AID TO SAVIMBI'S UNITA: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500050044-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: March 8, 1986
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500050044-3
HUMAN EVENTS
8 March 1986
Aid to Savimbi's UNITA: How Much Is Enough?
As usual, my good friend Jeane Kirk-
patrick rose above the foggy. bottom of
Washington doubletalk and succinctly
stated the essence of the problem:
"Savimbi needs real weapons," she
told a crowd at a recent dinner in honor
of Dr. Jonas Savimbi.
I couldn't agree more. Pap resolu-
tions, photo sessions, receptions and
Band-Aids are not enough for Angola's
freedom fighters, known as UNITA
(the National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola). Savimbi and his
60,000 fighters need real anti-tank wea-
pons and real anti-aircraft weapons and
they need them now.
How ShowW We Assess
Now Meta Aid is Enough?
The question is, how should UNITA
supporters assess how much aid is
enough? Before we can answer that
question, we must come to grips with a
more fundamental issue: enough for
what? Enough to win a military victory,
enough to pressure the MPLA (Popular
Movement for the Liberation of An-
gola) regime to negotiate or enough to
simply ease the consciences of Wash-
ington bureaucrats?
A useful baseline is to compare
UNITA's needs today to its needs in
1975-the year the MPLA's military
buildup began and the only year the
United States has sent aid to Angola's
freedom fighters.
At that time, there were two anti-
Marxist groups fighting in Angola,
UNITA and the FNLA (National Front
for the Liberation of Angola), the once
dominant freedom fighter group which
is now a relatively minor player in the
Angola war.
In January 1975, UNITA, the
FNLA, the MPLA and the Portuguese
signed an agreement providing a frame-
work for establishing Angola's inde-
pendence from Portugal. Under the
terms of the accord, known as the
Alvor Agreement, an interim coalition
government composed of all four
groups was to run the country until free
elections could be held in October.
Alvor Agreement
Abrogated by MPLA
By SEN. ORRIN G. HATCH (R.-Utah)
gated the Alvor Agreement, opting for
armed take-over instead of democratic
rule. Just three months after the signing
of the Alvor Agreement, Cuban troops
were sent to the MPLA's guerrilla
camps for training.
Tragically, U.S. policy in 1975 was
not aimed at enabling UNITA and the
FNLA to win a victory against the
MPLA, but at harassing the Soviets in
order to avoid an easy victory against
Stockwell notes that if we had provided
the anti-Communist forces with C-47
gunships in the fall of 1975, they could
have completely broken the MPLA. In-
stead, as a result of the 1976 Clark
Amendment which prohibited aid to
Angolan freedom fighters, the heroic
UNITA guerrillas have fought for 10
long years without one dollar of U.S.
aid.
Fortunately, the defeatist at-
titude symptomatic of U.S. for-
eign policy in the 1970s is on the
wane and is being replaced by a
new, positive outlook known as
the Reagan Doctrine which says
that we must "not break faith"
with those who are fighting for
freedom.
Congress reaffirmed its support for
the Reagan Doctrine by repealing the
Clark Amendment last year and by
passing the 1984 Tsongas resolution
stating that it would be indefensible to
provide Afghan freedom fighters with
only enough aid to fight and die but not
enough to advance their cause of
freedom.
And President Reagan reiterated his
firm commitment to assisting freedom
fighters in his recent State of the Union
message in which he said that "America
will support freedom fighters in Af-
ghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Nic-
aragua with moral and material assist-
ance, in the belief that the freedom
fighters have not just a right to fight
and die for freedom, but a right to
fight and win freedom."
As policymakers assess UNITA's
needs today, we need to be sure that we
send Angola's Freedom Fighters
enough real bullets, enough real=-anti-
tank weapons and.enough real anti-air-
craft weapons.
If $35 million worth of military hard-
ware was not enough - td 'offset the
MPLA in 1975, a much sma)t atr)ount
surely would not be enough today.
Then-CIA Director William Colb "
reporte y a vise the NSC 4 at t o
CIA would have to spend $100 million
to ensure a victory in Angola. But our
1975 Angola program was not $100 mil-
lion or even $50 million. It totalled only
$27 million (which is equivalent to $35
million in 1985 dollars).
UNITA's foreign minister, Jeremias
Chitunda, says that UNITA received
no more than $2-$3 million worth of
weapons from the U.S. in 1975 because
most of the assistance "vanished some-
where in the pipeline."
According to Chitunda, with the ex-
ception of the LAWS (light anti-tank
weapons), the arms we sent to Angolan
freedom fighters 10 years ago were not
adequate.
The former head of the CIA's
A_ ngola -Task Force, John Stockwell,
who is, incidentally, a bitter critic of
UNITA, reports in his book In Search
of Enemies that the rifles we provided to__ttie anti-MPLA forces in1975 were
obsolete World War d-
semi . automatics
-"no matt for the AK's the MPLA
was g g`" Here is one grim sce
nario: On Nov. 11, 1975, a small force
of 1,500 men, including FNLA fight-
ers, two Zairian battalions and 100
Portuguese Angolan commandos,
stood helplessly in an open valley not
far from Luanda as Cuban/MPLA
forces fired salvos of 122-mm. rockets
at them.
Ten Years of Fighting
Without Any U.S. Aid
Stockwell writes. that"CIA observ-
ers estimated that 200 rockets rained on
the task force as it broke and fled in
panic, scattering across the valley in
aimless flight, abandoning weapons,
h?
v
allow
e a es and wounded comrades al_tke.
As we now know, the elections were Survivors wou call it l~'shila w
never held bet ~ttg~ i RR1@ase.2jG04/m4429:ifIAdRDP Q2~~~2000500050044-3
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500050044-3
$2 BINion in
Soviet Military Hardware
In the last 18 months alone, the
Soviet bloc has poured some $2 billion
worth of military hardware into
Angola. Savimbi reports that the
MPLA arsenal includes 200 jet fighters,
over 1,000 tanks-including T-34's
and T-62's-and 160 helicopters-in-
cluding Ml 18's, MI 25's and the de-
structive Hind helicopter gunships
which are known as "flying tanks" be-
cause they are equipped with anti-tank
missiles and can drop bombs.
At the end of 1975, the MPLA was
backed by 6,000 to 10,000 Cuban
troops and 400 Soviet "advisers." Ac-
cording to unclassified State Depart-
ment reports. today there are at least
35,000 Cuban military personnel in
Angola and 1,500 Soviet East bloc
"advisers."
It is time to quit talking and start
sending UNITA anti-aircraft weapons
and anti-tank weapons. UNITA antici-
pates another MPLA offensive in the
early spring; it is imperative that the
U.S. send the Angolan freedom fight-
ers effective support as quickly as pos-
sible.
In addition to our moral obligation
to help UNITA, it is vital to our na-
tional security interests that we do not
let the Soviet bloc get a firm foothold in
Angola. As Dr. Savimbi has stated,
"UNITA is the key to Angola, Angola
is the key to southern Africa, and
southern Africa is critical to the West."
According to press reports, Savimbi
has said that he needs "100 to 200"
anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles
which he estimates would cost between
$50 and $60 million-a small price to
pay compared to what is at stake. At
the very least, we should send UNITA
100 U.S.-made Stingers, 100
U.S.-made improved TOW anti-tank
weapons and sufficient ammunition for
their present weapons in preparation
for the expected April offensive. In
assessing how much aid is enough for
Jonas Savimbi's freedom fighters,
policymakers must not repeat the
mistakes of 1975. This time, we cannot
afford to be penny-wise and pound-
foolish. 0
a)
Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500050044-3
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ARTICLE APPE.','r
?..N PAGE
USA TODAY
24 February 1986
In the news this week
FRaAV - Former CIA Director William Colby speaks at symposium
on international terrorism at Tufts University in Medford, Maas.
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