan's strategy was making major in-
roads Into the opposition. Some con-
gressional sources said the
administration's tactic of linking the
vote on the missile to the Geneva
talks was "masterfuL" They predict-
ed it would carry when Congress
votes this month.
"Six weeks ago I would have said
the MX was dead," said one. oppo-
nent. "Now I'm afraid the President
is close to getting it."
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8 March 1985
COLBY JOINS FOES OF MISSILE
WASHINGTON
Former CIA Director William Colby on Friday joined congressional opponents
of the MX missile, saying the weapon is irrelevant a t e e y ou F -0 arms
Control talks beginning next week in Geneva.
Colby was at a news conference along with Rep. Les AuCoin, D-Ore., another MX
opponent who said the missile has become the "glass jaw" of the American
strategic defense system.
AuCoin compared the MX to the U.S. Navy fleet bombed at Pearl Harbor by the
Japanese on Dec. 7, 1941.
If the United States builds and installs the MX in Minuteman missile silos,
AuCoin said this country will be saying, "Come attack me. Land a hard one on my
glass jaw."
Colby. now a Washington attorney, was CIA director in the 1970s. He has
been a supporter of the nuclear freeze movement.
He said the MX will not be a bargaining chip in the Geneva in part because
only the Reagan administration, and not the Soviet Union, places a high priority
on whether the 10-warhead weapon should become an integral part of U.S.
strategic weapons strategy.
"The Soviets have put all their emphasis an 'Star Wars,"' Reagan's proposed
space-based defensive strategic system, Colby said. "They have hardly mentioned
the MX."
Colby disputed administration arguments that the MX is needed to bolster the
American position in the arms talks. The former intelligence chief said he
believes the president intends to complete production of at least 100 MXs
whether or not they are vulnerable to a first-strike Soviet attack.
"When they are in the ground, they will just stay there," Colby said.
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pis NFl% YORK TI TS
17 February 1985
E GOAD AT HOME
Anthony Lewis
silence
BY
Lawsuit
BOSTON
ritain's Official Secrets Act
must be one of the most thor-
oughly discredited laws in the
Western world. The act makes it a
crime to disclose any Government in-
formation without official approval,
even if the purpose is to expose
wrongdoing. It intimidates the press
and limits public discussion of policy.
Hard as it is to believe, the Reagan
Administration is now trying to im-
pose on the United States a replica of
the Official Secrets Act. Few have no-
ticed, because the Administration is
moving crabwise toward that objec-
tive. It is not asking Congress to pass
a law: Congress would say no. In-
stead it is seeking silence by an ingen-
ious lawsuit.
The vehicle is the strange case of
Samuel Loring Morison, a Navy em-
ployee who worked at an intelligence
center in Suitland, Md. With the
Navy's consent, Mr. Morison also did
part-time work for Jane's' Fighting
Ships, the annual British survey of
the world's fleets, and for its paper
Jane's Defense Weekly.
Last October Mr. Morison was ar-
rested for having sent Jane's Defense
Weekly three U.S. satellite photo.
graphs, classified secret, of a Soviet
aircraft carrier under construction.
He was charged with violating the Es-
pionage Act and the law against theft
of Government property.
The charge is what makes this case
so important. For it takes a press leak
of the kind that goes on all the time in
our Government and treats it as "es-
pionage." If the Reagan prosecutors
win on that theory, then ordinary
leaking will become a grave crime
and the United States will have a
draconian Official Secrets Act.
The Espionage Act was passed by
Congress during World War Ito deal
with just that: transmittal of defense
secrets to an enemy. Only once before
now has it been used in a journalistic
context, against someone who turned
over material for general publica-
tion. That was the ill-starred 1971
prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and
Anthony Russo for giving the Penta-
gon Papers to the press - which was
dismissed because of Government
misconduct.
Exactly the same is true of the law
on theft of Government property.
Only once before, in the Ellsberg-
Russo prosecution, has there. been
any claim that leaks to the press
amount to stealing property.
The Reagan Administration has
made very clear that it wants to use
the Morison case for large repressive
purpose;. The prosecution, in court
papers, has brushed aside the idea
that it should have to prove a subver-
sive intent on Mr. Morison's part, or
indeed any bad motive.
Even if Mr. Morison was motivated
only by "a desire to expose obvious
wrongdoing in high official circles,"
the prosecutors said in a memoran-
dum, he was guilty of espionage and
theft when he sent the photographs to
be published. The memo brushed
aside arguments that Mr. Morison
must be shown to have acted with
knowledge, or reason to believe, that
he would be aiding a foreign power or
harming the United States.
The sweep of that argument is not
hard to understand. The Government
classifies millions of documents
every year, most of them containing
no real secrets. The fact that our
satellites can photograph the Soviet
Union foot by foot, for example, has
been well publicized - and the Gov-
ernment itself has published satellite
pictures of such things as airports in
Nicaragua.
It is a commonplace of Washington
life to leak classified but not truly
dangerous items. The technical air-
craft and space magazines are filled
with them in every issue. Indeed, it is
only the publication of such material
that permits essential discussion of
such things as new weapons.
If the Reagan Administration can
use the Morison case to turn leaks
into crimes, it will have made a ra -
cal change in the American system.
William E. Colby, the former Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, said in
1979 that Congress "has drawn a line
between espionage for a ioreLgn
mower and simple disclosure of our
foreign policy and defense secrets,
and decided e latter roo ems
are an accepts a cost of the lund o
society we prefer." tag with leaks as a price of free-
dom has not in fact weakened Amer-
ican society. Just think of Britain, with
its Official Secrets Act, by comparison.
Has British policy been wiser with pub-
lic debate on crucial issues dampened?
Has Britain been more successful in
stopping true espionage?
The Morison case cries out for ex-
planations. Why would the. Reagan
Administration want the United
States to adopt a failed British sys-
tem? Why not go to Congress if it
wants such a law? And why has the
American press paid so little atten-
tior4o this dangerous C Teat? ^
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--~~ 25 January, 1985
Ex-C.I.A. Aide Tells Jury of
`Self Deception' by Q.J.S.
By Al. A. FARBER M. Allen, who completed his testi- In addition to Mr. Adams, whoth
irony yesterday as the second witness ! served as a paid consultant for the
George W. Allen, a former deputy for CBS, said he wanted to assist the documentary, the individual defend-
chief of Vietnamese affairs for the Cen- jury and the public in understanding ants in the case are George Crile, the
tral Intelligence Agency, testified yes- "the responsibility that many officers producer of the broadcast, and Mike
terday that the production in late 1967 i'n the intelligence community have, to Wallace, its narrator.
of a "misleading" intelligence esti- insuring that honest estimates are pre- Under questioning yesterday by Mr.
date on enemy strength in South Viet- rented to the policymakers." Dorsen, Mr. Allen acknowledged tell-
nam was part of a broader "self decep- , Mr. Dorsen then brought out that, at ing Mr. Crile in early 1981, when the
tion" by the Administration of Presi- the start of the second day of a pre-trial producer's investigation was getting
dent Lyndon B.-Johnson regarding 'deposition in August 1983, Mr. Allen - under way, that he would not appear on
progress in the war. had asked to have the oath "to tell the the documentary If it attacked the
- Mr. Allen, testifying for CBS in the truth, the whole truth and nothing but C.I.A. Mr. Crile, Mr. Allen said, as-
trial of the libel suit brought by Gen. the truth" repeated for him. It was sured hirn that that was not his inten-
William C. Westmoreland, said the "the whole truth" part that he wanted tion.
White House had tried to "head off "verified," Mr. Allen said then. "Did Mr. Crile tell you that 'I'm a
mo inting public opposition to the war' Yesterday, Mr. Allen explained that journalist and I can't make any prom-
ib tie summer of 1967 through a "mas- he told the truth on the first day of the ises till I hear all.the evidence?' "
sive public-relations campaign to influ- deposition but hadn't listened to the '`Not as you worded-it," Mr. Allen
ance, exaggerate and misrepresent." oath when it was read. He said he had ? said. "But he told me that he had Bath-
- It was in this context, Mr. Allen said "lain awake" all the previous night ered considerable evidence against the
do cross-examination in Federal Dis- "reviewing the seriousness of the situa- military and was not at that time tar-
trict Court in Manhattan, that he once tion and the events of the last 15 geting the C.I.A."
d
rib
d
di
esc
e
a
spute over the enemyhh
years," during wic time, he said, he
strength estimate as "making a moun- had "rationalized and been evasive"
tain out a molehill." regarding the 1967 estimate on enemy
"I was referring to the fact that the strength in Vietnam.
production of this dishonest estimate Having the oath "reaffirmed" on the
was only a small part of that bigger second day of the deposition, he said,
-Issue, that bigger exercise by the Ad- ,was a symbolic gesture by me-that-
ministration, which in fact, caused its the time had come to stop dissembling,
-loss of credibility," Mr: Allen told the , no matter what the personal embax-
jury. And that effort, he said, ! rassment to me."
"produced an area of self-deception to General Westmoreland's suit stems
tl}e extent that neither the Congress, from a 1982 CBS documentary - "The
nor members cf the Administration, Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Decep-
ngr the population was prepared for the lion" - which charged that the gen-
psychological impact mounted by the eral's command had engaged in a
C,omrnunist forces on an unprece- "conspiracy" to minimize North Viet-
dented scale" during the Tet offensive namese and Vietcong capabilities. As
in January 1968. part of this "conscious effort," the
Played 'the Good Bureaucrat' broadcast said, the general removed
Mr. Allen. who retired from the the hamlet-based self-defense forces
C:I.A. in 1979 but still works under con-
tract for the agency, portrayed himself
as someone who had compromised his
.own integrity in 1967 and played "the
good bureaucrat" until this case forced
him to "cross the Rubicon" and con-
front his own failings and those of the
Government.
But David Dorsen, a lawyer for Gen-
eral Westmoreland, suggested that the
58-year-old witness had tailored his
A testimony to help Samuel A. Adams, a
former C.I.A. colleague who is one of
the defendants at the trial before Judge
Pierre N. Leval.
-- Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Allen, that
you are here testifying in order to
rrom the ornciai ustmg or enemy would not permit that number to be in-
strength known as the order of battle cluded in the estimate for the Presi-
and refused to allow a current count for dent.
them in a 25-page special estimate for Mr. Allen conceded that he had not
President Johnson in November 1967. discussed the order of battle with Gen.
Military 'Insignificance' eral Westmoreland in 1967 and that, un-
like Mr. Adams, he had not complained
General Westmoreland contends that to a review board. about the estimate
the documentary defamed him by say- for the President before it was signed
ing he had lied to the President and the and sent to the White House.
Joint Chiefs of Staff about the true size He also acknowledged writing a draft
,,and nature of the enemy. He testified statement for an inquiry into the dis-
that he deleted the self-defense forces pute in 1975 by the House Select Com-
- newly estimated in 1967 at 120,000, an mittee on Intelligence in which h
id
e sa
increase of 50,000 - because he had "'I am not aware of any instance in
come to believe that they were insig- , which the C.I.A., as Mr. Adams sug
nificant militarily and that reference to Bests, deliberately modified its assess-
the higher number would mislead ments on Vietnam to acco .,.od to the
D
d
d
orse I l
i
.-
not come to this court
room simply to defend or come to the
-aid of a beleaguered former col.
',league of mine.
Like Mr. Allen, Mr. Adams favored
the inclusion of the self-defense forces
in the order of battle and argued, at a
series of conferences with reppesenta.
fives of General Westmoreland in 1967,
that the total strength of the enemy
should be estimated at about 500,000.
The military successfully advocated a
total of about 300,000 - which the docu-
mentary described as an "arbitrary
ceiling."
Yesterday, as he had on Wednesday,
Mr. Allen accused his superiors at the
C.I.A. of "caving in" to the military.
Mr. Allen said the military had let
the C.I.A. and other intelligence agen-
cies know of the higher estimate for the
self-defense forces. But the important
thing, he said, was that the military
fore the committee that he was"able to
accept the final agreed-upon figures as
reflected in the estimate" in November
1967.
STAT
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.1.-
But Mr. Allen said that, under "in-
,/q, structions" by William Colby, then the
/ Director of Central Intelligence, he had
.been "less than candid" with the com-
mittee.
"Make them dig," Mr. Allen said he
was told by Mr. Colby and by Mitchell
Rogovin, the C.I.A.'s general counsel.
The remark brought smiles to the
faces of both Mr. Dorsen and David
Boies, the lawyer for CBS.
"Had you on other occasions spoken
to lawyers who gave you similar com-
ments?" Mr. Dorsen asked.
Not like "make them dig," said Mr.
Allen.
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JACKSONVILLE TIMLS-uNLU.v ,rLJ
25 January 1985
;Former spy master says CIA essential agency
By Nancy Price
Staff writer
1 "Hi, I'm Bill Colby," the bespectacled
man said with a smile, reaching out to shake
hands.
Where were the cloak and dagger? The
hidden microphones in the hotel suite?
Could it be that this thin, gray-haired man
with the professorial manner once parachut-
ed behind Nazi lines into Norway and
France, directed pacification efforts in Viet-
nam and headed the Central Intelligence
Agency for four years?
William E. Colby seems like such a nice
man. Who'd ever figure him for a master
spy? ut don't be fooled by his mild-mannered
demeanor. Colby started spying during
World War II, and after joining the CIA,
served in Stockholm, Rome, and Saigon as
chief of the CIA's Far East Division.
Repercussions from Watergate forced
President Nixon 'to reshuffle his Cabinet,
leading to Colby's appointment as CIA di-
rector in 1973. Colby was removed by Presi-,
dept Ford in 1976.
Colby, 64, now works as an attorney in the
Washington office of Reid & Priest, special-
izing in international legal matters.
He was in Jacksonville yesterday to
speak at Florida Junior College's Kent Cam-
pus" His talk, an. insider's look into the. CIA,
was part of the Forecast '85 Lecture Series
sponsored by the FJC Institute for Private
Enterprise.
Colby, attired in !a gray flannel suit and
navy blue tie, admitted with dry humor that
he is hardly a James Bond lookalike.
"I know what you're thinking: He doesn't
look like a spy, with glasses and gray hair,"
he told his 500 listeners. "You're thinking,
'Where's the cloak? Where's the stiletto?
Where's the blonde?' ." ,
No, he said,.his appearance was not a cov-
er.
"The profession of intelligence is different
than it used to be," Colby said. "And it was
here in America that the changes were
made."
After 1945, when spying behind the Iron
and Bamboo curtains became more and
more difficult, the United States turned to
aerial photography, first with U-2 planes. and
later using satellites, he said. Hong
Instead of sending a spy through
Kong to the Manchurian border be-
tween the Soviet Union and China,
"we can look down at the tanks, the
aircraft and artillery assembled
there. We know when they move
from time to time. We know what 100
spies could not tell us."
In the mid-1970s, CIA operations
underwent a metamorphosis - "we
now insist on operating under the
Constitution, not outside it," he said.
"Congress has two committees in
the House and Senate that have the
right to know what the CIA is doing.
We have developed a special court, so
we can go before a judge and get a
warrant to conduct an activity,
"If we run it this way, it's clear the
decisions are American decisions -
not a CIA rogue elephant running
loose, and not just the president act-
ing. And when congressional commit-
tees have put up barriers to certain
activities, it has stopped certain ac-
tivities."
In an interview yesterday morning,
Colby said intelligence gathering and
analysis is an essential function of the
CIA and critical for the nation.
"You can't live in modern times
iwithout intelligence," he said. "The
CIA is needed to collect information,
analyze the world and make sensible
projections."
Colby, who said he supports the nu-
clear freeze movement, said arms ne-
gotiations would not be possible with-
out CIA-supplied intelligence.
"So you've got to look at the plus-
ses as well as the minuses," he said.
A CIA manual distributed to
Nicaraguan rebels that advocated
.`neutralization" of enemies was a
mistake, not an indication that the
CIA is out of control, Colby said.
"Mistakes happen once in a while,"
he said. "If the Air Force makes the
mistake of paying $7,000 for a coffee
pot, that doesn't negate the need for
the Air Force."
The word "neutralization" was an
unfortunate choice because it has
several connotations, Colby said.
"In dealing with guerrilla prob-
lems, you have to think in terms of
discrediting the leadership," he said.
"The term `neutralize' originally
came from China. It didn't mean kill-
ing, it meant political neutralization
- putting a dunce cap on those peo-
ple to be discredited and making
them ride around in a cart.
"It should not have been written us-
ing that term, because it has a double
meaning. But it's hard to control the
far ends of a guerrilla war. I should
know - I've been in them."
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STAT
WASHINGTON POST
22 January 1985
The Military and the News Me-
dia: A Matter of Intelligence. A
)ecember 1984 debate on the issue
of national security vs. the public's
right to know. Based on a make-be-
lieve situation in which the U.S.
decides to launch a secret spy sat-
ellite as an arms control treaty with
the U.S.S.R. nears. (Coincidentally,
the real-life dilemma posed by the
identical circumstances became
public a month later). Among the
panelists: former Sec. of State Al-
Pxander Haig (who plays the pres-
ident); attorney Floyd Abrams; for-
mer CIA directors William Colb
and James Schlesinger who nlav
the Sec. of State); federal judges
William Byrne Jr. and Antonin
'Scalia; CBS Broadcast Group xec-
utive vice president Van Gordon
Sauter (who plays himself in the
mini-drama); Meg Greenfield and
Fred Hiatt of The Washington Post;
and Bill Kovach of The New York
'Times. 90 minutes (Channel 26 at
II0).
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YORK TIr1FS
24 January 1985
CBS Jury Told oFC.I.A. Sel(cae' en '67
J By M. A. FARBER
/a George W. Allen, a former deputy
chief of Vietnamese affairs for the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, testified yes-
terday that the C.I.A. had "sold out" to
the military in 1967 on the issue of
enemy strength in South Vietnam and
that President Lyndon B. Johnson had
beer given a "dishonest and mislead
ix:g" estimate that fall.
Mr. Allen said in Federal District
Court in Manhattan that Gen. William
C. Westmoreland was "ultimately re-
sponsible" for "this prostitution" and
that the C.I.A., by "going along with
it," had "sacrificed its integrity on the
altar of public relations and political
expediency."
As a result, Mr. Allen testified,
Washington was left "essentially with
an inadequate understanding of what
we were up against" in Vietnam.
During the Tet offensive of January
1958, Mr. Allen said, "the chickens
came home to roost." He estimated
that at least 400,000 armed troops took
part in that attack - perhaps 100,000
more than the total enemy acknowl-
edged by the military and the C.I.A. at
that time. Mr. Allen said that, during
1967, he and some C.I.A. colleagues had
actually argued for an enemy force
estimate of about 500,000..
Mr. Allen, who retired from the
C.I.A. in 1979 but still works under con-
tract there, appeared as the second wit-
ness for CBS in the trial of General
Westmoreland's $120 million libel suit,
against the network. f-
25-Page Estimate for President
The suit stems from a 1982 CBS docu-
mentary -"The Uncounted Enemy: A
Vietnam Deception" - which charged
that the general's command engaged in
a "conspiracy" in 1967 to show
progress in the war by minimizing the
size and nature of North Vietnamese
and Vietcong forces. As part of this
"conscious effort," the broadcast said,
General Westmoreland removed the
Vietcong's part-time, hamlet-based
self-defense forces from the listing of,
enemy strength known as the order of
battle and refused to allow a current
count for them in the 25-page special
estimate for the President in Novem-
ber 1967.
Mr. Allen - . who testified Tuesday
afternoon that the self-defense forces
might have accounted for as much as
40 percent of American casualties in bitrary ceiling" of 300,000 on reports of
Vietnam--said yesterday that it was a enemy strength. He testified that he
"lie" th
u
its
ould
t th
t b
d
l
d
l
d
h
lf
a
ose
n
c
no
e
counted accurately.
"We existed," he said, "to make esti-
mates."
Mr. Allen seemed on the verge of lay-
ing part of the blame for the C.I.A.'s
"sellout" on Richard Helms, who was
then Director of Central Intelligence
and who signed the estimate for the
President.
Mr. Helms, he said at one stage,
"made it clear to our staff that he was
not prepared ." Judge Pierre N.
Leval cut the witness off and called the
lawyers to the bench for a private con-
ference. Later, Mr. Allen said only that
he heard Mr. Helms "express himself
on more than one occasion" about the
conflict with the military over the fig-
ures.
Mr. Helms is not expected to testify
at this trial. In a pre-trial affidavit so-
licited by General Westmoreland's
e
ete
t
e se
y
-
efense forces -new
estimated at 120,000 by his intelligence
chief in 1967 - because he believed that
they were insignificant militarily and
that their inclusion at a higher number
in the order of battle or the estimate for
the President would be misleading.
Until the summer and fall of 1967,
when the C.I.A. and the military quar-
reled over a new estimate, the military
listed the enemy size at 298,000, includ-
ing about 70,000 self-defense forces and
the Vietcong's political cadre as well. i
The new estimate - which George
Carver, who was then chief of Vietnam-
ese affairs for the C.I.A., has testified
was a "compromise" - put enemy
military strength at 223,000 to 248,000,
excluding the self-defense forces.
Moreover, the political cadre was rele-
gated to a separate listing, numbered
at 85,000.
Yesterday, in response to a question
lawyers, he said that the "disagree- by Judge Leval, Mr. Allen questioned
ment" over enemy strength was not the diversion of the political cadre.
war," that he was under no pressure
from "the military or any other
source" to accept low numbers and
that the estimate he signed ,repre-
sented the highest quality of intelli-
gence analysis given the 'softness' of
much of the data."
Mr. Allen said that, in 1975, when a
Congressional inquiry was conducted
into the dispute, he was told by William
Colby, who had succeeded Mr. Helms,
to be "guarded" in his House testimo-
ny.
Mr. Allen recalled driving to Capitol
Hill with Mr. Colby and others on the
day of their appearance. Mr. Colby, he
said, looked at him and said he "didn't
want to put ourselves in the position of
attacking the military."
"I now see very clearly it was a
whitewash," Mr. Allen told the jury,
"and I regret I conformed." The
C.I.A., he said, wanted to "sweep" the
earlier conflict "under the rug."
General Westmoreland, who com-
manded American force$ in Vietnam
from January 1964 to June 1968, con-
tends that CBS defamed him by saying
he had lied to the President and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff about the true size
of the enemy.
The general denied a charge on the
broadcast that he had imposed an "ar-
enemy's command and not just a group
of politicians carrying weapons," he
said. "They would fit the term para-
military, as I construe the term."
Earlier in the 15-week-old trial,
Lieut. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, retired
director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, testified that only 85,000 to .
90,000 enemy troops took part in the Tet
offensive. Other witnesses for General
Westmoreland used a similar figure.
But Mr. Allen said yesterday that his
figure of 400,000 troops was based on a
trip he made to Vietnam in February
1968 with Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Philip Habib, a State Department offi-
cial. The military's estimate for the
units in the January offensive, Mr.
Allen told the jury, was "a gross under-
statement" and excluded hundreds of
assaults on hamlets by forces not listed
in the order of battle.
Mr. Allen said he learned on his trip
that in one region in Vietnam, where an
intelligence officer in the field had re-
ported that all but 3 of 33 enemy battal-
ions had been wiped out before Tet -
with the remaining 3 "cowering in
sanctuary in Cambodia" - 45 battal-
ions actually participated in the offen-
sive "at essentially full strength."
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The New York Times/Maruyn Church
George W. Allen testifying yester-
day at libel trial.
Y3essence," he testified, "not only
ha0 of them not been wiped out, but
the 33 had been reinforced by 12 more.
Mr. Allen, who was calm and deliber-
ate through most of his testimony, sud-
denly became agitated when he re-
called an incident in April 1968 involy-
ing General Graham, who was then a
colonel in General Westmoreland's
command.
By that time, Mr. Allen said, the
C.I.A. had "broken the constraints" of
the military and was insisting, at a con-
ference in Washington, on higher
enemy force estimates. But Colonel
Graham, he said, "embarked on an-
other rambling attempt" to portray the
self-defense forces as old women and
boys "and not important."
Leaning forward in the witness chair
and nearly shouting, Mr. Allen said he
had challenged the point.
"You don't really believe that," he
recalled remarking.
"Of course I don't, but it's the com-
mand position and I'm sticking with
it," he said the colonel replied.
"That example of intellectual prosti-
tution," Mr. Allen told the jury, was "a
low point of my career - I left the con-
ference."
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,y- 775
WASHINGTON POST
24 January 1985
O -Count Compromise Hi.
t
in CBS Trial, Ex-Analyst Calls CIA Agreement a Mistake
/4
By Eleanor Randolph -
Washington Pos!'Smff Writer
NEW YORK, Jan. 23=Former
CIA analyst George Allen said today
that a CIA compromise almost iS
years ago on enemy troop strength
in Vietnam was "the mistake of-the
century."
Allen, a key defense witness for
CBS Inc. in retired Army general
William C. Westmoreland's $120
million libel suit, called a 1967
agreement between the Central
Intelligence Agency and Westmore-
land's command on how many en-
emy troops were in Vietnam late
that year "a prostitution of the in-
telligence process."
"I felt that my own professional
integrity had been compromised by
my going along with this particular
estimate and that ... the agency
had sacrificed. its integrity on the
altar of public relations and political
expediency by going along with the
publication of a dishonest and mis-
leading estimate,"' Allen said.
Allen, 58, who was a former dep-
uty chief of Vietnam affairs for the
CIA and is under''contract to lecture
on intelligence ethics at the agency,
said he told CBS producer and co-
defendant George Crile that West-
moreland "had the fundamental re-
sponsibility" for the "distortion of
the [intelligence] process."
He said Westmoreland, com-
mander of ground forces in Vietnam
at the time, established a "command
position" that listed enemy troop
totals in the 1967 official roster at
about 300,000 instead, of as much
as 500,000. The' higher .figure, was
proposed by the CIA and some of
Westmoreland's Army intelligence
experts. - -
Allen's firm defense of CBS came
on the third anniversary of the
broadcast at issue in this case.
Called "The Uncounted Enemy: A
Vietnam Deception," the program
accused Westmoreland of being
part. of an alleged "conspiracy" to s=
keep a ceiling on enemy troop
strength figures in order to main-
tain support for the war.
Westmoreland, who has -argued
that the broadcast defamed him in
saying he. tried-to, hide the larger
enemy count from superiors includ-
ing President Lyndon B. Johnson,
hi's testified that his officers
dropped "home militia troops" from=
the official enemy count because.
they were difficult to count and
were "civilians" or "non-soldiers."
Allen said such. troops. should be
considered dangerous in a the type
of -war waged in Vietnam. "The mi-
litia was organized in - much the
same way as our own militia had
been during the Revolutionary
War," he-said.
Allen said the importance of the
troop estimate became apparent in
January. 1968 when- communist
-forces staged.the Tet offensive, the
series of attacks against virtually
every major city and military base
that became for many Americans a
psychological. turning point affect-,
ing their support for the war.
"This was the chickens coming
home to roost," Allen said he told
R codefendant Samuel A. Adams, who
worked for Allen at the CIA in 1967
and early 1968. "Our having gone-
along with - the dishonest estimate
had contributed to the psychological
impact on the administration of the
Tet offensive," Allen said.
Allen said lie spoke to. Crile
. more candidly and forthrightly" off
camera than during the two inter-
views he gave the team working on
the disputed documentary.
"I had some feeling of guilt about
my involvement ... and was reluc-
tant publicly to acknowledge that
guilt," Allen testified.
"I was not proud of my own in-
volvement in this," he said, speak-
ing firmly to the jury. "I was not
A
proud of the-agency's involvement,
and I just did not feel that I was pre-
pared at that time to wash my own
and the agency's dirty linen in pub-
lic."
Allen said he felt that he was un-
der 'similar constraints for the.
broadcast as those . her said - were
imposed on-him by then-CIA Direc-
tor William E. Colby in -1975 when
Allen testified before the House.
intelligence committee. - -
Challenged later by Westmore-
land's attorney, David M. :Dorsen,
about his statements to that panel,
Allen said Colby told him before his
appearance that "we ... don't want
to put ourselves in the position cf
attacking the military or appearing
to attack the military in order to
save the agency on this issue."
"I played my role on that occa-
sion, I regret to say, of not breaking
ranks and conforming to what I.now
see clearly in my view was a white-
wash," Allen said.
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i rit IvtW TUKic I lflL
23 January, 1985
CBS Witness Links U.S. Losses to,'
FARBER Senior C.I.A. Analyst
By M
A
.
.
and various intelligence agencies, Mr.
George W. Allen, a former deputy Mr. Allen - who served as a senior Adams and some CLA
ll
co
..-
eagues un
chief of Vietnamese affairs for the Cen- analyst at the C.LA.'s station in Saigon successfully opposed the deletion of the
tral Intelligence Agency, testified yes- from 1964 to 1966, when he became self-defense f
ith
th
d
orces
n
e or
er of bat
-
terday that the Vietcong's self-defense deputy head of the agency's Vietnam- tie. But it was not until early 1973,.
forces may have been responsible for : ese affairs staff at Langley, Va. - said shortly before he resigned from the
as much as "40 percent of American he had been Mr. Adams's "mentor on C.I.A., that Mr. Adams first publicly
,.losses" in Vietnam. ._-order of battle problems since we first accused the military of willful decep-
Mr. Allen, who is 58 years old, took 'met" in January 1966. At that time, Mr. tion.
the stand in Federal District Court in Adams had worked for six months of a Besides being used for the order of
,"Manhattan as the second witness for two-and-a-half year assignment on the battle, the enemy strength figures set-
CBS in the $120 million libel trial Vietnamese affairs staff.
brought by Gen. William C. Westmore- . "I sometimes wished I had the cour- tied upon in late 1967 were used for a 25-'
land against the network. age of my convictions as Sam had," page special intelligence estimate for
The suit stems from a 1982 CBS docu- Mr. Allen told the jury. "I regard Mr, President Johnson and other senior of-
mentary that charged a "conspiracy" Adams as one having an unusually high ficials. That document-which listed a
by the general's command to minimize sense of professional integrity." total enemy military strength of 223,000
the true size and nature of enemy Mr. Allen said that Mr. Adams's in- to 248,000 - said, in a paragraph, that
r., strength in South Vietnam in the year tegrity "was commensurate with the the self-defense forces might have
biblical en numbered 150,000 in 1966 and, though
before the Te.t, offensive of January
passage engraved in the en- declining and not "offensive military
1968. The broadcast - "The Uncounted trance to C.I.A. A . headquarters - `Ye -Enemy: A Vietnam Deception" - ac- shall know the truth and the truth shall forces," still "constitute a part of the
cured the military of deliberately dis- make you free.' " overall Communist effort."
toning enemy capabilities by deleting A - Earlier in this trial, George Carver, Yesterday, on re-direct examination
the Vietcong's self-defense units from the chief of that C.I.A. unit, testified for by David Boies, a lawyer for CBS, Mr.
the official listing of -forces known as General Westmoreland and portrayed Adams said that document was "not an
the order of battle. Mr. Adams as someone who was "rel_ honest statement" of full enemy
Mr. Allen, who appeared on the docu- dom in doubt, often in error." strength.
mentary, is regarded as a particularly ? General Westmoreland, who com- But his interpretation was chal-
impurtant witness for the network. manded United States forces in Viet- lenged on re-cross examination by
Both George Crile, the producer of the _ nam from January 1964 to June 1968, David Dorsen, a lawyer for General
t"r broadcast, and Samuel A. Adams, a contends that CBS defamed him by Westmoreland.
former C.I.A. analyst who was a paid saying he had lied to President Lyndon Q. Are You suggesting that people
consultant for the program, have told !B. Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff like Secretary of Defense McNamara
the jury that Mr. Allen was the "dean" about enemy strength in 1967. would not be aware that self-defense
on Vietnamese issues: Mr. Allen him- Arbitrary Ceiling forces were not in the strength
self said yesterday that he had more -'" totals?
experience 'on Indochinese matters as , "'Ihe documentary specifically A. I believe he might be aware, but
an American intelligence officer - - charged that General Westmoreland if he read that paragraph he wouldn't
more than 17 years -than any other ',had imposed an "arbitrary ceiling" on get a proper idea of what those peo-
-person, civilian or military. 'reports of enemy strength, mainly by ! pie did.
c.,.,a' auvut ue-'
On the documentary,- Mr. Allen said _der of battle, and had disregarded re- scribing the self-defense units as "mili-
the removal of the "paramilitary" self- -ports from his officers of a higher Viet- tary," Mr. Adams said that "para-
defense forces from the order of battle ,cong presence and a higher rate of military" might be an acceptable term
twisted "our concept" of the war. , North Vietnamese infiltration than was but that he never doubted the need to
"We were skewing our strategy," he , made known. include them in enemy strength totals.
said on the broadcast. "We were not ac-. - General Westmoreland testified that Mr. Allen testified that the self-de-
knowledging that indeed there was an- he removed the self-defense forces - fense forces "were responsible for
important indigenous South Vietnam- :-then newly estimated at 120,000 - be- sniper fire, preparing booby traps and
ese component; that, indeed, it was a cause they were inconsequential miii- terrorist-type grenades and sometimes
civil war.'. followed Adams tarily and their inclusion in the order of they would actually engage in a fire-
. r Alle Mr. to the f; 11
Dattle at a high figure would mislead g M He said Uiey were killing South
-stand around ? ` yesterday, an Washington and the press. He said he Vietnamese and American troops "and
hour before court adjourned. Mr. also wanted, in 1967, to "purify" the or- were terrorizing civilians. They were
Adams completed his testimony by re-, der of battle by "separatinthe fight- an int y'
egral part of the enem s mill-
calling his many years of efforts to, e h tarv strength 11
rs
- suc as North Vietnamese
bring to light what he called the "em-
regulars and Vietcong guerrillas - He said he recalled- ,-figures as_hieh
barr
military deception" inc Vietnmry of from what he called the "nonfighters," 1 as 40 percent of American losses being
such as the self-defense units.
Mr. Adams said the military's "dis At a series of conferences in 1967 be ; inflicted by militia self-defense ele-
honest" position regarding enemy ments."
strength in 1967 was the "kind of thing tween representatives of the military ~ Mr. Allen, who said he wa~ one of a
that people want to put out of their dozen intelligence analysts who de-
mind. vised the first American order of battle
"It was the kind of thing people al- for enemy forces in Vietnam in 1962,
most have to confess to," he said, tell- said he agreed with Mr. Adams that the
ing of his repeated attempts to pry the military's position on enetny strength
story loose from former military intel- , figures five years later was not in
ligence officers and to acquire infor- I I good faith."
mation that was still in classified docu-
ments.
Vietnam Self-Defense Force
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-_---
TIN APPEARED
40
former director of the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency, a former special
Co!by,-i~iley, Werner Form Internationa
in Ffrm
Former CIA Director.,
1lrationacl -Security Aide.
join-l'orces in `Consortium'
assistant to President Reagan for na-0
6S)r,zss WASHINGTON POST
21 January 1985
tional security affairs, and the Thunder of sev-
eral investment -consulting firms. have joined
forces to form a new international consulting
firm.
Colby; Bailey, Werner 'Associates,
named for the firm's three partners, will pro-
vide political,. economic and investment con-
sulting services to a variety of potential cli-
ents, ranging from' banks and brokerage firms
to foreign governments and mule:t.auona;.cor-
poratioxis.
William E.. Colby, the most prominent part-
ner, was CIA director under presidents Nixon
and Ford. Since -then, Colby has been affili-
ated with the Nexw York, law firm of Reid &
Pr lest and has held -several political consult-
ingpositions. These include a post with In-
ternational Business Government Counsellors
Inc., where he 'served as a senior advisor
along with another of the. new firm's part-
ners, Norman A.. Bailey''
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STAT
 STAT
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N1!"' YU1'U I1`'?131'.G
2U January 1)8S
The
Joseph Letyv rid rally favor the latter interpretation, reliving his youth.
has tried to function as if it were so, rv v-e members, who can be
tend to portray him
ld of Allen
h
h
ars
,
nearly as
OR THE CENTRAL casting himself in the mo
who as the opposite of an activist director:
McCone
A
h
,
n
Intelligence Agency W. Dulles and Ja
. and its frequently flourished in the 19eS'ss and ea-rly rthesuis, as wa captive of a hose major Langley eb it
embattled leader, before serious questions had been William J. Casey,_ raised, on either moral. or pragmatic is alleged, is to shield itself from con-
the start of the sec- grounds, about covert action .2n a troversy. The two images overlap, in i
and Reagan Admin- global scale. Like them, rather than that neither takes him very seriously
he as an effective Director of Central In. ;
redecessors
t
di
,
e p
a
like his imme
istratian is more
d in Washington telligence or an influence on policy,
i
c
ze
ogn
been re
than just the halfway mark in amara- has thorn. :Ronald Reagan is the first and beyond for having ready access either broadly on matters of national
President in.12 years to take the oath to the President. Like them, he has security or narrowly on matters spe-
of office for a second time, but it has not hesitated to make his voice heard cific to the intelligence community.
been 16 years since a head of the as at the White House on policy distinct from intelligencemevalua- a clash of perceptions about Casey. It
American intelligence community also
a clash
eptions last managed to continue in office tions. (Indeed, he might even be re- said
what a Directorf of Geatral In surpassed next. On th ert
ct, for a President who gence should be and, beyond that,
from one he eesidea previous term to occasion, the in to sped,
reluctantly Richard M. Nixon reluctantly values the Cabinet as a forum, he has about how ready the United States
gave in to an argument that he should managed to become the first Director should be to intervene secretly -
retain Richard M. Helms as Director D sal Intelligence ever to sit at poles the ly ~ and, especially,
unhli Oy
of Central Intelligence in order to the table as a participating _ both sides - those ofe her think res. do
saieguar d the nonpartisan character member.) And like Dulles in parts
great white casubordi- rector is se offs- think he is not neactive arly act-and i eenoughho
of the sine , There have - been five di- iar - hw om no nates as fon"dly. known to
one since, and Casey '- there is a tendency to forget the fun-
rectors
one has ever called nonpartisan - rer" because.of his consuming Pas-
has now survived longest of them all. lion for espionage and related games damental insight that emerged from
This can be regarded as a footnote, ._ Mr. Casey is believed to have im- the investigations of the 1970's: that
a fluke, or an indication that the mersed himself deeply in the day-to- all directors, finally, are creatures of
C.I.A. has essentially weathered the day management of clandestine the Presidents they serve. If Press-
.
investigations and strictures of the operations. dents dents that hear conflicts wience th what about the
they world 1970's, that it has recovered much of 'Yet for an assortment of reasons do would that c believe, they
have they
times and changed ex- option of setting it aside. But no direc-
its old effectiveness .and mystique. some personal,' others having to rather The present director, who would cats- with changing
Joseph Leiyveld is a staff writer for pectations of a director - no one tor can ignore the President's goals,
would suggest that official Washing- The different ways directors inter-
this magazine. ton has learned to view William Casey pret their jobs reflect differences
among the Presidents who picked
them. -
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rR1 :-- , _ WASHINGTON TIMES
17 January 1985
BRIEFLY / Business
Consulting firm started
William E. Colby, former CIA director, has formed
an international consulting firm to serve multi-national
corporations, with partners Norman A. Bailey, former
special assistant to President Reagan for national secu-
rity and senior director of international economic
affairs for the National Security Council, and Robert F.
Werner, founder of the Washington Forum. The firm,
called Colby, Bailey, Werner & Associates, will analyze
international defense and economic activities.
STAT
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