CHIEF SPY LIKES BAR TELEPHONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 28, 1982
• Content Type: NSPR

-2)
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WEST PALM BEACH POST (FL)
28 February 1982
k,
STAT
D120002-2
? ? ?
-.1t all started innocently enough with a form- i
letter invitation to William Casey, director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, asking him to meet
with The Post's editorial board during his brief ,
visit to Palm Beach County.
1 hardly expected a reply, much less an accep-1
tance. Figures of Casey's stature usually fly in, t
deliver their speeches at The Breakers or Society'
of Four Arts, then fly right back to Washington.
And given the nature of the CIA, it didn't seem
likely that the nation's chief spy would want to
spend an hour answering questions from newspa-
.permen.
.So I wasn't surprised when I received a phone
call from a CIA public relations man thanking me
for the invitation but giving the chief's regrets.
What did surprise me was when the same P.R.
man called back last weekend to inform me that ?
Casey's plans had changed and he would, indeed,
be able to meet with The Post. "Great," I said,
"when will he be here?"
"I can't tell you that," he said. "We'll be in
touch."
That was three days before Casey's Four Arts
speech last Tuesday. Late Monday afternoon, I
was summoned to the telephone. "Hold for William
Casey," said a voice. The next voice I heard was
Casey's unmistakable New York City brogue in-
forming me that he would arrive at 4:30 p.m.
Tuesday for a 30-minute conference that would be
strictly off the record. ?
We chatted about the beautiful Florida weath-
er and the fact that Casey had just finished a round ;
,of golf at Boca Rio.. He allowed as how he had
'played poorly. - ?
?
A CIA security man arrived during the lunch
hour Tuesday to examine the conference morn
where our meeting was to beheld. Then at precise-1
._
ly 4:10 p.m., two limousines pulled into the parking
lot and Casey appeared, flanked by several trim
and well-groomed bodyguards. ' 1
, I opened the session by asking Casey about
recent reports that the CIA was training Central'
.American dissidents in Florida And other states. ;
? "You don't really expect me, to answer that, do'
you?" was the reply.
I tried again with a query about possible
changes in the CIA's methods after the agency's
failure to warn us of the Iranian revolution. Casey
responded that the CIA now monitored social,
, religious and economic developments in more than
,20 countries rather than concentrating solely on
military intelligence. - . .
? Most of the questions, however, got the stan-
dard "no comment" or "you'll have to wait and
; hear what the president has to say" response.
Casey spoke in a barely audible voice, giving the
:impression that he might be trying to confound any
!FecorAlopftviltd3FdrcReteatter28051111/2..: CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2
-;? About 15k minutes into the sessiOn, ane of
;Casey's security men came into the,reom. bran.;
dishing a Post press card. He secretively flashed it
to me and asked, "Does this man work for You and
do you want him in the room?" ? ? ' -
The card bore the photograph of reporter
Edgar. Sanchez, who had covered Casey's speech
and was late getting back to the office:Sanchez is a
native of El Salvador and the CIA obviously was
taking no chances, particularly with a dark Latin
male who claimed to be a reporter. ?
? After I assured the man that Sanchez -was
authentic, Edgar was ushered into the room.Casey
wouldn't answer his questions, either. ? ?
At exactly 5 p.m., Casey rose and said, "I told-
you I'd give you half an hour and it's been 45
minutes. I've got to go." We thanked him and shook
hands all around.
' The limousines pulled out of the parking lot,
turned left on Dixie Highway and stopped in front
of the seedy but much-loved El Cid Bar directly
across Dixie from The Post. Two security men
jumped out and entered the tavern. ,
In a few minutes they emerged and huddled
with Casey. Then the CIA director, with two body-
? guards in front and two behind, entered the Cid.
It would be somehow reassuring for, me to
report that the crusty superspy, in his three-piece
suit, then bellied up to the bar and hoisted. a cold
one among the T-shirted and blue-jeaneel .E1 Cid
clientele. But Casey didn't have liquid refreshment
on his mind. ? ? - ."; ?
Instead, while his security men stood guard,
Casey plunked a quarter into the Cid's telephone
and placed a call to parts unknown. Then-he was
' off to the airport for his flight back to Washington.
; It's not yet known whether themanagement
of the El Cid will place a brass plate on its phone to
commemorate the day when America's No. I spy
came in from the cold. , ? ? ??
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1,7 '1 I 0:::E 2-1?PrARED
ON
THE WASHINGTON POST
28 February 1982
STAT
r.r1T6 Jolly Jim Watt -S mfr.
.s. onCapitol
rp 0 ENVIRONMENTALISTS, of course, it's a lit-
tle like nailing Al Capone on income tax evasion.
But when it comes to bridling Interior Secretary
James Watt, they will take it any way it comes.
Watt is being stalked by three congressional com-
mittees, not for his crimes
against the land ? the
leveling of mountains, the
destruction of forests
but, when you come right
down to it, for being ob-
noxious. To be more spe-
cific, for guarding his files
better than the country's
wildlife and for being as obtuse about a national
shrine as he is about the wilderness.
Thursday, the House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee voted to cite him for contempt of Congress for
refusing to hand over certain documents relating to
the public's business.
Friday, he refused to appear before another sub-
committee which wanted to examine his federally
funded social life. Watt, on two occasions in Decem-
ber, appropriated for his
OBNO
MOUS
own use the hallowed
? mansion that was the
home of Gen. -Robert E.
Lee.
Mrs. Watt had 18 sister
cabinet wives for breakfast
on Dec. 14.
The bill came to
$1,148.10. Among the items was $48 for a sign that ad-
vised the peasants who had come to pay homage to
the Confederate saint that they must wait outside for
two hours, while Mrs. Watt presided over scrambled
eggs and quiche and conversation with guests whose
name cards cost $5 'apiece.
Two days later, the Watts. gave a sumptu-
ous bash at Arlington House, as Lee's home is,
officially' designated by the National Park -
Service. This time the bill was $6,921, and no
wonder a _ 'green and white striped tent,
shrimp and crabmeat casserole for 177 peo-
ple, not to , mention wine, champagne and.
hard liquor.-: ? , ?; ? - ,
Six volunteers in period costumes- served
drinks and -L..- -here comes a lovely touch ?
held the guests' glasses for them when they
went upstairs, where drinking is forbidden. -?
A piano player played on a piano tuned
especially for the-event. It is nice to think
that the burdened dignitaries ? they in-
-ciuded CFA Director ?Vatarn J. Casey and.
Taasury .Secret -ponalct, Regan -- gath- '
ered around for little caroling.
' r.XCERPTED
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Washington, D. C.20505
26 February 1982
Dear David,
I've tried to clean this up a little. I don't
think I changed any meaning significantly. Sorry
it has taken so long to get it back to you.
If I can do anything else to help, please
let me know.
Mr. David Kahn
NEWSDAY
Long Island, New York 11747
Enclosure
Yours,
William J. Casey
x)t-epi C-(L. -ue-ag
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Next 16 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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THE WEST PALM BEACH POST ( FL)
24 February 1982
By Edgar Sanchez
Post' Staff Writer
? International terrorism represent
a greater threat to the United Statep
than all the nuclear missiles in the.
Soviet Union, CIA Director William .1.
Casey said yesterday in Palm Beach.
In a speech before the Society of the
Four Arts, Casey said the Soviet
is using sophisticated terrorism to d
stabilize governments friendly to the.:
U.S. . . .
The subversive acts are being cot-
red out by the KGB, the Soviet's se-
cret police agency, and communists
around the world, he said. The goal is
? to eventually topple democratic gov-
ermrients and create a Soviet-dorni-
nated world, he said.
1
"In the aftermath of Vietnam', the
Soviet Union began to test whether the
U.S. would resist its advances," Casey
said from a prepared text.. -
Avoiding a direct confrontation, the
Soviets instead unleashed "a witch's
brew of terrorism" in developing
na-
tions such as Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Guatemala,. Iran and Lebanon.
where numerous social problems ek-
ist. " -
!..
"The United States has. had diffici
ty in countering this terrorism. is
much easier to support an insurge*
ase
erroin
r
than resist it," Casey said.
This international campaign is be-
ing financed in part by Libyan dictator
Col. Muammar Qaddafi, he said.
"In Libya, terrorist training is the
second largest industry next to oil," he -
said. a .
. "Sophisticated terrorism is a big
business. It requires safe houses, safe
training areas, multiple travel docu-
ments, transportation and weapons,
and all that is very expensive. Qaddafi
has decided to pick up the tab," he
said.
Casey, who has a home in Palm
Beach, requested that no cameras or
tape recorders be allowed at his pre-
sentation. He also would not hold a
press conference.
At the end of the speech, however,
Casey did answer questions from the
audience.
"How do you account for the fact
that two of our foremost newspapers
... have been so hospitable towards
the Soviet Union?" one man asked,
apparently referring to the New York
Times and the Washington Post. '
"I'm much too discreet to answer
that one," Casey said. .
Casey was asked about the offer of
Mexican President Jose Lopez-
Portillo to become a mediator be-
STAT
20002-2
tween the factions in war-tom IC Sal-
vador. "How do you exph, in his
motives?' one man asked.
not sure I ought to accept the
challenge of explaining all these ques-
tions," Casey said. "The only e.,.plaria- '
tion I can give is that he (Portilio) is a
politician. He's going out of off!cesoon?
and he wants attention. He's ta.xious
to play his role on the world st- ae (one
last time)."
In response to another quer:.. Casey
said the Soviet Union is undergoing
serious economic problems. "Li recent
years, their (agricultural) haraest has
gotten lower and lower," he ;aid.
Casey was head of clandestine ac-
tions for the World Wai- II ( ifice of
Strategic Services, the foren.nner of
the CIA. He later served as &airman
of the Securities and Exchan,.;e Com-
mission and established a reAttation
as a corporation tax lawyer.
He was appointed CIA clirxtor in
January 1981.
'Sophisticated t .rrorism
is a big business it requires
safe houses, safe training
, areas, multiple ,travetsiocu-
rnents,. transportation ,and
weapons, and ali that is very -
s
ex ? - ? 4 uammar)'-
13.
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Y ed to pick
? ?
'up the tab _f, '
-ifljdffl Casey
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THE BALTIMORE EVENING SUN
19 February 1982
Gas pipeIine
would swell
Russ power
over West
By Cord Meyer
WASHINGTON
HE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION is
united in general disapproval of Western
European plans to lend the Soviets $15
billion en favorable terms to build the Si-
berian pipeline, which when completed in
1934 will carry Russian natural gas to
European factories and homes.
But the administration is bitterly di-
vided on just how much American pres-
sure can safely be brought to bear, with-
out wrecking the alliance, to force a can-
cellation of 'what CIA Director William
Casey calls "the biggest foreign aid proj-
ect in the history of the world."
Although very critical of European ea-
gerness to push ahead with the pipeline,
Secretary of State Haig and his senior
policy team are resigned to accepting the
deal as a fait accompli. They point out
that $10 billion has already been commit-
ted and that too many contracts have
been signed to expect the Europeans to
back out at this stage.
. In trying now to unscramble the ome-
let, the U.S., State officials argue,- would
not only fail but would in the process so
alienate the European allies as to endan-
ger the survival of the alliance. The
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Cosenittee, Sen. Charles Percy (R-FII.),
joins State in warning that hours of con-
versation with Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt and other European leaders
have convinced him that at this late date
an attempt to block the pipeline would he
totally counterproductive.
Against this solid phalanx of opinion in
State that the pipeline is unfortunate but
unavoidable stands the leadership of the
Pentagon and the CIA. These officials are
convinced that this deal is SO critical to
the threatening buildup of Soviet military
power that every lever must be pulled to
stop or at least delay it.
Dare disturbing than the blackmail !
potential of a Russian hand on Europe's !
energy faucet is the fact that the Soviets
will be able to earn annually $3 billion of
hard currency from the sale of their gas
to the West over a period of 25 years. At a
time when their oil exports are dwin-
-dling? this windfall profit reaped in West-
ern Europe would provide just that mar-
gin of hard currency needed to expand
the purchase from the West of military-
rein ted high technology.
Instead of being forced to divert re-
sources to the civilian sector, the Soviet
military budget would be bloated by the
folly of the Europeans, who in their
scramble for jobs and profits from the
pipeline contracts would be endangering
nut only themselves but the Americans as
well.
In fact, Pentagon officials make a
very strong argument that the real fall
guy in the pipeline deal will eventually be
the American taxpayer. The West Euro-
peans gain jobs from the recovery Of
their steel industry in building the pipe.
The Soviets obtain enough hard currency
to keep their military machine growing
with the most advanced Western tech-
nology, and the Americans will have to
pay ever higher taxes in order to try to
maintain an increasingly expensive bal-
ance of power.
. Rather than rescuing the Soviet mili-
tary buildup with these windfall profits,
far better, it is argued, for the U.S. and
Western Europe to pool their resources to
help each other attain energy self-suffi-
ciency. The Norwegians have 'recently
discovered a huge new gas field but the
capital to develop it will riot be available
if it is drained off in loans to Russia.
American opponents of the pipeline
admit they should have started two years
ago in developing specific alternative
solutions with the Europeans. But with an
oil glut and reduced demand for gas, they
believe there is still time to appeal to the
common sense of the Europeans, espe-
cially in light Of the Polish events.
If rational argument does not per-
suade the Europeans, the hard-line oppce
nents of the pipeline deal are prepared to
use tougher tactics. Under the terms of
Reagan's Polish sanctions, General Elec-
tric has been prohibited from selling to
Russia through. European firms the tur-
bine rotors they need to build the giant
compressors that pump the oil.
61/Al
00120002-2
The French I.rm, Alsthom Atiantique,
is the only E!irepeall company that
makes these roi ors but it has a specifiet
contract with Ganeral Electric that pro-
vides it will ab iae by U.S. export adminis- ?
tration rules. I y forbidding export of
these rotors to Faissia, the U.S. could suc-
ceed in adelayin the completion of the '
pipeline by at lest two years. _
By this enfersed delay, Pentagon offi-
cials claim the ILS. could keep billions in
hard currency out of Soviet hands and
win time for wiser heads in Europe to see
the folly of the deal. But State officials
warn that this costly delay caused by the
U.S. would old; temporarily postpone
completion of the project, would infuriate
the Europeans end drive them towards
neutralism.
With his principal advisers thus divid-
ed, President Rtyagan will have to do his
homework on this one. He alone can de-
I
cide it.
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NEW YORK POST
16 February 1982
STAT
By NIL.r..S LATH FM
WASHINGTON ? Ad-
ministration, C011greS:.,
sional and diplornatio
sources . said. last night'
that over the past year.:
CIA Director William
liCasey has ordered a:
'steady buildup of covert :
activities in Honduras, Eli
Salvador and Nicaragua. '
The operation is said to:
have twewbjectives: -
0 Develop a major in-
telligence .network to in-
form the _White House:
and the Pentagon of mili-
tary activities and politi.
cal trends. , ?
0 Disrupt the growing.
Influence of Cuba and
Nicaragua and-their arms
pipeline. _
The revelations came in
the wake of reports that
the White House was de-
bating whether to give
$19 Million to the CIA for
the operatioir,--;;=' ?.
The CIA operation is
one phase of. sweeping
military, economic
and political plans to pro-
tect ? America's "back
door."
Sources told The Post
-that- for the- past six
months the .groundworkk
fOr the CIA operation hasr
kre,ady been laid, and!
that spending is probably',
running to much greater;
levels than $19 million. 11
. Although many details,
remain top secret, sources
said: ? I
0 CIA stations in major:,
cities in the region have
been beefed up to full ca-
Parit..Y.
0 A wide range of intel-:
ligence contacts have
been developed. .
9 Aerial -surveillance
and other activities under
?
the Defense In:elligence;
Agency and the National!
Security Agency have.
been- dramatically in-
creased_ ?
0 Several in. _,.;es forli
training and infiltration
operations have been es-
tablished along the bor-
ders of El S-alvarior, Gua-
temala, Nieragua? and
_Honduras. -
0 Training Cf para-
miltary. "action teams"
has been in prc gross forj
.well over three months.
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NEW YORK POST
15 February 1982
STAT
,Rnpcsan
x.war is also
rdid'kr5
El Snlyath5
By NILES LATH EM
N.Y. Post Correspondent
WASHLNGTON -The ''?;
CIA is planning. to dis-
patch hit- teams 'and to -
launch a- massive carnea,
paign of anti-Commu-
nist propaganda . on
Cuban and Nicaraguan
agents infiltrating El -
Salvador, sources report
here. = : .
The CIA is prepared , to
use U.S.-trained pararni- t441' ---
Mary teams of _ "non- ;.;?;;Liigr,,.4gwoid.`"'
. ?,..r--- - . ,--.. = .._ , Associated Press Photo
- r _
A.mericans" to go h'eact.'-; --
to head - ' with . Cuban .:. Demonstrators march through a snowstorm in Boston protesting continued U.S. '
-4-. ? ..._. .
agents in El Salvador;_ a assistance to the government of El SolVador. Ahot,if 3600 people took-part. - '
Honduras and ." Guate-- .--.' " , ? _ .,.., .. ?7 ; .?. - - _ _ - - - .-- .- ----,...". , ,:;.,,, -, _ .- ,-...;. ? ._ ,.?s7. ' _,_, " .
mala.'s!e"" ' - ' - ? ,..-; Haig told-reporters yes- sources said likely ac- jenti-Sandinisfa exiles. - poll: ical and military'
Itigh ranking Admin: ' .terday, ''There's a host ' tivities would include:
istration officials said of things to do," adding, 0 Declaring a major contingency plans likely
last night that a Plan? "There is an increased 0 '.Craining, a series of propoganda war on to la- taken by the Rea-
devised early last year. problem on the .`door- highly specialized para.- Cuba and. Nicaragua. gait Administration,
by CIA Director William military hit teams for ;This would probably be whith is determined to
Case and his de put step' of America." "' --? military, political and in-done-through a series of curl. Communist influ-,
y y, Disclosure of the CIA
Adm_ Bobby Inman, -o ame telligence purposes___ .' " I "disinformation." tactics ence in the region...
-
being actively reviewed:
is peration c as Ftea-, ?
n re pared to give a
Like the aborted Bay-,
. as-well as by using U i
.S.- Re, - gan = spent the
ga p
by the White House aP ? major policy speech on of pigs operatioa in the - -sphorisored raddio " and wee end in Camp David
part of its efforts to eon-. ,Central America which 1060s, the teams would . ot er 'propogan_ a .wea - revitwing the plans and
trol a growing Comeau- .' -Will all on the American
be comprised of clarales- ?- pons, sourc-e. s said. ..._ , , prep /ring his speech on-
nist threat to El Salva- people to disregard corn tine solidiers and- di- --- Also _major U S.. slip- e- p- . Central America ' L a-
- -
dor and the Caribbean
pari On to
_ war era and stand an the -.Vietnam_ , %dint s from the - region - , port would probably be spee-h which will proba
basin e
0... and possiblpArgentina. ? -given in Nicaragua-to a bly ke delivered within_
,;
.:-- Disclosure of -the, CIA
.
, tally' behind him in his., -. Sources reported thai""-' political movement' op. the r ext 10 days.
operation- - first ? _ca-in, -efforts to protect the, a secret US. base has al,_ posed to the .Sandinista So far direct ITS: Mill;
from the WaShingtori?N
-"ba,ck yard," of the U.S. '. ready: been ? established regime. _ -- - - .- ..-__?tary action in the region
Post and was later inde- _ ',Although details of the ' in Honduras, where sup- The -05.-Pey plan-is one is not one of the options),
pendently confirmed- by ?'',, 9.1-14.21.o.a.rerriain secret.. ? -port is being given to in a series of economic under consider tion ? -? l
.
The New-York Post.--?fee-.1..
President Reagan, re-
turning ,from ".Camp
David, refused to com
rnent 4..'either. way" ? on
the report. ','......- 'All I can think-abou
is .. . . this Caribbean
program in which Can
adaa_Mexico, Venemel
and -the United _ Stat
are going to help the
with their economy."
Secretary ;of Stat
?a-- . . ? --- -
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? h
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ARTInE APPEARED
NEWSWEEK
ON PAO?. R 15 February 1982
Is There a CIA
Link With Kaddafi?
It is a government scandal that will not
die, a sinister suspicion that the CIA can-
not--or will not?police "rogue" agents -
and ex-agents who sell CIA skills and con-
nections to foreign governments. It has al-
ready spawned grand jury hearings and in-
vestigations by at least five government
bodies, and the House Select Committee on
Intelligence spent most of last week behind
closed doors attempting to detail the activi-
ties of two prime rogues, Edwin Wilson and
Frank Terpil, former CIA operatives who
in 1976 contracted with Libya's Muammar
Kaddafi to provide intelligence and weap-
onry and to train Kaddafi's terror teams.
Although ostensibly gone from the CIA,
Wilson had numerous connections with the
agency during that period. He offered S1
million to three CIA agents to assassinate a
Libyan dissident, secured explosive devices
from one active CIA officer and directed
another's recruitment of Green Berets for
duty in Libya. Indeed, Wilson appeared to
be so close to senior CIA personnel in the
"dirty tricks" Operations Directorate that
many participants in his dubious intrigues
are convinced?or claim to be?that they
were involved in an official CIA operation
to penetrate Kaddafi's entourage.
CIA director William Casey and his
deputy, Bobby Inman, iinsisted last week
that neither Wilson nor Terpil had formal
links to the agency during their Libyan
operations. It was, they said, simply Wil-
son.'s aptitude for name-dropping that cre-
ated the impression of official sanction.
But NEWSWEEK has talked to one House
committee witness whose story suggests ,
that more than name-dropping was ;
Bucks': Luke Thompson, 47, was a
Green Beret master sergeant in 1977 when
he was recruited to work in Liby;a under;
Wilson. Now retired from the armed
forces and training as a nurse in Hawaii,
Thompson remains convinced that he was
participating in a CIA operation. Like;
many Green Beret's, Thompson was a vet-
eran of secret CIA operations, and he was
initially suspicious of a telephone offer of
"big bucks" to go abroad. Consequently
Thompson reported the contact to military ;
intelligence at Fort Bragg, where he was ;
counseled to pursue it. An intelligence offi-
cer at the post twice instructed him to i
"proceed until we tell you to stop." Says
Thompson: "To me this was a CIA opera- ;
tion from that point fdtward." .
.. Thompson was hardly surprised when
Wilson's recruiter, Patry Loomis, turned ;
up in person and introduced himself as
"currently employed by the CIA." In fact,
Loomrs's agency contract had only days to
run, but the impression of official business
was enhanced by the ease with which ;
Thompson subsequently obtained leave
from his Army duties. Thompson and three
men he had recruited then flew to Zurich
where they were met by Wilson himself.
Wilson made no references to the CIA. "I
want you to go to Libya and make yourself
indispensable to those bastards,' Thomp-
son recalls Wilson saying. Thompson asked
Wilson who they were working for. "You're
working for me," he replied. Libyan offi-
cials seemed to take the official connections
of such foreign specialists for granted. "I
know that one or all of you are KGB or
CIA," Libya's deputy chief of intelligence
told the group. "I don't care who you are.
All I want is your professional services."
'Stinks': Back at Fort Bragg, Thompson
says, his contact in intelligence
informed him that he had
learned the Libyan operation
was not legal and "stinks to
high heaven." Yet he also told
Thompson to maintain contact
with Wilson's team in Libya,
and Thompson continued to
recruit and obtain materials
and supplies for them. Called
before a Federal grand jury
looking into gun-running
charges against Wilson and
Terpil, Thompson went first to
CIA headquarters for guid-
ance. A CIA counsel told him
to say anything he wanted,
abouts now .ire unclear. There '
have been ssisly rumors that !
Terpil's apy .saranee in several
television t ocumentaries an- .
gered some terrorists who kid-
napped him. cut out his tongue
and killed hi rn. U.S. authorities
say only ths t Terpil has pulled
disappearin; acts before?and.
the mystery surrounding both
men seems 5 areto continue.
MARK 7, FARE with MCI! ARD
SANDZA i Witikiki and DAVID C
AARTIN in Washingtcn
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LOS ANGELES HERALD-EXAMINER
12 February 1982
cAu troub
rooks to us as if the CIA_ might
be gearing up for dirty tricks.
First,. President Reagan signed
an ;executive ?Order in December that
expanded- the agency's power to
maintain surveillance over American
citizens-iin this country and to infil-
trate domestic organizations.. .
Anknow, CIA.. Director. William :.
Casey .is. asking .the Justice Depart-
ment.Ifo ask Congress :to. shield the*
agency: from criminal prosecution fort
illegitimate acts so long as agents are
on 'legitimate" missions. Yes, the old-
fashioned end-justifies-the-means
theory, and Casey wants .the exemp-
tion written into the criminal code
Perhaps it's really not so surpris-
ing, he's pressing for intelligence
behavior that the CIA's 1947 charter
forbids and former. President Carter
sought to curb definitively. After all,
there are strange allegations about
domestic infiltration by Libyan hit-
men out to get our, president and
about Sovietimmiabrants intent On
disrupting the 1984 Olympics..
But the fact that it's not surprising
does not make it any less disturbing.
A blanket exemption from criminal
prosecution is not only unnecessar
for conducting intelligence activities
it is undesirable. We've expressed
concern before that our intelligence
community's ability to perform effec-
tively has been unduly curbed in
recent years. But it was unduly
'curbed in response to excesses by the
intelligence community,. and we're
afraid this latest move by Casey might
be asking for unnecessary trouble
again. . ?
, Avoiding not just impropriety, but
the appearance of impropriety, is an
awful lot trickier for the CIA than it
could ever have been for Caesar's
wife. And avoiding not only the abuse
of power but the appearance of abuse
of power is at least as important.
Casey's proposed revision of the
criminal code would permit an oppor--
tunity for abuse that, even if never
exercised, would only reinforce the
suspicion that some Americans, let)
alone the rest of the world, hold for
our intelligence operations.
CIA agents should be free to'
perform, their? duties effectively, of,
course, but those duties must bet'
carefully determined and their per-
formance: as free from taint as\
reasonably possible. That means per-
forming,their function within the'i
limitations now prescribed by law.
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APlO 1V REPORTS, INC.
STAT
0120002-2
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068
FOR
PROGRAM
DATE
SUBJECT
IMINIMMICALSOMINIPPMISMansa*.aaNdias?rmak
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PBS Late Night
STATION
WETA TV
'BS Network
February II, 1982 12:30 AM Washington, DC
CITY
Interview with Frank Snepp
DENNIS WHOLEY: Frank Snepp is our guest right new.
Frank is a former CIA agent. He was awarded the Medal of Nerit
for his work in Vietnam. His book "Decent Interval" calls the
evacuation of Saigon a fiasco, and he criticizes the CIA fcr
stupidity and mismanagement. The Justice Department sued, claim-
ing that Snepp's book broke his secrecy agreement and causcd harm
to the national security. The Supreme Court upheld that rtling.
Kind of a broad question, putting it out on the lible
right now: Should former agents of the CIA be allowed to criti-
cize the agency, or, in some cases, use their knowledge, their
experience or their expertise in civilian life?
Good to have you here.
FRANK SNEPP: Thank you.
WHOLEY: The last four or five years, how has this book
changed your life?
SNEPP: Well, it's changed my life in many ways. One
thing, it has turned my name into an italicized synonym for gov-
ernment censorship. The Supreme Court ruling in my case, in fact,
gives legitimacy, for the first time, to an American officill
secrets act.
In your introduction you left out one important fAct
about my situation, and that is, I was never accused of publish-
ing any secrets in that book.
WHOLEY: True?
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OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES S CHICAGO 0 DETROIT 0 AND 011-ER PRINCIPAL CITIES
STAT
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NEW YORK TIMES
APPEARED 7 1.-713',',U..-RY 1q82
011
1:+im Spotlight
Cn Libyan Afl
How do you prevent former Central
Intelligence Agency employees from
peddling their expertise to foreign
governments? With difficulty, if at
all, it appeared from testimony last
week, before the House Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence.
The closed hearings capped a four-
month committee staff inquiry into
tile activities of two former C.I.A.
agents, Edwin P. Wilson and Frank
E. Terpil, and the C.I.A.'s investiga-
tion of their dealings with the Libyan
government. But the question of
C.I.A. involvement and the nature of ,
the agency's relationship with its for-
mer employees remained as murky
as ever.
Mr. WilApn was accused of recruit-
ing Amene...n soldiers to train Libyan
terroristsand he and Mr. Terpil, now
fugitives, were indicted in 1980 for
,illegally shipping explosives to Libya. t
.Mr. Wilson is known to have had the
help of C.I.A. employees in his re-
cruitment project, but two internal in-
quiries, one of which was ordered last
year by agency director William J.
Casey, have concluded that the aid
was not official.
' Two middle-level employees were
dismissed in 1977 for their part in the
affair. Two senior officials who were
suspected of involvement were exon- I
crated, and Mr. Wilson subsequently '
set one of them up in a business that
, later hired the other one. In his testi-
mony at the hearings, Mr. Casey ap-
parently was unable to shed new light
on this relationship.
He did reveal, though, that the
C.I.A. had recently adopted a new
code of conduct extending agency
regulations to former employees for
the first time. The rales were said to
prohibit the use of inside information
. for private gain, but a spokesman
conceded they were "not a legal,
- binding agreement" and that the
agency was powerless to make for-
mer employees obey them. Mr. Casey
was said to be willing to work with
Congress on legislation that had more
teeth.
- -
Michael Writ
and Caroline Rand Herron
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ART I CLIC EPPEAR-ED
C2C
!VIEINBERGER SEES
TO DECLARE POLES
IN A DEN DEFAULT
ADMINISTRATION IS DIVIDED
; Aides Says Secretary Believes
a Hard Line on Loans Can ?
Block Soviet Pipeline
By HEDRICX SMTTH
? Sirxial oTtrNewYoTln,r5 .
WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 ?Secretary of
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger report-
edly intends to keep pressing to have Po.
land declared in default of its debts to
the West and to have Western European
nations halt their natural gas pipeline
deal with MOSCOW. ?
On the recommendation of the State,
Treasury and Agriculture Departments,
President Reagan recently agreed to
have the Administration pay American
banks the Z71 million owed them by Po-
land to forestall a declaration of default
and the ensuing disruption of East-West
economic relations.
But, in the continuing debate on the
question within the Administration,
high Pentagon officials oppoise this 'ac?
tion. They insist that the issue of Polish
default has not been finally settled. Mr.
Weinberger is known to favor the
tee:eller stance of ancrwing default and
the disruption-of Western credit rela-
tions with the East to impose an eco-
nomic penalty on Moscow and Warsaw
for the repression in Poland... -
Salvadoran Intervention Opposed e
On the issue of El Salvador, however,
. Mr. Weinberger opposes American:
combat involvement and and is under,
stood to be wary of military operations
in the Caribbean, such as a blockade of
Cuba or Nicaragua; that wcttld require
Congressional approval.
Tuesday, in Congressional testimony,
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig
Jr. seemed to reopen the threat. of
American intervention in Centred Amer-
ica by asserting that the United States
would do "whatever is. necessary"? to
prevent the overthrow the-!3.1)ese.
;Government
111,-,W YORK TIMES
14 FEBRUARY 1982
STAT
Larry Speakes, a White House spokes- have that a Polish default would not only
? man; left Mr. Haig,'s comments stand- impose further economic burdens on the
ing but emphasized-that there-were no Soviet Union but would delay the pipe-
plans "at the moment" _for American
line. The Administration concedes, how--
i-utars to go into combat in Salvador ever, that West European banks and
t
or elsewhere.
governments are shying ,iway from this
- ? '
approach.
Mr. speakes.said the Secretary "was
Mr. Wei nberaar's arguments with the
discussing contingencies," and added,
"The President has said he has no plans Western Europeans is that the Wests'nouldnot help tfie Soviet Union develo
to send troops:anywhere and he has no
its oil and natural gas r.,sources (not-
plans. .
cially. when Westerrr in:ell ig,enc&.> esti-
A high Pentagon Official, acknowledg- mates project Soviet shorten in the
:Jag domestiCr poliical opposition to
I American military involvement, added .
I that "one ot the lessons of Vietnam is ;
that we can't engage in a war that is not
supported by/American public opinion?! taken the most pessimistic. view of
ln coments on another, more distant developments. Recently, for example
Mr."?Weinberger commented that he felt-
"the Polish Government is runby a R
!sian general in a Polish uniform."
" Although he is known to favor most
policies that would make it harder for
the Soviet Union to obtain new arms and
;support the military regime in Poland,
Mr. Weinberger has not pushed for coy-
ert operations in ?-.support of Polish.
resistance to martial law. '
years ahead,
In the Reagan Adrainstraon's-inter-
nal' debates over Poland Mr.,Weinber-
gerand some of his P-entaaou aides have-
trouble spot, a senior Administration of-.
, tidal 'revealed rising concern over re-
ports that the Soviet Union was provid-
ing aid to the Communist Tudeh Party
in Iran and was "very likely" sending_
arms and military supplies across the
Soviet-Iranian- border to other groups
:lighting the regime- of Ayatollah Hho-
- :e e ?
On the issue of possible Polish default,
The Administration's announcement
Mr. Weinberger was reported to have Monday that the Gcrverrin,.ent would pay
been taken by surprise by the Adhurli%e American banks rather than allow Pe-
traticn's decisicn to pay off the Amen- land to go into formal default has come
an banks, primarily because ' he had . under fire from conservaeve groups,.
been preoccupied vrith preparation of ,:, "Default would require the Soviet
the new Pentagon budget. But since the Union, -rather than the American tax--
Defense Secretary did not get a chance., payer, to bail out the bankrupt Polish
to press his own views on the issue with i Government," Howard Phillips, leader
1
not regard the matter as settled. - . Mr. P
- ? ...hillips said at a ne wsconference
President Reagan, the Pentagon does. of the Conservative Caucus, said today.
-Mr. Weinberger is said to feel that the t?tha_t his organization had launched a
recent decision to bail out the banks was- eleu,C4X) letter-writing carnixii7i to urge
i
an "interim" action.. He is said. to be- banks to force Poland into default by
lieve that the question is still- "a live seeking
immediate repayment of cut-
issue" among, Administration policy, t standing Polish loans. . ',. .. , .;..,
t makers and certain to be reconsidered
as future installments of Polish debts
carn e due. e
' "This is a continuing debate," a high
Pentagon official said. "The default
I issue is wit-h us continuously. There are
quarterly payments due so it will come
up again. It"s a live isaue."- ,,_ : -.- -. ? --, , - : ,
The default question is linked in Mr.
Weiinberger's "opinion . to the pipeline
deal, which has for months been a major
target of Pentagon officials and Ameri-
can diplomats.
The rNaleap Piaaarapen
Intelliaence
pi1tri not only m
,erri_Eurapt.sitner4ent_tal Moscow
vital ener ?lies but would also
earn the Soviet Union about
year in hard currency..
spent on Western technologa_vdthanili,_
tarv annlica tines.
Mr. Weinberger is,undeptood to tx,?,
_
is that
e est-
10 billion a
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ART ICL
0.1:1 FAG:3
The CIA.
4,1L13a,D
NEW YORK TIMES
4 FEBRUARY 1982
porkin Enjoying Move
To Casey and Compan
i3y JEFF GER'rH
S"ialtoTbeNr?YorkTicmes,
WASIIINGTON:eFeb. 3 A top offi-
cial of the Central Intelligence Agency
spent a week in California last month
attending a securities-conference. But
the session had nothing to with na-
tional security.. est-ot--
.rhe conferencee7participants Justice. Department proposing; that
cies. To many 'outside observers, Mr.
Sporkin, in , that case, walked a fine
line between-conservatives who-think
the agency should be unleashed and
civil rights advocates who oppose its
intrusion into domes tic affairs. ? -
Late last year, Mr. Sporkin helped
? draft a letter that Mr. Casey sent to the
allow CIA. agents to en--.
' eluded officials_ of' the Sectuities and ,Congress
Exchange Commission, members of gage in, otherwise illegal activities
while on legitimate missions. The the securities bar, and alumni, such as E:
pro-
Stanley sporran, general counsel to the , posal,. labeled "technical" by Mr.
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sporkin, . evoked a strong negative -
_
reaction from the Justice Depart-
In May, in one of Washington's most ment's off ice of intelligence policy.
unusual career shifts, Mr. Sporkin lett
Mr. Sporkin is near completion of a
a successful and visible tenure as en -
study into the involvement of the for-
forcement chief at the securities cam-
mer agents Edwin P. Wilson and
mission for the post at the intelligence
agency. The man who made a career Frank E. Terpil in training Libyan ter-.
out prosecuLg
? had rorists and- the adequacy of the agen-
c.y's previous investigation into the at-
ascome the-lawyer for "the Company," .
the agency is referred to in intelli-
gence circles. ' ?
Mr. Sporkin, to heir him tell it, has ?
"The True test of -any decision is
whether you have would have done it
again," he said.."I would have done it
again, and more so." et e ? o.
o
? Did lt for Long-Time Friend-
For the most part, however, he
switched jobs out of a sense of loyalty
and respect for his long-time friend'
William J. Casey, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, who offered him the '
post. -
The two met when Mr. Casey was .
chairman- of the S.E.C. in the early
1970's. In 19;72; Mr. Casey avoided a
potentially emba.rassing situation by
following Mr- Sporkin's advice to re-
buff White House attempts to interfere
and delay an investigation of the finan-
? cier Robert. Vesco. Those attempts t
? led to the indictment of some Nixon -t.
Administration officials;' Mr. Casey agency wall be- --
and Mr. Sporkin were witnesses for the
prosecution. at , a -? ? -- great asset, to U.S
Mr. Sporkin's closeness to the Direc- -- ?
tor has given him tremendous latitude
and power but has also evoked some ?
private criticism:: ? -tee, ? ? ea -
,eatease, ete t ? ?
Though lacking experience in intern- fair. Mr.. Sporkin declined to say what
gence matters, Mr. Srxnldn has played changes, - if any, would be rec.om-
a key role in sensitive issues: the rules mended in the agency's employment
under which the agency operates, its contract or personnel prO:Fedures.
.ability to police itself and the extent to - -"You've -got to do whatever you can
which agents are subject to criminal Luta prevent it from happening again,"
,prosecution in. the rmance; ,of
their duties. perfo
ee. ? ti--.1---a.;;:??a-teet Mr.. Sporkin Said. . . , .
Last Year hliaY skiiktkkeiti
order loosening to some extent restric- great asset to this country" after being
tions on_ the nation's intelligence agen?.? ?'drained down" in the last 10 years, an
allusion to disclosures in the 1970's
STAT
a
tl
S.
t2
Mr. Sporkin appeared oa many re-
porters to function at tirr es last year
as a Spokesman and privai a lawyer for
Mr. Hugel, who resigned in the wake of
disclosures about his hu-aness prac-
tices, and for Mr. Casey, who, after a
long investigation by the senate Intel-
ligence Committee, was found "not
unfit" to hold his post_ .
?
Mr. Sporkin thinks the criticism is
unfair and says he has a good relation-
ship with C.I.A. employee, although
he expects to be with ag..,T,cy only as
long as Mr. Casey. ?- tt,
The day-to-day feel of Mr. Sporkin's
new job is different in m eny respects
from that of his days with the securi-
ties commission. Frequ .,nt contacts
with the press have endeo. His staff is
only a couple dozen lawyers, against
the 200 he supervised at the S.E.C. And
while he was at the center of the se-
cu.rities commission's activities, Mr.
Sporkin is far removec from, and-
sometimes even unaware of, the Corn-
pony's operations in the il tad. ? .e?
? Government officials and private-
lawyers who have dealt vern Mr. Spor-
kin-since he joined the C. 'LA. say they
have found him to be ag,gnessive, fair,
honest and occasionally single-mind-
ed. His friends say Mr. pork in, who
turns 50 next Sunday, ha; no ambiva-
lence about his future; he longs for
The'"Y`"'"Tilpmfr"'"zalit'la a Federal judgeship.
S tanley Sporkhrt
drafting the asen
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ART I CL APP.-6.61ED
ON PAG ELL
LOS ANGELES T DES
3 February 1982 ?
'
, - ? - ,
1 y1(013ERTL. JACKSON, Timis Staff Writer:7.4:?---
WASHLIGTON-i-Williiii::f-Caseetar of the.-
Central: In Eelligence.. told a Housecoiniaittee--
Tuesdaylt.hat the CIA did 12otaprove Libyan, terrorist
t rainin" activities. by; former:;- agents .Eid:,P;Wilsonf
and FranCi:51.E..Terpil,-,:s'5,;-:,
:132xyWilson and Texpil.:,Whes are under federal
ment, in?ly have receivedhelp.from individual CIA:.
- Pae t.wp:We'reytorls'ang. for the-radical-te,gittie;
Libyan leader Moarcinar Kada5., according:to -Reri-:
Edward - (D-244.ss.A. chairman; clf,the Hous
- Intel 'hgenp.e
- Casey-dertial of arty official CIA inrFement m the
-Wilsoni-Temil !case ? came,: as. Abe HoUse ,conunittee;
-opened.ciosed-illoortearingxintcrinternationalbUsiriess'l
deals--byrformere
? Boland told" t'eficirters' after -The hearirig- th,aCCasey
rlia-Crord?e:e:il a wi?git5fof the CIA's tiit
- son and Terpil.,;whowere charged irtAPrit 1980Vvithil:.
rlegalty eaporting*irarisirequipthent
?^ - -0- - ?
tlie :Justice DeptirtrrientIs -investigating other-deals
by the tivarnen;hialuding their:alleged secret attempt-sr.;
;to export high-technbIngj deViceilo the Soviet YJnipk.
an d=tion.s in the lEddle =."
"^ J
Tiro Dirflik,Sea'r,.i ? ?
? drrt Stimifield "Itrner:l CaseP4Fedecessor ;as ?7.A-
'chief,.h ad received in _earlier 'internal, report,that?led-
hirr to'ctsmiss twontiddle-level agency emplo:yeee who
?suspect ed _of having ties to 1,Vilson and Terciii2.ButIi
the report- exoner1ter7--,-several senior officials who Were:
stisp?ected othaving suck ties;Taccordink foriner._CIA_.z
_ ty==.
Boland sai&Casey's t
the second investigation
CIA..".involvement in LI
there ivaiOicibfficial OZ
Ter,pil after their indittip
Bola'nd said his commit
four-month inquiry and '
conduct at this
May Rave Been Conies
-Asked Whether thetIi
'before their indictment;i
kno.._;of .a_r131.?.PPrPiarti
Terptt but there may hav
werebn.boari
dicaftiiSe to th?p?fth
Casey declined to meet. x.r.inn LeI3 d1 Lr uns.teitimony.
hot pr.bvidedBoland tyPednotes. -
t!Last month. Douglas M:?Schlachter; a:form ra- Close-
a..):ociate of Wilson's told federal investigators tha't-he.:-
h4d briefed two-high-ranidng CIA officialsTsabc
Son'ai-activi ties atineetingx.ia. the Washington area:
izisandlow. r
-
d.;;ThOmat-:- -;"O
Both. b e-ietrediiidthave deni?kn?wixg al /01
lhari=teirorist training:: ShackleY?:-Was chief deputy'tCV
thCL ector of clandestine services; : aZ-f CiLiec-o
was (L'..ect. or bf_tre,a.indimtliat cn
STAT
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7
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ON PAGE I.
3 kee.bruary 1982
400120002-2
STAT
What's News?
. ?
* * *
CIA Director William Cagey told a House
panel, that the spy agency tentatively has
concluded "there was no CIA involvement in
Libyan terrorist training:: the committee's!
chairman-,said. Rep., Edward Boland !ID?
Mass.) spoke atter a closed meeting on pos-
sible CIA links to two former agents :
cused of setting up a terrorist training-
ect in:
-* -
The White House dropped a controversial
plan to plug news leaks by requiring offi-
cials to get approval for interviews that
Might bring up classified matters-...A spokes-
man said new rules supersede a Jan. 12
presidential order that threatened use of
"all legal means" against leaks.. The latest
proposals limit the number of officials with
access to sensitive data.
* *
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ARTICLE SLY.F.Eil
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Fe bruar7 i 982
Casey reportedly says CIA
didn't train Libya terrorists
Associated Press
WASHINGTON -- CIA Director
William J. Casey told the House In-
telligence Committee yesterday
that the spy agency has tentatively
concluded "there- was no official
CIA involvement in Libyan terror-
ist training," the committee chair-
man said,
Rep. Edward P. Boland (D-
Mass.) spoke with reporters after
Casey and other CIA officials testi-
fied before_ the House panel behind
closed doors for three hours.
The hearing focused on ques-
tions over the adequacy of an inter-
nal CIA investigation into possible
links between the agency and two
former agents. Edwin P. Wilson
and Frank E. Terpil, accused of set-
ting up a terrorist training project
in Libya.
Bola.nd said his committee has
"a very deep concern because of
.the impact that these allegations
have upon the agency. Of course,
the CIA agrees with this, too."
The chairman said he was
pleased by the CIA's cooperation
with a committee inquiry into WO-
son-Terpil situation. He added,
"I'm satisfied with the agency's
conduct at this point."
However, Boland indicated that
the committee believes there are-
Still discrepancies that need to be
:resolved between the CIA's official
'version and information from oth-
e'v Sources about the Libyan-related
dctivitim
Boland summarized main
points which he said were con-
tained in Casey's testimony, call-
ing them the "tentative conclu-
sions" of the CIA's internal investi-
gation. These were, according to
Boland:
? "There- there was no official
CIA involvement in Libyan terror-
ist training." -
? "There was no official CIA
contact with Wilson or Terpil after
their indictment."
? "There was no official CIA in-
volvement in the recruitment of
Green Berets" for projects in Libya.
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EARED
THE WASHINGTON POST
3 February 1982
Of Conitit:.:1 ti.h
Atdincr..Qaddcaft
?? , United Press International ? '
.The chairman of the-House Intel-
ligence. Committee: said Yesterday
that. investigation e iiiirtirrned.up no
evidence of official ..contaCt. betWeen
. the CIArandl-wp- former agents .w.1-.0
, went to work for-Libya's ;Col.,M?anie
-? mar Qaddati-
Howtever,r'cominitfee-'iltb:airinan
Edward.Bolanil (D-Masjsaid CIA
employes ...who -.1aterr'yverired-. for-, .a
firm associatetl..-wi.th one of the.
gitive ex agents, Edwin .Wigon; like-
"..1y- had centact.with both Wilsoa-and
Frank Terpi1 while. si1L at the agen-,?'.
.? ?-,r? ? .,
. Boland ? referred to 'rhentlore
Sliackle?y;,forrner deputy- director;of
clandestine operations, and Thomas
Clines, former director of training in -
the clandestine services': ?
Clinesafter ;leaving] the in
?.-1978, established a petroleum equip-
ment biisiness, with help from Wil-
son..- S hackley went e to work for
Clines when he retired in 1979.
Boland. spoke with reporters 'after
a three-hour close&eornmittee-hear-
ing-.ittended by CIA,Direct4er:
Wil-
lim J. Casey,. Depnky ?I)ireCtor ?
Bobby R. Inman, CIA inepector gen-
eral ellarle-,i Brigg's?-and CTA general
. .
During the hearing, the first in, a
series .focusing. on the activities .01
Wilson and ellerpil,.the' CIA officials
denied that the iigericY 'had sanc-
tioned any cOntactis With ?the two or
..any involvement in the recruitment
of former. U.S.. Army Special Forces
troops to train terrorists in Libya.
?
'Boland said he told t6. CIA of-
ficials the committee - has "a very
deep ?concern" about possible ram-
ifications of the; work- Wilson and
Terpithave done for Qaddafi. , ???
Wilson, last reported living in Lib- ?
ya, and Terpil, said to be in Leba-
non, were indicted, in 1980 on.
charges of illegally- shipping explo-
sives:and arms to Libya after they.
lett the:agenCy in,1976.
'r TWO lower-level employes were.
fired. for . cooperating with them
still.with the CIA..
Boland:_quOted Casey as saying in
his opening statement that?the CIA's
-ongoing:- investigation came to the
. "tentative .conclusion" there was no
official tigekY: involvement in any of ?
the the..LilaY*, activities, no official/
..reontactrittrytilson and Terpil after
their inclict-merit and no involvement
in the recruitment of Green Berets i
to train terrorists for Qaddafi..
,
STAT
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ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
3 February 1982
N o Case For Hiding iniQnnuti?
The Senate Subcommittee on the
.Constitution showed little sense of
, responsibility when, despite .the failure of
CIA Director William Casey to justify the
eneeln.pproved bill that would exempt
theeCIA) from the Freedom of Information -
Act. While testifying before the
subcommittee; Mr. -Casey was asked to set
forth examples of how his agency had been
harmed by the act. Despite repeated
questions from panamembers, Mr. -Casey
was Unable to say how many agents had been
lost, as claimed, because of their alleged fear
. of being exposed through the FOI Act. At one
? point he said, "I really can't tell you." At
another, he made the extraordinary remark
that his information came from "hearsay."
Mr. Casey's vagueness did not result from
any glare of publicity, since he was talking at
a closed session, for which the testimony was
only made public later after proper
clearance. Based on the director's
unconvincing performance, several senators,
including Chairman Orrin Hatch, expressed
their disappointment for the record. But the
panel still approved changes in the FOI Act '
that the administration had asked for.
This display of senatorial willingness to
weaken the act was unwarranted, not only
because of Mr. Casey's failure to answer
questions persuasively but because the FOI
law already exempts information being kepi
secret in the interests of foreign policy anc
national defense. Former CIA Director
Stansfield Turner has said that the agencl
has .not lost a single case in the courts ir
which it . claimed that something wa.,.
classified and therefore could not be
released. Given this record, the only
apparent reasons for the administration'.;
move to dilute the FOI Act is to save the Cie,
the trouble of having to justify secrecy in
some areas or to avoid embarrassment from
some disclosures. Those are not sufficient
reasons for exempting . an agency whose
illegal acts have been exposed under FOI.
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STAT
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S...FFEARED NE,14 YORK TIMES
ON PLG7.;_67?__A: 3 FEBRUARY 1932
? .Denles Official Link
en? C ? - ? ?
BY IEFFGERTI-1
hue:, ?
-eel seed e. ,Y9r?c Ti rnel
..SHINGTO N. Feb. 2? William J.
Casey, the Director. of Central Intelli-
gence, told the House Select Committee
on Lenelligtoday that the C.I.A. had
teniati%ly Concluded that the agency
hach' -40 'official lavolvernent ' in the
Libyan.activities of two fon:tier agents,
EcihrerhrIa! Wilson and Frank E. Terpil,
a ecoraing to Ceoressional sources. ?
24e, Casey also told the closed hear-.:
inge4e sources said, that the agency
sharae4 the committee's concerns about
preveeeeingefuture misuse ofintelligente
expeatieeandinferrnation as well as in..
suringihe adequacy-of internal agency-
MET-WilSon' YeTefeifilfiviere lic
dieted in 19so on charges of exporting
explosives to Libya and, with other for-
mer. intelligence and military person-
nel, have been linked to the training of
terrorists and the 4ansfer abroad of ad-
vanced minter/ equipment and exper-
tise. Both men arefugitives; Mr. Wilson
lives in Libya and Mr. Terpil is believed
to be somewhere in the Middle East.
Much of trxiay's hearing focused on
possible legislative and administrative
remedies that, if enacted, could signifi-
cantly curtail the export of intelligence
expertise and tighten disclosure- and
reeistration requirements for Ameri-
cans working for foreign governments;
according to thesesources. ? ?' - ' ?
In his testimony before the commit..
tee, Mr. Casey said the agency, after a
long internal investigation begun last
July after press disclosures about the
case, had reached these these tentative
conclusions: r ?
41There was no official contact by the
agency with Mr. Wilson and Mr. Terpil
al te.r their, orial indictment ill nap , _
?
tiThe agency had no official involve-
ment in Libyan terrorist training. ?
OThere was no official agency in-
volvement in the recraiting of members
of the Army Special Forces to help train
Libyans.
While Mr. Casey's testimony isi some
respects echoed earlier agency denials
of official complicity, it also reflected a
new willingness to address questions
surrounding the agency's ability to po-
lice its employees and their outside ac-
ties... = . ,e, ?
e While Mr. Casey told the committee
that the agency was revising its internal
code of conduct as a result of the Wilson-
:Terpil affair, he seemed to favor legisla-
tive remedies as a solution rather than,
for example, changes in the C.I.A.'s em-
ployment contract, sources say.
. Queries enTles to Aides
Committee members, most of whom
attended the three-hour hearing, ad-
dressed a wide range of questions to Mr.
Casey covering mast aspects of the Wil-
son-Terpil affair. Representative Ed-
ward P. Boland, Democrat of Massa-
chusetts, who is chairman of the com-
mittee, said afterward that Mr. Casey.
and the agency now seemed to have a
good pip on the facts in the cite, al-
though Mr. Wilson's activities were first
brought to the agency's attention in
1976. '' -. -- ?...., ? ? ? -. e ...
.. Some committee members were. in-
terested in the relationship between Mr.
Wilson and some senior agency employ-
ees who maintained contact and had
business relationships with Mr. Wilson
in 1977 and 1973, but Mr. Casey was ap-.
parently unable to shed any new light on
this matter.. . . .
. . .
Most of the discussion, according to
_Corieessional sources, focused on ways
to r
the
Inc
pie
wri
iSSL
rea
find
soul
Among the legislative so atone being
discussed were these: - ?
qAmending, the laws gas' 'ening Tf..'..4-
tration of foreign agents to cover people
working for foreign goverrireentis on in--
telligence matters; .
gArnending export con rol laws to
miniraize the export of int-...?11igence ex-
grtequiring intelligence e7rnployees to
register after leaving the United Stat;
Government if they go tow Leis for a for- ?
eigiceuntry..
elProhibiting certain kinds of private
employment for Goverrareent intelli-
gence agents;. especially wen retained
by foreign governments_ 'hat support
terrorism. - - ?
.? .
"Working with Mr. Casey on the ques-.
don of possible legislative remedies 'will
beStanleY Sporkin, the alermcy general
counsel; who accompanied' Mr. Casey to
ihehearing. ee?e,
. hTwo members of the inte4Ii gen? cam-
rnittee inteieeted in , lee;siative reme-
dies, Representative -Albert Gar- Jr.;-
Democrat of Tenn e:ssee-, ari Re.pr eeent-
alive Norman Mazzoli, Democrat of
Kentucky, both said that any legislation
Would have to be designed so as not to:
impinge _on ??? yariotz c oaUtutional
rights.
Mr. Mazzoni said that v,?-o,,s
disturbed about the rov-ri. -!.zions of the
Libyan, activiti- of the two , former
agents, his -questions to Mr. e Casey
loolsed more to the future, for the
;-:agency to "give us their vf- sdom on how
to eliminat, . or stop this ind of prac-
tice ee... ? - -." ee-e" erne:h
Mr.. Gore said he three-4-d that-:?the
agency had been "blinded' iaits analy-
sis of Iran under the depoeed Shah Mo-
hammed Rim Pahlevi and Libya in part
.1;ecause of close ties between former
'egency personnel and the two countriee'.
The Tennessee Democrat said he in-
tended to propose legislation requiring
members of the intelligence oornmunity_
to agree not to work fora foreign gave
emment alter their stint as intelligence
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TO:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
MI
3
D/ICS
4
DD/NFA
5
DD/A
6
DD/0
7
DD/S&T
8
Chm/NIC
9
GC
10
IG
11
Compt
12
D/EEO
13
D/Pers
14
D/OPP
15
C/EAS/OPP
16
C/IAS/OPP
17
AO/DCI
18
4,
,..1
/ -
?
20
21
22
0002-2
STAT
rpational
Twrjrnv :ficatioApproved For
Liic "'Icy
Sites of Arre,fica
Wash fl.g ton, D. C. 20547
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
elease 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-0090
,
February 2, 1982
Office of the Director
90?400pcOct?13:,"
The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Gilbert A. Robinson
Acting Director
SUBJECT: "Let Poland Be Poland"
The first reports of usage around the world for "Let
Poland Be Poland" are most encouraging. More than 100
million viewers in 25 foreign countries saw the
presentation in whole or in lengthy excerpts on Sunday
night or Monday morning. About 72 million of those
viewers were in Europe. In the United States, 16 of the
top 25 major market affiliates of the Public Broadcasting
System aired the entire program Sunday night or Monday.
The radio adaptation broadcast by the Voice of America and
Radio Free Europe is estimated to have reached more than
one hundred million listeners.
Many countries will be broadcasting the program in
upcoming days which means the total viewing audience will
ultimately be much larger.
Two comments say a lot. The German TV commentator said:
"It was a picture of America's unbroken capability to be
sympathetic to freedom." In France, the TV commentator
there said: "It was a quality production, advance
criticism was proven to be unjustified."
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02317 5'
STA I
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cLACh
.es
Spy Operations
After Iran Loss
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 ? United
States intelligence-gathering activities
are increasingly being conducted under
the cover of private commercial organi-
zations rather than 'diplomatic mis-
sions, according' to:senior intelligence
officials. e ? e
The officials said...the change was
made in an effort to. tighten security
after the loss of :Sensitive documents
when the American Embassy in Tehe-
ran was seized 4'1,1979,
? ?
?
Approaches- to Banl-Sadr Cited :7
The officials said thii new procedure,.
initiated by William J, Casey, director
of Central Intelligence, resulted from
the intelligence corrununity's concern
over the public disclosures of secret con-
tacts with Iranian, afficials?and 6C-de-
tailed American assessinents of the Ira-'
nian situation. that followed the take-
_ .
. ? ,? ?
over? . -. . - . ?
The documents were obtained by Ira-
nian militants when they seized the em-
bassy on Nov. 4, 1979. They were subse-
quently published in Iran in a 13-volume
series of paperback books, copies of
'.which have now reached newspapers in
,-
,the United StatesitA-L,
Information-int-lie doc4n3erits" ranges
from account2of :CentraleIntelligence
Agency efforts to recruit AbolhaSsan
-Bani-Sadr, then a close adviser to Aya-
tollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to a 47-page
C.I.A. study of Israelts.inteifigenceand
security serviceseeeeee--eeenea'
? That study reveals that the Israelis
placed listening_ devices in 'American
diplomatic offices in Israel in the 1950's
and 1960's and attempted to blackmail
an American consularofficial in Jerusa-
lem to obtain information.-
NEW YORK TIMES
2 FEBRUARY 1982
"We used to keep en cyclopedic files in
a lot of stations, including Iran,, ' one in-
telligence official said. "That was a
mistake. We're now trying to keep files
Ito a minimum."
In addition, the C.I.A. has asked the
State Department to restrict the circula-
' tion of intelligence data in foreign i post,
the officials said. Much of the material
lost in Iran, they said, was found in files
'kept by embasay pernonnel,
Bruce Laingen, the charge d'affaires.
At the time of the takeover, an effort
was Made to burn or shred sensitive in-
formation, but the militants-were able
torecover. considerable quantities of
documents and were also able to recon-
Struct shredded materials.- , ,
.--eme documents, which were published
Iran and made available here, dis-
closed, among other things, that in the
: days before the seizure of the embassy,
the Iranian Govemnient, then headed
? by a moderateePrime Minister Mehdi
Barzagan, established contacts with
American intelligence agents to seek
formation on whether Iraq was foment-
ing the insurrection of the Kurdish mi-
- parity and whether Israel was also in
1
According to the documents, the
C.I.A. made contact with Mr. Bani-
Sadr, who was then a close adviser to
. Ayatollah Khomeini and later was to be-
? come president of Iran, in an effort to
recruit him.: But the mission, which in-
volved the use of a secret agent using an
'alias, produced only mcdest informa-
tion about the political situation in revo-
lutionaryIran. The attempt to recruit
Mr. Bani-Sadr as an agent failed. ?
Deportation of Shah Urged.
01R000400120002-2
? For example, there is considerable
documentation to show that American
intelligence agents had contacts with
Abbas Amir Entezarn, who was Deputy
Prime Minister and official spokesman
for Mr. Bazargan, whose Government
fell in the aftermath of the takeover of
the American Embassy;
-ndri Entezam was appointed ambas-
, iador to Sweden just before the Bazar-
gan Government fell on Nov. 6, 1979 and
later was tried on charges that included
collaboration with the C.I.A. Last June
the official Iranian press agency said a
revolutionary court had sentenced him
to life imprisonment.
Mr. Entezarn is not named in the
documents, but in the context seems to
fit the description of 'a -C.I.A. contact
known in the cablegrams to Washington
as "SDPLOD/ 1." .
Mr. Entezam and Foreign Minister
Ibrahim Yazdi both appeared to have
been particularly ? 'concerned about
Iraq's activities, given the traditional
enmity between that nation and Iran.
A document says that on Oct 18, 1979,
"SDPLOD/1" met with an American
known by the code name of "Adiesick"
to tell him that Iran's needs "at the mo-
ment were basically for tactical infon
roation on Kurdish situation and politi-
cal intelligence ? on e who - supporting
Kurds and why."
:.".;tAfter the 'deposed Shah Mohammed
Pima Pahlevi was admitted to the United
States for medical reasons in October
1979, the publications reveal, various
Iranian. officials pleaded. with the
United States Embassy to deport him
for fear that his. presence in America
would be used by radicals to destroy any
chances of improved Iranain-Arnerican
relations. Mr. Laingen himself had
? strongly: urged against admitting the
Shah to the United States. - a
t? :In 1977, the documents shows, the
C.LA.: complained in a repoit that too
' much credence was given to imforma-
- The intelligence officials said that Mr. non supplied by the Iranian intelligence
Casey, who took-office at the start of the-. service, Savak. -
Reagan Administration; had placed a if 1 The public release of the documents,
high priority on establishing con:anal-, which include the minutes of embassy
cial cover for agents and operations; ette meetings conducted by Ambassador
ther by gaining. the coc
of:' William H. Sullivan, the last envoy to
' 'aseration
ws"_ _rateee Teheran. seemed designed to put
American Ira-
. corporations -. ape '''.5 man moderates and other opponents of
, abroad or by creating Jictitious corn-1-the religious factions in the worst1
I
. i nies for the purpose.: a...,:',.4'' .. a.; . ' ' '1?be iht., ,. .; m: :_.;
: : ; ? : " :
Mr. Casey was also reported to have----------------
ordered that the amount of intelligence
data stored overseas bereduced.:- Tatteit.: ,
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11/
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SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER
2 February 1982
unity for the CIA
C AREBRAINED" is what one unnamed
LFilJusticeDepartment official called CIA
Director .William Casey's proposal for the
granting of immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion to CIA agents while they are on legitimate
missions. An "overreaction," said another. ?
That may be the least that can be said of
the Casey proposal. It is a worrisome request,
for in the conduct of a person's duties, not even
the president is above the law.
Casey posed the idea in a letter to Attorney
General William French Smith, suggesting that.
Congress be asked to approve such a shield.
Neither Smith nor the Congress should
advance any further the notion of carte
blanche for the CIA. No agency or agent of
government ever should be endowed with such
extraordinary power in a democracy.
The Justice Department's Office of Intelli-
gence Policy Review, which recognizes the
need for internal agency oversight, opposes
Casey's recommendation on the ground if
would permit CIA agents to "freely engage" in'
otherwise illegal activities without authoriza-
tion or approval from Justice.
The CIA's general counsel, Stanley Sporkin,.
says that the Casey proposal is a technical, legal.
matter, not a policy change. That is debatable:
. ? . . ?
STAT
But even if Sporkin were correct, it is on
technical, legal matters that courts determine
privilege in this country ? as well as the
admissibility of evidence. And if there could be
little or no criminal prosecution of individuals
or organizations sufficiently threatening to our
national security because of rights' violations,
then ,intelligence agencies realistically would
have to employ other means of dealing with
those considered to be enemies of the state.
Ironically, some CIA officials contend that
the Casey proposal really wouldn't give the
agency anything it doesn't already enjoy under .
current law ? the concern merely being for
the status quo protection under the upcoming.
revised federal criminal code. But that expla-
nation is somewhat feeble, particularly since
this administration has made clear its intent to
relax what it considers to be unreasonabl
restrictions on U.S. intelligence agencies.
While there is no denying the need fora
flexible, opportunistic intelligence community
to protect this nation's interests, to grant a
standing shield .of legal _ immunity to agents
would effectively remove them from. the -
control of government's elected leaders, who
themselves could become the target of misdi-
rected agents or an agency whose integrity had
been compromised:
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?T?
ASSOCIATED PRESS
Approved For Releas% 2105Wila8)9a-RDP91-00912
STAT
R BYLVIXEEV
,?.
1R000400120002-2
L.ONCLUDES OFFICIALLY .'liVOLVE3 IN
...- :_,. _ ____-.- ., ......
t.r: ViKti-h J.;il-LirIN Q. Uhz.EY iviLt
.iNTELLIGENCE ?_. laiitt, ON ,u1 irlhi thz zFY hUmNi..=i-ih".*:. ic.N;h!ivmi..;
1..vNt-i-vi,tv intnm 1141-5..:. Nu Urtita.i. ....AH INvUL.'vmPitNi IN LIBYAN TERRORIST
TRAINING" THE COITTEE 1::HAIR!-AN SAID.
EDWARD 7,-.:4ASS. SPOKE WITH REPORTERS AFTER
OTHEN !..11 OFFICIALS TESTIFIED BEFORE THE 'OUSE PANEL BEHIND CiOFFD
DOORS FOR THREE HOURS.
-HE HEARING FOCUSED ON ti.uEETIONS OVER ThE ROFijArY OF AN ITERAL
INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE LINKS EET'wEEN THE AGENCY AND TO
- -
FORiYiER AGENTS cONIN NILSON AND '7RANN C. iERPIL! ACCUSED OF SETTii-41.1
UP A TERRORIST TRAINING PROJECT IN :IFYA.
7.OLAND SAID HIS COMNITTEE HAS R VERY DEEP CONCERN BECAUSE OF THE
IfIPACT THAT THESE ALLEGATIONS HAVE UPON THE AGENCY. F rOURF.E THE
AGREES
"
WITH THIS5
7HE Ct.iFii.4 SAID HE WAS PLEASED EY Int COOPERATION WIiH A
COnMITTEE INCI.LiIRY INTO w,ILSON-ERPIL AFFRIR. ;;;E .ADDED ":7M F.ATISFIED
wiTH THE AGENCVS CONDC7 THIS POINT."
RT
?OwEVER5 DOLAND INDICATED THAT THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THERE ARF
STILL DISCREFANCIES WHICH NEED TO EE RESOLVED BETWEEN THE
OFFICIAL VERSION FiNF INF-mFTION FROM OTHER SC-..'SCES THE
LIBYRN-RELRTED RCTIVITIES.
"Y,ITH REFERENCE 70 WHO s.f.NEW AND WHEN5 THAT NuuLD HAVE 70 EP
BA,..ANCEL N,ITH SOME OF THE INFORmATION WA. HAVE IN THF FIF AND
TESTIfviONY NhICH HAS BEEN ADDUCED BY WITNPSSES NHERF IT DOESN1T
,
wITH THF AGF4CY1F INVPSTIGATION? CJOLAND SAID WITHOUT
ELABORATING.
7.FRFARING wITH C.REEY AT THP HEARING WERE
E:OFFY
THF-
NE, L AL-7 EF INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR THE AG,:--NrY5 P' R N N t:
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Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2
2 February 1982
STAT
L Lt1UtX5 LAP
prz;zrioTr.:
HT9JT TE TRIOW IM TI 5 R5O R117INn IN P O O
: ..77
?: I :0,111,47 r4t: sst-i? ? 1,17777:t7 F,??.:
: : ? ? : 7 .7
,
? Ezp
L1tLtr L::..r
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OP CLHOESTIME OPERRTIBS$ AND THOM CLINFS -
DIRFC- 3. OFRfl_I
NI (..iiNnPSTDIEfi T HR TNTHE
H.. . ? . ? t 1./S743 I? "s1?3? / 1? 5r. *1 tF 1i?-;1%1?1Wr )^ . H ?. .z
EOUIPPIENT riUSILNESS WITH THE REPORTED HELP OF 4I_SEN. SHAP.KiFY UFMT TO
WORK FOR CLINES WHEN HE RE -IP .ED IN A379.
PPc:PY STfiRiFil Fi SECOND INYESTIG8TI114 IMTO THE
LRS - Tp!$ ccr prippr ? re riiirriiiiivi;r?
: .!
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Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2
AR T I C:r_irs A:PPEABED
ON PAGE
HOUSE IS STARIIN
FEARINCS ON C,
NEW YORK TIKES
1 FEBRUARY 1982
? The two men, accordirig to the Justice '
Department, reached an agreement
with Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan
leader, in 1976 to sell Libya their ex-per-
' tise in intelligence and military matters
' to help train terrorists.
? The C.I.A.'s internal Investigation is
one of several facets of the Wilson-Ter-
case that the House Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence is ex-
pected to explore in three hearings this
week, committee staff members said.
Other. facets include the recruitment
of Army Special Forces veterans :to
train terrorists in Libya and.Mr.WiI-
son's association with a secret Navy. in-
tell igence unit called Task Force 157:
. The hearings will conclude a four-
month committee staff investigation.
into the activities of Mr. Wilson and Mr.
iTerpd. The- committee, according to
staff members; has reached no conclu-
sions about the adequacy of the inspec-
tor general's report, but enough ques-
tions have been raised to warrant a re-
'view of the specific Wilson-Teroil in-
quiry' as well as the general ability of the
?C.I.A. to investigate possible
rniscon-
duct by its officials. . -
: Ofileials Defend Inspector General
I Former ' officials of the agency, in-
cluding Adm. Stansfield Turner, Direc-
Agency Report of-Activity for,
Libya Is Focus of fnquiry.
.By PHILIP TAUBMAN
,.SpecialtolbeNewYoesTtrers _
1? WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, ?-?? The House!
'Intelligence Committee- will; begin:
closed hearings Tuesday on the Central!
;Intelligence Agency's, investigation or,
its possible links to two former agents.
who sold their services to Libyae ?
- The C.I.A.'s internal investigation:
may have failed to pursue several sig-
nificant lines of inquiry and may not,
have examined all possible sources of.
information, sources familiar with the.
I committee's work said. The inquiry was.
I conducted in -1976 and 1977 by the agene
I cy's inspector general to . determine_
whether any officials helped establish a.
; terrorist training project itiLibya... ? '
Report Exonerated Officials.
The inspector general's report, which
led to the dismissal of two middle-level
agency employees, exonerated several
senior intelligence agency officials who
were suspected of having ties:to the for-
mer agents, Edwin P. Wilson and Frank
Terpil, according to former C.I.A. of-
ficials.
The report also served until recentl
as the basis for agency statements tha
the C.I.A. had thoroughly irivestig,at
the Wilson-Ter-ail matter and had teem
no official ties to the Libyan operati
organized by the two
' A second internal. C.1-..A..k investiga-
tion, .initiated last_year by. William
Casey,: the Director of Central
gence; is continuing, according to Rea-
gan Admitiisti ation official.: To date,' it
has found no evidence of official agency
approval or .support for the operation,
according to the
It has; however,--; raised questions
about the thoroughness of the first in-
vestigation, according to those familiar
with the committee's work. These
sources deelined to provide details, but
said that agency investigators might
have prematurely cleared .senior offi
cials. - ? ' '
Mr. Wilson and Mr.-Terpil were in-
dicted in 1980 on charge eFatelpi
shipping explosives to 1..ib"ri. They are
currently living abroad as fugitiyes,..
tor of Central Intelligence in the Carter
Administration, defended the work of
the inspector general in the Wilson-Ter-
pil case. "I turned him loose and I'm
satisfied that he got me to the bottom of
,7 the case," Admiral Turner said in a re-.
cent interview.
'? Admiral Turner disinissed two mid-
dle-level agency employees in 1977 after
the inspector general found that they
had helped Mr. Wilson establish the ter-
rorist training operation in Libya. .? -? 2
? At the time, the C.I.A.'s inspector gen-
eral was John H. Waller, who worked in
the agency's.! clandestine oPerationa
division for many years before becom-
ing inspector general in 1976, according
to former intelligence officials. Mr.
Waller retired from the C.I.A. several
years ago. _
..- 'Mr._ Waller's investigation of the Wil.'
,Son-Terpil case focused almost exclu--
sively on officials in clandestine opera-
tions, including several with whom he -
had worked closely before becoming in-
spector general, according to former in-
telligence officials. Mr. Waller last
week declined to discuss his work at the
Specific
Theodore
rector
Thomas C
the eland!
maintain(
left gover
establish
- Mr. Stu
denied kri
son's bust
acknowlec
him set up
ness when
Shackley ?
when he i
- both men.
- ? -
a
The Hou
said to be (
-conflict fa(
asked to ii
Mr. Wilsor
Clines.
Witnesses expected to testify et Ites-
day's hearing, which will examine Mr.
Wilson's links to the agency, will aclude
Mr. Casey; Admiral Bobby R. ':arnan,
the Deputy Director. of Central Intelli-
gence; Charles A. Briggs, the current 1
Inspector general, and Stanley S-.-orkin,,4
the agency's general counsel.
s?,Adrnirrel Inman is expected to return
?the next day to discuss- Mr..
work for Task Force 157, a secret Navy
intelligence unit that the admiral dis- '
mantfed in the mid-1970's when le as
Director of Naval Intelligence.
- Defense Department officials ire ex-
? ected to appear Thursday to eiscuss
?-Mr. Wilson's recruitment of L? eke. F.
Thompson, an officer on active duty in
the Army Special Forces, to hela train
terrorists in Libya. Mr.. Taompecei
. asserted that his superiors in the Green
Berets approved his mission to Li aya....
STAT
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ARTICLE Al-TEA:RED U.S ULZA WO4LD ...RE.EQET
or pAGE_piL3roved For RelealsT3RRiairl !48 im-Kurui-00901R00
king 0
nruly
on
Russia, Taiwan, Cuba, Mideast?the President
is altering course across the board as
complex international problems close in.
America's allies welcome the change a lot
more than Reagan's "new right" backers.
Up against the harsh realities of a troublesome world,
Ronald Reagan is being driven to alter drastically many of
the premises he carried to the White House a year ago.
To the dismay of his staunchest conservative supporters,
the President has modified what was widely seen as an
essentially ideological approach to a host of critical foreign-
policy issues involving Russia, China, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, Central America and the Mideast
The President continues to stand firm on the administra-
tion's two basic objectives?rearming America and meeting
more vigorously the challenge of Soviet expansionism. But
at the start of his second year in the White House, he finds
himself moving broadly in the direction that American
U.S. Foreign-Policy
Establishment
TIMOTHY MURPHY-USNMYR
400120002-2
ST
Presidents have pursued internationally. for . quarter of a
century or more. Thus?
ii Stiff anti-Soviet rhetoric that stirred widespread con-
cern about a return to the cold war last year now is muted
in favor of arms-control negotiations and suminitry with the
Russians.
is Preserving unity of the Atlantic Alliance is given priori-
ty in the Polish crisis over demands for sanctions
against Russia and the military regime in Warsaw that
America's partners are reluctant to impose.
m Washington's drive for a "strategic consensus" in the
Mideast, once a top priority, is being suborc inated to the
search for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.
ii Threats of military action against Cuba to neutralize
Fidel Castro's support for Marxist guerrillas in Central
America are giving way to greater emphas s on political
and economic measures to meet the danger.
ii Closer strategic cooperation with China, iewed initial-
ly with suspicion by many close to Reagan, is t_ etting prefer-
ence over campaign promises to upgrade elations with
Taiwan.
Behind these wide-ranging shifts in adminstration for-
eign policy is the discovery that global realities often do not
correspond to the views voiced by Reagan in the 1980
campaign. Many of the Chief Executive's orig-.nal initiatives
overseas boomeranged?alarming U.S. alli ?s, fueling a
peace movement in Europe to the delight of :lussia, impos-
ing severe strains on U.S. relations with China, alienating
black Africa and much of the rest of the Third World and
allowing the dangerous Palestinian problem t ) fester.
Beyond that, what has been brought home to Reagan is
that America's ability to influence intractable allies and
adversaries is limited, whether in responding to the annex-
ation of the Golan Heights by Israel's Menaciern Begin or
the Army crackdown in Poland instigated by Russia's Leo-
Md Brezhnev. Military power, the Presider t has discov-
ered, is of limited utility?even against international pyg-
TIMOTHY MURPHY-USNSWA
Caspar Weinberger
Pentagon chief cc ntributed to ap-
pearance of disarray by squab-
bring publicly with Haig. Hard-liner
on many issues b not on block-
ading Cuba_
William Casey
CIA director served as Reagan
campaign manager, survived in-
quiry into financial affairs, seeks
active role in shaping of foreign
policy.
2
A
President Reagan
Delegates wide authority over for-
eign policy. Decisions on Taiwan,
Poland, disarmament negotiations,
Alexander Haig
Secretary of State emerging
as "vicar" of foreign policy,
criticized by conservatives for
favoring "Kissinger disciples"
at State.
William Clark
New NSC head is close Rea-
gan friend, foreign-policy nov-
ice. His assignment: End bick-
other issues disappoint "new right" ering, coordinate overseas
supporters. ApprovecktRocisRelease 2005/11/2
coiviiivuED
mies such as Cuba's
Libya's Muammar Qa
The result has been an increasing
tendency by Reagan, in dealing
with tests overseas, to overrule
hawkish elements in his administra-
tion in favor of the more pragmatic
line usually, but not always, es-
poused by Alexander. Haig's State
Department. A conspicuous exam-
ple: The administration's measured
response to martial law in Poland,
which a right-wing leader?Rich-
ard Viguerie?denounces as Rea-
gan's being soft on the Soviets.
It is not only the substance of
foreign policy but also its manage-
ment that Reagan is altering. He is
embracing a plan that he originally
spurned by recasting in January the
role of the national-security adviser
into one of the most powerful in
the White House and naming to
the job a close confidant, William
Clark, to replace Richard Allen.
Criticized as an ineffective admin-
istrator with a strong ideological
bias, Allen had so little status that
he was required to report to the
President through White House
Counselor Edwin Meese III, who is
without experience in international
affairs.
With the reorganization, the
President is attempting to elimi-
nate the high-level arguments and
turf battles involving Haig and De-
fense Secretary Caspar Weinber-
ger, as well as Allen. The feuding,
which Reagan promised would not
be permitted in his administration,
gave rise to confusion over who, if
anyone, was in charge of foreign
policy. In the new setup, Haig ap-
pears to be emerging with greatly
enhanced authority.
Staunch conservatives deplore
the changes. They see the elimination of Allen and the
promotion of professional Foreign Service officers to top
State Department posts as further evidence that diplomatic
careerists are gaining control of international affairs in the
Reagan administration. --
Whatever the misgivings of the President's right-wing
supporters, a survey by the magazine's bureaus abroad
indicates that the current direction of the administration's
foreign policy is endorsed by U.S. allies. Reflecting a widely
- shared view in Europe, the magazine's London bureau
reports: "To the British, Reagan is moving from rhetoric
and ideology in his first year to greater diplomacy and
realism in his second."
The administration's handling of four of the most critical
international issues points up how far it has modified its
original premises in an effort to find an effective strategy
for dealing with a world crowded with intractable problems
and defiant nations?allies no less than adversaries.
FfiltHaV =MOM aCIALAUP91-00901R
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Deputy Secretary
A 40-year veteran of For-
eign Service, manages
State for Haig.
Lawrence Eagleburger
Under Secretary
Kissinger protege, still
unconfirmed, driving
force behind policies.
Jeans J. Kirkpatrick
Ambassador to U.N.
A Democrat, but ranked
among hard-liners on Po-
land, human rights.
Robert D. Hormats
4ssistant Secretary
Slated for top economic
'ob, criticized by conser-
ratives as too liberal.
movement in West :.rrt Europe and
0N4NitZ9V-243.own in Poland.
In its initial approach to relations
with Moscow, the administration
stressed that arms-control negotia-
tions would have to await a signifi-
cant-U.S. military b?iildup and that a
Reagan-Brezhnev summit would
depend on evidence of Soviet good
behavior internationally?in Af-
ghanistan and Poland particularly.
At the same time, key members
of the Reagan foreign-policy team
indulged in what some critics, espe-
cially in Europe, branded as unnec-
essarily strident, anti-Soviet rheto-
ric?for example, the President's
assertion that Sos let leaders "re-
serve unto themselves the right to
-commit any crime to lie, to cheat"
to attain their goal of world domi-
nation. Also, there was a good deal
of talk by the Preiident, Haig and
Weinberger about limited nuclear
war in Europe?a sensitive subject
that previous administrations had
assiduously avoidel.
A top administration official in-
sists that all this was necessary to
send a clear signal to Russia of a
definite change in Washington. His
words: "As we evolved an East-
West strategy, we needed in the
early stages to clarify our positions.
It has always been the President's
view that confusion is the greatest
threat to world peace. We set out
to strip away the ambiguities. We
wanted to make sure that the Sovi-
ets understood where we stand,"
What administration officials dis-
covered was that 7hey were fright-
ening America's allies more than
the Russians and 'neling the Euro-
pean peace movement that threat-
ened to undermine NATO's nuclear
- strategy.
The change in the administration's posture toward Russia
was signaled dramatically by Reagart's November 18 state-
ment proposing a "zero option" agreement in negotiations
to limit medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and also
calling for other arms control talks with Russia. With that
move, he seemed to seize the initiative from Moscow in a
fateful struggle for Western European opinion that the U.S.
had been losing by default. ?
Subsequently, the President announced what was seen as
a reversal of his policy on summitry. He ceelared his inter-
est in a summit meeting with Soviet President Brezhnev
without linking it to Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, Poland
or other international crisis spots as in the past.
Washington's reaction to the imposition of martial law in
Poland underscores how far the administration is playing
down its original policy of "linkage" and emphasizing what
could be called a "NATO first" approacn. Despite his in-
dictment of Moscow for complicity in the Army crackdown
. in Poland, Reagan is resisting pressure from some support-
ers to break off arms talks with the Soviet;, drop any notion
of a summit and embargo all trade with Russia. Haig did
inform the Soviets that he was unpreparei to discuss a date
Vernon Walters
Ambassador-at-Large
Former CIA deputy direc-
tor, Haig's personal trou-
bleshooter.
A New Line Toward Russia
. Reagan's hard-line strategy for handling Russia has been
tempered by two events?the spectacular rise of the peace
Richard R. Burt
Coordinates policy on
arms negotiations, other
strategic issues.
?-? .
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Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2
for beginning strategic arms talks at a late January meeting,
in Geneva with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. This
was seen as a reaction to sharp criticism by former Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger and the new right, but not as
a new decision to spurn arms negotiations.
Adjusting Mideast Priorities
I laig's latest Mideast trip?his second in two weeks,-
points up the switch in administration priorities in that
volatile region. Originally the emphasis was on building an
anti-Soviet "strategic consensus" embracing moderate Arab
states as well as Israel, with the search for an agreement on
the Palestinian problem pushed to the back burner.
The theory was that a greater sense of security in the
area would make it easier for Israel and the Arabs to come
to terms. Events have deflated that assumption. In the
words of a former high-level State Department
specialist: "Haig tried to convince the Arabs that
the Soviets were the main problem, but it didn't
work. The people in the Middle East made it clear
they wouldn't buy it."
Saudi Arabia, cast for a key role in Reagan's
regional defense plan, still opposes an American
military presence in the Persian Gulf area, while
the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat
has raised doubts about military cooperation with
that country in the future.
As for Israel, even though Washington signed a
strategic-cooperation agreement with the Jerusa-
lem government, Prime Minister Begin was not
deterred from defying the U.S. by annexing the
Golan Heights. The upshot was suspension of the
accord, a bitter Begin attack on the Reagan admin-
istration and a major crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations.
Says Amos Jordan, vice chairman of Georgetown Univer-
sity's Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington: "Both Haig and the President have viewed
the Middle East in terms of U.S.-Soviet confrontation and
not in terms of internal dynamics. Both are in the process of
learning."
As a result of the learning process, the administration has
reversed its Middle East priorities. Haig, in his travels to
the area, now is concentrating on an attempt to achieve a
breakthrough in peace negotiations between Israel and
Egypt, while soft-pedaling the question of an anti-Soviet
defense arrangement.
Downgrading Taiwan
If there was one international issue on which candidate
Ronald Reagan held passionate personal views dating back
many years, it was on U.S. relations with Taiwan.
When he moved to the White House, he assumed that he
could upgrade American diplomatic and military ties with
the Taipei government and at the same time reinforce
strategic cooperation with China. But in its first major test,
that policy proved unworkable. The issue: Taiwan's request
for an advanced FX warplane to augment its force of F-5E
planes.
Chinese leaders served notice that such arms deliveries to
an island that they claim as an integral part of their country
would jeopardize their :relations With the U.S. After months
of tough behind-the-scenes debate in the administration, the
President in early January decided to reject Taiwan's re-
quest for more-sophisticated aircraft but allow further deliv-
ery of the F-5E's that are produced on the island. He acted
on the unanimous advice of Haig, Weinberger and Central
Intelligence Agency Director William Casey that, contrary
to the claims of Taiwan leaders, the island does not face a
threat that requires more advanced aircraft.
IAGGIE STI?BEH
The decision reflected an administration judgment that, I
for compelling strategic reasons, relations with China
should take precedence over links with raipei. Upward of
50 Soviet divisions are being tied down n the Far East by
the face-off with China. Furthermore, Peking diverts other
Russian forces by supporting guerrillas in Afghanistan and
contributes to stability in Southeast Asia by deterring Viet-
nam from contemplating adventures t eyond Cambodia.
Conservative Republicans reject this rationale, accusing the
administration of kowtowing to Peking. Even so, Chinese
leaders are not happy.
The magazine's Peking bureau reperts: 'The current
pattern of arms sales to Taiwan, with no increase in the
sophistication of weapons supplied, prooably will avoid a
downgrading of official U.S.-Chinese re:ations. But it will
set back for an indefinite period the surprising cooperation
between the two olc enemies that was
expanding so rapichy last year. Rea-
View From the Kremlin:
A Tougher U.S. Stance
MOSCOW
To the Kremlin, implications of
Ronald Reagan's hard-line foreign
policy come across loud and clear
The era of unchallenged Soviet ad-
ventures abroad is over.
Even as Moscow assails America's
toughened stance, it is evident here
that Soviet leaders are convinced
Reagan is determined to resist ex-
pansionism and that Russia must move with greater
caution as a result.
Concern about a confrontation with the U.S., for
example, contributes to Moscow's relictance to send
its military forces into Poland. Likewi:.e, Soviet uneas-
iness is seen as being behind President Leonid Brezh-
nev's desire for a summit meeting with Reagan and
Russia's deep interest in the reopened U.S.-Soviet
arms-control talks.
Behind Moscow's eagerness to keep doing business
with the United States are these three main factors:
II The Kremlin is extremely concerned about the
U.S:military buildup and wants to avert an arms race-.
or With its economy in a perilous state, Russia
knows it must import American grain and acquire
Western technology to boost productivity.
=? The Soviets are convinced they can only gain
from a face-to-face encounter between Brezhnev and
Reagan_ Not only would a summit enable Brezhnev to
take the personal measure of his U.S. counterpart, but
it would enhance what Nfoscow believes is Western
Eurooe's perception of Brezhnev as a man of peace
a.nd Reagan as a troublemaker.
For all of Russia's need for accommodation, the
Kremlin has not been cowed by Reagan. The Soviets
continue to deploy SS-20 missiles aimed at Western
Europe, to strengthen their bomber squadrons and to
send economic and military aid to clients such as
Libya, Syria and Cuba.
Even so, with Reagan residing in the White House,
the Soviet Union views new ventures abroad as full of
dangerous risks.
" , ? ???
By NICHOLAS DANILOFF
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c EVIVUV-0
Approved Fgr Release 2005/11/28 :QA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2
gan s willingness to continue setting t aipei any military
aircraft makes the Chinese wonder whether he ever actual-
ly abandoned his pro-Taiwan 'two China' view."
Stopping Castro Without Gunboats
More than anywhere else, in Central America the admin-
istration is confronted with the limits on the utility of
American military power.
Haig and others, from the outset, have talked repeatedly
of possible armed action to cut off the flow of weapons from
Castro's Cuba to Marxist guerrillas attempting to seize pow-
er in El Salvador and elsewhere in the region. The Secre-
tary of State set the tone with an early threat that the U.S.
would "go to the source" if external arms deliveries to the
insurgents continued.
High-ranking administration officials concede that they
are engaged in a game of brinksmanship with Castro. As
one put it: "It is true that we are dealing in calculated
ambiguities with our threats to Castro, but since when do
you tell your enemy what you will and will not do?"
The fact is that Cuba has continued its assistance to
Central American guerrillas and the administration has re-
frained from responding with military action.
Weinberger's Pentagon reportedly is taking a strong
stand against the use of American armed forces to try to
neutralize Castro on the grounds that it probably wouldn't
work and it would be widely opposed in the U.S.
Also, Haig has found only minimal support among Latin
American countries for military intervention. In fact, Mexi-
co, which Reagan views as an especially important ally,
stresses its friendship with Castro and opposes an American
naval blockade or any other form of armed action to neu-
tralize Cuban support for Marxist guerrillas in Central
America.
The danger, warns one Latin American expert, is that
Castro will call Washington's bluff. To quote Prof. Luis E.
Aguilar of Georgetown University in Washington: "It's like
a Western movie: You'd better be willing to draw your gun
or they will make you eat it."
Despite the threatening posture, the focus of administra-
tion policy is shifting away from militaiy options to political
and economic measures designed to reinforce Central
American governments under attack
by leftist rebels. Washington is
counting heavily on elections to be
held in El Salvador in March and a
Caribbean Basin development plan to
help turn the tide against the armed
revolutionaries. But administration
policymakers concede that they are
working against heavy odds.
Thus, Reagan could find himself in
a no-win situation in Central Ameri-
ca, inhibited from using the military
power of the United States and un-
able to devise an effective political '
antidote to the threat posed by Marx-
ist revolutionaries.
For the President, all of this under-
scores a clear lesson: Any American
administration, sooner or later, must
recognize that in the complex real
world there are few simple problems
and no simple solutions. 0
By JOSEPH FROMM with DENNIS MULLIN, SU-
SANNA McBEE and the magazine's foreign bureaus
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Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0
NOTRE DAME NEWS
February 1982
STAT
In the CIA, says Ralph
you hczve b do is tell the
Ralph McGehee '50 joined the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1952, shortly after
he was cut from the Green Bay Packers.
He's not sure why the CIA approached
him, but during his intelligence training he
met so many other pro football dropouts
that he suspects the agency considered
the National Football League a prime
recruiting ground.
When the Korean War ended in 1953
McGehee joined the agency's clandestine
operations section as a case officer. Over
the next two decades he served in the
Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and
Vietnam. He did the routine work of an
intelligence officer: recruiting agents,
conducting investigations, and maintain-
ing liaison with the local police and
intelligence organizations.
During that era the CIA's main
struggle was against Communist
insurgency in Southeast Asia. That
struggle was a losing one. 01 all the
countries in the retion, today only
Thailand remains allied to. the West..
McGehee thinks he knows why our side
lost the rest.
In 1965 McGehee directed an intelli-
gence gathering effort in a province in
northeast Thailand where a Communist
insurgency was beginning. After a
detailed, yearlong, study, McGehee re-
ported that he had found a popular
movement so broad, pervasive and deeply
rooted that purely military measures were
unlikely to defeat it.
McGehee submitted his findings to the
agency but, .after a brief period of praise
for this work, he ran into an official wall
in Washington.
His findings, he explains, ran counter
to the official Washington view that
Communist insurgency was a form of '
clandestine invasion, and that the
natives involved were unwilling partici- ?
pants who were duped or forced into
joining guerilla units who took their arms
and orders from outside.
McGehee maintains that intelligence
information often is politicized_ In ..
theory, the agenc- provides accurate and
unbiased informanon to the President so !
he can make wist decisions regarding'
national security. in practice, when a .
President is firrn'e committed to a
particular policy such as military
victory in Vietnani), the agency shapes
its information to conform to that policy
Bad or even incvnvenient news is
- unwelcome. That is an abiding theme in
the history of int-Ili.gence, and it is the
rock on which R tlph McGehee
foundered.
After he subm tied his dissenting
report, McGehee', career took a nose?
dive. He was shuttled from one low-leve
- job to another. Jr was promised
promotions but r ever received them_
He was frustraned as he watched his
country wage tht wrong kind of war in
i
Southeast Asia, :me he knew was
doomed to failur t. Ho did what he coal
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App,roved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00040
PAGE_
THE WASHINGTONIAN
February 1982
STAT
BOBBY RAY INMAN
Master Spy Who's Not Out in the Cold
Tall, spare, with hooded eyes and a Bugs
Bunny grin, he has access to more raw
intelligence than anyone in Washington.
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Bobby Ray Inman was born 50 years ago
in Rhonesboro, Texas. "Anybody from
that far back in the sticks can't be all
bad," says Senator John Tower, and in-
deed Inman is regarded as extraordinar-
ily good by powerfut members of Con?
gress. They prefer Inman to CIA Director
William Casey, whose errors have drawn
fire but who retains President Reagan's
support, for the time being.
Inman?smart, ambitious, articulate,
quick?reads half the night, subsisting
on four or five hours of sleep. Asked to
where he says the Soviets outnumber us
three-to-one.
After service in Korea and Vietnam,
Inman headed the National Security
Agency for four years, then hoped to
accept a lucrative outside offer. He had
two sons to educate and a wife in grad-
uate school, But Reagan talked Inman
into the slot as Casey's deputy, boosting
Inman to four-star admiral. He was one
of the youngest men to attain that rank.
Rumors that Inman, not Casey, runs
the CIA appear unfounded. A former CIA
intelligence official who knows Inman
well says, "Casey briefs the President.
Inman coordinates the work of other in-
telligence agencies, a tedious job. The
assiV6118feEicKfrIMPeillkailtib8541/28v941110RItiRt4t-80190/1011413400/1/200
nesss Thniai ays: "On current intel- the President and the President doesn't
ligence we're very good. In assessing always make the decisions. Should Casey
loco tuall " 1-ks. ffsr"...1 nub,
02-2
Approved For Release -20051/12111218E:SCIA-IRDP91-00901R0004001
February 1982
There is nothing the news media love more
than a good scandal. When the personal
business affairs of a highly placed Govern-
ment official appear to create a conflict with
public obligation, every last detail is likely
to be reported and rehashed. In reeent
weeks, even the melodrama of a Libyan as-
sassination squad and the tragedy unfolding
in Poland failed to eclipse three grubby
tales?Richard Allen's, William Casey's,
and Maurice Stans's.
While we would be among the last to rise
to the defense of any of these three, it does
seem to us that much of the hullabaloo
raised about their alleged transgressions is
utterly beside the point. What reporters
and editors consistently fail to ask is
whether Government Policy would be dif-
ferent to any significant extent if the finan-
cial affairs of a President's close aides were
clean as the proverbial hound's tooth.
Allencaseystans, whose name has been
sullied with charges of wastefraudancla-
buse, was merely going about his usual busi-
ness: the shaping of a foreign policy that
best suits the needs of U.S. multinationals.
Certainly it is no news that democracy is but
a footnote on CIA and National Security
Council balance sheets; from Guatemala to
Iran to Chile, corporate profits have always
come first. Just as at the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, to which Stans
has just been appointed, the stimulation
and protection of U. S. interests abroad rule
the day.
Richard Allen's consulting firm, William
Casey's portfolio--7-they make a good read.
But they have little to do with the way
American foieign and domestic policy is
shaped. In our economic system, conditions
that make General Motors, ITT, Exxon,
and the rest happy are the foremost goal. ,
But the Allencaseystans stories do serve
one important function. A good house-
cleaning now and then convinces many that
our highest leaders are serving the public
good. And the emphasis on the superficial '
failings of the cleaned prevents the media
from undertaking even a modest examina-
tion of the systematic role of corporate !
power in political life.
20002-2
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STAT
2---
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.1.J1T THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
ON February 1982
Tilting at Windmills
When the Washington Post
bought the printing plant of the
Washington Star, it had a
legitimate reason: Post circulation
had skyrocketed because of the
Star's demise. But the purchase
also effectively cut off the
possibility of a new afternoon
paper published by anyone other
than the Post. There is simply not
the existing press availability to
print such a paper, and the
capital investment to buy new
presses, considering the generally ?
dim prospects for afternoon -
papers, is just too forbidding.... ?
Remember how clever criminals
-once wore gloves or carefully
erased their fingerprints before
leaving the scene of a crime?
These precautions are no longer
necessary. You can leave prints all
over the place and still have two
months to escape to Rio or some
other haven and commit a few
more burglaries before you leave.
The reason is it's now taking the
FBI that long to process requests
for fingerprint checks....
The Reagan administration has
extorted S10 000 from William
-Colby by threatening him with
prosecution because his French
publisher had distributed copies_
of his book containing certain
"sensitive passages" that were
deleted at the CIA's request in the
American edition. It was this
magazine that first pointed out
the differences ["Le Convert
blown," by Joseph Nocera,
November 1980] between the
French and American editions.
Our point was that the agency's
cuts?the so-called sensitive
passages--concerned insignificant
matters and proved how idiotic
the OM csjamlbja_yeaLrhe
fine is a shameful reversion to
STAT
The Reagan administration is
giving us another appointee in the
great tradition of Allen, Raymond
Donovan, and William J. ("not
unfit") Casey. He is Maurice
Stans, who has been nominated
to be director of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation.
Stans, you will recall, served as
finance chairman of the
Committee to Reelect the
President and raised a record S62
million for the 1972 campaign.
Unfortunately, the way he raised
and disbursed the money led to
his indictment by two grand
juries. On March 12, 1975, he
pleaded guilty to three counts of
violating the Federal Election
Campaign Act and two counts of
accepting illegal campaign
-contributions....
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Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-0090
THE PROGRESSIVE
February 1982
Beau Grosscup
Last January, shortly after the Ninety-
seventh Congress convened, a reso-
lution was introduced in each house
authorizing the President to pro-
claim March 16 as "Freedom of Informa-
tion Day." The Senate version (S.J. Res.
22) made it a point to stress that public ac-
cess to information is indispensable to pub-
lic decision-making in a democracy. Tt
states: .
Whereas a free press exists to serve the
American people whose daily decisions rest
on their having information;
Whereas a fundamental principle of our
Nation is that given information? the people
can make the decisions that determine their
present and theirfuture; .
Whereas if these decisions are to he wise,
they must be reached after weighing the facts
,
and considering the alternatives and conse-
quences;
Whereas the freedom we cherish in this
land is rooted in information. . . .-
Since assuming office, the Reagan Ad-
ministration has often invoked the central
assumption of S.J. 22 that public access to
information is crucial to the democratic
process. This, after all, is the basis of its
claim that its program has been shaped by
informed public sentiment. .
Whether the conservative Reagan forces
have accurately gauged public opinion is by
no means clear. What is clear is that the Ad-
miniStration and its supporters in Congress.
have moved swiftly to choke off the flow of
information by which public opinion is pre-
sumably formed. Three separate but com-
patible tactics are being used:. ? -
First, the Administration has mounted a
direct attack on the principle that the peo-
ple have a `-right to know" in a number of
respects. Proposed changes in the Freedom
of Information Act seek to restrict access to
Government documents, either by outright
denial or by burdensome rules designed to
discourage demands for information. One
bill, S. 587, would amend the Freedom of
Information Act to limit access to records of
law enforcement agencies. Another, S. 586,
would amend the Privacy Act of 1974 to al-
low Government officials access to law en-
forcement records while limiting such ac-
cess for those who are the subjects of
Government files. S. 391 would prohibit the
unauthorized disclosure of information
identifying U.S. inte hwifsvwdritsorTFlzgi
Nuclear Regulatory Agffcy-has proposed
Roan Gmccrun tpachev nolitics at Ithaca
STA I
legislation that would reduce the public's
right to gather information for use at nu-
clear plant licensing hearings. Each of these
measures has its specific rationalization, of
course, but the general theme for all of
them is that "excessive" public access to in-
formation is an obstacle to efficient govern-
ment. .
Second, reduced public access to in for-.
_mation is a consequence of the
Administration's wholesale budget cuts in
social services. Many of the agencies bear-
ing the brunt of funding cuts are basic infor-
mational sources for consumers, educators,
and public interest groups.. In a speech be-
fore the National Association of Govern-
ment Communicators, Ralph Nader argued
that the Office of Management and Budget
is deliberately using budget reductions to
hobble those Government agencies that
monitor business practices and publish con-
sumer information.
The Administration has, in fact, put an
end to the dissemination of consumer infor-
mation by the Government Printing Office
and imposed a spending moratorium on
films, brochures, and audio-visual aids. The
Federal Trade Commission's funding is be-
ing squeezed, and the Consumer Product
Safety Commission is either to be abolished
or to have its budget reduced to a level of
paralysis.
Agencies which provide the public with
information on. the rights of workers, mi-
norities, and women are under attack. The
Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) and affirmative-action pro-
grams in the Labor Department have had
their budgets cut and their very existence
challenged by the Reagan Administration's
anti-regulation crusade. Reduced spending
by the Food and Drug Administration
means less information for consumers. Pub-
lic access to information on welfare rights,
tenant-and-landlord rights, health-care
rights, and services available to the elderly,
Social Security recipients, women (rape
crisis centers), the unemployed, and youth
(student loans and the CETA program) are
being severely restricted as a result of
budget slashes.
Third, the Administration is resorting to
the politics of intimidation to discourage
the kind of public questioning that results in
informed challenges to official conduct.
aVreestiRltgee MAaRDPRiNtt01904
domestic spying have already begun to cre-
ate a climate of intimidation. CIA Director
William I_ Casey has asked fnr lenislatinn
power to conduct st.rprise searches of news- 1
paper and broadcast newsrooms. The legis- i
lation preventing the unauthorized idea- !
tification of U.S. ;itelligence agents has
been applied in broader terms than origi-
nally conceived by Federal agents in their
attempt to stifle investigations and reports -
they consider dama,Oe to their agencies. ?
,
? . . ?
. ..
. .
?,---" he contradiction between the
- Right's cel.!bration of public opin-
ion as the -mandate" for its pro-
gram, on the one hand-, and the
Reagan Administration's attempts to limit
the public's access to information, 'oh the
other, has great and ominous significance.
The Right is attemating to institutionalize -
its alleged mandate end make it permanent.
Drawing on its conception of past Amen- -
can greatness, it wants to give rriaXimurn ex-
posure to its ideas ot family, religion, sexu-
ality, authority, ecenornic -structuring, and ,
national security, ,.\ hile curbing public ac-
cess to ideas and V a, lies that differ. A mea- .
sure of the extent to which this effort has al- ?
ready succeeded can be seen in the
pro-business, anti- consumer, anti-labor,
anti-environment, anti-feminist message
emanating from many Federal agencies.
The Right denies, of course, that it is try-
ing to limit public access to. information..
Rather, it claims to ae encouraging the pri-
vate sector to act as the basic gatherer and -
disseminator of in fo7mation vital to the for-
mation of public opinion. But the Right also
Understands that access to the private-sector
depends on one's ability to pay. In fact, the
greater role the Federal Government has ?
assumed in the past two decades as a gath-
erer and disseminator of information can
largely be attributed to the extent to which
private channels ?vera closed to the public. .
Now the Right threatens once again to
disenfranchise millions of people because
they lack the information they need and the
resources to acquire it. Public opinion is to
give way once again to elite opinion. Para-
doxically, the concentration of control over - .
.public and private mechanisms of cornmun, '
ication will make it increasingly difficult for
people even to perceive that all this is hap-
pening. .
The ultimate danger posed by the
public's diminished access to in forination is
that in time it will become impossible to
01(104001291}012i-ai_ I to information still ex-
ists. We may wind up celebrating "Freedom
of Information Day' on March 16 and not
-1?
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THE PROGRESSIVE
February 1982
Narrainfg, Names
(ince open societies of the
,..)sort that can put up with
Freedom of Information Acts
and ACLUs are at a disadvan-
tage when it comes to operat-
ing an intelligence agency, Jeff
Stein should name his under-
cover CIA agent only when he
can expose one KGB agent
("Naming Names," December
issue).
Of course, if he believes we
shouldn't maintain any sort of
intelligence service, then any-
thing done to weaken the CIA
would, in his eyes, be
beneficial. But I would argue
that such a position is unrealis-
tic?first, because some sort of
information-gathering system
is essential, and second, be-
cause there isn't any chance of
accomplishing such an objec-
tive.
The goal, it seems to me,
must be to defeat the dan-
gerous people and encourage
the moderates: to rid the
agency of the likes of Casey,
rid the nation of the Adminis-
- t
to the Editor
tration that strives to lessen re-
strictions on the CIA, and
work for a world in which the
need for spying is reduced as
speedily as possible.
The act Stein is tempted to
take could be taken in almost
no other country in the world,
and would merely demon- ,
strate that he is willing to take
unfair advantage of that fact.
Robert H. Yoakum
Lakeville, Connecticut
DoesJeft Stein think the
United States should in-
dulge in espionage? If so, how
does he think a regular, run-
of-the-mill spy's duties should
differ from the duties he pro- -
jects for his "bright, attractive
your'," woman"?
The reasons se l out in his
article surely explain why "the
Government [must makerit il-
legal to revea) this woman's
name," along with the names
of other dedicated, hard- -
working Americans in the es-
pionage service of their coun-
try.
Ben Owen
? Columbus, Mississippi
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