REORGANIZING THE CIA: WHO AND HOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500020005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 1, 1976
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

NUMBER 2?. STATINTL
SUIv BR 1976
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R
RE'JORGANIZING
THE CIA:
WHO AND HOW
In FOREIGN POLICY 22, Peter Szan-
ton and Graham Allison wrote that the
time had come to "seize the opportunity"
and restructure the American intelligence
community. In the exchange that follows,
William E. Colby and Walter F. Mondale
comment on their proposals and Stanton
and Allison reply.- -The Editors.
William E. Colby:
Indeed we have an opportunity to rethink
arid restructure American intelligence. A year
of intensive investigation by a presidential
and two congressional committees, world-
wide concern over sensational accounts of
CIA deeds and misdeeds, and a series of Con-
stitutional confrontations between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches cannot dis-
appear into our history books without
changes in American intelligence.
The first and easiest action would be to
tinker with the organizational structure of
intelligence. When in doubt, or under pres-
sure, reorganize; this is an old bureaucratic
ploy. It is also a tempting panacea for infi-
nite problems. With due respect for the ideas
suggested by Peter Szanton and Graham
Allison, but without agreement with many
of them, I believe this opportunity should
be seized in more important fields.
The fundamental lesson of the year of
investigation is that American intelligence is
a part of and must operate under the Amer-
ican constitutional system. This perhaps ob-
vious fact for Americans is a stunning nov-
elty in the long history of intelligence. It is
as startling an idea to many developed de-
mocracies as it is incongruous to totalitarians.
It does not reverse any early American
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500020005-9
 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : C.IA-RDP91-00901 R000500020005-9
doctrine to the contrary, but it does over-
turn longstanding and comfortable practices
which grew up before the question was
squarely faced.
Three conclusions stem from this new
status of intelligence. First, the place of in-
telligence in the governmental structure must
be established and understood in open stat-
utes and directives. The National Security
r\ct of 1947' made a start in this direction,
and the cm, Act of 1949 provided statutory
authority for many of the essential attributes
of our intelligence service. Both contain
several vague and encompassing clauses,,
however. The resulting ambiguities led to
actions which in retrospect fall below to.
day's standards.
President Ford's executive order of Feb.
ruary 18 makes a major stride in the direc-
tion of providing a public charter for Amer-
ican intelligence, describing its structure and
functions and clearly delimiting areas of au-
thorized, and unauthorized, activity. Sub-
stantial parts of this order, however, should
be enacted into law, our constitutional pro-
cess of establishing and recording our na-
tional consensus on matters of public import.
George Washington once said that upon
secrecy, success depends in most enterprises"
of intelligence. The past year has shown al-
most a total lack of consensus and even un-
derstanding of the role and limits of secrecy
in American intelligence. What were leaks
rose at times to flood stage proportions.
Strong voices are beard advocating almost
every variation on the spectrum from a mod-
ern version of "open intelligence openly ar-
rived at" to the contention that an Official
Secrets Act should protect an intelligence
structure totality hidden in the recesses of the
executive branch. President Ford has recom-
mended legislation which will impose the es-
sential discipline on intelligence personnel to
keep the secrets they learn but leave untram-
meled the First Amendment's guarantee of a
free press.
'Vi'e have laws and sanctions to protect
many secrets necessary to the preservation
U.otby
and operation of our free society. The se-
cret ballot box, the confidence between at-
torney and client, advance crop figures which
might upset the market, all are protected by
crirmmi::ial sanctions against individuals who
might disclose them. Intelligence secrets.
however, are in effect only protected against
the foreign spy. But their disclosure to our
free society makes them available to the for-
eigner as well, and can cut our nation off
from sources and information which are es-
sential to its safety in a world which has not
yet been made safe for democracy.. Better
protection of our sources through law woulc'
apply to the intelligence profession the s.'
discipline that journalism has found essei
tial to its functioning-
"The photographs must be pub-
lished, the backgrounders attrib-
uted, the publications edited to
protect the sources but circulate
the substance of their reports .. .
regularly to all iiieiiibers of Con-
gress...." -William E. Colby
The second conclusion from the new sta-
tus of intelligence under the Constitution is
that it must be responsible and accountable.
This burden must rest not only on those in
intelligence: it lies with equal weight on. all
three branches of our constitutional struc-
ture. President Ford has moved to strengthen
executive control and responsibility for intel-
ligence. The stronger position of the director
of central intelligence. the interagency corn-
mince structure for the review of the policies
and programs of national intelligence, and
independent review and supervision by the
private citizens of The President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, all will increase
the control and accountability of intelligence
to the president himself and to the senior
members of the executive branch.
Congress has an equal duty to arrange it-
self to exercise its constitutional role with
respect to intelligence. It must assume its full
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500020005-9
.. _7 p 1 '' .',r. tq F Ui`^9.if ~' F-r^a?, t .~ ,+
.+s i:; y ., 'S
ie _ ...~., :. s s is,d'a A . . e 1 &.. s , I #, >., .?.`S.'~b a;-. ~tt'ar l ". . -.r~ __F. San
 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500020005-9(-.,ti,.// .tondnte
responsibilities in all senses of the word. It
must organize and carry out full and cur-
rent reviews of the intelligence community,
assuring that it not only remains within the
guidelines set for it, but also that it is effi-
ciently and comprehensively accomplishing
the tasks assigned. Congress' other respon-
sibility, however, is to do this without de-
stroying the ability of intelligence to carry
out its duties. Thus the secrets of intelligence
must be protected on Capitol Hill as well as
at the CIA's Langley headquarters. The min-
imum number of people, congressmen as well
as staff, who truly "need to know should
be informed and should be subject to sanc-
tions for improper disclosure. A single com-
mittee, in each House if necessary, should
represent their colleagues in this function,
ending the present requirement to brief at
least six committees.
The third conclusion which derives from
intelligence's advent to constitutional status
is that it must serve the constitutional pro-
cess. Traditionally and in other lands the
servant only of the executive, it must now
demonstrate its value to the Congress and
to the public. It must earn the large invest-
ment needed by modern intelligence, the
risks and inevitable occasional failures and
embarrassments incurred, and respect for its
professional discipline and secrecy. This must
be accomplished by sharing the fruits of the
enterprise with all participants in the Amer-
ican decision-making process.
Perhaps this is the most challenging task
ahead for intelligence. It must develop the
distinctions between protecting the secrecy
of its sources and techniques and making
available the substance of its information
and conclusions. It must face public criti-
cism and political challenge of its assess-
ments. It must maintain the independence
and objectivity of its judgments apart from
the policies and programs they may sup-
port or question. Internationally, we must
insist that an intelligence judgment is a step
toward policy, not a reflection of it, wheth-
er relating to ally or adversary. In a political
debate where knowledge can be power., in-
telligence judgments must be supplied im-
partially to all factions, to help 11W best so-
lution to emerge. rather than a favored one.
This vAll require many changes in intel-
ligence habits and concepts. The photo-
graphs must be published, the background-
ers attributed, the publications edited to
protect the sources but circulate the sub-
stance of their reports.
With these changes, intelligence can be
distributed regularly to all members of Con-
gress. not held under such high classifica-
tions that it cannot be circulated and made
conveniently available- The estimates will
be debated and the sage unanimity of the
intelligence cloister challenged by those close
to the struggle and fearful of ii rational and
foolhardy. but real, surprises. Out of the
process, however, will cone a better under-
standing of the role and value of modern in-
telligence, as well as better intelligence itself.
"Seizing the opportunity" to implement
these conclusions will mark a major turning
point in the discipline and profession of in-
telligence. In its wake may come some of
the structural changes suggested by Szanton
and Allison and by others joining in. the
close examination of intelligence sparked by
I975's investigations. Some of their and
others` ideas will not be adopted, and ad-
ditional ones will arise for consideration.
But the coming of age of intelligence as a
full participant and contributor to the con-
stitutional process will start a continual re--
view and renewal of intelligence to meet the
challenges of the future. Among more sub-
stantial substantive benefits to the nation
and to American intelligence, this will make
unnecessary another sensational and shat-
tering updating of American intelligence.
N alter E 1M' .nnd ale:
Like most Americans. I have strongly sup-
ported the necessity of our government's
conducting intelligence activities. But after
continua
 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500020005-9
witnessing :hundreds of hours of testimony
before the Senate Select Committee on In-
reIligence, I am also convinced that basic
reform is necessary.
The committee heard respected former of-
ficials of our nation talk about institutional-
ring an assassination capability in tl,e CIA
as though it were just another option. We
studied how the United States has used brib-
ery, corruption, and violence in almost ev-
ery quarter of the globe, and saw how es-
pionage is aimed at our friends as well as at
our foes. The committee reviewed how our
academic institutions, press, and religious
institutions have been exploited for clan-
destine purposes, despite the special place
these institutions must have in our dem-
ocratic society,
"... there must be some firnda-
mental chair-es in America's intel-
ligence activities or they will fun-
damentally change America."
-Walter F. Moirdale
It is clear to me that we have paid an ex-
tremely high price for any resulting secret
success. American covert intervention often
undermined the very democratic institutions
we sought to promote. Because of our clan-
destine activities, the United States is re-
grettably regarded less and less as an example
of democracy to be admired and emulated.
Almost anything bad that happens in this
world is attributed to the CIA--including
the murder of King Faisal. And at home,
the confidence of Americans in their gov-
ernment is weakened when our leaders use
covert intelligence operations to mislead the
public and short-circuit our democratic pro-
cess. I have come to believe that there must
be some fundamental changes in America's
intelligence activities or they will fundarnen-
tally change America.
The proposals of Peter Szanton and Gra
ham Allison in the spring issue of IOR-
I:1GN POLICY go in the right direction.
They improve upon simiIar recommenda-
tions I made last fall. I recognize the costs
in such a reorganization, and George A.
Carver, Jr., in his cuinm nt on the Szanton-
Alli;o,r article, also in the spring issue, has
pointed to certain aspects of them- But in-
sofar as substantive problems can be met by
structural change in the executive branch, I
believe that the gains would outweigh the
costs.
The problem, however, is deeper.
As the committee took testimony day af-
ter day on assassination plots, my first im-
pression was that we were grappling with
some of the darker forces of human nature:
the undertaking of acts which would b: un-
thinkable if not clone in secret; the enthu-
siasm with which we emulated. our enemy;
how patriotism and loyalty could be per-
verted to the point of dishonoring thr na-
tion; the spectacle of men of great respect
offering explanations and excuses at the rear
gin of credibility.
My initial conclusion was that the an-
swer lay in better accountability--vigorous
congressional oversight plus a system in
which officials cannot hide responsibility for
their actions. To this end, I have supported
a new Senate oversight committee with the
power to authorize all national intelligence
budgets.
But the problem, I am afraid, lies deeper
still.. It is not just a problem of means, it iS
a question of ends.
When A.rnerica saw itself as primarily re-
sponsible for countering the Soviets and
Communists throughout the world, our in-
telligence services responded. Since Vietnam,
I believe America's view of its responsibil-
ities has changed. However, there has been
no redefinition of our role in the world, no;
of the policies to be served by our intelli-
gence activities.
As a start, I would suggest the following--
Avoiding nuclear war is most important.
It requires the best possible intelligence. The
continuing suspicion and antagonism be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
continued
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R0005000200
 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500020005-9
Union and the levels of nuclear weapons on
each side, place a premium on the most ac-
curate assessment of Soviet military capa-
bilities and political intentions. Agreements
to control nuclear and conventional arms
need a strong intelligence base to ensure both
sound agreements and compliance. To this
end, I believe the Soviet Union and its allies
must remain our Number One intelligence
priority.
> Containing Soviet adventurism is the re-
sponsibility of all free countries. Each na-
tion must look to its own resources first. If
U.S. help is needed, covert action could
prove vital. But, in general, I see little rea-
son why U.S. aid should go through covert
intelligence channels. Except in extraordi-
nary circumstances, nations wishing Amer-
ican support should be prepared to admit it.
The American people and the Congress must
not be left in the &.rk about new commit-
men ts.
> Support for democracy. America remains
the greatest friend of liberty in the world,
if no longer the sole defender of every regime
that calls itself anti-Communist. But help-
ing the shattered democratic parties of West-
ern Europe survive in the late 1940s is one
thing, and seeking to overthrow a democrat-
ically elected government in Chile in the
1970s is quite another. Moreover, despite
possible short-term success, covert action can
be the enemy of democracy. It often amounts
to corruption and nothing is more destruc-
tive of a democratic political system than
corruption, in particular from a foreign
source. If American aid to democracy is es-
sential to offset Soviet subversion, we should
find a way to do this openly. Perhaps our
political parties can assume some of this re-
sponsibility, much as European Social Dem-
ocratic parties have in Portugal.
> Meeting the problems of hunger and dep-
rivation and building a more equitable
world economic system are urgent tasks un-
suited to clandestine activity. A foreign pol-
icy which relies heavily on covert interven-
tion and espionage will be self-defeating in
,11w Ida Ie
this area, for it will cps: do>ubt c?n the le-
gitimacy of our cc>'>per