CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM COLBY INTERVIEWED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500050037-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: June 8, 1986
• Content Type: TRANS

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1W RADIO N REPORTS, INC.
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PROGRAM McLaughlin: One on One WRC-TV
STATION
June 8, 1986 5:30 P.M.
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT
Lrl~ r y
CIA Director William Golb-y Interviewed
JOHN MCLAUGHLIN: Should news organizations be
prosecuted for revealing secret intelligence? We'll put that
question to the spymaster of the U.S.
Born, Queens. Age, 73. Wife, Sophia, 45 years. One
daughter. Roman Catholic. Repubican. Fordham, bachelor of
science. St. Johns University, doctor of laws. U.S. Naval
Reserve, World War II, lieutenant. OSS, Office of Strategic
Services, transferred to. Organized French Resistance,
supporting Normandy invasion, awarded Bronze Star for.
Intelligence operations, OSS, European Theater, Chief, two years.
Marshall Plan, Associate General Counsel, one year. New York
University, lecturer, 14 years. Practicing attorney, New York
and Washington, 26 years. Presidential campaigns: Dewey,
Willkie, Taft, Eisenhower, Nixon, Romney, Scranton, various
positions in, '40 to '68. Venture capitalist, 25 enterprises,
cofounder and co-developer of, '51 to '71. Capital Cities
Communications, owner of ABC, cofounder and director of, 21
years. U.S. House of Representatives, New York, Third District,
Republican nomination, candidate for, 66. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Chairman, two years. U.S. State Department,
Economic Affairs, Undersecretary, one year. Export-Import Bank,
President and Chairman, almost two years. Ronald Reagan
presidential campaign, manager, one year, 1980, succeeding John
Sears, discharged by Mr. Reagan. Author, "Armchair Tour of the
American Revolution" and 20 other books and manuals. Central
Intelligence Agency, Director, 5 1/2 years and currently. Net
worth, 1981, three million dollars-plus.
William Joseph Casey, it's one on one.
ANNOUNCER: From Washington, D.C., John McLaughlin's One
OFFICES IN: WASAppTtoveFOi' R49easeK2004tlDlJg ;Eg A-RDPP4AWOIR"WO ORIa aTHER PRINCIPAL CTIES
Material supplied by Radio N Reports. Inc may be used for file and reference purposes only It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500050037-1
on One. An unrehearsed, probing inside exchange with the people
making the news.
Here's the host, John McLaughlin.
MCLAUGHLIN: Director Casey, you carry, literally, the
secrets of the world on your shoulders. Is it an onerous job?
DIRECTOR WILLIAM CASEY: I don't find it particularly
onerous. It's a heavy responsibility. I rather enjoy it. It's
very challenging.
MCLAUGHLIN: Is one of your problems winnowing out the
information you get, you get so much information?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Oh, certainly. Winnowing it out,
selecting, evaluating. That's the main thing we do. It's the
analytical and the assessment work that is the critical part of
the job.
MCLAUGHLIN: This week Ronald Pelton was convicted of
espionage on several counts and conspiracy. How do you think the
press handled itself in relation to this trial?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I think the press reported the
trial well. I was disappointed that some elements of the press
put some information, classified information into their stories
that was not cleared to come out in t;-ie court process and in the
process of declassifying information for purposes of the trial.
But I thought it was well covered.
MCLAUGHLIN: In the early part of May, the reports began
to surface that you were considering asking the Justice
Department to prosecute the Washington Post, the Washington
Times, Time magazine, Newsweek magazine because they were in
potential or in real violation of a section of our law called
COMINT, which is a 1950 law, Section 798, Title 18 of the U.S.
Code, which bars publication of any information relating to codes
and intelligence gathered through intercepted communications.
In one of its broadest provisions, it prohibits disclosure of
communications by foreign governments if they were obtained
through interception. And your particular grievance against the
Washington Post was that it had published the intercept between
Libya and the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin.
Is that a fair statement of what happened in early May?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Not only the Washington Post, all the
major medias had published that intercept. And that, knowing and
willingly publishing any information about communications
intelligence, is prohibited by federal law.
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MCLAUGHLIN: You were really anticipating a larger
article to have been written by The Post, which was then in
composition, where The Post was contemplating writing about the
submarine eavesdropping capability of the Navy. And in fact, The
Post did publish that article, but in a sanitized state. And it
was reported that you enlisted the help of Ronald Reagan, who
called Kay Graham, the Editor of The Post.
Is that pretty much what happened?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Pretty much. We frequently are able to
discuss a story which is sensitive and would be damaging to our
intelligence capabilities with members of the press, members of
the media. And they frequently -- sometimes hold and sometimes
will modify a story to protect our equities and our interests.
MCLAUGHLIN: I take it that's the way you like to
proceed, on that kind of a cooperative...
DIRECTOR CASEY: That's the way we like to proceed.
That's the way we've worked with The Post on a number of
occasions, and on this particular occasion for quite a while.
MCLAUGHLIN: The press counterargue that: Hey, wait a
second, Director Casey. Your operation at the CIA, some of your
people, and elsewhere in the government, will. directly leak
information when it suits your purpose.
For example, in the case of the undertaking against
Libya, Richard Burt delivered himself of a clear statement very
early on that there was conclusive evidence, or reasonably
conclusive evidence that Libya had been -- was behind it. And
Senator Byrd condemned roundly the CIA for hemorrhaging leaks
which might have even impaired the military success of the Libyan
strike.
So, do you really -- the question is, do you really want
it both ways? Do you want to be able to leak the information you
want in the press, but at the same time slap the wrist of the
press, or worse, if the press gets out of line?
DIRECTOR CASEY: John, I want it both ways. I want to
stop the leaks internally and I want the press to cooperate in
not publishing, or in publishing, not publishing information that
is damaging to our national security and damaging to the safety
of our citizens. It is deplorable. And we all deplore, I
deplore the loose talk and the lack of discipline within the
government, the Administrative branch, and in the Congress as
well. And you don't condone that.
But it's always been recognized, recognized by the
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Congress, that you can't bottle up all the information. Some )f
it's going to get out. And when it does, if it deals with
communications intelligence, the press is prohibited by law from
publishing it.
MCLAUGHLIN: Right. And that's that COMINT act of 19...
DIRECTOR CASEY: That's right.
MCLAUGHLIN: ...or law of 1950.
You took the gloves off against NBC, though, when James
Polk, on the show, the Today Show of May the 19th, he said this,
quote: Pelton apparently gave away one of the NSA's most
sensitive secrets, a project with the code name Ivy Bel13,
believed to be a top secret underwater eavesdropping operation by
American submarines inside Russian harbors.
It's been speculated around town here in Washington that
the reason why you hit NBC so hard was because you got a phone
call from Ben Bradlee and he said, "Look, I did what you asked me
to do. I sanitized our story. But look at what NBC did. NBC
revealed everything that we withheld."
Is that why the CIA got
DIRECTOR CASEY: Not at all. I had told everybody, many
other medias, that this law was there. And I thought it neces-
sary to apprise them they were exposing themselves to that risk
if they publish information about communications intelligence.
It so happened that NBC was the first one after the
beginning of the Pelton trial. And Ben, The Post had been very
cooperative. They had withheld. And if I let anybody else do it
without responding, I would -- the whole situation would crumble.
And I felt it necessary to notify NBC that they had violated our
law.
MCLAUGHLIN: But here's the position, now, that occurs
to someone looking at what happened. On November the 27th, Jim
Polk -- that's last November, six moninths ago -- the same crack
investigative reporter who did the May story -- on November the
27th, Polk revealed the exact same information. He said on that
program, when there was a hearing, a bond trial hearing tor
Pelton, Polk reported, "A clue to what secrets Ronald Pelton may
have sold to the Russian KGB emerged in a court hearing today.
The defense used the phrase Ivy Bells. Ivy Bells refers to Navy
eavesdropping operations. The Navy is known to have submarines
outside Soviet harbors listening to what the Russians say."
So the question arises, why didn't you go after NBC last
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November? Why wait until May?
DIRECTOR CASEY: We might have been asleep at the
switch. There's no principle of law that says if you violate a
law once, you're immune when you violate it a second time.
The reason we've taken this position now is that there
has been a perfect hemorrhage of these things. There's been a
complete flood. It's reached the point where we're very
seriously concerned about the impact on our basic capabilities.
If you have -- we have a single situation, you weigh it.
You say, "Well, is it better to act or is it better to hope that
it goes away or hope that nobody notices it too badly." If you
act, you attract attention to it.
The number of disclosures we had, the number of leaks,
and the sensitive nature of them, the damage they did to our
capabilities required us to act at this time. And we were acting
across the board at this time.
MCLAUGHLIN: There's a story around town to that you are
now in retreat with regard to your attempts to enforce COMINT --
that is, the 798 section of the U.S. Code -- and that you've been
called off by the White House.
Any truth to that?
DIRECTOR CASEY: That's a false story, entirely false.
It's hard to understand how, when a law enacted by the Congress
to protect intelligence capabilities is violated flatly, it's
hard to understand how you can fail to act and seek to use that
law and implement it to protect what the law requires you to
protect.
So, nobody's called me off. Nobody's tried to call me
MCLAUGHLIN: One final question before we leave this
segment, Director Casey, and that is this: When Pelton went to
trial, the CIA delivered itself of a pointed statement. And part
of it said this: "Those reporting," referring to the press, "on
the trial should be cautioned against speculation and reporting
details beyond the information actually released at the trial.
Such speculations and additional facts are not authorized
disclosure and may cause substantial harm to the national
security." Unquote.
The press went wild at that. They felt that this was
going to exert -- (A) it was obscure; and secondly, it was going
to exert a chilling effect upon the press.
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And you value the press, I'm sure, the freedom of the
press as much as anybody else in this country.
DIRECTOR CASEY: I do entirely. Very much so. I'm of
the press, in a way.
That was probably not put as clearly as it might have
been. What we intended to say is that the information that had
been released can be considered to be no longer classified. But
any additional information related to that, if it remains
classified, if it's used, if it's published, it's in violation of
that statute.
That's what we were trying to say. We were trying to
give that simple message.
MCLAUGHLIN: Do you think you succeeded in that?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Oh, yes. I think we succeeded in that.
MCLAUGHLIN: Because it was...
DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, there was misunderstanding and
confusion.
MCLAUGHLIN: But didn't Pelton...
DIRECTOR CASEY: And I think it's pretty clear. People
understand what we're saying.
MCLAUGHLIN: But at the trial...
DIRECTOR CASEY: That information -- publishing that
information is a violation of law. And I think all the media
lawyers are working over that.
MCLAUGHLIN: But at the trial itself, didn't Pelton
ponit to a map, to the Kamchatka Peninsular up there near the
Bering Strait and point to the area where the submarines are
listening, our submarines are?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, that's a legal question, whetner
that constitutes unclass -- removal of classification.
MCLAUGHLIN: It was published by The Post. Do you have
any grievance by The Post for publishing that?
DIRECTOR CASEY: I haven't raised any question on that.
MCLAUGHLIN: I published in a magazine called (he
National Review...
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DIRECTOR CASEY: It was revealed in open court.
MCLAUGHLIN: Two years ago I published in The National
Review, Director Casey, a story that I did on Russian submarines
in Puget Sound monitoring, eavesdropping, particularly on the
Trident submarine. Puget Sound. Now...
DIRECTOR CASEY: On Russian submarines.
MCLAUGHLIN: Right. Now the...
DIRECTOR CASEY: That's probably...
MCLAUGHLIN: In other words, isn't this so well known
that it makes, really, no difference? And aren't you
exaggerating?
DIRECTOR CASEY: You're absolutely wrong, John. You're
dead, cockeyed wrong. The Sovi -- how do you know what the
Soviets know? How do you know what they need to have confirmed?
How do you know what details they need to effectively counter
what we can do?
DIRECTOR CASEY: You just can't know. You're in no
position to understand or realize it.
MCLAUGHLIN: You mean that the press confirms, and that
act of confirmation is what is the -- is what itself is
subversive of the natural -- national interest, that it te'ls,
that it communicates something to the Soviets?
DIRECTOR CASEY: The law is pure and simple. It Nays
publication of information about communications intelligence is
illegal. There were reasons for enacting that. During World War
II, we were reading German and Japanese communications. That
saved many, many thousands of lives and cut the war short a few
years. One little whisper of that in the media would have
enabled the Germans and the Japanese to turn that off, the law
would have been prolonged, many more lives would have been lost.
That's why the Congress enacted that law. And it's been
on the books and it's still there, and it's there to protect this
particular kind of communication intelligence.
MCLAUGHLIN: When we come back I'd like to talk to you a
little bit about counterintelligence.
DIRECTOR CASEY: Okay.
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8
DIRECTOR CASEY: ...assemble quite a lot of information.
MCLAUGHLIN: We're back on the air, Director Casey. And
it's a pleasure to have you with us today.
DIRECTOR CASEY: It's good to be here.
MCLAUGHLIN: Can we talk a little bit about Ronald
Pelton? Because a lot of people are disillusioned at the
counterintelligence capacity of your distinguished agency in the
way it handled Ronald Pelton. Now, it's not the CIA, it's the
NSA. But I think a lot of people feel that you are an umbrella
person, as far as intelligence is concerned, because you have a
seat at the Cabinet table. And therefore, although there is the
CIA and the DIA and the NSA...
DIRECTOR CASEY: And the FBI.
MCLAUGHLIN: ...and the FBI, that you kind of are the
principal honcho of intelligence.
Is that a fair statement?
DIRECTOR CASEY: I have a coordinating authority over
the intelligence community.
MCLAUGHLIN: You do.
DIRECTOR CASEY: Yes.
MCLAUGHLIN: Good. Okay.
The question is this: Ronald Pelton is a man 44 years
of age who was making $24,500 a year. He went into debt to the
tune of $63,000. He is a gifted human being. He's brilliant.
He's got a photographic memory. He was a wizard as far as
cryptography is concerned. All of a sudden he quits the NSA, and
there's no check. That's number one.
Number two, he makes several phone calls to the embas:3y.
The phone line is tapped. We heard the conversations that Pelton
had with the Soviet Embassy. No check is made after that.
Number three, during the course of a two-or-three-year
period, three-year periods of travel, he goes to Vienna, he stays
in the ambassador's embas -- in the Soviet Embassy for three days
at a time. No check on that.
Finally, we have a defector, or a pseudo-defector, by
the name of Yurchenko, Vitaly Yurchenko, and he announces that,
indeed, Pelton was an agent for the Russians.
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Why is it that we have to depend upon a defector, or a
pseudo-defector, to tell us what the intelligence community ougot
to tell us at the start?
DIRECTOR CASEY: We had no information about Pelton's
disloyalty and what he did when he left the agency, or while he
was at the agency. He worked for the NSA. The NSA was responsi-
ble for his conduct. They polygraphed him at some point.
Nothing came out which caused any suspicion with respect to Mr.
Pelton.
I didn't know anything about Mr. Pelton until Yurchenko
told us that this man had passed information to the Soviet
Embassy. And even then, we didn't know who he was. It took us
quite a while to identify exactly who he was.
MCLAUGHLIN: Well, doesn't that tell you something about
counterintelligence?
DIRECTOR CASEY: It tells you that counterintelligence
is a very tough job. We do catch a great many spies. We cauqht
more spies last year than we have ever before in any one year.
MCLAUGHLIN: How many spies did you catch last year?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Eight or nine.
MCLAUGHLIN: And their principal spies? I mean...
DIRECTOR CASEY: They're important spies.
MCLAUGHLIN: They're important spies?
MCLAUGHLIN: What do you think about Yurchenko, Vitaly
Yurchenko? Do you think he was the real article, or was the
whole thing an assignment from the Soviet Union? Did he
redefect?
DIRECTOR CASEY: He was a bona fide defector who had a
change of heart and redefected. I think he gave us a great deal
of information, important information, helped us catch some other
spies. Not only here, but in other places around the world. And
he was a bona fide defector who, for a variety of reasons, had a
change of heart and decided to go back. And I think everybody
accepts that now.
MCLAUGHLIN: You know what would argue against that, is
that he fingered two people that I'm aware of -- one is Pe lton
and the other is a fellow by the name of Howard. Ronald Howard?
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DIRECTOR CASEY: Yes.
MCLAUGHLIN: Now, Howard escaped, and Pelton has been
heylwere drained by
easy
convicted. But both were drained. They
Russians. In other words, they were giveaways for the that would of argue that he was
not a bona fide second .
DIRECTOR CASEY: That's a rather narrow iargument, arid
t
there were a great many other pe op
think you can make that claim about.
And it was also -- we wouldn't have caught Pelton, and
Pelton might have had some further usefulness for them if he
hadn't told us about him.
MCLAUGHLIN: True.
We'11 be right back, Mr. Director, with some other
questions about your life at the agency.
MCLAUGHLIN: The mastermind of the Achille L ors
hijacking was a man by navernmebtsAbbAnd hendwaseinterviewed
hunted by several different go And b a deal cut with Mr. Abbas
recently by NBC's Henry Champ. Y
and his people, NBC refused to reveal where the interview took
place.
What do you think of that behavior on the part of NBC?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I deplore it. I think it was a
pretty shabby performance.
ou think that -- here is another
MCLAUGHLIN: Do y an NBC reporter,
otChamp,
argument about intelligence.
of people say, why c~~n't
l think Han lot
can track down Abu Abbas,
the CIA?
a
~
g
n
e
s
He
hime
see
to
DIRECTOR CASEY: W ell, been we invited
about Abu Abbas.
well-guarded, he's well-protected by other governments.
MCLAUGHLIN: Now, I learned and I published in The
that interview took I t
I learned the
National Review Athe lgeria. And of
took k place in Algeria.
what is can't we -- I
Government. Now, if it's in Algeria,
intelliqence
guess what I'm getting at, Mr. Director,
capability in the Middle East?
DIRECTOR CASEY: We have a significant intelligence
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capability in the Middle East. We have our own people. We have
very close relationships with the other governments in the Middle
East. We have been able to warn against, cause action to be
taken, or abort, better than a hundred planned terrorist attacks
over the last year. And that's a pertty considerable capability.
Now, we don't kow where every one of these guys are.
They have armed guards. They hide. They move all the time.
They're well-protected. And we just can't send people in to
interview them on a contractual basis, the way NBC did. There's
no analogy there at all.
We're out there working the terrorist account all the
time, with increasing effectiveness. It's a very difficult
target, but we're doing steadily better at it.
MCLAUGHLIN: In that sector of the world -- quickly,
because I want to ask you the mega-question -- are you concerned
about the terrorist capability of Syria?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Yes, I am.
MCLAUGHLIN: Do you think that Syrian terrorists were
behind the La Belle discotheque?
DIRECTOR CASEY: I'm not going to comment on that
publicly.
MCLAUGHLIN: When we come back I'll ask you the
mega-question.
DIRECTOR CASEY: Okay.
you've
you've
MCLAUGHLIN: You're a veteran spook, so to speak. And
been spymaster for this nation for over five years, and
got a background against which to judge things in this
Do you think the United States is safer than it was when
Reagan took office and you went over to the CIA?
DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I'm
gence capabilities are far stronger
I spent billions of dollars and
talented young people. And this
capability unprecedented in this or
As to whether that makes
safe without it. But we are also
increasingly dangerous.
sure it is that our intelli-
than they were at that time.
recruited thousands of very
has created an intelligence
any other nation.
us safer, we'd be much less
in a world which has become
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12
MCLAUGHLIN: Thanks so much for being my guest on one on
DIRECTOR CASEY: Okay.
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