ANGOLA BILL FUELS NEW DEBATE OVER U.S. COVERT ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500050042-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: May 14, 1986
• Content Type: PREL

Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500050042-5
REUTERS
14 May 1986
ANGOLA BILL FUELS NEW DEBATE OVER U.S. COVERT ACTION
BY CAROL GIACOMO
WASHINGTON
Legislation designed to force public votes in Congress on U.S. aid for
Angolan rebels has fueled new debate over President Reaaan's use of covert
action -- paramilitary operations -- against foreign governments.
While few experts propose an end to all covert action as a U.S. foreign
Policy tool some contend it should be employed more sparingly and that there be
maximum open debate on decisions to intervene in o er countries -- especially -
when a decision, such as on rebels in ngo a, is controversial.
"Few foreign policy decisions are equal in importance to a decision to go to
war or to support a war," said Rep. Lee Hamilrton, chairman of the House 1a
iaence Le -
L_ sponsored the Angola bill.
"The extreme complexity of the modern world, the growth of America's
responsibilities and the ambiguous nature of many international Causes all
demand that Congress and the president pool their judgments on these questions,
the Indiana Democrat told the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Reagan, according to many analysts and published reports, has vastly expanded
covert actions during his five years in office in his personal crusade -- called
the "Reagan Doctrine" -- to bolster anti-Communist insurgencies around the
world, particularly in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola.
Jay Peterzell, in his 1984 book "Reagan's Secret Wars," said the president
made "far-reachin changes in U.S. covert action policy, increasin the use of
such operations and severe y limiting the role in reviewing them by officials
outside tie intelligence community.,
Peterzell, who works For the American Civil Liberties Union's Center for
Naudies, added: "The changes reflect an apparent consensus within the
administration that covert action should be a routine rather than an ex e i n
instrument in American foreign relations."
It Is generally believed U.S. covert operations declined after a committee
headed by the late Sen Frank Church in 1975 held rare public hearings and
.spurred changes in the essional oversight process.
The Reagan administration and many U.S. officials formally refuse to disclose
details of most current U.S. operations.
But many of the facts have leaked out through a variety of sources, including
the White House, Congress, rebels and private analysts.
"There is a dilemma in trying to conduct any secret activity in American
_government because of the tendency to ask questions and debate at the top of our
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The result has been a curious hybrid, often called an "overt-covert" program,
that has the effect of ensuring the public knows the United States is doing
"something" for these myriad guerrilla forces, but keeping must der-ails secret
and denying Congress a role in the decision-making process.
A Senate Intelligence source said the "overt-covert" tactic is useful because
it allows Washington and governments assisting Washington officially to deny
knowledge of ll. paramil~ dry opera ions.
Morton Halperin, a former deputy assistant secretary for defense, contends
that defining interventionist activity as covert is a clever way for a president
to avoid public debate and scrutiny.
"Often they remain secret long enough for the United States to get involved,
then the argument becomes that we can't abandon our friends in the field," he
told Reuters.
The debate over U.S. support for the so-called contra rebels trying to topple
Nicara uuaa's leftist Sandinista government has been the most divisi o eagans
.covert exploits.
Polls show a majority of Americans oppose such aid and this resistance has
been reflected in Congress.
With attention centering now on Reagan's request for $100 million in mostly
military aid for the contras, what was once an entirely covert operation has
been forced by circumstance a.nd politics almost entirely Into the open. "
The request, however, is bogged down in Congress and will not be resolved at
least until June.
Meanwhile, a new fight is brewing over Reagan's decision to send $15 million
in covert military aid -- including highly-portable Stinger anti-aircraft
missiles -- to the UNITA Forces of Jonas Savimbi in Angola.
Hamilton's bill, which passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee and is
waiting action by the full House, does not directly bar U.S. aid to UNITA
(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).
But it would mandate that aid cannot be given until Reagan publicly declares
that support for UNITA is important to U.S. national security and Congress
cnn cu r5 .
Hamilton told his colleagues that aiding UNITA represented a significant
policy change and should be openly debated and voted by Congress "so that
ultimately it can be sustained" by popular consensus.
i.L~S. aid was halted a decade ago after disclosures the CIA funded UNITA and-
.another Pro-Western rou in a three-sided civil war following Angola's
independence from Portugal.
Many lawmakers, including Hamilton, oppose renewed aid, fearing it would
align Washington with South Africa and destroy efforts to reach a negotiated
settlement to conflict in southern Africa.
More compelling, some say, is the dichotomy of an administration that insis c
the program be treated as "covert" while Reagan and other top officials publicly
endorse support for the rebels and welcome Savimbi at ig -vis ty White House
ceremony. Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500050042-5